Bibtex export
@book{ Valasek2016,
title = {Dynamic reform of public institutions: a model of motivated agents and collective reputation},
author = {Valasek, Justin},
year = {2016},
series = {Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels},
pages = {40},
volume = {SP II 2015-303r},
address = {Berlin},
publisher = {Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH},
urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46218-v2-2},
abstract = {State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals
with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective
reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both
high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector
exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution requires a non-monotonic wage
path: since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a highreputation
institution, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to
a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated
workers in, followed by a wage decrease to crowd non-motivated workers out.},
keywords = {Motivation; Effizienz; public service; efficiency; öffentliche Dienstleistung; Leistungsanreiz; wage; öffentlicher Sektor; public sector; Reputation; motivation; wage increase; Korruption; reputation; corruption; incentive; Lohn; Lohnerhöhung}}