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@article{ Granier2009,
 title = {Mergers and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets},
 author = {Granier, Laurent and Trinquard, Sébastien},
 journal = {Applied Economics},
 number = {3},
 pages = {297-309},
 volume = {42},
 year = {2009},
 issn = {1466-4283},
 doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840701604495},
 urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-242012},
 abstract = {After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms' entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name firms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name firm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical differentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic firm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount.},
}