Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others

Guillen, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan

[working paper]

dc.contributor.author	Guillen, Pablo	de
dc.contributor.author	Hakimov, Rustamdjan	de
dc.date.accessioned	2016-02-15T11:48:08Z
dc.date.available	2016-02-15T11:48:08Z
dc.date.issued	2014	de
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46119
dc.description.abstract	We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. (author's abstract)	en
dc.language	en	de
dc.subject.ddc	Psychologie	de
dc.subject.ddc	Psychology	en
dc.subject.ddc	Publizistische Medien, Journalismus,Verlagswesen	de
dc.subject.ddc	News media, journalism, publishing	en
dc.subject.other	Top-Trading-Zyklen	de
dc.title	Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others	de
dc.description.review	begutachtet	de
dc.description.review	reviewed	en
dc.source.volume	SP II 2014-202	de
dc.publisher.country	DEU
dc.publisher.city	Berlin	de
dc.source.series	Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten
dc.subject.classoz	Sozialpsychologie	de
dc.subject.classoz	Social Psychology	en
dc.subject.classoz	Informationsmanagement, informationelle Prozesse, Informationsökonomie	de
dc.subject.classoz	Information Management, Information Processes, Information Economics	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Schulwahl	de
dc.subject.thesoz	school choice	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Strategie	de
dc.subject.thesoz	strategy	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Sicherheit	de
dc.subject.thesoz	security	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Information	de
dc.subject.thesoz	information	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Quantität	de
dc.subject.thesoz	quantity	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Auswirkung	de
dc.subject.thesoz	impact	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Markt	de
dc.subject.thesoz	market	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Gestaltung	de
dc.subject.thesoz	layout	en
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung	de
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications	en
ssoar.contributor.institution	WZB	de
internal.status	formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen	de
internal.identifier.thesoz	10057496
internal.identifier.thesoz	10034457
internal.identifier.thesoz	10036566
internal.identifier.thesoz	10036968
internal.identifier.thesoz	10044683
internal.identifier.thesoz	10037482
internal.identifier.thesoz	10034440
internal.identifier.thesoz	10036238
dc.type.stock	monograph	de
dc.type.document	Arbeitspapier	de
dc.type.document	working paper	en
dc.source.pageinfo	24	de
internal.identifier.classoz	10706
internal.identifier.classoz	1080502
internal.identifier.document	3
dc.contributor.corporateeditor	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
internal.identifier.corporateeditor	381
internal.identifier.ddc	150
internal.identifier.ddc	070
dc.description.pubstatus	Veröffentlichungsversion	de
dc.description.pubstatus	Published Version	en
internal.identifier.licence	3
internal.identifier.pubstatus	1
internal.identifier.review	2
internal.identifier.series	961
dc.subject.classhort	10800	de
dc.subject.classhort	10700	de
dc.identifier.handle	https://hdl.handle.net/10419/95868
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer	CERTAIN

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Sozialpsychologie
Social Psychology
Informationsmanagement, informationelle Prozesse, Informationsökonomie
Information Management, Information Processes, Information Economics

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