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Internal decision-making rules and collusion


Rasch, Alexander; Wambach, Achim


Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-313424

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Abstract We study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company. The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its local units. It is shown that when transportation costs are high, collusion is more stable under delegation. Furthermore, collusion with maximum prices is more profitable if price setting is delegated to the local units. Profitability is reversed for low discount factors.
Thesaurusschlagwörter delegation of tasks
Klassifikation Betriebswirtschaftslehre
Freie Schlagwörter D43; L13; L41; Collusion; Holding company; Merger; Nash bargaining solution
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2009
Seitenangabe 703–715 S.
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72 (2009) 2
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.008
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)