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Delegation, accountability & legislator moonlighting: agency problems in Germany
[Arbeitspapier]
Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Members of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such moonlighting activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are di... mehr
Members of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such moonlighting activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting. (author's abstract)... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Abgeordneter; Nebenbeschäftigung; Wahlverhalten; Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Schwarzarbeit; Verhalten
Klassifikation
Sozialpsychologie
politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur
Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Freie Schlagwörter
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2012
Erscheinungsort
Berlin
Seitenangabe
17 S.
Schriftenreihe
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism, SP II 2012-105
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58349
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz
Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung