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College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
[journal article]
Abstract
We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decen... view more
We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.... view less
Classification
Basic Research, General Concepts and History of Economics
Free Keywords
all-pay auctions; college admissions; contests; experiment; incomplete information; student welfare
Document language
English
Publication Year
2018
Page/Pages
p. 886-934
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory (2018) 176
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/209667
ISSN
0022-0531
Status
Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence
Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0