

On the Challenge of Immigrant Integration: A Political culture perspective on Western and Central Eastern Europe

Voinea, Camelia Florela

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Voinea, C. F. (2023). On the Challenge of Immigrant Integration: A Political culture perspective on Western and Central Eastern Europe. *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities*, 12(1), 1-35. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-85275-6>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de>

Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Commercial-NoDerivatives). For more information see:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0>

On the Challenge of Immigrant Integration. A political culture perspective on Western and Central Eastern Europe

Camelia Florela Voinea
European Research Centre for Political Culture
Dept. Public Policy, International Relations and Security Studies
Faculty of Political Science
University of Bucharest
camelia.voinea@unibuc.ro

Submission: August 15th, 2022

Acceptance: November 10th, 2022

Date of publication: February 20th, 2023

Abstract

This paper takes into consideration the contextualization hypothesis and addresses several relevant influence factors which might have shaped the immigration perception in the Eastern European ex-communist societies after the migration crisis in 2015-2016: (i) the history and geopolitical context of the countries in the eastern half of Europe and the history of East-West emigration before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; (ii) politicization of migration and political party favourability in the host societies, (iii) national culture characteristics as emphasized by Hofstede's theory, (iv) beliefs (trust in others), and (v) materialist and postmaterialist values. The roles played by these influence factors in the formation and change of anti-immigration attitudes are discussed in four Country Case Studies comparative analysis between traditional immigration countries from Western Europe and latest immigration target countries from the Central Eastern Europe. The research outcomes provide conceptual support to the hypothesis that the Central Eastern European societies are more sensitive to political culture issues and their reactions to massive immigration might be deeply influenced by their historical and geopolitical contextual conditions, and by their sets of values and beliefs. These and other contextual conditions are discussed with regard to the capacity of CEE countries to develop national models of immigrant integration such that they could face the challenge of massive migration waves in Southern-Central-Eastern Europe.

Keywords: politicization of migration, immigrant integration, anti-immigration attitudes, political culture.

1. Introduction: Migration in Western and Central Eastern European Countries.

After the massive migration wave which reached Europe in 2015, a phenomenon of reinforcement of anti-immigration attitudes has spread throughout European countries. It proved to have the same devastating effect in the Central and Eastern as in the Western



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Corresponding Author: Camelia Florela Voinea, Ph.D., Associate Professor

Affiliation: European Research Centre for Political Culture, Dept. of Public Policy, International Relations and Security Studies, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, Romania

Address: #8, Spiru Haret Street, 010175-Bucharest, Romania

e-mail: camelia.voinea@unibuc.ro

Copyright © 2023, Camelia Florela Voinea

European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities - EQPAM, Volume 12, Issue No.1, February 2023 pp. 1-35.

ISSN 2285 – 4916

ISSN-L 2285 – 4916

European countries, that is, in both countries with rich past immigration integration experience and countries with no such experience, but with a different political past.

From this perspective, it is important to identify the roots of anti-immigration attitudes in the Central and Eastern European societies, to explain and eventually predict their behaviour in scenarios with mass immigration waves targeting these countries, but also to evaluate their possible approaches on immigrant integration. This might eventually emphasize the need to approach the securitization of migration in Central and Eastern Europe not only as a security issue but also as a political culture issue (Voinea and Dimari, 2021).

This paper makes a review of the immigration integration national models and research literature and type of approaches which have proved relevant in this area. On this background, the paper makes a comparative approach between some western and eastern European societies with respect to immigration from a political culture perspective. To this aim, the approach has analysed survey data from relevant European databases, like World Value Survey, European Social Survey, and Eurobarometer and has studied several variables: (1) anti-immigration attitudes, (2) beliefs, such as "trust in others", (3) values, by taking into consideration materialist and postmaterialist values, (4) tolerance to diversity, as well as (5) national culture aspects, and history of ethnic issues and demographic aspects in the European societies.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: *Section 2* describes the research hypotheses, aims and types of approach. *Section 3* reviews the theoretical and research literature on national integration models of immigrants in Europe and US. *Section 4* reviews the research literature and the concepts and theories which have characterised the national integration models in the classic immigration countries, like USA, France, UK, Netherlands, and Germany. It discusses the contextualization hypothesis on which this approach is based. *Section 5* describes the political culture perspective, the comparative approach and data, the variables and their significance in the case studies of four CEE countries and justifies the relevance of the approach. The section describes the research issues, the research methodology of a comparative analysis between two sets of European countries: Western European countries, that is UK, Germany, Netherlands, France, and Eastern European countries, that is Poland, Czechia, Hungary and Romania. *Sections 6* makes an assessment of the research outcomes in terms of the patterns of attitudes, values and beliefs which are characteristic for the case studies. *Section 7* draws conclusions regarding the collective perceptions of the immigrants in the European case studies, and provide for research issues to be further development, like the politicization and eventually securitization of immigration in the Central and Eastern European countries.

2. Research Issues, Aims, and Hypotheses

Our research approach addresses the issues of immigrant integration from a political culture perspective.

Our first research hypothesis is the *contextualization hypothesis* (Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2012), which mainly concerns the historical, social, and geopolitical context

of immigrant integration in CEE countries. It is applied to a comparative analysis to national immigrant integration models and strategies. The empirical basis of data analysis is provided by a set of four case studies on Central Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Romania) after the mass migration wave in 2015.

Our second research hypothesis concerns the relationship between democratic political culture and the collective perception of migration phenomena in the Central and Eastern European societies. Democratization of the countries in the eastern half of Europe has not succeeded so far in fully replacing the communist value set with democratic values. The political culture legacies of their communist past might prove essential for these countries' capacities to cope with massive migration, and to face increasing campaigns of politicization of migration.

Our aim in this paper is to study the most relevant dimensions of comparison of approaches on migration, the historical, geopolitical, and political culture views on immigrants and immigrant integration models in the European countries, and how these characteristics could explain societal and political reaction to severe politicization of migration.

Our research question addresses the ways in which specific characteristics of Central Eastern European societies, like their history, political culture, or geopolitical context could have influenced their perception of immigrants and would shaped their type and quality of future participation in the immigration integration.

Main research question:

Q1. *How would different immigration contexts, perceptions, and understandings constrain the contribution of the European countries in the EU immigrant integration strategies and processes?*

It concerns some characteristics of the ex-communist European societies which make them (or make them not) capable to cope with a systematic phenomenon of immigration like the set of beliefs (social and political trust) and the set of values (materialist/postmaterialist). The analysis of these and other aspects is discussed in the following sections. The outcomes of this comparative analysis provide support to our main research hypothesis that in the Central Eastern European societies the perception of 'otherness', as well as the challenge of immigrant integration have been essentially marked by the enduring political culture legacies of their communist past. We aim to explain how politicization of migration becomes effective in the CEE countries when the host society's democratic political culture-based action choice is replaced by a political ideology-based action choice. This falsification of democratic political culture allows for the translation of the political culture frame of action into a political ideology frame which enhances the manipulation of preferences and voting behaviour. In the cases of Hungary and Poland, politicization of migration is deeply related to political culture. This relationship is informed by the (often) excessive politicization of migration (Brug, D'Amato, Berkhout and Ruedin, 2015), politicization of exclusion (Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski, 2018), anti-immigration attitudes, and political discourse emphasizing anti-pluralism (Bayer, 2013). One more research question addresses therefore the need for

identifying the ways of weakening and removing the perception of the threat of migration in the CEE host societies:

3. National Immigrant Integration Models

Research literature on international migration from the 19th century to the late 1970s reveals three main theories on the causes of migration and immigrant settlements in the host societies. The *push-pull* theories which explain the migration as a labour flow from poor sending areas toward most industrialized and developed countries in the world by migrant recruitment processes based on economic mechanisms (Portes and Walton, 1981). The *supply-demand* theories which explain the self-initiated and spontaneous labour flows starting from the peripheral societies to economic powerful countries as labour migration from the former colonies to Britain, France or Netherlands or labour migration flows known as "*guestworkers*" to former FRG (Rist, 1979; Castles, 1986). The *assimilationist* theories explain the settlement patterns of immigrants by their adaptation to the cultural values and norms of the host society by a process of absorption into the mainstream including the "*stages of acculturation, structural assimilation, amalgamation and identificational assimilation*" (Portes and Borocz, 1989).

From a definitional point of view, though there is neither universal agreement, nor clear definition (Jensen, 2019), the classic national assimilation models have thus combined the requirements of protecting the host societies' culture, values and style of living while hosting immigration in a much more extensive social and political framework than ever imagined in the 1960s. *Multiculturalism* has been the concept which apparently provided all the ingredients for an optimal solution for both *Hosts* and *Others*. Notwithstanding theories and expectations, such national integration models and strategies have often resulted in rejection, isolation, and segregation of immigrants.

National models of citizenship and immigrant integration have represented conceptual and pragmatic approaches to the immigration problem in Western European countries (Bertossi, 2011): the concept of 'integration' has been defined to address the incorporation of new groups / population (immigrants, 'Others') in the existing social structures of a host society ('Host').

National integration models rely on both conceptual and theoretical approaches which represent the philosophy of integration, and pragmatic approaches including a policy, an institutional structure, and the national culture (Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2012). Such models have represented for quite a long time the fundamental references in migration literature in Europe (Brubaker, 1991). There are three main typologies of national models of immigrant integration based on: (i) republicanism, (ii) multiculturalism, and (iii) ethnic differentiation (Brubaker, 1992; Bertossi, 2011; Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2012; Finotelli and Michalowski, 2012; Gans, 2007, 1997). One of the most relevant strategies of integration known as the Theory of Acculturation (Berry, 1997) explains the four typologies of acculturation strategy, that is *integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization*, as based on two fundamental dimensions: *assimilation vs. segregation*, and *universalism vs. multiculturalism* (Koopmans et al., 2005). *Integration Hypothesis* (*Biculturalism*: Berry, 2013) explains how migrants as ethnic minorities succeed in

adaptation to their host society by adopting the mainstream culture of the host society while maintaining their cultural heritage.

During the past decade, hard criticism addressing the concept of national model of immigrant has revealed its main weaknesses: firstly, the concept definition is not clear enough to provide effective support for its operationalization, and secondly, it does not consider the differences between various host societies (Jensen, 2019). The weaknesses and limitations of the national immigrant integration models have been reported long before in the research literature (Joppke, 2009) and started being gradually revised. As biculturalism proved to have very weak influence on the adaptation of migrants in the host societies, the new approaches have provided arguments for *contextualizing* immigration integration such that relevant factors for their adaptation, such as discrimination, could be identified and studied (Bierwiazzonek and Kunst, 2021).

Some European countries do not have immigration integration strategies, some of them implement national programs of immigrant integration, and some others implement programs and action plans for immigrant integration as recommended by the EU institutions. The Case Studies presented in this paper concern four Central and Eastern European countries: Poland, Czechia, Hungary, and Romania. These case studies have provided data concerning the country immigration status, national strategies, policies and programs for immigrant integration, national legislative packages which have been elaborated under the EU legislation, institutional resources which have been created for the management of immigrants and services for healthcare, education, social inclusion, and employment of immigrants (see Table 1).

The current European picture reveals the EU as the main actor in promoting a new philosophy on immigrant integration: European Commission has elaborated a new legislation and a new concept of quota-based proportional distribution of immigrants among the EU member countries taking into consideration their national capacities to absorb the immigrant flows and provided support for an EU immigrant integration program which has been implemented at both the EU and national governmental levels.

Immigration has been traditionally studied from a social-cultural perspective which is characteristic for the theories underlying the immigrant integration models mainly based on cultural assimilation and citizenship studies. The failure of the multiculturalist model and the official recognition of the incapacity of the European Union to provide an identity-oriented framework for immigrants' integration (Cameron, 2011; Muchowiecka, 2013), has stimulated EU to approach the immigration issue with a complex legislative package aimed at providing the means for an integration based on human rights, inclusion, and equal chance for development (European Commission's New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 2020).

4. Contextualization of Immigrant Integration

Contextualization of migration is an increasingly powerful trend in migration research which acknowledges the necessity to reconsider immigrant integration strategies and national models from a multidimensional contextual perspective.

Table 1. CEE Country Case Studies: Immigrant Integration strategies, policies, and programs

Case Study/ Country	Status	National Government: Immigrant Integration		
		Strategy	Policy	Program/ Action Plan
Case Study#1: Poland	country of immigration ¹		Immigrant Integration Policy ² Start Year: 2005 Update(s): 2021	
Case Study#2: Czechia	country of immigration ³		First Immigrant Integration Policy ⁴ Start year: 2000 Updates: 2006, 2011, 2016	Annual Action Plans Start Year: 2012 Update(s): yearly
Case Study#3: Hungary	immigration transit country ⁵	Migration Strategy ⁶		no immigrant integration program ⁷
Case Study#4: Romania	emigration country ^{8,9}	Romanian National Immigration Strategy ¹⁰ adopted by Romanian Government Decision ¹¹ and Integration Law adopted by Governmental Ordinance Nr. 44/2004		Immigrant Integration Action Plan ¹²

Historical country specific issues have been emphasized in the research literature as an explanatory dimension of country specific immigrant integration strategies (Bertossi, Duyvendak and Foner, 2020; Bertossi, 2011).

The relevant contextual factors and their impact on immigration integration and securitization phenomena studied in this paper are: (1) Country factors (historical and

¹ European Website on Integration/Poland: [Governance of migrant integration in Poland | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#)

² Poland-Immigrant Integration Policy: "The Council for the Model of Migrant Integration in the Mazovian Voivodeship, established by Caritas Poland and composed of representatives of Mazovian public institutions and NGOs, started working on the strategy of integration of migrants in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship" (Update year: 2021): [Proposals of Actions Aimed At Establishing a Comprehensive Immigrant Integration Policy in Poland](#)

³ European Website on Integration/Czechia: [Governance of migrant integration in Czechia | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#)

⁴ [Governance of migrant integration in Czechia | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#): "... first Czech immigrant integration policy in 2000. It focused on equal opportunities and non-discrimination, as well as measures to provide long-term residents with rights similar to those of Czech citizens. The document was fundamentally updated in 2006, 2011 and 2016, with an increased emphasis on promoting good relations between migrant communities and the majority population. In addition, since 2012, the Czech government published annual action plans"

⁵ European Website on Integration/Hungary: [Hungary's Migration Strategy | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#)

⁶ Hungary's Migration Strategy: [Hungary's Migration Strategy | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#)

⁷ Hungarian Governmental position with respect to immigrant integration: [Governance of migrant integration in Hungary | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#)

⁸ European Website on Integration/Romania: [The Index of Immigrant Integration in Romania - IIR | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#)

⁹ Cosciug, A. (2018)

¹⁰ Romanian [National Strategy for Immigration for the period 2015-2018](#):

¹¹ Romanian Government Decision concerning immigrant integration national strategy: Governmental Decision Nr. 780/2015; Integration Law adopted by Governmental Ordinance: [Government ordinance No. 44/2004](#)

¹² Romanian Integration Action Plan: [2021-2022 action plan](#)

geopolitical context); (2) Ethnic factors; (3) Social trust; (4) Political culture factors (values, beliefs); (5) National culture factors.

4.1 Country factors: historical, and geopolitical factors.

In the past millennium, the Western European wealthy countries have been the target of several migration waves. After WWII, during the harsh communist regimes ruling in the eastern half of Europe, these countries have been the target of Eastern European emigrants and political asylum seekers. After communism has been deposed in the Central and Eastern European countries in 1989, these western European countries became once again the target of economic immigrants coming from the countries in the eastern half of Europe.

In 2015, a massive migration wave hit Europe. At the time, the situation revealed the limits of the European systems to cope with the high number and complexity of the immigration flows transiting the southern countries, especially Greece and Italy, and heading toward western and northern countries, such as Germany, France, Netherlands, or UK. In the same time, after the 1990s, target countries like UK, Netherlands, Germany and France faced a fast evolving phenomenon of increasing immigration which resulted in high percentages of immigrants in the host population: UK: from 6.39% (1990) to 13.20% (2015); Germany: from 7.52% (1990) to 14.88% (2015) ; Netherlands: from 6.90% (1990) to 11.70% (2015); France, from 10% (1990) to 12% (2015) (see Figure 1).

In the past millennium, the history of the eastern half of Europe covers a long time of wars, invasion, and occupation by the Ottoman Empire in the Southern areas and by the Habsburg and Russian Empires in the Central and Eastern Europe. Historical societies in this part of Europe have witnessed repeated settlements of Ottoman military forces as well as the coercion exercised by both native and foreign political and administrative bureaucracies (Hall, 2014; Jennissen, 2011). Muslim population coming from the Ottoman Empire has settled down in the Western Balkans, southern and eastern areas of Europe, while German and Hungarian groups have settled down in some countries in the Central Europe and partly in the Eastern Europe, as it happened for example in Slovakia or in Romania (Transylvania, Harghita, and Covasna counties). The fall of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empire has left behind a complex mix of ethnic groups.

Demographically, several of the ex-communist Eastern European countries have a multi-ethnic, multicultural structure, with high ethnical diversity (Stojšin, 2015). Since the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, nation-states in the Western Balkans and the South-Eastern Europe have had to manage multiple ethnic communities, the historical Muslim ones included.

Historically, almost all countries in this part of Europe have been multi-ethnic. Ethnic conflicts have dominated the area for long time, modifying the size of ethnical groups and their influence. The post-WWII era has witnessed a substantial change in the ethnical diversity of several countries: Poland, for example, became an ethnically homogenous society after the Holocaust and the massive deportations of ethnical populations.




Figure 1.

Brief history of emigration during communist regimes of the Eastern Europe:
 Immigration in Western European countries (1960-2017)

Source: <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/> Immigration Statistics 1960-2022

More than fifty years of communist regimes and the influence of the former-USSR over all countries in this part of Europe have had major consequences from the perspective of ethnic conflicts. After the deposing of communism and the legitimization of a new democratic order in the former communist societies starting from 1989, the complex phenomenology of disintegration of former USSR and former Yugoslavia have been the major political changes in the Eastern European geopolitical space which revealed how the historical ethnic conflicts have been revived by the new order.

In his chapter on ethnic politics, Stephen Bowers, citing Karl Deutsch (1961), explains the relationship between the rise of the democratic new order in the Eastern European countries and the revival of ethnic conflicts and wars:

"... As Eastern Europe's communist order is being replaced by a new one, ethnic strife may be an unavoidable by-product of change. Studies of the process of modernisation have established the proposition that such an event, with its demand for new behavioural patterns, produces ethnic conflict (Note 7: p. 109). [...] In such an environment, nationalism is often transformed into hostility against ethnic minorities"

(Bowers, 1997)

Nationalism in the Eastern Europe as well as social cleavages fuelling political hostility between ethnic groups (Powell Jr., 1970), have constantly provided the political stimulus for the emergence in the Eastern Europe of new ethnic conflicts as follow-ups of the historical ones or complementary to those. After the Yugoslavian Wars between 1991 and 1995 in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the experience of more than 2.5 million people massive displacement in the Bosnian War (Ramet, 2010; Meznaric and Zlatkovic-Winter, 1993) as well as the massive emigration after 1989 from the East to the West Europe, have fundamentally marked the history of immigration from within Europe.

Hungary is considered ethnically homogenous (Schafft and Kulcsar, 2015) with a larger ethnical minority group of Roma (approx. 3%, MRG, 2018) and other smaller ethnical communities of Germans (aprox.2%, MRG, 2018), Serbs, Croat, and Romanians ethnical groups of less than 0.5% (MRG, 2018).

Ethnical composition of Central and Eastern European countries makes the immigrant integration approach shift from the Western European, US and Canadian state multiculturalism conceptual backgrounds to a different background: these countries are committed to approach the immigrant integration models from the perspective of ethnical minorities and their relationship with the ethnical majorities since this identifies the societal aspects of ethnic-based discrimination, social inequalities and explain the failure of classic multiculturalism in the approach of the policies of inclusion and tolerance to diversity (Phalet, Baysu, and Van Acker, 2015).

This historical condition of these countries justifies the contextualization hypothesis and provides for one more argument in the favour of political culture-based approach on immigrant integration.

Ethnic Nationalism in the eastern half of Europe (Bochsler, 2007) as well as social cleavages fuelling political hostility between ethnic groups (Powell and Bingham, 1970) have constantly provided the political stimulus for the emergence in the Eastern Europe of new ethnic conflicts as follow-ups of the historical ones or complementary to those. After the Yugoslavian Wars between 1991 and 1995 in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the experience of more than 2.5 million people massive displacement in the Bosnian War (Ramet, 2010; Meznaric and Zlatkovic-Winter, 1993) as well as the massive emigration after 1989 from the East to the West have fundamentally marked the history of immigration from within Europe.

4.2 Ethnic factors

The dichotomy ethnic-civic is dominant in citizenship and immigration research as the empirical studies show that it depends on the degree of diversity accepted in a host society and therefore differs from one society to another (Reekens and Hooghe, 2010). The notion of 'ethnic citizenship' is associated with having national ancestry, while the notion of 'civic citizenship' is understood as obeying the national laws in the host society.

In the Northern and Western European countries, immigrant integration policies cover a wide range between assimilation and variants of multiculturalism in which multiple cultures and ethnical identities are accepted. However, in the Southern and CEE countries which are ethnically homogenous (Greece and Italy in South Europe, Poland and Hungary in Central

Europe) the experience of immigrant integration is built-up based on "*particular histories of nation building*" (Kosica and Phalet, 2006).

Considering their historic and demographic characteristics and ethnical composition, for the countries in the eastern half of Europe the immigrant integration issue could be approached in terms of ethnical minorities. The model of multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995) might be considered as more appropriate since it covers both the multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism characteristics of these societies:

"The theory of multicultural citizenship, or the liberal foundation of the minority rights, is built on two pillars: first, that the minority rights build a frame which makes possible the actual and practical effects of the individual rights and liberties, and second that the specific (minority) rights can ensure equality between the members of the majority and those of the minority groups. Thus Kymlicka set himself not only to eliminate the perceived difference between the individual liberalism and the minority rights, conceived as being collective, but also to reconcile the two perspectives "

(Lupu, 2014: 81)

These factors could influence the perception of immigrants and immigration in the new democracies in the eastern half of Europe. Historical background as well as current economic and political contexts of these countries make them vulnerable to-, and unlikely to prove resilience against - massive migration waves.

Though there is wide agreement on the EU position that immigration might be helpful for the host societies in achieving higher tolerance to ethnical groups and cultural diversity, the reported survey data prove that Eastern European societies are at low levels on the appreciation of cultural diversity, low at socializing with immigrants, low also in accepting that immigrant integration is a 'two-way' process involving responsibility from both Host and Others (see Figure 7).

5. Political Culture: Why would it matter for the immigrant integration programs in the European Union?

As an essential characteristic of a society and polity, the *political culture* has roots in the philosophical thinking of Alexis de Tocqueville (Tocqueville, 1835/1968) about *the mental habits* of the individuals in a democratic society. The classic theory of political culture has been founded much later by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963). In their view, political culture is concerned with the "*particular distribution of orientations towards political objects among members of the nation*" (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 13). Further elaborated by Lucien Pye and Gabriel Almond (1965), the political culture is said to consist in all attitudes, values, beliefs and skills and their distribution in the society, and it is meant to help in identifying the nature of political systems and the patterns of behaviours (Pye, 1965):

"Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments, which give order and meaning to a political process, and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system".

(Pye, 1965)

By making reference to the new democracies in the Central Eastern Europe and analysing their chance to survive, Bernd Wegener emphasizes the idea that democracy is enhanced by the economic development as argued by Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart,

1990; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 2003), but it would only survive with the essential support of a democratic political culture as a system of values, beliefs and attitudes which gives meaning to democratic political participation (Wegener, 2000). Robert Putnam argues that the main dimensions of a democratic political culture, such as the political interest and participation, social trust and social equality are fundamental for the democratic political systems and effective governance (Putnam, 1993).

The relevance of a political culture-based approach to immigrants and their integration in the host societies is studied in this paper with the general aim of better understanding it with regard to the Central and Eastern European societies: their capacity of immigrant integration as well as the issue of the quality of such integration is under the EU guidance. However, the societies in the eastern half of Europe have a different history, a different experience on migration and a different political culture than the societies in the western half of Europe. These differences are studied to the purpose of explaining their influence on the immigrant integration capacities of these countries under a scenario of possible massive migration wave.

In this paper, we provide a comparative perspective over two sets of European countries, one set includes four classic immigration countries from Western Europe (Germany, France, UK, and Netherlands), and the other one includes four countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Romania). The comparative analysis is performed by taking into consideration the following typical political culture issues and variables: (i) beliefs: the study takes into consideration variables like trust in others, tolerance to cultural diversity, and political beliefs (ideologies) which are related to the populist and extremist political parties in Europe during the past two decades, (ii) anti-immigration attitudes, (iii) (materialist and postmaterialist) values, (iv) national culture characteristics, (v) politicization of migration and political party favourability.

As discussed in the subsequent sub-sections, the political culture issues prove to have more impact in the societies from the eastern Europe due to their communist legacies. In the subsequent sections, these issues are analysed with survey data from European and US databases, research institutes, and with expert data and analysis from the research literature. The purpose of this comparative analysis is to emphasize the political culture aspects which are relevant for a better understanding of the immigrant integration in European countries, with a special focus on CEE societies.

In the following sub-sections, the research outcomes are structured with two criteria: (1) the political culture issues of study, and (2) the types of comparative analysis studies, that is, causality studies and change pattern studies. This structure helps in identifying the most interesting political culture aspects, to assess their relevance, and eventually to explain the role they might play in the anti-immigration attitudes change and in the build-up of national models for immigrant integration in the CEE countries.

5.1 Politicization of immigration in the European societies

The immigration issue and anti-immigration attitudes have provided the subject for a relevant trend in Western European countries even before the migration crisis in 2015. The political discourse in the electoral campaigns has been substantially influenced


by the anti-immigration issues, and one major impact of this trend in the UK has finally resulted in Brexit (Voinea, 2022).

Rooted in the nationalist, populist and extremist political ideologies, this trend has been systematically conveyed through the public discourse by various political parties with populist and nationalist ideological characteristics, and has been mirrored in the voting preferences, which have increased from 7% in the early 2000 to 25% by 2018 (see Figure 2,a). Politicization of immigration in the political discourse has suddenly “exploded” in Hungary and Poland after 2015 as an impressive hate wave against the immigrants which has been consistently reinforced by (print and social) media.

Systematic campaigns of politicization of migration in Hungary and Poland have often exceeded the strength of xenophobia and populism of similar campaigns in the Western European countries (Ruzza, 2018) (see Figure 2, b, c).


In this context, not all CEE EU-member countries have fully accepted to collaborate and implement the new EU legislation and strategies for immigrant integration: the Hungarian Government started building fences at Hungary’s southern borders with the explicit goal to stop immigration flows transit Hungary. Poland rejected the EU requirements for national immigrant integration strategies, while Polish top political leadership, the political party in power (PiS) and Polish tabloid media started an unexpectedly intense anti-immigration integration campaign.

Debates and survey data regarding the *European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum* in 2020 have revealed that the main driver of anti-immigration attitudes in the European countries is *threat*. Two types of threats have been identified: a realistic threat with economic and security dimensions concerning both employment, financial burden, and physical security of individuals and assets, and a symbolic threat, concerning national identity and cultural values. The main factors which influence the anti-immigration attitudes are identified in (a) the politicization of immigration by political parties, with a relevant role played by the populist parties, and (b) the (classic and social) media which influence the public perception of immigrants.



Source: *The Guardian*¹³.

(a)



Source: Pew Research Center¹⁴, articles in the electoral media in Romania¹⁵.

Figure 2 a, b,c.

Political party favourability [%] in (a) Europe, (b) Western European countries, (c) CEE countries

5.2 National culture factors

The impact of the enduring communist political culture legacy on the level of social trust has negative effects on the organizational culture which in turn can influence the employment of immigrants in the Central and Eastern European countries.

The dominance of interpersonal networks of close ties in the management of social trust is usually mirrored in the organizational culture as the employment and management are performed on an interpersonal trust networks basis which considers the personal relationships more than the competence, merit, and work performance of the employee. Besides, the interpersonal networks of close ties have the effect of preserving corruption-based routines in organizational life.

In Romania, the survey on organizational culture and values emphasize highest appreciation of values which express appreciation of *"no-effort money"*, *"taking benefits with no-work and no-involvement"*, no appreciation for honesty, accepting the idea of bribing for obtaining privileges in the organization, no appreciation for hardworking fellows, as well as lowest levels of trust in others (Bodea, 2013).


When evaluating these aspects with regard to immigrants' employment then the picture becomes very discouraging. Organizational cultures and values differ substantially between Western and Eastern European countries at least in two of the six

¹³ J. Henley in Prague and Berlin (2018) "How populism emerged as an electoral force in Europe", *The Guardian*, Tue 20 Nov 2018, available online at url: [How populism emerged as an electoral force in Europe | Czech Republic | The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/20/populism-emerged-as-an-electoral-force-in-europe) . Accessed: 25 January 2023.

¹⁴ Pew Research Center, October 2019, "European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism", p. 98-100.

¹⁵ Lazăr, Mihnea (6 decembrie 2020). [„Ce este, de unde vine și ce vrea AUR, partidul de extremă dreapta care a ajuns de la puțin peste zero la pragul electoral”](https://digi24.ro/stiri/ce-este-de-unde-vine-si-ce-vrea-a-ur-partidul-de-extrema-dreapta-care-a-ajuns-de-la-putin-peste-zero-la-pragul-electoral). Digi24. Accessed: 19 February 2023 (in Romanian).

dimensions described by Hofstede (1980): 'individualism' and 'uncertainty avoidance' (see Figure 3).



Source: [Country Comparison - Hofstede Insights \(hofstede-insights.com\)](https://hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison)

Figure 3.

National culture factors: individualism, uncertainty avoidance, (Hofstede, 1980).


Combined with the other two paradigms which are still effective in the post-communist societies from the eastern half of Europe, that is the interpersonal networks of close ties (Rose, 1994) and the preference falsification (Kuran, 1995), these characteristics of the management quality in the organizational culture could provide for immigrant discrimination, exclusion of immigrants on criteria which are not based on performance and inducing a climate of rejection of immigrants from the organizational performance (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010).

5.3 Tolerance to cultural diversity


A comprehensive picture of the current attitudes toward immigrants in Europe is described by the Eurobarometer public surveys developed during 2018-2021 in both Western and CEE countries (see Figure 4. Special Eurobarometer 519, 2021). These surveys show that the mindset of people in the host societies emphasizes a change in some respects, for example in their view that the immigrant integration is a 'two-way' process (Special Eurobarometer 519 (2021): QB14) while remaining dominated by the idea that the immigrants should accept the values and norms of the host society (Special Eurobarometer 519 (2021): QB11.4), while many citizens in the host society keep the socialization with the immigrants at low levels (Special Eurobarometer 519 (2021): QB6).

The distribution of these characteristics in the European countries included in our case studies conveys an empirical clue on the substantial differences between Western and Eastern European societies in what regards perceptions of immigrants and immigrant integration, as follows:


- the belief that immigrants should accept the values and norms of the host society is dominant in the Western societies (between 77% in France and 84% in Netherlands), while it has a lower support in the CEE societies (between 56% in Romania and 79% in Hungary)



(a)



(b)



(c)

Source: Integration of Immigrants in the European Union Report, Special Eurobarometer 519 Report, Fieldwork: November-December 2021, Catalogue Number: DR-06-22-176-EN-N. ISBN: 978-92-76-50186-2. DOI:10.2837/672792. No figures for UK, as the Special Eurobarometer survey has been developed after Brexit. Available online at url: [Special Eurobarometer: integration of immigrants in the European Union | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/toc/special/eu-integration) . Last accessed: 18.09.2022

Figure 4.

Special Eurobarometer 519 (2021): QB11.4, QB14, QB6.

- the belief that both the Host and the Others should take the burden of integration by assuming the necessary changes of the immigrant integration processes has acquired higher degree of support in the Western European societies (between 74% in France and 81% in The Netherlands), while remaining rather low in the CEE societies (between 48% in Hungary and 63% in Poland);
- the degree of openness to immigration by accepting practices and policies of inclusion in the CEE societies (between 41% in Poland and 69% in Romania) is significantly higher than that in the Western countries (between 26% in Netherlands and 35% in France), however not enough for the development of sustainable inclusion policies and tolerance to diversity programs.

5.4 Values

In the Western European countries selected as country case studies in our research, the postmaterialist values are systematically more relevant or dominant with respect to the materialist values, while in the CEE countries the materialist values are clearly dominant (see Figure 5).


The discussion of tolerance to cultural diversity with reference to immigration has been dominated by the dichotomies West/East and civic/ethnic nationalism: while in the

Western European societies the concept of nationalism is understood in a political key and essentially related to the concept of citizenship, in the Central Eastern European societies the concept of ethnic nationalism is dominant and justified as a historical legacy of nation-building processes after the dissolution of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, or Russian Empires (Cebotari, 2019; Shulman, 2002; Brubaker, 1996; Schopflin, 1996; Kohn, 1944). In the post-communist societies in Central Eastern Europe ethnic nationalism is deeply related to the national and ethnic identity and to the support for democracy from the perspective of the rights of ethnical minorities.

However, in both cases assimilationism is the approached preferred by both Western (Modood, Dobbernack, Meer, 2010) and Eastern European societies with respect to immigration.

The evolution of the attachment to materialist and postmaterialist values in Central and Eastern European countries is described in Figure 5.


In Poland, tolerance dimension of the legislation concerning the immigration is covered under the term of “constitutional nationalism” (Buchowski and Chlewińska, 2010). In Hungary the tolerance to diversity is emphasized in the co-existence of several ethnical minorities (Horvath, Vidra and Fox, 2011). In Czechia the tolerance to diversity is increasingly based in the legislation for immigration (Drbohlav and Janurová, 2019; Volynsky, 2016). In Romania the tolerance to diversity concerns both the ethnical, and the religious minorities with legislation providing for the equal relevance of national and native language, education, religion as well as political participation from the individual to the top political leadership level (Poiana et al., 2010).



Source: [WVS Database \(worldvaluessurvey.org\)](https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) . . , variable: Y002

Note: Hungary (1981); Poland (1990-1994); Czechia (1990-1994); Romania (1995-1999).

(a)



Source: [WVS Database \(worldvaluessurvey.org\)](https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDatabase.jsp) . Variable: Y002.

Note: Wave 5: France 2006, Germany 2006, Netherlands 2006; Wave 7: France EVS, Germany 2018, Germany-EVS, Netherlands 2022, Netherlands EVS, United Kingdom - Great Britain EVS.

Figure 5.

Evolution of materialist & postmaterialist values in the Western European countries (1981-2021).

5.5 Social Trust

Motto:

"Virtuous citizens are helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ on matters of substance."

Putnam, 1993: p.89)

"Distrust is a pervasive legacy of communist rule."

Richard Rose (1994: p.18)


Democratic societies base their social and political internal stability on the civic culture of trust (Seligman, 1997; Luhmann, 1979). The theories of social trust which interpret it as a property of individuals (personality trait) emphasize the idea that distrust is a characteristic of the individuals with low income, low level of education and vulnerable social status (Putnam, 2000). This idea is addressed by several authors (Inglehart, 1999; Warren, 1999) and has empirical support in the survey data: the individuals who suffer from discrimination, social exclusion and poverty show low degree of trust in others. The theories of trust, which interpret it as a property of society, address the idea that individuals receive influence of social and political institutions which encourage the attitudes and behaviours based on trust and thus participate in a culture of trust (Delhey and Newton, 2002).

For the societies in the Central Eastern Europe, the networks of interpersonal relations have a long history related to their communist past: in the communist system, these networks were maintained as restricted as possible to family and close ties in order to solve problems of scarce resources and survival means in a society based on distrust and suspicion introduced by the *Nomenklatura* system and ideology characteristic for authoritarian communist regimes (Sztompka, 1996; Rose, 1994; Delhey and Newton, 2002: 7). The legacy of interpersonal close ties networks as well as distrust in all the others in the society is a strong political culture legacy in the post-communist societies (Offe, 2010).

During the past decade, social trust has been decreasing in almost all European democratic societies. In the ex-communist societies, social trust is very low and, in some cases, has drastically decreased in the past decades (see Figure 6).

In the European ex-communist countries, the decrease in social trust is explained on a political culture basis. This evidence is interpreted in the research literature as based on a political culture legacy of the communist past of these societies (Uslaner, 2010; Offe, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 1996; Rose, 1994).


Such aspects have a non-uniform distribution across the new democratic societies in the eastern half of Europe after 1989 (Ekiert and Foa, 2011), however the analysis of data from public surveys, governmental institutions, and national, European and international organizations prove that social trust is deeply related to an enduring mentality of low participation, low civic commitment, low participation in volunteering programs and collective actions, low trust in institutions, policy, and elite, and authoritarian trends in governmental and political decision making (Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski, 2018; Bocskor, 2018; Kotras, 2016; Grzeżkowiec, 2014).



Source: Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Max Roser (2016) - "Trust". Published online at url: OurWorldInData.org Retrieved from: 'https://ourworldindata.org/trust' [Online Resource]. Available online at url: [Trust - Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/trust) . Last Accessed: 18.09.2022.

Figure 6.
Trust in others (a) Western and (b) Eastern European countries.

A careful quantitative analysis of the relationship between social trust (independent variable) and the acceptance of immigrants by the citizens in the Western, Southern, Central and Eastern European host societies (dependent variable) reveals that the correlations between the acceptance of immigrants by the host societies, and the social trust in the host societies show differences which are worth considering (see Figure 7).



Source: [Share of people agreeing with the statement "most people can be trusted", 1993 to 2014 \(ourworldindata.org\)](https://ourworldindata.org/) (CEE & Western European countries).

Figure 7. Trust in others: absolute change.

Absolute change in levels of trust-in-other for Western and Central Eastern European countries, based on survey data during 1993-2014.

6. Interpretations of the comparative outcomes

The interpretation of the comparative analysis outcomes is aimed at identifying what are the most relevant similarities and differences in the anti-immigration attitudes which could inform the policy making and the model design for immigrant integration in CEE countries which do not have the same experience and the same history of immigration like the Western European countries. As the latter set of countries have already experienced model design, implementation and learned from these experiences what are models' main limitations, an important task for the former countries is to evaluate to what extent the experiences and the lessons learned could contribute to immigration integration approaches in their own societies and under their political cultures background.

The outcomes of the comparative analysis of the political culture issues, like attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviours, are meant to inform the modelling of the immigration integration in the CEE societies by making the appropriate adjustments to how this modelling has been performed for the Western European societies in the traditional immigration countries.

The comparative analysis includes two types of studies: (i) causality studies, and (ii) change patterns studies.

6.1 Causality studies

In the causality studies of the relation between the change in (postmaterialist and materialist) values and the change in beliefs (social trust: “trust-in-others”), the preliminary outcomes provide for interesting findings. These findings concern the degree of influence some variables have on the anti-immigration attitudes.

6.1.1 *Causality studies in value change*

For the set of selected CEE countries: the correlation between the change in materialist values and the change in trust-in-others is negative and rather strong ($r = -0.68$), while the correlation between the change in postmaterialist values and the change in trust-in-others is positive and of similar strength ($r = +0.60$). In both causality relationships, the role played by the changes in the social trust might prove decisive as other factors too, like political party favourability, might reinforce this type of causality.

For the set of selected Western European countries (i.e., traditional immigration countries), the correlations in both cases are positive and of low strength with small differences ($r = 0.18$ for materialist values vs. trust-in-others, and $r = 0.32$ for postmaterialist values vs. trust-in-others). Linear regression studies prove that the causality relation between values and social trust in Western European societies shows a similar (with small differences of strength) low-strength relationship of both dependent variables with the change in social trust. This makes the social trust having a rather non-decisive impact on the changes in values during the past decade. This finding puts further emphasis on our hypothesis that Western European societies are less sensitive to political culture issues than CEE societies, and suggest that in the former case, there are other factors to play a more important role, while in the latter case the role of social trust proves decisive (or close to decisive) for the value changes from materialist to postmaterialist patterns.

6.1.2 *Causality studies in anti-immigration attitudes and their relationship with social trust in CEE countries*

This causality study aims at a better understanding of the degree of influence the social trust might have on the anti-immigration attitudes. In the European Union member-countries, the correlations are studied for anti-immigration attitudes survey data provided by the Eurobarometer 519 (2021) with three variables:

Variable (QB6) for the percentage of respondents having low level of socialization or no socialization with the immigrants. For the CEE countries, the correlation between social trust and anti-immigration attitude is negative of average strength ($r = -0.52$) suggesting that lower levels of trust in others are associated with an increase in the number of citizens in the host societies having low or no socialization with the immigrants. The study provide support for the hypothesis that, in CEE societies, low levels of trust in others would reinforce the rejection of immigrants rather than their integration.

Variable (QB11.4) for the percentage of respondents preferring the immigrants to accept the value of the host society. For the CEE countries, this appear as the preferred approach to immigrants and immigrant integration as the correlational study shows that the relationship between social trust and anti-immigration attitudes (dependent variable) is characterized by a high positive correlation coefficient $r=0.96$. The study suggests that high levels of trust in others would enhance a person's positive attitude toward immigrants who get assimilated in the host society.

Variable (QB14) for the percentage of respondents who admit that the immigrant integration is a "two-way" process which involves responsibility of both Host and Others.

For the CEE countries, this kind of attitude toward immigrants has a positive average-strength correlation with the level of social trust: as trust in others increases, there is an increasing trend in the number of people sharing the idea of a "two-way" process of immigrant integration which assumes that both Host citizens and the Others (immigrants) hold the responsibility of immigrant integration. As a difference from the Western European countries, this "two-way" idea of immigrant integration has been more successful in the CEE countries, showing higher number of preferences for this idea (see Figure 4).

The correlation between the acceptance of immigrants by the Host under the requirement that the Others share the value set and norms of the host society (Special Eurobarometer 519 (2021): QB11.4), and social trust (see Figure 4) is positive and has a strength close to the average ($r=0.58$) for the Western European countries, while the same correlation has a negative value, and a higher strength ($r=-0.69$) for the Central Eastern countries. The correlation between the acceptance of immigrants (Others) by the citizens in the Host societies under the requirement that the Others become active in organizations and actions in the host society (Special Eurobarometer 519 (2021): QB11.5), and social trust is negative and proves rather irrelevant ($r=-0.28$) for the Western European countries, while the same correlation has a negative value, but a higher strength ($r=-0.47$) for the Central Eastern countries in our case studies.

These analyses based on social trust suggest that the social relationship with the immigrants is depending on factors belonging in the political culture of the host society.

6.2 Studies on patterns of change

The comparative analysis of political culture issues in the Western European and CEE countries include several studies concerning the patterns of change in the data collected for the most relevant variables: materialist and postmaterialist values, trust in others, and anti-immigration attitudes.

The change pattern studies are mainly focused on the characteristics of the change in data sets, like the type and extend or amount of change, the temporal intervals of change, the convergent/non-convergent change trajectories. These patterns help in visualizing the kind of change process as the dynamics of change in the chosen variables proves asymmetry and context-dependencies.

While causality studies help in better understanding and explaining the change phenomena, the studies on the patterns of change help in better understanding how the

change occurs, how it evolves during temporal intervals, in what context, and under what conditions, what type of outcomes the change produces in the dependent variables.

This comparative analysis identified two main patterns of change which are of particular interest for this approach:

- (1) patterns of change in values: materialist and postmaterialist values,
- (2) patterns of change in beliefs: social trust.

There are also patterns of change which regard the anti-immigration attitudes and their dependence on the political party favourability, with a special focus on populist parties.

In this approach we address the patterns of change in values and beliefs. Each pattern of change in value sets is briefly described in the followings.

6.2.1 Patterns of change in materialist and postmaterialist value sets

The patterns of change in materialist and postmaterialist values in the European countries provide for a differentiation amongst the societies in the set of selected countries. They provide support to (i) the hypothesis that the immigration issues should have different approaches in CEE countries in comparison with Western European countries despite societies apparently develop very much similar anti-immigration attitudes, and (ii) different approaches on the countries from the same set as they are different from one another despite sharing the relevant characteristics of their geopolitical area, and the findings acknowledge that these CEE societies differ from one another as much as they differ from the western societies.

There are two patterns of change in materialist and postmaterialist values:


One is the pattern which describes the change in each set of values as having a shared point. The other pattern describes the change in each set of values as having no shared point but proving some (weak or powerful, slow or fast) convergence trend to a potential shared point. These patterns are identified in both sets of selected countries.


One possible interpretation of the “shared point” pattern is that the two value sets share a value subset, and this finding is supported by the survey data as “mixed value set” in the WVS data collection on variable Y002 which has been employed in the analysis reported in this paper. The values in the shared subset might be a cultural trait (national culture characteristic) or a subset of values which are learned (experience-based).

For both Western European and CEE set of values, the “shared point” pattern could indicate that the value set is a *whole* in which some part(s) could be shared and some – separate, however they are integrated into a *whole* and not meant for overlapping or replacing one another. (The patterns for Germany and France and Poland, see Figure 8 a, b). This can further be interpreted that some value subset is strong enough as not to be overlapped or replaced by any other subset no matter if it is of materialist or postmaterialist type. Thus, such values are not belonging to any subset, but to the whole value set as they consistently relate to the whole value set.

The possible interpretation for the “potential point of convergence” pattern is that there are value subsets which are different (possibly acquired from different experiences or beliefs or cultural background), and they are preserved separated as each might need

or might get associated with separate codes of conduct or codes of survival. The “potential point of convergence” pattern could identify the whole value set as a stratified cultural and experience-based set of values, in which the strata are preserved as such and eventually replaced with one another if the context requires different criteria of survival or conduct (The patterns for Netherlands and UK, see Figure 8, a). For both Western European and CEE countries this pattern could be interpreted as the convergence of separate value sets, and their possible overlapping in contexts which might require their replacement with one another on a norm compliance basis, assuming that values and norms are fully internalized. However, beyond the justification based on economic reasoning and welfare standards with which materialist and postmaterialist value sets are usually associated, this pattern could have a more specific interpretation for the Central Eastern European’ sets of values. In this case, the “potential point of convergence” pattern provides support to another hypothesis, that is, the (political) culture legacies of the past in the ex-communist societies are still powerful enough as to maintain separate value sets and to make their convergence going too slow by reinforcing the non-compliance pattern of preferences falsification (Kuran, 1995) in the new European democratic societies (set of CEE countries) where the freedom of opinion is not well-consolidated and individual citizens might continue to prefer hiding their true opinion and attitudes toward sensible subjects, like immigrants and immigrant integration. Thus, value sets are preserved as separated sets with the aim of replacing one another when contexts require norm compliance, but norm compliance is not fully internalized. (The patterns for Romania, Hungary, and Czechia, see Figure 8, b). The analysis of such patterns of change in the materialist and postmaterialist value sets require further research work as the testing of the preference falsification hypothesis against empirical data from CEE societies might need survey design which could uncover characteristics of the ways in which citizens and societies achieve and make use of their value sets, form their anti-immigration attitudes, and express them in the public space.





Source: WVS, Variable: Y002; Waves 5 and 7.

(b)
Figure 8.


Patterns of change in materialist and postmaterialist values in (a) CEE countries, and (b) Western European countries.

These findings are currently under extended research methodology choices in which analytic approaches combined with data mining and machine learning techniques could enhance the study of dynamically evolving political culture aspects in the CEE host societies. To this purpose, the country case studies are extended for covering data extracted from classic (print) and social media, and approached with discourse and text analysis methodologies for the analysis of immigration issues in the CEE media during and after the migration crisis in 2015 (Voinea, 2023, *forthcoming*).

6.2.2 Patterns of change in social trust

The analyses based on social trust suggest that the social relationship with the immigrants is depending on factors belonging in the political culture of the host society (see Figure 9). The arguments in favour of an enduring communist political culture legacy with long-term effects beyond the democratization process of the countries in the eastern half of Europe are based on two political culture paradigmatic dimensions.

Firstly, interpersonal network-based evidence proves that people trust the close ties (only) and often distrust all the others. The theory of interpersonal networks of relations is based on the essential characteristic of the former communist societies which were dominated by generalized distrust and fear as basic components of the so-called "culture of fear" maintained by the *Nomenklatura*, that is, the type of state and political institution which maintained an ideological dictatorship in all these countries (Mishler and Rose, 1997; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; Sztompka, 1996; Fukuyama, 1995; Rose, 1994).



Source: [Share of people agreeing with the statement "most people can be trusted", 1993 to 2014 \(ourworldindata.org\)](https://ourworldindata.org) (Western European and CEE countries).

Figure 9.

Patterns of change in social trust.

Absolute change in the variable "trust-in-others" for CEE countries shows substantial differences between these countries: there are three patterns of change: very small negative change (Czechia), small positive change (Hungary), deep negative change (Poland, Romania).

Secondly, communist societies were characterized by the duality of people's opinions and attitudes in public and private space, respectively. This theory, known as preference falsification (Kuran, 1995) describes an essential characteristic of communist dictatorships in which people express in the public space opinions which are complying with the requirements and constraints of political authorities, while they preserve their true opinions and attitudes for the private spaces of interpersonal networks of close ties

(usually, the family). The duality of opinions and attitudes in the ex-communist societies is often associated with value sets dominated by the materialist values (see Figure 5).

The patterns of change in social trust in Figure 9 show the difference between levels of absolute change in each set of selected European countries while the absolute change in social trust in the Western European societies is positive and often consistent, the absolute change amount in the CEE societies is severely negative and high such that the social trust is reaching much lower levels than in the western societies. This pattern of change is interesting because it involves different consequences for the role the social trust plays in each set of selected countries in the case studies. While social trust level decreases in each set of countries, the CEE social and political context deepens this decreasing trend, thus making that same amount of change (in absolute figures) to operate with different impact: positive for the western societies, negative for the eastern ones. As a political culture item, a belief ("trust in others") is a dynamic variable with a rate of change which is quantifiable on small enough time intervals, as proven by the data we employ for a decade-long time (OECD, 2011). Even so, the patterns of change in beliefs (social trust) as well as the patterns of change in values might require huge amounts of data from large populations, and large time intervals to prove their dynamics. This issue of research has been approached with agent-based modelling and simulation methodology (Voinea, 2021) such that data is generated for large populations and extended time intervals, which help study the complexity of value change with value mappings methods. Further development of this approach would allow the study of dynamic value change, which is still an open issue as the values are considered to change at a very slow pace, if at all. However, the patterns of change in materialist and postmaterialist values might help in getting insight on the values change dynamics.

7. Conclusions and further research work

Our approach identifies several influence factors which are pivotal in the policy making and policy management of immigrant integration in Europe, with a special focus on CEE countries. For these countries, the political culture aspects might prove decisive since the democratic political culture and the democratic value set has not been fully put in place after the deposing of communism. The main question in this approach is how powerful are the political culture legacies of the past as to influence the capacity of the host societies in South-Eastern, Eastern and Central Europe to cope with a massive immigration wave like that of 2015 or even larger. Though the new European Union framework for immigrant integration provides the member countries with solutions for economic, logistic and financial aspects of this endeavour, the context of the eastern half of Europe might rise different problems, like the low level of social trust and the slow replacement of materialist values with the postmaterialist values set – two issues with strong impact on the tolerance to cultural diversity and change of anti-immigration attitude.

All four country case studies revealed that the contextual factors like history, geopolitical context, and ethnic structure which are deeply connected to their nation-

building history prove to be conditional for a better understanding of citizens' anti-immigration attitudes.

The enduring political culture legacy of the communist past of the CEE countries strongly influences the social trust and their set of values by making these reach either lower levels (postmaterialist values) or higher values (materialist values) than in the Western European standard democracies who appreciate more the postmaterialist values. This enduring legacy proves to deeply influence social, political, and organizational dimensions of these ex-communist societies, making native citizens less tolerant, and less able to socialize with immigrants. More striking evidence from the data analysis in the CEE countries concerns a difference between citizens' values, beliefs, and attitudes toward immigration, on the one hand, and the public statements, official positions, and attitudes of their political elite regarding this issue, on the other hand. From evidence provided by the case studies in Poland and Hungary, the political elite in these countries seem to recall and hardly employ methods of the past communist regimes in constraining and controlling citizens' preferences, social and political attitudes, and behaviours. These contrasting preferences are not evident in Czechia, where a large part of the Czech citizens (73%) widely agreed and accepted their President Miloš Zeman's public political attitude toward the immigrants in the migration crisis of 2015-2016. Research papers report a certain fear of the Hungarian intellectuals to publicly express disagreement with their Prime Minister's public statements and official positions regarding immigration (Farkas, 2022) thus expressing in some implicit way a distance from the Hungarian political elite. Finally, there is a difference between Romanians' attitudes toward immigrants and those of their political elite. This case study revealed that (part of) citizens have strongly rejected immigrants, in contrast with their political elite's attitude toward immigrants, which proved openness and tolerance in compliance with European Union 2020 program for immigrant integration.

The study reveals the CEE societies' vulnerabilities which are deepened by the enduring communist political culture legacy and its strong impact on countries' capacity of immigrant integration.

Finally, this approach provides for further developments with a special focus on the relationship between immigration and the host polities. It seems that both concepts of *multicultural* and *multi-ethnic* society cover the premises of conflict as long as such conflict is generated by the identity construction and the resentments which are too often associated with it at individual, societal, cultural, and national level (Fukuyama, 2018). Our approach addresses the idea that the political culture framework – as an alternative to the state multiculturalism – might provide the means to avoid conflicts in immigrant integration by reinforcing processes of construction of their identity in the host societies through tolerance to cultural diversity and shared values in the active civic and political participation – an idea which is at the heart of classic political culture theory. However, the issue of (national, cultural, social, and political) identity requires a complex investigation if associated with studies about national model of immigrant integration. While the new European Union's program provides for logistics, economic and financial support for the immigrant integration programs in each Central and Eastern member

country, this might prove not enough to make these countries appropriately cope with the immigration integration. There might be that their capacity to approach the immigrant integration issue as expected from fully complying with the EU norms and set of shared democratic values is jeopardized by political and social positions associated with identity conflict, ethnic-based resentment, political culture legacies of their communist past which enhance and maintain the collective perceptions of immigrants as sources of security threats.

Our analysis identified some influencing factors which might deeply affect the national approaches on immigrant integration in the CEE member countries, like social trust, ethnic conflict issues, and value sets. Further research work is already underway for extending the study of anti-immigration attitudes and political identities with big data and advanced methodologies based on discourse and text analysis enhanced with data mining and machine learning methodologies. Our final research goal would be that of informing immigrant integration policy making and national immigrant integration models for the countries in the eastern half of Europe.

References

Research literature & papers

- Almond, G.A. & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Balica, E., Marinescu, V. (2019) Refugees in Europe: Romanian Online Media Coverage of the Refugee's Crisis, *Rom. Jour. of Sociological Studies*, New Series, No. 1, p. 45–58.
- Bayer, J. (2013) Emerging Anti-pluralism in New Democracies - the Case of Hungary, *Osterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 42(1):95-110.
- Berry, J. W., & Sam, D. (1997). Acculturation and adaptation. In: J. W. Berry, H. S. Marshall, K. Cigdem (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Social behaviour and applications* (pp. 291–326). Allyn and Bacon.
- Berry, J.W. (2013) Global Psychology, *South African Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 43 Issue 4, pp.: 391-401. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0081246313504517>
- Bertossi and Duyvendak (2012) National Models of Immigrant Integration: The costs for comparative research, *Comparative European Politics* (2012) 10, 237–247. Doi:10.1057/cep.2012.10
- Bertossi, C. (2011) National models of integration in Europe: A comparative and critical perspective. *American Behavioural Scientist* 55 (12): 1541–1561.
- Bertossi, Ch., Duyvendak, J.W., Foner, N. (2020) Past in the present: migration and the uses of history in the contemporary era, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47 (2020): 4155 - 4171. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1812275>
- Bierwiazek, K. and Kunst, J.R. (2021) Revisiting the Integration Hypothesis: Correlational and Longitudinal Meta-Analyses Demonstrate the Limited Role of Acculturation for Cross-Cultural Adaptation, *Psychological Science* pp. 1–18.
- Bochsler, D. (2007) The spread of the ethnic/nationalist divide over post-communist Europe, Conference at the New Europe College, Bucharest, 1-3 June 2007.
- Bocskor, Á. (2018). Anti-Immigration Discourses in Hungary during the 'Crisis' Year: The Orbán Government's 'National Consultation' Campaign of 2015. *Sociology*, 52, 551 - 568.
- Bodea, D. (2013) *Valorile angajatilor romani*, Editura Result.
- Bosis, M. & Lampas, N. (2018) Is Refugee Radicalization a Threat to Greece? *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 29(1), 36-47.
- Brubaker, R. (1991) International Migration: A Challenge for Humanity, *International Migration Review* Volume 25 Issue 4, pp.: 946-957. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/019791839102500415>
- Brubaker, R. (1992) *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

- Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brug, W., D' Amato, D., Berkhout, J., Ruedin, D. (Eds.) (2015) *The politicisation of migration*. London: Routledge.
- Buchowski, M. and Chlewińska, K. (2010) Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Poland, Work Package 1. Available at url: [Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Poland | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](http://toleranceandculturaldiversitydiscourses.europa.eu) . Last accessed on: 28.09.2022.
- Bowers, S.R. (1997), Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe, Chapter 5, pp.105-129, in: Max Beloff (Ed.), *From Beyond the Soviet Union: The Fragmentation of Power*, Ashgate Publishing, 1997. <http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781855219113>
- Cameron D. (2011) 'MP's speech at Munich Security Conference' delivered on 5th February 2011 (<http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/>) (Last Accessed: 12 August 2022).
- Castles, S. (1986) The Guest-Worker in Western Europe: An Obituary, *International Migration Review*, 20:761-778.
- Cebotari, V. (2019). Civic, ethnic, hybrid and atomised identities in Central and Eastern Europe. *Identities*, 23, 648 - 666.
- Corbu, N., Buturoiu, R., & Durach, F. (2017). Framing the Refugee Crisis in Online Media: A Romanian Perspective, *Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations* vol. 19, no 2 (41) / July 2017, 5-18.
- Čulík, J. (2017) Why is the Czech Republic So Hostile to Muslims and Refugees?, *Europe Now*, available online at url: <[Why is the Czech Republic So Hostile to Muslims and Refugees? – EuropeNow \(europenowjournal.org\)](http://europenowjournal.org)>
- Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2003). Who trusts: The origins of social trust in seven societies. *European Societies*, 5, 93-137. doi:10.1080/1461669032000072256
- deTocqueville, A. [1835/1968] *Democracy in America*, Lawrence, G. (Trans.). New York: Anchor Books, 1968. (Originally published, 1835; Vol. 2 originally published, 1840).
- Drbohlav, D. and Janurová, K. (2019) Migration and Integration in Czechia: Policy Advances and the Hand Brake of Populism, *Migration Information Source, online journal of MPI*. Available at url: [Article: Migration and Integration in Czechia: Pol.. | migrationpolicy.org](https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migration-and-integration-in-czechia-pol) . Last accessed: 28.09.2022.
- Deutsch, K.W. (1961) Social Mobilization and Political Development, *American Political Science Review* (September 1961), pp. 490-514.
- Ekiert, G., Foa, R. (2011) Civil Society Weakness in PostCommunist Europe: A Preliminary Assessment, Carlo Alberto Notebooks, No.198 January 2011. www.carloalberto.org/working_papers
- Farkas, E. (2022) Discussing immigration in an illiberal media environment: Hungarian political scientists about the migration crisis in online public discourses. *Eur Polit Sci* 21, 95–114. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-021-00340-y>
- Finotelli, C., Michalowski, I. (2012) The Heuristic Potential of Models of Citizenship and Immigrant Integration Reviewed, *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 10:3, 231-240.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: Social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
- Fukuyama, R. (2018) Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Ressentiment.
- Gans, H. J. (1997) Toward a reconciliation of "assimilation" and "pluralism": The interplay of acculturation and ethnic retention. *International Migration Review*, 31(4), 875–892.
- Gans, H. J. (2007) Acculturation, assimilation and mobility, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30(1), 152–164.
- Grzeżkowiec, A. (2014) Quantitative Analysis of the Elements of Interpersonal Trust of Poles, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* ol.5 No.13, pp. 72-78.
- Hall, R.C. (2014) (Ed.) *War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History from the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Breakup of Yugoslavia*, ABC-CLIO Santa Barbara: California.
- Hansen, L. (2012) Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it. *Review of international studies*, 38(3), 525-546.
- Hofstede, G. (1980), *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

- 31

- Kosica, A., & Phalet, K. (2006). Ethnic categorization of immigrants: The role of prejudice, perceived acculturation strategies and group size. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 30(6), 769. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.06.003>
- Poiana, S.-E., Lupea, I., Doroftei, I.-M., Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2010) Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Romania, Technical Report, ACCEPT-PLURALISM, 2012/33, 5. New Knowledge, Country Synthesis Reports, Work Package 5: New Knowledge on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Cadmus permanent link: <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/24380> .
- Portes, A. and Borocz, J. (1989) Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Special Silver Anniversary Issue: International Migration an Assessment for the 90's. (Autumn, 1989), pp. 606-630.
- Portes, A. and Walton, J. (1981) *Labor, class, and the International System*, New York: Academic Press.
- Powell Jr., G. Bingham (1970) *Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility*, Stanford University Press, pp. 29-30.
- Putnam, R. (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Putnam, R.D. (1993) Making Democracy Work *Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1993)
- Pye, L.W., and Verba, S. (Eds.) (1965) *Political Culture and Political Development. Studies in Political Development*, 5. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ramet, S.P. (2010) *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*. Cambridge University Press.
- Reekens, T., Hooghe, M. (2010) Beyond the civic–ethnic dichotomy: investigating the structure of citizenship concepts across thirty-three countries, *Nations and Nationalism* Volume 16, Issue 4 October 2010, pp. 579-597.
- Rist, R. (1979) Guestworkers in Germany: Public Policies as the Legitimation of Marginality, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2:401-415.
- Rose, R. (1994) Postcommunism and the problem of trust, *Journal of Democracy* 5 (July): 18-30.
- Rose, R. and Mischler, W. (1997) Trust, distrust, and skepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies, *Journal of Politics* 59 (2): 418-51.
- Rose, R., Mishler, W., Haerpfer, C. (1998) *Democracy and Its Alternatives - Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Ruzza, C. (2018) Populism, migration, and xenophobia in Europe. *Routledge handbook of global populism*, 201-216.
- Schafft, K.A., Kulcsár, L.J. (2015). The Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Hungary. In: Sáenz, R., Embrick, D., Rodríguez, N. (eds) *The International Handbook of the Demography of Race and Ethnicity. International Handbooks of Population*, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8891-8_26
- Schopflin, G. (1996). Nationalism and ethnic minorities in post-communist Europe. In R. Caplan & J. Feffer(Eds.), *Europe's new nationalism* (pp. 150-170). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Seligman, A. B. (1997) *The Problem of Trust*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Shulman, S. (2002). Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35, 554 - 585.
- Stojšin, S. (2015) Ethnic Diversity of Population in Vojvodina at the Beginning of the 21st Century, *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities*, ISSN 2285-4916 ISSN-L 2285-4916, Volume 4, Issue No.2, (April 2015), pp.25-37.
- Sztompka, P. (1996) Trust and emerging democracy, *International Sociology* 11(1): 37-62.
- Troszyński, M., and El-Ghamari, M. (2015) A Great Divide: Polish media discourse on migration, 2015–2018, *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01027-x>
- Uslaner, E.M. (2010) Democracy and Social Capital, Chapter 5, in: M. E. Warren (Ed.), *Democracy and Trust*, Cambridge University Press, pp.121-150.
- Voinea, C.F. and Dimari, G. (2021) Political Culture and Immigration in Eastern European Post-communist Societies. A study on the determinants of immigrant integration, Eastern European societies and

Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Via dei Roccettini 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole – Italy. ACCEPT PLURALISM Research Project, Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st century in Europe, European Commission, DG Research, 7th Framework Programme Social Sciences and Humanities grant agreement no. 243837. www.accept-pluralism.eu; www.eui.eu/RSCAS/. Available from the EUI institutional repository CADMUS www.cadmus.eui.eu . Available online at url: <[Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Britain - DocsLib](#)> . Last accessed: 28.09.2022.

Romania:

EWI/2010: EC, European Website on Integration, Ethnic Diversity Challenges in Romania: Tolerance Discourses and Realities (31 December 2010), online at url: [Ethnic Diversity Challenges in Romania: Tolerance Discourses and Realities | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#), Last Accessed: 28 June 2022.

Report on Romania: EC, European Website on Integration, Ethnic Diversity Challenges in Romania: Tolerance Discourses and Realities (31 December 2010), online at url: [Ethnic Diversity Challenges in Romania: Tolerance Discourses and Realities | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#), Last Accessed: 28 June 2022.

Poland:

EC, European Website on Integration, Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Poland (31 December 2010), online at url: [Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Poland | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#), Last Accessed: 28 June 2022.

Buchowski, M. and Chlewińska, K. (2010) Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Poland, Work Package 1 – Overview of National Discourses on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity, 1.1 Country Reports on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses, published by the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, ACCEPT PLURALISM 7th Framework Programme Project, Via dei Roccettini 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole – Italy. Available on url: www.accept-pluralism.eu ; www.eui.eu/RSCAS/ . Available from the EUI institutional repository CADMUS www.cadmus.eui.eu. Accessed at url: [Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Poland | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#) . Last accessed on: 28.09.2022.

Hungary:

Horvath, A., Vidra, Z., Fox, J. (2011) Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Hungary, CPS Policy Research Reports Series, CEU, Centre for Historical Studies, Journal of East Central Europe, online at url: [Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Hungary | ECE Journal \(ceu.edu\)](#), Last Accessed: 28 June 2022.

Zapata-Barrero, R., and Triandafyllidou, A. (Eds.) (2012) [Addressing tolerance and diversity discourses in Europe: A Comparative Overview of 16 European Countries](#). CIDOB Barcelona Centre for International Affairs.

Czech Republic

Drbohlav, D. and Janurová, K. (2019) Migration and Integration in Czechia: Policy Advances and the Hand Brake of Populism, *Migration Information Source, online journal of MPI*. Available at url: [Article: Migration and Integration in Czechia: Pol.. | migrationpolicy.org](#) . Last accessed: 28.09.2022.

Volynsky, M. (2016) The Unresolved Dilemma of Czech Immigration Policy, *Social Europe*. Available online at url: <[The Unresolved Dilemma Of Czech Immigration Policy – Masha Volynsky \(socialeurope.eu\)](#)> . Last accessed: 28.09.2022.

Survey Data & Analysis

World Value Survey

EuroBarometer

Special Eurobarometer 519 (2021): [Special Eurobarometer: integration of immigrants in the European Union | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#)

Observatory of Public Attitudes to Migration

[Observatory of Public Attitudes to Migration - Migration Policy Centre - MPC](#)

Open Access

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).