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Ferdinand Alquié contra o monismo de Espinosa
Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza's monism
[journal article]
Abstract This paper aims to present Ferdinand Alquié's rejection of Spinoza's monism. Unlike Descartes, who sustains dualism, the monist thesis determines that there can be only one substance constituted by infinite attributes. This thesis is fundamental for the consolidation of the entire philosophical syst... view more
This paper aims to present Ferdinand Alquié's rejection of Spinoza's monism. Unlike Descartes, who sustains dualism, the monist thesis determines that there can be only one substance constituted by infinite attributes. This thesis is fundamental for the consolidation of the entire philosophical system of Spinoza. Alquié concludes that the monist thesis is incompatible with the argumentative structure of the first book of the Ethics. Alquié's approach is important because it exposes the problem very clearly, which justifies the presentation of his thinking, that can be useful to those who are interested in the studies of Spinoza's philosophy.... view less
Keywords
Spinoza, B.
Classification
Philosophy, Ethics, Religion
Free Keywords
Alquié, Ferdinand; Monism; Substance; Attribute
Document language
Portuguese
Publication Year
2018
Page/Pages
p. 72-85
Journal
Griot: Revista de Filosofia, 18 (2018) 2
ISSN
2178-1036
Status
Published Version; peer reviewed