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%T Career concerns incentives: an experimental test
%A Koch, Alexander K.
%A Morgenstern, Albrecht
%A Raab, Philippe
%J Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
%N 1
%P 571–588
%V 72
%D 2009
%K C91; D83; L14; Incentives; Career concerns; Signal jamming; Experiments
%= 2012-05-10T16:21:00Z
%~ http://www.peerproject.eu/
%> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-293040
%X Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side.
%C NLD
%G en
%9 journal article
%W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org
%~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info