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Money, fame and the allocation of talent: brain drain and the institution of science

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-248102

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Abstract The earning structure in science is flatter than in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the latter. This paper studies the allocation of talent between both sectors when agents value money and fame. Assuming that the intrinsic performance is a less noisy signal of talent in science than in the private sector, we show that a good institution of science mitigates the brain drain and that introducing extra monetary incentives through the market might induce excessive diversion from pure to applied research. We finally show the optimality of a relatively flat earning structure in science.
Thesaurusschlagwörter brain drain
Klassifikation Wissenschaftssoziologie, Wissenschaftsforschung, Technikforschung, Techniksoziologie; spezielle Ressortpolitik
Freie Schlagwörter Fame; Science; Incentives; Asymmetric information
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2008
Seitenangabe S. 558-581
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66 (2008) 3-4
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.012
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
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