More documents from Geys, Benny; Mause, Karsten

Export to your Reference Manger

Please Copy & Paste



Bookmark and Share

Delegation, accountability & legislator moonlighting: agency problems in Germany

[working paper]

Geys, Benny; Mause, Karsten

fulltextDownloadDownload full text

(external source)

Citation Suggestion

Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:

Further Details
Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Members of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such moonlighting activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting. (author's abstract)
Keywords representative; additional job; voting behavior; Federal Republic of Germany; moonlighting; behavior
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture; Labor Market Policy; Social Psychology
Free Keywords Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Document language English
Publication Year 2012
City Berlin
Page/Pages 17 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism, SP II 2012-105
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications