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Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: an experiment
[working paper]
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unr... view more
We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers' health leads to even less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium, and to a lesser extent inequality aversion. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
labor market; productivity; employee; privacy; behavior; information
Classification
Labor Market Research
Social Psychology
Document language
English
Publication Year
2013
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
33 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2013-208
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85322
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications