Tax policy and yardstick voting  
in Flemish municipal elections

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[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Vermeir, Jan; Heyndels, Bruno

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Abstract	Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. We analyse municipal elections in Flanders during the period 1982-2000 and find empirical evidence for yardstick voting. Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Importantly, the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents.
Sprache Dokument	Englisch
Publikationsjahr	2006
Seitenangabe	S. 2285-2298
Zeitschriftentitel	Applied Economics, 38 (2006) 19
DOI	http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840500427536
Status	Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)