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Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Micola, Augusto Rupérez; Banal-Estañol, Albert; Bunn, Derek W.

Zitationshinweis

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Abstract We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market. We show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals’ costs model. In our case, higher prices relate to the nature of energy markets, which facilitate the emergence of financial netback effects.
Klassifikation Wirtschaftssektoren; Management
Freie Schlagwörter Agent-based modelling; Energy markets; Reward interdependence; C63; L22; L97
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2008
Seitenangabe S. 381-393
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67 (2008) 2
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.12.007
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
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