Referendums about Presidential Mandates: Deviations or Correctives?

Abstract

A particularly sensitive issue in Latin America concerns changes to presidential mandates, be it because presidents want to remain in power even if the rules do not allow them, or because they face early termination of their mandates. Mechanisms of Direct Democracy have spread across the region and have become an important focus of political contestation. This chapter reviews both the resulting attempts to activate referendums affecting presidential term limits and those aimed at blocking such changes. Under what conditions do they succeed, and with which consequences? Do the outcomes vary according to who triggers the popular consultation process? And above all, do these direct appeals to the electorate work as a corrective to dysfunctional politics or as a deviation from sound procedures? The score of cases analysed includes Argentina 1993; Bolivia 2008 and 2016; Colombia 2009; Ecuador 1994, 1997, 2014 and 2018; Honduras 2009; Panama 1998; Peru 1993 and 1998; Venezuela 2004, 2007, 2009, 2016 and 2022; and Mexico 2022. Special attention is given to recall referendums, potentially the most powerful instrument to promote presidential accountability. Our evidence, based mainly on the Mexican case, shows that the positive potential of presidential recall can be overshadowed by its major associated perils.