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Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Vermeir, Jan; Heyndels, Bruno

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-239238

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Abstract Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. We analyse municipal elections in Flanders during the period 1982-2000 and find empirical evidence for yardstick voting. Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Importantly, the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents.
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2006
Seitenangabe S. 2285-2298
Zeitschriftentitel Applied Economics, 38 (2006) 19
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840500427536
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
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