Internal decision-making rules and collusion

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[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Rasch, Alexander; Wambach, Achim

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Abstract	We study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company. The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its local units. It is shown that when transportation costs are high, collusion is more stable under delegation. Furthermore, collusion with maximum prices is more profitable if price setting is delegated to the local units. Profitability is reversed for low discount factors.
Thesaurusschlagwörter	delegation of tasks
Klassifikation	Betriebswirtschaftslehre
Freie Schlagwörter	D43; L13; L41; Collusion; Holding company; Merger; Nash bargaining solution
Sprache Dokument	Englisch
Publikationsjahr	2009
Seitenangabe	703–715 S.
Zeitschriftentitel	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72 (2009) 2
DOI	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.008
Status	Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)