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%T On the optimality of the full cost pricing %A Thépot, Jacques %A Netzer, Jean-Luc %J Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization %N 1 %P 282-292 %V 68 %D 2008 %K Full-cost pricing; Imperfect competition; Strategic effects %= 2011-09-05T09:37:00Z %~ http://www.peerproject.eu/ %> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264064 %X This article is aimed at defining the full-cost pricing as a leader-follower game in two-tier organizations: (i) the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost; (ii) the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost. In the Cournot oligopoly case, the full-cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules. There exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost, for which the full-cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules, in terms of gross profit. %C NLD %G en %9 journal article %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info