Affect/Emotion - Orientation Matters: A Conversation between Sigrid Schmitz and Sara Ahmed

Schmitz, Sigrid; Ahmed, Sara

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.de

Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0

Dieser Text ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-77470-6
Schmitz: Your books “The Cultural Politics of Emotion” and “The Promise of Happiness” are highly recommended in the field of affect studies. How do you use the terms “emotion” and “affect” and what would you say is their relation?

Ahmed: I am reluctant to use the word affect; it’s probably worth reflecting on how the affective turn can bounce. As I was writing my book the “The Cultural Politics of Emotion” (2004) in the late 1990s, there was a kind of interest in affect specifically and in making affect something specific. And for me, the reason why I picked up emotion as my word was partly because I was interested in this idea of movement that is explicit in its etymology. And it was also partly that I wanted to use the word that is used in everyday life; that my mother would use when she was describing her feelings or her situation. She would think of it in terms of emotion while the word affect didn’t have that kind of everyday resonance. We assume to know what it means – emotion is about having a feeling in response to something – however, it is much more complicated and socially mediated than that. I actually wanted to disrupt the idea of emotion coming from within and then moving out towards objects and others. Some people use the word affect to describe how you’re affected – to affect and to be affected – thereby expressing a bodily responsiveness to the world that the word is used to donate. I rather use emotion because that word took me further in not starting with the question of how we are affected by this. What was interesting to me was not just how is the body affecting and being affected, but how is it that certain kinds of things are given value over time? Affects tended to be used a little bit too much at the level of an encounter between bodies. I wanted to talk about histories that preceded and directed this encounter and emotion, as a word, let me do that. My key-emphasis is on objects. How are things given values: they become emotional things. I actually use affect as part of what emotions do. And I am quite critical, in fact, of some of the ways in which affect and emotion have been defined as very distinct and clear.
Schmitz: I agree that the distinction between affect as relational to bodies, the within, and emotion as the relation connected to subjectivity and cognition should be questioned more precisely in feminist discourse. Another distinction is made between emotions as being intentional and affect as being unintentional, that is also a very ambiguous crisscrossing, saying affect is on relativeness, on intersubjective exchange of affects, and at the same time separating affect as the unintentional from emotion as the intentional, being – in some definitions – more closed up in a body.

Ahmed: I just do not think it is very helpful. From a feminist queer point of view I want to challenge that model of emotion as being subject-centered. If you suddenly introduce another term, “affect”, which is relational and non-intentional, that does not work because then emotion is simply understood as intentionality. The key phenomenologists have not created their models of emotion about intentionalities, but about responsiveness and being responsive. So if you want to challenge some of the psychological models of emotion – as Rei Terada in her book “Feeling in Theory” – you need to use a word that usually denotes subjectivity to say that actually emotions don’t work simply in a located, bound subject. They move and they are not just social in the sense of mediated, but they actually show how the subject arrives into a world that already has affects and feelings circulating in very particular ways.

Schmitz: There is an ongoing debate going back to Sandra Harding’s and Donna Haraway’s discussion about “strong objectivity” and “situated knowledge”. It is about the question of whether to use new words because the old words are dirty or – as Harding argues in that debate – whether to take the strong, old words although they are perhaps connoted in a way we don’t agree with. We’ve been having this debate for thirty, forty years – I think it depends on what we want to imply with the wording.

Ahmed: We have a course “Gender, Affect and the Body” and I’ve just changed how it is taught because my impression was (from essays that students were delivering) that there was a great degree of confidence that affect was this over here and emotion was that over there and that this distinction mapped onto different bodies of work. But the distinction was actually obscuring the histories of how certain bodies of work came to exist in the first place. I encourage my students to think about it more in terms of separation as an activity. You can break an egg to separate the yolk from the white, but you have to separate what is not separate. Separation is an activity, not a noun. And I think that in some contributions to affect studies the concept has come to replace the thing. So affect is treated as an agent that is doing things on its own accord. I think you can separate affect and emotion, you even can have a rationale for doing that, but it needs to be understood as a method allowing you to do certain things and not as corresponding to a natural distinction that exists in the world. The world we are describing is messy – if we have clear distinctions we’re actually losing our connection to that world. Clear distinctions for a messy experience or a messy
situation are neither helpful for a better understanding of reality nor interesting for the debate. Separation has to be understood as a verb rather than as a noun. Then the debate becomes much more interesting than just a debate that assumes a definition: this is what x is, this is what y is.

**Schmitz:** Connected to this debate, sensation is an important term you are also using to describe, as you put it, how emotions are surfacing individual and collective bodies. How do you use sensation in relation to emotion and can you explain the term “surfacing”?

**Ahmed:** I was influenced, particularly in “The Cultural Politics of Emotion”, by the work of Alison Jaggar and Elizabeth Spelman, feminist philosophers looking at the history of philosophy and thinking about the relation between mind and body. I learned a lot from their feminist critiques of the tendency to devalue emotion, and from their affirmation of cognitive models, conceiving emotion as a kind of thinking of the body. I wanted to think about emotions in terms of ideas and values, that is as judgments about things: To hate or to fear is to have a judgment about a thing as it approaches. But I also wanted to focus on the bodily/corporeal/visceral reactions that we have. Thinking about what emotions do, cannot be done without thinking about sweating and the sense of being in a body. Using the term sensation attends to that visceral responsiveness. Often when we are busy, when things are going the right way, we become less aware of our bodily reality.

**Schmitz:** …a phenomenon for which the word “flow” was very common in the 1980s...

**Ahmed:** In the psychology of happiness the flow is a very common term. Psychology of happiness is a part of the booming movement of happiness studies in the United States, much of which may rightly be questioned. This discourse has brought the language of the flow right back in. When I talk about surfacing I aim to express an intensification of an experience, in particular in the experience of pain, it is about the surface coming to attention. It is a presumed consciousness but through these moments of intensification the surface comes to be a physical thing that has its own weight and sensibility. At the collective level, moments of national grief intensify a feeling of what it means to be part of a national community. Using the term surfacing actually relates to some of the other languages where you think about affects in terms of intensity. But I think about it at an experiential level. The experience of being in either an individual or a collective body is often through intensification. I am interested in emotions as a way of being directed towards particular things. In a way surfacing is also about the generation of objects that are apart. You create a surface as much by that “not”, by that what is not asked, by the act of expelling.

**Schmitz:** Is it an attempt to grasp something of the ungraspable of sensation, which is enacted and inseparably entangled, as I would put it, with generating
meaning and value, with becoming expressible? Is it in this area where you use the term sensation?

Ahmed: Yes. A lot of my work reflects about questions of race and racism. It is about skin encounters, the feeling of fear, its effect on the skin, about what it feels like either to be apprehended as a stranger who does not belong, or for someone to be apprehending somebody else as stranger who does not belong. So the language of surfacing is partly used metaphorically: how things become given by tangible qualities, as bodies are included in that category of things through the sensations on the skin. Surfacing is about how the skin becomes a border that feels, about the role of the feeling in making the border. You can see that at the level of individual corporeality, but you can also see it in the bodies that harm. This draws on Audre Lorde's work. It is also about how the street or a neighborhood or a nation comes to feel itself as a body through apprehending this intruder who has to be expelled. Only partially metaphor, it is probably closer to say it's a metonymy; it is a ripple effect that moves us from the individual to the collective level. The sense of “you’re not part” makes this individual body feel part of the street or the neighborhood, part of those that belong. You cannot really describe those mechanisms without thinking about the very sensational nature of them.

Schmitz: This touches the interesting and important questions about valuing the body. You also speak of emotions as cultural practices. Working in this area of embodying myself, I am used to focusing on the body, that is, mostly, on the individual level. On the other hand the question for me is how we can get the social, the political aspects into the discussion to open up these approaches for embodying. We have so many words until now – material semiotic, meaning making, discourse, matter and ‘how matter matters’. But the tricky thing for me, and the most important thing at the moment, is how we can get in the effects of societal processes, of politics on the structural level, not only on the individual body structure.

Ahmed: Nina Power, another feminist philosopher, and I had a teacher saying “your body is a structure”. Even when we are thinking about the individual body, we should not think of it as unrelated to structural questions. In the conclusion of “The Promise of Happiness” I sort of played with and reframed Raymond Williams’ idea of “structures of feeling” (Williams 1977, 128-135), when I proposed to think about “feelings of structure” (Ahmed 2010, 216). I reversed his paradigm to think about that in relation to happiness. In “Strange Encounters” (2000) I work about this most directly. Because I was very interested there in the actual, the everyday way in which an individual body moves and negotiates its relationship to space. It is how we are talking about the constitution of spaces as being for bodies. The book that picked up the argument most is much more “Queer Phenomenology” (2006), which begins to think that it is not just a question of “there are bodies that have orientations towards objects and others”, but rather that there are worlds that are orientated towards some bodies more
than others. And there are bodies that can be received, the bodies that have the – I use the metaphor “the comfortable chair” – the chair that has received an impression of a body that sits upon it. So the body can find it easier to sit upon that chair. And the way in which privilege can work like that. It can receive some bodies that have already given that shape and that impression to the world. For me that is how to describe bodily life, in which the life of the body and social structure are – to use your word – entangled right from the beginning. I have drawn on phenomenology a lot in my work and that is partly because of the focus on concepts of dwelling and residence. I am thinking about structures in terms of how worlds are actually made to shelter some bodies and not others. And the very work you do when you’re not the right body, the work you do to belong, is part of what feminist, queer and anti-racist politics is about. It’s actually about world-making in that sense. Donna Haraway and Edward Said both use that expression from very different contexts – feminist science studies and thinking about Palestine and orientalism. World-making actually matters, because worlds have been made to shelter some and not others, so the work of equality is deeply corporeal work.

Schmitz: Would you see this as the potential for taking up these discourses for queer and feminist studies? With all its challenges? What I’m really struggling with is the challenge of potential misuse. Coming from feminist science studies, for years and years I worked on the transgression of the border between nature and culture with several examples – plasticity, epigenetics – and they are sensitized now. But what happens is that it is used in very – I would say – neoliberal ways. I think it’s misused and that concerns me not only because I want to analyze how biopolitics and neoliberal paradigms are infecting the usage (Schmitz forthcoming). I was really engaged in introducing these paradigms – in how far am I responsible for what is happening now? And, turning to the question of happiness and the killjoys, why did you call the book “The Promise of Happiness” and not “The Promise of Anger”?

Ahmed: Happiness was one of the emotions that I didn’t foreground in “The Cultural Politics of Emotion”, which actually took up much more the role of bad feeling. I was particularly interested in disgust and fear and hate and how they make the “other” into the cause of feeling. That’s part of the way in which I’m approaching how emotions work to actually register the truth of a judgement – “I’m disgusted, you’re disgusting, it’s disgusting” – and how that then becomes the quality of a thing, but then how that quality becomes shared as a social agreement, that “they” are the disgusting thing. That was the general model.

Schmitz: …They all say “yes, yes, yes” to each other...

Ahmed: But then there are a couple of footnotes in “The Cultural Politics of Emotion” about happiness. I had been discussing the questions of happiness with Lauren Berlant. Both of us took it up in different ways, Lauren in “Cruel Optimism” (2011) and me in “The Promise of Happiness” (2010). But in “The
Cultural Politics of Emotion” (2004) there is a couple of footnotes and they relate happiness to waiting. I was very interested in the idea that when you’re waiting for something, the longer you wait, the harder it is to give up on the thing that you are waiting for. And I was very interested in the investments that that generates. The example I used was waiting on the phone. When somebody fails to return the phone call you are waiting longer and it becomes harder to give up. The failure to return extends the investment. Happiness can work as a form of waiting – you extend the investment in that promise of happiness through the very deferral of the thing that you’re waiting for. This is why I think of this is as a happiness-book, the question was not why was it not “The Promise of Anger”

Schmitz: ...or “The Promise of Killjoy”...

Ahmed: Actually I think it was important to signal that almost every book about happiness I’ve read (with a couple of exceptions) was a book about happiness as a good thing, whether it was understood in the classical sense of virtue or whether it was understood in the utilitarian sense of the maximizing of happiness. That was the presumption. From a cultural studies point of view it is the consistency of that assumption that becomes startling. I wanted it to be a book about happiness that was foregrounding its unhappy history. So it is very important that it had happiness in the title. I was interested in the idea of the promise in terms of its etymology “to send something out”. And I became very interested in actually getting much more precision about the mechanisms of sociality. I thought there was an over-emphasis on contagion and infection as ways feelings or affects pass around and I wanted to look at what I called – following others but in a very different way – “conditional happiness”. That was good reason for me using that word to signal ...

Schmitz: ...the promise to show the myth and to uncover the history.

Ahmed: Yes. The argument was about converting figures that are usually dismissed. The killjoy is actually a sort of dismissal, it is used as a stereotype and as an accusation. Following many other queer theorists, I was finding an alternative promise in the negation. The killjoy was a conclusion in a way, but it could not be the organizing trope of how that book was presented without nullifying the significance of the critique. My mother was very pleased I was writing about happiness. She would say: “At last something nice after all this work about these difficult things!” But of course it was actually a work about the difficult things and there was a lot of personal history that went into that choice. My childhood was full of the attempt to use happiness to stop us talking about difficult things; it really mattered to me to make that critique and to work out the way in which happiness worked in my own childhood and upbringing to generate a particular idea of the family. If you didn’t maintain or retain that idea of the family that meant you were losing proximity to happiness. So for me writing the book was important for personally coming to terms with happiness in my history and its relationship to becoming a feminist, becoming queer and so on.
Schmitz: Is the uncovering of happiness as a form of normative dispositive related to particular examples like the family, is that the relation of happiness and norms?

Ahmed: Yes, I don’t use the language of norms a lot in this particular project. I do that for a reason. Obviously I use the idea of “happy objects” and I use the idea of stickiness, as I was interested in how happiness itself can be the thing that accumulates and gives something a positive value. But it doesn’t necessarily mean that you’re made happy by that thing. In fact, the fact that certain ideas, that certain lives, that certain images are imagined as the route to happiness often makes them probably disappointing.

Schmitz: Is this the idea of stickiness?

Ahmed: Yes. The second chapter of “Queer Phenomenology” has it as a description of the family house: being surrounded by the kind of furniture, the photographs of family, almost being surrounded by ideas of happiness, that feeling of happiness becoming a path you’re supposed to follow and a pressure point. I started thinking about happiness as a way of being directed. “On being directed” would be the genuine subtitle, if there were one. Sometimes when people talk about norms there are things that appear to be given and that you live your life around and in relation to, but I was interested in the subtle modes of encouragement and direction like “I just want you to be happy, so do this, do that” and the way it often works through a kind of “yes”-saying. So it’s not “don’t do this”. It’s “do this, because this would make you happy”. We’re talking about subtle affective mechanisms whereby you end up feeling that this is the life that is available to you and that to follow a different path would be to not only compromise your own happiness but the happiness of others and the way that can create an enormous amount of pressure on people. I called it the paradox of the footprint (Ahmed 2060,16); the way in which paths are followed by being created and are created by being followed. The more people follow the path, the clearer it becomes, the easier it is to follow. Happiness seems to be about doing whatever, “you’re free to do whatever”, but actually it becomes about the narrowing of a set of possibilities – Shulamith Firestone called this a “narrow, difficult-to-find alley of human experience” (Firestone 1970, 155). When I was actually drawing on the work of very early feminism, from Simone de Beauvoir to Shulamith Firestone to Audre Lorde, I was actually struck myself how extensive the critiques of happiness have been in feminist intellectual history. Affect studies wasn’t my starting point, it was those feminist critiques and trying to think of feminism itself as an alternative archive to that kind of happiness studies.

Schmitz: Could you explain the figure of the feminist killjoy?

Ahmed: The feminist killjoy was a familiar political figure from my upbringing, from being a young person in the UK and Australia. I obviously didn’t invent her; she had her own political life. I’ve always been interested in the way she is writ-
ten about, describing for example how feminists are heard as the difficult ones, the ones who are sort of bitter, because they don't have what others have. What Marilyn Frye diagnoses in her work is how feminist critique is dismissed by presuming its authors were unable to pursue femininity and so on. The feminist killjoy found me, I didn't find her. When I gave papers on this material people related to her, because they were used to being in that place. I grew up in Australia, my partner grew up in the US, but we both had feminist killjoy moments with families about the film “Kramer versus Kramer”. We were both angry about how the mother was represented and we got in trouble with our families for not appreciating this film, how “beautiful and sensitive” it was, because “it shows the relationship between the father and the son” and “how could you, it’s such a beautiful film”. I could list so many of my experiences at school, at home, where you raise questions about the representation of gender and you become the problem. You’re getting in the way of people’s innocent enjoyments of these lovely things and people get very, very angry with you. Those dynamics also explain the model of emotion I proposed which is not about the smooth transmission of feeling, shame, creating shame, contiguity. It’s actually about alienation, feelings that don’t pass or feelings that get stuck. Bodies that become the cause of the loss of a feeling, affinity, etc. So, the feminist killjoy for me was there right from when I decided to write about happiness, immediately she became this central figure, even though she only has one chapter in that book. And now I have a blog organized around that figure. It has been very interesting to me how many people, young women especially, have found in it a way of converting what is actually quite a difficult experience into a sort of potential and energy.

Schmitz: For me this closes the loops back to the beginning; I think that it is very important to show how the directing, narrowing and homogenization of a direction of happiness is a form of politics. If we take the figure of the killjoy as a form of empowerment, there are two questions: do we also narrow a direction, that is now a bit of a provocative question, in saying “yes, yes, yes” to each other? Do we need this, is it okay to fight with the same weapons? Could you elaborate on the relation between individual strategies, that is the individual empowerment on the one hand, and political strategies on the other?

Ahmed: When I look back to “The Promise of Happiness” there was something very enjoyable about following that word happiness through its philosophical history and then into everyday situations. I was fascinated by the speech acts that make happiness present as a way of being with others: “I just want you to be happy.” “I’m happy if you are happy.” The book does not end with the killjoy, it ends with hap. It ends with the idea of putting the hap back into happiness – some people might say I find a lot of hope in hap.

Schmitz: What do you mean by hap?

Ahmed: Hap means chance, it is the root of the English word happiness. It worked out well – “good fortune”. Especially in a lot of positive psychology, hap-
Happiness is defined against chance. It’s actually not what happens, it’s what you earn. So I was interested in the history of happiness as the history of the removal of that hap. And part of the project was to put the hap back into happiness. I had a lot of hope in hap, some people might say too much. I wanted to think about happiness as possibility, or allowing the individual to decide the different paths that they might follow, but actually as described by that metaphor, it was a narrowing down of possibilities. The book did not end with the potential of the killjoy, but with a figure that is not really relatable to a particular subject or position that you or I might occupy. It is much more relatable to this something that is worldly, like a possibility that cannot ever be eliminated. And in a way happiness is an attempt to eliminate possibility when it becomes sanctioned socially. So even if I don’t think of myself as simply affirming the killjoy, it struck me how the feminist killjoy has become a form of bonding. And I think partly it’s understandable given the difficulty of doing diversity work. Because a lot of the experiences we are talking about are experiences of becoming very alienated from worlds that become not just given but reproduced insistently, not admitting you to be the body that you feel yourself to be. Finding others who have had that experience produces a bonding, a connection that I think is worth affirming. You don’t even need the figure of the killjoy to do that. It’s just that sense of what it means to be unseated, to be not allowed to take up a position because of the views you have or the situation or the world that you want or the desires you have. I’ve been interested in how wanting what causes other people unhappiness is assumed to be wanting to cause other people unhappiness. And that is exactly the position of the killjoy. It’s as if she wants to make others unhappy rather than other people are unhappy because of the world she wants. But you know anything can become a narrowing and I really think that it’s important not to think of oneself simply as being a killjoy and always being the woeful one. Because then you cannot see, how actually you can be the one whose joy is being threatened by other others. History of feminisms is an object lesson in that, in how some people become killers of feminist joy. I think we have to lose confidence in our capacity to recognize ourselves as being her, even when we take her up. We might not be that, we might not be the ones who are actually getting in the way of happiness, we might be the ones who are treating others as in the way. And that does mean recognizing that we, too, can be the problem in new ways, not just in the old ways that we are familiar with, but in our own political communities.

Schmitz: I think the approaches and perspectives of becomings, of dynamics, of practices – praxeological, sociological approaches for example – are very important as one facet, to differentiate. To be able to use these approaches as you say, and try to avoid closing up in individuals, to avoid essentialism, to avoid harmonism – we need a “we”, but a differentiated one. But the relation between stating this “we” and differentiating within it has been compromising feminist discourse for decades and decades, and to this day, it is as tricky as it was thirty years ago. I think to focus on the ways of becomings could be a door-opener or eye-opener to get these things together, to take concepts of matter, of body, also
of persons – not to say individuals, but related and active persons – into account, trying to avoid this ontological essentialism and closing up.

**Ahmed:** I think “tricky” is a good word. Audre Lorde describes that certainly better than anybody else I’ve ever read, how actually it is the trickiness that makes the work matter and that the idea that you should sort of resolve that is precisely the problem (1984, 114ff.). I use the language of “momentum” a lot, and increasingly in “Willful Subjects” (forthcoming). Like the crowd, the way in which you can be purely directed by the direction of the crowd and how hard it can be if you’re walking the wrong way in a crowd to simply keep going. Not because anyone’s pushing you but because the collective feeling of the crowd is shoving and pushing, so that you have to work harder to go the way that you’re going. Again I have to describe that corporeally to get a sense of what’s at stake here. I think institutions can work like that. It also shows you that the “we” matters, because actually a body has to accumulate momentum to have any capacity to intervene in a history sedimented like a wall, which is the example that I use in “On Being Included” (2012). There is no wall there, but it’s still a wall there. And that’s also worrying me. It’s not just about creating the relationships that allow you to survive the ongoing realities of the world that make it hard. It’s also because, unless you have bodies collected together, there’s actually no way at all to move. So that counter momentum is creating room – you need more bodies around to not be pressed down. Marilyn Frye’s book “The Politics of Reality” (1983, Crossing Press) talks about the bodily reality of oppression, going back to the idea of physical press. We need that level of description to think about why the “we” matters in a way that shows how the trickiness of assembling becomes part of what makes the assembling matter.

**Schmitz:** Just a few words on the relation to emotion/affect in your new book “Willful Subjects”. Is this another perspective you add?

**Ahmed:** There is quite a lot on affects and emotion in “Willful Subjects”. Obviously the translation of the English word “willful” is not easy. Because the equivalent words in most other languages aren’t will-words. “Eigensinnig” is a really interesting word to me. So the story that I use in my “Willful Subjects” book is the Grimm story “Das eigensinnige Kind”. I came to the word willful through my reading of the “The Mill on the Floss” (2003). In George Eliot’s novel the character Maggie Tulliver has too much will, thus fascinating many feminist philosophers including Simone de Beauvoir. In my book I ask questions like “whose will becomes a problem”? I am interested in the relation between will and happiness. The language that Augustine uses in “Confessions” in particular, but also in his writing on “freedom of the will” and in “The City of God”, is referring to this idea that everyone pursues happiness but willing well is to pursue it in the right way and that unhappiness is to stray. That same language about paths, and how willing right is to follow the path of happiness, implies an immediate relation between willfulness and unhappiness. I became interested in all these strays, those who cause unhappiness by going
the wrong way. It has allowed me to develop some of the arguments about affect and emotion by thinking of them in relationship to categories of will. So it’s a different inflection. I’m not really debating affect studies in that book. But, because a lot of the writing on will and particularly the writing on the phenomenology of will is about affect and corporeality, there is actually a lot of description of affect in the book even though it is not taken up as a primary category of analysis.

Schmitz: In the German-speaking world, there has been a discourse on the free will in which what I call the “modern neurodeterminism” plays a crucial role. It does not regard the brain as determined, but as an instance that determines all behavior and thought – consequently, from this perspective, we have no free will. I have to think a bit about the relation, but I’m very much looking forward to your book.

Ahmed: I do explicitly think about the book in terms of writing a queer history of will. And, although a lot of people say Augustine is the first scholar to use the will as an independent faculty, I’m actually quite interested in Lucretius and his idea of the swerving atom and I think about it in terms of a queer will. Of course in a lot of the sciences – I’m very interested in the 18th and 19th century – the will was actually something that anything had.

Schmitz: There were court processes and trials against swine, juridical acts against animals, who were accused and were pronounced guilty for something you could only do with a will. This is very interesting and it’s not new.

Ahmed: The word emotion looks like it belongs to a subject, but really that belonging is a very partial history of that. So it has a resonance with some of the critiques of the reduction of emotion to subjects. Part of the project is also to critique or to think what follows the critique of the reduction of the world to a certain kind of subject. The common history of the English words “will” and “want” can be traced throughout the history of moral philosophy. Through the Kantian turn will became this faculty that would eliminate want from itself. Willfulness becomes a will that wants too much and the relation between willing and wanting develops.

Schmitz: I’m very much looking forward to it. Thank You Sara!
Literatur