Bibtex export

 

@article{ Heijden2008,
 title = {Hierarchy, opportunism in teams},
 author = {Heijden, Eline van der and Potters, Jan and Sefton, Martin},
 journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
 number = {1},
 pages = {39-50},
 volume = {69},
 year = {2008},
 doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.007},
 urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-281136},
 abstract = {We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.},
 keywords = {Experiment; experiment}}