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%T Performance pay, sorting and social motivation %A Eriksson, Tor %A Villeval, Marie Claire %J Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization %N 2 %P 412-421 %V 68 %D 2008 %= 2011-10-11T08:36:00Z %~ http://www.peerproject.eu/ %> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-268278 %X "Variable pay links pay and performance but may also help firms to attract more productive employees. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance-pay on both incentives and sorting and analyzes the influence of repeated interactions between firms and employees on these effects. We show that (i) the opportunity to switch from a fixed wage to variable pay scheme increases the average effort level and its variance, and (ii) high skill employees concentrate under the variable pay scheme; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages reduce the attraction of performance-pay. Social motivation and reputation influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect." [author's abstract] %G en %9 journal article %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info