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Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. We analyse municipal elections in... mehr
Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. We analyse municipal elections in Flanders during the period 1982-2000 and find empirical evidence for yardstick voting. Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Importantly, the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents.... weniger
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2006
Seitenangabe
S. 2285-2298
Zeitschriftentitel
Applied Economics, 38 (2006) 19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840500427536
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)