Зангезурский и Южно-Аразский транспортные проекты: проблемы реализации в контексте отношений Армении, Ирана и Азербайджана

Abstract

From the second half of 2022, there have been noticeable changes in the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Russia's influence on the negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan has weakened. Western actors (the United States, NATO, the EU, France) managed to oust it in regional politics, strengthen their positions on mediation and arbitration. In a certain way, this affected the foreign policy of Yerevan, which reduced its interaction with the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation and noticeably became closer to the structures of the West. The prospect of maintaining the Russian military presence in Armenia has become less obvious. Due to the destructive policy of the Armenian leadership, the legal framework for unblocking the Zangezur transport corridor and ensuring its functioning under Russian neutral control has been destroyed. Consequently, Russia has lost the motive for further participation in the work of the trilateral Working Group jointly between Baku and Yerevan. Perhaps it should stop supporting the Zangezur project with the participation of Armenia and focus on the implementation of a joint project between Tehran and Baku to create the infrastructure of the South Araz Corridor through Iran. Despite the existing obstacles and numerous negative forecasts, the latter has a good prospect, since it is based on the long-term experience of interested cooperation between Iran and Azerbaijan. The implementation of the South Araz project promises benefits to all countries in the region. First, the scale of transport and logistics activities related to communication along the East - West corridor will significantly increase. It will be possible to optimize cargo transportation on the Baku - Tbilisi - Kars route. The economic development of territories along the line from Goradiz to Ordubad district of Nakhichevan, as well as the eastern regions of Turkey, will accelerate. The emerging strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran, and the latter with Azerbaijan, will be strengthened, primarily in solving the task of strengthening the capacity of the North–South transport corridor. Therefore, if successful, we have the right to expect a rapprochement of the positions of Russia, Iran and Turkey, and an intensification of their joint efforts to resolve a wide range of problems in the South Caucasus based on the Turkish 3+3 initiative. It can be assumed that the construction of the South Arab corridor will contribute to the depoliticization of relations between Yerevan and Baku, accelerate their resolution of issues related to the delimitation and demarcation of the common border, and bring them closer to concluding a peace treaty.