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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

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This is an Author’s Accepted Manuscript of an article published in DEMOCRATIZATION (Jonas Wolff, Democracy promotion, empowerment, and self-determination: Conflicting objectives in US and German policies towards Bolivia, Democratization, Volume 19 [2012], Issue 3, 415-437) [copyright Taylor & Francis], available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13510347.2012.674356.

Acknowledgments

This article presents selected results of the research project ‘Determinants of democratic states’ handling of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion’ conducted by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and Goethe University Frankfurt and supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Previous versions were presented at the 2010 Convention of the International Studies Association, at the 2010 Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations, and in the Carnegie Papers series (Wolff, ‘Challenges to Democracy Promotion’). The author thanks Hans Agné, Thomas Carothers, Arthur Goldsmith, Diane de Gramont, Annika Poppe, Laurence Whitehead, Richard Youngs, the members of the German Research Network ‘External Democratization Policies’, the editors of this Special Issue, and two anonymous reviewers for comments. All translations into English are those of the author.
Democracy promotion, empowerment, and self-determination: Conflicting objectives in US and German policies towards Bolivia

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Promoting democracy implies fostering political empowerment and self-determination. Although this creates obvious problems for any external policy seeking to change authoritarian regimes, mainstream thinking on democratization in the case of post-transition countries would predict a somewhat easier task for potential democracy promoters: cooperation with the elected government strengthens the democratic regime, while democracy assistance that supports institutional capacities and civil society participation simultaneously contributes to the protection and deepening of democracy. This article argues that such a view is far too simple. In the broad range of ‘normal’ post-transition countries, democracy promotion can be confronted with a variety of conflicts of objectives associated with the fact that there is no democracy without some kind of self-determination and no process of democratization without some degree of political empowerment. The article presents a typology of these conflicts of objectives and applies it to the case of Bolivia. Subsequently, it offers an analysis of how two important democracy promoters in the country – namely, the US and Germany – reacted to Bolivia’s ‘democratic revolution’ and handled their respective conflicting objectives.

Keywords: democracy promotion; democratization; foreign policy; development cooperation

Introduction

Democracy means self-determination of the people; democratization entails political empowerment. How, then, could these two processes possibly present a challenge to external democracy promotion? There is no question that in dealing with non-democratic regimes, the dual aim to support democratization as a process of regime change and democratic self-determination as a result is intrinsically contradictory: The former implies participation in the

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toppling of an existing regime, an activity clearly in opposition to the notion of self-determination. More specifically, it is commonly acknowledged that processes of political empowerment associated with the introduction of democratic institutions may increase the risk of violent conflict. Such processes can overburden the capacity of state institutions ill-prepared to handle broad-based political mobilization and participation, threaten entrenched authoritarian elites, or incite empowered majorities to turn against (e.g. ethnic) minorities.¹

Consequently, the idea that democracy promotion is the best way to foster peace both within countries and internationally is increasingly being called into question, especially in light of recent experiences with regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan.² However, this critical debate on the premises of external democracy promotion has focused on the prominent and particularly difficult cases of coerced regime change, the democratization of authoritarian regimes, and the implementation of democracy in post-conflict societies. This tends to create the illusion that these important but specific problems do not affect the day-to-day business of democracy promotion concerned with strengthening political institutions, supporting civil society, and dissolving ‘democratic defects’ and ‘authoritarian legacies’ in regimes that are, at least in a basic sense, already democratic. In such post-transition countries, the agenda for would-be democracy promoters is largely seen as straight-forward: Cooperation with the elected government strengthens the democratic regime, while democracy assistance that supports institutional capacities and civil society participation simultaneously contributes to the stabilization of democratic institutions (protection of democracy) and to improving the quality of the democratic regime (deepening of democracy). Certainly, there is a wide-ranging debate about the (limited) impact of democracy promotion and the best strategies and measures to be implemented under various circumstances.³ However, this debate has focused on problem-solving within an unquestioned agenda of democracy promotion and largely avoids critical examination of the normative and conceptual premises behind this agenda.⁴
This article argues that also in the broad range of ‘normal’ post-transition countries, democracy promotion is regularly confronted with a variety of conflicts of objectives. The article examines the plausibility of this general argument with regard to democracy promotion in Bolivia, and namely US and German reactions to the ongoing transformation of Bolivian democracy. Two of the research questions outlined in the introduction to this special issue are addressed: (1) What are the conflicting objectives in democracy promotion? (2) How do democracy promoters deal with these conflicts? Regarding the first question, the article presents a typology of conflicts of objectives associated with self-determination and empowerment in post-transition countries, and applies this typology to Bolivia’s ongoing democratic transformation. The main empirical part of the article investigates the second question, analysing how two important democracy promoters in the country – the US and Germany – reacted to Bolivia’s ‘democratic revolution’ and handled their respective conflicting objectives.

The case of Bolivia has been selected because it represents a fairly easy case for democracy promotion. Following a turbulent transition to democracy in the early 1980s, Bolivia has now experienced almost three decades of continuous democratic rule. In the 1990s, the country was regarded as a development model that successfully combined democratization, stabilization, and (neo-)liberal economic reform. Identification of conflicts of objectives in the Bolivian case would therefore strongly support the claim that these are general phenomena and are not limited to very specific difficult circumstances. A comparison of US and German policies towards Bolivia is promising because of the diverging profiles of these two ‘donors’: The US has important tangible interests in Bolivia, especially concerning the so-called ‘War on Drugs’, and thus severe extrinsic conflicts of objectives (democracy promotion vs. donor interests) can be expected; for Germany, Bolivia is mainly relevant only as a recipient of German development aid, and thus the intrinsic side of the conflicts of objectives can be assessed without much ‘noise’ stemming from economic or security
interests. The case studies trace US and German reactions to political change in Bolivia by drawing on secondary sources (including media reports), official documents (including data on foreign assistance), and interviews conducted in Bolivia, Germany, and the US.\(^6\)

The article starts by presenting a typology of the conflicts of objectives that democracy promoters can be expected to face in post-transition countries (second section) and, then, applies it to the case of Bolivia (third section). Subsequent sections analyse how the US and Germany reacted to Bolivia’s ‘democratic revolution’ (fourth section) and compare how they handled their respective conflicts of objectives (fifth section).

**Self-determination and empowerment as challenges to democracy promotion**

In a basic sense, the conflicts of objectives that are potentially relevant for post-transition countries correspond to those usually discussed in relation to the democratization of authoritarian regimes and post-conflict societies (see above and the introduction to this Special Issue). This is due to the fact that promoting democracy in countries that have established at least rudimentary democratic institutions also implies democratization, albeit a further democratization of the existing democracy. Of course, improving the quality of – or deepening – democracy can refer to any of the multiple dimensions of democracy, including the strength and capacity of democratic institutions and the rule of law. However, questions of political empowerment and national self-determination are obviously relevant here: Democracy as it exists in particular in developing countries (countries usually featuring sharp social inequalities and/or high poverty rates) is characterized by extreme asymmetries in *de facto* political participation, representation, and responsiveness; at the same time, asymmetric inter- and trans-national interdependencies mean that national sovereignty as a condition for democratic self-determination is particularly constrained in the developing world. Promoting democracy under such circumstances should include actions to reduce these asymmetries by contributing to the political empowerment of disadvantaged social sectors and increasing the
scope for national self-determination.

The very nature of democracy as self-determination and of democratization as political empowerment, however, gives rise to conflicts of objectives in post-transition countries.\(^7\) I propose to distinguish four types of conflicting objectives (see Table 1).

*Table 1: Conflicts of objectives*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Conflicting Objectives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-determination (political deviance of recipient country)</td>
<td>(1) Self-determination vs. donor interests (<em>extrinsic</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Self-determination vs. universalist donor conceptions (<em>intrinsic</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment (political conflict in recipient country)</td>
<td>(3) Political empowerment vs. protection of democracy (<em>intrinsic</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Political empowerment vs. intra-state peace (<em>extrinsic</em>)</td>
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The political empowerment of marginalized sectors of society, when successful, entails at least a partial change in political elites and should have an impact on a given country’s official political preferences, if there is any real substance to democratic self-determination. Given the highly asymmetric distribution of economic welfare and political power in the contemporary world, such changing preferences (driven by formerly marginalized sectors in relatively disadvantaged countries) will often challenge the economic and political privileges of those ‘North-Western’ countries that usually engage in democracy promotion. Such deviance from donor preferences might concern not only tangible economic or security interests, but also divergence in terms of the concepts of what democracy and ‘good’ governance are.\(^8\) In each case, the recipient country, based on its claim for national self-determination, will challenge donor preferences. For democracy promoters, the democratically driven divergence from donor interests – (1) in Table 1 – and universalist donor conceptions of ‘good, democratic governance’ – (2) in the table – raises the question of whether to tolerate deviance in the name
of democratic self-determination or not.

The empowerment and inclusion of marginalized sectors of society requires the redistribution of political power. However, the democratic state (like any state) institutionalizes social power relations; post-transition democracies are regularly built on (institutionalized) pacts and social compromises, and, in general, democracy under conditions of structural social inequalities depends on systematic limits to democratic participation in order to prevent the elites from defecting from the democratic rules of the game.\(^9\) Thus, empowerment in the sense of enhanced participation by marginalized sectors requires levelling the democratic playing field, which may include profound institutional and possibly constitutional change. The attempt to redistribute political power can therefore lead to a dismantling of the democratic institutions that are already in place. At the same time, the empowerment of marginalized sectors, regardless of whether they are accompanied by institutional change, may give rise to radical demands for the redistribution of economic resources and political power. If this is met with resistance from threatened elites (including privileged middle sectors), polarization can lead to an escalation of violent conflicts with the looming threat of civil war. In either case, empowerment in the recipient country clashes with the donors’ aim to protect a stable and peaceful constitutional order. Rising tensions between the goal to increase the political participation of marginalized sectors of society, on the one hand, and to protect existing democratic institutions – (3) in Table 1 – and uphold intra-state peace – (4) in the table –, on the other, prompt questions of whether too much political empowerment could eventually threaten democracy.

The conflicts (1) and (2) in Table 1 refer to contradictions between donor and recipient preferences; the conflicts (3) and (4) emerge from contradictory developments within the recipient country that lead to conflicting objectives on part of the donor. Following the distinction by Spanger and Wolff\(^10\) adopted in the introduction to this special issue, types (2) and (3) refer to intrinsic conflicts of objectives where different sub-goals of democracy
promotion clash, while types (1) and (4) concern extrinsic conflicts: here, the aim of democracy promotion clashes with other objectives (donor interests or intra-state peace).

The transformation of democracy in Bolivia

Between 2000 and 2005, Bolivia experienced a series of political crises. Massive social protests forced the resignation of both President Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 and his successor Carlos Mesa in 2005. In the course of these crises, Evo Morales, a union leader, coca grower, and the head of the Movement towards Socialism (MAS), established himself as the leading representative of the diverse protest movements. In December 2005, Morales was elected President of Bolivia by an absolute majority of the vote and became the country’s first indigenous head of state. Following his election, Morales initiated a period of profound political change that included the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and the adoption of a new constitution (by referendum in January 2009), as well as a change in economic and social policies exemplified by the ‘nationalization’ of the hydrocarbon sector – Bolivia’s most important export sector – and a series of social programmes. In December 2009, Morales was re-elected with 63% of the vote, and his MAS party won a two-thirds majority in the new parliament. This article examines the period of Morales’s first term as president (2005–2009).

With regard to democracy promotion, five characteristics of Bolivia’s self-proclaimed ‘democratic revolution’ stand out.

First, the democratic legitimization of the government and the overall process of political change stands in contrast to the series of procedural irregularities and outright breaches of constitutional and administrative law that have occurred during the period between 2005-2009. While impressive electoral victories since 2005 have demonstrated that Morales and his MAS party can rely on solid support from a clear majority of the population, the process of constitutional reform has been accompanied by controversial acts. For example, in a highly disputed procedure, the draft for the new constitution was adopted by the
Constituent Assembly by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly present at the time of voting, while the most important opposition groups had boycotted the vote. Following nine months of political struggle, a two-thirds majority in Congress agreed to a detailed revision of the constitutional draft; this procedure lacked any legal basis, but was crucial for enabling the constitutional reform to be accepted even by a significant part of the opposition, thus preventing further escalation of the political conflict.11

Second, in terms of representation and participation, the quality of Bolivian democracy has improved, but there have been at least temporary declines in institutional controls and in transparent and rule-bound (‘good’) governance. Both the government and parliament are considerably more representative today than ever before, and political participation (measured by participation in elections, among other factors) has clearly grown. At the same time, the restructuring of political institutions has meant that respect for the established institutional order was low; during the process of constitutional reform, old institutional controls and procedural rules were gradually dismantled before new ones had been established. Disputes between the government and the highest branches of the judiciary escalated, with the latter gradually losing their authority due to a series of resignations that were not followed by new appointments.

Third, the profound restructuring of the political system has generally been in accordance with the usual standards of democracy and human rights, but includes significant deviations from more specific liberal-democratic (donor country) conceptions. The new constitution includes the classical set of political and civil rights, and the new political system is dominated by mechanisms and institutions of representative democracy. However, this basic liberal-democratic order has been amended and modified in nontrivial ways: Indigenous (customary) law has been established as a second judicial system of equal status alongside the ordinary legal system; indigenous collective rights now permit self-government in autonomous indigenous territories in accordance with indigenous customs and practices;
indigenous minority groups in rural areas elect their delegates to the national parliament through special electoral districts; mechanisms of direct democracy such as recall, referendums, and popular legislative initiatives have been established; the highest branches of the judiciary are now to be elected by popular vote; and ‘organized civil society’ has gained vaguely defined but potentially far-reaching rights to participate in the design of public policy and to control public administration. Furthermore, social and economic rights now clearly go beyond anything generally found in established liberal democracies, with possibilities for privatization (e.g. of public services) constrained and property rights (e.g. for land) delimited.\textsuperscript{12}

Fourth, changes in economic and social policies promoted by the new government, while in line with a solid majority of the Bolivian population, differ significantly from both US and German conceptions of ‘sound’ development policies \textit{and} from US and German economic interests. The most important example here is the policy of nationalization, particularly (but not exclusively) in the hydrocarbon sector. In general, international companies have been forced into new contractual relationships, the control by the state (and state companies) of the affected sectors has been strengthened, and fiscal participation (royalties and taxes) has increased. Another example of political deviance from donor interests – that specifically concerns the US – is connected to the policy of coca eradication: The Morales government has shifted from the US-style ‘War on Drugs’ (that had included the coerced eradication of coca plants) towards a combination of cooperative coca eradication and continuing counter-narcotics efforts against drug trafficking.

Fifth, the political inclusion of anti-systemic social movements contributing to political stabilization and a de-escalation of the conflict between the state and these movements has been accompanied by a political marginalization/alienation of the former political and economic elites, thereby reinforcing regional and ethnic divisions, political polarization and an escalation of this new kind of conflict. Following the toppling of President
Sánchez de Lozada in 2003, it had become virtually impossible to govern the country against the will of the ‘popular sectors’, as represented by the social and indigenous movements. Thus it was expected that Morales’s election would lead to political stabilization. Indeed, although social protests led by a diverse spectrum of popular-sector groups continued throughout Morales’s first term in office, he initially brought relative stability to the country; however, in the context of the constitutional reform process in particular, serious political disputes and social conflicts resurfaced. The opposition now came from regional autonomy movements in the south-eastern lowland departments (the so-called *media luna*), led by the elected governors of these regional governments and ‘civic committees’. In September 2008, protests in the opposition-dominated lowlands peaked; cities, streets, and gas pipelines were blocked, federal institutions were occupied, and violence escalated between oppositional and pro-government groups.

From the very beginning, the ‘democratic revolution’ initiated by Morales has represented a series of challenges to German and especially to US policies. The rejection of ‘neo-liberal’ economic policies and the US-driven ‘War on Drugs’ compromises the development strategies promoted by the US and Germany and directly affects their economic and security interests. In addition, the political transformation promoted by Morales deviates from the model of democratic governance to which the US and Germany adhere. In actual fact, this transformation meant replacing the democratic institutions that were established after the transition to democracy in the 1980s (with active support from both the US and Germany). In this sense, the first three characteristics of Bolivia’s process of political change – which refer to the contradictory nature of the transformation of democracy – lead to intrinsic conflicts of objectives on the part of external democracy promoters: the emphasis on self-determination, including related principles such as alignment and ownership, clashes with the donors’ universalist notions of what good democratic governance means (self-determination vs. universalism) as well as with the aim to protect and strengthen existing democratic
institutions, good governance standards, and the rule of law (empowerment vs. protection of democracy). The fourth and fifth characteristics – which point to the policy changes and the political polarization that have accompanied Bolivia’s ‘democratic revolution’ – implicate extrinsic conflicts of objectives: here, democracy promotion becomes at odds with specific donor interests and potentially threatens intra-state peace.

**US and German reactions to Evo Morales**

Before the premature end of Sánchez de Lozada’s second presidency in 2003, the US and German interactions with Bolivia were characterized by good bilateral relations. In the case of US foreign policy, close bilateral relations at the time generally included support of democratic governments and, in particular, of elected presidents in times of domestic political crises. US support to Bolivia primarily consisted of diplomatic approval, trade preferences, and financial and technical assistance, all heavily focused on cooperation with the US-driven ‘War on Drugs’ and involving a high degree of direct political involvement in Bolivian domestic affairs. Germany has been far less exposed and committed in Bolivia, but again, bilateral relations have traditionally been good and for the most part smooth. German support to Bolivia’s elected governments has primarily consisted of development assistance; in general, German foreign policy towards Bolivia is mainly development policy. With regard to democracy assistance, US and German development aid to Bolivia has encompassed a range of projects explicitly intended to strengthen democratic institutions, processes, and actors (see below). The following analysis examines how the US and Germany reacted to Morales’s election and administration and the resulting conflicts of objectives, in terms of both diplomatic relations and democracy assistance.
The United States

Diplomatic Relations

Following Morales’s election, the US took a wait-and-see approach. The official line was to ‘congratulate the people of Bolivia on a successful election’, but also to emphasize that ‘the behavior of the new government’ would determine the course of the bilateral relationship: ‘It’s important that the new government govern in a democratic way […]’. Even prior to the election, the US government had taken a low-key attitude, a significant difference to the 2002 presidential election, during which then Ambassador Manuel Rocha openly threatened the possible withdrawal of US assistance if the Bolivian people dared to elect Morales. There were no negative repercussions, even when the newly-elected Morales called President George W. Bush a terrorist and appointed a cabinet that was widely perceived as friendly to the indigenous and social movements and critical of neo-liberal economics and the US ‘War on Drugs’. The US Embassy in La Paz even signalled its willingness to shift the focus of its policies on coca eradication towards a fight against cocaine and ‘surplus’ coca only.

Given the history of hostile relations between the US government and Morales, bilateral relations during the first two years of the Morales presidency were remarkably calm. Although both sides made critical statements, their impact on US policies and bilateral relations was fairly limited. For example, in June 2006, the Assistant Administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Adolfo Franco, stated that the Bolivian government had ‘on several occasions, demonstrated inclinations to consolidate executive power and promote potentially anti-democratic reforms through the Constituent Assembly and other means’. In September 2006, President Bush expressed concern ‘with the decline in Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation’. The Director of National Intelligence at the time John Negroponte, in 2007, stated that he viewed democracy as ‘most at risk in Venezuela and Bolivia’. ‘In both countries, the elected presidents, Chavez and Morales, are taking advantage of their popularity to undercut the opposition and eliminate checks on their authority.’
return, the Bolivian government periodically rejected US ‘impositions’ and accused the Bush administration of using US assistance to support the opposition and destabilize Bolivia.\(^\text{19}\)

In 2008, the situation changed dramatically from rhetorical tension to ‘diplomatic breakdown’.\(^\text{20}\) In June 2008, the cocalero movement and local mayors from Bolivia’s largest coca growing region, Chapare, declared they would not sign any further agreements with USAID and \textit{de facto} expelled USAID from the region, a decision endorsed by the Bolivian government. In September, amid a severe domestic political crisis provoked by the autonomy movements in the south eastern lowlands, Morales declared US Ambassador Philip Goldberg ‘\textit{persona non grata\textquotedblright}, accusing him of supporting opposition forces. The US government retaliated by expelling Bolivia’s Ambassador to Washington. A few days later, President Bush declared that Bolivia had ‘failed demonstrably’ to adhere to its ‘obligations under international counternarcotics agreements’. Bush avoided the automatic termination of US aid by declaring the bilateral programmes in Bolivia to be ‘vital to the national interests of the United States’.\(^\text{21}\) However, ‘decertification’ meant that Bolivia lost access to US trade preferences in the framework of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). The Bolivian government responded by expelling the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from the country.

In addition, Bolivia lost access to funding from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). In 2004, Bolivia had been selected as eligible for the MCA by meeting conditions concerning ‘ruling justly’, ‘investing in people’, and ‘encouraging economic freedom’. In December 2008, however, the Board of Directors of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) decided not to re-select Bolivia. Although the country’s scores on three governance indicators that are relevant for MCA eligibility had actually declined, comparisons with other MCC beneficiaries and interviews in Washington suggest that this gradual deterioration alone would not have triggered the suspension, had it not been in the context of the crisis in US-Bolivian relations.\(^\text{22}\)
In order to rebuild bilateral relations with Bolivia, the incoming Obama Administration launched a bilateral dialogue with the Bolivian government. The first meetings were held in May and October 2009. However, Obama refrained from reinstating Bolivia’s trade preferences and, in September 2009, again ‘decertified’ Bolivia. Bolivian authorities responded by continuing to accuse the US of supporting opposition groups. In this context, neither side could agree upon a new framework for bilateral cooperation.

*Development cooperation and democracy assistance*

The decline in US foreign aid to Bolivia preceded this deterioration in overall bilateral relations. It originates from Mesa’s interim government (2004–2005) and continued throughout Morales’s first presidency (2006–2009): The total US foreign assistance per year declined continuously from more than $150 million per year in 2002–2004 to less than $100 million in 2008 and 2009. US assistance remained significant, however, and the request for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 even sought to increase the flow of aid, signalling an interest to remain engaged, albeit at a lower level than in the early 2000s.\(^{23}\)

Officially, continued foreign assistance to Bolivia was justified by persistent local needs, especially with regard to narcotics control, poverty reduction, and democracy promotion,\(^ {24}\) but it was also to serve US political interests. Following the election ‘of a government that campaigned on promises that included decriminalizing coca and nationalizing private property’, the US felt the need to demonstrate ‘flexibility to protect our core interests’; flexibility here meant trying ‘to engage with the new government (as circumstances allow)’, but also with ‘the military and, particularly, the regional governments’.\(^ {25}\) Indeed, the new programme Strengthening of Democratic Institutions (Fortalecimiento de Instituciones Democráticas, or FIDEM) prioritized the departments, i.e. the regional governments. This change was a direct reaction to the first elections of departmental governors in December 2005. While Morales and his MAS party obtained
majorities at the national level in these elections, opposition candidates won in six of the nine departments. As a result, when FIDEM was launched in October 2006, USAID directly supported Morales’s strongest opponents.

An additional instrument in the US’ response was the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). In reaction to the political crisis surrounding Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation, OTI launched a programme in March 2004 ‘to help reduce tensions in areas prone to social conflict and to assist the country in preparing for key electoral events’. After the December 2005 elections, OTI re-targeted its programme towards ‘building the capacity of prefect-led departmental governments’. Between March 2006 and June 2007, OTI approved more than 100 grants for a total of $4.5 million, which included technical support and training for prefecture staff ‘to help departmental governments operate more strategically’. 26

Reflecting this new focus, the outline of US foreign assistance for FY 2008 did not even mention the Bolivian central government as a partner. Continued US cooperation with the national government notwithstanding, 27 the document stated that ‘partnerships will be developed with regional and local governments and non-governmental organizations (NGO), the private sector, and other non-executive branch entities to prevent further erosion of democracy, combat cocaine production and trafficking, improve healthcare, and increase educational opportunities’. Funding for democracy and governance assistance was to ‘be used to strengthen the Congress as well as state and local governments, encourage moderate national leaders, support legislation that complies with international standards to combat corruption and money laundering, and expand public diplomacy to emphasize the positive correlation between democracy and development’. Assistance was also provided ‘to support an active, credible civil society […] and to strengthen political parties’. 28 In addition, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) more than doubled its grants for activities in Bolivia from about $560,000 in 2007 to over $1.3 million per year since 2009, reinforcing the
US shift toward the support of civil society.29

The emphasis on departmental governments – the bastion of the opposition – and ‘civil society’ aligned perfectly with a strategy explicitly outlined by USAID: to focus assistance on ‘the support of counterweights to one-party control such as judicial and media independence, a strong civil society, and educated local and state level leaders’.30 Given the highly sensitive Bolivian government (which had on several occasions denounced US support to the opposition), this decidedly political mission was framed and implemented ‘in an apolitical, balanced manner’. As a result, support for regional and local authorities included assistance for jurisdictions led by representatives from both the opposition and the ruling party. US-funded programmes supporting political parties have been limited since late FY 2007 to ‘multi-party training events so as to ensure a clear public perception of apolitical “balance”’, putting on hold ‘[o]ne-on-one political party trainings and consultations, which were a key part of a political party strengthening program’.31

This last move has especially affected the local offices of the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Up until September 2007, IRI trained candidates for the Constituent Assembly and NDI organized debates between candidates from across the political spectrum. From October 2007 to July 2008, IRI and NDI supported political parties (including the governing MAS party), citizen groups, and indigenous peoples via multi-party activities such as events and workshops. Even before USAID decided to limit party support to multi-party activities (and before Morales’ election), the US political party institutes had included MAS in their activities.32 However, originally USAID’s programme to strengthen political parties was explicitly intended to ‘dovetail’ with the (then-governing party) MNR and to ‘help build moderate, pro-democracy political parties that can serve as a counter-weight to the radical MAS’.33

The Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) for FY 2010 signalled important adaptations to official Bolivian preferences. It reintroduced references to ‘Bolivian
government counterparts’ and requested a significant increase in funding to support Integrated Justice Centres, a programme implemented in direct cooperation with the Bolivian Ministry of Justice. Most notably, a new ‘priority program’ to strengthen the performance of municipalities across Bolivia was announced.³⁴ This reflected a crucial adjustment to the US democracy assistance portfolio. USAID had supported local governments in Bolivia since 1996, but from 2006 onwards, the new programme FIDEM had prioritized the departmental level over the municipal level. However, US support for the departments was met with fierce criticism from the Bolivian government, culminating in the expulsion of the US Ambassador. With the phase-out of FIDEM in 2009, the US ended support for departmental governments and focused again on the municipal level, in line with the demands by the Bolivian government. This decision predates Obama’s election, so this change cannot be explained by the new president’s revised foreign policy approach. The desire to adjust US democracy promotion activities to better match official Bolivian preferences indicates a decision to adapt to a government that was likely to remain in power for some time, and signalled an interest by the US to remain engaged.³⁵

Before a new USAID democracy programme could be launched, however, a new bilateral agreement was needed, which the two governments were unable to successfully negotiate. In August 2009, the Bolivian government instructed USAID to halt its democracy promotion activities, but signalled its willingness to accept US support for municipal governments. Accordingly, in 2009, USAID terminated its democracy and governance programmes, ‘with the exception of some municipal strengthening activities’.³⁶ NDI also halted its Bolivian programme in 2009, after the Bolivian authorities rejected its application for registration. Like NDI, IRI also lost USAID funding, but continued to support good governance at the municipal level through a NED grant.
Germany

Diplomatic relations

Bilateral relations between Germany and Bolivia, focused primarily on development assistance, have been far less affected by the election of Morales than US-Bolivian relations. Indeed, official German reactions to Morales’ victory were decidedly positive. In February 2006, the Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Wieczorek-Zeul promised to continue supporting Bolivia.37 Two months later, she travelled to La Paz to ‘signal that the Federal Republic [of Germany] is a reliable partner for Bolivia and that we support the new government’s efforts especially regarding poverty reduction, nature conservation and the strengthening of the rights of the indigenous population’.38 The German Foreign Office was reportedly not as enthusiastic as the Development Ministry, but did not take a public position. Nonetheless, the German Embassy in La Paz was fairly sympathetic to the new government, and officially Germany’s position combined hope for political change with an offer to support it.39

On the issue of drug policy, Germany had traditionally been sceptical of coerced coca eradication, favouring a more cooperative stance. As a result, the German government was much less alarmed by the changes in this policy field, announced by the new Bolivian government, than the US was. It was primarily the nationalization of gas that was met with German scepticism. In fact, this was the only topic that provoked a public statement on Bolivia by the German Foreign Minister: In an interview, Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed his ‘great scepticism’ about the decision ‘to nationalize the Bolivian oil and gas industry’.40 However, Wieczorek-Zeul directly responded to Steinmeier, stating that every country should ‘have the sovereignty to decide how to organize its natural resources’. She argued that it would be ‘wrong and counterproductive’ to threaten Bolivia with a suspension of development cooperation over ‘business disputes about the status of energy companies’.41

With regard to the one German company (Oiltanking) affected by the nationalization,
the German Embassy continuously engaged the Bolivian government to reach a negotiated solution, and Chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly dedicated a good part of her conversation with Morales at the EU-Latin America/Caribbean Summit in Lima in May 2008 to this subject. The German government also suspended a climate change and energy project as a direct sanction, but in general this dispute had no discernible wider implications for bilateral relations.42

*Development cooperation and democracy assistance*

German development aid to Bolivia has been largely characterized by continuity. With Morales barely six months into his first term, the two governments agreed to continue German development cooperation in the three established priority areas, ‘water supply/sanitation’, ‘sustainable agriculture’ and ‘modernization of state and democracy’. However, this continuity has been accompanied by some flexibility from Germany in response to the priorities set by the new Bolivian government. For example, in the area of democracy assistance, Berlin promised support to the Constituent Assembly.

In a new country strategy adopted in June 2007, Germany’s Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development stated that the Bolivian government’s ‘new orientation of economic and societal policies’ and, in particular, its aim to include the marginalized indigenous majority offered ‘new chances for development cooperation’. Although the document mentioned the risks of ‘radicalizing political polarization’ and raised ‘doubts’ regarding the consistent commitment to ‘democratic rules’ within the ‘very heterogeneous MAS movement’, the core problems highlighted were structural ‘deficits’, including socio-economic inequality, poverty, weak institutional and administrative capacities, corruption, and a ‘deficient culture of conflict resolution’. All of these were problems the Morales government had inherited and thus required support to address.43

As mentioned above, democracy assistance continued to be among the priority areas
of German development cooperation with Bolivia. The data on German Official Development Assistance (ODA) confirms this continuity in both the general amount of aid and the absolute size and relative weight of democracy assistance. Indeed, since 2006, Germany has, during intergovernmental negotiations, agreed to increase development assistance to Bolivia. In 2007, the German government promised a total of €52 million for the two years 2007 and 2008, and in 2009 it agreed to give €62 million for 2009 and 2010. In general, aid in the OECD category of ‘Government & Civil Society’ accounted for between one-fifth and one-third of German ODA to Bolivia. In 2008, new German ODA commitments to Bolivia went mainly (60.7%) to the subsector ‘government administration’, with ‘legal and judicial development’ and ‘strengthening civil society’ each accounting for 16.7%.44

The most important German aid programme in this area was ‘Decentralized Governance and Poverty Reduction Support’ (Programa de Apoyo a la Gestión Pública Descentralizada y Lucha contra la Pobreza, or PADEP). This programme was administered by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the organization that implemented the bulk of official German technical assistance (until 2011, when it was merged into the newly formed Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, or GIZ). PADEP began in 2002 with a thematic focus on poverty reduction, decentralization, and municipal development, and a regional focus on two particularly poor regions (Norte de Potosí and Chaco). The programme was subdivided into different (three to six) components that changed frequently. PADEP’s first phase ended in 2005, so that the initiation of the second phase (2006–2009) coincided with the change in the Bolivian government. A third and final phase (2010–2011) started in 2010.

The adjustments made to PADEP clearly reflect an adaptation to new Bolivian priorities and to the new political setting in general: Cooperation at the national level grew in relevance (relative to subnational entities), with much greater focus on structural political reforms than had been originally anticipated. Most notably, a new component was added to
support the Constituent Assembly, the most important political initiative Morales promoted after taking office. This component supported the Bolivian government’s coordinating agency representing the presidency (REPAC) that was established in March 2006 to organize the assembly and gave direct assistance to the assembly itself, including its directorate, technical unit, and commissions. After the end of the Constituent Assembly, PADEP shifted its focus to support the constitutional transition process, the implementation of the new constitution, and the new parliament (the Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional). With regards to PADEP’s decentralization component, the GTZ worked closely with the Bolivian Ministry of Autonomies to support the new process of creating autonomous governments at the subnational level. In addition, at the request of the Bolivian government, support for the national planning system was (temporarily) upgraded to an independent component of PADEP.

Another adjustment in the German development cooperation concerns an enhanced emphasis on crisis prevention and conflict resolution. One component of PADEP focused on ‘Constructive Conflict Resolution and Culture of Peace’, and since 2007, German aid has implemented instruments including ‘Peace and Conflict Assessments’ and ‘Do No Harm’. Germany also planned to introduce a common procedure for all German development programmes and projects to identify and eventually avoid conflict-aggravating effects. The sensitivity in democracy promotion activities to potential political and conflict-enhancing ramifications of supposedly ‘technical’ cooperation seems to have grown. Consequently, PADEP’s work with political institutions – national and subnational governments, Parliament, the Constituent Assembly – has at least in part shifted from offers of technical advice to efforts at promoting dialogue.

A significant example of the latter is the unofficial role that German development cooperation has played in facilitating negotiations between the central government and regional opposition, which ultimately led to a congressional agreement on constitutional
reform. Furthermore, in 2009, GTZ started a new programme (Programa de Fortalecimiento a la Concertación y al Estado de Derecho, or CONCED) funded by the German foreign ministry to support dialogue processes and improve the rule of law in the implementation of the new constitution. An additional project (PROJURIDE), funded by the Development Ministry, assists Bolivia’s Ministry of Justice in establishing a new ‘intercultural legal system’ in which indigenous jurisdiction is to be given the same weight as formal law, as envisioned by the new constitution.

German democracy assistance as implemented by GTZ is largely aimed at the Bolivian government at various state levels and, in general, GTZ is eager to maintain ‘an image of neutrality’. In contrast, Germany’s political foundations take explicit political stances. The Social-Democratic Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), for example, has developed a relationship with the governing MAS party. This was not easy, given the foundation’s previous engagement with former governments and Bolivia’s ‘traditional’ parties. It also represented a clear departure from Germany’s prior position, reportedly taken by the foreign ministry, to not cooperate with those opposition forces represented by Morales and the MAS, although it did directly follow the German government’s decision to engage the Morales government. However, FES’s approach has not involved explicit political support for the MAS party. On the other side of the political spectrum, the Hanns Seidel Stiftung (HSS), which has close connections to Germany’s Christian Social Union, has openly supported the main opposition party PODEMOS (through the Bolivian political foundation FUNDEMOS). Meanwhile, the Christian-Democratic Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), although very critical to Morales in public statements, has implemented relatively neutral activities. From these different angles, all three German foundations present in Bolivia have contributed to the process of constitutional reforms. In fact, FES played an important role in preparing the groundwork for the congressional agreement on the draft constitution in October 2008.
Notwithstanding the general support for Morales, German officials, like their US counterparts, have been concerned about what they see as deviance from standards of liberal democracy and the rule of law, although they almost always mention this only in private (e.g. in interviews). Under certain circumstances, however, German aid activities have been suspended. When irregularities and conflicts in the Constituent Assembly peaked in December 2006 and again during the Assembly’s final months in 2007, German support for the process was suspended (as part of a common European decision). As a reaction to the Assembly’s controversial conclusion, Germany stepped back from its original plan to support the public dissemination of the draft constitution. Similarly, in 2008 when the opposition departments adopted their ‘autonomy statutes’ in referenda lacking any legal basis, GTZ/PADEP temporarily abstained from new cooperation initiatives with the departments, and made support to them dependent on approval from the Bolivian government, and limited support to areas that would not contribute to the process of regional autonomy. Interviews conducted with German organizations in Bolivia confirm that these German reactions were rooted in a conflict-related aim to ‘do no harm’. Considerations of empirical legitimacy or factual approval – not formal legality or democratic correctness – led Germany to suspend or reconsider its cooperation.

Dealing with conflicting objectives: A comparative analysis

The four general conflicts of objectives identified at the beginning of this article were clearly relevant for both US and German democracy promotion policies towards Bolivia. Unsurprisingly, the varying characteristics of the two ‘donors’ meant that different conflicts came to the fore in different shapes and were addressed in different ways.

Self-determination vs. donor interests: For the US, the political deviance of the Bolivian government was particularly relevant in connection to specific US interests in the ‘War on Drugs’. Officially, the US government reacted in line with democracy promotion by
respecting self-determination and ownership. In fact, the US continued (and, as far as the Bolivian government allows, still continues) to cooperate in Bolivian counternarcotics efforts. However, the US made it clear from the outset that certain issues were non-negotiable because they were considered to be vital to US security interests. The certification process and the actual ‘de-certification’ of Bolivia is the clearest sign of such explicit limits to the principle of self-determination. The US government clearly prioritized counter-narcotics related interests over the respect for self-determination.

With regard to the change in economic policies, both the US and Germany proved rather flexible and pragmatic, perhaps because it was obvious that the administration in Bolivia enjoyed such broad support that a general attitude of objection would have no effect, or perhaps because no major economic interests were involved. The rather intense efforts by the German Embassy and even the Chancellor to secure the interests of the one German company affected by nationalization (including the decision to suspend a minor development cooperation project) suggest a prioritization of economic interests. The German reaction to Morales’s claim to self-determination probably would have been much less benign and tolerant had there been significant danger to German economic interests.

Self-determination vs. universalist donor conceptions: With regard to the self-determined and democratically legitimized deviance from (and, in part, open breach of) mainstream standards of liberal democracy and good governance, both the US and Germany officially reacted with an attitude of respect for alternative paths and models. Both governments continued their development cooperation with Bolivia, and although there were some changes in US priorities (away from central government support), the US maintained a rather cooperative posture. In fact, USAID proved willing to make significant concessions in order to adapt to official Bolivian preferences, i.e. to accept a self-determined path of political development even when this implied a partial deviation from the US conception of liberal (market) democracy. Germany even provided direct support to the political changes driven by
the Morales government, including the Constituent Assembly.\textsuperscript{53}

This partial deviance from what was perceived by both German and US representatives as universal standards, however, was still seen as problematic. Alignment with Bolivian decisions therefore represented a pragmatic and, in fact, reluctant adjustment, rather than a sign of principled respect for self-determination. This adjustment was driven by the recognition of broad majority support in Bolivia, the hope to have some moderating influence on the Bolivian government, and the strong desire to remain somehow engaged in Bolivia (stemming either from the self-interest of the various development agencies to continue their work or from the general political assessment that a withdrawal from the country would be the worst option). In this sense, the donors’ reactions can be interpreted as attempts to balance the recognition of self-determination with the aim to minimize deviance from universally conceived standards. A degree of adaption to official Bolivian demands was the dominant strategy in this regard, even on the part of US foreign assistance. Negative reactions by the US were arguably driven not by considerations related to intrinsic conflicts of objectives but by (extrinsic) disagreements in the area of counternarcotics and by what was seen as provocation by the Bolivian government.

\textit{Empowerment vs. protection of democracy:} Regarding the tension between the deepening of democracy (in terms of political empowerment) and its protection (in terms of the stability of existing democratic institutions), the unambiguous majority support for and the democratic legitimization of every major step in Bolivia’s political transformation have proved to be crucial factors. These made it almost impossible for external actors emphasizing the importance of democracy to openly reject the political changes promoted by the Bolivian government. As a result, the US remained more or less neutral, with some explicit assistance to the government, some open help for political and societal counterweights, and some dubious support for the departmental opposition. Germany openly supported the dismantling of existing democratic institutions in favour of ‘re-founding’ Bolivian democracy. However,
in cases where the breach of the democratic/constitutional rules of the game were perceived as overly dramatic, the German government decided to suspend its cooperation, but only temporarily and only in connection to specific projects. Even in these cases, the German decisions to suspend, end, or resume cooperation were driven more by concerns related to conflict resolution and intra-state peace than by an adherence to the established institutional order.

*Political empowerment vs. intra-state peace:* This final observation relates to the fourth conflict of objectives where democracy promotion and the aim to uphold intra-state peace collide. Germany *de facto* prioritized conflict prevention and thus intra-state peace. This is not to say that Germany tried to limit political empowerment; however, its main aim was not to promote the strengthening of formerly marginalized social groups and actors, but rather to secure inclusive processes of dialogue and consensus-building. In this regard, Germany favoured constraining the emancipatory project of the MAS in order to include the (former) elites and middle sectors as much as possible. The idea behind this strategy was that the empowerment of the indigenous and poor majority was real and ongoing, but that intra-state peace was what was truly at risk.

The US was not in a position to meaningfully contribute to intra-Bolivian dialogue; in fact, at least some US policies in Bolivia only increased polarization, since the US government was seen as a party to the internal conflict. However, in terms of official statements, the US, even if it generally welcomed the growing political inclusion of the indigenous and the poor, aimed more at limiting the powers of the newly empowered by supporting counterweights to the central government in political parties, civil society, and at the subnational level of the state. In general, it seems that neither empowerment nor peace have been priorities of the US government since the election of Morales.
Conclusion

The case of Bolivia suggests that the *problematique* of conflicting objectives is not limited to difficult cases of coerced regime change, the democratization of authoritarian regimes, or the implementation of democracy in post-conflict societies; rather, it is also an issue democracy promoters must deal with in the relatively benign context of post-transition countries. In particular, four conflicts of objectives associated with self-determination and empowerment in post-transition countries were shown to be relevant: the aim to promote self-determination may clash with donor interests or universalist donor conceptions, and the support for empowerment can collide with donor objectives related to the protection of democracy and intra-state peace. However, the recent and ongoing transformation of Bolivian democracy is a unique case, and broader comparative work is therefore required in order to systematically identify the types of conflicting objectives, the conditions that give rise to their emergence, the ways in which various democracy promoters react, and the effects this can have on democracy in recipient countries.

With these caveats in mind, the analysis shows that conflicts of objectives in democracy promotion cannot be reduced to the well-known tension between norms and interests. The question of whether external democracy promoters prioritize their particular (economic or security) interests or whether they are really willing to promote democracy is surely important, but it is only one question among a series of difficult issues. Conflicting objectives affect the very business of ‘genuine’ democracy promotion as well: the principles, norms, conceptions, and strategies that guide the whole endeavour. A general consequence is that critical and decidedly normative reflections on the normative premises and conceptual guidelines of democracy promotion are needed. This includes reconsideration of the basic assumptions regarding political development that underlie current democracy promotion policies. In the aftermath of recent experiences with forced regime change in countries including Iraq and Afghanistan, such reconsideration has begun. However, as this article has
shown, there are more general problems of democracy promotion that can also affect supposedly easier cases.

Note on the contributor

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Notes

1 Huntington, Political Order; Snyder, From Voting to Violence; Chua, World on Fire.
2 Cf. Burnell and Youngs, New Challenges; Goldsmith, Making the World Safe; Smith, A Pact.
3 See the general debate on conflicting objectives in democracy promotion in the introduction to this Special Issue.
4 Cf. Diamond, The Spirit; McFaul, Advancing Democracy; but see also Hobson and Kurki, The Conceptual Politics.
5 Cf. Mayorga, ‘Bolivia’s Silent Revolution’.
6 Interviews were conducted in April/May 2009 (Bolivia), in May 2010 (Washington, DC), and between 2008 and 2011 (Germany).
7 There are, of course, many different definitions of both democracy and democratization. However, it is generally accepted that democracy connotes a political regime that is meant to somehow realize the self-determination or sovereignty of the people. In the same basic way, democratization describes processes that entail politically empowerment of the people, whether in terms of formal empowerment (e.g., institutionalizing equal political rights) or in a more substantial sense (e.g., increasing capabilities to exercise equal political rights). Cf. Coppendge and Gerring, ‘Conceptualizing’, 248, 253; Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development, 10-11.
9 Cf. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions; Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development.
11 Cf. Romero et al., Del conflicto al diálogo. While the Constituent Assembly had been specifically elected to draft a new constitution, Congress – the regular national parliament – had no formal authority to revise the constitutional draft. Under the new constitution, the national parliament is no longer called Congress but “Plurinational Legislative Assembly”.
12 Cf. Wolff, ‘New Constitutions’.
17 White House, ‘Presidential Determination [2006]’.
21 White House, ‘President Bush’.
23 For comprehensive data on German development assistance, see Wolff, ‘Challenges’, 10–4.
26 USAID, ‘USAID/OTI’.
27 Indeed, such cooperation went beyond assistance in counternarcotics and socioeconomic issues and included democracy assistance. For example, support for the Integrated Justice Centres (IJCs) was continued in close cooperation with the Bolivian Ministry of Justice. The US was apparently favourably disposed towards prolongation of this programme (see below).
33 US Embassy La Paz, ‘Scenesetter’.
For example, the program designed to strengthen municipalities is mentioned in a USAID document from February 2008 (quoted in Wolff, ‘Challenges’, 31). This document identifies potential new activities for different budget scenarios and demonstrates USAID’s willingness to adjust democracy promotion activities, at least in part, to official Bolivian preferences.

US Department of State, CBJ 2010, 573, 575, 576.

BMZ, ‘Wieczorek-Zeul’.

BMZ, ‘Bundesministerin’.

Bundesregierung, ‘Verhandlungen’ 9–10; BMZ, Länderkonzept.


Der Spiegel, 8 May 2006, 19.


BMZ, Länderkonzept, 1, 8, 3.

For comprehensive data on German development assistance, see Wolff, ‘Challenges’, 19–22.

Cf. GTZ, Asesoramiento. PADEP’s initial decision to support the preparation of a Constituent Assembly was taken at the end of 2003, and GTZ (together with the German political foundations) contributed to the preparatory process during Mesa’s interim government.


This emphasis was only partially a reaction to the new government; it was more generally a response to the conflict escalation since 2000. It also was part of a global trend in German development cooperation.

Cf. GTZ, Asesoramiento; Wolff, ‘Challenges’, 23.

GTZ, Asesoramiento, 50.

In terms of political ideology, the German government was not as distant from Morales as the Bush administration was. Germany was then governed by a coalition between the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), and it was the latter party that controlled both the Foreign Office and the Development Ministry (Development Minister Wieczorek-Zeul belonged to the left wing of the SPD).