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[journal article]

dc.contributor.authorDhami, Sanjitde
dc.contributor.authoral-Nowaihi, Alide
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-04T03:00:00Zde
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-29T23:07:38Z
dc.date.available2012-08-29T23:07:38Z
dc.date.issued2007de
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/19955
dc.description.abstractUsing actual probabilities of audit and penalty rates, the return on evasion is 91–98%. So why do not most of us evade? Existing analysis, based on expected utility theory (EUT) is unable to explain this. Furthermore, and contrary to intuition and the bulk of evidence, EUT predicts that evasion should be decreasing in the tax rate (Yitzhaki puzzle). We apply Tversky and Kahneman’s [Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1992. Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297–323] cumulative prospect theory to tax evasion. We show that prospect theory provides a much more satisfactory account of tax evasion including an explanation of the Yitzhaki puzzle. This also provides independent confirmation of prospect theory.en
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcWirtschaftde
dc.subject.ddcEconomicsen
dc.subject.otherReference dependence; Loss aversion; Decision weights; Prospect theory; Expected utility theory; Tax evasion; Optimal taxation
dc.titleWhy do people pay taxes? Prospect theory versus expected utility theoryen
dc.description.reviewbegutachtet (peer reviewed)de
dc.description.reviewpeer revieweden
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organizationde
dc.source.volume64de
dc.publisher.countryNLD
dc.source.issue1de
dc.subject.classozÖffentliche Finanzen und Finanzwissenschaftde
dc.subject.classozPublic Financeen
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-199556de
dc.date.modified2010-11-04T09:37:00Zde
dc.rights.licencePEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)de
dc.rights.licencePEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)en
ssoar.gesis.collectionSOLIS;ADISde
ssoar.contributor.institutionhttp://www.peerproject.eu/de
internal.status3de
dc.type.stockarticlede
dc.type.documentjournal articleen
dc.type.documentZeitschriftenartikelde
dc.rights.copyrightfde
dc.source.pageinfo171-192
internal.identifier.classoz1090303
internal.identifier.journal196de
internal.identifier.document32
internal.identifier.ddc330
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.08.006de
dc.description.pubstatusPostprinten
dc.description.pubstatusPostprintde
internal.identifier.licence7
internal.identifier.pubstatus2
internal.identifier.review1
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizerCERTAIN
internal.check.languageharmonizerCERTAIN_RETAINED


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