Bibtex export
@book{ Benndorf2013, title = {Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: an experiment}, author = {Benndorf, Volker and Kübler, Dorothea and Normann, Hans-Theo}, year = {2013}, series = {Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten}, pages = {33}, volume = {SP II 2013-208}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH}, abstract = {We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers' health leads to even less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium, and to a lesser extent inequality aversion. (author's abstract)}, keywords = {Arbeitsmarkt; labor market; Produktivität; productivity; Arbeitnehmer; employee; Privatsphäre; privacy; Verhalten; behavior; Information; information}}