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@article{ Meffert2010,
 title = {Strategic coalition voting: evidence from Austria},
 author = {Meffert, Michael F. and Gschwend, Thomas},
 journal = {Electoral Studies},
 number = {3},
 pages = {339-349},
 volume = {29},
 year = {2010},
 doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.005},
 urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-257796},
 abstract = {"Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the
probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three
decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of
a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as
uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred
small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit
strategic coalition voting to influence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coalition
government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before
the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses." (author's abstract)},
 keywords = {voting behavior; Austria; preference; Österreich; decision; Wahlverhalten; Wahlergebnis; influence; Koalitionspolitik; Koalitionsbildung; Strategie; Wahl; formation of a government; Regierungspartei; Entscheidung; election; coalition policy; Regierungsbildung; party supporter; party in power; Präferenz; Einfluss; strategy; election result; coalition; coalition formation; Parteianhänger; Koalition}}