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Money, fame and the allocation of talent: brain drain and the institution of science

[journal article]

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-248102

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Abstract The earning structure in science is flatter than in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the latter. This paper studies the allocation of talent between both sectors when agents value money and fame. Assuming that the intrinsic performance is a less noisy signal of talent in science than in the private sector, we show that a good institution of science mitigates the brain drain and that introducing extra monetary incentives through the market might induce excessive diversion from pure to applied research. We finally show the optimality of a relatively flat earning structure in science.
Keywords brain drain
Classification Sociology of Science, Sociology of Technology, Research on Science and Technology; Special areas of Departmental Policy
Free Keywords Fame; Science; Incentives; Asymmetric information
Document language English
Publication Year 2008
Page/Pages p. 558-581
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66 (2008) 3-4
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.012
Status Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)