dc.date.accessioned | 2025-06-05T10:11:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2025-06-05T10:11:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2025 | de |
dc.identifier.issn | 2381-3652 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/102831 | |
dc.description.abstract | In the early hours of June 1, 2025, a fleet of small, unassuming drones took flight across Russia, their buzzing propellers barely audible against the vast expanse of the country's heartland. These were not the sleek, high-tech machines of a superpower's air force, but rather a swarm of low-cost, improvised quadcopters, each guided by a nearly 20-year-old piece of open-source software called ArduPilot. Orchestrated by Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) in an operation dubbed "Spiderweb," these drones struck with surgical precision, targeting Russian military airbases in Belaya, Olenya, Dyagilevo, and Ivanovo - locations scattered across thousands of miles, some as far as Siberia. The result was staggering: an estimated 34% of Russia's strategic bomber fleet, including Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 aircraft, was damaged or destroyed, with losses valued at $7 billion. This audacious assault, planned over 18 months, was not just a tactical triumph for Ukraine but a seismic shift in the nature of warfare, propelled by a technology born in the basements of hobbyists and now reshaping battlefields. | de |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Politikwissenschaft | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Political science | en |
dc.subject.other | Modern Warfare; Drones; Open Source Software | de |
dc.title | ArduPilot: How an Open-Source Software Is Redefining Modern Warfare | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet (peer reviewed) | de |
dc.description.review | peer reviewed | en |
dc.source.journal | IndraStra Global | |
dc.source.volume | 11 | de |
dc.publisher.country | USA | de |
dc.source.issue | 6 | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Sicherheitspolitik | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Peace and Conflict Research, International Conflicts, Security Policy | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Kriegsführung | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | warfare | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | neue Technologie | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | new technology | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Waffe | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | weapon | en |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-102831-8 | |
dc.rights.licence | Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht kommerz., Keine Bearbeitung 4.0 | de |
dc.rights.licence | Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 | en |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10050019 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10053171 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10039581 | |
dc.type.stock | article | de |
dc.type.document | Zeitschriftenartikel | de |
dc.type.document | journal article | en |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10507 | |
internal.identifier.journal | 858 | |
internal.identifier.document | 32 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 320 | |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 20 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 1 | |
dc.subject.classhort | 20800 | de |
internal.pdf.valid | false | |
internal.pdf.wellformed | true | |
internal.pdf.encrypted | false | |