A result similar to the Odlyzko's "Paris Metro Pricing"

Marin de Montmarin, Maxime de

[journal article]

dc.contributor.author	Marin de Montmarin, Maxime de	de
dc.date.accessioned	2011-04-01T02:55:00Z	de
dc.date.accessioned	2012-08-29T23:07:53Z
dc.date.available	2012-08-29T23:07:53Z
dc.date.issued	2006	de
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/23896
dc.description.abstract	We investigate the two-stage competition in which two Internet Service Providers chosse sequentially their capacities and then their prices while facing a flow of new customers who decide to belong to one ISP or the other on the basis of a comparison of access prices and of expected congestion rates. At the equilibrium of the game a vertical diﬀerentiation between the Internet Service Providers endogenously emerges: the firm which provides the larger network has the lowest rate of congestion and the highest access price. The I.S.P providing the smallest network (thus the most congested) earns the larger profit. It will be noticed that the spontaneous functioning of oligopolistic competition produces a result similar to the Odlyzko's "Paris Metro Pricing": at the equilibrium the two competitors propose diﬀerent prices and rates of congestion, the most expensive one being also the least congested.	en
dc.language	en	de
dc.subject.ddc	Wirtschaft	de
dc.subject.ddc	Economics	en
dc.subject.other	Congestion; Internet Service Providers
dc.title	A result similar to the Odlyzko's "Paris Metro Pricing"	en
dc.description.review	begutachtet (peer reviewed)	de
dc.description.review	peer reviewed	en
dc.source.journal	Applied Economics	de
dc.source.volume	38	de
dc.publisher.country	USA
dc.source.issue	15	de
dc.subject.classoz	Economic Sectors	en
dc.subject.classoz	Wirtschaftssektoren	de
dc.subject.classoz	Betriebswirtschaftslehre	de
dc.subject.classoz	Business Administration	en
dc.identifier.urn	urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-238967	de
dc.date.modified	2011-10-17T13:36:00Z	de
dc.rights.licence	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)	de
dc.rights.licence	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)	en
ssoar.gesis.collection	SOLIS;ADIS	de
ssoar.contributor.institution	http://www.peerproject.eu/	de
internal.status	3	de
dc.type.stock	article	de
dc.type.document	journal article	en
dc.type.document	Zeitschriftenartikel	de
dc.rights.copyright	f	de
dc.source.pageinfo	1821-1824
internal.identifier.classoz	1090304
internal.identifier.classoz	1090400
internal.identifier.journal	21	de
internal.identifier.document	32
internal.identifier.ddc	330
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840500426967	de
dc.description.pubstatus	Postprint	en
dc.description.pubstatus	Postprint	de
internal.identifier.licence	7
internal.identifier.pubstatus	2
internal.identifier.review	1
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer	CERTAIN
internal.check.languageharmonizer	CERTAIN_RETAINED

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Betriebswirtschaftslehre (allgemein)
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Wirtschaftssektoren
Economic Sectors

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