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Reforming an institutional culture of corruption: a model of motivated agents and collective reputation

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Dies ist nicht die aktuellste Version von diesem Dokument. Die aktuellste Version finden Sie unter: http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46218.2

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Valasek, Justin

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Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110976

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Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Recent empirical studies suggest that poor public sector performance in developing nations is due in part to the difficultly of selecting workers whose motivation is aligned with the mission of the institution - in direct contrast to evidence from developed nations, public sector workers tend to be less prosocial. Moreover, contrary to the public sector efficiency-wage argument, empirical evidence from developing countries suggests that motivation is weakly increasing in wages. This paper provides an account for this discrepancy between developed and developing nations by analyzing a model where motivated workers value the collective reputation of their institution, e.g. due to a prosocial signaling motive or identity concerns. The initial insight of the analysis is that there exists both a highreputation, low-wage equilibrium and a low-reputation, high-wage equilibrium. Importantly, the comparative statics of motivation and wage differ between the equilibria: starting from low-reputation, higher wages crowd in motivation, while starting from high-reputation, higher wages crowd out motivation. The paper also details the implications of this model for successful reform: taking reputation as the state variable, we show that a non-monotonic wage path is required to achieve a transition to the high-reputation equilibrium - an initial wage increase to crowd in motivated workers, followed by a wage decrease to crowd out nonmotivated workers. (autrhor's abstract)
Thesaurusschlagwörter developing country; motivation; employee; wage; corruption; institution; civil service; reform; wage increase; industrial nation; comparison
Klassifikation Einkommenspolitik, Lohnpolitik, Tarifpolitik, Vermögenspolitik; angewandte Psychologie
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2015
Erscheinungsort Berlin
Seitenangabe 33 S.
Schriftenreihe Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, SP II 2015-303
Status Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung
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