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Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market. We show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals’ cost... mehr
We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market. We show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals’ costs model. In our case, higher prices relate to the nature of energy markets, which facilitate the emergence of financial netback effects.... weniger
Klassifikation
Management
Wirtschaftssektoren
Freie Schlagwörter
Agent-based modelling; Energy markets; Reward interdependence; C63; L22; L97
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2008
Seitenangabe
S. 381-393
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67 (2008) 2
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.12.007
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)