

On boxes and arrows: cognitive maps as a method for actor-centered process tracing

Wolff, Jonas

Postprint / Postprint

Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:

Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK)

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Wolff, J. (2012). On boxes and arrows: cognitive maps as a method for actor-centered process tracing. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft : Comparative Governance and Politics*, 6(2), 131-153. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-010-0087-5>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

gesis
Leibniz-Institut
für Sozialwissenschaften

Terms of use:

This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public.

By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

Mitglied der

Leibniz-Gemeinschaft

On boxes and arrows: Cognitive maps as a method for actor-centered process tracing

Jonas Wolff, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), wolff@hsfk.de

This english version has been published in: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft/Comparative Governance and Politics Volume 6 (2012): Supplement 2, 1-22. The original German version 'Von Kästen und Pfeilen: Cognitive maps als Instrument zur akteurszentrierten Prozessanalyse' was published in: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 3 (2009): 1, 131-153. © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, <http://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12286-010-0087-5>.

Abstract Process tracing as a method in comparative politics usually aims at reconstructing socio-political macro processes. This entails the risk of structuralist or functionalist short-circuiting, i.e. the results-driven ascription of actors' preferences and strategies. To avoid this, one has to take actors and their particular logics of thought and action seriously. The article presents the cognitive map as a way to ground macro-political process tracing via actor-centered micro analyses. Two cognitive maps taken from an analysis of the indigenous movement in Ecuador are used to discuss the added value, the possibilities and the limits of this methodological tool.

Keywords: Research methods – Process tracing – Cognitive map – Ecuador

1 Introduction

When country case studies in political science do “process analysis” (Hall 2003: 391-395) or “process-tracing” (George/Bennett 2005: Chap. 10), they usually try to reconstruct socio-political macro processes at the national level. Systematically speaking, the process tracing method aims at detecting the causal mechanisms or paths that lead to a certain outcome that is to be explained (Brady/Collier 2004: 300). This implies the necessity of what Anthony Giddens has called “methodological bracketing”: It is not enough to analyze the structural features of a social system and their changes over time; in a second step, one has to look closely at the (collective and individual) agents that act within this structural setting, but who reproduce or transform it at the same time (Giddens 1997: 342-343; cf. Rösener 1998: 119-121). A perspective that, in line with structuration theory, refrains from giving epistemological priority to either actor or structure may be able to avoid the paradigmatic debate between

structuralists and methodological individualists at the level of meta theory (Sil 2000). Yet, the question remains how to translate the idea of a duality of structure and agency into manageable empirical research.¹

The aim of the present article is not deal with this question in any comprehensive manner. It sets out to propose and critically discuss only *one* particular methodological strategy that may help to underpin macro-political process analyses by including actor-centered micro analyses: the instrument of cognitive maps which are deduced from qualitative content analysis in order to be interpreted in a comparative manner. Originally developed in the field of psychology, the cognitive map approach was introduced in political science research quite some time ago (cf. Axelrod 1976a; Bonham et al. 1997; Hart 1977; Shapiro/Bonham 1973; Shapiro et al. 1988). Its potential contribution to qualitative process analyses, however, has yet to be fathomed. In what follows, I will try to do this – not in an abstract form, but using the example of a completed empirical study that has applied, *inter alia*, this tool (Wolff 2008). In the study, the compilation, analysis and comparison of cognitive maps of different social movement organizations (of the unemployed movement in Argentina and the indigenous movement in Ecuador) deepened the process tracing of democratic crisis and conflict management in South America. In the present paper, the exemplary recourse to this specific study’s methodological procedures and empirical material serves illustrative purposes only; it is not possible to comprehensively present the case studies and process analyses.

In what follows, I will first introduce the cognitive map approach and substantiate this presentation by using the example of the study mentioned above (2.). Then, the potential and limits of using cognitive maps as an instrument of actor-centered process tracing are critically examined (3.), and illustrated by means of two cognitive maps of indigenous organizations from Ecuador (4.).

2 The cognitive map approach: A methodological introduction

Cognitive maps represent particular interpretations of a specific policy problem. They are arrow diagrams where central concepts are linked through causal and quasi-causal assertions.

¹ Handbooks or textbooks on Comparative Politics usually focus their methodological remarks on the “method of comparison“ (Pickel 2007: 179; cf. Jahn 2006; Kneuer 2007) and thus tell us little about the ways and means of collecting the empirical data that is to be compared at a later stage. The advocacy of qualitative methods (and small-N comparisons) against the quantitatively oriented mainstream is particularly predominant in Anglo-Saxon publications (cf. George/Bennett 2005; Brady/Collier 2004); as this debate is mostly situated at the level of the philosophy of science, there is remarkably little information as to how intensive case studies should in fact analyze processes and actors.

They map how a distinct pattern of thought links aims and values, options for action and framework conditions (cf. Axelrod 1976a; Hart 1977; Shapiro/Bonham 1973). The basic idea is that properties and changes of the world “out there” – material and social structures, events etc. – have an impact on social life only in the way they are perceived and evaluated by social actors. Given the complexity of social life, all actors “have to form simplified, structured beliefs about the nature of their world” (Holsti 1976: 20). A cognitive map, then, is thought to (approximately) represent the interpretative scheme through which social actors filter real-world events and structures, and connect them with their own actions and goals. This scheme, however, does not seek to reproduce the general world view of a particular actor, but only a problem-specific pattern of thought. As a descriptive instrument, the cognitive map requires the researcher to convert complex and potentially diffuse patterns of thought and arguments into a network of causal assertions; at the same time, it offers a technical tool to graphically depict the web of causal linkages extracted from qualitative content analysis (Bonham et al. 1997: 222; Eden 1992: 262; Heradstveit/Narvesen 1978: 85).

Initially, cognitive maps were used in political science to understand (and, in fact, predict) the behavior of individual persons, but in later studies the tool was applied to capture collective interpretative schemes that guide the actions and decisions of groups (cf. Shapiro et al. 1988: 397-398). This raises the problem of the adequate textual basis from which to extract the cognitive map of a collectivity via content analysis (Axelrod 1976b: 239-240). In the example used in the present article, the task was to understand the diverging strategies of different organizations and currents within a specific social movement. A problem-centered, semi-structured interview was conducted with a leading representative of each of the selected organization. This interview, then, formed the basis for the content analysis. The assumption was that these interviews with single representatives of the organizations comprehensively represented the self-image and the world view of the respective group – obviously not an unproblematic premise that had to be reflected and critically discussed in the analysis (see Section 3).

As a first step, the interviews were subjected to a structuring (qualitative) content analysis as proposed by Philipp Mayring. Initially, the “basic dimensions of structuring” (Mayring 1997: 83) were established by way of a deduction from the research question. These, then, served as selection criteria for the inductive development of categories.² Working through the interview

² In addition to the evaluation of change and continuity during the governments of the recent past (V1), these basic dimensions (variables) included: preconditions for social change (V2); perceptions of negative legitimation (V3); bases of and incentives for mobilization (V4); bases of and incentives for (protest-) alliances (V5); reasons for and triggers of divisions within the “camp” of protest groups (V6); reasons for an orientation towards cooperation (with the state) and moderation in protest behavior (V7); reasons for an orientation towards confrontation (against the state) and a radicalization in protest behavior (V8).

material, arguments related to the different topics were identified, constituting the categories for the content analysis.³ Finally, the universe of arguments identified in the interviews was coded and arranged in a table for each organization.

In a second step, these structured collections of assertions were scanned individually for each representative/organization in order to identify the central concepts and, subsequently, the (quasi-) causal linkages between these concepts. In the cognitive maps presented below all concepts are represented by boxes.⁴ Drawing on different typologies proposed in the literature (cf. Bonham/Shapiro 1976: 115; Hart 1977: 119), goals (immediate political aims), values (general, abstract aims), perceived events and determining factors (framework conditions), and options for action can be identified as important types of concepts. These different types serve as a rough systematization of the concepts, but, in the end, it is advisable to specify the relevant types of concepts depending on the problem and research question at hand. In the study discussed here the main concepts constituting the cognitive maps are: initial conditions (as part of the context), patterns of organization and operational strategies (as options for action) as well as different concepts of goals, distinguished by the degree of immediacy (interim goal, aim, perspective).

Every linkage between two concepts that was at least quasi-causal in character is represented as an arrow, while positive (“causes”, “leads to”, “contributes to”, “is necessary for”, “enables”) and negative (“impairs”, “constrains”, “diminishes”, “inhibits”) impacts are differentiated (cf. Bonham et al. 1997: 223). In addition to definitely positive or negative arrows, it is also possible that two concepts are linked by different causal links. If a context condition is added that defines which impact is effective, this can be represented by a conditional link (in the cognitive maps below such conditional links are depicted as dashed arrows).

To illustrate this procedure of developing a cognitive map, take the following example from the analysis of an interview with Blanca Chancoso (see also Hart 1977: 117–119). This interview with a representative of Ecuador’s indigenous movement from the Andean Highlands (CONAIE/ECUARUNARI) served as the basis for one of the cognitive maps discussed below. Asked for the bases of indigenous mobilization, Chancoso emphasized: “First of all, there is a situation of identity. We identify ourselves as indigenous. And even if, considered individually, we may be in better economic conditions, there is a bond that unites us, and this

³ E.g., with regard to “bases of and incentives for mobilization” (V4), eight arguments were identified: the specific context of (economic) crisis (code 4.1 “crisis context”), state failure in the provision of basic (public) goods (4.2 “state failure”), resistance to political repressions (4.3), support by the state or external (international) actors (4.4), “need satisfaction/self-help” (4.5), “collective identity/ideology” (4.6), “political practices/representation” (4.7) and “protest and success experiences” (4.8).

⁴ Different ways of designing (box, circle) and formatting (bold, highlighted grey) these concepts serve illustrative purposes only.

is being indigenous. Everyone, in equal measure, suffers from discrimination, from the disrespect of one's identity." In a first step, this assertion was coded as category 4.6 ("collective identity/ideology" as basis of and incentive for mobilization). In a second step, the concept "indigenous identity (incl. experiences of discrimination & marginalization)" was developed. As depicted in the cognitive map reproduced below (see Figure 1), this concept was identified as an initial condition with a positive impact on the (action) concept "indigenous mobilization & organization".

In analyzing a given cognitive map, useful interpretive strategies include, first, the search for causal paths that run through the scheme. Such causal chains link the context and initial conditions, options for action, immediate (intermediate) aims and general perspectives. Second, hierarchies and priorities are of interest: E.g., an option for action may stand out because it contributes directly to an aim (while other action concepts only impact aims in a mediated way); in addition to a concept's position on the map, the number of arrows linking a concept with others signals its importance within the scheme. Third, mutually linked concepts can form clusters that may constitute virtuous or vicious circles through causal feedback loops. Fourth, an important question is whether the causal relations represented by the cognitive map combine to form an unambiguous and linear picture or contain contradictions and negative feedback loops (cf. Eden et al. 1992; Hart 1977: 119-121).

3 Applying cognitive maps in process tracing: Potentials and limits

The cognitive map is a tool for the micro analysis of (collective) actors. Within the framework of qualitative process tracing it scrutinizes whether and to what extent a certain macro explanation *makes sense* from the perspective of distinct social groups: Do the patterns of action and perception as well as the logics of operation and reaction on the level of the single organization match the expectations that emerge from the macro perspective? This includes the question of whether social structures identified at the macro level can be discovered as "memory traces" (Giddens 1997: 69, 77) in the thoughts of specific actors.⁵ Thus, an important function of the cognitive map is (self-) control: The (graphic) reconstruction of causal relations from the perspective of the actors themselves helps avoid structuralist or functionalist short-circuiting, i.e. the results-driven ascription of actors' preferences and strategies.

⁵ As an instrument applied to broaden the micro foundations of a macro explanation, the cognitive map is not bound to a social theory as taught by Giddens. In much the same way, it can be used, for example, within a methodological individualist framework like James Coleman's "macro-micro-macro model" (cf. Jahn 2006: 263-264). I owe this point to one of the journal's anonymous reviewers.

[Figure 1 about here]

This said, the cognitive map is useful only within the established framework of a comprehensive process tracing. Obviously, its role as a method of (micro) control depends on a given (macro) analysis that is to be controlled. On a more general level, a micro analysis based on cognitive maps requires detailed case knowledge: knowledge both about the actors studied and about the socio-political macro processes in which these actors are embedded, to which they react and which they help to shape. Thus, the whole idea is that the cognitive map approach should not replace, but rather complement the usual analysis of processes and actors based on secondary literature and primary sources. However, even such an embedded application of cognitive maps encounters four problems that point out the limits of this instrument – yet, in part, these limits merely reflect general problems that apply to the scientific analysis of social subjects as such.

A first problem affects any analysis that tries to infer the thoughts behind the speech from linguistic articulations: the question of authenticity. It is impossible to solve this problem, but case knowledge can be used to ask for incentives that may motivate “dishonest” assertions and to check assertions against observed actions of the respective (collective) actor (cf. Axelrod 1976c: 252-253).

Second, as descriptions of collective patterns of thought, cognitive maps encounter the problem of representativeness. In the study which the present article refers to, the assumption was that interviews with single (leading) representatives reflect the dominant interpretive schemes of the given organization in a correct and comprehensive manner. Such a sweeping premise can only be justified if the textual basis as well as the interpretation of the cognitive map are controlled by means of the method of triangulation (Mayring 1993: 121; cf. Denzin 1978), by looking at further secondary analyses and other primary sources of the organization concerned. This minimizes the risk that an individual (minority) pattern of thought is misleadingly treated as the (majority) scheme characterizing the collectivity. An even better way to deal with the problem of representativeness is to select documents as the textual basis of the cognitive map – e.g., as an official declaration of an organization – which *qua* document type represent the collectivity’s “prevailing opinion” and which, in the best of cases, resulted from collective processes of deliberation and decision making. This, however, depends on the very practical condition of the existence (and availability) of such documents, and the question of sufficient substance concerning the problem and the research question of the analysis.

The highly interpretive character of the “deduction” of cognitive maps presents a particular challenge. More so than other tools of qualitative content analysis, the transformation of multi-layered and frequently diffuse patterns of arguments into a limited number of concepts and causal links requires a process of massive reduction of complexity and aggregation. It is impossible to avoid that one’s own subjective predispositions and expectations shape this process – especially because the deduction of cognitive maps depends on detailed case knowledge. Thus, it is advisable to include additional controls. These, for example, can be in the form of a complementary statistical analysis: Following the first step of the qualitative content analysis – i.e. before the deduction of the cognitive map begins – the interim results can be quantified. In the example used here for illustrative purposes, the collection of assertions arranged according to the system of categories was quantified by counting the number of coded assertions for each category. This resulted in a table that displayed the number of entries per category (argument) for all units (organizations).⁶ Given such a frequency distribution, it is then possible to systematically compare the patterns of arguments by the means of descriptive statistics. By comparing the frequency distribution of two organizations by means of a bivariate correlation analysis we are able to discern whether high and low values (entries) are assigned to the different arguments in a systematically similar way. Thereby one can control whether similarities and differences that result from the interpretive comparison of two cognitive maps are confirmed by corresponding statistical correlations.

At the same time, such a complementary statistical analysis qualifies a fourth shortcoming of the cognitive map approach: As boxes and arrows remain unweighted, the relative importance attributed to specific concepts and causal links by the text is not reflected in the scheme. In addition, developing a cognitive map requires a process of aggregation that subsumes several arguments (and categories) under broad concepts. In this case, a frequency analysis can reintroduce certain differentiations lost in the process of “deducing” cognitive maps by simply counting and comparing the number of entries for each category. By comparing the frequency of entries across organizations, one can also estimate the relative importance of specific arguments in the sets of assertions of different actors – an additional strategy to verify the solely qualitative comparison of cognitive maps.

4 Cognitive maps in practice: Competing patterns of thought within Ecuador’s indigenous movement

⁶ When a specific argument was rejected, it was counted as a negative entry.

In the remainder of this article, I will illustrate the potentials and limits of grounding qualitative process analysis in cognitive maps by using the example of two schemes representing different currents within Ecuador's indigenous movement. The maps originate from an empirical study (Wolff 2008) which cannot be outlined in full detail within the realm of the present paper. Nevertheless, a short description of the context is indispensable in order to render the cognitive maps comprehensible.

4.1 The cognitive maps' context: A short abstract

In the study mentioned above, the aim was to explain how contemporary democracies in South America that are characterized by mass poverty, extreme social inequalities and far-reaching politico-institutional "defects" are, nevertheless, able to survive even severe economic crises, the escalation of social conflicts and political turbulences that regularly occur during such crises. The main case studies were recent crises in Argentina (2001/2002) and Ecuador (1999/2000). In order to explain the macro-political re-stabilization after the crisis, it was necessary, *inter alia*, to trace the process during which a particular "challenger" to the system who temporarily proved highly conflictive was politically "contained" or "tamed" in both countries: the unemployed workers' movement in Argentina and the indigenous movement in Ecuador. Complementing analyses of the general formation and evolution of these two "movement[s] of movements" (Colectivo Situaciones 2003: 73) as well as of their interaction with the political system, a series of cognitive maps was deduced from content analyses of interviews with representatives of different organizations and tendencies within the general (unemployed or indigenous) movement. These cognitive maps helped to understand the diverging behavior of the different sub-collectivities by looking at their respective (predominant) interpretive schemes.

Following a spectacular first "uprising" of the indigenous peoples (*levantamiento indígena*) in 1990, which catapulted Ecuador's indigenous movement onto the stage of national politics, it quickly became the country's most important social movement as well as the strongest indigenous movement in the region (Yashar 2005: 85; Van Cott 2005: 99). The movement's organizational core was the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador*, CONAIE), founded in 1986. Through its three regional federations ECUARUNARI (Andean Highlands), CONFENIAE (Amazonian Lowlands) and CONAICE (Coast), CONAIE united the overwhelming majority of indigenous grassroots organizations. Ecuador's deep division in three major regions is also reflected in the indigenous movement: As only a very small part of indigenous people live in the coastal

region, CONAICE is rather marginal; in contrast, ECUARUNARI, representing the Quichua who live in the Highlands, acts for the largest indigenous “nationality” that equals about three-fourths of the indigenous population; finally, CONFENIAE, unites a diverse spectrum of “nationalities” who, in part, comprise barely 100 members. The most important rival to the Catholic-dominated CONAIE is the federation of evangelical indigenous people FEINE (cf. Wolff 2008: 237-239).

During the 1990s, Ecuador’s indigenous movement experienced a remarkable advancement politically (cf. León 1994; Pallares 2002; Selverston-Scher 2001; Van Cott 2005: Chap. 4; Yashar 2005: Chap. 4; Zamosc 2007). In periodic mass protests, CONAIE forced the respective incumbent governments into negotiations and concessions. Via the political party Pachakutik, which was founded in 1995 and is dominated by CONAIE, the indigenous movement quickly gained seats and votes within Ecuador’s democratic institutions. In the course of the economic crisis that escalated in 1999, the indigenous movement led the protests that escalated throughout the country which culminated in the toppling of elected President Jamil Mahuad in January 2000. Following the victory of Lucio Gutiérrez as the presidential candidate supported by the indigenous movement in late 2002, representatives of CONAIE and Pachakutik were part of the national government (as proper ministers) for the first time. The rebellion-turned-coup against Mahuad in 2000 and the electoral victory of Gutiérrez in 2002 based on claims for far-reaching political change signaled a serious challenge to Ecuador’s political system, its traditional representatives, strategic orientation and entrenched political practices (Wolff 2004; Almeida 2005). Yet, after taking office, President Gutiérrez immediately changed course towards alliances with established political forces and an orientation toward the IMF and the US with respect to the economic and foreign policies. Consequently, Gutiérrez quickly lost the support of all his allies among the indigenous and social movements (cf. Barrera et al. 2004). After having abandoned the government, the indigenous movement in general – and CONAIE in particular – proved heavily weakened, unable to mobilize any significant resistance against the “traitor” Gutiérrez (Posso 2004). When Gutiérrez was toppled in April 2005 during renewed mass protests, the indigenous movements did not play a significant role. This crisis of a “challenger” who had proven highly able to mobilize resistance can be traced back, in particular, to dynamics of division and demobilization within the movement, dynamics that were effectively fueled by President Gutiérrez in a strategy of *divide et impera* based on clientelism and cooptation (cf. Almeida 2005; Beck/Mijeski 2006; Wolff 2007: 21-27; Zamosc 2007).

In this context, some of the indigenous organizations were not willing to confront the government of Gutiérrez, while others were not able to mobilize significant support for protests

against the president. CONFENIAE and FEINE pragmatically decided to cooperate with a government that, although it had broken all election promises in terms of macro policies, selectively responded to certain issue-specific material claims of these indigenous organizations and their bases. In contrast, the leadership of CONAIE and Pachakutik, dominated by ECUARUNARI, declared Gutiérrez a “traitor” and sought to topple him with any institutional and extra-institutional means available. Thus, the actor-centered analysis of cognitive maps has to answer two main questions: Considering the strategies for and logics of action from the perspective of the different indigenous organizations, how can we interpret (a) the diametrically opposed reactions of different groups’ tendencies within the indigenous movement to the government of Gutiérrez and b) the general proneness of the indigenous movement to clientelist offers and divide-and-rule strategies? In what follows, I will exemplarily present and discuss the cognitive maps of ECUARUNARI (Highlands) and CONFENIAE (Lowlands).⁷

4.2 The cognitive map of CONAIE in the Andean Highlands (ECUARUNARI)

The first cognitive map (see Figure 1) depicts the pattern of thought of ECUARUNARI, the Highlands branch of CONAIE.⁸ As a social movement or social movement organization, ECUARUNARI can be treated as a collective actor only with the usual reservations; this reservation applies particularly to the indigenous movement because it is characterized by strong and relatively autonomous organizational structures at the local level rooted in indigenous communities (*comunidades*) (cf. Zamosc 2007: 16-17). Nevertheless, indigenous confederations like CONAIE at the national, and ECUARUNARI at the regional level are social entities that are capable of acting collectively and feature distinct (dominant) world views and interpretive schemes, political positions and claims (cf. Van Cott 2005: Chap. 4; Yashar 2005: Chap. 4). Thus, organizations like CONAIE and ECUARUNARI can be analyzed as collectives whose actions are shaped by collective (although always contentious) patterns of thought in much the same way and with equal qualifications as, e.g., political parties.

Turning now to ECUARUNARI’s pattern of thought as represented by the cognitive map, there are six different vertical types of concepts: Initial conditions, patterns of organization, operational strategies, interim goals, political aims and the perspective constituting the general

⁷ In the original study (Wolff 2008: Chap. 5.4) seven cognitive maps are included to cover the whole spectrum of indigenous currents and organizations in Ecuador.

⁸ The cognitive map is based on an interview with Blanca Chancoso, a historic leader of CONAIE from Ecuador’s Andean Highlands, conducted on February 10, 2005, in Quito.

normative horizon. This yields six steps that make up the horizontal causal paths that run through the scheme.

As initial conditions (1), “indigenous identity” and the common “unsatisfied basic needs of the indigenous communities” activate the processes of indigenous mobilization and organization. The generalized rejection of “polity, policies & politics” – i.e., of the political system, its representatives and the general model of development – constitutes the shared point of departure that enables alliances with non-indigenous social forces (“protest alliances”; “political, ‘mixed’ organizations”). The prospect of such alliances is limited however because it is only the common enemy and the rejection of the political and socio-economic status quo – and not some shared needs, claims or identities – that unite indigenous and non-indigenous forces.⁹

As regards the indigenous part of the story, the picture is complicated as well as it is not only the common ground they share as *indígenas* but also the respective identities and needs of single indigenous peoples and nationalities that active and shape mobilization. This problem is verified by the arrow that leads from “particular identities & needs of indigenous peoples & nationalities” to the concept of “political attempts to divide & coopt”, a concept that, in turn, has a negative impact on “indigenous mobilization & organization”. Yet, the negative arrow that leads from “indigenous identity” to “particular identities & needs” shows that the common identity as *indígenas* is attributed a moderating effect on the differences between the indigenous peoples.¹⁰

Now, these initial conditions yield particular patterns of organizations (2) and operational strategies (3). Both take place in two complementary dimensions. In the upper half of the diagram, there are the purely indigenous processes of mobilization and organization; the common focus here is the socio-political claim to represent the indigenous population in social and political life. The lower half of the diagram includes, in addition, the dimension of a broad (party-) political organization that includes both indigenous and non-indigenous forces. CONAIE and ECUARUNARI represent the former, Pachakutik the latter. As for the operational strategies, these are divided into extra-institutional strategies of protest, and institution-

⁹ In Section 2, Chancoso was already quoted as identifying the “indigenous identity” as the basis of (indigenous) mobilization. The second basis of mobilization – the initial condition “unsatisfied basic needs of the indigenous communities” – rests on the assertion that it is “the basic needs of the communities” that constitute “a common interest that unites us”. The proposition that it is the shared rejection of “polity, policies & politics” – and only this rejection – that enables mixed “protest alliances” is substantiated by the following statement: “If one compares the needs of someone living in the city with the needs of an indigenous person living in a rural area, they have no similar claims. But there is one point where we identify with each other, and that is the rejection of the policies of the state. This is what unites us: the desire to change the policy of this state.”

¹⁰ Cf. Chancoso’s following assertion: “Within CONAIE and ECUARUNARI, even if we are different peoples, we are exclusively *indígenas*.”

al forms of participation on the national and local level.¹¹ The strategy of establishing alternative “popular parliaments”, sustained by social and indigenous organizations is an additional way of incorporating social forces outside the formal-democratic institutions (which are perceived as non-representative).¹²

This repertoire of complementary strategies for action in turn contributes to a series of tangible interim goals (4). Here, we can discern a cluster of positive interactions (highlighted in grey in the figure): Strategies of protest and participation, and political achievements like “constitutional reforms”, “recognition as political actor”, “material ‘responses’” mutually reinforce each other. A case in point is the establishment of state institutions specifically concerned with questions of bilingual education (DINEIB), “indigenous health” (DNSPI) and the implementation of local development projects in indigenous communities (CODENPE). E.g., the establishment of CODENPE developed out of the recognition of indigenous peoples in the new constitution of 1998; it provided the indigenous organizations – and CONAIE in particular – with far-reaching competences for participation and self-administration; it thus reinforced the political recognition of the indigenous peoples; and endowed indigenous representatives with institutional power and enabled them to respond to the basic needs of the indigenous communities (cf. Wolff 2008: 241, 245). While the constitutional recognition of the indigenous peoples and the establishment of CODENPE resulted from a combined strategy of protest (CONAIE) and participation in the Constituent Assembly (Pachakutik), the achievements in turn further increased the capacities for mobilization and organization of the indigenous movement.

However, in the context of Ecuador’s actually existing democracy, the medium-term experiences of the indigenous movement with these institutional achievements were rather disillusioning. In the cognitive map, this is reflected by the fact that three further interim goals are deemed necessary for achieving a “democratization of democracy” that goes beyond limited

¹¹ In this sense, Chancoso distinguishes between CONAIE and ECUARUNARI as “exclusive organizations of the indigenous peoples and nationalities” that have “a political position not limited to elections”, and Pachakutik as a “broader space that fulfills an electoral role”. With respect to both operational strategies (“protests/ *levantamientos*” and “institutional participation”) Chancoso emphasizes that all of the achievements of the indigenous movements were achieved “by struggle, by proper efforts”: “We had to pay all the costs, the *levantamientos*, the mobilization of the people, our people had to mobilize to get something done.” At the same time, she highlights the complementary character of the two strategies which is represented by the joint impact on a series of interim goals in the cognitive map: Asked to evaluate the strategies of protest versus institutional participation, Chancoso argues that “the one takes nothing away from the other. Depending on moment and opportunity, you do one thing or the other.”

¹² Therefore, a national alternative parliament was established in January 2000 before the “uprising” against President Mahuad. It emerged from a series of “popular parliaments” at the local level and was sustained, in particular, by the indigenous movement (cf. Walsh 2001: 175).

responses to indigenous claims:¹³ the ability to make “plebiscitary ‘appeals’” including the toppling of unbearable presidents by means of mass protests or direct popular referendums on vital topics; the “struggle against undemocratic practices”, i.e. against corruption, breaches of constitutional law etc.; and the extension of ‘real’ bottom-up “popular political participation” that is attributed, e.g., to those “alternative municipalities” that are governed by Pachakutik and rely on mechanisms of direct social participation (cf. Tituaña 2005).

These interim goals contribute to three main aims (5) that pave the way for a perspective of fundamental social change towards “real”, participatory democracy and comprehensive and balanced socio-economic development (6). As it is particular to the indigenous movement, it is important that “territorial autonomy for indigenous communities” is designated as a goal in addition to macro-political concepts that strive for “indigenous representation & participation” and “general democratization”: The demand for political participation is thus complemented by a claim for local self-government based on indigenous customs and practices.¹⁴

The two arrows that lead to the goal of autonomy illustrate that success in this dimension depends, on the one hand on top-down macro-political achievements of the indigenous movement – i.e., on the constitutional recognition of collective indigenous rights – and, on the other on a bottom-up dynamic of autonomous local organization on the part of indigenous communities.

Three features of the cognitive map stand out. The first refers to the complexity due to the high number of concepts and causal links. This reflects CONAIE’s experience that indigenous mobilization often resulted in important political achievements, but that tangible improvements for the indigenous population nevertheless remained limited. Hence, political strategy is not about taking a few steps towards the grand breakthrough, but a complex process with multiple steps and interim goals. Second, what is striking is the focus on the independent organization of indigenous peoples. The indigenous movement dominates the horizontal causal path in the center of the figure that leads to the crucial cluster (highlighted in grey). Conversely, the role of non-indigenous (urban) movements and organizations is limited. Even though they are important for protest alliances, a broad (party-) political project and, thus, for a “general democratization of democracy”, they are unreliable candidates as the dashed arrows show: The confluence of indigenous and non-indigenous forces is based on a common position of objection; as the mestizo-urban forces share neither the specific needs of the indige-

¹³ Thus, Chancoso emphasizes: “We had the possibility to see, from within, how the political system works. And this has led us to insist more intensely on our right to demand change. Because it is not enough to occupy certain spaces in the administration.”

¹⁴ According to Chancoso, in addition to the “struggle for real democracy“, indigenous goals include the defense of a “territorial space [...] in which the specific norms and rules of the respective community apply, in which the community has authority.”

nous peoples nor their political project, alliances depend on the opportunistic behavior of these actors and, thus, on specific political junctures (see note to Figure 1). Third, the negative feedback loops – via “political attempts to divide & coopt” – are relativized. Successful indigenous strategies of protest and participation evoke political divisions and attempts at cooptation which have a negative impact on the unity and strength of the indigenous movement. Yet, at the same time, two factors limit the potential (of the government) to weaken the indigenous movement: The overarching indigenous identity diminishes the differences between the indigenous peoples and, thus, the basis for political attempts to divide the movement; in addition, the indigenous movement learns from its problems and failures with respect to its ability to withstand manipulatory strategies.

Finally, the role of “external intervention” by international organizations and foreign governments as a disruptive factor is remarkable. Externally set sanctions and incentives limit the margin for change instituted by indigenous protest and participation at the national level. Externally provided development funds serve as additional resources for political attempts to divide the movement and coopt representatives and sub-groups (if they are awarded to indigenous communities). By way of dialogue and protest, however, the indigenous movement can, on its part, minimize such external “disruptions”.¹⁵

4.3 The cognitive map of CONAIE in the Amazonian Lowlands (CONFENIAE)

The second cognitive map (see Figure 2) represents the perspective of CONAIE’s branch in the Amazonian Lowlands, CONFENIAE. The contentious stance towards the government of Lucio Gutiérrez led to the public division of this confederation. The CONFENIAE leadership upon which this cognitive map is based¹⁶ represents the group of indigenous organizations from the Amazonia which remained close to the CONAIE leadership and was relatively reserved vis-à-vis President Gutiérrez. Thus, the pattern of thought “of CONFENIAE” that is analyzed below refers to this dominant sub-group, only – a sub-group, however, that was crucial for determining the confederation’s political stance.

Again, the map’s concepts can be roughly divided into initial conditions, patterns of organization, operational strategies, interim goals and aims. In the case of CONFENIAE, one single

¹⁵ CONAIE campaigned against the extension of the World Bank project PRODEPINE, a project that, in large parts, funded the development projects implemented by the national development council for the indigenous population CODENPE (cf. Bretón 2005). This seems to be counterintuitive at first but is actually perfectly in line with this logic.

¹⁶ The empirical basis, in this case, are two interviews with CONFENIAE leaders: a short one with then CONFENIAE President Luis Vargas and a more extensive one with the Director of Territory, Eduardo Mamallacta. Both interviews were conducted on January 28, 2005, in Quito. In order to have text material that is comparable in length, both were analyzed together as if they were a single text.

causal path dominates the scheme (indicated in bold in the figure): This path is located in the upper part of the map, running from the “needs of indigenous nationalities & communities” via processes of indigenous organization, strategies for action and different interim goals to the “self-determined development of indigenous nationalities & communities in the Amazonian region”. “Pragmatic/ needs-oriented organization” which appears as two national organizations that represent the interests of the *indígenas* of the Lowlands (CONFENIAE) and of Ecuador in general (CONAIE) constitute the center of this path. Hence, CONFENIAE conceives itself as well as CONAIE as an interest group that represents its own basis vis-à-vis – not *within!* – the political system.¹⁷

The operational strategies correspond to this self-image: The main strategy is a “policy of *propuesta*”, i.e. suggesting precise proposals (e.g., of development projects) and remaining in a dialogue with state entities; targeted protests (“with tangible goals”) constitute a complementary strategy in the sense that extra-institutional pressure is, at times, necessary to make one’s voice heard. Thus, the *levantamientos* (uprisings) of the 1990s were intended to achieve the recognition of *indígenas* as legitimate and institutionally represented interest group: “Targeted protests” provided the indigenous movement with a “political voice” and “institutional representation”. As suggested by the mediated impact of “targeted protests” through “political voice’ for the indigenous nationalities” on “policy of *propuesta*”, today, these hard-earned achievements enable CONFENIAE to focus on a strategy geared to making proposals and maintaining a dialogue.¹⁸

[Figure 2 about here]

This being said, also the political achievements mainly serve to achieve and implement “development projects etc. for the communities” (this is the only aim of the “policy of *propuesta*”). At the same time, such development projects are promoted from the bottom up by self-help initiatives of indigenous organizations at the local, regional and national level. In addition, “Sympathizers’ in the government” (as well as external funds from development

¹⁷ The most important elements of this causal path are indicated by the following quote by Mamallacta: “The top priority of CONFENIAE is to ensure that all of the organizations of the different nationalities develop positively, to defend the ancestral territories of all nationalities of the Amazon region and to assist with the implementation of development projects for the nationalities [...]. It is the fundamental guiding principle of our work to act as a guarantor for the interests of each and every nationality.”

¹⁸ This causal chain is based on Vargas’ and Mamallacta’s argument that the *levantamientos* of the 1990s aimed at, and resulted in, “effective achievements” (Vargas). Thanks to these achievements – e.g., institutions like CODENPE, DINEIB and DNSPI (see above), and the constitutional recognition of indigenous (collective) rights – the indigenous nationalities gained a political “voice” (Mamallacta). Thereby, today, CONFENIAE can act “like every Ecuadorian citizen” claiming institutionalized “collective rights” and pursuing her interests “on the basis of proposals” (Vargas).

cooperation) also make a contribution. Notably, the origin of these “sympathizers” is left in the dark. E.g., in the interview, President Gutiérrez – the “first president from the Amazonia” (Eduardo Mamallacta) – and his indigenous Minister Antonio Vargas are mentioned as contact persons for CONFENIAE. Yet, neither is there an explanation as to why and how the indigenous groups from Ecuador’s Lowlands became supporters of the government of Gutiérrez, nor as to what extent CONFENIAE intentionally enforced (or is able to enforce) the rise of such sympathizers and corresponding government orientations. Accordingly, no factor in the figure has an impact on the concept “‘sympathizers’ in government”. Yet, an indirect link is suggested by the cognitive map: Indigenous organizations attract attention as possible political supporters or, at least, as cooperative forces who tolerate the government due to the complementary strategy of protest. The external role of “sympathizes” in the map, thus, points to the fact that CONFENIAE’s self-description as an ordinary interest group that relies on proposals and dialogue leaves out an important dimension: An indigenous organization that neither uses formal institutions (parties, elections) nor informal protests to make use of its central resources of political power – the representation of a relevant number of (potentially) mobilized people – has very few chances in the procedures of political lobbying.

These are also the three elements that constitute the differences in strategic orientation of CONAIE’s Lowlands and Highlands branch. First, the limitation of the strategy of protest: For CONFENIAE, protest is an instrument applied selectively in the interest of achieving tangible goals; protests “for the sake of protest” and *levantamientos* that serve particular political interests of single leaders and/or politico-ideological goals lead to the instrumentalization of the indigenous movement, the cooptation of indigenous representatives and the destabilization of democracy. As a result, the reproduction of the “system” – i.e., of “the same as always in power” (Luis Vargas) – is supported. Second, the qualification of extra-institutional (protest) strategies is not accompanied by an upgrade of the strategy of gaining influence through formal institutions; participation via democratic institutions is not mentioned. This corresponds to the self-image as an interest group. This also applies to the third element, the macro-political claim of representation, which is limited to their own grass roots level, the needs of the indigenous communities and their demand for self-determined development.¹⁹

Given these three features, the cognitive map confirms general evaluations concerning the particularities of indigenous mobilization and organization in the Lowlands (in contrast to the Highlands): the pragmatic political aim to achieve tangible results; the informal strategy of gaining influence through quasi-corporatist negotiations; and the susceptibility to clientelist

¹⁹ Thus, in the interview, Mamallacta emphasizes that the indigenous nationalities “do not want any more grand speeches [...], but development projects for their communities”.

strategies of incorporation on the part of the state which is determined by these two characteristics. The scheme suggests that it is precisely the critical evaluation of the reality of Ecuadorian politics that helps to explain the susceptibility to the critical issues mentioned above: Formal political participation is rejected as it would imply the inclusion in institutions shaped by cooptation, instrumentalization and clientelism; yet, the alternative of a “policy of *propuesta*”, as an informal mode of participation, is even more prone to such mechanisms. The difference is that clientelism and cooptation operate by means of deals within the political system in the “game” of formal institutions, whereas informal mechanisms of inclusion result in direct outputs for the grass-roots level as exchanges of support for (material) favors. The former implies negotiations about political appointments and ideological positions; the latter – even if just as “dirty” in procedural terms – is always oriented at tangible benefits for the organization’s local bases.

This reflects the experiences of Amazonian indigenous peoples. They have never been able to trust the formal institutions of the state (if these were present at all) and have always had to find pragmatic ways to deal with “external actors” in their territories – be they representatives of the state or of international (oil) companies (cf. Yashar 2005: 109-130). All this occurred in a context of threatened subsistence where immediate problem-solving strategies are predominant compared to abstract political programs. According to these needs as well as the experience with external intruders, political ideologies are considered to be particular strategies of opportunistic participants in Ecuadorian politics: “individual/ particular interests” and “politico-ideological goals” lead to “processes of *top-down* organization” and, ultimately, undermine the idea of a “common ‘political project’ of the indigenous”. The reason is that such a “political project” of the indigenous movement, according to CONFENIAE, is not ideological and, in the end, it is apolitical; its aim is to further classical socio-economic development (promotion of infrastructure, education, business) while respecting politico-cultural self-determination and legally protecting the respective nationalities and their territories. In this sense, the dimension of CONAIE that corresponds to the notion of a “pragmatic/ needs-oriented organization” has a crucial (and positive) position in the cognitive map. In contrast, the concept of “politico-ideologically oriented organization” – that also refers to CONAIE – leads to counterproductive activities that undermine CONFENIAE’s aims.

4.4 The cognitive maps’ contribution to understanding the indigenous movement

From the very beginning, the indigenous movement in Ecuador had a dual character (cf. León 1994): On the one hand, it aimed to protect and promote specific interests of the indigenous

population in general and of different indigenous peoples and communities in particular; on the other hand, CONAIE's political project comprised a broader and long-term goal of profound social change in the name of the poor majority of Ecuador's population. This dual character implied two tensions: between a particular/indigenous and a general/social agenda, and between a short-term/problem-solving and a long-term/programmatic perspective (cf. Collins 2004: 53-57; Beck/Mijeski 2006: 17; Almeida 2005). The cognitive maps demonstrate the different ways of articulating and tackling these tensions within the indigenous movement: The aim and the causal paths that lead to it indicate that the indigenous organizations from Ecuador's Lowlands that are represented by CONFENIAE are pragmatic and needs oriented. Their thinking and their behavior is shaped by the immediate needs and living conditions of the indigenous communities both with respect to the initial conditions as well as the future aims. The other concepts constituting the dominant causal paths confirm this interpretation: Self-help, needs-orientation and development projects (funded by the state or external actors) are of central importance; questions of political ideology/program play no role or a negative role; protests directly targeted at indigenous claims are relevant, ideologically and/or opportunistically driven protests, however, constitute a negative disruptive factor. In contrast, ECUARUNARI can be characterized as a macro-political and leftist organization. The normative perspective, here, is broad social and political change. A specifically indigenous agenda is equally important, thus constituting the main commonality between the two regional branches of CONAIE; but such an agenda is complemented by a strategy that is explicitly conceived of in macro-political terms, which has a clear leftist orientation and which seeks to incorporate non-indigenous forces: "Protest alliances" and a "(party-)political, 'mixed' organization" are important elements in ECUARUNARI's cognitive map. Protests, on their part, receive an unreserved positive evaluation.

This interpretation is confirmed by a correlation analysis that compares the patterns of thought of CONFENIAE and ECUARUNARI as well as of Pachakutik and FEINE following the procedure outlined in Section 3. The respective cognitive maps identify Pachakutik as another macro-political/leftist, and FEINE as another pragmatic/needs-oriented organization (Wolff 2008: Chap. 5.4). And, in fact, the statistical comparison reports strong and significant correlations between CONFENIAE and FEINE on the one hand, and ECUARUNARI and Pachakutik on the other. At the same time, correlations across the two groups are considerably weaker.²⁰ According to a frequency analysis that looks at the entries for the different arguments, the ranking of the satisfaction of basic needs and self-help is higher than collective

²⁰ Both the Pearson and the Spearman coefficient were significant only with respect to the two pairs ECUARUNARI/Pachakutik and CONFENIAE/FEINE. The level of significance in both cases is at $p < 0.01$. The correlation coefficients are reported in Wolff (2008: 426, Tab. 8).

identities and ideologies among pragmatic organizations. With respect to the second group, there is a well-balanced mix. Only the macro-political/leftist organizations consider the development of programmatic alternative to be a prerequisite for social change. Conversely, only FEINE and CONFENIAE mention that support by the state or external (international) actors is a basis for and incentive for mobilization; correspondingly, the argument “cooperation (with the state) as a political opportunity” predominates among the pragmatic/needs-oriented organizations.²¹

This explains the diametrically opposed reactions of the different indigenous organizations to Gutiérrez’ government: From CONFENIAE’s perspective, the government’s tangible offers in terms of cooperation and resources were more important than political differences, as profound as they may be; conversely, for an organization like ECUARUNARI, it was unthinkable to cooperate with a government that openly acted contrary to the general political aims, even if it refrained from violating material interests of the indigenous population. The cognitive maps reveal that this is about more than merely corrupt indigenous leaders in the Lowlands or a plainly opportunistic indigenous leadership in the Highlands. As CONFENIAE’s pattern of thought demonstrates, the Lowlands’ organizations first and foremost expect material support (“development projects”) from the state, and, in addition, they demand certain chances to participate in decision-making processes that immediately concern their interests, i.e. they strive for the recognition as a legitimate interest group. This, however, does not include a claim to comprehensive political (democratic) participation. Against this benchmark, the performance of the government of Gutiérrez was not that bad. ECUARUNARI’s pattern of thought, in contrast, points to a clear-cut predominance of political aims and to an orientation towards comprehensive democratic participation. Against this benchmark, the government led by Lucio Gutiérrez was unacceptable (cf. Wolff 2007: 21-27).

Concerning the question of the general proneness of the indigenous movement to clientelist offers and divide-and-rule strategies, the cognitive maps reveal different weak spots for corresponding regime strategies. In the case of a pragmatic/needs-oriented organization like CONFENIAE, tangible cooperative offers – in the absence of direct attacks on vital indigenous interests – facilitated the political incorporation of entire confederations “from above”.²²

²¹ The data: Concerning the “bases of and incentives for mobilization“ (V4), only CONFENIAE and FEINE feature considerably more entries for the argument “need satisfaction/self-help” (code 4.5) than for code 4.6 “collective identity/ideology“, the proportion being 11:1 and 12:4, respectively. Only CONFENIAE and FEINE mention the support by the state or international actors (code 4.4) as a (positive) factor of mobilization. Regarding the “preconditions of social change“ (V2), only Pachakutik and ECUARUNARI feature entries for the argument “alternatives“ (code 2.9).

²² As regards CONFENIAE, there is an additional feature that helps to understand the proneness to clientelism and cooptation as it results from the inner logic of Lowlands Organizations: It is precisely the skepticism vis-à-

In contrast, ECUARUNARI, as an organization with a more macro-political claim, was susceptible to clientelist offers that directly appealed to the indigenous communities: This way, the government could exacerbate the (already, if latently existing) tensions between the organization's political leadership and the social grass roots and, thus, weaken the indigenous movement's capacity to mobilize "from below".

In addition, the cognitive maps help to understand why the indigenous movement – CONAIE as well as Pachakutik – reacted to their weakening during the Gutiérrez government with an "indigenization" (Wolff 2008: 281-282; Beck/Mijeski 2006: 17). The differences and commonalities between ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE, as represented by the two patterns of thought, suggested a focus on the shared indigenous identity and the specific needs of the indigenous population as a strategy to reunify the multiply divided indigenous movement. In terms of allies, this was to the detriment of any broad movement of indigenous and mestizo organizations – but this negative side effect appeared to be acceptable given the ambivalent role of non-indigenous allies even in ECUARUNARI's cognitive map; in CONFENIAE's pattern of thought they did not even exist.

Finally, it becomes clear why, in the 1990s, the indigenous movements, was temporarily able to act so united and strong, only to gradually weaken and divide – and massively so during the presidency of Gutiérrez. In both cognitive maps, the unifying relevance of a common indigenous identity is combined with an equally important role of specific basic needs of the indigenous population. The indigenous movement was successful and relatively united when the task was to simultaneously fight for a basic recognition of one's own identity by the state (in political and constitutional terms); for institutions and resources that serve specific indigenous claims; *and* against continuous attacks on vital indigenous interests, i.e. neoliberal cost-cutting and structural adjustment measures. President Gutiérrez, however, refrained from such attacks – e.g., he did not reduce the subsidies for cooking gas – and counterbalanced the political marginalization of one part of the indigenous movement (ECUARUNARI, Pachakutik) by attempting to incorporate another part (FEINE, CONFENIAE). Thus, the main factors that would have mobilized unified resistance of the indigenous movement did not come to the fore. As a consequence, the differences between the indigenous organizations from Andean Highlands and Amazonian Lowlands, as shown in the cognitive maps, emerged with full force.

vis the participation in a political game that is perceived as being pervaded by clientelism, opportunism and corruption which suggests modes of informal and pragmatic cooperation with the state.

5 Concluding remarks

By representing socio-political causal relations as seen by specific actors, cognitive maps contribute to an understanding of socio-political processes that are shaped by the respective actors. Thus, the interpretive schemes of the two indigenous regional confederations revealed different dispositions that suggested, in part, diametrically opposed, but in each case reasonable reactions to identical “external” events and impulses. The cognitive maps illustrate (part of) the structural conditions within which CONFENIAE and ECUARUNARI act – from their own perspective, that is.²³ The role of the organizations’ grass-roots level and of (potential) political allies, the (anticipated) impact of different strategic decisions, the relation between options for action and aims – all this could be pictured as seen by the actor himself. This being said, cognitive maps do not replace the proper analysis of such factors and structural conditions in the framework of broader process tracing. Yet, the very idea behind Giddens’ notion of “methodological bracketing” (and the duality of structure and agency) is that the same holds true the other way around: A process analysis that coherently reconstructs macro-political interrelations has to make plausible that the social structures that were analyzed are real in the actors’ minds, and that the political processes that were reconstructed correspond to the motives and decisions of those that drive them. For this purpose, the cognitive map is a promising instrument.

Yet, the cognitive map remains a descriptive tool: An actor’s pattern of thought is represented in the form of causal relations. This neither confirms the presented causal links nor does it explain the specific behavior of the respective actor. Concerning the former aspect, cognitive maps are simply unsuitable. As for the latter, a cognitive map contributes important evidence, but only for a specific part and from a particular perspective. As the scheme refers to the perspective of only a single actor, the structural conditions reflected in the map, *first* have to be contrasted with an analysis of macro-social structures and processes that draws on different data. As the cognitive map is based only on assertions that are consciously and explicitly made in a given text, *second*, articulated strategies and aims have to be compared to assumptions regarding strategies, aims and practices (that are potentially routines and/or not reflected discursively) that can be reconstructed from observable data regarding the constitution, internal debate and actual behavior of the respective actor. *Third* and finally, specific events, impulses for action and interactions have to be included in the analysis – such event-type factors will usually not appear in cognitive maps as these focus on general causal relations regarding

²³ This presupposes that the textual basis that the cognitive maps draw on reliably represent the dominant pattern of thought of the respective collective actor – a premise that is to be critically questioned, especially in the case at hand, and can, at best, be verified partially by including certain controls (see Section 3).

a specific problem. The endeavor of embedding micro analyses based on cognitive maps in a broader process tracing could only be adumbrated in the framework of the present article which focused on presenting and critically discussing the methodological tool as such. Therefore, cognitive mapping is not an alternative to other ways of analyzing data. Nor does this instrument solve the basic problems of qualitative political science. However, this paper has argued that cognitive maps can serve as a useful supplement to macro-politically oriented process tracing. They force us to seriously consider the specific logics of thought and action characterizing selected actors and to explicitly verify to what extent macro structures and processes are reflected in the thinking of relevant actors. At the same time, they offer a procedure for summarizing all this in a problem-oriented illustrative way.

As a graphic representation of individual or collective patterns of thought, a cognitive map remains, of course, an “artefact” constructed by the scientist (Eden 1992: 262). Nevertheless, if it is well-directed, it prevents the researcher to a certain extent from inferring all too directly from the function of the actors in the processes that are analyzed to their preferences and strategies in the course of process tracing. In terms of the case study at hand: A government may decide to apply a strategy of cooptation and *divide et impera* – this strategy’s success, however, requires the counterpart to allow such cooptation and division.

Acknowledgements

The present article is based on my doctoral dissertation (Wolff 2008) written at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF). In addition to PRIF and DSF, I would like to thank the International Postgraduate Center Social Sciences at Goethe University Frankfurt and the German Research Foundation (DFG) for financial support, the local offices of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Buenos Aires and Quito for their hospitality, and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Special thanks go to my colleague Katja Freistein for first giving me the idea to enrich my PhD project by including cognitive maps.

Translated version of “Von Kästen und Pfeilen: Cognitive maps als Instrument zur akteurszentrierten Prozessanalyse” published in *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, Vol. 3 (2009), No. 1, pp. 131–153.

References

Almeida Vinueza, José. 2005. The Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement and the Gutiérrez Regime: The Traps of Multiculturalism. In: *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 1 (28). 93–111.

- Axelrod, Robert (ed.). 1976a. *Structure of Decision. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1976b. Results. In: *Axelrod 1976a*. 221–248.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1976c. Limitations. In: *Axelrod 1976a*. 251–265.
- Barrera, Augusto et al. 2004. *Entre la utopía y el desencanto. Pachakutik en el gobierno de Gutiérrez*. Quito: Editorial Planeta.
- Beck, Scott H. und Kenneth J. Mijeski. 2006. How to Lose by Winning: The Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement After the 2002 Elections. Beitrag zur Jahrestagung der Latin American Studies Association. 15.-18.03.2006. San Juan, PR.
- Bonham, G. Matthew, Victor M. Sergeev und Pavel B. Parshin. 1997. The Limited Test-Ban Agreement: Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation. In: *International Studies Quarterly* 2 (41). 215–240.
- Bonham, G. Matthey und Michael Shapiro. 1976. Explanation of the Unexpected: The Syrian Intervention in Jordan in 1970. In: *Axelrod 1976a*. 113–141.
- Brady, Henry E. und David Collier (eds.) 2004. *Rethinking Social Inquiry. Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bretón, Victor. 2005. *¿Más allá del neoliberalismo étnico? Enseñanzas desde los Andes del Ecuador*. http://www.icantropologia.org/contenido/uploads/NEOLIBERALISMO_ETNICO.pdf (03.04.2006).
- Colectivo Situaciones. 2003. Vielfalt und Gegenmacht in den Erfahrungen der Piqueteros. In: Colectivo Situaciones. *¡Que se vayan todos! Krise und Widerstand in Argentinien*. Berlin: Assoziation A (herausgegeben von Ulrich Brand). 69–94.
- Collins, Jennifer. 2004. Linking Movements and Electoral Politics. Ecuador's Indigenous Movement and the Rise of Pachakutik. In: Burt, Jo-Marie und Philip Mauzeri (eds.). *Politics in the Andes. Identity, Conflict, Reform*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 38–57.
- Denzin, Norman K. 1978. *The Research Act*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Eden, Colin. 1992. On the Nature of Cognitive Maps. In: *Journal of Management Studies* 3 (29). 261–265.
- Eden, Colin, Fran Ackermann and Steve Cropper. 1992. The Analysis of Cause Maps. In: *Journal of Management Studies* 3 (29). 309–324.
- George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge/London: MIT Press.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1997. *Die Konstitution der Gesellschaft. Grundzüge einer Theorie der Strukturierung*, Frankfurt/New York: Campus.
- Hall, Peter A. 2003. Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics. In: Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.). *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 373–404.
- Hart, Jeffrey A. 1977. Cognitive Maps of Three Latin American Policy Makers. In: *World Politics* 1 (30). 115–140.
- Heradstveit, Daniel and Ove Narvesen. 1978. Psychological Constraints on Decision-making. A Discussion of Cognitive Approaches: Operational Code and Cognitive Map. In: *Cooperation and Conflict* 2 (13), 77–92.
- Holsti, Ole. 1976. Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively. In: *Axelrod 1976a*. 18–54.
- Jahn, Detlef. 2006. *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Kneuer, Marianne. 2007. Deutliche Konjunktur – Literaturbericht über Einführungen zur Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft. In: *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 1 (1). 183–195.
- León Trujillo, Jorge. 1994. *De campesinos a ciudadanos diferentes. El levantamiento indígena*. Quito: Abya-Yala.
- Mayring, Philipp. 1997. *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken*. Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag.
- Mayring, Philipp. 1993. *Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung*. Weinheim: Beltz.
- Pallares, Amalia. 2002. *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance. The Ecuadorian Andes in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma.
- Pickel, Gert. 2007. Zwischen Identitätsfindung und Richtungsbestimmung – Englischsprachige Basisliteratur der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft. In: *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 1 (1). 166–182.
- Posso, Antonio. 2004. *Radiografía de una Traición*. Quito: Editorial El Conejo.
- Rösener, Matthias. 1998. *Dialektik der Kontrolle. Macht, Handlung und Struktur in der Sozialtheorie und Soziologie* Anthony Giddens. Münster: Schöningh.
- Selverston-Scher, Melina. 2001. *Ethnopolitics in Ecuador. Indigenous Rights and the Strengthening of Democracy*. Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press.
- Shapiro, Michael J. and G. Matthew Bonham. 1973. Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making. In: *International Studies Quarterly* 2 (17). 147–174.
- Shapiro, Michael J., G. Matthew Bonham and Daniel Heradstveit. 1988. A Discursive Practices Approach to Collective Decision-Making. In: *International Studies Quarterly* 4 (32). 397–419.

- Sil, Rudra. 2000. The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Culture, and Structure in Social Theory. In: *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3 (12). 353–387.
- Tituaña Males, Auki. 2005. Cotacachi: ein Beispiel partizipativer Demokratie und lokaler Entwicklung. In: Sevilla, Rafael and Alberto Acosta (eds.). *Ecuador. Welt der Vielfalt*. Bad Honnef: Horlemann. 61–80.
- Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2005. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America. The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America. The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walsh, Catherine E. 2001. The Ecuadorian Political Irruption. Uprisings, Coups, Rebellions, and Democracy. In: *Nepantla: Views from South* 1 (2). 173–204.
- Wolff, Jonas. 2008. *Turbulente Stabilität. Die Demokratie in Südamerika diesseits ferner Ideale*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Wolff, Jonas. 2007. (De-)Mobilising the Marginalised. A Comparison of the Argentine *Piqueteros* and Ecuador's Indigenous Movement. In: *Journal of Latin American Studies* 1 (39). 1–29.
- Wolff, Jonas. 2004. *Demokratisierung als Risiko der Demokratie? Die Krise der Politik in Bolivien und Ecuador und die Rolle der indigenen Bewegungen*. Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK-Report 6/2004).
- Zamosc, Leon. 2007. The Indian Movement and Political Democracy in Ecuador. In: *Latin American Politics & Society* 3 (49). 1–34.

Annex: Figures

Figure 1: The cognitive map of ECUARUNARI




Figure 2: The cognitive map of CONFENIAE

