

Mapping Popular Perceptions: Local Security, Insecurity and Police Work in Yemen

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Mapping Popular Perceptions: Local Security, Insecurity and Police Work in Yemen

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A YPC POLICY REPORT

By:
Dimitris Soudias
&
Mareike Transfeld

July 2014



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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAS	Ansar al-Sharia
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
CbP	Community-based Policing
CSF	Central Security Forces
CSO	Central Security Organization
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GPC	General People’s Congress
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JMP	Joint Meeting Parties
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NDC	National Dialogue Conference
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NSB	National Security Bureau
PARC	Pan-Arab Research Center
PC	Popular Committee
PDRY	People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
PSO	Political Security Organization
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
YPC	Yemen Polling Center
YSP	Yemen Socialist Party

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

The Yemen Polling Center (YPC) is an independent non-Governmental organization, providing the highest quality social science research services. YPC was established in 2004 as the first and only polling center in Yemen. We received our registration certificate No. 147 from the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor in December 2005. YPC is the 2010 recipient of the Best Partner in the Middle East and North Africa award from Gallup International. We design and implement opinion polls, household and other surveys, and provide other services which fulfill research needs of national and international institutions, non-profit organizations, corporations, government agencies, and professional associations.

YPC conducts public attitude surveys, focus groups, in-depth interviews, demographic studies, and market research employing both quantitative and qualitative methods for development projects, international organizations and foundations, publications, business groups, banks, and other stakeholders. As a member of both the World Association for Public Opinion Research and the American Association for Public Opinion Research, YPC remains committed to excellence in all aspects of social science.

Since its inception, YPC has conducted dozens of qualitative and quantitative research projects on a multitude of issues ranging from satellite television and radio consumption patterns and consumer attitudes, to human rights, women's rights, political reform issues, corruption, public health, and other governance related studies.

In addition to numerous successfully completed public opinion surveys and research projects, YPC has implemented several economic surveys and qualitative studies covering all governorates in Yemen. We have surveyed nearly 100,000 Yemeni citizens in face-to-face interviews.

YPC has a dedicated, well-experienced and qualified team. In addition, the Center cooperates with dozens of experts, consultants and university professors within Yemen and abroad when need be. Our experience, as well as our personnel and technical resources, allow us to conduct surveys of any size throughout all of Yemen's governorates while adhering to the most stringent international standards in data quality. Furthermore, Yemen is a religious and conservative society in which male-female interactions are quite limited. As such, around half of our enumerators are female, which makes us able to conduct interviews with women respondents.

YPC has wide experience in implementing internationally funded projects. It has cooperated, and thus far conducted, dozens of projects with numerous international institutions including the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Pan-Arab Research Center (PARC), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Ministry of Local Administration, among others.

BACKGROUND OF THE AUTHORS

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REPORT OBJECTIVES

More than two years have passed since the signing of the GCC initiative, a deal brokered by the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in cooperation with the United Nations, the United States and the European Union. The deal led to the transfer of power from then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh to Vice President Abd Rabou Mansour Hadi. Additionally, it initiated the formation of a unity government equally composed of the ruling party, the General People's Congress (GPC), and the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the most significant of which are the Islah Party and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). The foremost goal of the agreement was to bring stability back to the country, which has been in unprecedented turmoil and in a precarious security situation. To achieve this, the GCC initiative's implementation mechanism mandated a national dialog to resolve major ongoing conflicts and restructure Yemen's security apparatus.

The United Nations Special Advisor on Yemen, Jamal Benomar, is observing the implementation of the GCC initiative. Though representing the international community, he has played a critical role in facilitating the process, the transitional process has not yet yielded the expected outcomes. Although President Hadi has initiated substantial personnel changes within the security sector, Yemen's security situation continues to deteriorate. Despite the conclusion of the National Dialog Conference (NDC) in January 2014, movements which have demanded political change in the 2011 uprising continue to rely on force and protest to make their demands heard. The NDC, which was to solve the various conflicts and address the grievances of the people, was not able to achieve its goal and establish a national consensus. The progressive results that have come out of various work groups (such as Rights and Freedom, State Building, Development, Sa'da Issue, Southern Issue, Security, Transitional Justice und Good Governance) now present the basis of the constitution to be drafted in the coming months. However, the conditions on the ground have not improved. YPC research has shown that the security situation remains a major obstacle in the lives of ordinary Yemeni citizens.

With the government not taking the necessary steps to reform the security, economic, health and education sectors, the wellbeing of a community is often left in the hands of the citizens themselves. From this perspective, the fragile security situation detrimentally affects a community's ability to develop. While there has been some research on security threat assessments, security sector reform, and the impact of transition on local justice and security systems, few researchers have looked at public perceptions of security. Given the weaknesses of the Yemeni state, and its inability to provide security to all of its citizens, it is important to understand the complex network of local actors that bring, or worsen, security in the communities. Only with such an understanding can policy makers develop a feasible approach to security provision and security sector reform. Apart from mapping security issues and violent conflict on a national and regional level, it is vital to assess on-the-ground public perceptions.

In November and December 2012 the Yemen Polling Center (YPC) undertook a European Union (EU) funded quantitative survey on Public Perceptions of the Security Sector and Police Work in Yemen. Local Yemenis from each of the country's twenty-one governorates

were interviewed in this survey. Perception of security and insecurity in Yemen

- a. Local security provisions and conflict resolution mechanisms
- b. Current landscape of non-state actors; mapping of local and regional conflicts
- c. Public attitudes toward the police
- d. Gender-related security issues¹

The goal of this report is to summarize and analyze key survey findings in regard to insecurity and security provisions within each of Yemen's twenty-one governorates. Before delving into the internal institutional arrangements and conflicts within Yemen's military-security services (during the period prior to and during the 2011 mass protests), this report will briefly assess the most significant security threats the country has been facing. These prerequisites will allow for the disentanglement of prevalent conflicts and the configuration of conflict-relevant (armed) actors. Furthermore, this report will elaborate on the security developments of each governorate for the time between 2011 and 2013. This will help the reader understand the perceptions of survey respondents toward particular actors, police work, and security.

The fieldwork for this report was conducted between November and December 2012. The target sample of the survey is 2000. Due to a security related incident in the city of Sa'da, the actual sample size is 1990. All of the respondents are above the age of 18. The ratio of male and female respondents is even. The urban/rural ratio is 28% urban, 72% rural.

¹ For more information, see: Heinze, M. and Ahmed, S. (2013). Integrating Women's Security Interests into Police Reform in Yemen – Some Suggestions for Structural Reform. YPC Policy Report. [report] Yemen Polling Center. Retrieved from: http://yemenpolling.org/Projects-en/English-YPC_Policy_Report_June2013.pdf.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

Yemen has been struggling with a great variety of conflict, security issues and cleavages in many parts of its territory, society and institutions. Since the 2011 uprising, these cleavages have been exacerbated by escalated violent conflicts and the emergence of new (in)security actors. Not only did the uprising lead to the breaking out, and/or expansion, of conflicts, it also created security vacuums that actors were able to exploit. In order to understand the main lines of conflict, this chapter will introduce the main political and (in)security actors involved.

The upheavals of 2011 represented an unprecedented period of social mobilization across the country. United by the common demand for the removal of the Saleh regime, different political and social groups such as the political parties, Houthi and HIRAK movements, youth movement and tribesmen all occupied public squares in major cities and towns throughout the country. It represented a unique moment when different actors throughout the country, regardless of whether or not they were previously involved in their own separate conflicts, came together for a common cause. As a reaction, Saleh began to mobilize loyal tribes and members of the GPC against the opposition while responding with excessive use of force against protesters and promising reforms and economic incentives to the opposition. By April of 2011 the popular movement started to display signs of fragmentation. Even though the various social and political groups shared the goal of removing Saleh and his family from power, they were distinct from each other in terms of their relationship with, and grievances against, the regime. The varying positions among the different groups, coupled with conflicting ideologies and interests, resulted in the emergence of a complex network of (in)security actors on the local level.

The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP)

Before the 2011 uprising the formal opposition parties had already allied themselves under the framework of the JMP. They declared their support for the ‘Youth Revolution’ in late February of 2011. Previously, they had already been in a political conflict with the ruling GPC. During the presidential elections of 2006 the opposition for the first time fielded a presidential candidate. Officially, he only attained 21.8% of the vote, a figure that is remarkable given the authoritarian context of the elections. However, the opposition did not accept these results, and demanded reforms in the electoral system. This conflict has been ongoing since then and reached a climax in late 2010. In December 2010 Parliament agreed to pass amendments to the constitution. One of the amendments effectively allowed Saleh to remain president for life. With the 2011 popular uprising, the JMP ultimately demanded the resignation of President Saleh.

The Tribal and Military Elite

As the number of street protesters grew, and attempts to solve the political crisis failed, violence on the streets further escalated. One of the bloodiest days of the 2011 uprising was the ‘Friday of Dignity’ (March 18, 2011). More than fifty protesters were gunned down at Change Square in Sana’a. Many loyal members of the government, GPC and security apparatus defected from the regime. The most prominent defections were that of General Ali Mohsen, a longtime ally of President Saleh, and Sadeq al-Ahmar, the paramount sheikh of the Hashid tribal federation.

These defections had both a tribal and a military dimension since Ali Mohsen is part of the Sanhan tribe, the tribe of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Sanhan is a part of the Hashid tribal federation, which is headed by the al-Ahmar family. With Saleh concentrating political power in his family's hands, their defection was motivated by the political and economic marginalization that they experienced throughout the previous decade. When President Saleh began to groom his son, Ahmed Ali, as his successor in the early 2000's, he began to push potential competitors to the side. These included the al-Ahmar family, the historical leaders of the powerful Hashid tribes and wielders of great political and economic influence. General Ali Mohsen, a high-ranking military officer and close ally of Saleh, was also subjected to political and economic marginalization. Both Mohsen and the al-Ahmar family joined ranks with the opposition and lent their resources to the opposition on the streets. Hence, the defection caused a split not only within the military, but also within Hashid at large, and Sanhan in particular.

Ali Mohsen's troops, the so-called First Armored Division (also referred to as al-Firqa, engl.: the division) joined the side of the protesters. Likewise, large portions of the powerful Hashid tribal federation were now opposing the regime. Though the defection of these elites was welcomed by parts of the popular protest movement, many independent protesters saw the elite support to be an attempt to hijack the revolution. Even though the defected elites attempted to legitimize their defection by repeatedly claiming to defend the protesters, many on the squares believed they were acting according to their own interests.

Because of its sheer size, along with its organization and mobilization skills, the Islamic Islah party dominated the protests in many areas of the country. Eventually, the defected elites entered into a close alliance with them. In contrast to the elites, ordinary protesters were demanding radical change. They wanted the entire regime to be removed and the establishment of a civil state led not by the tribal-military elite, but civilians according to democratic practices. For many, the seemingly less severe demands of the elites and Islah would not accomplish this one solemn goal.

The Youth Movement

Motivated by high unemployment rates, rampant corruption across all sectors of society, and poverty, the youth were certainly the drivers of the 2011 upheavals. While the United Nations defines youth as an age group ranging from 15 to 24 years, in the context of the Yemeni "youth revolution", the term youth, or in Arabic shabab, has come to mean more than just a group of similar aged youngsters. The vibrant Yemeni youth movement, or more specifically the so-called "Independent Youth Movement" describes young people in the broader age range between 18 and 38 (and even older), who share a similar mindset demanding political reform and democracy.² After protests had begun in Tunisia and Egypt, loosely organized groups of youth and human rights activists staged the first protests in Sana'a. Later on they put up tents in front of the university campus. Soon permanent protest camps were established all over the country. The youth movement lacked organizational strength however. Eventually, the established political parties pushed them to the side. Even so, the youth movement continued their protests.

2 Alwazir, Atiaf (2012): "Youth" Inclusion in Yemen: a Necessary Element for Success of political transition. Arab Reform Initiative.

In April 2011 the youth began to direct their protest toward the JMP. In the context of the GCC initiative's negotiations, the Islah-Hashid-First Armored Division alliance repeatedly prevented the youth movement from being too provocative by keeping it on a tight leash. For instance, in early June 2011 the youth planned to march to Vice President Hadi's residence in order to demand the establishment of a transitional council. The opposition soldiers positioned themselves around the estate and prevented the protesters from reaching it. As time passed the youth movement was increasingly marginalized. With the negotiations for the GCC agreement ongoing, only the elites and political parties were included, with substantial parts of the protest movement being ignored.

The Hirak Movement

Excluded from this negotiation process was the Hirak movement, a separatist movement emanating from southern Yemen. Its roots go back to the 1990s. It is a long-term consequence of the mismanaged unification of the southern People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). One of the many challenges related to the process of unifying these two countries was the merging of their militaries. The southern army has been described as better organized and more professional. Furthermore, both of them suffered from ideological and regional divides. In the societies at large, southerners assumed there would be an equal power sharing arrangement with the north. What followed was a feeling of political and economic marginalization. This crystallized in the civil war of 1994. After Saleh appointed northern-born military governors as leaders over southern governorates, while southern officers were forced to retire.³ These actions were among many others that led to the present day, and severe cleavage between the South and North.

The Hirak movement has been protesting against these injustices since 2007. In its early days the movement consisted of retired officers of the former southern army. Primarily, they were demanding promised pensions. In subsequent years, other social groups joined the movement. Their protests took place in various southern governorates, particularly al-Dhali'. Their primary complaint was that the northern-based government extracts southern resources for its own good while they are blocked from state employment opportunities and patronage benefits.⁴ For these reasons, certain parts of the movement began calling for secession in 2008. Be that as it may, the Hirak movement is a fragmented one. It consists of various groups under different leaderships with different interests. During the early phase of the 2011 protests they quickly joined the popular protest movement. It was particularly in Aden that the government forces used heavy repression. During this time the government supposedly employed their US-trained counterterrorism forces to do this.⁵

At this point a certain awareness among southerners emerged. They began to see and believe that the population of northern Yemen suffered under very similar economic and political circumstances as they did. This created an unprecedented degree of solidarity between the two populations.

3 Makovsky, M., Misztal, B. and Ruhe, J. (2011). Fragility and Extremism in Yemen. [report] Bipartisan Policy Center, p. 30. Retrieved from: <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Yemen%20Final%20Report.pdf>.

4 Phillips, S. (2011). Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis. Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 26.

5 Human Rights Watch (2011). Days of bloodshed in Aden, p.8. Retrieved from: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen0311webcover.pdf>.

Yet, with the exclusion of the Hirak movement from the political negotiations, and the increasingly dominant role of the Islah party who had a critical stance toward the separatist movement, Hirak withdrew to the south. Subsequently, their demand for an independent state began to radicalize. In the NDC, the demands of the southern movement were not adequately addressed. Moreover, Hirak representatives did not speak for the entire Hirak movement, but were more moderate in their demands. Therefore, the conclusion of the NDC did not contribute to building trust towards the central government in the southern governorates and did not establish a national consensus able to appease the southern population.

The Houthi Movement

Though the Houthi movement does not demand an independent state, in the course of the 2011 upheavals they were able to gain nearly full autonomy in the northern governorate of Sa'da, which represents their stronghold. Though the region remained relatively quiet throughout the uprisings, the Houthi movement was able to reach into areas south of Sana'a.

The Houthi movement is named after its first leader Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. The movement is motivated not only by the general political and economic marginalization of the region, but also in defense of the Zaydi tradition. Even though Saleh's regime was predominantly Zaydi, Saleh practiced a policy of sunnification and supported conservative Sunni interpretations of Islah, such as Salafism. Many Zaydis in and around Sa'da felt threatened in their religious identity.

The beginning of the Houthi conflict can be traced back to 2004. On a Friday afternoon an anti-government protest was sparked in front of a mosque in Sana'a. The protesters were condemning the fact that the government was cooperating with the United States' led 'War on Terror'. The government reacted with repression against the Houthis and killed their leader Hussein Badreddin. This quickly led to an armed conflict in Sa'da located along the border of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. What started as a local conflict quickly escalated and spread into neighboring governorates, displacing at least 250,000 people. To this day the number of casualties is unknown.⁶ The war against the Houthis did not improve the state of Yemen's security and stability. It effectively weakened the regime, dragged local tribes into warfare and created a security vacuum, which encouraged threatening actors such as al-Qaeda.

The regime believed the Houthis are calling for the re-establishment of the Shia Zaydi imamate, which ruled northern Yemen until the 1962 republican revolution.⁷ Since the Houthi family claims they are descendants of the Prophet Mohamed (family of Sayyids), they would be eligible for claiming the title of Imam themselves. Reviving the Imamate is an ambition that both the Sunni majority and many Zaydi tribesmen have rejected. This is true because the impulse behind the 1962 revolution was to break down the power of the Sayyids. In the aftermath of the revolution, tribal sheikhs were empowered and continued to oppose the rule of the Sayyids.

6 Boucek, C. (2010). War in Saada - From Local Insurrection to National Challenge. Middle East Program No. 110. [report] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 1. Retrieved from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf.

7 Phillips, S. (2011). Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis. Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, p 28.

Even though the Houthi movement participated in the NDC and called for a “civil state” in the dialogue conference, uncertainty remains as to what precisely the vision of the movement for the future Yemen is. Continuing to rely on violence and using religious rhetoric, the conflict with the Houthi movement has caused an increase of sectarianism. The majority of Yemenis are Shafi’i (a religious tradition part of Sunni Islam), while a large minority (approximately 30-35%) is Zaydi (a religious tradition part of Shi’i Islam). The Zaydi minority is primarily located in the northern highlands, whereas the Shafi’i are concentrated both in the country’s agricultural heartland (central Yemen - Taiz, Ibb and Hodeida) and former PDRY territories (such as Hadhramout, Aden, Abyan or Shabwa). Since the formation of the unity government in late 2011, and the empowerment of Islah in that process, Zaydis feel increasingly threatened. They see the Houthi movement as their strongest political voice. Since the signing of the GCC initiative the Houthi movement both grew in size and gained many supporters outside of its traditional strongholds. In contrast to the Houthi movement, Islah acts as the voice of the Shafi’is. This dynamic often causes conflicts between the two parties on the local level.

The Deepening Cleavages

Many of these cleavages deepened after the signing of the GCC initiative. During the 2011 protests the members of political movements that felt excluded from the political system believed that they could change the status quo to their favor. As the negotiations began this wish became increasingly illusionary. The parties in the negotiations were limited to the formal political parties, namely the GPC and JMP. Even though Ali Mohsen and the al-Ahmar family were not formally part of the process, these elite actors saw themselves as represented by the JMP. Loyalists to the regime had their interests represented by the GPC. All other actors, including the youth, Houthi and Hiraq movements were excluded from the negotiations. They grew increasingly critical of the GCC initiative. As time progressed, it had become clear that the GCC initiative would lead only to an elite settlement. With their own concerns and demands remaining unanswered, the protest movement grew increasingly fragmented. Each group withdrew to their individualist stance and focused on their own grievances. Due to these developments, various conflicts along ideological, regional and sectarian lines escalated in all parts of the country.

Tribal actors

Enmeshed in this are tribal conflicts. They are not only limited to revenge killings and disputes over land and water, but also include battles between tribal militias and various political groups. Although the 2011 protests were unprecedented in size and extent, Yemenis regularly challenge state authority, particularly in the tribal governorates of Marib, al-Jawf and Shabwa. Attacks against electricity and crude oil infrastructure are frequent in these areas. At the same time, these areas and others, such as Abyan and Lahj, have served as a safe haven for both terrorist groups and criminal gangs.

Al-Qaeda

Because of the security vacuum in these regions, insecurity actors have been able to increase the geographical reach, intensity, and frequency of their activities. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) successfully exploited the predominant conflicts in Yemen. For example,

while framing the Houthi rebellion as the threatening rise of the Shia and Iranian influence, they supported the secessionist movement. They saw it to be a legitimate resistance against the regime's military mobilization among southern tribes and their exploitation of southern resources.⁸ More importantly, AQAP used the common grievances and desires of normal Yemenis and emphasized the regime's failure in providing basic necessities. As a result, AQAP has been able to establish support bases across the country, especially in the southern governorates. Consequentially, they managed to step up their attacks both on a local and regional scale.

The activities of criminal gangs have also increased. This does not only include robbery and kidnapping, but also arms smuggling and human trafficking, particularly along the Red Sea coast. Displaying all symptoms of a failed state, the Yemeni security apparatus is not able to address all of these security challenges, as the security apparatus itself is characterized by political infighting.

YEMEN'S MILITARY-SECURITY SERVICES PRIOR TO THE GCC SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR)

Yemen's military-security sector is substantial in manpower and benefits from considerable foreign assistance. However, it has rarely been effective and is often enmeshed in internal conflicts. Before the SSR process was initiated, the military-security services could be broadly divided into three subdivisions: police and internal security, intelligence, and the military. The conventional police consists of general police (security, traffic, tourism), the Najda (emergency police who protect government buildings and foreign embassies), firefighters, passport authority, the Coast Guard and the Criminal Investigative Department (prisons, counter-terrorism teams, and special operation teams).

As for internal security, the Central Security Organization (CSO) has its own extrajudicial detention facilities and an estimated 50,000 paramilitary troops that are equipped with a range of infantry weapons and personnel carriers. It falls under the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and includes the Central Security Forces (CSF), a paramilitary formation with similar responsibilities to the Criminal Investigative Department (including securing of military checkpoints, tracking terrorism suspects and undertaking special operations including against al-Qaeda).⁹ The CSF were heavily involved in repressing the 2011 mass protests.

Regarding intelligence, the Political Security Organization (PSO) is the largest service by far. It operates its own detention centers and reports directly to the president.¹⁰ In 2002, President Saleh formed the National Security Bureau (NSB). They are charged to carry out similar tasks as the PSO, but with a particular focus on cooperating with western intelligence agencies.¹¹ It remains unclear how the PSO and NSB coordinate their responsibilities.

8 Harris, A. (2010). Exploiting Grievances - Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Middle East Program No. 111. [report] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 6-7. Retrieved from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/exploiting_grievances.pdf.

9 Ibid., p. 38.

10 Library of Congress - Federal Research Division (2008). Country Profile: Yemen. [report] Library of Congress, p. 10. Retrieved from: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf>

11 Makovsky, M., Misztal, B. and Ruhe, J. (2011). Fragility and Extremism in Yemen. [report] Bipartisan Policy Center, p. 38. Retrieved from: <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Yemen%20Final%20Report.pdf>.

Furthermore, both perform their functions outside the law and have no transparent modes of accountability. Many consider their activities to be largely unconstitutional.¹²

Despite the country's economic mal-performance and budget deficit, Yemen's military budget is increasing regularly. In 2012 the government authorized 1.4 billion USD for defense and security spending.¹³ Yet, the setup of the military budget remains entirely opaque. The military is made up of roughly 84,000 active-duty troops. They are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and are subdivided among Yemen's Army, Navy and Air Force. The army includes the Republican Guard. This is the regime's main defense against external and internal threats, including coups. Parts of the military have been heavily involved in fighting against the Houthi movements and the 2011 protesters.

The constitution of Yemen clearly defines the state as the only authority to establish armed forces, police, security forces and any such force in order to protect the republic and safeguard its territories and security. No other organization, individual, group, political party or organization may establish forces or paramilitary groups for whatever purpose or under any name.¹⁴ Although legally binding, throughout the history of the republic this has rarely been the case. There has always been a range of non-state actors, each active in security provision and paramilitary action. Saleh has been able to raise Popular Armies (PAs) to suppress conflicts and insurgencies. For example, in the 1990s he brokered the so-called 'covenant of security'. After returning from Afghanistan, thousands of Mujahedeen assisted the northern government in the civil war of 1994. In this agreement Saleh offered them a safe haven in exchange for assisting the government with military operations. These PAs included an estimated 20,000 armed fighters. Many believe they were recruited, and paid for, by the PSO. Apparently, no formal proof of this exists.¹⁵ Furthermore, many think that the PSO organized Popular Committees (PCs) to fight both in the southern governorates and Sa'da. Similarly, PCs have been established through popular will. Since 2011, in the governorates of Abyan, Lahj, Shabwa and al-Baydha', PCs participated in fighting campaigns against both AQAP and their proxy Ansar al-Sharia (AAS).¹⁶

Besides PCs, there are other non-state actors that are formed to address security issues and conflicts. Tribal actors provide social order outside the formal system. Tribes, tribal law and conflict regulation in many parts of the country serve as substitutes for a weak state with a limited reach. Yemeni history is rich in tribal and Islamic practices of mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution. While there are varying resolution techniques in different places and tribes, the methods usually include that all conflict parties agree upon a respected arbitrator who has knowledge of legal traditions (customary and Sharia law), wisdom and a reputation for persuasion and negotiation.¹⁷

12 Noman, M. and Sorensen, D. (2013). Reforming the Yemen Security Sector. CDDRL Working Paper Vol. 137. [report] Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, p. 6. Retrieved from: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/24151/No_137_Yemen.pdf.

13 Ezzi, Y. (2012). Military Spending after the Revolution. Yemen Times, [online] 29th May. Retrieved from: <http://www.yementimes.com/en/1572/report/850/Military-spending-after-the-revolution.htm>.

14 Al-Hakuma al-Yemenia [Yemeni Government] (2013). Al-Dostour al-Yemeni [Constitution of Yemen]. [online] Retrieved from: <http://www.yemen.gov.ye/portal/Default.aspx?tabid=2618>.

15 Makovsky, M., Misztal, B. and Ruhe, J. (2011). Fragility and Extremism in Yemen. [report] Bipartisan Policy Center, pp. 32-57. Retrieved from: <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Yemen%20Final%20Report.pdf>.

16 Yaser, A. (2012). Yemen: Popular Committees Take Control. Al-Akhbar English, [online] 19th April. Retrieved from: <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/6353>.

17 Colburn, M. (2002). The Republic of Yemen: Development Challenges in the 21st Century. London: Stacey International, p. 22.

Conflicts between the state and tribes are usually also resolved through mediation, as if the state is a tribal party within the conflict.¹⁸

Overall, the Yemeni state relies on a tremendously large military-security apparatus with a variety of different units and personnel. This apparatus would not function without substantial foreign financial assistance. YPC survey findings clearly reveal that the Yemeni state finds it difficult to implement security countrywide. The variety of different state and non-actors involved in security provision indicates how fractured Yemen's security-military apparatus is.

Authoritarian regimes are often marked by the fragmentation of power. Potential challengers are constantly pitted against each other in order to prevent them from unifying against the regime itself. Simultaneously, centralization is a key attribute. This ensures that power remains in the hands of few. This too limits the influence of potential challengers. The centralization of power finds a geographical embodiment and can very well explain why cities in general (especially Aden), and the capital Sana'a in particular, are overly policed. They are the homes of key institutions. Rural areas remain largely marginalized (see below). Hence, the level of security in Yemen's cities depends heavily on the presence of the military (especially the Republican Guard and the CSF) and autonomous militias (PCs, tribal forces, First Armored Division) supporting police work. The police rarely carry out their duties effectively.

Corruption, patrimonialism, and above all else a concern for regime survival have hampered the effectiveness of Yemen's military-security complex. As the multiple layers of military-security services suggest, there is considerable overlapping, and even duplication of effort and capability, between police and internal security, military and intelligence. Saleh has intentionally encouraged rivalries within the military-security agencies, thereby preventing any institution from potentially uniting to overthrow the regime. He has also prevented the establishment of effective and legitimate security institutions.

18 Schmitz, C. (2011). Understanding the Role of Tribes in Yemen. Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, [online] 31st October. Retrieved from: <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/understanding-the-role-of-tribes-in-yemen>.

POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF YEMEN'S MILITARY-SECURITY APPARATUS

The statistics in figure 1 suggest that the public has a fair understanding of what the police force is. The majority of respondents correctly associate the police division with its respective units. Considerable amounts were not entirely sure. For example, 12.8% did not know that the traffic police are a part of the police forces. This may be attributed to its unclear hierarchies, vague division of labor and overlapping responsibilities among its units. The figures show that people perceive the police to be either ineffective in performing their duties, or entirely absent.


Figure 1: Are these units part of the police force?

		percentage
Traffic police	Yes	77.1%
	No	10.0%
	I don't know	12.8%
	Refused to answer	0.1%
Firefighters	Yes	60.8%
	No	14.3%
	I don't know	24.8%
	Refused to answer	0.1%
CSF	Yes	72.4%
	No	12.1%
	I don't know	15.4%
	Refused to answer	0.1%
Najda	Yes	81.6%
	No	5.7%
	I don't know	12.6%
	Refused to answer	0.1%
Passport and Immigration Authority	Yes	50.5%
	No	23.4%
	I don't know	26.0%
	Refused to answer	0.1%
Investigative police	Yes	73.3%
	No	7.8%
	I don't know	18.8%
	Refused to answer	0.1%
The Civil Registration Authority	Yes	55.1%
	No	20.2%
	I don't know	24.6%
	Refused to answer	0.1%


22.7% of the respondents say that they have had negative experiences with the police. 39% say they have had very negative experiences (graph 1). Moreover, almost 43.8% state that they have little confidence in the police, while 15.7% have no confidence whatsoever (graph 2). However, it is possible that many survey participants have had few or no experiences with the police at all. This could be true because in seven of the twenty-one governorates respondents uniformly denied the existence of a police station in their area. Only in Aden and Sana'a City did respondents overwhelmingly confirm the existence of a police station. Overall, 44.12% of the survey respondents claim that the police are not active in their area at all (graph 4).

The (in)activity of police in rural areas is surprising. As the chart below shows, there is a clear misbalance of police provision between rural and urban areas. An astonishing 88.39% of the respondents in rural settings claim that there is not a police station in their area. In contrast, only 23.21% in urban areas answer this question the same way (graph 5). The results corroborate the findings of a YPC workshop on Civil Society and Journalists Perspectives on Police Work and Reform. The participants largely agreed in the idea that there is an unbalanced distribution of security forces in the country. Most of the security forces and police are concentrated in the capital city to the detriment of security in other governorates.


Graph 1: Overall, how would you describe your experience with the police when putting forth complaints or problems?




Graph 2: How much confidence do you have in the police?




Graph 3: In your opinion, are the police in this area active in a positive way, active in a negative way, neither positive nor negative, not active at all?



Graph 4: Is there a police station in this area (per governorate)?




Graph 5: Is there a police station in this area (urban/rural)?



Many Yemenis connect the level of corruption within the military-security services to their failure to provide meaningful security. As graph 6 shows, 75.44% of survey respondents state that blatant corruption and favoritism are the systemic ills that fuel their lack of confidence in the Police.¹⁹ 9.7% perceive them as lacking zeal when they are called upon. This tendency is similar to Saleh’s style of corrupt authoritarianism, where personal gain and achievement is connected more to loyalty rather than merit and skill. What is different is that these military-security institution troops tend to be more loyal to their respective commanders than the state. Their protection comes above the protection of the population.

Graph 6: In your opinion, what is the reason for the general lack of confidence in the police? (open question, one answer)




¹⁹ Moreover, 78% of respondents think that police wages are unfair and 54% of respondents think police officers would be less corrupt if they were paid better.

29.35% of the respondents state that tribal leaders are people they go to first to deal with problems or security incidents. The ‘Aqil and police tied for second, both receiving a 21.91% response rate.²⁰ Except for Aden, where state institutions have historically been strong since the establishment of the PDRY, in general the police are usually not the primary institution to deal with security issues.

People approve of the way tribal leaders handle their grievances. For them, their service provides the very basic rule of law. 16.4% claim that tribal sheikhs bring security to their area. 66.4% want them to assist the police in resolving security issues.

A 2007 survey by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) found that even in heavily tribal governorates like Marib, al-Jawf and Shabwa, tribal leaders expressed support for state interventions.²¹ This includes the intervention of police in cases of murder. Their arrest and detention of a perpetrator may help communities successfully maintain truce conditions.


Graph 7: In general, when a problem or security incident occurs in this area, which actor deals with it first?



20 An ‘Aqil is an individual who is nominated by members of a neighborhood. They are appointed by the local administration to be responsible for security in a particular neighborhood. They usually have a background in security provision. Many are former employees of the CSO. An ‘Aqil reports to the security apparatus and acts as an arbiter for the members of the neighborhood.

21 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (2007). Yemen: Tribal Conflict Management Program - Research Report. [report] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, p. 19. Retrieved from: <http://www.ndi.org/files/Conflict%20Management%20Program%20Research%20Report%20March%202007.pdf>.

Graph 8: In general, when a problem or security incident occurs in this area, which actor deals with it first (by governorate)?




MAPPING LOCAL THREATS: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN YEMEN'S GOVERNORATES


Despite the state's failure to adequately provide security, 45% of the respondents feel always safe and 28% feel mostly safe. On the other hand, 11% feel mostly unsafe and 5% feel always unsafe. 11% are undecided. Given that there are numerous conflicts throughout the various regions, these results are surprising. Having been socialized in a relatively conflict-ridden country, the average perception of Yemen's security situation seems unusually positive.

When comparing the security situation in 2011 to the way it was in November of 2012, 15% of the respondents claim that the security situation in their area has deteriorated. 55% say it improved. 30% say it is presently the same as it was before. As graphs 9 and 10 show, perceptions vary about who is responsible for the presence and/or absence of security in their regions. To better understand these perceptions, local actors and conflicts must be taken into account. For these reasons the YPC surveyed the various perceptions of the security situation, and provision, according to each individual governorate.


Graph 9: In comparison to one year ago, how do you evaluate the security situation in this area (per governorate)?




Graph 10: How do you evaluate the general security situation in your area (per governorate)?




Graph 11: In reality, who worsens security in this area (per governorate)?



Graph 12: In reality, who brings security to this area (per governorate)?



Sa'da



The rural governorate of Sa'da is located along Yemen's northern border. Historically, it has suffered from underdevelopment and political marginalization. It is among Yemen's poorest governorates. It receives very few civil services, which is a result of the central government's failure to both expand the reach of their basic services, infrastructure and implement law and order.

Despite the political and economic marginalization of their governorate, the people of Sa'da feel mostly safe. The YPC survey shows that the majority of people (43%) say security did not improve over the last year. This percentage feels that the security situation is good to some extent. Out of them, 33% say it is very good. 38% state that when compared to a year ago, the security situation has improved. In contrast, 43% percent believe that the security situation has largely remained the same, while 17% claim it has deteriorated.

The main security risks that the people of Sa'da face emanate from the Sa'da war, a series of six rounds of battles between 2004 and 2010. The key actors in this conflict were the Houthis, the central government, Salafi groups and various Yemeni tribes with differing loyalties.

Initially, the Sa'da conflict was driven by sectarian marginalization, which can be understood as a reaction to the spreading Salafi influence in this region. Additional motivating factors for the rebellion included both the realities of economic underdevelopment and the general sense of displeasure with the regime's foreign policies concerning Saudi Arabia and the United States.²² The Houthi conflict developed into a war with both a military and tribal component. In the beginning many of the tribes in the region decided to stay neutral. Eventually though, a large amount of them were dragged into the conflict. The loss of life among civilians caused by government attacks fueled the people's anti-government sentiments. Furthermore, the civilians respected the conflict resolution abilities of the Houthis (on the basis of Sharia law) more than those of the government.²³

Eventually, it became clear that government forces were not sufficient to confront the escalating Houthi rebellion. As a consequence, the regime began to organize militias of new tribal and non-tribal recruits. Their message had a clear anti-Zaydi dimension. Militarily, the region was under the responsibility of General Ali Mohsen, a person that is widely known for having close ties with Sunni groups. As a result, the antagonisms between Sunni fighters and the Zaydis increased. The employment of these militias led to long lasting cycles of revenge killings, which was something that affected the broader region.²⁴

During the 2011 popular uprising the Houthi movement gained the control of the entire governorate. After this they created a certain level of stability in the region. In an attempt to both govern the people and increase their political influence, the Houthis began to spread into neighboring governorates by taking control over more land.

Since the beginning of the conflict in 2004 more than 250,000 people have been displaced. Between 2004 and August 2008 more than 6000 houses, 900 farms, 90 mosques, 80 schools and five health facilities were damaged in Sa'da alone.²⁵ The regime accused the Houthis for employing indiscriminate and brutal methods. However, it has been documented that they too employed methods involving indirect fire in their efforts to fight this counterinsurgency. These actions caused great suffrage among the civilian population.²⁶

22 Boucek, C. (2010). War in Saada - From Local Insurrection to National Challenge. Middle East Program No. 110. [report] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 4. Retrieved from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf.

23 Brandt, Marieke (2013) "The Irregulars of the Sa'ada war: 'Colonel sheikhs' and 'tribal militias' in Yemen's Huthi Conflict (2004-2010)." p. 114.


24 Ibid., p. 117.

25 Salmoni, B., Lodoilt, B. and Wells, M. (2013). Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen - The Huthi Phenomenon. [e-book] Santa Monica: RAND Cooperation. p. 245. Retrieved from: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf.

26 Ibid., p. 3.


It is no surprise that survey respondents mainly hold the Houthi movement (24%) and the government (16%) responsible for the lack of security in the governorate. The YPC survey further shows that 6% blame neighboring Saudi Arabia, which in 2009 actively involved itself in the conflict. Tribal leaders, extremists and government officials are also mentioned as insecurity actors. Interestingly, a large percentage (29%) of respondents claim that no one worsens security in the area.

Graph 13: Who worsens security in this area (Sa'da)?



With a history of self-reliance among the respondents in this governorate, many say that those who are responsible for security are the local people themselves (35%). 28% of respondents believe that the tribes and their leaders should be the main arbiters of security. Furthermore, 40% believe that tribal leaders should be the first to deal with security issues. This trend is most likely connected to their historic role as agents who resolve conflicts as described earlier in this report. The Houthis are third, with around 14%. 11% of respondents claim that no one brings security to the area.

Graph 14: Who provides security in this area (Sa'da)?



Not a single respondent states that the police provides security. Linked with this is the perception that there are no police stations in the entire governorate. When asked about their performance, approximately 17% claim that they have never heard about police in Sa'da. 45% say the police are not active at all. 33% do not know whether there are police stations in the area or not. An interesting note to this is the fact that despite the relative inactivity and ineffectiveness of police forces, 23% of respondents have a lot of confidence in the police and 65% of the respondents say the provision of security should rest in the hands of the state alone

Amran & Hajja



The northern governorates of Amran and Hajja border Sa'da to the south. Hajja has a direct border with Saudi Arabia. Like Sa'da, these two governorates have been equally neglected under President Saleh in terms of security presence, infrastructure, social welfare and education. Surprisingly, according to our polling many people perceive their governorate to be generally safe (Hajja: 48% always safe, 27% mostly safe; Amran: 52% always safe, 17% mostly safe).

Amran and Hajja alike have been severely affected by the consequences of the Houthi conflict and fighting among the tribes. The main conflict actors in these two governorates are the Houthi movement, the Islah party and the tribes.

When the Yemeni government launched 'Operation Scorched Earth' against the Houthis, the military's indiscriminate bombings in the area proved to escalate the conflict and battles spread from Sa'da to Amran and Hajja.²⁷ Particularly in Amran, the Houthi conflict tapped into long lasting antagonisms between the Sufiyan and Usaymat tribes, respectively of the Bakil and Hashid tribal federations. With Usaymat being from the al-Ahmar line of sheikhs, a family closely associated with the Islah party, and Sufiyan declaring allegiance with the Houthi movement, this area eventually turned into a fighting zone.²⁸

In an attempt to govern this area, in 2011 the Houthi movement extended its influence into Amran and Hajja. Their expansion of influence, combined with the fact that the Yemeni government appointed a member of the Islah party as governor over Amran, led to further clashes between Houthis and fighters of Hashid.

In Amran 29% of our survey respondents claim that no one worsens security. This figure is 36% in Hajja. The main conflict actors mentioned above are clearly perceived as those who are responsible for poor levels of security in the area.


27 Makovsky, M., Misztal, B. and Ruhe, J. (2011). *Fragility and Extremism in Yemen*. [report] Bipartisan Policy Center, p. 56. Retrieved from: <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Yemen%20Final%20Report.pdf>.

28 Brandt, Marieke (2013), "Sufiyan's "Hybrid" War: Tribal Politics during the Huthi Conflict", in *Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea*, 3 (1), 120-138.

Most respondents in both governorates (25% in Hajja, 12% in Amran) believe that the Houthis movement is the main factor behind its present insecurity. 12% of respondents in Amran, and 6% in Hajja, blame the Islah party for its present insecurity.


Armed groups are believed to be the cause of poor security in Amran by 10% of survey respondents. Interestingly, in Hajja this figure is zero. Revenge killings are considered to be a source of insecurity by 6% of Amran’s respondents. Al-Qaeda, or Ansar Al-Sharia, are also seen as a source of insecurity in Amran (3%).

Graph 15: Who worsens security in this area (Amran and Hajja)?



Consequently, a variety of actors are seen to be involved with bringing security to these governorates. In both, tribal sheikhs are the first to deal with security problems. Though they are considered to be the main security providers in both governorates, the majority of respondents say they would feel less secure if there are more of them in their area (48% in Hajja, 59% in Amran). The number of respondents who claim that no one brings security to the area is considerable (Amran 12%, Hajja 11%). In Hajja and Amran alike, people themselves are also seen to be an important arbiter of security. The Aqil of the community is also seen to be a source of security (Amran: 22%, Hajja 17%).

Graph 16: Who provides security in this area (Amran and Hajja)?




It is interesting to see that only 11% of respondents in Hajja, and 12% in Amran, view the police as actors who create security. 2% of the respondents in Amran know of a police station in their area. 53% say that the police are not active at all. In Hajja, 33% have an awareness of where to find a police station. Overall, the majority of respondents in both governorates (around 58%) say that the police are not active at all. That said, considering these statistics, in these areas confidence in the police is relatively high (37% in Hajja, 34% in Amran).

Respondents in Amran (28%) and Hajja (34%) believe that the provision of security should rest in the hands of the state alone. These numbers do not come as a surprise since tribes, rather than the police are perceived to be active in bringing security.

In Amran the population supports the inclusion of non-state actors in security provision (yes: 39%, no: 9%). 98% of the respondents in Amran believe that tribal sheikhs should be used to provide security. In Hajja 78% of the respondents believe the same. At the same time, 70% of the respondents in Amran say they would feel more secure if there is a police station in their area. In Hajja that figure is 60%.

Al-Jawf



The area of al-Jawf is east of Sa'da and Amran, and also borders Saudi Arabia. This thinly populated governorate was created in 1980. It became an important area to the regime when significant oil and gas reserves were found in the Marib and al-Jawf basins. Be that as it may, this governorate has experienced significant amounts of political and economic marginalization.

Overall, al-Jawf is perceived to be the second most unsafe governorate in Yemen. 30% of the survey respondents state that the security in their area is 'very bad', while 45% described it to be 'bad to some extent'. None of the respondents describe the situation as 'very good'. Together with Marib, al-Jawf is the only other governorate in which there are no survey respondents that say 'nobody worsens security' in their area.

Poverty, unemployment, and a lack of teachers and educational resources are some of the root causes of conflict in al-Jawf.²⁹ While tribal conflict and revenge killing are significant sources of insecurity in the region, both the Houthi conflict and al-Qaeda have an increasingly negative effect on people in the governorate. In fact, the governorate has developed a reputation for being a stronghold of al-Qaeda. Ultimately, the main conflict actors are the Houthi movement, tribes, al-Qaeda, and the Islah party.

Since the 1990s there has been an increase in the number of tribal conflicts in al-Jawf. Reasons behind these conflicts include border disputes between tribes, especially in terms of use of land, water access and distribution. Additional reasons include disputes over development projects and the presence of oil and gas companies.³⁰ These conflicts regularly result in long lasting cycles of revenge killings.

During an incident in 2011, dozens of Houthi rebels expanded to al-Jawf. Their presence led to fierce fighting between them and bands of local tribesmen who wanted to contain the Houthi's influence. In response to this fighting, PCs were set up. Their mandate was to enhance security in the region by tracking down and finding Houthi rebels. Beyond this they made efforts to support other anti-Houthi campaigns in Sa'da.³¹ Unlike in Hajja and Amran, the Houthi movement was not able to establish a stronghold in the region. Instead, the Sunni Islah party is more influential here.

Another insecurity actor that has been able to establish a considerable presence in the governorate is AQAP. Al-Jawf is both a source of recruitment and a gateway for fighters. Its porous Saudi Arabian border is an ideal path for arms and militants to flow.³² Even though al-Jawf has developed into a stronghold of AQAP, and despite popular assumptions, no formal or personal relations between AQAP members and tribesmen have thus far been documented.³³

Because of heavy fighting in Sa'da, many IDPs moved to al-Jawf in order to escape the conflict. In 2010 there were about 11,000 persons registered by the UNHCR and its partners. Other aid agencies estimated a total of 18,000.³⁴ According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the ongoing fighting and insecurity frequently prevented assistance from reaching people in need of these services.

5% of our respondents believe Islah is the main arbiter of insecurity. 21% blame the Houthis. AQAP, AAS and other extremists are also seen as those responsible for ruining security (35%). 9.1% say armed groups are responsible for poor security in the governorate.

29 Hammond, L., al-Dawsari, N. and Kolarova, D. (2012). Applying a Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Development Interventions – Tribal Mediation and Mitigation Program. [report] Partners for Democratic Change International, p. 9. Retrieved from: <http://www.pdci-network.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Annex-2.-Yemen-Case-Study-Report.pdf>.

30 Al-Dawsari, N. (2012). Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen. The Carnegie Papers. [report] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 10-12. Retrieved from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribal_governance.pdf.

31 Yemen Post Staff (2010). Houthis Expand to Jawf; Government Desperate for Victory. Yemen Post, [online] 10th April. Retrieved from: <http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?>


32 Burrowes, R. (2010). Historical dictionary of Yemen. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, p. 205. (second edition).

33 Koehler-Derrick, G. (2011). A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen. CTC Report. [report] Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, p. 15. Retrieved from: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CTC_False_Foundation3.pdf.


34 IRIN (2010). Yemen: Emergency aid delivery in Al-Jawf challenged by insecurity. Integrated Regional Information Networks, [online] 6th October. Retrieved from: <http://www.irinnews.org/report/90686/>.

Most respondents (26%) claim that the people themselves are the ones who bring security to the area. This is followed by 20% who say PCs bring it. This indicates the importance behind the roles of societal actors in providing security. Furthermore, people perceive them to be relatively successful in this area. Other arbiters of security are perceived to be the Houthi movement (11%), the religious scholars (8%), and powerful figures (5%). Few see governors (5%) and the central government (1%) as effective security agents.

Graph 17: Who worsens security in this area (Jawf)?




Graph 18: Who provides security in this area (al-Jawf)?



Illustrating the lack of security services as provided by the central government in the area is the fact that none of the YPC survey respondents knew of a police station in their area. Moreover, none of the survey respondents say that the police actually bring security to al-Jawf. Among all of the governorates that were surveyed, police in al-Jawf are seen as some of the worst in the country. 3% of respondents have never heard of police activity in their area. 70% claim they are not active at all. 10% say they act in negative ways. 65% say it is difficult to make contact with a police officer. From the police's perspective, it is difficult for them to perform their duties (including registration of IDPs) because of reasons like illiteracy and rampant possession of small arms.³⁵

Though the police have largely failed to improve security in this region, the people still confide in them. 58% of survey respondents believe that security provision should rest in the hands of the state alone. 63% say they would feel more secure if there were more police in their area. Given the strong tribal nature of al-Jawf, it is interesting to see that 63% of survey respondents say that they do not want to see the police asking tribal sheikhs for assistance. Perhaps this is because of the constant and repeated conflicts that tribes tend to be involved in. Given the positive role PCs have played, it is not surprising that 63% would like to see PCs assisting the police in their work.

Marib



Positioned to the east of Sana'a is the governorate of Marib. Though it has one of the highest oil and gas reserves in the country, it too has been marginalized by the central government. Lacking access to basic infrastructure and services including running water, electricity, roads, educational and health services, a striking 64% of the population lives in poverty.³⁶

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Gaston, E. and Al-Dawsari, N. (2013). *Waiting for Change – The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen*. [report] United States Institute of Peace, p. 12. Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW85-Waiting-for-Change.pdf>.

60% of the surveyed respondents considered the general security situation in their area as very bad. This is the highest figure among all governorates. This survey revealed that our respondents consider Marib to be the most unsafe governorate in Yemen.

Often tribal conflicts arise over resource shortages. Conflicts over resources such as water and grazing lands are a significant source of insecurity in the area. In the districts of Harib and Sarwah youth unemployment is seen as the greatest problem facing residents. These issues effectually lead to roads being blocked, sectarianism, revenge killings, excessive use of qat, violence, vandalism and gang membership.³⁷ Apart from tribal conflicts, violence connected with the activities of AQAP lead to insecurity as well.

Many Yemenis equate Marib with wide scale insecurity and anti-government sentiments. One of the reasons for this is the antagonism and recurrent conflict between tribes in Marib and the central government, fueled by the presence of oil companies in the governorate. Many complain about the fact that local people are often not hired as staff for the facilities. Conflicts over development projects are also common.

In February 2011, anti-regime protests spread throughout the country. In Marib hundreds of youth protesters called for the fall of the regime. Though these protests started peacefully, the overall security situation worsened after security forces withdrew from the main highways in the area. This allowed criminals, and other informal armed groups, to engage in banditry and road blockages.³⁸ Before these protests there was a high level of tribal conflict due to a lack of state presence and governmental control. However, as tribal conflict increased in Yemen after the protests, Marib witnessed a decrease in it. By agreeing to not take sides in the countrywide conflict, the tribes actively worked together to provide the necessary amount of security within their governorate.³⁹

Tribes began to use power vacuums for financial and political gains. They carried out targeted campaigns to vandalize power lines and oil pipelines. These attacks led to severe shortages of gas and power throughout the country, particularly in the capital Sana'a. They are estimated to have cost the country 4 billion USD in revenues since 2011.⁴⁰ Despite a series of tribal negotiations, and the dispatch of military and police units to support the local authorities in the area, these kinds of attacks in Marib continue to this day.

Just like in al-Jawf, AQAP was able to operate in a similar security vacuum in Marib during 2010. They were responsible for several high-profile attacks on electricity and oil infrastructure, and for frequent attacks on government officials and security forces. They justified their actions by demonizing the Yemeni government. However, as in al-Jawf, they have not benefited from tribal support. Nor have they existed under a formal agreement that provided tribal sanctuary.

37 Hammond, L., Al-Dawsari, N. and Kolarova, D. (2012). Applying a Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Development Interventions – Tribal Mediation and Mitigation Program. [report] Partners for Democratic Change International, p. 9. Retrieved from: <http://www.pdcinetwork.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Annex-2.-Yemen-Case-Study-Report.pdf>.


38 Gaston, E. and Al-Dawsari, N. (2013). Waiting for Change – The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen. [report] United States Institute of Peace, p. 13. Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW85-Waiting-for-Change.pdf>.

39 Ibid., p. 12.

40 Joao, P. (2012). Militant Attacks on Pipelines Cost Yemen \$4 Billion in Lost Revenues. Oilprice.com, [online] 4th July. Retrieved from: <http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Militant-Attacks-on-Pipelines-Cost-Yemen-4-Billion-in-Lost-Revenues.html>.

18% of the respondents say al-Qaeda and AAS both ruin it. 4% say that both the spread of weapons and actions of thieves are to blame. Interestingly, 18% believe the Islah party and GPC (16%) are to blame. 7% say that the army is at fault. Despite the high amount of tribal conflict in Marib, only 7% of the respondents say tribal sheikhs are responsible for the insecurity in this area.


Graph 19: Who worsens security in this area (Marib)?



Instead, tribes are seen as a significant source of security (36%). As mentioned above, throughout the 2011 popular uprisings tribes actively worked toward maintaining stability in the governorate. For some segments of Marib’s population, security at the time the survey was implemented was better than it has been in the past. In fact, 20% say security improved during the period between 2011 and 2012.


It is interesting to see that 9% of the respondents claim that AQAP brings security to their area. Here we see that AQAP successfully persuaded parts of the population with their anti-regime rhetoric. This is by far the highest rating that AQAP were given among all of Yemen’s governorates. Elsewhere, only in Sana’a did one respondent answer the same. Interestingly, 7% claim that the Houthi movement brings security to the area. This number is surprising, given the movement’s marginal presence in Marib. The army (4%), governor (2%) and police (2%) are seen by very few as sources of security.

Graph 20: Who provides security in this area (Marib)?



30% of the survey respondents claim to have no confidence in the police. Corruption is the primary reason for this (89%). State institutions (particularly those devoted to security and the judicial branch) have historically had a very limited presence in Marib. None of the respondents knew of a police station in their area. However, 100% of them say that they would like tribal sheikhs to assist the police in their work.

Shabwa & al-Baydha'



Shabwa and al-Baydha' are tribal areas. Similarly to other tribal governorates, the deterioration of traditional tribal conflict resolution mechanisms, such as tribal customary law, has created a gap in conflict resolution and security regulation. The government is currently unable to fill this due to a weak and ineffective presence of state and law enforcement institutions in those areas.⁴¹

The majority of respondents in al-Baydha' view their personal security situation as very good (58%), while the majority of respondents in Shabwa feel good to some extent (36%). In both governorates most of respondents feel the overall security situation has improved over the past year (73% in al-Baydha', 42% in Shabwa). When compared to other governorates in the country, al-Baydha' is perceived to be one of the safest. However, both governorates are plagued by frequent tribal conflicts, a heavy AQAP presence and fighting between government forces and AAS. In mid-October 2010 the central government began an armed offensive in Shabwa after security forces and natural gas facilities were allegedly attacked by AQAP militants.⁴² This highlights the reality that AQAP, and their affiliated groups, were able to establish a foothold in this area. During the 2011 mass protests both AQAP and AAS strengthened their presence. This was evident in the fact that they controlled large parts of the governorate.

In neighboring al-Baydha' nearly 150 AQAP fighters were able to seize control of the city of Rada'a (170 km southeast of Sana'a). Security forces said, "Militants overran the small police force that was assigned for insuring security affairs of the town when the heavy armed militants broke into the town."⁴³

41 Hammond, L., Al-Dawsari, N. and Kolarova, D. (2012). Applying a Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Development Interventions – Tribal Mediation and Mitigation Program. [report] Partners for Democratic Change International. Retrieved from: <http://www.pdci-network.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Annex-2.-Yemen-Case-Study-Report.pdf>.


42 Makovsky, M., Misztal, B. and Ruhe, J. (2011). Fragility and Extremism in Yemen. [report] Bipartisan Policy Center, p. 35. Retrieved from: <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Yemen%20Final%20Report.pdf>.

43 Al-Kibsi, M. (2012). AQAP captures more territories in central and southern Yemen. Yemen Observer, [online] 15th January. Retrieved from: <http://www.yobserver.com/local-news/10021805.html>.


After several days of tribal mediation by Sheikh Hashed Fadhl al-Qawsi, the fighters were convinced to leave the city.⁴⁴

More than 24% of al-Baydha' respondents perceive AQAP and AAS as entities that ruin security in their governorate. AQAP, AAS and extremists in general are perceived to be most responsible for insecurity in Shabwa (17%). Despite the worsening of the effectiveness of tribal customary law, 19% in al-Baydha' and 35% in Shabwa view the tribes and tribal sheikhs as the most important providers of security.

Graph 21: Who worsens security in this area (Shabwa and al-Baydha)?



Graph 22: Who provides security in this area (Shabwa and al-Baydha)?




44 Al-Haidari, F. (2012). Qaeda gunmen quit Yemen town under tribal pressure. Agence France-Presse, [online] 25th January. Retrieved from: <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hO4Bn9AJRksn248Ka8DUdAMf5jbw?docId=CNG.fbd256f622bb0f408ea3f47dcaf4896b.6a1>.

In Shabwa (86%) and al-Baydha' (82%), the survey respondents know of no police station in their area. However, 54% say nobody worsens security. 28% claim that police are the first to deal with security incidents. This is followed by the 'Aqil (18%) and tribal leaders (15%). On the other hand, in Shabwa non-state actors are the main arbiters for security. Most say tribal sheikhs (42%) and social figures (26%) are the first to deal with security issues.

Interestingly, the perception of the security that is provided by the state differs noticeably. The majority of survey respondents in Shabwa say they would feel more secure if there were more police in their area (64%). Most respondents in al-Baydha' say they would feel less secure (48%). The same feeling exists for military troops as well. The majority of respondents in al-Baydha' (52%) say they would feel less secure with more military troops in their area. Those in Shabwa say they would feel more secure (64%). It appears that in al-Baydha, which is where state-actors are the main providers of security, people would like to see less state intervention. In Shabwa, where state-actors are less active in security provision, respondents would like to see more state-based security.

Abyan



The southern governorate of Abyan has been severely affected by the 2011 crisis. The security situation remains extremely volatile. This has led to a disruption in trade and aid distribution, both of which negatively affect food security among the most vulnerable populations. Despite the general insecurity in Abyan, people generally feel safe. 35% rate the security situation in their area as very good. 25% rate it as good to some extent. Only 8% state that the security situation is very bad. At the time the survey was conducted most of the large-scale battles were over. This is reflected in the survey results, with 45% of the respondents saying that the situation has improved when compared with the previous year. Some (28%) did claim that the security situation has deteriorated.

Like many other governorates, Abyan suffers from a lack of infrastructure and government services. In addition to this, battles between AQAP and AAS versus the government have

caused the greatest risk to security in the area.

While AQAP taking over parts of the governorate was significant, it was not entirely surprising. AQAP had already shown that it established somewhat of a stronghold there. In the 1980's this governorate's southern towns of Ja'ar and Zinjubar supplied the Afghan Mujahedeen with fighters.⁴⁵ The withdrawal of government troops from the governorate in 2011 created a security vacuum. This was readily exploited by the organization. This occupation was short-lived, as the Yemeni military with US support reclaimed much of the governorate after launching 'Operation Golden Swords' in May and June 2012.⁴⁶ The military cooperated with local tribesmen to clear out militants from the populated areas of Ja'ar, Shuqrah and Zinjubar.

Ever since then a patchwork of state-backed PCs emerged against AQAP and affiliated insurgents. They serve as the frontline security force.⁴⁷ Reportedly, enlisted Yemeni military and security forces struck a deal with the MoD to return to their hometowns in Abyan (with their salaries) to fight for the PCs.⁴⁸

Dozens of civilians were killed, and hundreds were displaced (fleeing to Aden and other neighboring governorates), when the government forces were battling against AAS.⁴⁹ Between April 2011 and September 2012 more than 200,000 IDPs were registered. The situation for civilians in Abyan remains dreadful. To this day government facilities and offices in most places are not functioning.

Anti-government sentiments are said to be strong here. In 2009 frustration over economic stagnation and the marginalization of southern governorates by the central government became the motivation for 7,000 protesters in Zinjubar. They then they have been calling for southern secession. Criticism against local officials has also grown. Local politicians have come under fire as many have been accused of being corrupt and acting in self-interest.

The YPC survey shows that 48% of the respondents in Abyan feel AQAP and AAS are responsible for insecurity in the governorate. Among all of the governorates surveyed, this percentage exceeds the second highest figure by a 19% margin. Given the general anti-government sentiments in the area, it is not surprising that only 4% of survey respondents say the Hirak movement ruins security in Abyan.

The respondents in Abyan feel PCs (22%), tribes (20%) and tribal sheikhs (20%) each bring security to their area. Very few say the army (5%) and police (9%) provide security.

There appears to be little to no security forces or law enforcement outside what the PCs provide. 98% of survey respondents do not know of a police station in their area. Furthermore, 30% express zero confidence in the police. With that in mind, it comes as no surprise that 76% say they would like PCs to assist the police in their work.

45 Simcox, R. (2013). Ansar al-Sharia and Governance in Southern Yemen. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 14 p. 58.

46 Arrabyee, N. (2013). «Golden Swords» in Yemen. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, [online] June. Retrieved from: <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1102/re6.htm>.


47 Gaston, E. and Al-Dawsari, N. (2013). *Waiting for Change – The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen*. [report] United States Institute of Peace, p. 21. Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW85-Waiting-for-Change.pdf>.

48 Coombs, C. (2013). *Yemen's Use of Militias to Maintain Stability in Abyan Province*. Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, [online] 20th February. Retrieved from: <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/yemens-use-of-militias-to-maintain-stability-in-abyan-province>.


49 Gaston, E. and Al-Dawsari, N. (2013). *Waiting for Change – The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen*. [report] United States Institute of Peace, p. 21. Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW85-Waiting-for-Change.pdf>.

An astonishing 95% say they would like for tribal sheikhs to assist the police in their efforts to perform their duties.

Graph 23: Who worsens security in this area (Abyan)?



Graph 24: Who provides security in this area (Abyan)?



It is important to note that while the strategy of the central government to arm PCs may secure areas temporarily, it may very well backlash in the long run as it has in the past. In many governorates PCs and tribal sheikhs welcome regime arms and funding. However, the past has shown that many eventually use the same arms to actively challenge the government in their

efforts to attain political gain or material benefits. This could lead to a fragile security situation down the road. Perhaps this contributed to the sentiments of the 4% who hold PCs responsible for insecurity.

Aden



The city of Aden is the capital of the governorate of Aden. It is a historically important seaport city located on the edge of the Indian Ocean. When the British colonial presence in the city ended in 1967, Aden became the capital of the socialist southern Yemeni State (PDRY). Since the unification with north Yemen in 1990, and the subsequent civil war in 1994, Aden has been both politically and economically marginalized.

Over the past two years the security situation in Aden has collapsed. Only recently has it begun to recover. Yet there are still neighborhoods where soldiers and police officers cannot enter without the real threat of being attacked. None of the respondents describe the security situation in Aden as very good. Most (38%) state that the situation is neither good nor bad. 28% say the security is bad to some extent. However, a clear majority says that the security situation in November 2012 was better than it was a year before.

Divisions between Islahis and the secession movement are the reasons behind most of Aden's violence. Additionally, a considerable amount of attacks in the governorate have been linked to AQAP and affiliated groups.⁵⁰ During 2011 they increased their presence. To this day they continue to operate. AQAP can be blamed for many prominent security incidents and assassinations. As capital of the former PDRY, Aden has become a focus of secessionist activity. Hirak is an important actor in the area.

Since 2007 Aden has been marked by recurrent, and often violent, protests. In such occasions they have expressed their grievances against the Saleh administration and their frustration about the economic and political marginalization that they regularly experience.

⁵⁰ Gaston, E. and Al-Dawsari, N. (2013). *Waiting for Change – The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen*. [report] United States Institute of Peace, p. 18. Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW85-Waiting-for-Change.pdf>.

Residents of Aden perceive themselves to be subject to ‘internal colonialism’ by northerners. They claim this is manifested in nearly everything including tribal customary law, pension rights, government bureaucracies and Aden’s decline as a prosperous trading center. Since unification the once remarkable literacy rates in the south have fallen considerably.⁵¹

The secession movement is very popular. Particularly in areas outside of Aden city, where state presence is considerably weaker, it is growing at a considerable rate. Aden was one of the first and most important centers of the 2011 mass protests. Additionally, it was one of the most violent areas. As Gaston and al-Dawsari note, “the first three months of 2011, protests frequently led to fatalities as government forces fired on protestors, deployed tear gas, and at times attacked protest camps with heavy weapons and artillery.”⁵² Heavy security patrols, tanks and anti-aircraft guns could be seen in plain daylight. Protesters (especially secessionist) were often subjected to detention and extreme abuse. Yet, brutal government tactics led to a backlash of repression and an increase of popular mobilization throughout the country. The regime lost effective control of many parts of the governorate, which henceforth lacked centralized law enforcement or security, as many police stations remained unstaffed. Meanwhile, the arming of youth further fractured the city, as different factions governed each neighborhood.⁵³

By summer 2011, insecurity in neighboring Abyan led thousands to flee to Aden. Only in the summer of 2012, when the situation in Abyan stabilized, did Aden no longer receive IDPs from the neighboring governorate.⁵⁴ This internal migration also included the spillover of weapons and groups associated with the Abyan conflict such as AAS and AQAP. This affected and accelerated the conflict in Aden. Moreover, the governorate’s geographic location enabled conflict parties to recruit men and arms from the Horn of Africa. Aden’s harbor has long been a major hub for illegal arms sales.

Overall, 19% of respondents say AQAP and AAS are ruining security in the governorate. 15% blame the secession movement for insecurity in the governorate. Other respondents blame the GPC (8%), armed groups (12%), and the spread of weapons (16%) for its continuous insecurity.

Most respondents (38%) perceive local citizens as those who bring security to the area. The police rank in second place with a 22% response rate. However, the same figure (22%) represents those who believe that no one brings security to the area. Other actors mentioned agents of security include the Aqil (8%), powerful figures (4%), and PCs (3%).


51 Gaston, E. and Al-Dawsari, N. (2013). *Waiting for Change – The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen*. [report] United States Institute of Peace, p. 30. Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW85-Waiting-for-Change.pdf>.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 17.


53 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

54 Al-Maqtari, M. (2012). Aden no longer taking IDPs from stabilized Abyan. *Yemen Times*, [online] 16th July. Retrieved from: <http://www.yementimes.com/en/1590/news/1149/Aden-no-longer-taking-IDPs-from-stabilized-Abyan.htm>.

Graph 25: Who worsens security in this area (Aden)?



Graph 26: Who provides security in this area (Aden)?




According to 75% of the respondents, the police are the first actors to deal with security issues in Aden. While only 3% of respondents in Aden have a lot of confidence in the police, 73% have little confidence and 20% have no confidence at all. Even though the police have a strong presence in the governorate, respondents do not have much confidence in the police. This also represents the highest figure among Yemen’s governorates by far.

With a history of strong and effective state institutions in the PDRY, the population in the city has traditionally trusted the state and considered it legitimate. This is reflected up to this day,

as 98% of respondents in the governorate believe security provision should rest in the hands of the state alone. This is the highest such figure in this category. Sana'a City comes second at 60%.

Lahj & al-Dhali'



The governorates of Lahj and al-Dhali' are situated in southwestern Yemen. In former days, al-Dhali' was mostly part of the Yemen Arab Republic of the north. Lahj belonged to the southern PDRY.

In Lahj a low percentage (14%) of respondents claim that security is very good. 30% say it is good to some extent. In contrast, respondents in al-Dhali' describe the security situation as 'very good'. While security appeared to have improved in al-Dhali' (58%), respondents in Lahj (49%) say the security situation has deteriorated when compared to how it was a year earlier. The security situation in the two governorates is mostly affected by the activities of the southern movement, AQAP and AAS.

In al-Dhali' and Lahj alike, anti-northern sentiments remain within large segments of the population. The secession movement is able to draw from a very strong base of support in both governorates. When security forces in Abyan killed secessionist activists in July 2009, hundreds of people in al-Dhali' reacted with outrage in street protests. Security forces dispersed the crowd with brute force, leaving one person dead and several others wounded.⁵⁵ This was one of many episodes that created additional anti-regime sentiment and aspirations for an independent southern state.

⁵⁵ Yemeni security forces disperse protest in Al-Dali (2009, 25th July). [TV program] Al-Jazeera Arabic [via LexisNexis].

The resentment against the Saleh regime became a convenient dynamic for other actors. In Lahj AQAP has been able to establish a stable presence. Some reports indicate that elements of al-Qaeda joined the ranks of the armed southern movement.⁵⁶

Since 2009, the area has frequently seen attacks against both AQAP by the means of US drone strikes and repression against the secessionist movement.⁵⁷

In 2011 the situation continued to escalate with mass protests, when 2,000 to 3,000 troops including the Republican Guard were deployed in the governorate, establishing multiple checkpoints and engaging in lethal clashes with armed elements of the southern movement.⁵⁸ Sporadic clashes have also occurred in al-Dhali', which has triggered a displacement of civilians in neighboring villages.⁵⁹ Protesters in both governorates took to the streets for weeks, calling for Saleh to step down. Lahj in particular has been considered as the backbone of the southern movement.⁶⁰

In June 2011, AQAP-affiliated militants gained momentum when government forces and suspected AAS militants clashed. Meanwhile, large numbers of AQAP militants entered Lahj from neighboring Abyan and attempted to take over the governorate after having successfully gained control of Abyan.⁶¹ Since then, in an attempt to root out al-Qaeda members in the governorate, throughout 2012 military and security forces continuously engaged in battles with AQAP militants. This conflict between government and AQAP forces continues to be ongoing.

In Lahj, the actors who are perceived to be most accountable for insecurity are AQAP and AAS (29%), followed by no one (27%) and the Houthis (9%). Other insecurity actors mentioned are local citizens (3%), the GPC (3%), the southern movement (3%), extremists (4%), the army (3%), the spread of weapons (3%) and revenge killing (4%).

In al-Dhali' most people believe no one worsens security (67%). Insecurity actors that were mentioned by respondents are armed gangs (9%), police/security (4%), political groups (other than the GPC, Islah, Hirak or Houthis 5%), and revenge killings (7%).

56 National Yemen (2011). Army Deploys to Radfan to Face Southern Militants. National Yemen, [online] 17th January. Retrieved from: <http://nationalyemen.com/2011/01/17/army-deploys-to-radfan-to-face-southern-militants/>.

57 Press TV (2009). US Air Raids Kill 63 Civilians in Yemen. Press TV, [online] 18th December. Retrieved from: <http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/114056.html>.


58 National Yemen (2011). Eight Dead In Lahj Clashes. National Yemen, [online] 24th April. Retrieved from: <http://nationalyemen.com/2011/04/24/yemenis-flooded-the-streets-of-sanaa-and-taiz-on-friday-in-rival-demonstrations-for-and-against-president-ali-abdullah-saleh-who-gave-a-guarded-welcome-to-a-gulf-arab-plan-for-a-three-month-transitio/>.

59 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2013). Yemen: Lahj & Dhale's conflict -- Situation Report #1. [report] OCHA. Retrieved from: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/41190E623F6E849DC12578210039540B-Full_Report.pdf.


60 Yemen Post Staff (2011). Al-Qaeda Targeting Lahj Province in South Yemen. Yemen Post, [online] 1st September. Retrieved from: <http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=3973>.

61 Ibid.

Graph 27: Who worsens security in this area (Lahj and Al-Dhali')?



Graph 28: Who provides security in this area (Lahj and Al-Dhali')?



In Lahj, the main security actors are the tribes, followed by the ‘Aqil and other powerful figures. Respondents perceive PCs (10%), the southern movement (8%) and the police (10%) as entities that bring security. In al-Dhali’, which is perceived to be the safer governorate of the two, the majority (63%) claim that it is the local citizens who bring security. Other entities included in this category are tribes (7%), powerful figures (13%) and police (4%).

In both al-Dhali’ and Lahj, no one knows where a police station could be found in their area. In Lahj, most (69%) say that tribes are the first to deal with a problem or a security incident. Only 7% say the police are the first to respond. In al-Dhali’, respondents say that social figures (44%) and tribes (16%) are the first ones to respond to incidents. Police are perceived by 10% as those who do this.

In al-Dhali’, the respondents confidence in the police is comparatively high. 35% claim that they have a lot of confidence. 33% say they have little confidence and 26% say they have no confidence. On the other hand, in Lahj 76% of the respondents have little confidence, and 23% have no confidence. With this in mind, it is not surprising that in both governorates respondents believe that security provision should not rest in the hands of the state alone (al-

Dhali' 76%, Lahj 80%). 94% of respondents in Lahj, and 77% in al-Dhali' believe that tribal sheikhs should assist the state in security provision.

Taiz



After Sana'a and Aden, Taiz is the third largest city in the country. Additionally, it is the capital of Taiz governorate. Known for its relative cosmopolitanism and cultural fame, and for being the home of sympathizers of the secession movement, it has been described as “the heart of the Shafi'i south.”⁶² Over the decades, when compared to Aden and Sana'a, some of the relative importance of city has been lost. However, to this day it continues to be a vivid center of business and light industry.

Historically, Taiz has been seen as one of the most stable cities in Yemen. The insecurity following the 2011 mass protests was quite unique. Violence to this degree had not been seen since the 1962 civil war. Its impact is still visible in today's security situation.

In Taiz, 31% of the respondents rated the security situation as very good, while 34% rate it as good to some extent. With only 7% rating it as very bad, most people in Taiz feel safe (54%) and most (67%) claim the security situation has improved when compared to a year earlier.

During the 2011 uprising, the location known as 'Freedom Square' was the epicenter of the protest movement. The sit-in remained peaceful for almost four months. Eventually, in a multi-day attack, soldiers moved into the city and gunned down twenty protesters.⁶³ Soon the conflict polarized the city into various districts. Some of these areas remained under government control. Others became loyal to armed groups that had no government ties.

62 Burrowes, R. (2010). *Historical Dictionary of Yemen*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, p. 372. (second edition).

63 BBC (2011). Yemen forces <kill 20 protesters> in Taiz. BBC, [online] 30th May. Retrieved from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13592935>.

What began as a peaceful protest eventually galvanized into an armed resistance that included a number of major tribal leaders.⁶⁴ Central government forces and antigovernment militias alike engaged in indiscriminate fire. The exchange of mortars and rockets led to significant civilian casualties and property destruction.⁶⁵ According to Human Rights Watch, 120 civilians were killed by regime attacks from February to December 2011. Many more were wounded.⁶⁶

Over the course of the conflict both levels of violence and crime increased. After the February 2012 elections, when tensions were expected to subside, government forces were still unable to access major parts of the city. Many components of the rule of law did not function normally including lawful arrests, prosecution and judicial review of crimes. Additionally, security forces have been unable to secure other parts of the governorate. For months, the police and military forces were unable to resolve the ongoing conflict between two tribal sheikhs in northeast Yemen.⁶⁷ Freedom Square was yet to be safely policed as Houthi militants, who in fall of 2012 came to Taiz governorate, clashed with revolutionary youths.⁶⁸ Interestingly, in the absence of a functioning judiciary, a well-respected chieftain, sheikh and anti-Saleh rebel Hamoud Saeed al-Mikhlaifi, became ‘the city’s ultimate arbiter’, filling the gap of dysfunctional state institutions.⁶⁹

Regardless of the signing of the GCC agreement, violent confrontations continued. Only did they decrease after government tanks were removed from the city in December 2012. Although security has improved considerably since the transition began, it is still significantly worse than in 2010.⁷⁰

In Taiz, the main insecurity actors are perceived to be armed gangs (16%) and tribes (8%). Interestingly, most respondents (64%) claim that no one worsens security. While the majority of survey respondents (36%) claim that local citizens are the ones who provide security in the area, 20% claim that no one brings security to the area. The main security actors are perceived to be the police (16%), the ‘Aqil (11%) and powerful figures (4%). It is not surprising that in this urban area, tribes are perceived to bring security only by 6% of the respondents.

64 Gaston, E. and Al-Dawsari, N. (2013). *Waiting for Change – The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen*. [report] United States Institute of Peace, p. 8. Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW85-Waiting-for-Change.pdf>.

65 Finn, T. (2011). *Is Taiz Going to be the Benghazi of Yemen?* Read more: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2102183,00.html#ixzz2Yl0PEiWk>. Time Magazine, [online] 13th December. Retrieved from: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2102183,00.html#ixzz2VG8ICYoG>.

66 Human Rights Watch (2012). “No Safe Places” Yemen’s Crackdown on Protests in Taizz. [report] p. 2. Retrieved from: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen0212webwcover.pdf>.


67 Gaston, E. and Al-Dawsari, N. (2013). *Waiting for Change – The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen*. [report] United States Institute of Peace, p. 10. Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW85-Waiting-for-Change.pdf>.

68 Yemen Fox (2012). *Houthis Attack Taiz Freedom Square, Dozens Wounded*. Yemen Fox, [online] 8th September. Retrieved from: http://yemenfox.net/news_details.php?sid=4083.


69 Kasinof, L. (2012). *A Voice of Authority Emerges From the Opposition in Yemen*. The New York Times, [online] 21st July. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/world/middleeast/former-rebel-leader-in-yemen-fills-a-leadership-gap-in-taiz.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

70 Gaston, E. and Al-Dawsari, N. (2013). *Waiting for Change – The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen*. [report] United States Institute of Peace, p. 10. Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW85-Waiting-for-Change.pdf>.

Graph 29 Who worsens security in this area (Taiz)?




Graph 30: Who provides security in this area (Taiz)?



Given that the police are perceived to be the main security actor next to the people themselves, it is surprising that only 13% know where a police station is located. Though this is true, 38% say that the police are the first to act when problems and security incidents present themselves. Roughly 40% replied with tribes and stated the ‘Aqil (22%) as other entities that respond on such occasions.

In Taiz, 32% say they have a lot of confidence, 55% say they have little and 9% say they have no confidence in the police. The majority of Taiz respondents (68%) believe security provision should rest in the state alone. Yet, a considerable amount (47%) believes that the state should involve non-state actors. Out of these, 95% believe that powerful people should be involved. Additionally, 65% believe that tribal sheikhs should play a role in security provision.

Ibb & Rayma



Both Ibb and Rayma are the most food insecure governorates in Yemen.⁷¹ During last couple of years the government has invested more than 80 million USD in service and development projects in Rayma alone.⁷² Additionally, USAID has funded educational, health and food security projects in both governorates.⁷³ Though this has been the case, people here have suffered tremendously because of the lack of basic foodstuffs and service provision during the 2011 uprising.⁷⁴

In Ibb the majority (approx. 60%) find the security situation to be very good or good to some extend. In Rayma, half of the respondents rated the security situation similarly. While nearly 20% in both governorates stated that the security is neither good, nor bad, another roughly 20% in both areas find it to be bad to some extend or very bad. Consequently, for the most part, the residents in these areas consider the security positively.

71 World Food Programme (2011). More Yemenis Slip Into Hunger As The Country Faces A Serious Humanitarian Situation. World Food Programme, [online] 12th October. Retrieved from: <http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/more-yemenis-slip-hunger-country-faces-serious-humanitarian-situation>.

72 SABA Yemen News Agency (2010). Abu Ras opens, lays foundation stones for 202 projects in Raymah. SABA Yemen News Agency, [online] 18th May. Retrieved from: <http://www.sabanews.net/en/print214726.htm>.

73 SABA Yemen News Agency (2013). Delivery of USAID-funded projects in Raymah discussed. SABA Yemen News Agency, [online] 27th June. Retrieved from: <http://www.sabanews.net/ar/print218216.htm>.

74 World Food Programme (2011). More Yemenis Slip Into Hunger As The Country Faces A Serious Humanitarian Situation. World Food Programme, [online] 12th October. Retrieved from: <http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/more-yemenis-slip-hunger-country-faces-serious-humanitarian-situation>.

Although tribal ties exist, the social fabric in both governorates is often described as peasant-based. According to anthropologist Shalegh Weir, the town of Ibb, in an eponymous governorate, has never been tribally organized.⁷⁵ Violent conflicts related to land disputes often occur. In the governorate of Ibb, between January and August 2009 alone 800 people were sent to prison for homicide offenses. Most of the cases were related to land disputes.⁷⁶

When calls for secession at protests spread throughout the southern governorates, they also spread to Ibb. Since Ibb is historically part of northern Yemen, but at the same time geographically borders the former PDRY, the situation is complex. Ibb, Rayma, al-Hudaida and Taiz belong to what some referred to as ‘central Yemen’. They encompass the Shafi’i concentrated agricultural lands between Sana’a and the former PDRY.⁷⁷

People in central Yemen feel marginalized by the northern-based regime for a variety of reasons. In September 2009, activists launched the Central Plateau Movement. This was an effort to address grievances and sufferings by Yemenis in Taiz, Ibb, al-Baydha’, Rayma and Dhamar. They wanted to make it known that they feel the Saleh regime is responsible for their marginalization.⁷⁸

The secessionist movement made use of these sentiments and gained support in these northern provinces. Marginalization goes decades back and is also related to the military. Beginning in the 1960s, there was a focus on building a functional army. Yet within the northern military, there were rivalries between an ideological left group associated with the Shafi’i areas, particularly the Taiz, Ibb and Rayma governorates, as well as a group consisting of the conservatives who were mostly from the Zaydi northern highlands. Under Saleh, people felt that the army was biased in favor of the Zaydi northern tribes.⁷⁹

During the beginning of the ‘Arab Spring’, approximately 1,000 protesters set up camps in Freedom Square in Ibb city. Banners were waved that read both ‘Leave’ and ‘The people want the fall of the regime.’⁸⁰ Clashes erupted when Saleh loyalists, armed with rocks and sticks, marched toward Freedom Square. At that time, existing security forces chose to not interfere. During the attack one protester was killed and 37 were injured.⁸¹ Tensions calmed down in Ibb when Saleh stepped down.

Tensions grew again in September 2012 after the killing of a tribesman by unknown individuals. Tribal gunmen stormed Ibb city and besieged a police station. During the process they overcame army checkpoints along the city’s outskirts.

75 Weir, S. (2007). *A tribal order*. Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 2.

76 Small Arms Survey (2010). *Yemen Armed Violence Assessment*. Issue Brief No. 2. [report] Small Arms Survey, p. 4. Retrieved from: <http://www.yemenviolence.org/pdfs/Yemen-Armed-Violence-IB2-Social-violence-over-land-and-water-in-Yemen.pdf>.

77 The southern governorates of the former PDRY are also largely Shafei.

78 Yemen Times (2009). *Yemeni daily reports on impending launch of regional popular opposition movement*. Yemen Times, [online] 6th September. Retrieved from: <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-207454564/yemeni-daily-reports-impending.html>.

79 International Crisis Group (2013). *Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?*. Middle East Report No. 139. [report] p. 3. Retrieved from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Yemen/139-yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-new-conflict.pdf>.


80 National Yemen (2013). *Protests Rage In Ibb And Taiz*. National Yemen, [online] 21st February. Retrieved from: <http://nationalyemen.com/2011/02/21/protests-rage-in-ibb-and-taiz/>.

81 Western Mail (2011). *Protesters killed in latest clashes in Yemen*. Western Mail, [online] 7th March. Retrieved from: <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Protesters+killed+in+latest+clashes+in+Yemen+%3B+%26+UK+WORLD.-a0250798359>.


This incident illustrates the extent of challenges facing President Hadi (current) and the inefficiency of the Yemeni security and military apparatus in Ibb.⁸² This inefficiency is also reflected in the perceptions of the population in Ibb. Respondents in this area identify the main insecurity actors to be armed gangs (18%) and tribes (5%).

The protest situation in Rayma was comparatively calm. As protests affected the country, Saleh went to the Bani al-Hareth district in Rayma in order to talk with sheikhs and social figures. In an effort to stabilize the governorate, the former president discredited the movement and reassured the people of his legitimacy. Interestingly, the people of Rayma seemed to believe in the legitimacy of Saleh’s presidency more than anywhere else. Chieftains, dignitaries, social figures, civil society organizations and supposedly all of the residents of Rayma pledged allegiance with Saleh.⁸³

Graph 31: Who worsens security in this area (Ibb and Rayma)?



Graph 32: Who provides security in this area (Ibb and Rayma)?



82 Al-Ghubari, M. (2013). Tribal Gunmen Storm Ibb City, Besiege Its Police Station. Al-Bayan, [online] 10th September. Retrieved from: <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-302280231/dozens-yemeni-tribal-gunmen.html>.

83 BBC Monitoring Middle East (2011). President Saleh visits Rayma province, Yemen. BBC, [Lexis Nexis] 6th April.

In Rayma tribes (16%) are perceived to be the main insecurity actor. The answers ‘no one’ and ‘I don’t know’ was given by a large number of respondents (46%). In Rayma most of the respondents have a lot of confidence in the police (40%). 33% have little confidence, and 13% have no confidence at all. These numbers reflect that among all the other governorates, Rayma has the most confidence in the police. Here the state is quite active in the provision of security. 28% know of a police station in their area. 33% claim that the police are the first one’s to address problems or security incidents. These numbers also relate to why there is such a positive attitude toward the Saleh regime in this area.

Other than the police, which is perceived to bring security to the area by 10%, people in Rayma believe security is provided mainly by citizens themselves (24%), followed by tribes (22%) and the ‘Aqil (14%). Even though police seems to be fairly active in the area, societal actors continue to play an important role in security provision. Hence, 43% believe that security provision should not rest in the hands of the state alone, with 35% finding that non-state actors should be involved (55% of respondents believe non-state actors should not be involved). The idea that PCs (86%) and tribal sheikhs (50%) should be involved in the provision of security is popular.

In Ibb the police are less active. Here only 12% of the respondent’s knew of a police station in their area. 15% claim that the police are the first to respond to problems and security incidents. The security provision lies much more in the hands of societal actors. Only 5% believe that the police bring security, while 45% believe it is citizens themselves, followed by no one (26%), the ‘Aqil (10%), and tribes (8%). Accordingly, 45% believe non-state actors should generally be involved in security provision, while 25% believe non-state actors should not be involved in all but some cases. People in Ibb believe NGOs (51%), PCs (53%) and tribal sheikhs (63%) should play a role in security provision.

Dhamar



Located immediately south of the Sana’a governorate is Dhamar, which is a tribal and Zaydi stronghold. Dhamar is held to be one of the safest governorates in Yemen. With 59% claiming

the security situation is very good, and 34% stating that the situation is good to some extent, only a small margin (4%) believes security is bad to some extent, with no respondents describing it as very bad. When compared to 2011, only 6% believe the security situation deteriorated.

Dhamar's security is mostly affected by tribal conflicts, including the Houthi's, and byproducts of fighting among the elite in Sana'a. The main conflict actors are therefore the Yemeni government, tribes, and the Houthi movement.

For many centuries the capital, Dhamar city, has been a principal religious center for the Zaydi sect of Islam. The fact that it is a seat of a renowned Zaydi school might explain why the Houthis' were active in the governorate. Tribal conflicts are also notorious in Dhamar as they frequently arise and leave many casualties. A rapprochement between tribes occurred on the side of the opposition during the 2011 mass protests.

Dhammar is said to be a stronghold for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, during the 2011 protests, lawyers, tribal sheikhs and social figures resigned from the GPC after the regime took violent actions against anti-regime demonstrators, many of whom were students.⁸⁴

During protests, Dhamar city witnessed unprecedented military movements. In August 2011, armored vehicles and tanks from the Republican Guard were transferred to the governorate after Saleh ordered the allocation of scud missiles to Dhamar. Since mass protests did not decrease, but in fact gained a military dimension due to General Ali Mohsen's defection, Saleh decided to transfer scuds to this location in order to better target Sana'a city (these missiles only work from a distance).⁸⁵ At this point Dhamar University became the barracks for the military. This effectually frustrated many of the students and faculty.⁸⁶


Many people blame the army for insecurity in Dhamar. Survey results show that 6% believe they bring insecurity to the area. The consequences of the Houthi conflict are also reflected in the survey results, as the Houthis are believed to bring insecurity to the area by 10%. The Islah party has a 7% response rate. These results show the local antagonisms between the Houthis and the Islah party. While most respondents (48%) claim that no one worsens security in Dhamar, tribes (15%) are perceived to be the main insecurity actors.

84 Yemen Post Staff (2011). Fresh Blow to Ruling Party as Scores Quit in Dhamar. Yemen Post, [online] 7th March. Retrieved from: <http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=3245>.

85 Al-Washai, M. (2011). Days after transfer of «Scud» missile system: unprecedented military movement in Dhamar, continuing military convoys on their way from the east to Sana'a city, combat helicopters flying over the governorate. Mareb Press, [online] 22nd August. Retrieved from: http://marebpress.net/news_details.php?lng=arabic&sid=36111.


86 Al-Washai, M. (2011). On the first day of classes, there are no students and faculty members at the university of Dhamar during the presence of tanks that turn it into army barracks. Mareb Press, [online] 18th September. Retrieved from: http://marebpress.net/news_details.php?lng=arabic&sid=36590.

Graph 33: Who worsens security in this area (Dhammar)?



Interestingly, tribes (20%) are mentioned as the most significant security actors in the area. Other security actors include powerful figures (8%), the ‘Aqil (9%), the citizens themselves (41%) and the police (18%).

Graph 34: Who provides security in this area (Dhammar)?



According to the perception of the survey respondents, Dhamar is the governorate with the eighth highest rate of police stations distributed throughout the governorate. 26% of the respondents claim to be aware of a police station in their area. Consequently, the confidence in the police is comparatively high with 36% having a lot, 46% having a little and 19% having no confidence in them. Yet, as shown in the results presented above, social figures still play a greater role in security provision. Only 19% claim the police are the first to respond to security incidents or problems. Tribes (41%), the ‘Aqil (24%) and other social figures (13%) play a much greater role.

64% of the respondents believe security provision should not rest in the hands of the government alone. While 40% believe non-state actors should not be involved in security provision, 41% believe they should be involved in some cases, and 19% believe they should generally be involved. With a rate of 74%, most respondents agree with the idea that tribal sheikhs should be involved in security provision. 49% believe NGOs, and 57% believe PCs, should both play a role in the provision of security.

Al-Hudaida & al-Mahweet



The governorate of al-Hudaida covers the longest portion of the Red Sea along Yemen's western border. Adjacent to al-Hodeida lies al-Mahweet, which borders Sana'a governorate to the south east. It encompasses a big part of the Yemeni Tihama, a wide plain stretching from the northern tip of the Arabian Peninsula to Bab al-Mandab, the southernmost tip of Yemen's Red Sea border. Here the climate is among the hottest in the world with temperatures exceeding 49°C (120°F).

The governorates of al-Hudaida and al-Mahweet are among the safest in Yemen. In al-Hudaida, 76% state that they always feel safe, while in al-Mahweet 66% feel the same. Moreover, 60% of the respondents say the general security in al-Mahweet is very good. 55% feel the same in al-Hudaida. Here, 77% of the survey respondents claim that the security situation in their area improved when compared to the year before. 56% feel the same in al-Mahweet.

During the 2011 mass protests al-Hudaida experienced many instances of violence. When security forces attacked an anti-regime sit-in in al-Hudaida city they wounded hundreds of protesters with live and rubber bullets, tear gas and daggers.⁸⁷


In a separate attack, Saleh loyalists set the local headquarters of the Islah party on fire, leaving five of its members injured.⁸⁸ Further, tribal sheikhs are accused of abusing people, breach laws and loot lands.⁸⁹ The ongoing trafficking of weapons and people are also security concerns in this region.

Al-Mahweet happens to be a considerable tourist resort, and is mainly ruled by people who adhere to tribal customary law. In 2010 the MoI ordered the security authorities to step up their security measures in tourist areas so as to prevent acts of sabotage.⁹⁰

Protests in 2011 did not hit al-Mahweet as hard as others. For this reason the governorate remained comparatively safe. In January 2012 gunmen kidnapped seven foreign aid workers. They demanded the release of a fellow tribesman in exchange. In a successful mediation effort that was facilitated by tribal sheikhs, and through police provision, the workers were released two days later.⁹¹

In al-Hudaida the main insecurity actors are armed gangs (2%), tribes (5%), the Islah party (4%) and thieves (2%). However, it is the governorate with the greatest rate of respondents claiming that no one (77%) ruins security in the area. In al-Mahweet also a great number of people believe that no one (66%) ruins security in the area. There the insecurity actors are perceived to be the Houthis (3%), tribes (6%), the Islah party (5%), the GPC (5%), and powerful figures (8%).

Graph 35: Who worsens security in this area (al-Hudaida and al-Mahweet)?



87 Al-Arabiya (2011). One dead, 200 wounded in Yemen clashes. al-Arabiya, [online] 16th March. Retrieved from: <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/16/141843.html>.

88 BBC (2011). Yemen unrest: Dozens injured in clashes in al-Hudaida. BBC, [online] 16th March. Retrieved from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12762887>.


89 Yemen Post Staff (2012). Yemen's security arrests sons of tribal leader. Yemen Post, [online] 5th June. Retrieved from: <http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=5511>.

90 SABA Yemen News Agency (2010). Yemeni Interior Ministry steps up security in Mahwit tourist areas. SABA Yemen News Agency, [online] 15th August. Retrieved from: <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-234555193/yemeni-interior-ministry-steps.html>.

91 CNN Wire Staff (2012). U.N.: Aid workers kidnapped in Yemen released. CNN, [online] 2nd February. Retrieved from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/02/world/meast/yemen-aid-workers>.

Besides the capital city, al-Hudaida has one of the greatest rates of respondents that claim that police brings security to their area (23%). After them, the most important security actors in the area are the ‘Aqil (26%) and tribes (9%). However, a significant number of respondents (22%) claim that no one brings security to their area. In al-Mahweet, a fair share of respondents claim that no one brings security to the area (28%). Security provision in this area appears to rest mostly with the ‘Aqil (13%), the police (10%), tribes (11%), and to some extent powerful figures (7%).

Graph 36: Who provides security in this area (al-Hudaida and al-Mahweet)?




It is interesting to notice that even though the majority of respondents in al-Mahweet state that they always feel safe, none of them are aware of a police station in their area. This explains why only 10% believe the police are the first actor to address a problem or a security incident in the area. Despite this low number, 50% of the respondents have a lot of confidence in the police, with 14% having no confidence at all.

Most problems or incidents that happen here are addressed by societal actors such as tribes (60%), the ‘Aqil (12%) or other social figures (16%). 50% of the respondents believe security provision should not rest in the hands of the state alone. In contrast, 28% believe security provision should rest in their hands. 76% believe tribal sheikhs should assist the state in security provision.

In al-Hudaida a large number of respondents (46%) know of a police station in the area. 31% believe the police are the first to deal with security incidents or problems. After al-Mahweet, al-Hudaida has the highest rate of confidence in the police (49%).

The ‘Aqil also plays an important role in security provision in al-Hudaida, as 42% believe that he is the first actor to address incidents in the area. 57% of the respondents believe security provision should not rest in the hands of the state alone. 65% believe tribal sheikhs should be involved, and 96% believe other powerful people should play a role in security provision.

Sana'a and Sana'a city



In terms of infrastructure, food security and government services, Sana'a city is the most developed governorate. It lies in the center of Sana'a governorate, and forms a separate administrative district. Interestingly, among those polled in Sana'a, 63% state they always feel safe. In Sana'a city, only 12% say the same.

Sana'a city embodies the country's political center. For that reason, it is here where the Saleh regime was extensively challenged. Official government buildings and foreign embassies have been repeatedly targeted by a variety of groups ranging from Houthi rebels to AQAP militants.⁹² Additionally, Sana'a is frequently affected by the elite conflict between former President Saleh and the al-Ahmar family as well as Ali Mohsen. This conflict broke out during the 2011 protests. Besides politically motivated violence, security in the area is also affected by tribal conflicts. This is particularly the case in both the southern parts of the capital and in the wider realms of the region that the governorate encompasses.

2011 marked the lowpoint of a large-scale violent conflict in the capital. Under the threat of lethal force from the security forces, thousands of protesters called for the ousting of Saleh. In May the elite conflict turned violent. Led by Sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar of Hashid, thousands of armed tribesmen entered the capital and waged running battles against pro-Saleh troops. Together with defected units from Ali Mohsen's al-firqa, the tribal fighters successfully pressured Saleh for months.

At the time, Sana'a city was split. Saleh's government troops controlled the south. Ali Mohsen, along with the Hashid tribes under al-Ahmar, both controlled the north. The anti-government tribal fighters successfully occupied a number of government buildings in the north of the city. As a consequence, hundreds of local residents were forced to leave their homes. On the outskirts of the capital in Arhab, government forces clashed with tribes, which sided with the opposition.

92 Macleod, H. (2010). UK ambassador in Yemen escapes assassination attempt. The Guardian, [online] 26th April. Retrieved from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/26/uk-ambassador-yemen-assassination-attempt>.

After the signing of the GCC initiative the security situation in the capital remained volatile. In May 2012, AQAP claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that left 100 soldiers dead. Political assassinations and their attempts occur frequently. Since the 2011 uprising law enforcement has deteriorated. Additionally, tribal conflicts have increased in number.


Exchange of gunfire within the city and in southern districts is frequent. Conflicts over water and land also erupt regularly in the wider governorate. In early 2009, an average of two deaths per week through armed violence happened because of land and water conflicts.⁹³

Due to both political turmoil and subsequent economic hardships, through 2012 the crime level in Sana'a was 120% higher than the year before.⁹⁴ Most of the serious criminal activity was concentrated in areas on the outskirts of Sana'a city.⁹⁵

YPC survey data shows that 78% of the respondents evaluate their security as better than the year before. At the time this survey was implemented, large scale fighting between government troops, Hashid tribal fighters and oppositional soldiers had ceased.

The security situation of Sana'a city is well reflected in the survey results. Within them a variety of actors are perceived as agents that ruin security in the area. Armed gangs (18%) and thieves (13%) are among the greatest security risks. Other insecurity actors include the Houthis (12%), AQAP and AAS (5%), tribes (5%) and the Islah party (6%). In Sana'a governorate the Houthis are perceived to be the greatest insecurity actor (18%). Islah (7%), extremists (5%) and tribes (5%) are also blamed for insecurity.

Graph 37: Who worsens security in this area (Sana'a and Sana'a city)?



93 Small Arms Survey (2010). Under pressure – Social violence over land and water in Yemen. Issue Brief No. 2. [report] Small Arms Survey, p. 4. Retrieved from: <http://www.yemenviolence.org/pdfs/Yemen-Armed-Violence-IB2-Social-violence-over-land-and-water-in-Yemen.pdf>.


94 US Department of State -- Bureau of Diplomatic Security (2012). Yemen 2012 OSAC Crime and Safety Report. [report] US Department of State -- Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Retrieved from: <https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=12223>.

95 Ibid.

Despite the fact that Sana'a city has the most visible and effective police force in the country, residents feel relatively unsafe due to the continuing attacks in the capital. Around 38% of the respondents say that the police bring security to their area. An equal amount (38%) says that police are the first who deal with a problem or security incident. Most people in Sana'a have little confidence in the police (54%). 23% say that they have a lot. 22% have no confidence in them at all.

Most people perceive the police to have neither a positive or negative effect (47%). 21% have a positive perception of the actions of the police. 12% have the opposite view.


Graph 38: Who provides security in this area (Sana'a and Sana'a city)?



Our research in the governorate shows that the police are not the first who deal with security incidents or concerns. The people's confidence in them is relatively low there. 18% state that they have a lot, 32% have a little, and 9% have no, confidence in them. 41% replied with "I don't know" as their answer. The majority of respondents (49%) say tribal leaders bring security to the area. In contrast, 5% of respondents say tribal sheikhs are responsible for insecurity. Other security actors in Sana'a governorate are the 'Aqil (14%) and religious scholars (11%). A considerable amount say there are no security actors at all (15%).

The majority of respondents in Sana'a city believe security provision should rest in the hands of the state alone (59%). 71% believe that non-state actors should not be involved in security provision. In areas outside the capital, most respondents supported the involvement of non-state actors. 59% believe security provision should not rest in the hands of the state alone. 70% support the involvement of tribal sheikhs. 28% replied with "I don't know" as their answer.

Hadhramawt and al-Mahra



The southern governorates of al-Mahra and Hadhramawt are both large governorates that are home to notably large desert regions. Specifically in Hadhramawt, there are many active oil companies. Some of Yemen's largest oil reserves are located there.

The security situation in Hadhramawt is generally perceived to neither be good or bad. 18% of the survey respondents feel the security situation is very good, with 29% believing it is good to some extent. 23% state that the security situation is very bad, and 13% say it is bad to some extent. The majority of the respondents in Hadhramawt claim that the security situation has not changed since one year earlier. In al-Mahra, the population generally feels a little bit safer than in Hadhramawt. 40% of the respondents claim the security situation is very good, with only 10% claiming it is very bad.

Hadhramawt faces a strong presence of AQAP and secessionist activism by the southern movement. It has been exploited of its resources by the Yemeni government with little development and services in return. The recent acceleration of projects related to Yemen's energy infrastructure could likely reinforce existing north-south disparities. The regime tends to not circulate energy revenues back to the south. Yet, the governorate does not suffer the same level of poverty as many of the northern hinterlands. The capital, al-Mukalla, remains one of Yemen's most vibrant cities.

Since 2006, AQAP and affiliated groups have increasingly been active in the governorate.⁹⁶ They have targeted military and security personnel, police stations, oil and gas facilities and tourists by means of shooting, bombing and suicide attacks. Beginning with the December 2009 regime offensives, the increased operational tempo among the security forces prompted AQAP to increase its attacks on regime targets. Since 2010, suspected AQAP militants have inflicted costly attacks on security convoys, barracks, oil installations and intelligence officers.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ These include "Islamic Jihad Yemen", "Soldier's Brigade of Yemen", "Sympathizers of al-Qaeda".


⁹⁷ Makovsky, M., Misztal, B. and Ruhe, J. (2011). Fragility and Extremism in Yemen. [report] Bipartisan Policy Center, p. 35. Retrieved from: <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Yemen%20Final%20Report.pdf>.

Since April 2012, a high profile and ongoing campaign involving drones has been jointly conducted by the Yemeni military and USA government to counter AQAP throughout the entire country.⁹⁸ Yemeni troops have been particularly active in Hadhramawt since June 2013.⁹⁹

During the 2011 mass protests, anti-Saleh protesters rallied in the streets of al-Mukalla. They experienced several clashes with the police. During the clashes police forces repeatedly killed Hadhramawt civilians. In turn, this sparked even more protests.¹⁰⁰ Because of their “non-patriotic” behavior, anti-regime protesters also clashed with southern secessionist supporters.¹⁰¹ Hadhramawt has historically been a pivotal stage for the secessionist movement. Rallies have been regularly staged since 2007. Security forces generally respond with arrests and brute force. They regularly employ methods that include teargas and live rounds.¹⁰²

Due to the diffuse security situation in Hadhramawt, survey results show that a variety of actors are held responsible for insecurity in the governorate. 19% of the respondents perceive that AQAP and AAS are the main actors that ruin security. The government is also held responsible for this by 6% of the respondents since it has regularly failed to protect the general population. Other insecurity actors include the southern movement (3%) and armed groups (4%). Interestingly, 8% feel that the police ruin security in the governorate. This is the highest figure among all governorates in the country.

Graph 39: Who worsens security in this area (Hadhramawt and al-Mahra)?



98 Trend (2012). Intelligence Officer Killed in Yemen. Trend, [online] 29th December. Retrieved from: <http://en.trend.az/regions/met/arabicr/2104333.html>.


99 Reuters (2013). Yemen Launches Assault on al Qaeda, Several Killed. Reuters, [online] 5th Jun. Retrieved from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/us-yemen-security-operation-idUSBRE9540U320130605>.

100 Agence France-Presse (2011), Two killed in clashes with Yemen police. Al-Arabiya [online] 4th August. Retrieved from: <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/04/160781.html>

101 Yemen Post Staff (2011). Clashes Between the Revolutionaries and the Southern Secessionist Movement in Hadramaut. Yemen Post, [online] 16th October. Retrieved from: <http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=4187>.

102 Agence France-Presse (2013). Police Disperse South Yemen Protesters. Gulf News, [online] 26th May. Retrieved from: <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/police-disperse-south-yemen-protesters-1.1188870>.

Graph 40: Who provides security in this area (Hadhramawt and al-Mahra)?



The police have a comparatively high presence in Hadhramawt, with 46% claiming they know of a police station in their area. 39% say that the police are the first actor to address security incidents. 65% perceive the police as corrupt people. 19% believe they lack zeal. This might explain why only 4% have a lot of confidence in the police, while 21% say they have no confidence at all. 56% believe the provision of security should rest in the hands of the state alone. 65% believe tribal sheikhs, and 90% believe PCs, should play a role in security provision.

In al-Mahra, 50% of respondents say nobody ruins security in their governorate. From statistics related to the perception of respondents, al-Mahra is by far the safest governorate in Yemen. The YPC survey shows that security provision stems mainly from tribal sheikhs (50%). They are usually the first who address security issues. Additional security actors are the people themselves (25%) and PCs (6%). 60% believe that the provision of security should not rest in the hands of the state alone. 100% of the respondents believe tribal sheikhs should assist in security provision.

RECOMMENDATION

This review of each governorate's security situation illustrates the great degree of variation between actor configurations, conflicts and security provision on a local scale. The statistics confirm that in nearly every governorate the police are either ineffective, inactive or entirely absent. In none of the governorates do the police hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This makes it extremely difficult for them to be an effective arbiter of security. However, the YPC survey shows that most Yemenis feel safe. For many, non-state actors effectively provide security.

In almost all governorates, the majority of respondents expressed that they would feel more secure if there were more police in their area. This dynamic relates to Hansen and Stepputat's analysis on the 'paradox of the state'.¹⁰³ They argue the state's authority is constantly questioned and functionally undermined, while people are demanding more rights, entitlements and institutions. The more the state fails to provide security, the more people are asking for the state to act.¹⁰⁴ Arguably, this has to do with the persistence of the imagination of the state as the "embodiment of sovereignty"; as the source of social order and stability. Yet, while Hansen and Stepputat argue that only the state is deemed able of creating a territorialized nation-space that materializes in boundaries, infrastructure and authoritative institutions; the YPC study shows that this is true only for 10 of Yemen's 21 governorates. Additionally, more than half of the respondents believe that security provision should not rest in the hands of the state alone. Instead, it should be corroborated through non-state actors such as PCs, tribesmen and even NGO's. As these findings are indicative of popular demands to state security provision, they should certainly be part of SSR efforts.

Moreover, security actors need to regain legitimacy under state control. Military-security services are often accused of serving group interests with their patrimonial patterns. For these reasons they have been highly politicized, thus making SSR a key component of the GCC initiative and other relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.¹⁰⁵ The common denominator under which all key players could generally agree is the need to place professional military-security services under civilian control. In theory this would free these institutions from regional, sectarian, party and family influence.¹⁰⁶

In a nutshell, SSR in Yemen should include a reorganization process that removes every leader that was appointed through patronage, and replacing them with professionals who are qualified by their merits alone. The same reform measures need to be expanded to the police, judiciary, and intelligence services.

103 Hansen, T. B. & Stepputat, F. (Eds.) (2001). *States of Imagination. Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*. Durham: Duke University Press.

104 Hansen, T. and Stepputat, F. (2001). Introduction: States of Imagination. In: Hansen, T. and Stepputat, F. eds. (2001). *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*. Durham: Duke University Press, p. 2.

105 The most notable UNSC resolutions are S/RES/2014 (2011) and S/RES/2051 (2012).

106 International Crisis Group (2013). *Yemen's Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?*. Middle East Report No. 139. [report] p. 13. Retrieved from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Yemen/139-yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-new-conflict.pdf>.

Moreover, the police force should be professionalized through reform measures including educational training, anti-corruption efforts, wage reform and programs linked to genuine security provision.¹⁰⁷

A second crucial level of reform should correspond to local prerequisites. Local, regional, and national conditions shape the various public perceptions of the police. For security sector reform to be effective, the police must be perceived as agents of security instead of being equated with ineffectiveness, corruption and a lack of zeal. It will be challenging for them to reframe this image. It is therefore indispensable to take popular demands into account.

Additionally, YPC survey findings show that 37% of respondents would like non-state actors to support police in fulfilling their duties, particularly in tasks related to resolving instances of crime and conflict. 18% believe non-state actors should be involved in some cases, but not in all cases. 35% believe non-state actors should not be involved at all. 10% say they do not know.

The preference for non-state actors to be involved in the provision of security varies from governorate to governorate. Often it is based on the constellation of local security actors. The police should consider both this and the idea of utilizing other modes of conflict resolution like tribal mediation mechanisms. Such participatory measures could improve the popular image of the police.

In light of Yemen's territorial heterogeneity, community-based Policing (CbP) is a viable and comprehensive approach for police reform, particularly in highly fragmented areas. Organizations like UNDP, Saferworld and the International Peace Academy have offered models and frameworks on this topic. CbP prescribes a form of policing that involves the police themselves working cooperatively with individual citizens, groups of citizens, and both public and private organizations. Together they identify and resolve the issues that affect the living standards in neighborhoods and communities. In this model, the police recognize the fact that they cannot effectively deal with such issues alone. Instead, they work with other actors that share a mutual interest in resolving problems.

The YPC stresses that the following CbP-based recommendations form one particular viewpoint. Ultimately, it should rest on Yemenis and their representatives, which model of security provision they decide to enforce – or alternatively – which form of policing they collectively chose to develop. A model forced upon Yemenis will likely not be considered legitimate. In an effort to overcome this problem, YPC suggests considering CbP in Yemen, which may rest on the following principles¹⁰⁸:

107 Noman, M. and Sorensen, D. (2013). Reforming the Yemen Security Sector. CDDRL Working Paper Vol. 137. [report] Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, p. 10. Retrieved from: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/24151/No_137_Yemen.pdf.

108 In line with: Groenewald, H. and Peake, G. (2004). Police Reform through Community-Based Policing: Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation. [report] International Peace Academy, p. 2. Retrieved from: http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UN/Police_REFORM.pdf.

1. Policing should happen by consent, not coercion.

The police need to be perceived as actors who are capable of providing security for the common citizen, not an arbitrary force that works against the public. The aforementioned reform measures build the groundwork for such endeavors.

The excessive use of live rounds by police backfired on multiple occasions, especially during the 2011 mass protests. Since then these coercive strategies have resumed. Policing strategies need to become more inclusive in ethos and de-escalating in practice. They should include modes of citizen involvement, participative management and decentralized decision-making. Furthermore, any mode of policing should be gender-sensitive.

2. Police should be a part of the community, not an entity that is apart from it.

The police need to reinforce an image that portrays them as an arbiter of people's needs. To successfully do this they need to come from within their midst. YPC data shows that 10% of the respondents were victims of a crime within the last two years. 73% of these crimes were reported to the police. The ones who did not report the crime to the police believed the police would not have dealt with the issue seriously. The ones who did report the crime to the police were mostly satisfied with the service provided (63% were very satisfied), however. This shows that the police needs to improve its image in public and build more trust amongst citizens. It is striking that considering female respondents only, 80% did not report the crime, with 42% stating that they would report the crime if there was a women's unit at the police station.

The sheer fact that 88% of rural respondents and 23% of urban respondents do not know where a police station is in their area is indicative of the detachment between police and community. Community support services are crucial for realizing the most essential goals of the police. Police reform needs to include strategies for reorienting a public that largely distrusts the police. Building partnerships between the police and communities is a major challenge that needs to be bridged. The police also need to be perceived as community agents that are ultimately accountable for their actions. Any reform steps need to be coordinated with, and communicated to, the community.

3. When assessing policing needs there should be cooperation between the police and community.

Especially in areas where the police have been ineffective or absent, cooperation needs to occur between police and the non-state actors that have recently been a part of providing security. The community should be involved in the entire process of assessing their needs. Depending on both local conditions and functioning conflict-resolution mechanisms, tailoring a cooperative process between police and non-state actors should be considered. The fulfillment of these steps should improve the perception of the police within communities.

4. Partnership should occur between police, public, and relevant agencies.

CbP needs to be comprehensive. The police need to be transparent and accountable for their actions and duties. They should therefore seek to educate the general public about their

activities in various ways including publications, public access television, town hall meetings, conduct workshops and provide citizen-police academies. The police should accept, and even encourage, citizen review of its performance. Most importantly, the legality of prosecutions needs to be ensured by cooperating with relevant judicial agencies. These steps will help restore confidence in the police.

5. Policing needs to be tailored to meet individual community needs.

Considering the diversity of Yemeni culture, and the multitude of cleavages that have led to violent conflict in the past, uniform and homogenous national policing may not function equally well in all parts of the country. Considering the survey findings, YPC recommends that steps be taken to create locally tailored modes of security provisions. Instead of dictating the means of achieving security (particularly in terms of involving non-state actors), the police should tailor modes of security provision on a local level, in cooperation with communities, districts and/or governorates. If this were to happen, legal conditions may need to be revisited. This should be considered in the forthcoming conversations about federalism reform.

CONCLUSION

Policing is an important part of security provision. However, it only deals with symptoms of insecurity. UNDP's social cohesion component provides fruitful insights for tackling the root causes of insecurity.¹⁰⁹ By integrating both security and developmental interventions, the causes of insecurity can be identified. Ideally, this could lead to coordinated responses at the level of local communities. This approach emphasizes participatory modes of security, as a variety of actors can be involved.

Integrating social cohesion into CbP helps to ensure that issues of social exclusion are addressed. These are often the root causes of insecurity, and may require a response that combines economic and social action.¹¹⁰ If, for example, lack of social opportunities among young people translates into gang violence (as it has often been the case in parts of Yemen, considering 40% youth unemployment¹¹¹), then sporting and music events could provide outlets that help young people release any tension that they might feel. A key prerequisite for this is adequate funding. Donors have to be willing to tackle the roots of insecurity by pursuing the twofold approach of creating social and economic opportunities on one hand, and developing more effective modes of policing on the other.

Yemen's security situation is still fragile. Its future status largely depends upon the outcome of the processes related to military-security sector reform within the GCC initiative. Up to now, the police have not experienced sufficient inclusion in those processes. Additionally, stakeholders need to develop a comprehensive approach that integrates the police and judiciary.

YPC survey results indicate that police reform measures should include education and training, anti-corruption efforts and wage reform. Moreover, in order for reform measures to be both effective and legitimate in the eyes of the public, stakeholders need to ensure that security issues and provision mechanisms on a local level are taken into account.

The combination of a highly diverse actor landscape in Yemen with different local conditions requires that all stakeholders be included in reform processes. This comprises involving the Houthis and members of the southern movement. Critical to the reestablishment of public trust in state-based security provision actors will be the creation of an inclusive and transparent police force. Community-based policing approaches have the potential to strengthen such efforts by tailoring highly specific local needs and conditions to creative methods of security provision.

109 Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery United Nations Development Programme (2009). Community Security and Social Cohesion -- Towards a UNDP Approach. [report] UNDP, pp. 17-19. Retrieved from: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf>.

110 Groenewald, H. and Peake, G. (2004). Police Reform through Community-Based Policing: Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation. [report] International Peace Academy, p. 3. Retrieved from: http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UN/Police_REFORM.pdf.

111 The World Bank (2013). World Bank Grant Supports Employment Creation for Yemen's Neediest Youth and Women. [press release] 2nd April. Retrieved from: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/02/world-bank-grant-supports-employment-creation-yemens-neediest-youth-women>.

www.yemenpolling.org

