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Money, fame and the allocation of talent: brain drain and the institution of science
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract The earning structure in science is flatter than in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the latter. This paper studies the allocation of talent between both sectors when agents value money and fame. Assuming that the intrinsic performance is a less noisy signal of talent in sc... mehr
The earning structure in science is flatter than in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the latter. This paper studies the allocation of talent between both sectors when agents value money and fame. Assuming that the intrinsic performance is a less noisy signal of talent in science than in the private sector, we show that a good institution of science mitigates the brain drain and that introducing extra monetary incentives through the market might induce excessive diversion from pure to applied research. We finally show the optimality of a relatively flat earning structure in science.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Brain Drain
Klassifikation
spezielle Ressortpolitik
Wissenschaftssoziologie, Wissenschaftsforschung, Technikforschung, Techniksoziologie
Freie Schlagwörter
Fame; Science; Incentives; Asymmetric information
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2008
Seitenangabe
S. 558-581
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66 (2008) 3-4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.012
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)