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SOVIET RELATIONS OF DOMINATION: LEGITIMATE OR ILLEGITIMATE?

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Abstract

Questions of domination and power, legitimacy and legitimation have driven 20th century research on dictatorship and democracy, on totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, on fascism and communism and even on capitalism versus socialism. Reference to Max Weber’s ideal-types of legitimate domination was universal, but the prior logical distinction between legitimate and illegitimate domination remained unexamined. Hence Soviet relations of domination were appraised as ‘total’, ‘goal-rational’, ‘new traditionalist’ and ‘eudaemonic’ but never was the legitimacy of relations of command and obedience examined closely, not even in the light of the scope, duration and intensity of Stalinist terror. We propose such a re-examination here and conclude that as a consequence of the terror Soviet (imperial) relations of domination were illegitimate. We buttress this hypothesis through a historical comparison between the Soviet, National Socialist and Chinese communist case; by contrasting it with the most theoretically informed contemporary appraisal of the Soviet path after Stalin’s death; and by defending the excess content of the new hypothesis vis-à-vis such notions as ‘total domination’, ‘goal-rational legitimation’, ‘new traditionalist legitimacy’ and ‘eudaemonic legitimacy’. Our discussion challenges sociology to develop a general theory of domination as a social relation – as begun by Max Weber but never completed.

Keywords

Domination, power, legitimacy, legitimation, Soviet empire, terror, totalitarianism, goal-rational legitimation, eudaemonic legitimacy, legal-rational domination
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SOVIET RELATIONS OF DOMINATION AND LEGITIMACY: CLARIFICATION AND DEFENCE OF THE ARGUMENT

I should like to thank Timur Atnachev and Camil Parvu for an in-depth discussion of the theoretical issues and the argument presented in the paper. The Legal, Political and Social Theory Group at the European University Institute also entertained and criticised the argument.

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Researchers have suggested that the Soviet order at times suffered from a legitimacy deficit\(^1\) and that central European clients were strained to legitimate their rule\(^2\). Some analysts classified the Soviet order as a case of ‘total domination’ or ‘totalitarianism’\(^3\). Other researchers have written of ‘goal-rational legitimation’\(^4\) or ‘eudaemonic legitimacy’\(^5\) or ‘new traditionalist legitimacy’\(^6\). Yet none of these observations was articulated within a theory of domination, although discussion of legitimacy, legitimation and domination include reference to Max Weber\(^7\). Researchers have been seeking to qualify the overall political or economic order as legitimate or not legitimate but, curiously, given Weber’s definition of domination as a relation of command and obedience, paid little attention to the social relations of domination. To assume that the idealtypes of rational-legal, charismatic and traditional domination pertain to the political or economic order is analytically in error. A political or economic order may or may not be supported, respected or complied with. Moreover, even if people could be and were mobilised in the name of socialist goals and values, this implies neither the legitimacy of the relations of domination, nor assent to the Soviet order; neither overall, nor in the organisations of which people were members. Associations can mobilise for action and will seek to legitimate this action, to themselves and others. Conceptually, the legitimacy of social relations and the legitimation of action have to be kept distinct. It is relevant to research whether communist states or socialist economic systems enjoyed assent and support. But, my argument goes, research on the Soviet case would benefit if the political and the economic perspective were informed by an analysis of the social relations of domination.

Questions of legitimacy, legitimation and domination have driven 20\(^{th}\) century area research on Europe and Asia in the vast literature on dictatorship and democracy, on totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, on fascism and communism and even on capitalism versus socialism. Did not the debate over whether National Socialism or Soviet communism was totalitarian or pluralist or fragmented revolve around specifying the particulars of the relations of domination involved\(^7\)\(^8\) Did not the controversy on Hitler’s ‘willing executioners’ centre on a difference in judgement as to how actively people carried out commands and thus how strongly they believed in the legitimacy of the commander?\(^9\)

If we were to elaborate a theory of domination by developing the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate domination, how would we analyse Soviet relations of domination? I distinguish analytically between, firstly, the political and economic order, secondly, relations of domination, and, thirdly, mobilisation into action. By not maintaining these analytical distinctions, theorists and area researchers have made it difficult for themselves to satisfactorily specify their concepts. Notions such as total domination, goal-rational legitimation, eudaemonic legitimacy or new traditionalist legitimacy all contain important insights, but need integration into a theoretical framework to bear fruit. A shift in focus to relations of domination also implies a reassessment of conceptions of Soviet social organisation such as totalitarian
or mono-organisational and as pluralist or fragmented\textsuperscript{10}. My argument would be that while the original intention of the Bolsheviks may have been to lay the groundwork for a communist society, the re-conquest of most lands of the extinct Tsarist empire led to the re-establishment of centralised rule over a huge space and many peoples\textsuperscript{11}. In the course of their efforts to ‘build socialism’, the transcendent communist vision was thus transformed into an immanent ideology of an emerging Soviet empire. Characteristic is that the Bolsheviks already by the mid-1920s presumed and demanded obedience of their agents near and far, be it in Baku, Alma Ata, Berlin or Paris. Party leaderships not obedient were replaced with comrades more willing not only to have their leadership appointed and sanctioned by Moscow centre, but also their policy determined. Thus imperial networks\textsuperscript{12} emerged, even if the majority of party members had neither advocated nor consented to this. These hierarchical and star-shaped networks, with the communist and socialist unity parties as the trans-national centre, organised political collaboration as well as an extension of Soviet economy and culture.

My aim is to elaborate research programme on the Soviet relations of domination that is worthy of further research. It may be presumed that the following account will meet with a negative reaction from many area researchers who have invested in notions of legitimacy, legitimation and domination that are incompatible with what is proposed here. Yet, it is the social and political theorists that have failed to develop the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate domination and to complete the theory.

Within this article I propose, firstly, to reiterate and further elaborate a theory of domination with particular attention to indicators of legitimacy or illegitimacy. Secondly, I suggest that the illegitimacy of the Soviet imperial relations of domination stems from the scope, duration and intensity of terror. In a comparative sketch I seek, thirdly, to qualify Soviet illegitimacy by examining in how far National Socialism was a form of legitimate charismatic domination until 1942 and in what ways relations of domination in China were re-invested with legitimacy in the 1980s. While my argument benefits from hindsight, Barrington Moore, in 1954\textsuperscript{13}, just as terror had subsided, did articulate an interpretation of Soviet prospects that comes close to mine. Fourthly, I therefore argue that what he was missing was a sociological theory of domination and I proceed to outline the differences between his earlier approach and my present corrections. In conclusion I affirm the theoretical excess content of a sociological theory of domination and the hypothesis of Soviet illegitimacy against rival notions such as ‘total domination’, ‘goal-rational legitimation’, ‘eudaemonic legitimacy’ or ‘new traditionalist legitimacy’. All this effort is directed at making a ‘Weberian’ re-orientation of research plausible.
Towards a sociological theory of relations of domination

Max Weber, before his untimely death in 1920, was on the way to formulating a general theory of domination as ordered power relations by which an association is constituted. Despite Weber’s efforts at defining domination and distilling idealtypes of legitimate domination, theorists have to date not provided us with a theory of domination. Unfortunately, notable theorists licensed the misuse of the idealtypes and fostered the misunderstanding that the distinction between rulers, staff and ruled pertained to a political and economic order as a whole\textsuperscript{14}, i.e. the order of an imperial state or a nation state. Weber, however, had meant that certain larger and more developed associations of domination, what he calls ‘den Herrschaftsverband’, may institutionalise themselves administratively via the creation of a specialised staff. There is more at stake here than a quibble over the right interpretation of Weber’s text, for it seems to me that the lack of a theory of domination made it not altogether surprising that 1989 was not anticipated by scholars as a possible scenario\textsuperscript{15}.

Let me quote M. Weber’s definition of domination in the German original\textsuperscript{16}:

“Herrschaft soll heissen die Chance, fuer einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebaren Personen Gehorsam zu finden; Disziplin soll heissen die Chance, kraft eingueebter Einstellung fuer einen Befehl prompten, automatischen und schematischen Gehorsam bei einer angebaren Vielheit von Menschen zu finden.” He continued: “Der Tatbestand einer Herrschaft ist nur an das aktuelle Vorhandensein eines erfolgreich anderen Befehlenden, aber weder unbedingt an die Existenz eines Verwaltungsstabes noch eines Verbandes geknüpft; dagegen allerdings - wenigstens in allen normalen Faellen - an die eines von beiden. Ein Verband soll insoweit, als seine Mitglieder als solche kraft geltender Ordnung Herrschaftsbeziehungen unterworfen sind, Herrschaftsverband heissen.” This definition is part of the ‘Soziologische Kategorienlehre’ that M. Weber wrote down in 1919\textsuperscript{17}.

Let me summarise\textsuperscript{18} what follows from Weber’s treatment of the issue in his ‘Soziologische Kategorienlehre’ and in his writing on ‘Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft’. Domination presumes a claim to find obedience, but it only emerges if there is also a chance for it. Ideas and resources help to establish the claim, but, as Weber observed, only by the repeated success of commands does an association constitute itself hierarchically organised, exhibiting a division of labour. A sovereign association constitutes its order autonomously and is autocephalous in selecting its leadership. Mutual recognition by superordinates and subordinates strengthens ties within the association. Minimum physical and material security must be provided within the association. It is the leadership that has to find the means and ways of providing this security. Domination thereby becomes a legitimate mandate for leadership, and subordinates will actively carry out commands. As superordinates and subordinates respect their reciprocal, if unequal, rights and obligations, the relation of domination is invested with legitimacy, opening the avenue for its lasting integration by traditionalisation and/or
rationalisation. A belief in the legality of the superordinate, the holiness of the master or the extraordinariness of a leader represents a chance to establish or expand relations of domination because commands are likely to find obedience. But even charismatic domination, Weber noted, must be traditionalised or rationalised, because of the interest of the followers in the continued existence of the association, and because of the even stronger interest of its staff in securing their existence, materially and spiritually. Legitimacy invests the commander with authority. A relation of domination is coercive insofar as the commander selects among alternative courses of action, and subordinates are bound by this decision in executing the order.

Weber elaborated on three idealtypes of legitimate domination. But what if those asked to carry out the command, for the first or the umpteenth time, do not recognise the legitimacy of the commander? Lets assume that disobedience, possibly even rebellion, becomes widespread. What can the leadership do to prevent the dissolution of the association? Lets further assume that the leadership is either unwilling or else unable to undertake measures to regain legitimacy. If the association is not to dissolve, the leadership must now coerce subordinates into carrying out its orders. Domination becomes illegitimate, i.e. not based on mutual recognition, but can be perpetuated, if the leadership possesses the will and the means to lock in and tie down the subordinates, and to prevent self-mobilisation from below. Subordinates will be pressured existentially by the threat to withhold the means of livelihood, and by measures designed at least to control their actions. Illegitimate domination destroys authority and raises fear and mistrust among the members of the association.

Drawing further on observations that Weber made with regard to legitimate domination, we can surmise that associations struck by illegitimacy will exhibit a tendency towards dilettante monocratic leadership, which is prone to take decisions with adverse effects for lack of accurate information and pertinent advice. If this association has a staff, this condition will reproduce itself along its hierarchy. The central apex must aim not only to centralise resources, but also to monopolise them to prevent their diversion by the staff, which will be seeking some measure of seclusion from the central apex to enhance their physical and material safety. Hence a second, special police organ will be needed, charged with the task of enforcing obedience and reporting the non-fulfilment of orders back to the leadership. Even under tight spatial and social control, illegitimate domination can be perpetuated only until the resources necessary to maintain the organs of coercion are used up. Reform and mobilisation are dangerous, for as subordinates carry out orders without conviction, success is unlikely. At least there will be passive resistance through delays, evasion and obstruction from subordinates. Moreover, if the whole association has to be mobilised, this considerably reduces the capacity of the central apex to maintain flawless control, and hence there is always a chance that the members of the association will throw off the illegitimate domination.
This much can be inferred from Max Weber’s treatment of domination. Of course it would be desirable to have a full re-statement and elaboration of a Weberian theory of domination\textsuperscript{21}, but this lies in the future. I trust that for the present purpose the Weberian perspective on relations of domination is sufficiently illuminated.

\textbf{On the consequence of the scope, duration and intensity of terror: The illegitimacy of Soviet imperial relations of domination}

My historical argument is that the Soviet imperial relations of domination became illegitimate as a consequence of the unprecedented scope, the long duration and the extraordinary intensity of terror.

Firstly, let me qualify the descriptive range of this historical statement. The argument implies only that the Soviet imperial relations of domination became illegitimate, not that any or all relations of domination became illegitimate. Thus relations of domination within, for example, patriarchal families, bureaucratic enterprises or patrimonial patronage networks may well have been legitimate. However, the illegitimacy of the imperial relations is assumed to have been highly significant because the Soviet imperial networks exhibited not only hierarchical ties between organisations, but the lower organisation was also usually both heteronomous in its constitution and heterocephalous in its leadership. Thus the chain of command and obedience did run from Moscow centre far and wide in the economic, political, military and cultural networks. When there was not a direct chain of command, the heteronomy and heterocephaly of organisations indirectly ensured their subordination and the obedience of their members. Furthermore, I speak advisedly of illegitimacy as a historical consequence of terror in the Soviet empire and not of terror as the cause of illegitimacy. I make no presumptions as to whether terror will generally lead to the illegitimacy of domination. More importantly, I wish to stress that Soviet illegitimacy was the consequence of the particular scope, duration and intensity of terror that reigned within the networks. Illegitimacy then was the historical condition that the political, military, economic and cultural actors of the time had to deal with.

Secondly, let me clarify my historical argument. The dispute on the subject of the scale of terror, especially as regards the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and the controversy over the primary agency of Stalin, has exercised researchers for a long time\textsuperscript{22}. On the basis of observing the unprecedented scope, the extraordinary intensity and the long duration of Soviet terror I am prepared to argue that illegitimacy resulted even if one works from the lower estimates of the scale of terror. Moreover, terror reigned within the Soviet networks and it was with the expansion and extension of these imperial networks between 1928 and 1953 that terror gained part of its momentum as regards its scope and duration. That terror was effectively curtailed after Stalin’s death shows how influential the central apex was. Then again the scope and duration of the terror were only possible because the network members were not only its victims but also its agents. It has been documented how not only the police
and judiciary organs were instrumental, but also how writers, military personnel or ordinary party members were involved. Soviet terror has been documented extensively. Hence the unprecedented scope, the long duration and the extraordinary intensity of Soviet terror are known or knowable. Maybe we have not yet systematically enough assessed the scope, duration and intensity of terror until 1953 because our attention has been diverted by the dispute about numbers and the controversy regarding Stalin's agency.

Thirdly, let me therefore briefly remind us all about the scope, duration and intensity of the terror. For my present purpose, a rough sketch will suffice. Terror hit the Central Committee and its apparatus in Moscow, and also that in Prague and Budapest. Officials of Gosplan were affected, just as all the ministries, the directors of enterprises in Siberia, and collectivised nomads in Kazakhstan. Terror spread throughout the political network, but also engulfed the economic, military and cultural network. Terror was limited only by the reach of territorial control. Many Soviet officials serving abroad were lured to Moscow on a pretext for their arrest. Soviet terror even crept into organisations not subject to Soviet territorial control, such as the Communist Party of the USA. Members had to comply with orders from above, or else were branded as traitors, given a show trial, and expelled from the party. The CP USA then sought to prevent expelled members from securing a means of livelihood, but for lack of territorial control and administrative powers could not execute its members or have them sent to forced labour camps.

Terror lasted for more than twenty years, overcoming many organisations more than once and some persistently. Successive heads of the Gosplan administration were shot. Communist party members were 'purged' repeatedly. The Red Army lost its leading officers in 1937. During and after the winter campaign against Finland in 1939/40, more officers were executed and soldiers sent to forced labour camp. As the German Wehrmacht attacked in 1941 and the Red Army retreated in defeat more officers were executed. Even after having taken Berlin in May 1945, returning officers and soldiers were screened by the NKVD and sent to forced labour camps, all the more so if they had been interned in German camps.

It is also undisputed that terror was particularly intense at the communist apex. Stalinist repression between 1936 and 1938 hit five members of the politburo, 98 of the 139 members of the central committee, 1108 of the 1966 delegates to the XVII. party congress in 1934, and ninety percent of the party cadres in Leningrad. Only 3 of the 200 members of the Ukrainian central committee survived. In the Komsomol 72 of the 93 members of the central committee were arrested, 319 of the 385 regional secretaries, and 2210 of the 2759 district secretaries. Several hundred cadres of the Comintern were executed. The communist parties of eastern and central Europe were twice hit by terror at their central apex, first during their exile in Moscow in 1936 and 1937, and then for seven years after 1948. Scripted in Moscow, and organised by the secret police and judiciary organs, prosecution and proceedings were publicised across central Europe, keeping communist
parties and their members under threat and in fear, for anyone could be implicated in a ‘Titoist’ plot or some other conspiracy.

Fourthly, let me return to the question of scale. For my historical argument it is of relevance whether the victims of terror were members of the Soviet networks or not. Imprisoned, deported or executed nomenklaturists, cadres and party members quite obviously were members. Equally obvious is that much of the terror in the 1920s or during World War II was directed at outsiders or adversaries. What about the famine of 1932/33? It is because the millions of peasants and nomads who died had earlier been collectivised that there is credence in speaking of a terror-famine. Collectivisation was resisted, but it nevertheless proceeded apace. With collectivisation, heteronomous and heterocephalous agricultural organisations emerged that were subject to a chain of command and obedience that ran from Moscow. This social fact makes credible an interpretation that the famine was an act of Stalinist terror directed against real and imagined disobedience on the part of subordinates. Evidence that Moscow had all the products of the collectivised peasants and nomads forcibly requisitioned but then withheld the necessary means for livelihood may be interpreted as a punishment for passive resistance and poor performance. Withholding supplies of food and sealing off whole stretches of land to prevent people’s exit is an act of terror and signifies the illegitimacy of the relations of domination.

In an imperial perspective it is of consequence what the demographic effects of terror were and how widely people were affected. It has been estimated for the 1930s that there were over 9 million excess deaths until 1939, and that there was an overall demographic gap as high as 13 million. One wonders what the demographic gap was in, say, 1956, once terror had subsided and many of the camps were being disbanded. Because of World War II such calculations will be difficult. An estimation of the demographic gap in the area from Berlin, Budapest and Sofia to Vladivostok might, however, give an indication not only of the scale of terror, but also of the damage done to the Soviet empire owing to the loss of labour and brain power. As to how widely people were affected by terror, there exists an estimate that between 1923 and 1953 courts in the RSFSR alone sentenced 40 million people. Given the manipulation of the legal code and Soviet practice of repression, this might indicate that up to every third citizen between the age of 14 and 60 was affected directly. Moreover, these incidents were observed and reported, both among family, friends and colleagues and via the mass media. I reckon that on any count, given how coercion spiralled out of control into terror on the inside of the Soviet networks, which lasted for more than twenty years, Soviet imperial relations were experienced and recognised as illegitimate.

Fifthly, I will discuss the immediate effects and more lasting consequences of terror, especially as they affected the administration and mobilisation of the Soviet networks. Documentation of the scope, duration and intensity of Soviet terror suggests that, when obedience was increasingly coerced and this coercion spiralled out of control into terror, relations of domination in the
Soviet networks were disrupted. From the Soviet central apex downwards, superordinates applied existential pressure to have their orders fulfilled, refusing to recognise their obligation to provide for the wellbeing of their subordinates. Even if obedient, subordinates were threatened by sanctions ranging from relegation to execution any time superordinates were not fully satisfied. As obedience became based on fear, commanders could impose their will without authority, relying for reinforcement on the organs of coercion that operated on the inside of the Soviet networks. Subordinate members of the Soviet networks could get back at superordinates and colleagues by denouncing them to the organs of coercion. Relations of domination, based on expediency and fear, became illegitimate.

Subordinates in military organisations must carry out commands not only intelligently, but, in case of a war, also with enough flexibility to maximise the probability that the military aims will be achieved in battle. It has been estimated that in the years before World War II 30,000 of the 178,000 leading officers were repressed, among them 3 of the 5 marshals, 13 of the 15 generals, 8 of the 9 admirals, 50 of the 57 commanding generals, and 154 of the 186 division generals. Terror not only meant a loss of expertise but also must have been a devastating experience for an organisation that more than any other must rely on discipline and unquestioning obedience.

Practices of terror reinforced an imperial cage in which network membership became compulsory. Sealed borders enabled the comprehensive surveillance of imperial space, and the agents of coercion came to police on the inside of every organisation. Even after terror had been brought under control in 1953, the physical sedimentation not only lived on but was also reinforced by border fortifications and minefields, the Berlin wall only being the most spectacular and symbolic example of such a fortification. Organisations of coercion continued to be present in every other organisation. Budget figures, staff numbers and the number of covert informers rose. In the frontier state of the GDR, for example, the SED employed as agents of coercion in the 1980s out of the sixteen million people it ruled, and not counting its army proper and the 500,000 Soviet troops stationed in the GDR, as follows:

- 50,000 in border troops, with several thousand more ‘voluntary assistants’;
- 200,000 in special paramilitary units, including groups in its youth organisation;
- 80,000 in the ‘Deutsche Volkspolizei’, which commanded a further 15,000 staff designated for enterprise security and 177,500 assistants to aid in political tasks;
- 90,000 in the ‘Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit’, which employed a further 175,000 unofficially as covert agents within other organisations.

Organs of coercion were able to strike down self-organisation outside of Soviet networks. As a structural condition within the Soviet networks it mitigated against voluntary mobilisation of actors, enabling the central apex to de-mobilise any self-mobilised organisation at will. Soviet imperial governance thus rested on institutionalised coercion. It ensured widespread
passive obedience, reinforced by differential measures of privilege for conformity and punishment for transgression, but these practices were unsuited to motivation: organisations strove for self-sufficiency, while members became apathetic within these organisations.  

**Comparative case histories: Soviet, National Socialist and Chinese Communist**

For comparative research, the minimal standard is the Millian method of examining cases simultaneously for instructive similarities and revealing differences. Unfortunately this standard has often not been maintained when comparing 'totalitarian' or 'communist' cases. My first argument is that even if one accepts totalitarian similarities between the Soviet and the Nazi cases there existed a revealing difference, in that Hitler was the recognised charismatic leader that Stalin was not. My second argument is that, even if one claimed that the Maoist terror was of a similar scope, duration or intensity, there would still be a crucial difference, in that relations of domination were rendered legitimate again in China while in the Soviet empire they were not.

It proves to be an obstacle to historical research that totalitarian regimes have been defined as essentially the same, with the repeated invocation of "both" Hitler and Stalin, and of "all" totalitarian regimes. For this is an implicit stricture not only when comparing any totalitarian case with other historical cases, but also when searching for instructive differences between totalitarian cases. Totalitarian regimes are forces both of de-traditionalisation and of de-rationalisation. This makes the relations of domination in their organisations and networks more precarious. However, even when the National Socialists terrorised political opponents and anyone they identified as Jewish, terror did not enter their own networks. The only incidence of violence in the Nazi leadership was the execution of Roehm and his SA-leadership in 1933, just after they came to power. As the German Wehrmacht went down in defeat after defeat, the generals did make an attempt on Hitler's life, but only in 1944 when the Red Army began occupying Prussian lands. The unsuccessful conspirators were hunted down and executed.

As the National Socialists launched their war of conquest, terror became more extensive and intensive. It included strategies of genocide, memocide and coercive labour (Zwangsarbeit) for the German war machine. However, as long as the war was being fought successfully, the Nazi and Wehrmacht practice of preparing for and engaging in total war reinforced legitimacy, while terrorising and exterminating outsiders did not de-legitimise internal relations. In contrast, the Soviet practice of terrorising the members of their own networks, including the party members, rendered relations of domination illegitimate. German aggression gave the Soviet empire a respite internally, but Soviet totalitarian governance by terrorising network members was relaxed only until Berlin had been captured, and then tightened again.
Totalitarian parties organised themselves from a central apex downward and outward, with forefront organisations for sympathisers. However, this revealing similarity points to another instructive difference. Hitler’s will ruled his movement, including the Quisling regimes that emerged during the war, and even the industrialists and the military followed him. Although the Soviet industrialists and the military were Bolsheviks, Stalin obviously did not expect and did not find this absolute obedience, even in his inner circle - hence the show trials of the 1930s. Until 1940, while Hitler was piling success upon success and thereby becoming a highly charismatic leader, Stalin was failing with his policies. Everybody knew this: the peasants because they were starving, the workers because of the lack of material and food and Moscow centre because it had the statistical information. While Hitler was accumulating charisma, Stalin was persecuting his collaborators and punishing those whom he believed to have failed him. While Hitler employed his charisma to maintain organisational flexibility and fluidity, Stalin needed terror to achieve flexibility and fluidity, thereby disabling the Soviet networks and leaving the empire weakened in its defences when the Nazi-German military onslaught came in 1941.

In Maoist China terror reigned on a similar scope and scale inside the imperial networks, and also lasted for twenty years. China had its Laogai, its collectivisation with tens of millions of victims of starvation and execution, and its cultural revolution that was to cause the death of leading communists and the replacement of two-thirds of the central committee. However, it proves to be an obstacle to historical research that communist persecution, deportation, starvation and execution anywhere in the world are interpreted as originating from the same genetic (sic! memetic) code created by Lenin and Stalin, with local permutations only. Since brutal violence is interpreted as programmatic, it becomes analytically difficult to distinguish changing circumstances and the acts of violence that went with these, such as revolutionary violence, persecution of political opponents, forced mobilisation of peasants and workers, and terror striking into the communist party itself. As there was supposedly only a single matrix, the agency of indigenous communist regimes is judged as only derivative. Implicit is an injunction against the historical comparison of individual communist cases, for this would necessitate recognition of the specific historical circumstances.

As in the Soviet empire, the Chinese communists had to bring terror under control, and did so with Mao’s death. This was followed by efforts to establish a legal order and rationalise the relations of domination, although as late as 1989 both were considered politically expedient. There is possibly no instructive difference with respect to terror and its effects, and communist culture seems to have provided neither a protection against terror turning inward, nor any incentive for killing the tyrant promoting this terror. However, the Chinese trajectory was, comparatively speaking, diverted by de-collectivisation, not only of agriculture, but also of enterprises, and by the re-emergence of markets. By 1991 the southeastern costal provinces of China boasted the world’s most rapidly growing market-driven economy, based on
small-scale organisations. After terror, the Chinese centre devolved decision-making, transferred property rights to local cadres and respected the autonomy of newly emergent organisations. When this was attempted again in the Soviet empire in the late 1980s, it lead to the bank run not only of local cadres, but also of central committees, with widespread insubordination and simultaneous privatisation of resources.

Both the Soviet empire and the Chinese empire had to deal with the institutional effects of the terror, but only in the Soviet empire did the physical and organisational sediments remain intact and were actually reinforced. Efforts at rationalising relations of domination, most notably by the Nagy and Dubcek leaderships, were wasted and repressed by Moscow centre. The imperial centre failed to institutionalise its relations of domination as legitimate, and was consequently unable to stabilise its imperial networks.

**After terror: Anticipating the Soviet path**

Ever since terror was brought under control, area researchers anticipated the chances of the perpetuation, change or demise of Soviet rule. In 1954 Barrington Moore published his study on “Terror and Progress USSR”, investigating “a series of situations and a series of people, from the factory worker on the assembly line to the leaders in the Kremlin”, thereby aiming to assess “future events as indices of stability or of change in specified directions.”

Focusing on political organisation and control, and on economic production, distribution and mobilisation, he wondered about the chances for further rationalisation or traditionalisation, its likely forms and consequences. For Moore under Stalin, “the emphasis on power as the criterion of a good decision in all spheres of Soviet life was pushed to a point that seems close to the possible limit”, but not beyond a point at which a “war of all against all” ensued.

While my present theoretical argument benefits from hindsight, I do wish to suggest that a complete sociological theory of domination would have enabled area researchers better to anticipate Soviet change and continuity. I argue this point in relation to Moore’s study. I do so because his study was both a very early attempt at anticipating possible Soviet futures and very well informed by Weber’s work. Being at Harvard University in the early 1950s, Moore was familiar with totalitarian models and with the emergent more pluralistic view. He also had access to the interviews with refugees that the Russian Research Centre had conducted, a project on which Merle Fainsod was working too.

There are differences between Moore’s and my approach:

- He assumed that ‘purges’ were somehow compatible with rapid industrial expansion and widened educational opportunities because they enhance social mobility, while I argue that in effect the Stalinist terror was dysfunctional both to industrialisation and formal education and made ‘Soviet modernity’ unwanted and unloved, promoting re-traditionalisation.
He assumed the legitimacy of the Soviet order, while I argue that Soviet relations of domination had become illegitimate;
He argued that power was only maximised, but I assume that imperial relations were threatened with disintegration as an effect of terror;
He asked how Stalinist power politics might be rationalised and traditionalised, but I assert that the illegitimacy of Soviet domination needed to be overcome if rationalisation and traditionalisation were to serve the empire.

I conclude that the rationalisation of Soviet relations of domination failed, and with it the rationalisation of imperial regulation and governance. Partly this was helped by misguided campaigns against bureaucracy and so-called ‘ministerialism’\(^{55}\), but this was also reinforced by the vestiges of traditional society preserved in paternalism in politics, barter in the economy, and by nepotistic, ascriptive and particularistic principles of stratification. Objective and transparent mechanisms of stratification, both in the allocation of people to positions and of resources to positions, were destroyed, thus enforcing preoccupation with the maintenance of personal relations.

Moore presented three alternative scenarios of the Soviet future: a perpetuation of totalitarian power politics, its rationalisation, and its traditionalisation. While he argued that totalitarian power had acted as “a corrosive on tradition”, he also asserted that the establishment of a rational-legal order would amount to a “genuine transformation”, and hence, overall, he stressed signs pointing towards a re-traditionalisation of the Soviet order\(^{56}\). More specifically, in 1954, he expected that there would either be a push towards rationalisation with an emphasis on responsibility and competence in organisations, or more traditional ties would re-assert themselves with an emphasis on kinship ties and personal loyalty. In this latter case, while formally perpetuating totalitarian rule, local centres would seek both to limit the directional powers of the central apex and evade its control, thus finally paralysing it. Moore expected for this scenario the emergence of a hereditary class system, with an isolation of the ruling class, followed by industrial stagnation, a disruption of exchange relations between town and country, and finally population decline.

The existing urban and industrial culture could have fostered rationalisation, Moore believed, especially if mobility became less a matter of coercion, than an effect of achievement. Such a meritocracy required, however, that the educational system would empower its students with rule knowledge and skill competence. This, in turn, required that the sciences and the arts would be free in their search for truth. Totalitarian power politics, Moore says, had known multiple truths (or no truth at all, as the success of Lyssenko’s biology implies)\(^{57}\) with limited and differentiated access for different strata, and propaganda for the masses. In the case of re-traditionalisation, Moore expected that the overwhelming majority of students would be prevented from gaining rule knowledge, so as to prevent them from understanding the order
they lived in. Much of the re-traditionalisation that Moore anticipated came to pass.

With a complete sociological theory of domination and a better comparative technique for analysing totalitarian rule Moore might well have arrived at the conclusion that I draw. He contrasted the orderliness and defined spheres of competence of a “large and well-run cargo steamship” with the Soviet dictatorship. Indeed, if we imagine the industrialising USSR steaming through rough weather and arctic waters: What kind of effects would Stalinist terror have had on such a ship?

Had Moore worked from the assumption that the imperial relations of domination were illegitimate, he would have seen that it was the persistence of this illegitimacy with prompted re-traditionalisation. For re-traditionalisation offered the possibility of securing a niche in the imperial cage, a kind of ‘parallel’ or ‘second’ society. Parallel networks re-established ties that were legitimate and helped to privatise whatever could be diverted from imperial resources. Illegitimacy promoted traditionalisation, and traditionalisation further undercut rationalisation, progressively obstructing both mobility in the Soviet empire and the mobilisation of the imperial networks. The longer this condition persisted, the less likely it became that recognition between superordinates and subordinates would be achieved, including the establishment of the rule of law, and the more likely it became that the Soviet empire would be engulfed by immobility or, as Michal Gorbachev would come to call it, stagnation.

Area researchers have collected the following indicators of failed rationalisation: the regular, voluntarist violation of formal rules or legal regulations that the Soviet imperial association gave itself and its empire; the personalisation of administrative practices and the extension of office prerogatives over family and friends; and the prevalence of political and personal loyalty in recruitment over meritocratic criteria. Further indicators of failed rationalisation are: no party in the Soviet empire was able to re-establish democratic centralism; all parties tightly controlled their polity to pre-empt organised challenges; all other organisations in the networks were heteronomous and heterocephalous, and still subjected to surveillance by the organs of coercion; the whole population was locked into these organisations, and immobilised by a combination of military occupation and police pressure, with direct and illegal coercion for individual dissenters; the imperial borders stayed sealed, while anyone attempting to cross them without prior administrative clearance and approval was shot. With any breach of its strict control, the imperial association felt threatened, and retaliated extra-legally.
Soviet relations of domination and legitimacy: Clarification and defence of the argument

The present argument has sought to make it plausible that the Soviet case could have been one of illegitimate imperial relations of domination rather than of ‘total domination’, ‘goal-rationality’, ‘traditional legitimacy’ or ‘eudaemonic legitimacy’. My final task is to take on these alternative historical interpretations more directly and to suggest ways in which the new diagnosis of illegitimacy exhibits theoretical excess content. I seek neither to review nor directly to criticise previous notions of domination and legitimacy, but rather to indicate ways in which the new theoretical framework might include, replace or refute previous analyses. Thus the notion of the illegitimacy of the Soviet imperial relations of domination is set up for further discussion and for elaboration by research.

Researchers utilising the concept of totalitarianism need to decide whether it is just a device for prejudging historical cases and comparing them for their similarity and differences, or whether it is to be developed into an idealtype of order. If an idealtype is constructed, commonalities would need to be abstracted that would specify the dynamics of the formation, perpetuation and demise of totalitarian regimes. Friedrich and Brzezinski’s definition distinguished as essential features: “(1) a totalist ideology; (2) a single party committed to this ideology and usually led by one man, the dictator; (3) a fully developed secret police; and three kinds ... of monopolistic control: namely that of (a) mass communications; (b) operational weapons; (c) all organizations, including economic ones”. Indeed, the power of the technologies was such that society seemed transformed into a single organisation, in which, as Rigby noted “a complex pattern of command-structures ...[was] bound together in a single all-embracing structure” by the communist party. Apart from the totalist ideology, all other elements suggest that the commonality lies outside totalitarian organisations: in technologies of power available in the 20th century - especially in organisation, communication, transport, and armaments - and the infrastructure and logistics they enabled, not only covering vast territories, but also hundreds of millions of people locked into organisations, themselves huge, like the Soviet imperial association of party and nomenklatura with its over twenty-five million members.

Friedrich and Brzezinski themselves have to acknowledge that these characteristic elements are given by technology - and globally heightened the chance for states and political organisations to achieve control over other organisations and submerge them to a single central apex. The only commonality specific to totalitarian parties is that they are driven by a totalist ideology that exploits this opportunity, liquidates all other political organisations and institutes single party-rule. It is a functional commonality in distinguishing ideologically between in-group and out-group, and justifying propaganda and terror as useful devices. However, totalitarian ideologies have different histories, diverging contents, and effects that are instructive in
their difference: whereas Nazi totalitarianism aimed at territorial expansion and the subsequent exclusion of its native inhabitants, Soviet totalitarianism was directed towards social expansion and subsequent inclusion of all people in their networks, locking them up in formal organisations.

As a concept, totalitarianism is rather static. It presupposes the formation of the regime, and seems to outline the necessary configuration for mobilisation to commence. Mobilisation brought about 'total domination'. Any mobilisation of an association brings with it a rise of the frequency and duration of action subjected to commands, and the more complete and intense the mobilisation, the more relations within an association are subjected to domination. Total domination would be the border case in which people spend all their time and expand all their energy in relations of domination. Hence Arendt understood the concentration camp to be a model of total domination. This model implies that totalitarian mobilisation is able to create and maintain an absolute social distance between mobilisers and mobilised, by which the central apex may coerce people into action at will, backed up by their apparatus of terror and propaganda. Thus, Arendt noted, totalitarian regimes achieved more flexibility and fluidity than military organisations by the multiplying of chains of command, and by frequently creating new organisations while degrading older ones.

Arendt herself observed, however, that a "hierarchically organized chain of command means that the commander's power is dependent on the whole hierarchic system in which he operates. Every hierarchy, no matter how authoritarian in its direction, and every chain of command, no matter how arbitrary or dictatorial the content of orders, tends to stabilize and would have restricted the total power of the leader". Soviet hierarchies did. Moreover, because of terror, Soviet mobilisation failed to achieve any of the goals that had been set. Marxist ideology and Leninist doctrine seemingly justified any means to achieve the desired end, but the actions that followed violated socialist values, hence the subsequent condemnation of the personality cult and the rehabilitation of terror victims.

The insight that there was an 'all-embracing structure of command and obedience' led Rigby to assume that the Soviet Union was mono-organisational, that is, organised as a single organisation. Unfortunately this assumption precludes any investigation of the actual relations between organisations. After terror it was the persistent heteronomy and heterocephaly that signified the continuing illegitimacy of the Soviet relations of domination. Whenever an organisation aimed to re-establish autocephaly, be it the writers' union in Moscow or the communist party in Prague, the imperial centre, based on the physical and organisational sediments of terror, intervened and re-affirmed the heterocephaly and heteronomy of the subordinate organisation. Moreover, though the party did have a political monopoly (which was the condition for the existence of the empire), it does not logically follow that the party was 'monolithic' or that society was 'mono-organisational'. Rigby's observation that all organisations were bound into a single command
structure is correct, but must be followed by the query about how this was achieved and how the links between the organisations were forged.

Rigby proposed that this all-embracing structure of command was legitimated with reference to goal-rationality.\textsuperscript{68} Goal-rationality, or better, goal-directedness, is a component of action, which can be analytically distinguished from the value-oriented, affectual and routine component. By these distinctions we can understand scale, scope and intensity of mobilisation to action. Mobilisation becomes most intense when a highly charismatic leader, in pursuit of the realisation of a grand idea, spurs his association into action. This action will be goal-directed and value-oriented and shaped by affectual ties to the leader. As a successful revolutionary, Lenin enjoyed this capacity with his Bolsheviks, and so did the victorious Stalin of 1945 with the communist youth of eastern and central Europe. The emphasis on the goal of establishing communism, or later of simply holding on, justified in the eyes of the leaders those actions by which the organisations in the Soviet networks were made both heterocephalous and heteronomous. The ‘all-embracing structure’ emerged in the service of imperial mobilisation. But it is one thing to establish and enforce a chain of command and obedience, running down and out from a central apex, and quite another task to secure the legitimacy of this relation. Rigby was thus not revealing anything about the stability of the Soviet order, nor about the legitimacy of imperial relations, but implicitly suggesting that the Soviet capacity to mobilise had shrunk by the 1950s - because a mobilisation on goal-directed grounds alone is much less intense. Terror constrained further Soviet mobilisation, by destroying affectual ties and violating the values of the association’s members.

Some authors have argued that socialist states enjoyed eudaemonic legitimacy,\textsuperscript{69} possibly based on a social contract.\textsuperscript{70} It is an argument that brings the people back in. Indeed, by collectivisation, the Bolsheviks and the people they ruled had become highly interdependent - they were now members of the same organisations. Any association must provide for its members if it is to be recognised by the subordinates. And conversely, recognition by the superordinates of the subordinates implies the obligation to provide for them. Hence socialist welfare, first created for the Bolsheviks, was an extension of privileges, and took the form of subsidising transport, housing, or food. It was a graded system of privileges, with chauffeur-driven limousines, palaces and gourmet food for the nomenklatura, and cheap bus fares, nominal rent, and staple foods at the bottom.

As Stalinist terror denied security of existence in the Soviet networks, the extension of welfare benefits was imperative if the people in the networks were to recognise their superordinates and accept Soviet governance. As a result of the rapid industrialisation, the Soviet economic networks did provide the resources for an extension of staff privileges and the wide distribution of welfare benefits. This was an asset for the imperial association in its struggle for legitimacy. Because of the illegitimacy of relations of domination it was
ineffective and failed, and because of the lack of an institutionalised political order, this policy ruined the Soviet empire. For example, every year Honecker insisted\(^7\) that welfare provision had to increase by four percent. Even though politburo members were aware of the disastrous consequences of their welfare policy, which would force them either to drastic cuts or into increasing dependency on western credits, they were unable to reconstruct their welfare system. These observations mitigate against the claim that there was a stable institutionalised order, for one would expect that this order would have provided institutionalised procedures by which disastrous consequences for itself could have been averted. But there were none, not least because the state apparatus was only a means to relay commands, to govern military, economic and cultural organisations, and to suppress civic self-organisation.

In contradiction to what has been said about the failure of rationalisation and the dysfunctional effects of traditionalisation, Heller claimed that while the legitimisation of communist party rule probably failed in central Europe, it did enjoy traditionalist legitimacy in the USSR\(^2\). She says that the Soviet political order emerged from an indigenous revolution and was therefore exemplary and binding for the party members. Suffice it then to say that for lack of an alternative vision the population complied. No people in the USSR envisioned a legal state and democracy, Heller suggests, while central European nations did, and this included a significant section of the party members. Hence central European party leadership, though bolstered by Soviet military presence and economic support, was seeking ways to legitimate the Soviet order, but failed time and again to codify its rule. But why would such an argument not be valid for any Soviet republic? At least for the Baltic republics it would seem justified, given their history between the two world wars, to assume that the local agents of the Soviet political order were also in a permanent legitimisation crisis - and in good measure failed to achieve the transition from enforcing their rule primarily by means of direct coercion to exercising authority in governing and regulating\(^7\).

More problematic is however, how Heller conceptually juxtaposes party and population, for the population was locked into formal organisations controlled and directed by the party. On the inside of these organisations relations of leaders to staff, leaders to members, and members to staff, must be examined. It was inside the Soviet networks that these groups were unable to negotiate the permissible degree of central concentration of powers of decision-making and any de-monopolisation of resources. It was because centralisation and monopolisation were not negotiable, that leaders, staff, and members of organisations, sometimes together, sometimes against each other, sought to divert imperial resources for their private gain, to withhold their labour-power and thwart central control.

In the absence of legitimacy, the central apex and superordinates in the chain of command were left with the self-legitimation of their acts of regulation and governance. Such self-legitimation of action, and accompanying personal self-adulation, requires strictest control over channels of communication.
Others must not be given any opportunity to voice their experience independently, or to share their opinions on these actions. Hence the monopolised media were not only heteronomous and heterocephalous, but were furthermore subjected to censorship. Although the central apex imposed its order and selected the personnel, it did not trust anybody. Hence the dilettante at the top indulges not only in opinion reports prepared for him from taped phone calls and opened letters, but also develops a practice of keeping most things secret, so that access to information is already restricted for the politburo and central committee\textsuperscript{74}. As information does not flow upward, it has to be provided conspiratorially by the security organs.

As only self-legitimation was possible, monopolistic control over means to mobilisation, especially also over channels of communication, was essential in order to prevent people sharing their own, their families and their nations experience of terror, deportation and death. If these memories were spoken, they would expose not only the horrors of Stalinism, but also the illegitimacy of Soviet imperial relations. Conversely, the self-legitimation of the central apex was only convincing to itself as long as it could believe that the results obtained in the form of economic development and military prowess were real achievements and that it was worth defending these achievements at nearly any price. This might explain why the Soviet central apex and its vassals were deluding themselves with statistics that supposedly showed the enormous progress achieved\textsuperscript{75}.  

12 The notion of imperial networks is adapted from M. Mann, The sources of social power, op.cit. It was developed with the aid of G. Teubner, ‘Die vielköpfige Hydra: Netzwerke als kollektive Akteure höherer Ordnung’, in W. Krohn and G. Küppers (eds), Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung (Frankfurt/M. 1990). The ties that bind the organisations are investigated for their auto-
14 Instructive is the extensive discussion in L.Holmes, *The End of Communist Power*, op.cit., pp. 8-38.
20 M. Weber had not developed any notion of illegitimate domination, although his treatment of legitimate domination implies its existence. In showing the importance of value-orientation for action and emphasising that a successful (legitimate) command presupposes an interest to obey on part of those carrying out the order, indicators of legitimacy and, in reverse, of illegitimacy are suggested - cf. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, op.cit., pp. 17f., 24-26, 157-158, and 182f.
29 R. Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (London 1986);
38 S. Wheatcroft, ‘The Scale and Nature of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930-45’, Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 8, 1996, pp. 1319-1353, takes care to differentiate the purposive five million deaths caused by the Nazis (murder) from the million caused by the Soviets (execution).
40 D.J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s willing Executioners, op.cit. examines in detail the behaviour of armed German units and by implication argues not only that the crimes were committed voluntarily, but also that they positively reinforced the legitimacy of Nazi relations of domination.
consequences which is essential if actors are to understand the conditions of their agency and hence achieve the intended results.

Still instructive on this point is the report delivered by N.S. Krushchev as ‘Secret Speech’ to a closed session at the XX party congress of the CPSU on 25 February 1956, and published by the United States government on 4 June 1956.


F. Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy and Conflict in China (London 1984).


B. Moore, Terror and Progress USSR, op.cit.

B. Moore, Terror and Progress USSR, op.cit., page ix to xi.

B. Moore, Terror and Progress USSR, op.cit., page 186f.


B. Moore, Terror and Progress USSR, op.cit., p. 222 and p. 228.

B. Moore’s discussion of how totalitarian politics affects reality testing and truth searching implies that such politics are self-defeating because they lead to ‘illusionary action’ by obstructing reflexivity, which is essential if actors are to understand the conditions of their agency and hence achieve the intended consequences - Terror and Progress USSR, op.cit., pp. 212ff.


60 Publicly this became evident in October 1984 when four members of the Polish state security were put on trial for the murder of the Polish priest Jerzy Popieluszko - a trial in which, of course, neither the prosecution nor the judge were independent - cf. S. Lammich, ‘Der ‘Popieluszko-Prozess’, Osteuropa, 35, 1985, pp. 446-456.


65 C.J. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, op.cit., pp. 9-13. This acknowledgement comes in the introductory chapter, following the presentation of their idealised model. They did not stumble over this, however, even though it signals that their model insufficiently captures the commonality of the various historical cases. R. Vetterli and W.E. Fort, Jr. also conclude their review of *The Essence of Totalitarianism* (Lanham 1997), by emphasising technology as the requisite both for totalitarian collectivisation and mobilisation.


71 T. Pirker et al., Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion. Wirtschaftsführung in der DDR (Opladen 1995).


74 J. Pakulski, ‘Legitimacy and Mass Compliance’, British Journal of Political Science, op.cit., p. 46, calls this self-legitimation by ‘substitute’ claims to past and future achievements or the historical and constitutional right to rule and remarked “none of these ‘substitute’ claims withstands confrontation with reality and they have to be regularly discarded and replaced by new versions”. Cf. also J. Pakulski, ‘Ideology and Political Domination. A Critical Re-appraisal’ International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 28, 3-4, 1987, pp. 129-157. In some detail this has been analysed for the GDR and the Honecker Politburo in T. Pirker et al., Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion. Wirtschaftsführung in der DDR, op.cit.