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Shaping Online News Recommendations in Russia: The Yandex.News Controversies¹

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Abstract

In Russia, numerous controversies have arisen since 2012 around the political role of the aggregator Yandex.news in prioritizing media news. Through its algorithm, this service is suspected of contributing to the decline of information pluralism for political purposes. These suspicions have only grown with the start of the war in Ukraine.

Where Google Does Not Dominate

Russia is among the few countries in the world where Google does not dominate the online search industry. In 2020, the Russian-language equivalent, Yandex, held just under half the market share (about 45 percent).

Yandex has long benefitted from a certain degree of autonomy, and its founders have even, at different moments, expressed political disagreement with the Kremlin. However, as a national economic champion and a key player in the organization of information, it has found itself under tight scrutiny. This has been particularly true since the 2011–2012 protests against electoral fraud and the 2014 annexation of Crimea, which also represented turning points for Russia due to the increased control exerted over the media, Internet, and civil society (Oates, 2013; Soldatov and Borogan, 2015; Wijermars and Lehtisaari, 2020).

A case in point is the Yandex.Novosti (“Yandex. News”) aggregator—the Russian equivalent of Google News, launched in 2004—which is the focus of this article. When they first appeared, search engines and recommendation systems such as aggregators were designed as tools that would make the diversity of content on the Web more manageable. As a vast body of research has shown, however, these platforms occupy a strategic place and have become key intermediaries in channeling information to end users *qua* citizens. Thus, they wield a form of power in shaping users’ perception of social reality that scholars, policymakers and civil society alike are still in the process of defining. With the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the role of Yandex.News in controlling the media agenda in Russia has become an even more crucial issue.

Algorithmic Gatekeeping in Digital Media Ecosystems

The Yandex.News aggregator can be described as an *automated news recommender system*. The best-known

example of such a service is the Google News aggregator, which was first launched in 2002 and taken out of beta in 2006 (Bharat, 2006). Initially, the service aimed to provide a broad overview of trending news by presenting users with “clusters” of related articles. As of 2021, the service indexed tens of thousands of news websites around the world and was woven into Google’s main web search service.

Google and Yandex alike have generally presented their services as “neutral,” but such claims to objectivity have been criticized for various reasons. For the past decade, because of their increasingly powerful personalization features, some of the main Web services—and particularly Google’s search engines—have been suspected of entrapping users in “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers” (Pariser, 2011; Bozdag, 2013). By making users oblivious to certain types of information or to alternative perspectives, and by sometimes reinforcing existing prejudices or biases, these services arguably undermine the public sphere. Search algorithms and automated recommender systems have also been criticized for promoting outrage and conspiracy theories, with the YouTube recommendation algorithm, for instance, being presented as “the great radicalizer” (Tufekci, 2018).

However, the reality of these phenomena is difficult to assess precisely (Flaxman et al., 2016; Bruns, 2019), particularly in the case of search engines, which have also been shown to increase information diversity (see Fletcher and Nielsen, 2018). The algorithms deployed by these platforms can therefore be perceived as an “invisible hand,” deciding which topics will be singled out as relevant and which news outlets will be pushed to the forefront according to sometimes unfathomable criteria—profoundly affecting the nature of journalism in the process, as professionals adjust the form and nature of their published content in line with these constraints

¹ A longer version of this article has been published online: Daucé, Françoise, and Benjamin Loveluck. “Codes of conduct for algorithmic news recommendation: the Yandex. News controversy in Russia.” *First Monday* (2021).

(Brake, 2017; Christin, 2020). In the Russian political context, the issue raised by the Yandex.News aggregator is acute: could it be manipulated for political reasons, either through direct interference with the results or by fooling its algorithm?

Yandex.News as Political Controversy

Russia's political leadership has targeted Yandex.News through various policies and legal initiatives since 2014. Yandex.News presents a selection of topics and articles that purport to reflect the themes most widely covered by the media at any given moment. To do so, it processes the information published by a range of (mainly Russian) online media. Yandex.News was launched in 2004 and was initially a pilot project led by a team of computer scientists and linguists who had been hired to develop named-entity recognition and extraction in the news. The Yandex.News team claims that the algorithm works in the absence of human intervention. News from partners is gathered into topics through the algorithm's clustering process, which analyzes keywords and facts using three main criteria: citation rate, recency, and informativity. A Top 5 of its aggregation results is always visible on the Russian version of the Yandex homepage, just above the search box. In 2017, according to Gligori Bakunov, Yandex Technical Director, "The daily audience of the five news items that appear on the Yandex homepage is the same as the homepage—approximately 20 million people, depending on the day. Six million visit the Yandex.News page daily."

However, the controversies that arose after 2012 put an end to public belief in the objectivity of the aggregator. That year was a decisive one for freedom of expression in Russia and a "watershed moment" for Internet regulation (Lonkila et al., 2020). Control over the public sphere increased again in 2014 during the conflict with Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea. Yandex.News, in particular, found itself at the heart of a political controversy after being accused of partiality by the authorities for providing visibility to information that did not align with the official narrative. The site Pravda.ru wondered whether "Yandex lights a 'Maidan' in Russia?" (referring to the protests in Kiev that led to regime change in Ukraine).² The newspaper was outraged by the headlines chosen by the news aggregator and claimed that legal regulation of its activity was required. This led to the adoption in 2016 of a law on news aggregators that was designed to extend control of the media to such intermediaries and specifically targeted Yandex.News.³ Those news aggregators that received over one million

daily visitors became legally responsible for any content published in their results (and at risk of heavy fines in the event of violations), unless the selected media had been officially registered with Roskomnadzor. The law went into effect on January 1, 2017, whereupon all non-registered media (including dissenting voices such as Mediazona), as well as all foreign media (such as the BBC in Russian and exiled media such as Meduza), disappeared from both the Top 5 results presented on the Yandex homepage and Yandex.News. In sum, the aggregator may claim to be neutral and objective, but on the one hand, the authorities denounce its propensity to relay discontent and destabilize the political situation, while on the other hand, journalists, web professionals, and activists underline that its institutional framing requires it to promote a "loyal" agenda.

Its shortcomings have been made clear since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as the last remaining independent media have gradually been shut down. In a post published on his Facebook page three days after the beginning of the war, Lev Gershenzon, former head of Yandex.News, stated:

Now every day Russia's war against Ukraine is possible because there are no mass anti-war demonstrations in Russian cities. And they don't happen not only because of the danger of reprisals to those who do come out (huge admiration to all who do come out), but mainly because the vast majority of the population is unaware that Russian troops are in their fourth day of full-scale warfare. Leading this ignorance, along with television, is Yandex—a website and apps with a news bloc, 5 news, "on the home page." This news gets straight to people precisely because they do not come for it, but for some other reason: to find a product or the address of a pharmacy, to see the dollar exchange rate or the weather, etc. We once articulated that the task of this unit was to find out "if anything is wrong." So now it says: "no, there is no problem." [...] Every hour and day that it works the way it does now is an endorsement of the war.⁴

The Yandex Rankings as a Gateway to the Algorithm and Its Transformations

Though it is difficult to investigate the algorithm itself, one can look at the output that the aggregator displays. During the month of June 2020, we conducted a quantitative analysis of the news selected by Yandex.News and presented as part of the Top 5 on the Yandex homepage.

2 "Yandex 'razzhigaet' Majdan v Rossii?", Pravda, at <http://www.pravda.ru/topic/yandex-617/>.

3 Federal Law № FZ-208, 23 June 2016.

4 Lev Gershenzon Facebook page, February 27, 2022.

We carried out a systematic scraping of news: between June 1 and June 30, 2020, we automatically collected the Yandex.News rankings every two hours and listed a total of 3,011 references.⁵ It appeared that, during this period, only 14 media outlets were cited in the Top 5—an extremely narrow sample considering the more than 7,000 sources listed in the Yandex.News database. We then extended the scraping to the period June–December 2020 and obtained the same results, with the same 14 media appearing in the Top 5 over this period. The data provide striking evidence of the concentration of information on Yandex.News with a few large media players: public press agencies, state-funded media, leading newspapers, and mainstream online publications (RIA Novosti, Gazeta.ru, Izvestia, RBK, Lenta.ru, RT in Russian, Kommersant, Regnum, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, TASS, Vesti.ru, Vedomosti, BFM.ru, and Interfax).

The over-representation of specific news publishers has also been demonstrated in the case of Google News (Schroeder and Kralemann, 2005; Haim et al., 2018), but not to such an extent. Our results from Yandex.News feature a much narrower range of publications than the findings of Nechushtai and Lewis (2019) in the case of Google News in the US, for instance. Although 14 outlets likewise dominated that aggregator, a long tail of other publications also figured in the results. Moreover, even if nuances can be detected between the 14 major media that dominate Yandex.News in terms of their editorial line, it is evident that in 2020, “officially sanctioned” media reached Yandex’s heights more easily. Indeed, most of the 14 selected outlets are related to the Kremlin: they are either funded by the state directly or are privately owned by “loyalist” figures or entities and thus indirectly “managed” by the authorities.

The recent history of Yandex.News in Russia highlights how platform regulation can be leveraged to set up a form of “governance by algorithms” of the media and the public sphere. Initially presented as a technical means to “objectively” assess the diversity of online con-

tent, the aggregator sparked techno-political controversy in the 2010s: it was criticized by the authorities for promoting “unpatriotic” or “fake” news, while journalists, web professionals, and end users increasingly suspected that *inconvenient* truths would find it difficult to reach its top rankings. The adoption in 2016 of a law on news aggregators, which allowed only officially “registered” sources to be displayed by the service, clearly reflected an intention on the part of the authorities to domesticate the platform in order to limit the visibility of protests and discontent in the public sphere. This regulation took place in a complex digital ecosystem that articulates different levels of gatekeeping, including Yandex.News and other platforms, the telecommunications watchdog Roskomnadzor, as well as media outlets and journalists.

Yandex as a news recommender system abides by both legal and technical “codes of conduct” that help ensure that the information it promotes and amplifies remains in check. Although no outright censorship has yet been demonstrated at the level of Yandex.News, the aggregator appears to be an important cog in the machine of tightening control exerted by the authorities over the overall Russian media ecosystem. Until recently, however, governance by algorithms has remained imperfect and taken place in an intricate technical, political, legal, and economic context where national and international platforms have coexisted and competed.

Journalists and publishers could seek alternative channels to distribute information, relying on social media such as Telegram or Twitter. It remains to be seen how far this will still be possible as the war unfolds and the space for critical voices diminishes. Up until the beginning of the war, the Russian authorities justified their efforts to control the media agenda and to reassert their sovereignty over the public sphere by denouncing information framed as “unpatriotic,” “fake” or otherwise problematic. Today, any dissenting views are being quelled, and the role of Yandex.News is at the heart of political concerns about the use of algorithms for warmongering.

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⁵ We analyzed the code of the Yandex homepage and found that 10 news references were presented at any given time. We therefore set up a Node.js script to collect these 10 references every two hours: four references occupy places 1 to 4 of the Top 5, while the fifth place is likely occupied by the six other references on a rotating basis. The script uses two main Node libraries: Puppeteer for scraping and Mongoose for database registration. After manually analyzing the html code of the homepage and several other pages of the website, we wrote javascript code to scrape the content of the 10 top news (title, date, source name, source url, rank on the homepage). The data was then registered in a MongoDB database using the Mongoose library.

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ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST

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