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Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets

[journal article]

Micola, Augusto Rupérez; Banal-Estañol, Albert; Bunn, Derek W.

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-254631

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Abstract We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market. We show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals’ costs model. In our case, higher prices relate to the nature of energy markets, which facilitate the emergence of financial netback effects.
Classification Economic Sectors; Management Science
Free Keywords Agent-based modelling; Energy markets; Reward interdependence; C63; L22; L97
Document language English
Publication Year 2008
Page/Pages p. 381-393
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67 (2008) 2
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.12.007
Status Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)