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%T Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: an experiment %A Benndorf, Volker %A Kübler, Dorothea %A Normann, Hans-Theo %P 33 %V SP II 2013-208 %D 2013 %~ WZB %X We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers' health leads to even less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium, and to a lesser extent inequality aversion. (author's abstract) %C DEU %C Berlin %G en %9 Arbeitspapier %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info