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ARTICLE

And if they don't dance, they are no friends of mine: Exploring boundaries of national identity

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Abstract

National identity is widely used to explain anti-immigrant attitudes and thus the appeal for right-wing (populist) parties. Yet, consensus on how to capture national identity is lacking. This article identifies ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making across 42 countries and more than 25 years beyond the ethnic-civic dichotomy and addresses the multidimensionality of national identity. Using latent class analysis and cluster analysis, four ideal-typical conceptions of nationhood are identified and shown to be differently related to national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism. Overall, the results close the methodological-empirical gap between classical approaches and recent inductive approaches to national identity and demonstrate that national identity is a cross-cultural phenomenon with distinct types.

KEYWORDS

large-scale comparison, latent class analysis, national boundary making, national identity, nationhood

1 | INTRODUCTION

National identity plays an important role in explaining social cohesion, trust, and in particular anti-immigrant sentiments and has therefore also been used to explain the appeal of right-wing (populist) parties (e.g., Bonikowski et al., 2021; Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Hjerm, 1998a; Hochmann et al., 2016; Jones & Smith, 2001a; Kunovich, 2009; Mader et al., 2021; Wright, 2011a). Yet, consensus on how to capture national identity is lacking.

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Most quantitative research relating national identity to openness and hostility towards outsiders relies on the dichotomy of ethnic versus civic conceptions of nationhood (Brubaker, 1994; Kohn, 2005; Smith, 1991). These conceptions differ in how national boundaries are defined. Whereas ethnic conceptions emphasise ascriptive membership criteria (e.g., ancestry), civic conceptions emphasise voluntaristic criteria (e.g., adherence to shared values). However, this dichotomy, which was originally derived from the analysis of state-level resources (Meinecke, 1970; cf. Helbling et al., 2016; cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010), has proven to be insufficient to fully capture the complexity of individual national identity (Pehrson et al., 2009; Reijerse et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2012). More recent advances have therefore introduced person-centred methods like cluster analysis (CA) and latent class analysis (LCA). Findings from research using CA demonstrate that individuals select and arrange membership criteria beyond the ethnic–civic dichotomy and that these patterns of national boundary making—or rather the underlying conceptualisations of nationhood— influence attitudes towards outsiders (e.g., Hjerm, 1998a, 1998b; Trittler, 2017a). Studies using a multidimensional approach to studying national identity beyond membership criteria have found that conceptualisations of nationhood *together* with national attachment, pride, and chauvinism compose certain types of nationalism that influence attitudes (e.g., Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016) and attraction to right-wing (populist) parties (Bonikowski et al., 2021). While studies using CA have been limited to few country samples, studies employing LCA in the multidimensional approach of national identity have recently been heavily criticised, both conceptually and empirically, for combining multiple distinct dimensions of national identity into one model (Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, 2022b). Overall, there is a lack of a strictly person-centred analysis which would identify patterns of national boundary making as well as the theoretically distinct dimensions of nationalism in a large-scale comparative setting.

Building on previous approaches and findings, this paper explores the ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making based on the membership criteria measure typically used by researchers. By using person-centred methods, this approach uncovers underlying conceptualisations of nationhood and thus overcomes the ethnic–civic dichotomy. A comparative analysis examines which concepts of nationhood are held by citizens and whether these concepts can be generalised. Finally, I address national identity's multidimensionality by analysing the relationship of these patterns of national boundary making with national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism.

Combining LCA and CA to analyse a large-scale harmonised comparative data spread across more than 25 years and 42 countries, I demonstrate the existence of four unique types beyond the ethnic–civic distinction: exclusionists, assimilationists, integrationists, and pluralists. Specifically, assimilationists and integrationists express selective boundary making patterns which uncover distinct conceptualisations of nationhood. Exclusionists and pluralists can be characterised by an overall emphasis in the case of exclusionists or an outright rejection of membership criteria in the case of pluralists. The results support the assumption that membership criteria items are differentially selected, arranged, and even understood by respondents based on the underlying conceptualisations of nationhood that they have. Furthermore, analyses of the relationship between dimensions of national identity show that being exclusionary in particular is positively correlated with national attachment, general and domain-specific national pride, and national chauvinism. Conversely, being a pluralist is consistently negatively correlated with dimensions of national sentiment. Being in favour of assimilation and integration is both positively correlated with the political subdimension of national pride, but not with national chauvinism.

2 | WHAT CONSTITUTES NATIONAL IDENTITY?

Being a member of a nation gives individuals a sense of who they are in relation to others, a purpose, and a feeling of home (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 337). National identity relates to three conceptual dimensions: awareness, affect, and content (Citrin et al., 2001). While awareness of belonging to a nation-state, mediated by official documents and developed during socialisation, forms the basis for identification, content and affect are two conceptually independent and potentially volatile dimensions.

The content dimension revolves around the “particular set of ideas about what makes the nation distinctive—ideas about its members, its core values and goals, the territory it ought to occupy, and its relation to other nations”

(Citrin et al., 2001, p. 75f; also Abdelal et al., 2009). This dimension entails the concepts of nationhood and, consequentially, the way boundaries are drawn between national in-group members and outsiders. These boundaries enable actors to recognise each other as one social group and to distinguish themselves from others (Abdelal et al., 2009, pp. 20f, 23; Bail, 2008; Helbling et al., 2016, p. 746). Distinction, in turn, is a key precondition for the devaluation of outsiders and thus hostile attitudes (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979, on Social Identity Theory). Though nations are based on the inherent assumption of shared characteristics and differences relative to others (cf. Anderson, 1983; Citrin et al., 2001, p. 73; Guibernau, 2004, p. 134; Wright et al., 2012, p. 469), it is not implied that all individuals of a nation base their conceptualisations of nationhood on the same membership criteria (Abdelal et al., 2009; Citrin et al., 2001; Hjerm, 1998b). Depending on the criteria that individuals use to distinguish between who belongs and who does not, "others" are different people (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 337). In other words, those who are recognised as outsiders, and thus devaluated, are dependent on the underlying conceptualisation of nationhood.

The affect dimension entails the (emotional) consequences of identification, expressed through feelings of closeness, pride, and feelings of superiority that are anchored in the acknowledgement of group membership (Citrin et al., 2001, p. 74; Helbling et al., 2016, p. 746; Weldon, 2006, p. 333). Both national pride and national chauvinism are varieties of this affective dimension. Although pride describes positive attachment to the nation and is often linked to patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) without being necessarily linked to out-group hostility (cf. Ariely, 2020, p. 267), national chauvinism includes perceptions of national superiority (Citrin et al., 2001, p. 74f; Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, p. 343) and thus has been linked to nationalism (see Mußotter, 2022, for an overview on the conceptual [inter]relations) and repeatedly associated with anti-immigration attitudes (e.g., Blank & Schmidt, 2003).

Although some scholars argue for a broader multidimensional definition (e.g., Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Citrin et al., 2001) including all of the dimensions listed above, others argue that the content dimension by itself is the essence of national identity (e.g., Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, but also Abdelal et al., 2009). Without giving preference to any definition, I argue for retaining the conceptually distinct dimensions, because, although they may be interrelated, they are conceptually different, may be shaped divergently, and have also been shown to affect attitudes independently (cf. Lubbers & Coenders, 2017, p. 101f). Awareness represents a necessary precondition for identification. The affective dimension (pride and chauvinism) determines the degree of in-group affection, favouritism, and saliency of belonging, whereas the content dimension (concepts of nationhood and boundary making) governs to whom this favouritism is allocated to (cf. Wright, 2011b).

3 | THE MISSING CONCEPTUAL-METHODOLOGICAL LINK IN NATIONAL IDENTITY RESEARCH

3.1 | The ethnic-civic dichotomy in national identity research

National identity research has long been dominated by the analysis of membership boundaries in the realm of the ethnic-civic dichotomy. This dichotomy, which resulted from the analysis of legal and popular culture documents, public education, and ideological histories of nation-states (Meinecke, 1970; cf. Helbling et al., 2016; cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010), distinguishes between the Western European and especially French "civic nationalism" on the one hand and Eastern European and German "ethnic nationalism" on the other. Whereas civic nationalism ties membership to place of birth in accordance with the *jus soli* principle of citizenship, ethnic nationalism underpins citizenship policies with blood relations in line with the *jus sanguinis* principle. Accordingly, ethnic national identity is assumed to be based on restrictive ethnocultural and ascribed specific characteristics, for example, ancestry and blood relations, nativity, religion, and culture. Likewise, civic national identity is assumed to be more open due to being based on more voluntarist or achievable principles, such as birthplace, and political community in particular as well as respect for legal norms (Berg & Hjerm, 2010; Janmaat, 2006; Jones & Smith, 2001a, 2001b; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Wright, 2011a; Wright et al., 2012). This dichotomy has thus come to be viewed as responsible for explaining differences in acceptance of fewer (ethnic) or larger (civic) proportions of immigrant societies.

Empirically, this dichotomy, along with the conceptually and theoretically problematic deduction of individual national identity from legal texts and historic path dependencies (cf. Reijerse et al., 2013), has been proven inadequate for the analysis of individual national identity. Using variable-centred methods, like factor analysis, many studies indeed confirmed the existence of two factors, mostly labelled as ethnic (-ascribed/objectivist) and civic (-voluntarist) (Helbling et al., 2016; Hochmann et al., 2016; Jones & Smith, 2001a, 2001b; Kunovich, 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Yet, along with a high correlation of factors and small differences in their exploratory power concerning policy positions (Janmaat, 2006; Wright et al., 2012, p. 471; cf. Hochmann et al., 2016, p. 73), the ambiguities concerning the content that constitutes the factors resulting in inconsistent factor structures across studies are striking (Ariely, 2020; Berg & Hjerm, 2010; Wright et al., 2012; cf. Hadler & Flesken, 2018; cf. Hochmann et al., 2016, cf. Jones & Smith, 2001a; cf. Kunovich, 2009; cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Adding to this, Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) demonstrate a lack of cross-country comparability within the ethnic–civic framework. Opposing the dichotomy, alternative approaches find no (Helbling et al., 2016, p. 752) or only very few (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 341, 1998b) respondent(s) that only favour ethnic criteria alone and hence suggest a continuum from inclusive to exclusive conceptions. In sum, the contradictions point to underlying conceptualisations of nationhood that influence how individuals understand, employ, and combine criteria beyond the ethnic–civic distinction.

Conceptually, the way in which citizens understand nationhood is expected to be much more complex than the ethnic–civic dichotomy suggests (cf. Helbling et al., 2016; cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). How conceptualisations of nationhood are incorporated by individuals depends on socialisation and individual experiences (Abdelal et al., 2009; Weldon, 2006; cf. Almond & Verba, 1963; cf. Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; cf. Sears, 1993; cf. Sears et al., 1999; see Hjerm, 2001, on the effects of education). Individuals arrange and employ boundaries depending on their situation and access to available repertoires offered by, for example, citizenship policies, historical models, or elite discourses (Trittler, 2017a, p. 371). Rosenberg and Beattie (2019) have additionally outlined the role of cognitive skills used when processing and incorporating available narratives and integrating them into a coherent national identity. Additionally, as native-born citizens are typically not confronted directly with or taught about the legal requirements of citizenship, univocal incorporation is hindered. In sum, conceptions of nationhood are expected to be rather vague and latent. Interpretations of survey items in empirical analysis capturing national identity thus only reflect these underlying conceptions.

3.2 | Ambiguities of surveyed items

The conceptual ambiguity of surveyed membership criteria items intended to capture individual national identity is striking. Together, these ambiguities underline the conceptual pitfalls of the ethnic–civic dichotomy and indicating a demand for methods better suited to the individual-level complexity and dynamic of national identity. One of the more striking examples is the membership criterion of *language*. Language is often included among institutionalised citizenship requirements. Command of the national language is a comparatively easily accomplished skill enabling individuals to take part in the national community and can thus be seen as a civic criterion (Janmaat, 2006, p. 56; Yogeewaran & Dasgupta, 2014, p. 195; Wright, 2019, p. 473). Simultaneously, language is interpreted as an ethno-cultural feature representing cultural heritage and thus an indicator of quasi-ethnic differences (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 336; Wright 2011a, p. 473, 2019, p. 839). Hence, the discriminatory value of this item regarding the ethnic–civic dichotomy is comparatively low. Similarly, the criterion of *birthplace* may be interpreted as proof of national kinship and thus nativity or as a mere civic prerequisite in the sense of *jus soli*, granting membership to children of migrants (Jones & Smith, 2001a). Being member of a majority *religion* can function as a boundary marker for rigid religious or cultural identities concerning religious denominations, or it could represent a belief system evolving around basic integrational and solidary values and norms, for example, charity, freedom, and tolerance (Trittler, 2017b, p. 710). Additionally, holding *citizenship* can mean very different things across different citizenship regimes (Wright 2011a, p. 839, 2011b, p. 603). *Feelings of belonging* as well as *living in the country for most of one's life* fails to fit the ethnic–civic dichotomy at all (Wright, 2011b, p. 603). It is only the criteria of national *ancestry* and the *respect of laws and*

institutions that clearly tap into the ethnic–civic dichotomy, with ancestry and kinship representing the *jus sanguinis* principle of blood relation and law abidance representing commitment to civic principles.

The methodological problems of unambiguously placing items in either ethnic or civic categories coupled with the conceptual–theoretical problems of deduction from country-level derivatives to the individual level that lead to divergent interpretation suggest a need for researchers to overcome the ethnic–civic dichotomy when studying citizens' conceptions of nationhood. Consequently, recent advances in national identity research introduced person-centred methods that are sensitive to individual-level underlying conceptualisations of nationhood and directly address these issues.

3.3 | A new person-oriented path for national identity research

By examining response patterns, recently introduced person-centred methods (e.g., Alemán & Woods, 2018; Bonikowski, 2013, 2016; Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Hjerm, 1998a, 1998b; Trittler, 2017a) allow for the discovery of the underlying conceptualisations of nationhood.

Using the membership criteria measures and thus applying a narrow definition of national identity, CA applications by both Hjerm (1998a, 1998b) and Trittler (2017a) show that individuals understand and combine criteria differently, with a continuum from inclusive to exclusive conceptualisations of national identity. Similar to Helbling et al. (2016, using factor analysis and mean scaling), both Hjerm and Trittler find exclusionary types of national identity to employ all available criteria. Moreover, they found that these types are correlated with xenophobia and hostility towards immigrants. Their analyses, however, were limited to Australia, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden.

While CA detects types using the membership criteria measures, LCA enables large-scale comparisons of patterns of national identity. Applying a multidimensional definition of national identity that combines “indicators of national identity with measures of national patriotism, chauvinism and identification with the nation” (Eger & Hjerm 2022a, p. 342), previous studies using LCA identify four types of national identification: *Ardent* nationalists are reportedly most attached to the nation and display high pride and high chauvinism while being the most exclusionary class concerning conceptions of nationhood. In contrast, the *disengaged* are less restrictive and less engaged with nation-oriented idioms and practices. *Restrictive* nationalists show moderate emotional affect towards the nation while holding exclusionary conceptualisations. *Creedal* nationalists are emotionally attached to the nation while having less restrictive demands for fellow national members. In particular, both the ardent and restrictive types seem to resonate with negative attitudes towards immigrants (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016).

Empirically, the large number of items the models used in the multidimensional approach is associated with sparseness, which potentially explains why these previous models fail to fit the data in terms of absolute fit (cf. Eger & Hjerm 2022a, 2022b). Moreover, use of the multidimensional approach can lead to the internal structure of dimensions remaining unobserved. Additionally, effects of single dimensions on attitudes cannot be differentiated. In fact, previous results show that two of the inductively identified types of national identity show “striking similarities in demographic profiles” (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016, p. 17), similar effects on especially anti-migration attitudes (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016), similar prevalence in geopolitically challenged states (Soehl & Karim, 2021), and even strikingly similar profiles of membership criteria (cf. Bonikowski, 2016, p. 19; cf. Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016, p. 11; cf. Soehl & Karim, 2021, p. 10). Therefore, the way membership criteria are employed may be the driving force in explaining antimigrant attitudes. Equally, single dimensions may even have opposing effects, as demonstrated by Hjerm (1998a), who finds political national pride negatively related to xenophobia, possibly contradicting findings of this multidimensional approach.

Together, results of CA (Hjerm, 1998b; Trittler, 2017a) and LCA (Alemán & Woods, 2018; Bonikowski, 2013, 2016; Larsen, 2017), in connection with other alternatives to classical factor-analysis techniques (e.g., Helbling et al., 2016) and qualitative research (Ditlmann & Kopf-Beck, 2019), indicate, first, that the ethnic–civic dichotomy does not hold when capturing individual conceptualisations of nationhood. Second, whereas Helbling

et al. (2016, p. 752) as well as CA results in general suggest a continuum from liberal to restrictive conceptions of nationhood, the person-centred approaches additionally demonstrate the existence of distinct conceptualisations (Alemán & Woods, 2018; Bonikowski, 2013, 2016; Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Hjerm, 1998b; Trittler, 2017b) that divergently employ and arrange criteria (and nation-oriented idioms). Furthermore, specific conceptualisations seem to coincide differently with national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism. Yet, what has been missing is a strictly person-centred perspective on boundary making itself in a large-scale comparative setting.

This paper contributes to closing the missing conceptual–methodological link in national identity research by first focussing on national boundary patterns from a person-centred perspective in a comparative framework and then by examining the relationship between the dimensions of national identity. In doing so, it aims to understand the conceptualisations *citizens* have of their national in-group and whether these conceptions can be generalised across countries and time. National identity, however, is as a concept inevitably stuck between individual identification processes and institutionalised national boundaries. To analyse national identity, national frames must be considered together with individual processes.

4 | NATIONAL OR INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL IDENTITY?

This paper specifically focusses on citizens conceptualisations of nationhood, though it must be acknowledged that national identity is not merely individual. It is inherently linked to a powerful source of identification, the nation-state, a constant reminder for every individual of their membership and the relevance thereof (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000) through birth certificates, passports, and the rights and duties of citizenship. Likewise, citizenship policies offer a formal frame of the conceptualisations through clear-cut definitions of the features and characteristics which ought to be shared by its members, guaranteeing access to participation, representation, and to social welfare (Brubaker, 1994; Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 7). Hence, national identity research should include a collective perspective (cf. Kunovich, 2009).

From a legal–historical perspective, citizenship policies represent historically path-dependent shared notions of nationhood (Brubaker, 1994; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017). Shared experiences among members of national societies during the process of nation-state building are responsible for large-scale country-specific conceptualisations of nationhood, which still shape how individuals imagine their national in-group. Simultaneous bottom-up (from shared experiences to common policies) and top-down (from institutional frames to individual perceptions) processes suggest not only homogeneously shared conceptualisations within countries but also differences across countries due to different historic experiences. The perspective moreover implies individuals strictly incorporate what the legal frames offer. Yet, although citizenship policies are institutional frames that influence individuals, the extent to which they shape individual national identities varies. The relationship is neither deterministic nor unidirectional, but dynamic. The incorporation of images of the nation offered by the nation-state depends on socialisation, individual experiences, and cognitive abilities (Abdelal et al., 2009; Weldon, 2006; cf. Almond & Verba, 1963; cf. Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; cf. Sears, 1993; Sears et al., 1999). Citizenship policies, historical models, and elite discourses only represent publicly available repertoires of the socially constructed categorisation. How individuals arrange and employ criteria depends on their situation and access to available repertoires (Trittler, 2017a, p. 371). Expecting national identity to be constructed identically across countries, previous approaches may overlook country-level mechanisms at work.

There are few points to emphasise before discussing the analysis. First, even though national identity is hypothesised as being different on the individual level, national identity is nonetheless expected to be affected in part by national frames, for example, those set by citizenship policies. Hence, national identity types ought to be similar in some respect (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 337) within countries, possibly displaying country-specific peculiarities. Second, nations do share common basic principles and citizenship policies have in fact converged over time across (European) countries (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010, p. 580; cf. Vink & Bauböck, 2013, p. 623; see Koopmans et al., 2012, on specific policy fields). Brubaker (1994, p. 2412, note 9) notes “popular understandings may be much more similar”

than elite understandings or policies. Thus, aggregate conceptualisations of national identities might also be similar across countries (despite interindividual differences within countries). Third, policies are a snapshot of the conceptualisations of the national in-group of political majorities (cf. Bail, 2008; cf. Knoth, 2015) and are subject to change, in the event that the majorities change (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Therefore, the inclusion of multiple country samples over time may result in different within-country structures for different points in time.

Consequently, my analysis uses explorative methods that allow for the detection of latent conceptions of nationhood. It thus (i) allows for criteria to be arranged beyond ethnic or civic terms thereby bypassing the problem of item ambiguity. Concentrating (ii) on national boundary patterns serves to close the gap between classical approaches explaining hostility towards outsiders with the ethnic–civic distinction and recent inductive approaches that applied these methods to a multidimensional understanding of national identity. To acknowledge country-specific path dependencies and possible time-variant effects on how membership criteria are arranged, (iii) country-year samples are analysed separately in this research. Addressing the question of whether the images can be generalised across countries, (iv) subsequent analyses of the within-country-year results are conducted within survey waves leading to ideal-typical derivatives of national identity reflecting possible similarities across countries. Addressing the multidimensionality, further analyses examine (v) the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and attachment, pride, and chauvinism.

5 | DATA AND METHODS

To investigate the conceptions of nationhood, I primarily use data from the National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group, 1998, 2012, 2015) surveyed in 1995, 2003, and 2013 and, for comparisons, the European Values Study (EVS, 2020a, 2020b) surveyed in 2008 and 2017, as compiled by the ONBound-project (Bechert et al., 2020). The ISSP National Identity Module and the EVS offer stable question and item wordings over a long period of time and across many countries. Membership boundaries are measured by asking respondents to rate the importance of different criteria to describe the national in-group. Though doubt has been expressed as to whether ISSP captures the full range of membership criteria (Janmaat, 2006, p. 69; Reijerse et al., 2013, p. 616), inductive research shows that the ISSP items indeed are among those criteria commonly mentioned by individuals (ancestry, language, nativism, citizenship, living, and law abiding) to define their national in-group. In qualitative studies, only religion and feelings of belonging appear rarely, whereas stereotypical personality traits and cultural aspects are frequently mentioned (cf. Ditlmann & Kopf-Beck, 2019). Despite these shortcomings, the ISSP item battery remains one of the best sources for national identity research and is hence used as main subject of the analyses. The question and surveyed criteria across survey programmes read as follows (Table 1):

Apart from the *descent* item, all items have been queried in all three ISSP waves. Due to the missing item, the 1995 wave, like EVS, is used for comparisons and cross-validations only. To avoid bias by earlier national belonging and residence, if available, I reduced the dataset to those respondents holding citizenship status of the respective country. After excluding country samples (South Africa in 2013 and Bulgaria and Latvia in 2003) due to different scaling or missing items within waves, the pooled dataset comprises a total of 164 country-year observations. To avoid model sparseness, the 4-point Likert scale was dichotomised to indicate support or rejection of criteria. Arguably, because boundaries demarcate the national in-group from outsiders, considering one criterion as even “fairly important” implies that this criterion is used for boundary making. Aiming for these boundaries, reducing complexity outweighs the informational depths in this case. Weights were used where applicable.

The empirical analysis includes five elements: First, national identity is conceptualised as prone to individual-level socialisation, experiences, and cognitive abilities and, hence, allowed to differ within countries. Using LCA and a subsequent bootstrap loglikelihood ratio test (BLRT) of the results serves this individual-level perspective. LCA identifies classes of respondents that share similar response patterns and thus allows for the surveyed items to be understood differently. Hence, LCA detects how the criteria are arranged, selected, and thus interpreted by the respondents. Finding a solution that fits the data best is crucial. What this could mean may diverge (cf. the debate

TABLE 1 Item availability across study waves

| Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is ... | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|-------------|
| | ISSP 1995 | ISSP 2003 | ISSP 2013 | EVS 2008 | EVS 2017 | |
| To have been born in [COUNTRY] | X | X | X | X | X | Born |
| To have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship | X | X | X | | | Citizenship |
| To have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life | X | X | X | X | | Lived |
| To be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE] | X | X | X | X | X | Language |
| To be a [RELIGION] | X | X | X | | | Religion |
| To respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws | X | X | X | X | X | Laws |
| To feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] | X | X | X | | | Feel |
| To have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestors | | X | X | X | X | Descent |
| To share [NATIONAL] culture | | | | | X | Culture |

between Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016, 2022, and Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, 2022b). Empirical identifications of the best LCA solutions may rely on information criteria [...] (e.g., Akaike information criterion, Bayesian information criterion, adjusted Bayesian information criterion, and consistent Akaike information criterion) or likelihood tests (e.g., naive chi-square difference test, Lo–Mendell–Rubin likelihood ratio test, and BLRT) [...] (Nylund et al., 2007), with the BLRT being “approximately valid” (Dziak et al., 2014, p. 536) and outperforming other likelihood tests, especially in cases where, as here, sample sizes are relatively large ($N > 1000$) and in simple few-item ($N \leq 8$) structured models (Nylund et al., 2007, p. 554). The following analysis has been conducted using the LCA Plugin for STATA by Lanza et al. Version 1.2.1 (Collins & Lanza, 2009; Lanza et al., 2018). Models with up to eight latent classes were considered and fit to the data. The models are not restricted. General model specifications were held constant across all LCAs. As BLRT tests for absolute model fit, I chose this path. Absolute model fit tests the goodness of correspondence between data and the fitted model (Eger & Hjerm, 2022a). Subsequent BLRT tests were performed using the LCA bootstrap Stata function (Version 1.0) by Huang et al. (2016).

Second, theories of historical path-dependent country-level determinants guide the decision to analyse each country separately for the initial analysis. Third, because country-level institutional frames possibly affecting individual-level national identity may change over time (e.g., Germany changed from *jus sanguinis* in 2000) and political climates through public debates might change, these initial analyses are carried out separately for each country-year sample. Fourth, the subsequent analyses identify ideal-type derivatives of individual-level national identities across countries. Therefore, the results of the previous steps are submitted to a CA routine. CA exploratively identifies “natural groupings” (clusters) of observations by their structural composition (Bock, 1985) and offers various options as well. For the analyses the question of which cluster technique might be best is secondary. The goal was to find those patterns of national identity most stable across clustering techniques within the pooled results of the initial country-year analyses performed by LCA and BLRT. Therefore, four clustering methods across varying randomised dataset sorting were used successively. Classes that overlapped within all modifications of the CA were considered most stable and thus to represent ideal-typical derivatives of national identity conceptions. Because not all countries were sampled in each wave, results of the CA may be influenced by varying prevalence of certain types due to the specific country selection. In particular, European countries are more frequently included in the surveys, which may increase the influence of the patterns of national boundary making prevalent in Europe on the results. Though the

analysis strategy detected comparable and meaningful ideal-typical derivatives, we should consider this pitfall when interpreting the results.

Finally, the multidimensionality of national identities is addressed by including measures of attachment, general and domain-specific national pride, and chauvinism and then examining correlations among these dimensions.

6 | RESULTS

The empirical strategy reveals four important main findings. First, across countries and time, four meaningful classes are found repeatedly. These ideal types of national identity can be differentiated in terms of number, degree, and combination of supported and rejected characteristics used for national boundary making. Second, the internal structure of national identity types varies across countries. Not only does the number of classes vary within countries but also the existence of ideal types and size of each type varies across countries and time points. Third, the types can be structured from inclusive to exclusive. Whereas two types either support or reject most or all criteria, the other two types express clear-cut conceptions of nationhood. Fourth, the identified types relate differently to other dimensions of national identity.

6.1 | Ideal-typical patterns across countries and time

Figure 1 plots profile plots of the identified national identity types within the three ISSP survey waves. Lines connecting the dots serve for orientation and do not imply causal relations. Grey areas plot the standard deviations based on all countries within the survey. Values between 0.8 and 1 indicate very high conditioned probabilities and high within-class homogeneity of identified types. Put differently, all members of this type agree on the importance of the criterion with a probability larger than 0.8. Accordingly, values below 0.2 indicate high probability of rejecting the criterion with high homogeneity within classes. Values between 0.2 and 0.8 only indicate tendencies concerning the importance of items (0.2 to 0.4: weak rejection and 0.6 to 0.8: weak agreement on importance). Values closer to 0.5 suggest strong internal heterogeneity concerning the characteristic in question. Figure 1 only plots ideal types composed of classes that unambiguously clustered together, even though subtypes emerged through CA (see Figures A1.1-A1.3).

Type 1 (Exclusionists): The first and most striking class (upper left plot) is characterised by very high probabilities to perceive any membership criterion as important. Except for *religion*, the conditioned probabilities of this type are above 0.85 on average, indicating incredibly high agreement on the importance of all asked characteristics. Because respondents of this class show the most closed and strict perception of the national in-group, this type is labelled “exclusionists.” The exclusionist type emerges across all countries and survey waves with only one exception (Ireland 2003¹), ranging from 17% (Finland 2013) to above 85% (Venezuela 2003 and Philippines 2003 and 2013). These latter countries thus display rather homogeneous conceptions of nationhood, whereas most European countries show stronger internal divides.

Type 2 (Assimilationists): The second type (upper right plot) resembles the first one in some respect, though rather strikingly differs concerning the characteristics of *religion* and *ancestry* which are rejected as defining elements of the national in-group. *To be born in country* and *lived in country* are only moderately supported. This type is only found in 2003 and 2013, as it only differs strongly in terms of the *ancestry* item that was not asked in 1995. In total, this type can be found in three quarters of the remaining 61 country years. In some countries (Hungary and the Philippines 2003), this is type is less than 5%, whereas in others (e.g., Netherlands, Switzerland, and Slovenia), this class exceeds the first one with above 40%.

This type is labelled “assimilationists,” because individuals in this group reject strictly nonvoluntary aspects and characteristics (*ancestry* and *religion*) while putting some pressure on ideational (*speak language, respect laws, and institutions*), emotional (*feelings*) integration, and some sort of legal and cultural naturalisation (*citizenship* and *lived*). By somewhat supporting *born* and *lived in country* on average, this group at the same time supports a strict bar for




FIGURE 1 Profile plots of national identity types within ISSP 2013, ISSP 2003, and ISSP 1995. Figure contains mean scores and standard deviations of types identified by latent class analysis and cluster analysis within ISSP waves across all countries present in sample.

membership. Members of this type would probably accept second-generation migrants to their national in-group—should they be willing to integrate culturally, emotionally, and ideationally.

Type 3 (Integrationists): The third type (lower left plot) is defined by clear support for *language, respecting laws, and institutions* and rather supporting *citizenship* and *feelings* of national identification. *Being born, religion, and ancestry* are clearly rejected, and *having lived* is neither clearly supported nor rejected. This type therefore represents elements of national identity that are classically seen as civic elements. The profile of this type somewhat implies a willingness to integrate and requires an emotional bond. To *speak the language* and to *respect laws and institutions* thereby also offer the possibility to take part in the society and ensure a basic ability to interact. This type therefore is labelled “integrationists.” It occurs especially in European and North American countries. Integrationists range from 8% (Slovenia 2003) to 51% (Canada 1995) of respondents.

Interestingly, this type best represents the legal formalistic group as identified in the qualitative study by Dittmann and Kopf-Beck (2019). The supported items of *language, laws, and commitment/willingness* as represented by *feelings* are usually those criteria regulated in citizenship policies. The integrationists thus emphasise the requirements migrants must fulfil when applying for citizenship. Additionally, conditioned probability values of this type are different in those items that are usually the concern of citizenship policies and which therefore also vary across countries (e.g., required time spent in country or varying language levels).

Type 4 (Pluralists): Compared with the other three types, this type (lower right plot) is best characterised by its rejection of most characteristics to define compatriots. It therefore represents the type most opposite to the exclusionist type 1. Only *language and respect laws and institutions* seem to matter for some of the members of this type. In accordance with Hjerm (1998a, 1998b), this type is called “pluralists,” because these respondents care only about the two minimal criteria of societies and are comfortable with a higher degree of diversity: While commonly agreed upon laws and political institutions form the very basis of modern states, a shared and commonly understood language facilitates societal discourses, creates the feeling of belonging together, and is the key to individual participation. Overall, pluralists repeatedly appear across the samples, though the size of this class is rather small in most countries (e.g., Denmark 2013: 1.49% and The Netherlands 2003: 1.93%). However, there are countries which also display medium-sized pluralist classes, for example, Slovakia 2003 (16.36%) and Spain 2013 (11.26%).

Overall, identified ideal types vary between 1995 and 2013. Although in 1995, only three types can be identified due to the missing *ancestry* item, in 2013, a fifth type emerged that can be described as purely formalistic type that accepts other through *birthplace, lived, language, and citizenship*. However, this type comprises less than 8% within countries and has no manifestation in other survey years.

6.2 | Country-level variations

Though the ideal types emerged in the comparative analyses of country-year samples, country-specific classes differ in internal structure of types, size, and overall presence of types. Figure 2 (see also Appendix A2) illustrates the varying proportions for the ISSP 2013. Particularly, European countries tend to display differentiated national identities, whereas in the Philippines, India, Turkey, Russia, Mexico, Hungary, but as well as Spain and Portugal, large proportions of exclusionists are prevalent, indicating high homogeneity within these countries. Potentially, these large classes may be explained by peculiar histories of nation-state building, education, socialisation, or prevalent public discourses.

Country-level peculiarities can be further illustrated by subtypes of exclusionists (Appendix A1) that are mainly distinguished by their stance on *religion*. Whereas the exclusionists' subtype A (e.g., found as the only exclusionists' type in Russia, Israel, Turkey, and the United States in 2013) places high importance on belonging to the majority *religion*, subtype B (e.g., found in Sweden and Estonia in 2013) represents the other end of the spectrum, which may indicate a higher relevance of religion in the former countries.

The residual classes are quite large in some countries, for example, Japan, Latvia, Czech Republic, and Germany. First, the additional formalistic type, which could only be identified in 2013, belongs to this residual class. Then again,




FIGURE 2 Distribution of ideal types by countries in ISSP 2013. Figure contains representation of ideal types within country samples.

this class could indicate country-specific peculiarities not prevalent in other countries and thus not picked up by the CA. It is equally possible that respondents in the residual category did not display a coherent national boundary pattern or that their response pattern slightly diverged from the core ideal types and has been thus excluded by the rather strict analytical strategy. To rule out the latter possibility, an additional analysis that plots the residual classes with ideal types based on simple distance measures has been carried out (see Appendix A3). Thereby, in Germany, though missing in 2013, one type (with 30.5% of respondents) could be sorted to the assimilationist. The same applies to the relatively large (over 15%) Belgian, British, Hungarian, Norwegian, and Spanish assimilationists in 2013. As exclusionists and assimilationists are relatively similar, some CA routines might have sorted those to the exclusionist type. For this type, meanwhile, especially differences due to the *religion* item for some countries led to exclusion of a subtype (Czech Republic, Latvia, and Slovakia in 2013 with at least 35% of respondents). Overall, large portions of the residual types are explained by the overly strict application of CA, supporting the overall approach and results. Ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making that rely on the selection and arrangements of membership boundaries can be detected across countries. However, real country-specific peculiarities also emerged. For example, whereas exclusionists in Georgia 2013 (18.25%) and to a lesser extent in Japan (36.66%) reject *birthplace*, in Lithuania (13.15%), *respecting laws* is clearly rejected. All the remaining residual types diverge due to criteria not homogeneously agreed upon.

To conclude, ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making beyond the ethnic–civic dichotomy are prevalent across countries and time, though with slight divergences (concerning especially the relevance of *religion* but also in terms of country-specific nuances). Popular understandings are found to be much more similar across borders while being different within national borders at the same time.

6.3 | Robustness checks

For cross-validation, the initial LCAs were submitted to an alternative process relying on relative fits of information criteria instead of BLRT. The results show overwhelming similarities between the ideal types found in terms of class

profiles. Since the BLRT favours solutions with more classes in case absolute and relative fit indices differ, especially class sizes change because respondents with less clear profiles get excluded from the identified types. Overall, especially proportions of exclusionists stayed about the same. See Appendix A4 for a full discussion and comparisons.

Conducting LCA including BLRT and subsequent CAs for country samples of the EVS 2008 and EVS 2017 furthermore supports the findings obtained using the ISSP data. Though the item batteries differ, results show striking similarities. Appendix A5 discusses the results in detail.

6.4 | Addressing multidimensionality

To address the multidimensionality of national identity, I took the relationship between the dimensions to the test. I thus included measures on national attachment, general and domain-specific pride, and national chauvinism (see Table A6.1). The selection resembles those items included in the multidimensional approach (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016). National attachment and general national pride are measured with one question. Because there is no consensus on subdimensions of national pride, I tested individual items in separate models using an additive measure containing all 10 domain-specific pride items and factor scores obtained through an explorative factor analysis yielding dimensions previously identified by Hjerm (1998a). The factors are, first, political pride, which is based on pride in state-related areas, such as political institutions, the economy, and social security systems, and, second, natio-cultural pride, which is based on pride in nation-related areas, such as history, cultural practices, and achievements. For the national chauvinism battery, I also included single items, an additive measure, and factor loadings. For chauvinism, only one factor could be identified.

Figure 3 plots the coefficients of the bivariate regressions of the typology and all other dimensions. All values have been standardised from 0 to 1. While being an exclusionist is positively related with all dimensions, including subdimensions of pride and all single measures contributing to the dimensions' concepts, being a pluralist is negatively correlated with all (sub)dimensions and all measures, except one (*being ashamed of country* of the chauvinism battery). Being an integrationist or an assimilationist is positively correlated with attachment, general pride, and the political pride dimension. Among the integrationists, those that place high importance on those membership criteria reflecting legal requirements of integration, again, express their closeness to the state by demonstrating the highest values for the political dimension of national pride. Concerning the natio-cultural dimension of pride, both types show only weak negative associations. However, they differ in terms of national chauvinism: While the integrationists are negatively related with chauvinism, the values for assimilationists are not significant.

Overall, only exclusionists are positively associated with chauvinism, making this type the most nationalist overall. Stated differently, those who have a narrow conception of the nation also identify more strongly with the nation, feel more pride in relation to their nation, and express more feelings of national superiority.

7 | DISCUSSION

The conceptions of nationhood comprise the prerequisites to which solidarity, social cohesion, and legitimacy are anchored (Miller, 1997; Wright et al., 2012). The membership criteria determine who is accepted as part of the nation and who is excluded. Moreover, if individual conceptions of the national in-group collide with policies in place, the characteristics legally defining the national community are open for change. The growing success of right-wing (populist) parties stressing restrictive politics of exclusivity illustrates the political potential of the membership criteria. This research elucidates how citizens across countries construct the lines between compatriots and others.

Using explorative methods while retaining the conceptually distinct dimensions of national identity, the work seeks to close the conceptual-methodological gap in national identity research. The application of explorative methods has been driven by theoretical considerations of national identity's position between individual-level (e.g.,




FIGURE 3 National identity typology and national attachment, pride, and chauvinism

socialisation, experiences, and cognitive abilities) and country-level factors (e.g., top-down incorporation of institutionalised frames) and previous findings of inconsistent factor structures of classical research in the realm of ethnic versus civic conceptions and person-centred approaches suggesting more complex structures. The identified types can be classified from inclusive (pluralists who reject most criteria) to exclusive (exclusionists who attach importance to almost all criteria), with two types emphasising only specific criteria when drawing boundaries between the national in-group and compatriots: Some tend towards integrative measures (integrationists), and the others prefer assimilation (assimilationists). Empirically, the approach, unlike previous applications of LCA, withstands the criteria of absolute fit and thus produced tenable results within country-year samples, which furthermore supports the conceptual distinctiveness of national identity dimensions. Analysing the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and national attachment, pride, and chauvinism, the subsequent analyses underline national identity's multidimensionality and highlights the necessity to retain the dimensions. To shed some more light on the distinctiveness, I carried out additional regression analyses, which results are discussed in detail in Appendix A7. These results furthermore underline the necessity to retain the dimensions of national identity as a factor in the research because they seem to be related to openness and hostility towards outsiders in a distinct way.

The results also support the findings of within-country differences in the understanding of national belonging. Individuals employ and arrange criteria differently when thinking of compatriots and drawing a line to differentiate from others (Bonikowski, 2013, 2016; Dittmann & Kopf-Beck, 2019; Hjerm, 1998a, 1998b, Trittler, 2017b). Thus, the results reject a deterministic relationship between national frames and individually employed images and underline theories of individual-level factors of identify formation. If we compare the results at the country level, the countries are similar in terms of the presence and almost identical profiles of types. The former is especially true for Central European countries, which points towards possible structural similarities or possibly present elite discourses shaping individuals' incorporation of national identity concepts (cf. Helbling et al., 2016, on elite discourses). Hence, national frames matter—yet differently for different individuals. Furthermore, the results confirm the hypothesis of popular understanding being much more similar than elite discourses suggest (Brubaker, 1994, p. 2412, note 9). In particular, the extremely homogeneous exclusionist type illustrates the similarities, and the areas between exclusionists and pluralists as well as the residual classes reveal country-specific peculiarities. By being able to identify types of national boundary making across survey instruments, countries, and time, the present results confirm that national identity

is to a certain degree a universalistic principle: Where there is a nation, there are also people who are willing to use all available means to set high barriers. At the same time, the pluralists assemble those willing to set low barriers to the national community. We should thus invest further research capacities in explaining the differences from both an individual-level perspective and macrolevel influences.

Conceptually, the findings support the rejection of transferring the mutually exclusive ethnic-civic dichotomy from country-level observations on the individual level. Exclusionist images do coincide with both previously defined ethnic and civic national identity criteria. The type coincides with the “multiple national identity” type by Hjerm (1998a, 1998b). Helbling et al. (2016, p. 752) put it “[...] virtually no respondents who favour ethnic conceptions of identity do so without embracing civic ideas also.” This may lead to the assumption that ethnic notions drive exclusionary views or that exclusionary views necessarily include ethnic elements. Indeed, requiring descent puts individuals in the exclusionist type. Broadening the application of Hjerm's (1998a, 1998b) and Trittler's (2017a) findings, the approach here followed their initiative on a large-scale longitudinal comparison, leading to an ideal typology with comparable substantive results. Whereas Hjerm (1998a, 1998b) did not include the full range of ISSP items resulting in two types representing the classical distinction *among* his identified types, Trittler (2017a) teased out more than four types including all available items. While her additional types illustrate country-specific features that may explain the residual class in the present work, the types presented here open the perspective on generalisable types of national identity.

Finally, the approach presented here allows for comparative research on the influence of institutionalised repertoires of nationhood together with individual factors, questions of identity formation and determinants of change, and particularly effects of concepts of national identity on political attitudes and behaviour beyond the classical distinction that have been shown as inadequate for individual-level national identity research.

Despite these advantages, quantitative research almost always entails limitations. Here, first, though the approach of using LCA together with CA produces relatively stable ideal types across countries, time, and survey instruments, CA also falsely excluded classes from these types due to its strong restrictions (and possibly falsely included others). Being sensitive to the country selection and thus prevalence of certain types, the CA may have furthermore missed those types that are less common in the researched countries. However, most residual classes only slightly diverged, and real cross-country peculiarities only emerged in Lithuania, Georgia, and Japan, which supports the overall approach. Though the types emerged across country samples, the results may also be biased by the overrepresentation of European countries, which influences especially the CA. However, in most countries, at least three types emerged, which supports the assumption of national identity as universalistic principle across cultural contexts. Future research might well reconsider the approach and either reconstruct types based on the findings presented here or perhaps need to further refine the granularity of the methods. Another limitation encountered was those respondents who could not be assigned to any of the four types. Apart from those classes that fall prey to the strict procedure, remaining respondents may represent those without any consistent views on the national in-group, or they might represent further country-specific identities. Lastly, qualitative research (Ditlmann & Kopf-Beck, 2019) has revealed additional criteria people use to draw lines, for example, cultural elements and stereotypical traits. Quantitative research should consider these contributions to broaden and re-evaluate the construction of item batteries measuring the content dimension of national identities used in quantitative research.

8 | CONCLUSION

Analysing membership boundaries across countries, time, and survey instruments, this work details the different dominant patterns of national identity boundary making using an inductive approach. The key findings are, first, that national identity is an international cultural phenomenon with various distinct types. Second, national frames do influence individual-level boundary making, yet the top-down relationship is far from being deterministic. Third, results yield a rejection of ethnic versus civic principles as short-sighted because they have assumed congruence

between national frames and individuals. Fourth, especially when explaining antimigrant attitudes, it is imperative to address the dimensionality of national identity.

Despite the limitations discussed above, we can draw several key implications from the present findings: Future research in this field should acknowledge that the times of ethnic versus civic national identities as exploratory powerful categories are finally over and move towards approaches better suited to capture individuals' national identity. We thus need better theoretical explanations for individual-level mechanisms of national socialisation and incorporation of national frames. In turn, we also need to acknowledge the possibility of individual-level notions of nationhood affecting the political processes. Including national boundary making in models of political attitudes and behaviour seems worthwhile, especially when explaining preference for right-wing parties but also when focussing volatility of policies concerning national boundaries.

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ENDNOTE

¹ Irish respondents were asked about the importance of “speaking Irish,” whereas, in other multilingual countries respondents were asked about the importance of speaking any of the official languages. Consequently, because Irish is only spoken by a minority, in 2013, Irish data fail to fit the data in terms of absolute fit; in 2003, Irish exclusionists are excluded from the ideal types, and in 1995, where no assimilationists are present, exclusionists eventually emerged, yet again with less importance placed on the language item.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

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