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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version  
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

### Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Ukhova, D. (2023). Back to 'Traditional' Family Values? Trends in Gender Ideologies in Russia, 1994-2012. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 75(3), 446-467. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2107615>

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**To cite this article:** Daria Ukhova (2023) Back to 'Traditional' Family Values? Trends in Gender Ideologies in Russia, 1994–2012, Europe-Asia Studies, 75:3, 446–467, DOI: [10.1080/09668136.2022.2107615](https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2107615)

**To link to this article:** <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2107615>



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# Back to ‘Traditional’ Family Values? Trends in Gender Ideologies in Russia, 1994–2012

DARIA UKHOVA

## Abstract

Previous studies on individual-level gender ideologies in Russia have produced conflicting results, with some suggesting re-traditionalisation and others noting increasing egalitarianism. This research explores changes in the Russian population’s views on gender division of labour between 1994 and 2012, moving beyond unidimensional conceptualisations of gender ideology that juxtapose traditionalism with egalitarianism. The findings evidence highly class-specific gender-ideology trajectories. Only lower classes increased their support for separate spheres. Amongst the more educated and affluent, ‘re-traditionalisation’ instead entailed increased endorsement of both joint breadwinning and gender-essentialist views of women’s caring roles at the expense of support for the housewife/male-breadwinner model and for egalitarianism.

WHILE RUSSIA’S RETURN TO ‘TRADITIONAL FAMILY values’ at the level of political discourse and in actual policymaking is hardly debatable (Makarychev & Medvedev 2015; Sorainen *et al.* 2017), the picture regarding changes in gender ideologies<sup>1</sup> at the individual

The research for this article was carried out as part of a doctoral project funded by a scholarship granted from the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences. I am grateful to Sarah Ashwin, Sonja Drobic, Eva Fodor, Olaf Groh-Samberg, Ksenia Meshkova and two anonymous peer reviewers appointed by *Europe-Asia Studies* for their feedback on prior versions of this article, with special thanks to Nikita Loik for his advice on research design.

Disclosure statement: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

<sup>1</sup>In this article, I draw upon Davis and Greenstein’s (2009, p. 87) definition of gender ideology as ‘individuals’ levels of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities’. I therefore use the terms ‘gender ideology’ and ‘gender attitudes’ synonymously, as is commonly done in quantitative studies of this type. My use of the term is aligned with Ashwin and Isupova’s (2018) approach. It is important to note, however, that the definition of the term ‘gender ideology’ used in this article is substantially different from the one commonly used in Russian gender studies scholarship to refer to the state’s gender ideology; for example, Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007). The two types of gender ideology are closely related, as macro-level ideology is either incorporated or resisted in individuals’ gender beliefs (Lorber 1994). Later in this article, however, the focus is on individual micro-level ‘ideologies’.

level appears much less clear. Some researchers have, indeed, noted signs of attitudinal re-traditionalisation in the form of stronger preferences for separate spheres and more essentialist views of gender roles in general.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, others have highlighted the development of more egalitarian attitudes towards the gender division of labour, while also noting the persistence of the socialist ideological legacy, whereby joint breadwinning is prized yet women are also considered primarily responsible for care and domestic work (White 2005; Ashwin & Isupova 2018; Gurko 2019). Some researchers have also suggested that the dominant attitudes and preferred modes of gender division of labour may increasingly differ between classes (Temkina & Rotkirch 2002; Zdravomyslova & Temkina 2007) and across generations (White 2005; Gurko 2019; Klüsener *et al.* 2019). Overall, both the direction of change in gender ideologies and their determinants in contemporary Russia remain debated and understudied.

My goal in this article is to address this gap by further testing the argument about the alleged re-traditionalisation of gender ideologies amongst the Russian population. To this end, I provide a quantitative analysis of changes in Russian women's and men's views regarding the ideal way to divide care work and breadwinning in the early postsocialist period (1994–2002) and during the subsequent decade (2002–2012), drawing on three waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on Family and Changing Gender Roles (ISSP Research Group 2016). In contrast to previous quantitative studies on the topic, rather than relying on a unidimensional conceptualisation of gender ideology, I analyse three ideological orientations—separate spheres, egalitarian and 'traditional (double burden)'—with the last capturing combined beliefs in joint breadwinning and women's primary responsibility for unpaid care and domestic work. I also focus on the effects of education and income on gender ideologies, as well as on the ideological variations across different generations.

I start the article with a review of what we know so far about changes in Russians' attitudes towards gender division of labour, and place this discussion into the wider international scholarly debates about measuring gender ideologies and their determinants. This is followed by a description of the methodology of this study, the presentation of results and the discussion of key findings both in relation to the previous empirical studies in Russia and to broader scholarship of gender attitudes/ideologies.

### *Making sense of change in gender ideologies in Russia*

#### *Inadequacy of traditional/egalitarian framework*

In the international scholarship, gender ideology is most commonly framed as a unidimensional concept ranging from traditional to egalitarian (Kroska 2007; Davis & Greenstein 2009). Traditional ideology refers to a belief in gendered separate spheres in the family and employment domains, with the sphere of earning defined as male, and care and domestic work defined as female. Egalitarianism, on the contrary, reflects beliefs in women's and men's joint responsibility for earning and caring.

<sup>2</sup>For example, Nechaeva (2017), Kosova (2018), Klüsener *et al.* (2019).

Several recent studies, however, have indicated the inadequacy of the unidimensional framework for empirically locating contemporary gender ideologies (Grunow *et al.* 2018; Scarborough *et al.* 2019; Dernberger & Pepin 2020). Looking beyond traditional and egalitarian gender ideologies, researchers working on the United States and other Western countries have identified a number of other—so-called multidimensional—ideologies, characterised by a combination of beliefs in both separate and joint spheres.

Notably, a number of scholars researching gender relations in Russia have argued for quite a while that the unidimensional framework does not capture the full complexity of Russians' attitudes towards the gender division of labour.<sup>3</sup> As Gradskova (2016, p. 74) pertinently pointed out: 'The gender roles, expectations and values of Russian citizens constitute a ... peculiar patchwork. Loud declarations of the importance of family with "traditional" gender roles clash with ideas from 70 years of state socialism on the acceptability of women's work for wages outside the home'. Relatedly, Ashwin and Isupova argued that: 'In the post-Soviet context, "traditional" implies support for a ... model in which the man is the breadwinner (highest earner) and the woman is employed and takes primary responsibility for domestic labour. Separate spheres are the preserve of a wealthy minority' (Ashwin & Isupova 2018, p. 447). Further on in the text I therefore use 'traditional (double burden)' in quotation marks to refer to one of the categories of my dependent variable, to indicate that I am adopting Ashwin and Isupova's (2018) definition.<sup>4</sup> I use traditional without quotation marks to refer to the separate spheres ideology.

All the quantitative analyses concerned with the transformation of gender attitudes in Russia identified during the literature review for this article still relied, however, on the unidimensional conceptualisations of gender ideology that juxtapose traditionalism with egalitarianism (Motiejunaite & Kravchenko 2008; Lezhnina 2013; Nechaeva 2017; Kosova 2018; Klüsener *et al.* 2019). While these studies have provided important insights into the trends and determinants of gender egalitarianism and traditionalism in Russia, they have failed to account for the seemingly contradictory views on men's and women's roles in the family that most of the Russian population actually still holds. The current study addresses this gap by focusing on three ideologies, namely, separate spheres, egalitarian and 'traditional (double burden)'.

#### *Macro-level context and the direction of ideological change at the individual level*

The most prevalent gender ideology in late socialist Russia entailed an expectation that a man should be the highest earner, while a woman should work but also take primary responsibility for care and domestic work (Kay 2002; Temkina & Rotkirch 2002; Ashwin & Isupova 2018). At the macro level, this ideology was supported by universal employment and a substantial gender wage gap (Ashwin & Isupova 2018). It was further reinforced by the Communist Party's proclamations of women's 'right' to contribute to

<sup>3</sup>For recent discussions, see Gradskova (2016), Ashwin and Isupova (2018).

<sup>4</sup>See also Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007) for a discussion of different understandings of 'tradition' in the interpretation of women's and men's roles in postsocialist Russia.

national production, combined later with a renewed emphasis on women's domestic and care responsibilities triggered by concerns about falling fertility in the 1970s (Kay 2002). This ideology was at the core of the so-called 'working mother' gender contract (Temkina & Rotkirch 2002)<sup>5</sup> and underpinned Soviet women's infamous 'double burden' of paid work and care (Lapidus 1978).

In the postsocialist period, changes at the macro level of political discourse and policies have been conceptualised as 'neo-traditionalist' (Watson 1993; Zdravomyslova & Temkina 2007). Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007) proposed to differentiate between 'neoliberal gender traditionalism' and 'neo-statist traditionalism' as two key macro-level ideological frameworks. The former entails a combination of contradictory beliefs in, on the one hand, gender equality and women's right to choose (whether to pursue a career, become a housewife or do both); and on the other hand, in 'natural' differences between sexes that predestine women to become mothers and carers. Neo-statist traditionalism constructs women as a special category of citizens in need of paternalist social policies due to their demographic function: reproducing the nation. In addition, since the early 2010s, the discourse of 'traditional family values', emphasising the importance of heterosexual and fecund marriage based on the provision of unpaid care, has become central to the government's conservative political agenda (Sorainen *et al.* 2017; Ukhova 2018).

Research on changes in gender ideologies at the individual level, however, has provided quite contradictory results. Researchers have relied on two substantially different approaches, each of which produced a somewhat different picture. The first approach has been informed by a combination of evolutionary modernisation theory (Inglehart & Norris 2003) and arguments about the postsocialist neo-traditionalist turn discussed above. Mostly relying on large-scale survey data, these studies juxtaposed attitudinal liberalisation with re-traditionalisation, employing the unidimensional conceptualisation of gender ideology.<sup>6</sup> For example, using the 1994 and 2002 waves of ISSP, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko explored changes in support for the male-breadwinner family model *vis-à-vis* the egalitarian family model and showed that 'Russian people on average became slightly more liberal' (Motiejunaite & Kravchenko 2008, p. 45). More recent studies employing this approach have rather unequivocally suggested, however, that after some liberalising tendencies in the 1990s and early 2000s, Russians' gender attitudes became more traditional in the late 2000s to early 2010s (Nechaeva 2017; Kosova 2018; Klüsener *et al.* 2019).

The second approach has focused on the pluralisation and complexity of gender ideologies in the postsocialist period.<sup>7</sup> Usually relying on qualitative interview/focus-group data or

<sup>5</sup>The concept of a 'gender contract' was initially developed by Scandinavian feminist scholars—and later widely adopted in Russian gender studies—to refer to 'unspoken rules, mutual obligations and rights which define the relations between women and men, between genders and generations, and finally between the areas of production and reproduction' in specific socio-historical contexts (Hirdman 1996; Rantalaio 1997, p. 25). This concept is thus closely related to the concept of gender ideology, as used in this article. The contract of 'working mother' implied equal participation of men and women in the labour market combined with women's primary responsibility for care and domestic work, usually shared with other female members of the household.

<sup>6</sup>For example, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko (2008), Lezhnina (2013), Nechaeva (2017), Kosova (2018), Klüsener *et al.* (2019).

<sup>7</sup>For example, Temkina and Rotkirch (2002), White (2005), Ashwin and Isupova (2018), Gurko (2019).

highly specific surveys, these studies have provided detailed accounts of evolving gender ideologies. This scholarship has paid particular attention to the persistence and morphing of the Soviet ideological legacy that is difficult to locate on the unidimensional attitudinal vector. For example, Temkina and Rotkirch (2002) have argued that, although ‘working mother’ remains the most dominant gender contract in Russia, a range of alternative contracts implying a different gender division of labour inside and outside of the home are also gaining legitimacy, including the ‘career-oriented woman’ contract, the ‘housewife/male breadwinner’ contract and the ‘sponsored woman’ contract.<sup>8</sup> Anne White’s study of Voronezh women students’ gender-role attitudes carried out in the early 2000s suggested that the majority did not endorse the idea of women’s ‘return to the hearth’ and were, instead interested in building ‘careers’; furthermore, nearly half of White’s sample did not see motherhood as an essential role for women (White 2005). In their longitudinal qualitative study, aimed to explain the persistence of a highly unequal gender division of domestic labour in contemporary Russia, Ashwin and Isupova (2018) pointed out the persistence of Soviet-style ‘traditional’ gender ideology, but also noted the shifts away from it, towards egalitarianism, in parts of their sample. Gurko (2019), in her research with male and female university students in Stavropol and Moscow, found signs of increasing support for an egalitarian gender division of labour amongst both women and men, as well as a low endorsement of essentialist views on parenthood. She also pointed out that, while some students preferred professionally orientated egalitarian partnerships, others opted for family-orientated—but still egalitarian—models. Importantly, scholars working within the second approach have also drawn attention to the importance of analysing differences in gender ideologies amongst different social groups, including classes and generations (see more on this in the following section).

Due to the qualitative nature of data used in the second type of studies, their authors avoid drawing conclusions about general societal trends. However—at least to the extent that we could compare findings from large-scale surveys with those from smaller-scale surveys and qualitative studies—the two above-described approaches seem to suggest quite contradictory pictures of the direction of ideological change. My aim in this article is to bring these two bodies of scholarship into conversation, to gain a better understanding of the trends in gender ideologies in Russia, and to answer the questions of whether, and how, we can speak of the re-traditionalisation of gender attitudes in the 2000s without relying on the unidimensional conceptualisation of gender ideology.

### *Socio-demographic determinants of gender ideologies in Russia*

Individual-level determinants of gender-role attitudes have been widely researched in various contexts. The effects of gender, education, income and cohort on gender ideology—which my

<sup>8</sup>In the ‘career-oriented woman’ contract, women focus on professional development and the organisation of housework and childcare is usually negotiated with relatives and hired domestic and care workers. In the ‘housewife/male breadwinner’ contract, man is a dominating agent; he possesses the power and material resources to support motherhood and female sexual attractiveness. In the ‘sponsored woman’ contract, the man has a similar role as in the housewife/male breadwinner contract, but this relationship does not generally include joint residence and shared children (Temkina & Rotkirch 2002).

study focuses on—are well documented in international research. Those identifying as women, having higher education and belonging to younger cohorts usually hold more egalitarian views on gender division of labour.<sup>9</sup> Having a middle—as opposed to low or high—income has also been shown to be associated with stronger endorsement of egalitarianism (Seguino 2007).

In Russia, however, the role of various determinants of gender ideologies remains quite unclear, as most studies on the topic either focus on general societal trends or are not comparative in their design. Notably, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko (2008, p. 45), using ISSP data from 1994 and 2002, showed that, most commonly, analysed determinants had quite low explanatory power in Russia in the early postsocialist period. The same study, however, suggested that by 2002, Russians' gender attitudes became 'somewhat more predictable', with older, married, religious people without higher education expressing greater support for the male-breadwinner family model.

In terms of gender differences, while Motijunaite and Kravchenko (2008) using ISSP data did not find them to be significant, Fodor and Balogh using EUREQUAL data showed that Russian women tended to hold more liberal views than men (Fodor & Balogh 2010). In a smaller-scale study of students that compared data from 1978 and 2018, Gurko (2019) suggested that the role of gender had decreased over time, as young women and men converged towards greater endorsement of egalitarianism in the family sphere. Nechaeva (2017) found that, between 1999 and 2007, female students embraced more egalitarian views more quickly than male students, and thus the effect of gender as a determinant increased. She observed a return to more traditional views of gender roles between 2007 and 2014, and found that this return was actually faster amongst women, which resulted in decreased gender differences in attitudes.

Class has been indicated as a perhaps increasingly important determinant of Russians' gender ideologies.<sup>10</sup> As Temkina and Rotkirch (2002) and Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007) have suggested, class stratification processes in the postsocialist period have been related to the differentiation of family models and gender contracts. Indeed, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko (2008) showed that, while education was not a significant predictor of gender attitudes in 1994, by 2002 people with higher education were significantly less likely to endorse the male-breadwinner family model as opposed to the egalitarian model. So far, however, there have been no further studies on the changing role of education and/or income as determinants of gender-role attitudes in Russia.

Finally, cohort effects on gender ideologies that have been quite extensively researched elsewhere (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Cotter *et al.* 2011; Scarborough *et al.* 2019) have received almost no attention in the scholarship on Russia. In a recent comprehensive study on generations in Russia (Radaev 2019), the issue of gender attitudes was not even touched upon. Only Klüsener *et al.* (2019), in their quantitative study of a recent 'baby boom' in Belarus and Russia, tentatively suggested that one of the explanations behind this phenomenon could be that Russian and Belarusian millennials hold more conservative views

<sup>9</sup>For an overview, see Davis and Greenstein (2009), Chatillon *et al.* (2018).

<sup>10</sup>In the qualitative literature that I relied on for selecting class as a variable for my model, class is understood as a process rather than a fixed category. For a discussion, see, for example, Rotkirch *et al.* (2012). As it is challenging to operationalise class as a process in a statistical model, I chose to focus on education and income as proxies of class, following the approach of Seguino (2007) and Cooke (2011), amongst others.



on gender division of labour than previous generations. They have not, however, extensively theorised what could explain this conservative turn amongst millennials in these countries. This lack of analytical focus on potential generational differences in terms of gender ideologies is particularly surprising, given that people from different cohorts experienced the rupture of established gender expectations brought about by the economic collapse of the 1990s and the (initial) rejection of the Soviet gender ideology at different stages of their life course. While those belonging to older cohorts had to renegotiate actual gender roles within their families and/or deal with conflicts stemming from their inability to do so (Kay 2002; Ashwin 2006), those from younger cohorts initially had the role of observers. As has been shown in the case of post-Soviet Lithuania, however, those transformations have profoundly affected younger women's perceptions of desirable and potentially available gendered work–family arrangements (Reiter 2008, 2010). Notably, contrary to Klüsener *et al.*'s (2019) findings, in mid-2000s Lithuania the male-breadwinner model—which had turned out to be economically unfeasible for most post-Soviet families—occupied a relatively marginal position in 'imagined' adulthoods of young women (Reiter 2010).

In this study, using multinomial logistic regression, I not only track the historical trajectory of support for the three analysed gender ideologies, but also examine which socio-demographic characteristics influenced individuals' propensity to endorse each of them. This allows me to test whether, and how, the effects of gender and class on gender ideologies have changed over time. Focusing on birth cohorts also allows me to determine whether Russian millennials favour the separate spheres ideology more than previous generations did.

### *Method*

This article is based on data from the 1994, 2002 and 2012 waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on Family and Changing Gender Roles, in which Russia participated. The ISSP is a repeated cross-sectional survey drawing nationally representative samples of people aged 18 and over. It allows for the analysis of changes in attitudes towards gender division of labour over time, with a core set of attitudinal questions included in all waves. Income variable was the largest source of missing data (26%). In order to preserve cases with missing data, I used the multiple imputation procedure in SPSS 26, following best practices in family studies (Johnson & Young 2011). Twenty-five datasets were imputed and used for the analysis. Pooled across years, the non-weighted analytical sample size was 5,321.

### *Dependent variable: gender ideology*

My dependent variable is called 'gender ideology'. It is a nominal variable that captures the three ideologies discussed above: separate spheres, egalitarian and 'traditional (double burden)'. Building on Ashwin and Isupova's (2018) approach, I created this variable based on people's level of agreement with the following two statements:

- (1) Both the man and the woman should contribute to household income; and
  - (2) A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.
- Possible answers varied from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'.

TABLE 1  
DISTRIBUTION OF ANSWERS TO ITEMS USED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEPENDENT  
VARIABLE, COUNTS (%), POOLED SAMPLE,\* 1994–2012 ( $N=5,321$ )

		1. Both the man and the woman should contribute to household income				
		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree/nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
2. A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.	Strongly agree	527 (9.9%)	372 (7.0%)	185 (3.5%)	241 (4.5%)	45 (0.8%)
	Agree	368 (6.9%)	1021 (19.2%)	299 (5.6%)	190 (3.6%)	16 (0.3%)
	Neither agree/nor disagree	260 (4.9%)	587 (11.0%)	189 (3.6%)	40 (0.8%)	10 (0.2%)
	Disagree	322 (6.0%)	446 (8.4%)	49 (0.9%)	44 (0.8%)	7 (0.1%)
	Strongly disagree	73 (1.4%)	11 (0.2%)	6 (0.1%)	6 (0.1%)	7 (0.1%)

Notes: Percentages may not add up to 100, due to rounding up. \* Tables with distribution of answers in each individual wave are not presented for brevity but are available on request. Table 2 provides further details on changes in prevalence of different ideologies over times.

It is important to note that the item on shared breadwinning is frequently not included in unidimensional indices of gender egalitarianism constructed based on ISSP data.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, as my own exploratory analysis showed, inclusion of this item into the indices along with other items normally used in their construction radically reduces the reliability of the resulting scale. However, as Ashwin and Isupova (2018) argued, and as the frequency analysis presented also clearly suggests (see Table 1), in the Russian case this question captures an important dimension of attitudes towards gender division of labour.

In order to code the dependent variable, I first cross-tabulated answers to the two questions (see Table 1). In line with Ashwin and Isupova's findings (2018), a majority of people in all years agreed with both statements—a clear indication of the persistence of 'traditional (double burden)' ideology in Russian society. As Table 1 also shows, however, there was a small, but still substantial, number of people with 'more coherent' views, namely, clear egalitarians and clear traditionalists.

Based on the frequency analysis of answers, I coded those who (strongly) agreed with statement 1 and (strongly) disagreed with statement 2 as endorsing 'egalitarian' ideology (vertically shaded cells in Table 1). Those who (strongly) disagreed with statement 1 and (strongly) agreed with statement 2 were coded as endorsing 'separate spheres' ideology (diagonally shaded cells in Table 1). Those who did not (strongly) disagree either with statement 1 or with statement 2 were coded as endorsing 'traditional (double burden)' ideology (grey cells in Table 1).

The decision to include those with neutral answers in the latter category was taken based on the analysis of the bivariate distribution of the two variables. As Table 1 illustrates, the distribution has one clear peak located in the cell 'agree/agree'. This suggests that this ideology is hegemonic and those with neutral answers could, therefore, be assumed to be more likely to endorse rather than oppose it.

Those located in the lower right corner of Table 1, which represented 3.1% of the pooled sample, had attitudes that placed them outside of the three ideological categories; namely,

<sup>11</sup>For example, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko (2008), Treas and Tai (2016).

they opposed shared breadwinning but were also against separate spheres. I first coded them as a separate ‘inconsistent’ category. But having run the models first including them as a separate category and then as missing—which yielded essentially similar results—I opted to exclude them from further analysis.

### *Independent variables and analytical approach*

I used ‘year’ dummies to analyse changes in the likelihood of endorsing each type of gender ideology over time. ‘Household income’ was coded as a set of three dummy variables, namely, bottom 20%, middle 60% and top 20% of the household-size equivalised income distribution. I calculated household equivalised income by dividing household income as reported in the ISSP by the square root of the household size. Respondents’ ‘level of education’ was also coded as a set of three dummy variables—low, medium and high—corresponding to ISCED 2011 categories 0–2, 3–4 and 5–6 respectively. I first used local coding for the Russia-specific education variable, which then was translated into the international coding scheme ISCED 2011. To account for cohort effects, but also to understand generational differences in gender ideologies, I used a set of five ‘generations’ dummy variables. I drew on Radaev’s (2019) classification and coded those born in or before 1938 as the ‘mobilisation’ generation. Those born between 1939 and 1946 were coded as the ‘thaw’ generation, followed by the ‘stagnation’ generation born between 1947 and 1967; those born between 1968 and 1981 were coded as the ‘reform’ generation and the 1982–2000 cohort as ‘millennials’.

I also controlled for a number of other established determinants of gender ideology (Davis & Greenstein 2009). I coded respondents’ ‘labour market status’ as a dummy variable differentiating between those working for wages and those who were not. ‘Marital status’ was also coded as a dummy variable, with those married or living with partners coded as married, and all others as not married. Respondents’ ‘religiosity’ was also coded as a dummy, based on a question about whether the respondent belonged to any religion. Unfortunately, a related question on religious service attendance was not included in all the waves, so it was not possible to account for this potentially important aspect of religiosity. As at least 90% of respondents in all years had working mothers, to ensure large enough cell counts, I dropped this covariate in the final analysis. Data on urban/rural residence and parenthood could not be included as they were not available in all the waves.

As gender ideology is conceptualised as a nominal variable, I estimated a series of multinomial logistic regression models. I pooled the data for all years and respondents and regressed the dependent variable on time variables (year dummies), class characteristics (education and household income dummies), interactions of class characteristics with time variables, generational dummies and a set of control variables described above to account for compositional changes in the samples over time, as well as for alternative, individual-level explanations. Taking into account that gender is considered an important predictor of gender-role attitudes, I also included a gender dummy, as well as interactions of gender with all the other variables. All variables were entered into the models simultaneously. To simplify the presentation of the results, I then ran the same model separately for men and women. In what follows, I present the results from the latter step of the analysis, indicating the coefficients for which the gender differences were statistically significant in the pooled model (see Table 2).

TABLE 2  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Proportions					
	1994			2002		
	Total N = 1,998	Women N = 1,272	Men N = 726	Total N = 1,798	Women N = 1,103	Men N = 695
				Total N = 1,525	Women N = 978	Men N = 547
'Traditional (double burden)' ideology	0.69	0.67	0.71	0.72	0.70	0.74
Separate spheres ideology	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.08	0.08	0.09
Egalitarian ideology	0.15	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.19	0.14
Inconsistent attitudes/missing	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Income						
Low income/bottom income quintile	0.20	0.25	0.13	0.20	0.23	0.15
Medium income	0.60	0.58	0.61	0.60	0.59	0.61
High income/top income quintile	0.20	0.17	0.26	0.20	0.18	0.24
Education						
Low level of education	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.25	0.24
Medium level of education	0.66	0.68	0.62	0.56	0.55	0.58
Higher education	0.12	0.10	0.16	0.20	0.20	0.18
Generation						
'Mobilisation'	0.20	0.22	0.16	0.21	0.24	0.16
'Thaw'	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12
'Stagnation'	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.39	0.37	0.42
'Reform'	0.19	0.17	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.24
'Millennials'	–	–	–	0.05	0.05	0.06
Married (0 = no; 1 = yes)	0.69	0.66	0.75	0.53	0.47	0.62
Working for wages (0 = no; 1 = yes)	0.68	0.63	0.77	0.56	0.48	0.67
Religious (0 = no; 1 = yes)	0.55	0.66	0.36	0.76	0.81	0.68

Note: Pooled statistics based on 25 imputed samples.

TABLE 3  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY, ODDS RATIOS

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Year (ref. category: 1994)</i>						
2002	2.82*	1.70	1.21	1.50	0.43	1.16
2012	4.24*	1.29	1.03	1.23	0.24*	0.72
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level of education	3.39***	2.67*	2.45**	1.97 <sup>+</sup>	0.34**	0.73
Higher education	4.55***	3.92**	1.14	3.46**	0.54	0.88
Medium level education*2002	0.24** <sup>‡</sup>	0.95	0.98	0.57	4.06** <sup>†</sup>	0.60
Higher education*2002	0.22** <sup>‡</sup>	1.00	0.96	0.45	4.33* <sup>†</sup>	0.45
Medium level education*2012	0.20**	0.32 <sup>+</sup>	1.68	0.67	8.27***	2.13
Higher education*2012	0.22*	0.29 <sup>+</sup>	1.05	0.36 <sup>+</sup>	4.68*	1.23
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	1.45	1.02	1.41 <sup>+</sup> <sup>‡</sup>	0.69	0.97	0.68
High income	1.83 <sup>+</sup>	1.67	1.42 <sup>‡</sup>	0.61	0.78	0.36 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2002	0.68	0.48	0.40	1.21	1.14	2.54
High income*2002	0.72	0.38	0.91	1.69	1.32	4.44 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2012	0.34*	0.67	0.56 <sup>+</sup>	1.36	1.64	2.03
High income*2012	0.15**	0.22 <sup>+</sup>	0.44 <sup>+</sup>	0.99	2.96	4.46
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.13	0.72	0.85	0.86	0.75	1.19
Stagnation generation	1.39	0.97	0.85	0.73	0.61 <sup>+</sup>	0.75
Reform generation	1.63* <sup>†</sup>	0.70	0.92	0.79	0.57*	1.13
Millennials	1.52	1.38	1.08	0.65	0.71	0.47
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.05	1.06	1.11	0.97	1.06	0.91
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	0.99	0.83	0.72** <sup>‡</sup>	1.04	0.73 <sup>+</sup>	1.25
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	0.99	1.01	0.72**	0.87	0.73 <sup>+</sup>	0.86
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.032***	0.076***	0.243***	0.167***	7.668***	2.181

Notes: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 0.061$  (women's model). Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 0.063$  (men's model). <sup>†‡</sup>Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (<sup>†</sup>) or at  $p < 0.1$  (<sup>‡</sup>) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from a pooled model (not shown).

### Results

The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3. To facilitate the interpretation of the regression results, in Figure 1 the key time- and class-related findings are presented visually using predicted probabilities. Although the statistical power to detect significant effects is limited by the small number of cases in some subgroups, the emerging picture of changes and the class-specific character of those changes are quite clear.

'Traditional (double burden)' remained by far the most prevalent ideology amongst men and women of all classes throughout the analysed period. However, there were important class differences in trends of support for it. In 1994 more educated and more affluent




FIGURE 1. PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORTING VARIOUS GENDER IDEOLOGIES FOR MEN AND WOMEN FROM DIFFERENT CLASSES, 1994–2012

*Note:* Predicted probabilities were calculated on the basis of a pooled model that included year and gender dummies, as well as interaction terms for gender with all other predictors. Predictions are for married, non-religious, employed individuals belonging to the 'stagnation' generation.

women and men were significantly less likely to embrace this ideology than women and men from lower classes. By 2012, however, the class gradient was no longer observed. This class convergence was related primarily to an increased likelihood of endorsing this ideology amongst more educated and affluent women and men; and, to a smaller extent, to a slightly decreased appeal of this mode of gender division of labour for lower-class women.

As for the separate spheres ideology, the regression results show that behind the overall trend of decreasing support, as reflected in the descriptive statistics, there were idiosyncratic class processes. The likelihood of endorsing this ideology decreased only amongst more educated and affluent women and men. Notably, while in 1994 both higher levels of education and higher household income were important predictors of support for separate spheres for both genders, by 2012 this was no longer the case. Amongst less educated women, on the other hand, the likelihood of supporting this ideology slightly increased over time.

Finally, in relation to egalitarianism, the descriptive statistics suggested that, following some increase in support for this during the first postsocialist decade, in the 2000s there was a roll-back. Again, multivariate analysis showed that this was a trend characteristic of higher classes only. While the likelihood of supporting this ideology remained almost unchanged amongst lower classes, amongst highly educated and affluent women and men it first significantly increased between 1994 and 2002, and then sharply decreased during the following decade. It is important to note, however, that even in 2012, women from higher classes were significantly more likely to support egalitarianism than either similarly educated and affluent men, or men and women from lower classes.

Analysis of generational coefficients provided further insights into potential directions of change. Overall, generational differences in the likelihood of support for each of the ideologies were rather minor. Amongst men, millennials were the most likely to endorse separate spheres, and they had a significantly higher likelihood of supporting this ideology than the 'thaw' and 'reform' generation men. Amongst women, by contrast, it was the 'reform' generation that turned out to be the strongest supporters of this ideology.<sup>12</sup>

Analysis of control variables suggested that marital status had no effect on gender ideologies. Not working for wages was associated with lower likelihood of supporting egalitarianism, but only amongst women. Identifying as religious was also associated with lower likelihood of supporting egalitarianism, but only amongst women was the association statistically significant.

### *Discussion and conclusions*

This article has aimed to determine to what extent we can speak about the re-traditionalisation of gender ideologies in Russia in the 2000s; whether and how the effects of gender and class as their determinants have changed over time; and whether Russian millennials could be considered more traditionalist than the previous generations. The analysis has shown that in the 2000s one could, indeed, observe a sort of re-traditionalisation of attitudes towards the

<sup>12</sup>A pooled model with year\*generation interactions (not shown; available from the author on request) confirmed that millennial women had consistently low likelihood of supporting the separate spheres ideology in 2002–2012. A more puzzling and concerning finding in terms of possible future changes concerned the trends of support for the other two ideologies amongst women of this birth cohort. In 2002, millennial women expressed significantly stronger support than women of other generations for egalitarian ideology. It was also much stronger than the likelihood of endorsing this ideology amongst the 'reform' generation of women back in 1994 (when they were at approximately the same stage of their life course). However, between 2002 and 2012, the support for egalitarianism amongst millennial women fell substantially, while their endorsement of 'traditional (double burden)' ideology increased.

gender division of labour. However, the processes were very class specific. Furthermore, this re-traditionalisation did not primarily entail the strengthening of the separate spheres ideology, as is usually implied in the quantitative studies relying on the unidimensional framework (Nechaeva 2017; Kosova 2018; Klüsener *et al.* 2019). Amongst highly educated and affluent women and men, we witnessed a continuing increase in support for the ‘traditional (double burden)’ ideology, combined with a complete abandonment of the separate sphere ideal. Both trends, however, were already visible in the 1990s. What was different in the 2000s was the substantially decreased likelihood of support for egalitarianism amongst this class. Amongst lower-class women and men, attitudes were more stable in the period I studied, although the appeal of separate spheres to this class was on a slightly upward trend in both decades.

As a result of these idiosyncratic processes, contrary to my theoretical expectation about the increased effect of class on gender ideologies during the postsocialist period (Temkina & Rotkirch 2002), in 2012, class differences appeared to be at a historical low. While in 1994 the endorsement of separate spheres was clearly a prerogative of higher-educated and more affluent women and men, this ideology had completely lost its appeal amongst this group by the end of the analysed period.<sup>13</sup> Relatedly, while the ‘traditional (double burden)’ ideology had significantly less support amongst higher-class women and men in 1994, by 2012 they were overwhelmingly sympathetic to it. Only in levels of support for the egalitarian ideology did class gradients—which were always observed amongst women only—remain significant even in 2012.

However, we should not interpret this seemingly attitudinal convergence as an indication that class does not have an effect on gender ideologies in contemporary Russia. First, the findings show that the trends in endorsement of all the three analysed ideologies were highly class specific. Therefore, despite the convergence in 2012, it is reasonable to assume that the class gradients could have increased again in the subsequent years not covered by this study, if the trends have continued. Second, the renewed support for women’s employment amongst higher classes should be distinguished from the lingering support for it amongst lower classes. While the latter suggests attitudinal path dependency, the former could rather be interpreted as a response to rising economic inequality, as has been shown in studies elsewhere (Pepin & Cotter 2018). More educated and affluent Russians are becoming increasingly aware that women’s incomes are essential for maintaining families’ (upper-)middle-class positions, and are no longer toying with the idea of the housewife/breadwinner family model that may have appealed to them as being very middle-class back in the 1990s.

In terms of gender differences, it is notable that the overall trends amongst men and women with comparable levels of education and income were rather similar. And it is hardly possible, based on these data, to speak about gender convergence or divergence, as suggested by other studies (Nechaeva 2017; Gurko 2019). Echoing the findings by Fodor and Balogh (2010), it is, however, important to point out that women from higher classes remain by far the strongest supporters of egalitarianism in Russia.

<sup>13</sup>See also, Ashwin and Isupova (2018), who pointed out the diminished support for separate spheres at the aggregate level.



Finally, my findings regarding generational differences suggest that the argument that Russian millennials favour a separate spheres ideology more than previous generations (Klüsener *et al.* 2019) is applicable to men only. Further studies will be needed to understand the mechanism underlying the moderating role of gender in this relation. It is reasonable to assume, though, that the formative experiences of this generation during the 1990s—including the inability of many of the millennials' fathers to live up to breadwinner expectations; their mothers often having to become main breadwinners, while still being considered primarily responsible for care and domestic work; and the family conflicts and breakdowns caused by the above (Kay 2002; Ashwin 2006)—have had a differential impact on young men's and women's attitudes.

Key limitations of this study stem from the nature of the data used for the analysis. First, this study does not cover the period after 2012, when Russia's 'conservative turn' significantly accelerated (Makarychev & Medvedev 2015). Echoing the argument brought forward by Makarychev and Medvedev (2015), I suggest that it is unlikely that these developments have affected the Russian public's attitudes towards women's employment and breadwinning. However, essentialist views on women's primary responsibility for care work could have strengthened even further in this period. It will, therefore, be important to repeat the sort of analysis presented in this article when the next round of the ISSP Family and Gender Roles survey planned for 2022 becomes available. Second, due to the relatively small sample sizes in each wave, it was beyond the scope of this study to identify further possible variations in ideologies. Further studies on larger samples will be needed, in order to provide a potentially more complex picture of the multitude of gender ideologies in contemporary Russia. For example, it might be worth exploring quantitatively how the ideology of 'intensive parenting' (or rather, mothering)—which entails a combination of beliefs in gender equality in breadwinning and caring with a notion that young children suffer when mothers work (Grunow *et al.* 2018)—has transformed in the postsocialist period. Qualitative studies suggest that this ideology might be strengthening in Russia (Isupova 2018). Thirdly, as often is the case with surveys, the ISSP sample did not include high and ultra-high net worth respondents. Therefore, the findings of this study should be regarded as descriptive of changes amongst middle and lower classes only. The findings of an interview-based study of Russian elites (Schimpfössl 2018, p. 134) suggest that, even amongst that group, the separate spheres ideology is no longer prevalent, as people generally feel that women should work outside the home and 'pursue their own thing'. At the same time, Schimpfössl also highlighted the development of a sort of Western-style bourgeois masculinity amongst Russian elites, premised on the idea that 'good fathers provide but are also concerned about maintaining a warm and loving relationship with their children' (Schimpfössl 2018, pp. 127–28). The latter would suggest the increasing prevalence of egalitarian attitudes in this class. Testing this hypothesis is, unfortunately, not possible with the available data.

This article fills two currently existing gaps in the scholarship on Russia. It provides quantitative evidence on the direction of change in multiple gender ideologies. It also brings centre-stage the issues of class and generation, which have been notably absent from the empirical quantitative studies of the topic.

In terms of its wider theoretical contributions, this study lends further support to the argument about the multidimensionality of gender ideologies (Grunow *et al.* 2018). My

findings highlight how social group identities such as gender, class and generation could interact to shape individuals' gender ideologies and how the influence of these factors could change over time, something we still know relatively little about (Chatillon *et al.* 2018).

In conclusion, what do my findings reveal about the direction of possible change in gender relations in contemporary Russia? On the one hand, the sort of ideological re-traditionalisation amongst more educated and affluent men and women identified in this article is concerning, taking into account that behavioural social changes could be expected to emanate from the upper social strata (Bourdieu 1984). On the other hand, the fact that a significant proportion of highly educated and affluent women still favours egalitarianism, and that millennial women (in contrast to millennial men) do not show any increased interest in the return to separate spheres, may be a positive sign. Taking into account the increasing relative size of this group of women in the general population and their increasing political awareness and activism on gender issues (Couch 2020), this implies that progressive change in gender relations in Russian families is being already demanded at the micro level. Whether these changes will result in macro-level transformations remains to be seen.

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### Appendix

TABLE A1  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY IN 1994, ODDS RATIOS

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	3.33***	3.00**	1.28	2.23*	0.38*	0.74
Higher education	4.29***	4.33**	2.73***	4.09**	0.65	0.94
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	1.43	1.06	1.50 <sup>+</sup> ‡	0.73 <sup>‡</sup>	1.05	0.68
High income	1.85 <sup>+</sup>	1.85	1.70 <sup>+</sup> ‡	0.67 <sup>‡</sup>	0.92	0.36 <sup>+</sup>
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.34	0.73	1.06	0.80	0.79	1.10
Stagnation generation	1.72	1.04	1.23	0.77	0.71	0.74
Reform generation	1.25	0.60	0.67	0.74	0.54	1.24
Millennials	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.05	0.97	1.21	1.04	1.15	1.07
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	1.05	1.11	1.26	1.56	1.21	1.41
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	0.91	1.14	0.81	0.88	0.89	0.77
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.03***	0.06***	0.13***	0.12***	4.20*	2.05

Notes: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 0.066$  (women's model). Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 0.073$  (men's model). <sup>‡</sup> Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (†) or at  $p < 0.1$  (‡) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from the year-specific pooled model for men and women (not shown).

TABLE A2  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY IN 2002, ODDS RATIOS

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	0.89 <sup>‡</sup>	2.68** <sup>‡</sup>	1.36	0.98	1.52 <sup>†</sup>	0.37 <sup>+ †</sup>
Higher education	1.11 <sup>†</sup>	4.36*** <sup>a</sup>	2.91*** <sup>‡</sup>	1.30 <sup>‡</sup>	2.61* <sup>†</sup>	0.30 <sup>+ †</sup>
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	0.98	0.50 <sup>+</sup>	1.02	0.87	1.04	1.72
High income	1.26	0.66	1.20	1.01	0.95	1.52
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.14	0.83	0.76	1.11	0.67	1.34
Stagnation generation	0.98	1.13	0.54*	0.78	0.56	0.69
Reform generation	2.10 <sup>+</sup>	0.95	0.72	0.63	0.34*	0.67
Millennials	2.03	2.22	2.94** <sup>†</sup>	0.68 <sup>†</sup>	1.45	0.31
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.10	0.95	0.96	1.13	0.87	1.19
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	0.87	1.01	0.53**	0.69	0.61	0.68
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	1.36	1.36	0.67 <sup>+ ‡</sup>	1.15 <sup>‡</sup>	0.52 <sup>+</sup>	0.85
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.07***	0.06***	0.40*	0.24*	5.72*	3.98

Notes: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.082 (women's model). Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.047 (men's model). <sup>†‡</sup> Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (<sup>†</sup>) or at  $p < 0.1$  (<sup>‡</sup>) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from the year-specific pooled model for men and women (not shown).

TABLE A3  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY IN 2012, ODDS RATIOS

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	0.75	0.72	1.79 <sup>+</sup>	1.35	2.39 <sup>+</sup>	1.88
Higher education	1.21	1.00	2.34*	1.31	1.94	1.31
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	0.50 <sup>+</sup>	0.71	0.80	0.89	1.59	1.25
High income	0.30 <sup>+</sup>	0.37	0.63	0.60	2.11	1.62
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	0.76	1.00	1.14	0.65	1.50	0.65
Stagnation generation	1.32	0.75	1.01	0.54	0.77	0.71
Reform generation	2.32	0.68	1.28	0.82	0.55	1.19
Millennials	1.62	0.93	0.85	0.61	0.52	0.65
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.17	1.70	1.26	0.74	1.08	0.43
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	1.69 <sup>†</sup>	0.44 <sup>†</sup>	0.58* <sup>‡</sup>	1.19 <sup>‡</sup>	0.35*** <sup>†</sup>	2.73 <sup>+</sup> <sup>†</sup>
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	1.20	0.35*	0.61 <sup>+</sup>	0.82	0.51	1.50
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.07**	0.38	0.27*	0.36	4.04	0.96

Notes: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.061 (women's model). Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.072 (men's model). <sup>†‡</sup> Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (<sup>†</sup>) or at  $p < 0.1$  (<sup>‡</sup>) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from the year-specific pooled model for men and women (not shown).

TABLE A4  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY, ODDS RATIOS, POOLED YEARS 1994–2012

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Year (ref. category: 1994)</i>						
2002	2.82*	1.70	1.21	1.50	0.43	1.16
2012	4.24*	1.29	1.03	1.23	0.24*	0.72
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	3.39***	2.67*	2.45**	1.97 <sup>+</sup>	0.34**	0.73
Higher education	4.55***	3.92**	1.14	3.46**	0.54	0.88
Medium level education*2002	0.24** <sup>‡</sup>	0.95	0.98	0.57	4.06** <sup>†</sup>	0.60
Higher education*2002	0.22** <sup>‡</sup>	1.00	0.96	0.45	4.33* <sup>†</sup>	0.45
Medium level education*2012	0.20**	0.32 <sup>+</sup>	1.68	0.67	8.27***	2.13
Higher education*2012	0.22*	0.29 <sup>+</sup>	1.05	0.36 <sup>+</sup>	4.68*	1.23
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	1.45	1.02	1.41 <sup>+</sup> <sup>‡</sup>	0.69	0.97	0.68
High income	1.83 <sup>+</sup>	1.67	1.42 <sup>‡</sup>	0.61	0.78	0.36 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2002	0.68	0.48	0.40	1.21	1.14	2.54
High income*2002	0.72	0.38	0.91	1.69	1.32	4.44 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2012	0.34*	0.67	0.56 <sup>+</sup>	1.36	1.64	2.03
High income*2012	0.15**	0.22 <sup>+</sup>	0.44 <sup>+</sup>	0.99	2.96	4.46
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.13	0.72	0.85	0.86	0.75	1.19
Stagnation generation	1.39	0.97	0.85	0.73	0.61 <sup>+</sup>	0.75
Reform generation	1.63* <sup>†</sup>	0.70	0.92	0.79	0.57*	1.13
Millennials	1.52	1.38	1.08	0.65	0.71	0.47
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.05	1.06	1.11	0.97	1.06	0.91
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	0.99	0.83	0.72** <sup>‡</sup>	1.04	0.73 <sup>+</sup>	1.25
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	0.99	1.01	0.72**	0.87	0.73 <sup>+</sup>	0.86
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.032***	0.076***	0.243***	0.167***	7.668***	2.181

Notes: <sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.061 (women's model). Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.063 (men's model). <sup>†‡</sup> Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (<sup>†</sup>) or at  $p < 0.1$  (<sup>‡</sup>) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from a pooled model (not shown).

TABLE A5  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY, ODDS RATIOS, POOLED YEARS 1994–2012

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Year (ref. category: 1994)</i>						
2002	2.75 <sup>+</sup>	1.08	0.96	1.11	0.35 <sup>+</sup>	1.02
2012	5.05*	1.42	0.82	1.26	0.16*	0.89
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	3.41***	2.85*	1.24	2.09 <sup>+</sup>	0.36*	0.73
Higher education	4.34***	3.91**	2.54**	3.65**	0.58	0.93
Medium level education*2002	0.27**	0.91	1.16	0.51	4.34**	0.55
Higher education*2002	0.27*	1.06	1.25	0.40 <sup>+</sup>	4.71*	0.38
Medium level education*2012	0.21**	0.29	1.48	0.69	6.97**	2.37
Higher education*2012	0.25*	0.28	0.96	0.36	3.87 <sup>+</sup>	1.29
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	1.45	1.03	1.43 <sup>+</sup>	0.69	0.99	0.67
High income	1.90*	1.76	1.49	0.62	0.79	0.35 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2002	0.35	0.48	0.88	1.26	1.28	2.65
High income*2002	0.50	0.36	0.75	1.70	1.10	4.47 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2012	0.34*	0.66	0.56 <sup>+</sup>	1.32	1.67	2.00
High income*2012	0.15**	0.21	0.44 <sup>+</sup>	0.94	3.01	4.44
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.38	0.63	0.75	0.64	0.54	1.01
Stagnation generation	1.80 <sup>+</sup>	0.91	0.81	0.61	0.45*	0.67
Reform generation	1.25	0.52	0.57 <sup>+</sup>	0.68	0.46 <sup>+</sup>	1.31
Millennials	2.10	1.91	3.27***	0.87	1.56	0.46
Thaw generation*2002	0.85	1.22	1.10	1.94	1.29	0.80
Stagnation generation*2002	0.62	1.13	0.88	1.65	1.43	1.46
Reform generation*2002	1.82	1.58	1.59	1.26	0.88	1.59
Millennials*2002	—	—	—	—	—	—
Thaw generation*2012	0.55	1.41	1.50	1.02	2.74	0.72
Stagnation generation*2012	0.65	1.18	1.36	0.87	2.10	0.74
Reform generation*2012	1.33	2.15	2.55*	1.15	1.92	0.53
Millennials*2012	0.61	0.75	0.29*	0.60	0.48	0.80
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.11	1.08	1.13	0.98	1.02	0.90
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	1.09	0.86	0.73*	1.05	0.68*	1.23
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	1.01	1.00	0.73**	0.87	0.72 <sup>+</sup>	0.87
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.026***	0.080***	0.248***	0.183***	9.412***	2.300

Notes: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.072 (women's model). Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.069 (men's model).