Instytucjonalne i behawioralne uwarunkowania regulacji z perspektywy organów regulacyjnych

Abstract

The article concerns the institutional and behavioral conditions of the regulation from the perspective of regulatory authorities in Poland. Assuming that regulation is a formal institution defining the rules of the market game, it has been shown that the resulting bureaucracy and specific formal models of cooperation are of moderate importance as barriers to the relationship between regulators and enterprises. In the case of informal institutions, there is a greater lack of trust between the regulator and enterprises and a lesser degree of unfairness of actions. In most cases, much of the institutional conditions are independent of the market that is regulated. Research has also shown that officials are more likely to succumb to the certainty effect, the loss aversion effect and the reflection effect consistent with prospect theory and the asymmetrical dominance effect and less often to the status quo effect and overconfidence effect. Their scope is, to a limited extent, independent of the regulatory authority.