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Radical Beings? How Group Identities Impact Willingness to Justify Terrorism

by Eline Drury Løvlien

Abstract

There are many assumptions within terrorism research about the individual characteristics of those who commit or support the use of terrorist tactics, but no larger quantitative study exists on the subject in a European context. To rectify this the article aims to use a group identity framework in a novel way in order to study how group dynamics and group threat impacts individual attitudes toward the use of terrorist tactics. A multilevel research design, using survey data from the European Values Study, is employed to test some of the common explanatory arguments, looking at the role of religion, group identities, and grievances. The findings are mixed, with little support for the argument that religion is a central explanatory factor in understanding radical attitudes. It appears rather that group identities and grievances, as social phenomena, are a more fruitful avenue for understanding why some individuals are more willing to support the use of terrorist tactics. These findings remain robust after controlling for other common explanatory factors and when running alternative model specifications.

Keywords: European Values Study, grievances, group identities, Islam, political violence, radicalization, religion, survey, terrorism

Introduction

In the last three decades, Europe has seen the emergence of religious terrorism. While there has been a general decline in the total number of attacks, the lethality of attacks committed by religiously motivated groups has increased.[1] Post 9/11 has also seen an increased trend of European citizens radicalizing and attacking European targets.[2] Acts of religious terrorism have in Europe, by and large, been committed by Islamic jihadists. This has, in turn, led to an increased academic interest in Muslim attitudes toward the use of political violence.

Some of the earlier studies on the connection between political violence and religion, and Islam in particular, were often based on some fundamental assumptions, where individual attitudes and behavior were seen as best understood through emphasizing their cultural context.[3] This approach viewed Islam as incompatible with Western secularism, whereby radicalization and religious terrorism are portrayed as symptoms of a broader "culture war" between Western and Islamic "civilizations".[4] This focus on the supposed innate qualities of Islamic culture has been criticized for a lack of empirical evidence. The usefulness of focusing solely on religious qualities as an explanatory factor has also been questioned in more recent research.[5] The present article contributes to this debate by including measures of religious identities to test their role in explaining attitudes toward violence. In addition to this, the article uses civil war literature on group inequality to understand why certain groups appear more vulnerable to mobilization for, or support of, the use of political violence, outside of religious identity explanations.

The article aims to provide three main contributions to the radicalization research. Firstly, it will do so by focusing on individuals with radical attitudes but not necessarily the perpetrators of terrorist acts themselves. The role of supporters has increasingly been seen as a central explanatory factor within civil war and insurgency studies [6], while much of earlier terrorism research had largely ignored the role of supporters and rather focused on the perpetrators in an attempt to understand terrorist events post-hoc.[7] The article will attempt to rectify this by focusing on those willing to support the use of terrorist tactics and, through this, provide further insight into a group that is largely ignored when looking at the radicalization process.

Secondly, the article provides, to our knowledge, one of the first large cross-sectional analyses of attitudes toward terrorism in Europe. Several larger survey studies have been conducted in Muslim-majority countries or within individual European states, but little research exists on attitudes toward terrorism across Europe. One

of the reasons for this lacuna is the lack of updated and new survey data on this politically sensitive topic. The survey data used in this study derive from the 2008 wave of the European Values Study (EVS). This is the only version of the EVS that included questions about attitudes toward the use of terrorist tactics and the only cross-national survey done in Europe with questions on this topic. The article aims to expand on existing knowledge by studying support for terrorist tactics within a very specific context, namely amongst individuals living within highly developed and relatively stable democracies. Europe is both a relatively affluent and politically stable region but at the same time is highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks compared to some other Western countries [8], making it an interesting case for studying attitudes toward the use of terrorism.

Thirdly, the article uses a theoretical framework that combines and tests how group dynamics affect attitudes. Previous attitudinal studies have often focused on majority attitudes, while little research has been done on minority attitudes.[9] The article will seek to rectify this by using a theory on group dynamics in a novel way to highlight how the dynamic between majority and minority groups and group identities in Europe impact attitudes. The inclusion of social psychology theories helps build a framework for explaining how religious group identities potentially function as a driving force in radicalization processes, as well as regarding group identity in general.

The article is structured as follows: First, one of the more contentious terms of the article, radicalization, is briefly discussed. Following this, previous studies done on attitudes toward violence will be presented before developing the theoretical framework and presenting testable hypotheses. The data used for the empirical analysis will then be presented in more detail before the analysis and discussion of findings which conclude the article.

Radicalization Processes

Coolsaet and others have criticized the use of the term "radicalization" as a political construct, rather than functioning as a precise scientific term—and they also pointed out that the concept has garnered new meanings over time.[10] Guhl suggests that it is useful to differentiate between behavioral and cognitive radicalization as two separate phenomena.[11] Behavioral radicalization can also be understood as violent radicalization whereby radical attitudes manifest themselves as actual violence. The European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization utilized a definition of violent radicalization that described it as "socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism."[12] This refers specifically to behavioral radicalization, but there exists also cognitive radicalization, which is not necessarily actively violent. Borum, an American researcher, also separates between these, using the terms "radicalization" and "action pathways", where radicalization refers to "the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs" and action pathways refers to participation in violent extremist actions.[13]

Not all radicalized persons are necessarily willing to commit violent acts themselves but appear still willing to support the violent acts of others. This support for violence or terrorism can be seen as a manifestation of a radicalized mindset.[14] For the purpose of this article, the focus is on those who support groups or individuals who engage in violence or other illegal acts rather than the perpetrators themselves.[15] These individuals are of special interest to policy makers, as they are indicating some degree of cognitive extremism but not necessarily participating in violent acts themselves. Some of the cognitively radicalized individuals might at some later point participate in violence but it is not possible to predict this simply by relying on indicators of cognitive extremist attitudes.

Previous Attitudinal Studies

Many of the previous attitudinal studies done on radicalization or terrorism can be divided into two groups; larger cross-country studies amongst Muslim countries or smaller single-country studies in Western countries that focus on the Muslim minority population. Several larger Pew-funded studies have been conducted in

Muslim majority countries or countries with large Muslim minorities to look at attitudes toward terrorism and religion. Data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project have been used to study Islamist terrorism and its connection to urban poverty in the Middle East, which found a highly significant relationship between urban poverty and support for terrorism.[16] This is theorized to be a result of rural migrants who find themselves in urban settings without job prospects and a high degree of unmet expectations. Two articles based on Pew data from 2002 also look at individual-level support for terrorism in countries with either a Muslim majority or a large Muslim minority.[17] Neither of these finds any connection between low levels of education and support for terrorism, but rather that feelings of threat toward Islam is highly correlated with supporting the use of terrorist violence.

The findings from these studies are of interest but should be treated with certain caveats when it comes to the generalizability of the findings for a European context. These studies all look at countries with low levels of economic development and/or with relatively repressive regimes. Possible comparisons with European nations are therefore limited, though some of the same underlying explanatory factors, such as unmet expectations and threats against in-groups, can potentially be found in European societies, but with their own distinct manifestations. Previous quantitative studies done in Europe have garnered interesting findings, but are often limited to a single country and were intially focused exclusively on Muslims as a group rather than on religion in general.[18] However, some newer studies within psychology and criminology have also been looking more broadly at the general populace.[19]

Within the fields of psychology and criminology, there has also been a concerted effort to develop new ways of measuring radicalization in the general population as well as among minority groups.[20] One study of Dutch Muslim youths found that perceived threats against their religious in-group were an important predictor of a radical belief system, which, in turn, predicted positive attitudes toward the use of violence.[21] These findings were supported by another Dutch study on how collective identities and identity factors influence attitudes toward violence in defense of religion or ethnicity.[22]

These findings indicate that those who report experiencing high levels of collective deprivation, that is, deprivation as member of a specific group, are also more likely to perceive higher levels of threat against their in-group. It is hard to unpack the exact causal relationship, but it seems to indicate that deprivation and threat might function as a feedback loop. Feelings of threat might increase if feelings of group deprivation are present and these feelings of deprivation in turn make one more susceptible to feelings of threat toward one's group. [23] The group identity of an individual, the perceived collective deprivation of this group, and feeling of threat toward this group might therefore be crucial to understand the radicalization process. However, how these group identities manifest might not immediately be as clear as the findings above seem to indicate. Dutch Muslims are mainly of Turkish or Moroccan descent and while there are certain commonalities between these groups when it comes to shared socioeconomic and religious background, there are also certain dissimilarities along the ethnic divide. Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands are more traditional in their values compared to their Moroccan counterparts and are on average less secular than the Moroccan-Dutch population.[24] This shows one of the problems behind referring to a collective "Muslim identity". Such an identity is complicated by many factors, one of them being ethnic identities.

An article by Egger and Magni-Berton looks at the role of religious beliefs and their effect on the willingness to justify terrorism, using, as the present article is, EVS data from 2008.[25] Their article focuses specifically on the demographic context of these attitudes by concentrating on differences in attitudes in Muslim majority countries such as Kosovo versus countries with Muslim minorities. They find that a higher probability of justifying terrorism exists when Muslims form a minority. In general, their study finds that justifying terrorism is strongly associated with increased religious practice across the board. This indicates that there is an effect of group dynamics that remains untested and might be useful to pursue, if at the country level there are differences in attitudes based on a minority-majority context. The article by Egger and Magni-Berton also mentions the possibility of a connection between relative deprivation and attitudes but does not test for group dynamics or economic deprivation at the group level.

Salient Group Identities

There is an increasing body of research on the role of identity in understanding the dynamics of political conflict, pointing to the centrality of identity in creating and maintaining conflict.[26] Group identities function as cognitive structures that individuals use to navigate the sociopolitical world and are therefore crucial for understanding why and how individuals act. Conover and Feldman described group identification as a schema that provides a link between the individual and a larger political community.[27] According to social identity theory, a person's identity requires knowledge of belonging "to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance attached to [their] membership."[28] An individual's concept of self is therefore shaped by membership or categorization into specific social groups. Creating a salient and cohesive group identity consequently requires that membership of a group is incorporated into the concept of self.[29] In turn, any value or prestige connected with these groups are important for an individual's feeling of self-worth.[30] Membership of a social group and individual sense of identity are therefore intrinsically linked.

Individuals can possess multiple social identities simultaneously. This raises the question of why only some of these identities become politically salient. This requires what Miller et al. describes as movement from simple group identification to a salient group consciousness that seeks to change the status quo: in effect, a politicized group identity.[31] This process can also be viewed in Marxist terms, which applies class-based understandings to identify groups, with the aim of reflecting the perspective of the disenfranchised stratum.[32] It can also be understood in more general terms as a result of the existence of a dominant and a subordinate group, where individuals who identify with the latter group accept the belief that their own interests are different from those of the dominant group. This antagonistic relationship between the two groups creates discontent amongst those belonging to the subordinate group. Following this, the stable group membership becomes linked to political participation through collective actions such as voting, demonstrations, or other tactics aimed at changing the social order and bettering the standing of their group.[33] This requires that the individual views it as possible to enact change through these normatively more acceptable tactics.

Religious Identities

Much of the earlier research on group identities focused on social identities based around race, gender, or nationality, rather than religion, and this can perhaps be explained by a view of religious identities as being largely voluntary.[34] This view of religion as non-ascriptive has shifted in recent years and much of the current literature on religious identities underscores the centrality of religious epistemology and ontology in creating strong in-group and out-group dichotomies.[35] Many social identities are malleable and can often be combined in different contexts, but religious identities differ from other social identities in that all the major monotheistic religions traditionally forbid simultaneous memberships in different religions and have ensured strict theological boundaries between the different religions, making religious denomination one of the more exclusive identity markers.[36]

The exact role of religion in promoting or deterring violence is a point of contention amongst scholars [37] but the issue has garnered widespread interest in the years following the 9/11 attack. In particular, there have been attempts at understanding religious terrorism by looking at Islamic culture and texts in an attempt to explain acts of terrorism committed by Muslims.[38] This perspective is most notable in attempts to linking radicalization and willingness to partake in terrorist acts with certain interpretations of Islamic theology. There is an underlying assumption that there exists an ongoing conflict between Muslim youths and the adoption of a Western identity, which can be explained by unique traits inherent to Islam—something many researchers have criticized.[39] Much of this earlier research draws on similar arguments to those found in Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilization*, [40] which posited that Islam was unique in its willingness to use violence—an interpretation which has later been used to argue for policies that have mainly targeted Muslims in post-9/11 Europe.[41] This underlying assumption is not as prevalent in more recent research, but it is still common to connect increased religious beliefs in Islam with more radical views on the use of violence. This approach has

been criticized for viewing Muslim identities as static, and some researchers have highlighted that embracing a Muslim religious identity does not mean that there is a rejection of a broader national identity, with research showing that the self is able to incorporate multiple dimensions of oneself into one's own "identity".[42]

Historical evidence of violent conflicts in the Muslim world has been used to argue for Islam's unique role with regard to violence. This has perhaps been most clearly expressed in Huntington's quote that Islam not only has "bloody borders" but that Islam itself has bloody "innards."[43] While much of the current literature has become increasingly critical of this view of something inherently threatening or dangerous within Muslims and more specifically among Muslim youths, it is still relatively common in many policy and media circles, and even in certain academic circles.[44]

To test the argument that violent attitudes manifest themselves more prominently in Islamic culture, the following hypothesis has been included:

(H_{1a}) Certain religious denominations are more likely to justify the use of terrorist tactics.

According to Robert Pape, a Chicago-based political scientist, it is not necessarily the theological aspect of religion but rather the nature of group dynamics that explains the use of terrorist tactics. Religious identities create clear boundaries between different groups and make it easier for leaders to portray a conflict as a zero-sum game which, in turn, can create increased polarization between groups.[45] Therefore, religious concepts that divide individuals into believers and nonbelievers contribute to strengthening "us-versus-them" thinking.[46] Religious beliefs and religiosity can therefore also create a sharper distinction between in-groups and out-groups. To test the effect of religiosity, the following hypothesis is included:

(H_{1b}) Higher levels of religiosity increase the likelihood of justifying terrorist tactics.

Social identity theory posits that nearly all groups believe, at least to some degree, that they are unique and/or superior to others.[47] Such belief becomes especially potent when combined by religious dogma about being favored by God and that one's religious group is the only one having true faith. Such an interaction between group superiority and a dogmatic belief in one's religion can lead to increased prejudice and violence against those deemed to be unbelievers.[48] It is therefore not just religious denomination and increased religiosity by themselves that matter in this regard but rather the mediating effect between the two that might explain a penchant toward increased radical attitudes. To further test this argument, the following hypothesis is included:

(H_{1c}) Higher degrees of religiosity amongst individuals of certain religious denominations increase the likelihood of justifying the use of terrorist tactics.

Group Grievances and Sociotropic Mobilization

Political actions of individuals have historically been viewed as derived directly from issues that affect the individual personally, with little interest in the group nature of politics.[49] Personal economic grievances have for a long time been seen as a central explanatory factor in understanding the political behavior of individuals, but empirical evidence of a direct link between individual economic concerns and political action has been hard to establish.[50] According to Kinder and Kiewiet, this lack of support for a connection between political action and personal economic grievances can be explained by the fact that individual voters are not acting from a position of economic self-interest, but rather from a broader sociotropic position where they see themselves as part of a larger community or group.[51] This is also the reason why individuals who are not necessarily poor or disadvantaged themselves might still identify with others who are, creating a group frame of reference linking the individual to a political collective. According to Conover, evaluations of economic well-being of the group might in fact have more apparent political relevance compared to the individual actor's own condition, or that of the nation as a whole.[52]

The same phenomenon can be observed in the horizontal inequality literature, which stresses the importance of group inequality in explaining mobilization and the use of political violence.[53] It is not necessarily the

individual respondents' personal experience of inequality that functions as a driver, but rather inequalities that coincide with their group identities that have the greatest potential to increase grievances.[54] Evidence from the civil war literature finds that inequality between groups begets feelings of deprivation, which in turn enhance the sense of grievance and group cohesion amongst those who feel deprived, which in turn leads to conflict mobilization.[55]

Relative deprivation, as opposed to absolute deprivation, refers to the subjective sense of deprivation that stems from a gap between expected gains and actual achieved gains.[56] Absolute and relative deprivation are not isomorphically related; in fact, in many cases the better-off someone is, the worse-off he or she might subjectively feel.[57] Personal-relative deprivation and group-relative deprivation are also assumed to be the source of very different types of behavioral patterns.[58] There is, for example, little evidence of a causal relationship between personal deprivation and increased radicalization, as many radicalized individuals seem to come from relatively advantaged families.[59] Studies on the recruitment patterns and support for the American Black Power movement have found that many of the supporters and backers came from middle or upper income brackets rather than from the poorer (and more individually deprived) strata of American society.[60]

Much of the same has been found in studies on jihadists outside a Western context. Thomas Hegghammer found that jihadi recruits to groups such as Al-Qaeda were "unremarkable in the sense that they were neither society's losers nor winners."[61] Based on the demographic and socioeconomic profiles of these individuals, it was difficult to pinpoint any specific factors that could help explain why individuals radicalize. Stephen Vertigans found the same in his summary of previous research, where individuals who are recruited to jihadist groups appeared to come from a diverse range of socioeconomic backgrounds and possessing various levels of educational attainment. In addition to this, there appears to be a presence of upward mobile middle-class individuals both within more moderate groups and within radical Islamist networks.[62]

Studies on the characteristics of those who join jihadist terrorist cells also found that cell members vary in patterns of radicalization and with different functions within the cell.[63] The most pivotal part of a jihadist terrorist cell is the entrepreneurs, who form the political-ideological base for the cell, and who are usually more educated than their cell peers.[64] This lack of a connection between individual-level deprivation and more radical views on the use of violent tactics might be explained by the fact that individuals are able to have a broader sociotropic view of their identity. In this case, it is rather their identity as part of a less well-off group that makes them more likely to challenge the status quo.

Smith and Ortiz found that the strongest predictor for collective behavior was when people feel deprived as members of a salient reference group.[65] Group-relative deprivation is also more likely to lead to political protests and challenges to the status quo.[66] To test whether horizontal inequality and group grievances do in fact influence attitudes toward violence, the following hypothesis will be tested:

(H_{2a}) Individuals belonging to groups that are poorer than the country's average population are more likely to justify the use of terrorist tactics.

There are some indications that the effect of these group grievances affects groups differently, depending on group identity. Individuals who belong to a minority group are more likely to compare themselves to majorities.[67] To test whether belonging to the majority or the minority group has an impact on the effect of being economically disadvantaged and on attitudes toward political violence, the following hypothesis is included:

(H_{2b}) Individuals of minority denominations who are also members of groups that are on average poorer are more likely to justify the use of terrorist tactics.

Minority Identities and Perceptions of Group Threat

Two aspects of group dynamics have been explored so far, with religious identities and group grievances being put forward as important explanatory factors for understanding radicalized attitudes. According to Robert

Pape, factors such as religiosity do not trigger rebellion or conflict by themselves but rather must be seen in context with stronger group identities that might be triggered by outside pressure.[68] Threat perception is therefore also important for understanding the dynamics between groups as well as within them. According to group conflict theory, feelings of threat against an in-group are believed to increase negative attitudes toward an out-group and are therefore an important factor when trying to understand inter-group dynamics.[69] This threat is especially pivotal in understanding the increased polarization between majority and minority groups. Minority groups that are subjected to discrimination at the hands of a majority group are more likely to develop a stronger sense of in-group identity.[70] Members of a deprived group are also more likely to feel alienated from the established societal institutions, which they view as controlled by the dominant group. This distrust might be the result of exclusionary practices by the majority or dominant group but might also still exist in the absence of such practices. This distrust and these feelings of threat leave the door open for more aggressive and non-peaceful alternatives—such as terrorist tactics.[71] To test whether increased threat perceptions are likely to increase support for terrorist tactics within a country, the following hypothesis is included:

(H_{3a}) Countries with higher levels of threat perceptions between majority and minority groups will have higher levels of support for using terrorist tactics.

Laboratory experiments have also found that threats against the group mobilize members of the group in solidarity and increased hostility toward out-groups.[72] In an intergroup conflict situation, it is the group identity that helps the individual overcome concerns about personal safety and motivates them into taking action.[73] As mentioned previously, polarization between subordinate and dominant groups within a country is in general a strong predictor of conflict and increased threat perceptions within a country.[74] Simply belonging to a religious minority would therefore not increase the likelihood of supporting terrorist tactics, but rather belonging to a religious minority under pressure from an outside threat toward the in-group would. To test this, the following hypothesis has been included:

(H_{3b}) Countries with higher levels of threat perceptions between majority and minority groups will have higher levels of support for terrorist tactics amongst minority religious groups.

Data and Methodology

The data used for the main part of our analysis come from the 2008 wave of the European Values Study (EVS).[75] Ideally more updated data should be available, but the question used for the dependent variable has not been included in later waves of the EVS. This reduces the available data, limiting the article to the period in the years preceding the rise of ISIS. The Egger and Magni-Berton article argues that using the 2008 data can be useful for capturing the conditions that underlay the homegrown political violence that would emerge a few years later. At that time Europe was very much a "breeding ground" for Islamic radicalism, but the potential consequences of this radicalization were not yet visible in actual terrorist events.[76]

The 2008 wave covers 47 countries in Europe, including former Soviet states. The data used in the present article is restricted to the 43,999 respondents of European countries that are members of the European Union and/or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Turkey has been excluded because of missing values on the dependent variable. Europe is relatively homogenous, but the historical development and previous experiences of conflict and terrorism vary across Europe, making likely country-level variations between the different states. A chi-squared test of our data confirms this and finds that individuals in certain countries have a greater willingness to justify the use of terrorism on the aggregate level. Willingness to justify terrorism was highest amongst individuals in Finland and Greece, with the highest mean of .11 and .12 respectively (see Table 3). To capture this, the data will be used in multilevel modeling, aiming to capture both country-level and individual-level effects.

Sensitive Survey Questions

Self-reported attitudes are not ideal for predicting behavior but can still give an idea of what influences people's self-declared willingness to justify terrorism. Attitudinal studies are famously difficult to conduct and obtaining adequate measurements of attitudes is more error-prone than other types of data. This is especially true when asking questions on sensitive issues, as these topics tend to yield higher nonresponse rates and can lead to systematic misreporting when individuals seek to avoid giving *socially undesirable* answers.[77] Most individuals are aware of the normative ideas related to the use of terrorist acts and the social undesirableness of expressing support for such acts. These types of questions therefore run the risk of producing larger measurement errors than questions on nonsensitive topics. Attempts at softening or formulating more "forgiving" wording have become increasingly popular to combat these issues, but testing the validity of these attempts has given mixed results.[78]

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable aims to study respondents' willingness to justify the use of terrorism. This is measured with the following survey question which asked the respondents which of the following statement they agreed with: The first being "*there may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified*" or "*terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned*." There is also a category of respondents who answered "neither" if they expressed unwillingness to support the above-mentioned statements. Of the total number of respondents, 3,612 answered that terrorism under specific circumstances could be justified, constituting nearly 6% of all respondents. Unsurprisingly, the support of terrorism was low across all European states, as seen in Table 3, with a sample mean of only 0.1. The topic of the dependent variable is highly sensitive, which might result in individuals being predisposed to answering in terms of full condemnation. To counteract this, the empirical analysis will attempt to control for contextual or individual-level characteristics that might be impacting this.

For the purpose of this article, these categories have been recoded into a binary variable (0= always condemn/neither; 1= willing to justify terrorism). As the main interest of our inquiry are those individuals who agree that terrorism can be justified in some instances, the 1,543 respondents in the "neither" category have been included amongst those who always condemn the use of terrorism. Doing this runs the risk of not capturing individuals within the neither group who are willing to justify terrorism, but this will be further tested when looking at the robustness of the initial results [78] and running the sensitivity analysis at the end (tolerance tests show that multicollinearity does not pose a significant problem to the main independent variables. The stepwise inclusion of independent variables should also help uncover any collinearity issues).

Table 1 includes a descriptive summary of all included independent variables. The table first presents all the individual-level factors and then the country factors at the second level of the models. All variables are described in more detail below.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1
Age	46.85	17.90	16	108
Education	3.08	1.34	0	6
Religiosity	2.50	1.05	1	4
Minority	.04	.19	0	1
Income percentiles				
25pt	0.25	.43	0	1
50pt	0.27	.45	0	1
75pt	0.23	.43	0	1
100pt*	0.24	.43	0	1
Religious denominations				
Muslim	0.02	0.11	0	1
Nondenominational	0.28	0.45	0	1
Believers*	0.71	0.14	0	1
Marital Status				
Married*	0.73	0.44	0	1
Unmarried	0.27	0.44	0	1
Level 2				
Previous terrorist events	208.54	397.68	3	1511
Vote percentage (far-right)	8.85	10.79	0	44.2
**=Reference category*				

Hypotheses Variables

Several religious variables from the EVS data set have also been included. A religious denominations variable has been used to test the argument that there will be differences between specific religious cultures when it comes to attitudes toward the use of violence. The dummy variables are coded for *Muslims* and *Nondenominational*. Those in the nondenominational group are most likely both individuals who view themselves as nonreligious or agnostic, as well as nondenominational religious individuals. All other religious groups, such as Christians and individuals adhering to Southeast Asian religions, are used as the reference category (*Believers*). *Religiosity* is often defined as religious commitment, which can be viewed as the degree of adherence a person displays toward their religious values and beliefs. As religiosity reflects the level of adherence to religious values and beliefs, it is likely that highly religious individuals are more likely to abide by the religious codes set forth by their religious doctrines.[79] The measurement used for this is self-reported levels of religious belief. The scale measures to which degree an individual sees themselves as religious, from 'not religious at all' at the lower end of the scale to 'highly religious' on the other end.

As we are interested in testing the economic grievance argument, the income variable has been aggregated to the group level. This is done by taking the individual income variable (*25–100pt*) and aggregating it to the (religious) group level by country. This gives each individual a group average income based on their religious denomination for each of the 31 countries included in our sample. These have been coded into percentile dummies to make it possible to test the economic grievance argument and hypotheses related to this. A binary measurement of whether the individual belongs to a majority or minority religion is also included (*Minority*).

To test in-country polarization and feelings of group threat, a contextual level proxy measurement has been included at Level 2. The *Far-right percentage* variable is a contextual variable that captures the percentage of votes for far-right parties in the last election prior to, or during, 2008.[80] An important caveat is the issue of the degree to which these parties are comparable across Europe. Few of the parties would classify themselves as

far-right parties, but common to them is a clear anti-immigration rhetoric.[81] According to previous research on far-right groups' growth in Europe, countries where far-right parties are successful are on average more unfavorable toward out-groups. There is also evidence that people who view out-groups such as immigrants as a threat are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties.[82] Measuring the percentage of the population that voted for these parties should therefore give us an indication about the levels of in-group and out-group threat perception.

Control Variables

Several individual-level variables have also been included as controls as they are flagged as theoretically important by previous literature.[83] The first is a continuous measurement of the respondent's *Age*, which is included because the Muslim population in Europe is on average younger than the majority population. A dummy is also included for gender (*Female*) which is based on previous research and findings indicating a gender gap when it comes to attitudes toward violence. An ordinal variable for education level (*Education*) which is measured on a 6-point scale from no education to graduate degree has been added. The marital status of respondents is also controlled for, using a dummy variable (*Unmarried*), as there is an assumption in the literature, and amongst security services, that finds that more radical individuals are often unmarried and childless.[84] It is not necessarily the presence of these factors that makes individuals more vulnerable to radicalization but rather the lack of attachments it implies.[85]

Lastly, a Level 2 control has been included for the number of *previous terrorist events* within a country. Having experienced terrorist events can influence how individual respondents react to the topic of terrorism, which necessitates a count variable that looks at the number of terrorist events within a given country since 1990.[86] Excluding events from the Cold War period is done as the reporting and coding of the data become less reliable in certain countries as we go further back in time. In addition to this, older events are also less likely to shape respondents' current attitudes.

Empirical Analysis

The empirical analysis is presented below, starting with less complex bivariate models (Table 4). The bivariate models test for association between the main independent variables and attitudes toward the use of terrorism. The bivariate regressions find that all the main independent variables are significantly associated with attitudes toward terrorism, with the exception of religious denomination and whether the respondent belonged to a minority religion. The religiosity measure is negatively associated with the dependent. While there is a lack of any significant difference between religious denominations such as Muslims and believers in general, the dummy for nondenominational is significant and positively associated with support for terrorism. This finding weakens any argument for any group-level differences amongst major religious groups and is further tested in the baseline model (Table 2).

Table 2: Exponentiated Coefficients and Standard Errors from a Multilevel Logistic Regression of Willingness to Justify Terrorism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.990***	0.990***	0.990***	0.990***	0.990***	0.990***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.553***	0.553***	0.553***	0.553***	0.553***	0.553***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Education	1.025	1.024	1.025	1.025	1.025	1.025
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Unmarried	1.279**	1.281**	1.279**	1.279**	1.279**	1.279**
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)
25th percentile	0.898	0.899	0.917	0.898	0.899	0.898
	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
50th percentile	0.956	0.974	0.958	0.956	0.954	0.956
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.115)
75th percentile	0.959	0.967	0.969	0.959	0.961	0.959
	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Religiosity	0.942	0.901	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Muslim	1.388	0.717	1.547	1.389	1.412	1.388
	(0.319)	(0.381)	(0.389)	(0.319)	(0.330)	(0.318)
Nondenominational	1.189*	0.896	1.197*	1.189*	1.189*	1.189*
	(0.077)	(0.141)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Minority	0.902	0.922	1.088	0.902	0.130	0.902
	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.235)	(0.132)	(0.224)	(0.132)
Muslim*religiosity		1.344				
		(0.291)				
Nondenominational*religiosity		1.167				
		(0.091)				
Minority*25th			0.707			
			(0.178)			
Minority*50th			3.889***			
			(1.022)			
Minority*75th			0.708			
			(0.277)			
Far-right percentage				0.998	0.998	
				(0.005)	(0.005)	
Minority*far-right percentage					0.990	
					(0.009)	
Previous events						1.000
						(0.000)
Intercept	0.128***	0.142***	0.127***	0.0854**	0.0899*	0.128***
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.031)
Random intercept	1.177**	1.181**	1.178**	1.176**	1.176**	1.177**
	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
N	42776	42776	42776	42776	42776	42776
Level 2 *N*	31	31	31	31	31	31

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$*

The first two models in Table 2 test the religious identity hypotheses formulated in H_{1a}–H_{1c}. Models 3 and 4 test the hypotheses related to the economic group grievances argument (H_{2a}–H_{2b}), before testing the group threat hypotheses (H_{3a}–H_{3b}). The multilevel setup creates certain constraints on the number of Level 2 variables that can be included in each model, which necessitates incremental inclusion of the country-level variables over several models (Models 4–6).

Turning to the baseline model in Table 2, the control variables are all largely in accordance with previous research on attitudes toward political violence, with the exception of the educational attainment variable. The odds of expressing support for the use of terrorist tactics decrease by 1% for each year of age, supporting the idea that radical attitudes decrease with age. Gender is also significantly associated with attitudes toward the use of terrorist tactics, with men being nearly twice as likely to express support. Unmarried individuals are also more likely to support the use of violence compared to individuals who are or have been in long-term relationships. This corresponds with some previous research on how radicalized individuals are often young, unmarried males.

There is little support for the first hypothesis, H_{1a}, in any of the initial models. The religious group dummies do not significantly differ from each other, disproving the assumptions of H_{1a}. Comparing Muslims with religious individuals in general finds no significant difference between the groups. Having tested both separately and together, there is no support for the notion that justifying terrorism is more prevalent amongst specific religious groupings, such as Muslims. This does not lend support to the hypotheses that individuals belonging to certain religious groups are more likely to endorse the use of terrorist tactics. On the other hand, nondenominational or nonreligious individuals are significantly different from the reference category and 24% more likely to support the use of terrorist tactics, compared to believers in general. This is the case across the models; but drawing any conclusion about this group is difficult as it is likely to include not only a large subsection of nonbelievers/nondenominational but also individuals who view themselves as nondenominational but spiritual. The lack of significance for Muslims must also be seen in light of the slight under-sampling of Muslims in the survey. The standard error is much higher for Muslims, compared to nondenominational respondents, which makes it more difficult to garner significant results. However, the sample should still be large enough to garner reliable findings that can be generalized from.

There is no evidence of religiosity emboldening individuals to support terrorist tactics. There is rather a negative association between religiosity and the dependent in the bivariate model, but the significance disappears once other factors are taken into account. The religiosity measure is negative across all models, though not significantly so, which does not lend support to H_{1b}. Model 2 further tests some of the assumptions about religious identities by studying the effect of religiosity on specific religious denominations. The interaction variable is positive but not significant, suggesting that the effect of religiosity on Muslims does not differ from the effect of religiosity on believers in general.

Moving to economic group grievances hypotheses, H_{2a}–H_{2b}, we initially include the income percentiles in the baseline model. The 50th percentile was significant in the bivariate models (see Table 4 in Appendix) but there is no significant difference between the income percentiles in our main models in Table 2. All percentiles are negatively related to the dependent, but not significantly so, indicating that there are no differences between the income groups once other causal factors are taken into account. This indicates that political violence, as some of the previous literature suggests, is not a poverty-driven phenomenon or supported by those belonging to the lower socioeconomic strata. This goes against the assumption in H_{2a}, indicating that there is no connection between endorsing radicalized attitudes toward terrorism and economic group identity by itself.

Model 3 tests for possible interaction effects between minority identity and income percentile, to further explore the group grievance argument. The interaction term is significantly different from the reference category, while the lowest percentile and the top 75th do not significantly differ. This suggests that the effect of belonging to a below-average income group has a stronger effect if one also belongs to a religious minority. As the income percentiles are the main effect variables, they indicate the effect on those belonging to a majority, while the interaction term captures the effect of the different income percentiles on individuals belonging to a religious minority, versus those belonging to a country's majority.

Those belonging to the poorer-than-average, but not to the bottom 25th percentile, are significantly more likely to justify the use of terrorism. Those belonging to a religious minority are significantly more likely to justify the use of terrorism if they belong to the group that is between the 25th–50th percentile. This corresponds well with theoretical assumptions and previous studies that show it is not the poorest that are more likely to express

radicalized attitudes toward the use of terrorism but rather those belonging to groups that are economically slightly below average.

While minority identities or belonging to a religious denomination on the lower-income percentiles are not significant factors in themselves, there seems to a mediating effect between the two factors. This gives some credence to the economic grievance argument, that belonging to an on average poorer income group and a minority group strengthen a sense of outsiderness that might factor into more radical attitudes giving support to H_{2b}.

Because of the constraints put on the number of Level 2 variables in each model, the far-right vote percentage variable is included by itself in Model 5. If a country has a high voter turnout for far-right parties, this indicates higher levels of felt group threat and indicates that certain religious groups would be under increased pressure from far-right attitudes. This Level 2 variable is not significant, lending no support to H_{3a}.

Model 5 tests a cross-level interaction between minority affiliation and country-level measure of vote percentage for far-right parties. The interaction term has been constructed to test H_{3b}. The hypothesis assumes that the effect of minority identities might vary, depending on certain contextual factors in Level 2, namely the experience of group threat within a given country. It is difficult to say how much emphasis should be placed on this non-finding. Tolerance tests for this model show an issue of slight multicollinearity in this specific interaction model. Model 7 controls for previous terrorist events within a country since 1990. This contextual variable was included to control for the possibility that the number of terrorist events can potentially color the attitudes of the respondents. Its inclusion does not significantly change the individual-level coefficients and is not significant by itself.

To test the robustness of the initial findings, several alternative models are introduced in Tables 5–7 (see Appendix). In the original models the "neither" category was included amongst those not supporting the use of terrorist tactics. It is difficult to parse out where these individuals in actuality place themselves, which necessitates some further testing of the category. Table 5 shows the results after running the models with the "neither" category included in the same category as those willing to justify the use of terrorism. In Table 6 the "neither" category has been excluded from the analysis, resulting in no significant changes to the models as a whole. The last models (Table 7 in Appendix) have excluded all young males between 15–35 from the analysis. In most of the literature on violence, this group is often seen as the one most vulnerable to participating in violent actions, making it necessary to test whether this group is skewing the initial results. The results from these alternative specifications do not significantly differ from the initial results, with a few exceptions, and the main findings remain mainly unchanged across all models. The only significant change is the interaction variable between nondenominational and religiosity, which becomes significant in Tables 5 and 7, when the "neither" category is given different specifications. It is difficult to interpret this change, but respondents within the larger catchall of nondenominational and nonreligious individuals seem more willing to justify the use of terrorism when they are also experiencing higher levels of religiosity.

Discussion and Conclusions

The main aim of this article has been to study the support for terrorism within Europe and how group identities help explain this support. The findings are mixed, but with some support for the argument that more radical attitudes are not simply the result of religious or cultural factors, but rather stemming from an interplay between grievances and salient group identities.

Firstly, much of the previous literature on the effect of group dynamics on attitudes focuses on geographical areas with more volatile and unstable contexts, where the effects of group dynamics and identities might seem to have a stronger and clearer effect. The mixed findings of the present study indicate that the European context is less clear, perhaps because of fewer salient group identities which impact on group dynamics and reduce some of its explanatory power. There are some indications that there are underlying group dynamics at

play, but capturing them fully might require even more fine-grained measures or a mixed-methods approach where the survey data are combined with more qualitative data. Secondly, the empirical analysis garners little support for the idea that religious identities affect attitudes toward terrorism. The study finds no direct link between terrorism and religious identities and framing of religious radicalism as stemming from theological determinants within specific religions does not find support in the present study.

Lastly, it seems that it is rather group identities and grievances that have the strongest impact. Belonging to an on average poorer religious group is not significantly associated with the dependent variable by itself, but rather a mediating effect of belonging to a minority group as well. There is some evidence that belonging to a minority group that is also below the income average makes it significantly more likely to support a more radical view of terrorist tactics. Economic group grievances therefore seem to make respondents more willing to support radical action. This fits well with the assumptions of relative deprivation theory, which posits that a certain degree of prosperity and raised expectations play an important part in understanding why certain individuals are more at risk for developing radical attitudes. These findings fit well with the horizontal inequality literature and open up an interesting avenue for future research on group-level inequality in stable and relatively equal societies without the presence of larger conflict patterns. As some of the models also show, some of the other assumed mechanisms on the country level are not found to be present. This might necessitate the development of more accurate measurements for inequality or group dynamics within this specific context. Broader inequality measurements such as expressed with the GINI index vary little across Western Europe and are not able to capture the group level, which has been the goal of the present study.

Attempts at capturing feelings of group threat at the country level—in this case through far-right voting percentage—proved to be relatively fruitless. The lack of significance might perhaps be explained by the fact that the variable is trying to capture a phenomenon at the country level that perhaps would have been easier to measure, if the right instrument existed, at the individual or group level.

Some caveats about the data are also necessary, namely the use of the 2008 wave of the EVS. As mentioned in the introduction, the use of data from several waves would have been beneficial but as the questions related to terrorism were only included in the 2008 wave—the only cross-national survey done in Europe that has attempted to include questions on the topic of terrorism and the permissibility of its use.

Another data-related concern is the reliability of the results, when considering the sensitive nature of the survey questions. In addition to the difficulty in obtaining truthful responses, which should be alleviated by sensitivity analysis, there is also the potential that response rates might be skewed across Europe, depending on factors such as freedom of expression or willingness to express norm-breaking attitudes. Looking at Table 3, this does not seem to present a major issue as the mean values vary across Europe without any specific patterns. The lowest mean (.021) can be found in Slovakia but is followed closely by Spain (.027) indicating that there is no regional or geographical pattern that is unduly influencing the results.

The relatively high standard errors for Muslims as a religious group are an issue and ideally the data set should have a larger sample of subgroups. The issues of sampling minority groups and potential under-sampling is discussed extensively in the literature.[87] But the religious sub-samples in the data set should still prove large enough to make the findings, or lack thereof, reliable.

In conclusion, the article has studied an often overlooked group, namely people with radical attitudes who most likely have not participated in acts of terrorism, but who are willing to justify the use of terrorist tactics. By looking at this phenomenon across Europe, the article has provided insights into radicalization in a region that in recent years has seen a spike in radical groups and individuals who support them. The findings as a whole disqualify some of the initial theoretical assumptions about religious identities' role, while supporting some of the others that relate to broader group identities and grievances.

About the Author: **Eline Drury Løvlien** *obtained her Ph.D. from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim. Applying a quantitative approach, her dissertation aims to study the phenomenon of radicalization from both a micro and macro perspective. Using novel data from different sources, the dissertation*

combines individual-level survey data with country-level data on terrorist plots to study how group dynamics and grievances intersect in Europe to increase terrorist threats. She is currently working as a postdoctoral researcher in international relations at the University of Mannheim, Germany.

Appendix

Table 3: Dependent Variable Mean by Country

Country	Mean	SD	n
Austria	.073	.261	1,489
Belgium	.047	.211	1,504
Bulgaria	.035	.183	1,472
Croatia	.058	.233	1,475
Cyprus	.082	.274	977
Czech Republic	.062	.240	1,771
Denmark	.049	.216	1,487
Estonia	.065	.247	1,481
Finland	.109	.311	1,068
France	.061	.239	1,495
Germany	.056	.230	2,018
Greece	.123	.329	1,486
Hungary	.052	.223	1,489
Iceland	.051	.221	798
Ireland	.062	.241	925
Italy	.036	.185	1,487
Latvia	.053	.224	1,494
Lithuania	.029	.168	1,445
Luxembourg	.067	.250	1,572
Malta	.042	.200	1,482
Netherlands	.068	.252	1,539
Norway	.086	.280	1,084
Poland	.050	.217	1,471
Portugal	.041	.199	1,481
Romania	.088	.283	1,405
Slovakia	.021	.142	1,450
Slovenia	.073	.260	1,341
Spain	.027	.161	1,491
Sweden	.077	.266	1,082
Switzerland	.055	.228	1,235
United Kingdom	.067	.250	2,005
Total sample	.084	.277	43,999

Table 4: Bivariate Models for Main Independent Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	0.056***	0.106***	0.078***	0.064***	0.045***
	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.038)
Muslim	1.328				
	(0.302)				
Nondenominational	1.535***				
	(0.102)				
Religiosity		0.812***			
		(0.043)			
25th percentile (25pt)			0.744		
			(0.112)		
50th percentile (50pt)			0.737**		
			(0.092)		
75th percentile (75pt)			0.820		
			(0.138)		
Minority				0.930	
				(0.126)	
Far-right percentage					0.998
					(0.005)
Random intercept	1.174**	1.180**	1.162**	1.159**	1.159**
	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.052)
N	43840	43383	43840	43840	43840
Level 2 *N*	31	31	31	31	31

Odds ratio reported; Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: Robustness Model I: Multilevel Logistic Regression of Willingness to Justify Terrorism with the "Neither" Respondents Included with Those Willing to Justify Terrorism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.992***	0.992**	0.992***	0.992***	0.992***	0.992***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.631***	0.632***	0.631***	0.631***	0.631***	0.631***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Education	1.014	1.014	1.014	1.015	1.015	1.014
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Unmarried	1.313***	1.314***	1.312***	1.313***	1.312***	1.313***
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.089)
25th percentile	0.986	0.986	1.017	0.985	0.986	0.986
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)
50th percentile	0.998	1.019	0.997	0.998	0.997	0.993
	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.114)
75th percentile	1.002	1.013	1.007	1.002	1.004	1.002
	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Religiosity	0.934	0.890*	0.934	0.934	0.935	0.934
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Muslim	1.360	0.972	1.619	1.362	1.382	1.359
	(0.387)	(0.502)	(0.470)	(0.387)	(0.403)	(0.386)
Nondenominational	1.248**	0.899	1.260***	1.248**	1.248**	1.247**
	(0.077)	(0.132)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Minority	0.972	0.995	1.225	0.972	0.269	0.973
	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.306)	(0.145)	(0.562)	(0.146)
Muslim*religiosity		1.173				
		(0.246)				
Nondenominational*religiosity		1.197*				
		(0.080)				
Minority*25th			0.608			
			(0.182)			
Minority*50th			5.195***			
			(1.557)			
Minority*75th			0.746			
			(0.302)			
Far-right percentage				0.994	0.994	
				(0.005)	(0.005)	
Minority*far-right percentage					0.993	
					(0.011)	
Previous events						1.000
						(0.000)
Intercept	0.161***	0.179***	0.159***	0.0484**	0.0502**	0.166***
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.036)
Random intercept	1.183***	1.189***	1.186***	1.178***	1.179***	1.179***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.050)
N	42776	42776	42776	42776	42776	42776
Level 2 *N*	31	31	31	31	31	31

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6: Robustness Model II: Multilevel Logistic Regression of Willingness to Justify Terrorism with "Neither" Respondents Excluded from the Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.990***	0.990***	0.990***	0.990***	0.990***	0.990***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.551***	0.551***	0.551***	0.551***	0.551***	0.551***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Education	1.025	1.024	1.025	1.025	1.025	1.025
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Unmarried	1.289**	1.291**	1.289**	1.289**	1.289**	1.289**
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
25th percentile	0.907	0.907	0.928	0.906	0.908	0.907
	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
50th percentile	0.959	0.977	0.961	0.959	0.957	0.958
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.117)
75th percentile	0.969	0.977	0.978	0.969	0.971	0.969
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.075)
Religiosity	0.941	0.899	0.941	0.941	0.941	0.941
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Muslim	1.399	0.724	1.577	1.401	1.426	1.399
	(0.333)	(0.393)	(0.410)	(0.333)	(0.346)	(0.332)
Nondenominational	1.201**	0.897	1.211**	1.201**	1.202**	1.201**
	(0.078)	(0.140)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Minority	0.904	0.923	1.112	0.903	0.125	0.904
	(0.133)	(0.136)	(0.241)	(0.133)	(0.219)	(0.133)
Muslim*religiosity		1.343				
		(0.298)				
Nondenominational*religiosity		1.173*				
		(0.090)				
Minority*25th			0.679			
			(0.173)			
Minority*50th			4.957***			
			(1.349)			
Minority*75th			0.704			
			(0.282)			
Far-right percentage				0.997	0.998	
				(0.005)	(0.005)	
Minority*far-right percentage					0.990	
					(0.009)	
Previous events						1.000
						(0.000)
Intercept	0.132***	0.146***	0.131***	0.0796**	0.0838**	0.132***
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.032)
Random intercept	1.181**	1.186**	1.183**	1.180**	1.180**	1.181**
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
N	41755	41755	41755	41755	41755	41755
Level 2 *N*	31	31	31	31	31	31

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

** p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001*

Table 7: Robustness Model III: Multilevel Logistic Regression of Willingness to Justify Terrorism with Young Men (15–35) Excluded from the Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.992**	0.992**	0.992**	0.992**	0.992**	0.992**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.580***	0.581***	0.579***	0.580***	0.579***	0.580***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Education	1.015	1.014	1.015	1.015	1.014	1.015
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Unmarried	1.334***	1.336***	1.334***	1.334***	1.332***	1.334***
	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)
25th percentile	0.877	0.877	0.906	0.877	0.880	0.877
	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.104)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.099)
50th percentile	0.903	0.918	0.917	0.903	0.901	0.900
	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.138)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.130)
75th percentile	0.970	0.980	0.982	0.970	0.973	0.970
	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.094)
Religiosity	0.974	0.933	0.974	0.974	0.974	0.974
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Muslim	1.498	0.364	1.702	1.498	1.536	1.497
	(0.446)	(0.372)	(0.509)	(0.446)	(0.458)	(0.446)
Nondenominational	1.195*	0.913	1.209*	1.195*	1.197*	1.194*
	(0.099)	(0.175)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Minority	1.016	1.041	1.343	1.016	0.0323	1.017
	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.296)	(0.178)	(0.060)	(0.179)
Muslim*religiosity		1.810				
		(0.704)				
Nondenominational*religiosity		1.151				
		(0.113)				
Minority*25th			0.615			
			(0.148)			
Minority*50th			2.763***			
			(0.740)			
Minority*75th			0.699			
			(0.322)			
Far-right percentage				1.000	1.001	
				(0.005)	(0.005)	
Minority*far-right percentage					0.982	
					(0.010)	
Previous events						1.000
						(0.000)
Intercept	0.107***	0.118***	0.105***	0.110*	0.120*	0.109***
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.105)	(0.116)	(0.025)
Random intercept	1.157**	1.161**	1.160**	1.157**	1.158**	1.156**
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.049)
N	42914	42914	42914	42914	42914	42914
Level 2 *N*	31	31	31	31	31	31

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$*

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