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# Filtering or Blocking Mobility? Inequalities, Marginalization, and Power Relations at Fortified Borders

*Kristina Korte\**

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**Abstract:** »Mobilität filtern oder blockieren? Ungleichheiten, Marginalisierung und Machtverhältnisse an fortifizierten Grenzen«. This paper investigates four fortified borders: those between Hungary and Serbia, the USA and Mexico, Algeria and Morocco, and Pakistan and India. Starting from current border research, it asks how fortified borders control mobility, who is affected by fortifications, and how. Based on qualitative interviews, the paper finds that although all four borders are similarly fortified, they control mobility in different ways; while the Hungarian and the US border fences filter mobility, the two other borders instead block all forms of circulation. The paper conceptualizes these different types as filter borders and deadlock borders. It then examines their effects and analyzes not only how they are related to inequalities and power relations, but also how they can be used as resources. The filter borders reinforce the global gap in mobility rights by blocking migrants, whereas the deadlock borders also lead to increasing inequality within a country – between the capital and the border population – by cutting economic, social, and familial ties across the border line. The two border types also indicate different relations between neighboring states; filter borders are related to a clear gap in wealth and power, with one state exploiting the fortification to its advantage. By contrast, at the deadlock borders, the power balance is more ambiguous and contested.

**Keywords:** Fortified borders, mobility control, border control, cross-border relations, migration, border fences, border walls.

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## 1. Introduction

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Borders structure our world. Looking at a globe, it is divided by lines drawn between nations; however, looking at the real world, the situation is much more complex. Borders are not as clean and uniform as the lines on a map.

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Instead, their shapes and functions are diverse, complex, and in a state of constant change. This became very clear with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when previously open borders were closed very suddenly. Newspaper headlines such as “Coronavirus: Europe plans full border closure in virus battle” (BBC 2020) or “Canada extends U.S. border closure until Dec. 21” (McMahon 2020) would not have been imaginable just months before. These rapid changes in border policy and rules of entry show how much borders still matter today. Moreover, they reveal some of the essential functions of modern borders: to control, prevent, allow, and structure human mobility. However, if borders are diverse in terms of shape and function, they also vary in how they control mobility.

The current paper engages with the relevance and functioning of borders today, with a focus on mobility control and cross-border relations. It examines fortified borders, which are clearly designed for mobility control and therefore allow us to better understand the functions and effects of restricting mobility (for a classification of different types of border infrastructure, see Gülzau and Mau 2021, in this special issue). Historically, fortifications have been used as delimitations to restrict the neighboring state, and were often related to struggles over territory, power, and domination. This form of separation by fortification has become rare today, but still exists. An example of this is the Pakistan-Indian border fence, which is a result of an unresolved conflict over territory and regional hegemony. Quite different from such cases of territorial conflict, many fortifications today are tools to control, filter, and regulate mobility flows. Often equipped with high-tech infrastructure, these 21st century fortifications are designed to divide wanted from unwanted travelers, and, in most cases, they aim to keep out migrants. One of the most recent examples is the Hungarian fence built at the Serbian border against mostly Syrian refugees in 2015. Both forms of fortified borders – the still-existing cases of separation from the neighbor and the many recent cases of dividing wanted from unwanted mobility – indicate that, as opposed to the assumption that hard borders will disappear in the course of globalization, the age of fortification is far from being over.

In line with this, research shows that border fortifications are on the rise in the post-cold-war era, contrary to former expectations of a borderless world (Ohmae 1990). Today, the world’s borders are more fortified than ever, and the number of border walls and fences is still increasing (Vallet 2021). Consequently, recent border literature has examined which states build new fortifications and why they do so (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Carter and Poast 2017). The current paper adds to these debates by taking a closer look at some of these fortifications, stating that fortified borders do not form a uniform category but instead may differ in a number of ways (with regard to the variety, see also Balibar 2017). The analysis presented here identifies different

types of fortified borders and studies their functions as well as their effects on mobility and beyond. For this paper, function refers to the purpose and mode of operation of a border, whereas effect means the de facto consequences, whether intended or not.

The paper analyzes four fortified borders: those between India and Pakistan, Morocco and Algeria, Serbia and Hungary, and Mexico and the USA. The analysis is based on qualitative interviews in all eight countries and thus includes perspectives on both sides of the respective borders. All four borders are fenced and aim to control and limit mobility. At the same time, they exhibit major differences, as explained in more detail below. The paper introduces a new typology, distinguishing between “filter borders” and “deadlock borders,” which adds to understanding of the different contexts and effects of fortifications. The paper is structured as follows: The next part (section 2) discusses research on border fortification and re-bordering, then establishes the research questions for the subsequent analysis. In section 3, the data, methods, and cases are presented, followed in section 4 by an analysis of the empirical material and its implications for current debates in border research. Lastly, section 5 concludes the paper by bringing together its key points.

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## 2. Researching Border Fences and Walls

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This is a busy time for border research. The amount of border walls is on the rise all over the world, migrants continue to challenge the closure of state borders, and, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to radical changes in border policies, calling into question the very idea of open borders. Fortifications have become an essential dimension of the political (Balibar 2017). Consequently, much of the recent border research has focused on the phenomenon of new border fortifications and the factors that have led to more fencing. The following paragraphs give some indications of the trend toward fortification and the reasons for building fences and then present some research into their effects, particularly on mobility.

Several recent studies have illustrated the global trend of building new walls and fences (Vallet and David 2012; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Carter and Poast 2017). They not only show that the numbers of border fortifications are on the rise, but also that their construction is taking place at an accelerating pace, especially since the events of 9/11. Moreover, in particular since the 1990s, the newly built barriers have become significantly longer (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). The physical structures are as diverse as the motives for building them, and they are constructed by both democratic and authoritarian states as well as failed and healthy ones (Vallet and David 2012). However,

while border fortification can be considered as a global trend, there are significant regional differences, with most new fortifications being constructed in Asia and Europe (Mau, Gülzau, and Korte 2021). As these studies take a comparative and global perspective on fortified borders, they mostly treat them as a homogenous group without considering differences in their forms or functions. Others have argued that, with regard to their function to control mobility, fortifications should not be considered as monolithic and merely immobilizing, but rather as a means to modulate mobility (Denman 2020). This refers to the fact that most barriers are not supposed to suppress all crossing, but to selectively allow mobility (Rosière and Jones 2012) and that most borders are not simply either open or closed but operate as differentiated border control regimes (Ackleson 2012, 248). However, a more nuanced view of how fortified borders control mobility is still missing.

Observing the trend of re-bordering by fortification naturally raises the question of why states build new fences and walls. In response, quantitative studies have reached the conclusion that economic disparities are the most relevant driving factors for states to fortify their borders (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). Migratory movements often aim to cross these “economic or social discontinuity lines” (Rosière and Jones 2012) and border fortifications are meant to prevent this. Another factor in border closures is the heightened importance of security issues, which are considered deeply relevant for border politics – notably as a consequence of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks (Avdan 2019). Andreas (2003) uses the term “transnational clandestine actors” to describe a diverse group of people – including migrants, smugglers, or terrorist fighters – that states aim to stop at their borders. According to Vallet (2021, 11), the most relevant official motives for wall building are immigration (42 percent) and security (29 percent), followed by smuggling (20 percent) and peacekeeping (9 percent). However, these numbers have to be treated with caution; there may be more than one reason to fortify a border, the reasons for keeping it closed may change over time, and the officially stated motives may differ from unofficial reasons. These unofficial reasons often touch on symbolic and domestic aspects of fortification: walls and fences can be means for political leaders to suggest sovereignty (Brown 2017) and to retain power (Korte 2020). Fortified borders are thus related to not only foreign policy via the importance of territorial control and power relations (Paasi 2009; Newman 2003), but also to domestic policy via the symbolic image of the wall (Vallet and David 2012, 115). They are linked to relations of force on the one hand and to representations of identity on the other (Balibar 2010, 73).

While there is lively debate about the reasons for border fortifications, less attention has been paid to their effects. With regard to security, Avdan and Gelpi (2016) conclude that fences may reduce the relative risk of terrorist

attacks, while scholars in international studies have examined spillover effects of international violent militancy and the effectiveness of border fences in reducing them (Linebarger and Braithwaite 2020). These works focus on the effectiveness of border fences in terms of security and violence, but they do not seek to understand their broader – and possibly unintended – effects. With regard to economic dynamics, research finds that “walls appear to have significant and negative effects on commercial trade” (Carter and Poast 2019, 182). This points toward the possibly unintended effects of fortification, as by building fences, states probably aim to reduce smuggling, but not legal trade. Vallet (2017) states that border walls have high economic and human costs, while being barely effective in permanently eliminating smuggling activities. Further studies discuss the effects of border fencing on economics (Allen, Dobbin, and Morten 2018) or on smuggling (Getmansky, Grossman, and Wright 2019), but are restricted to single cases. In a somewhat broader cost-benefit analysis, Vernon and Zimmermann (2019) conclude that there is little evidence that walls effectively reduce smuggling, terrorism, or migration, and they suggest that opening borders would have positive economic effects. Many of these very recent studies on the effects of fortifications call for further research. As economics and international studies primarily discuss border effects on trade and labor, the impact on the people who are blocked by these borders are mentioned only in passing.

This leads to the questions: what are the effects of fortifications on “border crossers” and how do they affect different groups in different ways? Studies into the US-Mexican border find that enforcement has made the journey more expensive and potentially deadly for migrants, but has not changed the demand for smugglers (Gathmann 2008) and that border enforcement in some US states has mainly had the effect of shifting migratory movements to other parts of the border (Bohn and Pugatch 2015). In Israel and Europe, the efforts to “secure” borders against migration have clearly not been effective, as Medizini and Ari (2018) conclude. A broader (and less empirical) perspective points to the problematic implications of border walls for human rights, calling for further research (Simmons 2019). Indeed, a more systematic analysis of the social and human effects of fortifications is still missing. Moreover, the literature on these effects mostly focuses on migrants. Some texts consider the effects on border populations (Klatt 2021; Daoudi 2015; Kormoll 2021), but effects on both groups are not considered jointly, nor are they related to specific types and functions of fortifications.

Research on mobility control has also pointed out its effects on inequality (Ackleson 2012). Mau et al. (2015) highlighted the unequal mobility rights resulting from visa waiver agreements, while Shachar (2009) discussed the “birthright lottery” and the privileging of the rich and the gifted when issuing visas. The notion of “Teichopolitics” (Rosière and Jones 2012) emphasizes the

link between border fences and inequality (with regard to this link, see also Moré 2011), and Jones (2016) considers border fences as barriers against the “global poor,” stating that “borders are not natural divisions [...] they create and exacerbate inequalities” (Jones 2016, 70). The filter function of many borders (Cooper and Perkins 2012; Walters 2006) is another means of reinforcing inequality. At the same time, global inequality is a reason for border fencing: “The main driving factor of undocumented migration – and therefore walls – is inequality” (Vernon and Zimmermann 2019, 13). As social and spatial mobility are related, international mobility can be considered as “capital” (Kaufmann, Bergman, and Joye 2004, 745) that is unequally distributed, or as a “resource that grants access to other resources” (Huysmans et al. 2021, 40). In this sense, borders can likewise be understood as resources (Sohn 2014) that are mainly for governments (Lamour and Varga 2017), but also for border populations (Daoudi 2015) that may profit from trade or smuggling. Whether people can use borders as resources, however, depends on the possibilities to cross them, and these are restricted selectively by border control and fortification.

As demonstrated above, there is some literature examining the effects of border fencing on mobility and inequality, but a greater amount of empirical work on these effects is needed. In particular, the effects of border fencing on different populations and the “human costs” of fortifications (Vallet 2017, 3) merit greater attention. The current paper highlights and analyzes these effects. It contributes to the debate on border fortifications by presenting a comparative analysis of four qualitative case studies in order to identify different types of fortifications and their varying effects on mobility. Thereby, the aim is to show the variety of functions and effects of fortified borders in order to better understand their social impact. These reflections lead to three interrelated research questions, which are discussed in the three parts of the analysis: First, how do border fences control mobility? Second, who is affected by border fortifications and how? Third, what are the possible explanations for the different functions and effects of fortified borders?

Using four borders as case studies makes it possible to analyze the variety of fortified borders and their respective effects, while also permitting a systematization of this variety. As an introduction to the empirical material, the following section presents the data, explains the methodological approach, and introduces the four cases.

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### 3. Data, Methodology, and Cases

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This study is based on field research and qualitative topic-centered expert interviews in eight countries situated on the two sides of four different nation

state borders. Given the comparative approach of the research design, interviewing experts made it possible to obtain information about the respective borders and to adopt a macro perspective. Overall, 41 formal interviews were conducted with various actors: representatives of state institutions, think tanks, civil society, and international organizations (namely the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). A list of all the interview partners is provided in the annex. This very diverse group of interviewees allowed a multifaceted perspective on the topic. Moreover, as the subject of fortified borders touches on very sensitive diplomatic issues, state actors in particular often had a biased perspective on the respective border or conflict. Therefore, it was useful to compare the perspectives from both sides of a border as well as the viewpoints of very different actors. This enabled a more nuanced analysis, contrasting different statements and viewpoints. As field access proved to be difficult, numerous additional informal conversations helped prepare the interviews and, moreover, made it easier to discuss some of the very sensitive topics of research more freely and openly than was possible in the formal (and recorded) interviews.

Although most interview partners were chosen as experts and representatives of organizations, many of them had also personal connections to or experiences of the respective borders. Moreover, the many informal conversations in addition to the interviews helped to provide more first-hand information about the situation at the borders. Nevertheless, the interview material varies from case to case. For example, while in Morocco I was able to speak to people who had crossed the border as migrants or were living close to it, the interviews from the US exclusively relied on second-hand expert information (although some of the interviewees had frequently visited the border and carried out in-depth research there). Consequently, the analysis cannot provide detailed and first-hand information about the people directly concerned by borders. It can, however, compare the impacts of fortification by discussing some relevant (and limited) comparative elements.

The interviews were conducted between October 2018 and October 2020. Most of the fieldwork took place in the respective capitals – as this is where most organizations and institutions are based – but was also carried out in some border cities. Several unforeseen events made the field research more challenging: the popular uprising in Algeria in 2019, the terrorist attack in Indian Kashmir in February 2019 – as well as the subsequent tensions between India and Pakistan – and lastly the global COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. As a result of these difficulties, the interviews with the Pakistani and Indian experts, as well as some of the Algerian ones, had to be conducted digitally.

The interviews were carried out using a semi-structured guide. Some additional topics came up during the interviews and were included in the



research. As different subjects were relevant at the different borders, it turned out to be appropriate to change some of the questions and topics from case to case: for example, while migration was the dominant topic for the US-Mexican border, it played almost no role concerning the Pakistani-Indian one, where the Kashmir conflict dominated the interviews. The interviews were conducted in English, French, and Spanish, and thus in most cases not in the native language of the interviewees. As a consequence, some of the quotations needed to be slightly revised linguistically, although without changing their meaning. All the interviews were fully transcribed and coded in MAXQDA. The analysis was in line with the principles of qualitative content analysis (Gläser and Laudel 2010) and the coding method was mostly deductive but was completed with inductive codes during the process. Other techniques such as field notes and memos helped to structure and systematize the analysis. In the paper, the quotations are cited in a way that preserves the interviewees' anonymity, but the names of the organizations are used. The interview material was supplemented with a document analysis. To this end, 243 documents – such as press releases, policy papers, and newspaper articles – were collected and analyzed. As governmental actors were particularly difficult to reach, official documents were useful to further examine the state perspective. Moreover, the documents provided valuable insights into the debates concerning borders, border conflicts, and cross-border mobility in the respective countries.

The four borders were chosen for their common features of being physically fortified and heavily secured. At the same time, they differ in many respects. They are geographically distributed over four continents and thus have very different regional settings. Further differences include the time period of and reasons for fortification, the relationship and economic disparity between the neighbor states, and the mode of border closure. The particularities of each case mentioned here are shown in table 1 and their context is outlined in greater detail in the following paragraphs. These differences will then be linked to aspects of mobility control, inequality, and power relations in the analyses.

The Hungarian-Serbian border is 164 kilometers long with border fortifications running along its entire length. There are several border crossings that enable and control the circulation of people and goods. The fence was built between 2015 and 2017 as a response to increased migration movements to Europe via the so-called Balkan route (Bez nec, Speer, and Stojić Mitrović 2016). The Hungarian government cited protection against immigration and terrorism as motives for the border fortification. However, although Hungary was affected by the so-called refugee crisis in the sense that hundreds of thousands of people entered the country, the effect was limited, since the majority of them only transited through. The cost and effort expended on the

fortifications can thus instead be attributed to domestic political aims and as a tool for the government to retain power (Cantat 2020; Pap and Reményi 2017). The fortification acquires a symbolic function here, in terms of defining non-European migrants as the dangerous “other” that Hungary must be protected from (Cantat 2017).

**Table 1** Overview of Characteristics of the Four Cases

	Length	Type of fortification	Motives for fortification	Relationship between neighbor states	Mode of closure (Land Border)	Date of fortification	GDP per Capita (US \$) in 2019
DZA-MAR	1559 km	Fence (MAR). Ditch and rampart (DZA)	Territorial conflict, smuggling, migration	Conflict, no cooperation	Completely closed	Since 2014 (1957 French barrier)	3974 (DZA), 3204 (MAR)
IND-PAK	3190 km	Double fence (IND)	Territorial conflict, smuggling, terrorism	Conflict, fragile, ceasefire	Closed except for 1–2 border crossings	Since 1980	2099 (IND), 1284 (PAK)
USA-MEX	3169 km	Fences, barriers (USA)	Smuggling, migration, criminality, domestic policy	Strong trade relations	Many border crossings, difficult to control	Since the 1990s	65297 (USA), 9946 (MEX)
HUN-SRB	164 km	Double fence (HUN)	Domestic policy, migration	Cooperative	Closed except few border crossings	2015–2017	16729 (HUN), 7411 (SRB)

The border between the United States and Mexico differs from the Hungarian-Serbian one in the first instance in its length and geographical composition – it is 3,169 kilometers long and spans deserts and high mountains. The border has been fortified by different US governments over the course of several decades. Today, about a third of its total length is equipped with fences, mostly located around urban centers. The reasons given for the fortification of the border mainly revolve around irregular migration and smuggling. Terrorism, securitization, and othering also play a role. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the historically established demarcation of Mexico as the dangerous “other” intensified once again (Jones 2012, 31–45), with border security and a hardline policy against irregular immigration becoming key elements of the “war on terror” (Saddiki 2017, 88). In his 2016 election campaign, Donald Trump promised to build a wall along the entire border, and as justifications, he cited migration, crime, and terrorism (Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado 2017). Similar to Hungary, this (potential) wall also has a symbolic function, serving to distinguish between the dangerous world beyond the border and an interior worthy of protection (Brown 2018).

The Algerian-Moroccan border is 1,559 kilometers long. It has been officially closed since 1994, when the trigger for the closure was a terrorist attack in Marrakesh. Since then, both sides have fortified parts of the border: Algeria has dug trenches, while Morocco has constructed a fence (Saddiki 2021). In contrast to the two previously mentioned examples, there is no open crossing on the entire Algerian-Moroccan border, and it is not possible to (legally) cross it by land. The closure of the border was a result of political tensions, as the relationship between the two countries has been marked by competition and rivalry for decades (de Larramendi 2018). In contrast to the Serbia-Hungary and US-Mexico cases, Algeria and Morocco do not differ significantly in their economic power. A long-running conflict and rivalry between the two neighboring states, related to the long-term effects of colonial rule, have been the main determinants for the border fortification. The conflict over the Western Sahara plays a particularly important role, as Morocco regards the region as part of its territory, whereas Algeria supports its independence. Moreover, there is no final agreement on the course of the border. The border line was determined by the French occupying power during the colonial era and was not accepted by the Moroccan side, with the countries having fought two wars over it (Stora 2003). In addition to these historical aspects, there are other reasons for the continued closure of the border. In Algeria, gasoline and food are subsidized, which has led to intensive smuggling of these goods into Morocco. Drugs and other goods are moved illicitly in the other direction. Moreover, the migratory route towards Europe crosses this border.

Pakistan and India are separated by a border approximately 3,190 kilometers in length. The northern section runs through the Kashmir region, and is not a recognized border but merely constitutes the status quo of the current territorial control, the so-called Line of Control. Since both countries have laid claim to the Kashmir region, there is no official border and the Line of Control acts as the ceasefire line in the conflict over the territory. The southern, officially recognized part of the border is termed the International Border. It is fortified on the Indian side with a fence 1,926 kilometers long, and there are only two crossings on the entire border. The Line of Control is likewise fortified, although the terrain is very rough and difficult to control. The dispute between India and Pakistan is dominated by the Kashmir conflict, dating back to the time of British colonial rule. At the end of its reign over the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Great Britain defined the border between India and Pakistan, mainly according to religious criteria. This was accompanied by extensive and violent resettlement, which was intended to create religiously uniform populations on both sides of the border – Muslim in Pakistan and predominantly Hindu in India – causing historical trauma in both countries (Murshed and Mamoon 2010, 464). Both the Pakistani and Indian governments then claimed Kashmir, and the conflict over the territory continues

to the present day. As in the Algerian-Moroccan case, colonial history thus plays an important role in the enduring border dispute. Religion also remains an important aspect of the conflict: the border, defined according to religious criteria, remains rigid; Islam is the state religion in Pakistan, and although India is a secular state, it increasingly considers Muslims as not belonging to the nation (Jones 2009). In the context of the territorial conflict, security concerns – and in particular the prevention of infiltration by Kashmiri fighters – have been stated as the main reasons for India to fence the border (Saddiki 2017, 53). There are several terrorist groups based in both Pakistan and India (Cohen 2003, 32), making security concerns pertinent. The territorial conflict is moreover related to the contrasting national identities of the two states as well as to competition over regional power status (Paul 2006, 610-2).

As indicated above, the cases were selected as a result of some main features and differences that make them interesting for comparison; while the Indian-Pakistani and the Algerian-Moroccan border have been closed due to territorial and political conflicts (related to their colonial past), in the other two cases, the closures are linked more to migration and domestic political interests. The cases moreover vary concerning the economic disparity (gap in GDP) between the neighboring states as well as their relationships. The following analysis proposes a conceptual framing of these differences and then examines their effects on mobility and beyond.

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#### 4. Filter Borders and Deadlock Borders

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The preceding section shows that the four borders examined here are all physically fortified and tightly controlled but have very different contexts and histories. While in border research, walled borders are often considered as one uniform category, these cases show a variety that is important to acknowledge in order to gain an understanding of the functions of fortifications as well as their effects. One important difference among the examples concerns the questions of if and to what extent circulation is authorized as well as who is allowed to cross the borders and who is not. The analysis therefore focusses on questions of (human) mobility but also considers other aspects. It is structured as follows: Section 4.1. introduces the concepts of filter borders and deadlock borders, explaining their main functions and differences. Section 4.2. then describes in greater detail how fortification affects cross border mobility and how this is related to inequalities. Lastly, section 4.3. discusses the state level and power relations, then bringing together the effects on two levels (people's mobility and the state) by using the concept of borders as resources.

#### 4.1 Filtering or Blocking Mobility

Fortifications are designed to control mobility, but they can do so in very different ways. The following paragraphs examine different forms of mobility control at the four borders in question.

At the Hungarian-Serbian border, the fence and the tightened legislation that came along with it led to a sharp drop in transit migration through Hungary. Many of the migrants were initially stranded in Serbia and eventually tried to move to other countries, taking different routes – mostly to Bosnia-Herzegovina and from there on to Croatia. It is notable that Serbia only cautiously criticized the border fencing, and that the construction of the fence did not cause any significant conflict between the two neighboring countries. This lack of concern is related to the fact that the closure of the border did not seriously affect Serbia. Many of the migrants moved on to other countries, and the accommodation of migrants staying in Serbia was financially supported by the EU. Moreover, the border fence did not block Serbian citizens, as they could enter Hungary (and thus the EU) at border crossing points without a visa, with the exception of people from Kosovo. The Hungarian fence was not intended to restrict people from the neighboring country, but to target non-European migrants (Korte 2020). As an EU member candidate, Serbia was not interested in starting a conflict with Hungary and was aiming to follow the expectations of the EU (Stojić-Mitrović 2014). The fence thus enabled the Hungarian government to filter desired from undesired mobility and to gain votes, but without negatively affecting Serbia or Serbian citizens.

The US-Mexican border has several border crossings, which are very highly utilized. Despite the fortification, the border is extremely busy. There is a substantial volume of trade and passenger traffic at the border crossings, to the extent that it is the most heavily frequented border in the world (Nail 2016, 167). The extensive trade between the neighbors makes both countries dependent on exchange and reliant on the border being at least partially open. Due to the large wealth gap, however, Mexico is much more dependent on the United States than vice versa. This became apparent when, with the threat of punitive tariffs, US President Trump was able to force Mexico's government to tighten its migration and border policies in 2019. In addition to strong trade relations, there is also a long history of Mexican labor migration to the United States, although this has declined in recent years. At the same time, migration from Central America has increased. Mexico has thus shifted from being an origin country for migration, to being a transit and receiving country. Due to its length and partly inaccessible terrain, the US-Mexican border is considered to be very hard to control. Therefore, the fortification does not stop migration flows, but it forces migrants to take very dangerous routes through the desert. Similar to the Hungarian-Serbian case, the barrier

between the US and Mexico filters mobility, but the filtering function is more difficult to implement due to the difficulty in controlling the border. In contrast to the Hungarian fence, the US fortification also affects Mexican citizens who need a visa to enter the United States.

These two borders are designed to enable authorized crossing and at the same time block all undesired movement, especially that of migrants. They have in common that they select mobility, thus being typical filter borders that block some forms of mobility while allowing others (Cooper and Perkins 2012; Walters 2006). One important difference between the two cases is that Serbian citizens can cross the Hungarian border without difficulty, whereas Mexican citizens are blocked by the US border unless they have a visa. Both US and Hungarian citizens can easily cross their borders to the South. Another difference between the two borders is their length. On the one hand, the Hungarian-Serbian border is relatively short, meaning border control is more effective and clandestine crossing has become very difficult. On the other hand, the US-Mexican border is much harder to control along its entire length.

In contrast to these filter borders, the Algerian-Moroccan border has no open border crossing points at all. Traveling by air or by sea is possible, but the land border is completely sealed. Moroccan and Algerian citizens do not need visas to visit the neighboring country, but the people living near the border have to take long and costly detours via the capital or the closest airport. One particularity of the Algerian-Moroccan border is that it separates two countries with much in common – linguistically, culturally, religiously, and historically (Stora 2003), the connections between the border populations are particularly strong. However, the border fortification blocks not only the border population, but also migrants. The migration route from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe crosses this border and migrants thus depend on the possibility of crossing into Morocco from the Algerian side. While Algeria is still mostly a transit country on this route, Morocco is increasingly also becoming a country of immigration (de Haas 2014), as a result of the ever-tighter controls at the EU's external borders.

Between India and Pakistan, there are almost no crossing points on the very long and entirely fortified border. There have been attempts in the past to open the Line of Control in Kashmir to the local population through several border crossings (Singh 2013), but these attempts have failed due to the recent tensions between the two countries. Bilateral relations have further deteriorated in the last decade, which is also evidenced by an increase in violent incidents along the Line of Control (Thompson n.d.). As a consequence, there are only two crossing points along the entire border, which are also closed at times. While it is theoretically possible to cross the border at these points or by air, both Indian and Pakistani citizens need a visa to travel to the


neighboring country, and this is very difficult for most of them to obtain. Travel restrictions, visa regulations, the absence of direct flights between the countries, and restrictions in communications make border crossing very difficult.

Both the Moroccan-Algerian and the Pakistani-Indian borders are designed to prevent almost all forms of mobility. These two borders are therefore conceptualized here as “deadlock borders” – that is, borders that block almost all forms of circulation, including people from the neighboring country. Migrants are affected in the same way by deadlock borders – for instance, the migratory route from sub-Saharan Africa via Morocco to Europe crosses the Algerian-Moroccan border and is consequently blocked by the border fortification. There is no significant migratory route that would cross the Pakistani-Indian border, but any potential migrants would probably be blocked by the fencing anyway. Both cases have in common that the borders are closed due to longstanding political conflicts; hence, the term “deadlock border” describes both a completely or almost completely sealed border line and a deadlocked political situation that keeps the border closed. By contrast, the governments at filter borders have relations that are more cooperative. Another difference concerning the cross-border relations is that while the two filter borders were fortified unilaterally by one state without the consent of its neighbor, the two deadlock borders were closed – and in the Moroccan-Algerian case also fenced – to some extent by both sides. Moreover, while the two filter borders are related to a clear differential in wealth and power between the neighbors, the situation at the two deadlock borders is more ambiguous: Algeria and Morocco are “roughly equal in capabilities” (Saddiki 2021, 114), and while India is more powerful in many regards, Pakistan’s asymmetric strategies and tactics – as well as its possession of nuclear weapons, among other factors – make it impossible for India to decisively end the conflict in its favor (Paul 2006, 601). The difference in GDP per capita is also much more significant between the USA and Mexico or Hungary and Serbia than it is between India and Pakistan or Algeria and Morocco (The World Bank 2019; Moré 2011, 145-50).

Figure 1 illustrates the different forms of mobility control in the four cases. At the Hungarian-Serbian border, migratory movements are blocked, while Hungarians and Serbians are able to cross the border. At the US-Mexican border, Mexicans as well as migrants from Central America are blocked, while US citizens can cross. The Moroccan-Algerian and the Pakistani-Indian border are closed to everyone. In the Moroccan-Algerian case, this blocks Moroccan and Algerian citizens as well as sub-Saharan migrants. In the Indian-Pakistani case, there are almost no migrants, so those primarily affected are Indian and Pakistani citizens. As the current paper focuses on the mobility of people, flows of goods are not taken into consideration here, although trade

and smuggling play an important role at all four borders. Moreover, tourist flows are not shown in the figure for reasons of simplicity. Tourists can cross the two filter borders and, under certain circumstances, the Indian-Pakistani border.

**Figure 1** Cross-Border Movements at Four Fortified Borders



The differentiation between two functions of fortified borders introduced here – blocking or filtering mobility – connects with current debates on re-bordering. The filter function of modern borders has been rightly emphasized (Mau et al. 2012; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). However, not all fortifications are designed to enable mobility; therefore, their function as barriers should not be overlooked (Newman 2012). More importantly, there are degrees of openness or closedness, and of filtering and blocking, at every fortified border. This aspect has important implications, as will be shown in the following. As new border fences emerge all around today’s world, it is worth taking a closer look at the context of the respective border fences; and more precisely understanding their functioning as well as their effects. This will be examined in the following sections.

#### 4.2 “Whenever you Build Barriers, the Most Vulnerable Will Suffer as a Result.” Effects of Fortified Borders

After discussing how border fences control mobility in different ways, this section covers the impact of these different forms of control in greater detail. To put it simply: who is most affected by border fortifications in the respective cases, and how?

Migrants are affected by both types of fortified borders. In the case of filter borders, it is evident that the migrants who are targeted by the border fortifications also suffer due to them. The Algerian-Moroccan border was not



initially fortified due to migration, but the fence nevertheless has severe effects on migrants, and the two governments “play ping-pong” with the migrants (Interview ASCOMS, Morocco) by deporting them back and forth across the border. In all the cases, border fences and the policies that go along with them do not manage to completely stop the movement of migrants. However, they have the effect of slowing people down, making them wait, and forcing them to adopt other strategies or change their routes. This frequently forces migrants to take more dangerous and potentially deadly alternatives. In the US case, migrants need to cross the desert, where many die. In the Hungarian case, many migrants move to other countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they are again blocked and forced to wait under extremely harsh conditions. Moreover, even migrants who had planned to cross the borders legally by applying for asylum are forced to undertake illegal border crossings in order to progress. As a consequence of border fencing, “people more [often] decide to turn to the irregular pathway” (Interview, Info Park, Serbia). In addition, as fortifications make irregular border crossing more complicated, they also make it more expensive. Migrants are more likely to be compelled to cross the border with the assistance of smugglers, and the more challenging border crossing becomes, the more the prices for smuggling rise. This has the effect that those who have enough money can pay smugglers to organize ways to cross the border, while those who cannot afford the prices have to wait or try more dangerous and less promising routes. In this way, border fences reinforce the economic inequality between migrants: those who are the most economically disadvantaged have to risk their lives or give up the journey:

For those who have money, it's easy to organize the journey, to pay a smuggler, or to pay a hotel and to pay for a plane or car, because it's like a safe passage. [...] But if not, [...] then you're going to stay somewhere in limbo, stranded for long periods of time and you won't know what to do. (Interview, Info Park, Serbia)

It used to be easy to cross, but now it is difficult, [...] the prices have gone up exponentially. Not all the sub-Saharanans can afford to pay €1000 to cross the border. Before, they used to travel alone, but now they go to the South even though it is more risky and they can be caught easily. (Journalist II, Algeria)

The filter borders, as well as the Algerian-Moroccan one, thus hit migrants from the Global South and most severely affect the most disadvantaged among them, both economically and physically. The deadlock borders also have very serious effects on border populations. Borderlands are often considered as peripheral and marginalized spaces, given less importance than the center of a national territory (Vallet 2021; Gerst and Krämer 2021). Borders hold negative economic consequences for borderlands, making them

economically disadvantaged, but at the same time, they can create a specific border economy (Klatt 2021). Border populations often live on trade or – as in the Moroccan-Algerian case – on tolerated small-scale smuggling across the border (Daoudi 2015). Smuggling has for a long time been an important source of income for the population living near this border (ibid.). With the borders not only officially closed but also heavily fortified and controlled, the border population loses a very important source of income, which may be its only significant opportunity to create revenue – to the extent that in the Moroccan case, interviewees speak of an “economic crisis” resulting from the fortification of the border (Interview, Journalist, Morocco). In India and Pakistan, the border populations are likewise very poor and politically marginalized and they are further disadvantaged by the fortification (for India see also Kormoll 2021). In addition to these economic effects, the deadlock borders have severe social effects as they cut familial and social relations. The populations living near these borders depend on the possibility to cross them for a variety of purposes. They maintain strong social, cultural, and familial ties across the borders. Border closures disrupt these ties, forcing people to make very long, costly, and difficult journeys in order to visit each other:

What is really sad is that between the two countries [...] there are mixed families, a lot of them. [...] Humanely speaking it is a scandal. (Interview, Journalist II, Algeria)

For those who have [...] families across the border [...] it's a problem, it's a challenge [...] they're not able to meet their families. (Interview, Faces, Pakistan)

As a consequence, the border populations in Morocco and Algeria have protested against the ongoing closure (The North Africa Post 2018). At both deadlock borders, the border populations are already marginalized economically as well as politically, and the fact that the border closure has put further strain on them is given little significance in national politics. In the case of deadlock borders, even if the fortifications do not target these populations, their suffering is accordingly accepted as a form of collateral damage:

The villages that were living from the trafficking are almost on hold, there is a real economic crisis but nobody cares, people are not really interested in it. [...] People are organizing demonstrations or marches, and since they are far from the center, from Casablanca, from Rabat, we do not know much. Since the journalists from the center of the country barely go there, we do not have much information about it, although it is a region in a very critical situation. (Interview, Journalist, Morocco)

People along these contested borders continue to be marginalized, continue to be disadvantaged, and continue to be brutalized. [...] But in the scale of the populations of India and Pakistan, these are very small numbers. These are very poor people and because they're disadvantaged, they have almost

no ability to influence national and international politics. (Interview, Writer and Historian, India)

At the two deadlock borders, the fence thus does not operate as a filter, but as a blockade that cuts across social and economic practices in the border regions. Although it does not come as a surprise that a closed border also blocks the border population, this fact – as well as its implications for these populations – is often overlooked in literature on fortified borders. In all four cases, the border fences impact on vulnerable populations: the migrants, border populations, or, in the Moroccan-Algerian case, both. This supports viewpoints that consider migration control as a means to reinforce inequality and to develop a differentiated citizenship (Amaya-Castro 2017), as border fortifications here indeed have the effect of intensifying inequalities that already exist. As former research on borders and inequality has importantly stated, border fences both reflect and exacerbate inequalities (Jones 2016; Vernon and Zimmermann 2019). Nevertheless, it is important to note that at the filter borders, inequality is deliberately produced (by excluding certain groups and allowing others), while at the deadlock borders, the fact that certain groups are further marginalized by the fortifications is accepted as a form of collateral damage. The social and human costs of fortifications (Vallet 2017) differ between filter and deadlock borders. The filter borders increase the inequality between the Global North and the Global South by blocking people from the Global South while allowing movement of those from the Global North. Moreover, inequality is amplified by disadvantaging the weaker neighboring state in cases where the border represents a clear line of economic discontinuity. The deadlock borders reinforce the inequality inside the respective countries, between the center and the margins, by disadvantaging those living close to the borders; people who already constitute economically and politically marginalized populations. Moreover, all the fortifications increase the economic inequality between migrants, placing further strain on those who cannot afford to pay the rising prices for smugglers. These different forms of marginalization confirm that “whenever you build up barriers, the most vulnerable ones [will be] in a more difficult situation as a result” (Interview, IOM, Hungary).

#### 4.3 Borders as Resources: Winning and Losing Through Fortifications

So far, this paper has analyzed the different functions of fortified borders and their effects on different groups of border crossers, highlighting inequality and marginalization. However, not everyone loses from fortifications. Therefore, the current section focuses on the state level, discussing the strategic and power-related use of borders (Scott 2021). Borders are considered as

being resources (Sohn 2014), constituting opportunity structures for states that use their borders strategically to generate value from cross-border interactions. Despite major changes in border control, states are still crucial actors in terms of territorial control, and borders are therefore closely related to power (Paasi 2009; Newman 2003). This leads to the question: in what ways do the governments “use” their borders in the case studies presented here? The Hungarian government uses “the issues related to securing the southern border of Hungary [...] as political resources to achieve domestic political- and power-related goals” (Pap and Reményi 2017, 235). In this way, “borders [...] serve as a (geo)political resource in Hungary” (Scott 2021, 117). However, as Serbian citizens can cross the border without difficulties, the fence has no significant disadvantages for Serbia. Due to political circumstances (such as its position as an EU member candidate) and the filter function of the fence, the Serbian government has actually managed to exploit the border fortification to its advantage, seeking to project a positive image to the EU of its handling of the situation. Although Serbia did not agree to the fortification, the circumstances allowed the establishment of an effective win-win situation, with both governments using the border strategically (Korte 2020):

Serbia was actually also kind of making an advantage out of this situation because they’re aiming for EU membership. As it turned out that Hungary is the “bad boy,” they wanted to be the “good boy,” so they realized that taking good care of a few thousand people who got stranded there is worth a great deal with regard to international reputation. [...] But for people living on either side of the border fence, not much has changed. (Interview, Mígszol, Hungary)

In the US-Mexican case, the US government used the border fence to its own advantage by filtering wanted from unwanted mobility and by trying to win votes with the promise of a border wall. The Mexican government was forced to accept US policies and even to adapt their own policies as the weaker trade partner. Border towns in the USA have not been unaffected by the fortification, but it hit the Mexican side much harder:

You can imagine the pressure on the municipalities that are at the border with the U.S. because of people in transit from Central America, as well as people who are returning to Mexico [from the United States]. [...] This year, both those returning and those in transit make up around 50,000 people who are either waiting to cross to the U.S. or for their migration situation to be resolved. (Interview, Ministry of Interior, Mexico)

Here, the border fence creates a “win-lose” situation, playing out to the advantage of the US and to the disadvantage of Mexico. It is thus an example of the “mobilisation of the border as a differential benefit [...] to generate value out of asymmetric cross-border interactions” (Sohn 2014, 587).

In the cases of Morocco-Algeria and Pakistan-India, the complete sealing of the borders disadvantages all four countries economically and, moreover,

hinders regional cooperation. Limiting trade and regional integration weakens the states on both sides of the two borders. In the Indian-Pakistani case, most interview partners agreed that the closed border causes economic damage in both countries and has a negative impact on regional cooperation. Due to the border conflict, there is no direct trade between India and Pakistan; it is only possible via third countries:

The impact of closing the border is the following. The trade that used to take place between India and Pakistan [...] and the connecting roads and the railways: everything has been cut. [...] Most of the India-Pakistan trade is via Dubai. [...] And the other big consequence of the India-Pakistan border dispute and the proxy war is the fact that it has negatively affected the regional relationship amongst the regional countries and the SAARC, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation. (Interview, General II, India)

In the Algerian-Moroccan case, many interview partners were of the opinion that the economies of both countries are suffering as a result of the border closure, but that Morocco loses more from the situation than Algeria. As an oil-producing country, Algeria is less dependent on trade and cooperation with its neighbors than Morocco:

Both sides used to live from trade. People used to bring back goods, fruit, vegetables, semolina, medical drugs. It was a really fruitful trade and it provided work for people on both sides of the border. But now it is finished. On the Algerian side, the situation is the same but there are many social benefits, aid for young people, so it is less painful. (Journalist II, Algeria)

Therefore, although it was Morocco that initially closed and fenced the border, the Moroccan government has recently started to call for its re-opening (Bazza 2018). However, the Algerian side has questioned the sincerity of this demand (The New Arab 2018). For Algeria, the closed border remains an important means of exerting pressure in the conflict over Western Sahara (Zoubir 2012).

Similar to the India-Pakistan case, the interview partners in Morocco and Algeria highlighted the negative impact on both states' economies as well as on regional cooperation and integration. In this case, it is the Arab Maghreb Union that has never been able to function properly because of the Algerian-Moroccan conflict. All four governments at the deadlock borders have – or had – strategic reasons to close the borders; for example, to put pressure on the neighboring country concerning their respective conflicts and rivalries. However, taking into consideration the important economic and political disadvantages resulting from the closed borders, it is – at least to a certain degree – possible to speak of a “lose-lose” situation as a result of border fortification. The different ways in which the governments use their fortifications as resources again affect mobility at the borders. Comparing the situation at filter and deadlock borders, table 2 provides an overview of the varying effects of

border fortifications, also including the impact on border crossers that was discussed in the previous sections in order to give a more complete picture.

**Table 2** Winning and Losing Through Fortified Borders

	Filter borders		Deadlock borders	
	Hungary-Serbia	USA-Mexico	Algeria-Morocco	India-Pakistan
State level: gains and losses	win-(win)	win-lose	(lose)-lose	lose-lose
Mobility: who is excluded	migrants	migrants, Mexican border population	migrants, border populations	border populations

The single cases are of course more complex than this table is able to illustrate. In all the cases, there are certainly internal conflicts between the advantages and disadvantages of border fencing. Nevertheless, this rough classification demonstrates that the mere existence of a border fence does not indicate the relationship or the power balance between the neighboring countries, or the effects on the neighboring states or on border crossers. Filter borders and win-lose situations may be the most common case today – most modern walls are built along an economically asymmetric border (Vallet 2021, 12) – but they are not the only possible situation at fortified borders. This is important because the different functions of fortified borders, filtering or blocking mobility, have very different implications, as shown above.

In all four cases, governments use borders and their fortification as political and strategic resources. Due to the gap in wealth and power between them and their neighbors, the Hungarian and the US governments are able to use their borders as a resource to filter desired from undesired mobility and to select which people they want to allow to enter and which ones they aim to exclude. Moreover, they can use the building of fences as a means to preserve domestic power without having to face significant disadvantages from the fortifications. In the two other cases, the power and economic balance is somewhat less clear, and the governments are involved in longstanding conflicts that consume their resources. Here, the borders are likewise used strategically, but at the cost of economic disadvantages and the suffering of their own (border) populations – confirming that the situation of a border region depends on the relations between the neighboring states (Klatt 2021). The question of how borders work as resources in cases of deadlock borders, where all mobility is blocked and the power balance is reasonably equal, would merit more research. At the very least, the statement that “walls are never built against an equivalent power” (Saddiki 2017, 4) needs to be questioned.

Borders can be resources not only for governments (Lamour and Varga 2017) but also for border populations (Daoudi 2015). The latter often live from small-scale smuggling, which is not only tolerated, but sometimes even

institutionalized by the state power (Gallien 2020; Daoudi 2015). This becomes more difficult the more fortified a border is. While open or partly closed borders may thus function as resources for some populations, fortified borders may serve some governments, but not the border crossers, especially in the cases of deadlock borders. In these cases, fortified borders are definitively not what has been described as “a border for the people” (Laube and Roos 2010, 31) but are instead borders against them.

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## 5. Conclusions

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This paper has examined how fortified borders control mobility and related the different forms of mobility control to inequality and power relations. In order to analyze the effects of fortifications, it is useful to precisely define their different functions. The case studies demonstrate that different types of fortified borders exist, conceptualized here as “filter borders” for the Serbian-Hungarian and the Mexican-US cases and as “deadlock borders” for the Pakistan-Indian and Algerian-Moroccan ones. Filter borders separate desired from undesired mobility, they are fortified by one (wealthier and more powerful) state without the consent of its neighbor, and although the fortification may cause tensions between the neighboring states, they still maintain economic and political ties. Deadlock borders prohibit almost all forms of mobility, they are associated with longstanding political conflicts and little cooperation between neighbors, and their closure is advanced (to different extents) by both sides. Although the four cases presented here do not allow for generalization, it could be suggested that filter borders (and thus mostly win-lose situations) are more likely to appear where there is a strong disparity in wealth and power, and the stronger state can therefore use the border as a resource. By contrast, deadlock borders (and thus probably lose-lose situations) are more likely to exist where the power balance is actively disputed.

These two types of fortifications have different effects on mobility. In all four cases, borders – and border fences – can be used as resources by the respective governments. Sometimes they are tools to control mobility, and sometimes they are used to gain votes or to put pressure on the neighboring country. The political use of borders (Scott 2021) nevertheless differs: while wealthier and more powerful states can use these resources without serious negative consequences, others face adverse economic and political effects from closed borders. In all cases, border fences penalize the people who are constrained from crossing the borders: migrants as well as border populations. Limiting their mobility further disadvantages already marginalized populations. As much as fortified borders may be used as resources by governments, these same fortifications prevent the most vulnerable populations

from using mobility as capital (Kaufmann, Bergman, and Joye 2004). The social and human effects of border fortification have not yet been investigated in depth, and further research on this topic would make an important contribution to current border research. As the current paper is based on a qualitative comparative research design using expert interviews, it cannot provide an in-depth analysis of the effects that border control has on migrants or border populations, nor can it make quantitative statements concerning border types and effects. Instead, it has an explorative intent, presenting new ideas about the implications of fortification. More quantitative studies, as well as more ethnographic research at the borders and with the people who are affected by them, would be relevant to test and develop the conclusions drawn here.

Most fortified borders today are filter borders, appearing at economic and social discontinuity lines (Vallet 2021). The cases examined in the current paper, however, show the variety of border fencing. The win-win case points to the fact that a fence does not always have to be built against the neighbor or to its disadvantage (the discontinuity lines may be elsewhere). The lose-lose cases, by contrast, indicate that where the power balance is reasonably equal, both neighbors can use the border as a resource in some ways, but with significant disadvantages. These cases are less frequent, but comparing their differences provides information about the forms and functions of control – filtering or blocking mobility – as well as their effects and implications. Carrying out more research on these functions would help to add knowledge about how different forms of border control affect different groups of people, and to better understand the “burning political issue” (Balibar 2017) that border fortifications represent today.

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## Annex

### Annex 1 Interview Partners

	Governmental actors / actors close to the government	International or intra-state organizations	NGO/civil society
Hungary	1. University of Public Service, Border Police Department (NUPS)	2. UNHCR Budapest	3. Hungarian Helsinki Committee (human rights organization), Budapest
	4. Migration Research Institute, Budapest	5. UNHCR Szeged	6. Migszol ( <i>migrant solidarity group</i> ), Szeged
		7. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Budapest	8. An independent researcher in migration studies, Budapest
Serbia	9. Commissariat for Refugees, Belgrade	10. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Belgrade	11. Info Park ( <i>migrant support group</i> )
	12. Ministry of Interior, Border Police Directorate, Belgrade		13. Belgrade Center for Human Rights
USA			14. Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) I
			15. Washington Office on Latin America II
			16. Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington D.C.
Mexico	18. Ministry of Interior, Mexico City		17. Wilson Center ( <i>research center</i> ), Washington D.C.
			19. Asylum Access ( <i>migrant support organization</i> ), Mexico City

	20. CNDH (National Human Rights Commission), Mexico City		21. IMUMI ( <i>institute for migrant women</i> ), Mexico City
			22. Casa Refugiados ( <i>shelter for migrants</i> ), Mexico City
Morocco	28. Ministry of Migration, Rabat	25. UNHCR Morocco, Rabat	23. Platform of sub-Saharan associations and communities in Morocco (ASCOMS), Rabat
	27. Royal Institute for Strategic Studies (IRES), Rabat		24. Rabat Social Studies Institute (RSSI Rabat), Rabat
			26. Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH), Rabat
Algeria			29. Journalist, Rabat
			30. Journalist I, Alger
			31. Researcher I, Alger
			32. Researcher II, Marseilles
			33. Journalist II, Maghnia
India	34. General I		35. Aaghaz-e-dosti ( <i>peacebuilding association</i> )
	36. General II		37. Historian, Writer, New Delhi
Pakistan	38. Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)	41. IOM Pakistan	39. Institute for Regional Studies, Islamabad
			40. Faces Pakistan ( <i>peacebuilding association</i> ), Lahore

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## Borders as Places of Control

Fabian Gülzau, Steffen Mau &amp; Kristina Korte

Borders as Places of Control. Fixing, Shifting and Reinventing State Borders. An Introduction.

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Fabian Gülzau &amp; Steffen Mau

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Kristina Korte

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Lena Laube

Diplomatic Side-Effects of the EU’s Externalization of Border Control and the Emerging Role of “Transit States” in Migration Diplomacy.

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Ruben Zaiotti &amp; Nafisa A. Abdulhamid

Inside Out and Outside In: COVID-19 and the Reconfiguration of Europe’s External Border Controls.

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The Body as the Border: A New Era.

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Nina Amelung

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Vladimir Kolosov &amp; Maria Zotova

“De-Facto Borders” as a Mirror of Sovereignty. The Case of the Post-Soviet Non-Recognized States.

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