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# Emigration and Policy in Yugoslavia: Dynamics and Constraints within the Process of Muslim Emigration to Turkey during the 1950s

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## Abstract

The southern parts of Yugoslavia, especially Macedonia, experienced massive emigration by non-Slavic Muslims in the 1950s after an agreement was concluded between Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1953. The movement raises questions of ethnic belonging and policy towards minorities in socialist Yugoslavia, especially regarding the Albanian population in Kosovo. It also raises questions regarding the entanglement of (migration) policy and emigration and the character of state intervention in an ongoing emigration process. Thus, the author's aim is to analyse the pillars of migration policy, the legal and regulatory framework as well as the extent, causes and consequences of state intervention on emigration processes to Turkey. The author further questions the emigration factors and their ethno-political dimensions, also examining how the mass emigration of Muslims influenced different fields of society in the region of origin as well as the Muslim lifeworld in the region.

## Keywords

Yugoslavia, migration policy, emigration, Muslims, Macedonia, Kosovo, Sandzak, minorities, Albanians, Turks, Turkey

## Introduction

Migration history can become both complex and complicated if the translucent line between so-called voluntary and forced migration disappears. A perfect example is the emigration of non-Slavic and Slavic Muslims to Turkey during the 1950s from

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Yugoslavia's southern regions (Macedonia, Kosovo,<sup>1</sup> Sandzak) – i.e. Turks, Albanians, Bosniaks, Gorani, Pomaks, Torbeš and Roma. Seen by parts of the Muslim population as result of a 'denationalizing policy' by the state (see below), the migration movement and its consequences challenged both the communist leadership and Muslim society, especially in Macedonia, the main source of Muslim emigration. This was the first big wave of emigration from Yugoslavia not directly caused by the Second World War and forced a reaction from top government officials. According to Turkish immigration statistics, nearly 140,000 people emigrated from Yugoslavia to Turkey in the 1950s (almost 120,000 between 1954 and 1958). In Bulgaria, it seems a similar trend occurred at the start of the 1950s following a Bulgarian government resettlement campaign: between August 1950 and November 1951, around 155,000 Turks left Bulgaria before this emigration movement was abruptly stopped by Sofia.<sup>2</sup>

Emigration from Yugoslavia also left a deep mark within the collective memory of Muslim society, partly because it stemmed from ethno-political and state violence.<sup>3</sup> In spite of the putative meaning of this emigration, the outcomes remain disputed today. This affects not only the provisions of the famous *Gentlemen's Agreement* between Yugoslavia and Turkey, which regulated the immigration to Turkey, but also the numbers affected, as well as the reasons advanced to explain the emigration and especially the appraisal of the role of violence during this emigration process.

Before going into detail, we have to place the immigration to Turkey within the wider context of migration from Yugoslavia in the 1950s. It is therefore necessary to provide a brief summary of the emigration issue after the Second World War. In doing this, one should remember the specific context of Yugoslavia as it sought to find its own path beyond the East–West division after the Tito–Stalin split in 1948. This was reflected in the establishment of the self-management system and Yugoslavia's role in the Non-Alignment Movement. Accordingly, this was a period of great upheaval for Yugoslavia, with economic and political challenges and a restrictive migratory policy. Nevertheless, inner- and outer-migration never stopped and migration always remained an alternative for people searching for a better life. From a more general perspective, one should bear in mind that the history of Yugoslavia is closely connected to migration movements in south-eastern Europe, which often take on an ethnic character. In this respect, we can divide emigration from Yugoslavia up until the mid-1960s, when the regime liberalized its emigration policies,<sup>4</sup> into three separate phases. We can start with the 1940s and forced migration movements in the whole of south-eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, during and immediately after the Second World War. From the second half of the 1940s, a series of bilateral agreements facilitated legal emigration from Yugoslavia by different ethnic groups. Finally, unregulated and illegal emigration from Yugoslavia reached its peak in the second half of the 1950s.

To better understand the first phase, and its dreadful consequences, we have to take into account the resettlement and expulsion campaigns in regions controlled by the Nazis and their satellites; the Ustaša regime's extermination policy – especially of Serbs, Jews and Roma; and the Holocaust and the persecution of

different minority groups in the occupied areas. These migration movements affected south-east Europe in its entirety; they were accompanied by high human losses and affected the German population of the region as well.<sup>5</sup>

Between the first and the second phase, it is important to mention the resettlement of about 300,000 Italians from Istria, Fiume/Rijeka and Zara/Zadar. The massive immigration into Italy began in 1944, during the war, and ended in 1956. The cornerstones were developments in the final stages of the war, the peace treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia (1947), which granted the right to opt for Italian citizenship, and the London Memorandum of Understanding, regarding the Free Territory of Trieste (1954), which handed over the civil administration of Zone B to Yugoslavia.<sup>6</sup>

The second phase mirrored the bilaterally agreed emigration after 1945 which was ongoing while the regime set about building a socialist society and establishing the rule of the communists in Yugoslavia. A first set of people who belonged to certain ethnic groups which did not belong to the Yugoslav constituent people enjoyed the right to emigrate permanently from the bilateral agreements Yugoslavia concluded with Poland (1946),<sup>7</sup> Czechoslovakia (1948) and Israel (1948).<sup>8</sup> The people emigrating on this basis left Yugoslavia more or less voluntarily, having to give up their Yugoslav citizenship within a certain period. In a similar way, the so-called *Gentlemen's Agreement* (1953) with Turkey, described below, allowed and opened the door for the emigration of a second group of Yugoslav citizens of 'Turkish belonging'.

A third category of emigrants referred mainly to citizens belonging to one of the constituent peoples. However, since voluntary emigration from Yugoslavia was to some extent frozen until the mid-1960s and migration was under close political control, many left Yugoslavia illegally and in significant numbers. In this respect, in 1955, for example, the Yugoslav Ministry of Interior counted 6588 people who attempted to escape to the West (2738 unsuccessfully), and in 1956, 15,684 attempts (6000 of which were foiled).<sup>9</sup> It is perhaps symptomatic that, parallel to this development, the number of applications in Belgrade's US Embassy's Consular Section for immigration increased, from about 200 applications per month during 1954 and 1955, by more than twenty-three-fold to an average of 4611 per month for a total of 55,335 in 1956. Edward W. Burgess, Second Secretary of the Embassy, explained the massive increase as 'probably the most striking evidence of the unrest and dissatisfaction current in Yugoslavia'.<sup>10</sup> Thus, migration issues definitively became a political matter in the second half of the 1950s, discussed by governments, at the latest in November 1956, when some of them argued for a more liberal approach to the emigration question.<sup>11</sup>

According to the specific case in question and the regime's need for control, different migration policies were developed and implemented. The management and control of migration, especially maintaining control over population movements across state borders, a central element of modern statehood,<sup>12</sup> was of great importance in Yugoslavia, before and after the Second World War.<sup>13</sup> However, this was primarily oriented towards the needs of a South Slavic nation-state project, especially important in the context of the governmental nationalities policy of

the 1950s as well.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, Yugoslav state institutions, as a ‘patronage-state’, focused their interests on the constitutive nations (the so-called ‘Yugoslav nationalities’), whilst being more or less indifferent to the emigration of members of the population denominated until 1963 as national minorities.<sup>15</sup> This minorities’ policy in Yugoslavia, which is to be seen in a wider context of Yugoslavia’s nationalities’ policy, became more important still in the second half of the 1950s. Party leaders questioned and problematized this issue only in 1959, when they discussed in detail the social and economic integration of the minority population, especially in Kosovo.<sup>16</sup> Thus, a stringent long-term concept of minority policy did not exist in the first years.

On the basis of archival documents from Belgrade, where key decisions with regard to this emigration process were made, and Skopje, the capital of the most affected republic,<sup>17</sup> this article seeks to shed a new light on the history of migration in Yugoslavia and to re-open the discussion on the emigration of Muslims with different ethnic backgrounds. It adopts a thematic approach, primarily from the perspective of the state, and aims to answer the following questions: what were the pillars of migration policy to Turkey, how successful were the instruments implemented by state organs to regulate emigration, and which leading emigration factors can we identify in the 1950s? Moreover, the article examines aspects of ethno-political and state violence that accompanied migration. These command great importance, not only because of the background of the situation between 1935 and 1938, when state authorities in Yugoslavia actively tried to resettle a great number of Albanians (see below), but also because of its previously mentioned significance in the Albanian culture of remembrance into the 1950s. The paper also demonstrates how the mass emigration of Muslims in the 1950s influenced different parts of society in the region, as well as the Muslim lifeworld in the region.

The focus of the article is on the 1950s as the majority of Muslim emigrants headed to Turkey during this decade. At that time, the emigration process grew in political significance, which it subsequently lost. However, when mass emigration to Turkey started, the Yugoslav political leadership seemed surprised by the scale of this migration movement. Therefore, we claim that, contrary to widespread belief, the emigration or expulsion of Albanian Muslims, mainly from Kosovo, was not intended by the political leadership<sup>18</sup> and that it should not be equated with the policies of forced migration or ‘ethnic cleansing’, as the Albanian historiography often claims.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, the character of this very complex emigration process, which has received more attention in the literature in recent years,<sup>20</sup> will be explored as well, with the aim of opening a new discussion about this still sensitive issue, especially in terms of the role of violence.

## 2. Reasons for Emigration and the Importance of State Violence

In the 1970s, William Peterson pointed out that any migration has a tendency to generate a further migration and that a ‘migration stream’ is also the ‘consequence

of interaction among potential migrants, the rise of a collective impulse to leave',<sup>21</sup> In the case of Muslim emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey, this mechanism was of great importance, paraphrased by contemporary witnesses as 'a "fever" that spread uncontrollably'.<sup>22</sup> However, regardless of the fact that migration generates further migration, we can detect many complex social-cultural, economic and political motives for emigration to Turkey. Nonetheless, arguing with Anthony Richmond, an absolutely clear distinction between economic and socio-political determinants of population movement is not appropriate and a differentiation between voluntary and involuntary movements is also untenable. 'All human behaviour is constrained and enabled by the structuration process within which degrees of freedom of choice are limited'. Moreover, Richmond also argued that the 'distribution of economic and political power is central to the decision-making process at the individual and collective level'.<sup>23</sup> The latter can be assumed when looking at the numbers of Albanian and Turkish members represented in the Macedonian League of Communists (see Table 1). Their under-representation in the political structures probably fostered their self-perception of being unequal and unwanted members of a South Slavic state. Apart from questions of political integration, possible reasons for emigration constraints inherent to migration processes qualified as 'forced migration' or 'ethnic cleansing' also have to be considered.<sup>24</sup> This question arises in the case of Kosovo and the incidents taking place there in the winter of 1955/56, when state violence, especially against Kosovo Albanians, reached a tragic climax during large-scale operations by the police and the Yugoslav State Security to confiscate weapons.<sup>25</sup>

Identifying relevant emigration factors means one must detect decisive (socio-) political developments which affected the life of the Muslim population to a significant extent and finally led to emigration. As is generally known, socialist Yugoslavia's political manoeuvring between East and West was accompanied by the efforts of the political elite to solve the complex national relations in the country through balanced policies towards their constitutive nations and the population denominated as national minorities. Furthermore, with the intention of creating a socialist society, Yugoslavia's communists made considerable efforts

Table 1. Numbers of Albanian and Turkish members in Macedonia's League of Communists, 1953–1956.

	1953	%	1954	%	1955	%	1956	%
Turks	2475	5.48	1799	4.91	1233	3.46	1078	2.86
Albanians	3146	6.97	2367	6.46	2229	6.25	2289	6.07
Total	5621	12.45	4166	11.37	3462	9.71	3367	8.93

Source: Edvin Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten? Jugoslawische Migrationspolitik und die Auswanderung von Muslimen in die Türkei (1918 bis 1966)* (München 2013), 321.

to industrialize and modernize the country. The results generated and the ongoing socio-political changes were, as I argue, one of the most important emigration factors. This state intervention in everyday life, combined with economic factors and psychological elements – the disappointments of the Muslim population and their uncertainty about their future in Yugoslavia, as well as their expectations and hopes for a better life in Turkey – and the experience of violence, especially in the case of the Albanians from Kosovo, sparked massive emigration.

These emigration factors, although not the role of violence, were discussed in the context of consultations of the Committee on Internal Affairs of the Federal Executive Council (SIV) in 1956 and 1957. Several of their reports, focusing on the situation in Macedonia, stressed the complexity of the on-going emigration process. Several reasons for emigration were mentioned – for example, the political developments in the region. This refers to the deterioration of relations between the Balkan Pact states, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, the anti-Greek violent excesses in Istanbul in September 1955 and the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the countries of the Eastern bloc, ‘reviving a climate of fear’ among the Turkish minority, strengthening the intention to emigrate as soon as possible.<sup>26</sup> In another report, also produced for the Committee on Internal Affairs, the authors acknowledged just how multi-faceted this emigration process was: ‘[I]t is difficult to give a proper assessment of the elements and factors, which had the strongest impact on emigration’.<sup>27</sup> The authors of this paper outlined their findings as follows: mainly former big landowners, merchants and craftsmen from urban places, who lost their sources of revenue, were among the first emigrants. The difficult economic situation provided a further reason. Many members of the urban Turkish population were unemployed and were disadvantaged in some cases in favour of Macedonians. Furthermore, the report argued that existing family ties supported emigration, at a time when political propaganda, coming both from East and West, criticizing the Yugoslav political system and its policies towards religion, were unsettling the Turkish population. Of great importance certainly is the statement that when the gates of emigration to Turkey were opened, ‘a new psychological moment’ was created, not to remain alone within a non-Turkish society. This was exemplified in the report by some common and characteristic phrases and expressions: ‘Where do they go . . . Where should I stay . . . When I die, there is no one to bury me . . . When I want to celebrate a wedding, who will participate?’.<sup>28</sup> Another reason for the emigration, highlighted in the report, were so-called ‘religious aspects’, and important factors in this regard included: communist policies relating to questions of religion, as for example the campaign of lifting the veil (*zar/feredža*);<sup>29</sup> the closure of Islamic elementary schools (*Maktabs*); the refusal to open *madrasas*; the prohibition on celebrating *Mawlid* (‘Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad’); and the reduction in the number of Islamic teachers (*hodža*).<sup>30</sup> These measures were interpreted by Muslims ‘as [a] general plan for destroying Islam and converting the Turkish national minority into “Giaours” [a pejorative term for non-Muslims]’.

From the point of view of the Committee on Internal Affairs, we have to consider a wide range of emigration factors as part of, or producing, processes of chain migration. Economic reasons as well as psychological aspects regarding the fears and hopes of the migrating population and cultural-religious dimensions were mentioned in particular. These or similar observations were also made at other levels of government and tended to coincide with statements of contemporary witnesses collected in the secondary literature.<sup>31</sup>

As we see from the minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists at the end of 1956, the motives for the emigration of Muslims from the Sandzak and for Albanians from Kosovo to Turkey were summarized as follows: 'The reasons are: religious, fear of war and partly economic',<sup>32</sup> The minutes of a later meeting noted with regard to emigrating Slavic Muslims from Serbia that 'conservative elements in the villages' would like to emigrate for the reasons: '1. Economic, 2. Fear of war, 3. Feeling of being religiously threatened (they have no Maktabs)'.<sup>33</sup> Not substantially different are the conclusions made by Ramiz Crnišanin, chairman of the municipal People's Committee of Novi Pazar, at a district meeting of the Serbian League of Communists in Novi Pazar at the end of December 1956. He referred to the political situation in the Sandzak and cited five main reasons for emigration to Turkey. In his opinion, first to be mentioned were religious reasons. Further factors were family relations, economic aspects, fear of war, with the related consequences, and finally 'various pressures', not only but especially on the Muslim population. In this context, he referred to the unlawful conduct of state security forces during the fight against rebel bands in the aftermath of the Second World War, as in winter 1955/56 when a huge operation to confiscate weapons was carried out in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.<sup>34</sup>

The operation mentioned by Crnišanin deserves special consideration, bearing in mind the possible characterization of the emigration of Albanians from Kosovo as 'forced migration' or 'ethnic cleansing'. We should take this operation into account as it supports the assertion that we should question the role of violence in the emigration process. In this respect, an assessment is difficult, especially as we lack well-founded research relating to state violence in the southern parts of Yugoslavia after 1948. Nevertheless, the state violence of the 1950s should not be equated with forms of violent oppression in the post-war period of the forties. The violent suppression of the armed Albanian insurgency in Kosovo (winter/spring 1944/45)<sup>35</sup> by Partisans or the so-called Yucel trial in Skopje (1948) against Turkish intellectuals and teachers, seen by Turkish scholars as 'one of the main push factors in the decision of most Muslims to migrate',<sup>36</sup> should be seen primarily in the context of a 'revolutionary "terror"'. The aim was to consolidate the power of the communists<sup>37</sup> at a time when a bilateral emigration agreement was not in sight.

The operation to confiscate weapons (1955/56) was implemented, according to the statement of Vojin Lukić, one year after the adaption of the Serbian Law on Weapons and in order to enforce the state's monopoly on the use of force,



following a proposal by the State Secretary for Internal Affairs from Kosovo and after the approval by Aleksandar Ranković.<sup>38</sup> Within this operation, force was used excessively and state violence against Kosovo Albanians reached a peak. In this respect, Serbia's Executive Committee indirectly admitted afterwards, during a meeting in October 1956, that something went wrong in Kosovo. They realized that the political situation worsened, due to the internal and external political situation and criticized the confiscation of weapons because 'in certain cases irresponsible measures were undertaken'. Emigration to Turkey was considered by the state only in so far as 'the problem of emigration to Turkey remains topical'.<sup>39</sup> Further hints regarding the use of force by governmental agencies can be discerned by the results of the investigations concerning the 'deviations' of the state security forces and the events of 1955/56, made in the shadow of the Brioni Plenum (July 1966). While the figures of the investigation reports were in part contradictory, it can be reasonably concluded that several dozen people lost their lives in the winter of 1955/56.<sup>40</sup>

Within the scope of these reports, comments were also made in relation to these forceful operations and the emigration of Albanians to Turkey. For example, in one case it was noted that:

As a consequence of the operation to confiscate weapons, emigration of Albanians to Turkey increased as well. The campaign to move to Turkey began in early 1954, because of the economic development, religious prejudices, family ties and the influence of foreign propaganda. It is a fact that the measures of the state security forces, taken during the operation to collect weapons influenced, increased, the emigration afterwards.<sup>41</sup>

Similar statements were recorded in the report of the Province Committee of the League of Communists for Kosovo and Metohija from September 1966:

... Repressive measures [undertaken] during the confiscation of weapons, various suspicions and similar things, contributed to a broader emigration movement and that a number of citizens have fled over the border to Albania ... , there are even examples of some people who were pressured by the [state] organs to leave the country. Understandably, the process and the movement for emigration were not caused only by the pressure from the authorities and their repressive measures. Many other factors influenced the emigration movement.<sup>42</sup>

Finally, the interconnection between these operations and the question of emigration was also a topic in the summary report sent to Tito in November 1966. The report briefly mentioned how the events around the confiscation of weapons resulted in the flight of some citizens to Albania and that a certain number of people fled to Turkey due to concerns and fear.<sup>43</sup>

Thus, parallel to the process of emigration to Turkey, the massive exercise of state violence which took place during the operation to confiscate weapons in Kosovo was a push factor. Therefore, the real and psychological role of physical

violence is not to be underestimated. Furthermore, it reminds us of a similar situation in the second half of the 1930s, particularly between 1935 and 1938, as described in the next section, when state authorities perpetrated acts of violence – especially towards Albanians living in the border region near Albania – against the background of the concluding of the bilateral convention between Yugoslavia and Turkey to resettle 40,000 so-called Turkish families.<sup>44</sup> But in the case of Kosovo in 1955 and 1956, and with regard to our current knowledge, it should also be noted that force was not purposefully and systematically used by the higher state organs to expel Albanians from Kosovo. Even if in some cases members of the security forces urged Albanians to leave the country, as mentioned above, neither the contemporary documents, nor the framework conditions, such as the existing restrictions mentioned below, allow such a conclusion as ‘forced migration’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’. As Isabel Ströhle has shown, physical violence escalated locally during the confiscation of weapons due to a combination of factors, rather than being ordered by Belgrade.<sup>45</sup>

The question of why migrants resorted to leaving their country of origin has to be answered with reference to different reasons. Violence as a factor causing emigration was present, first of all in Kosovo, but was not a dominant cause. On the contrary, the motives of the migrants were strongly connected with the ‘socialist transformation’ of Yugoslavia, the establishment of a new economic and social model in relation to efforts to industrialize and modernize the country. Of note here are the land reform after the Second World War, the agricultural policy and the attempts to collectivize agriculture and to nationalize the economy between 1948 and 1953. Therefore, it is not surprising that primarily landowners, merchants and craftsmen were among the first emigrants in 1953 and 1954. It is probable that their emigration was a starting point for the dynamic migration movement. Following this, Muslims from southern parts of Yugoslavia, especially of Turkish ethnicity, realized *en masse* their opportunities to emigrate from a country that interfered with their lives as never before. In this respect, particular attention should be paid to the religious policy as well as to the campaign of lifting the veil, which affected a key marker of identity of the Muslim population. Accordingly, the entanglement of hard and soft factors, a mixture of expectations and fears, of political, economic, religious and cultural reasons, created a dynamic and self-generating migration movement drawing in potential migrants.

### 3. The Preparation of the Bilateral Agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1953

The regulation of migration movements through bilateral agreements was a particular feature of the twentieth century. Relevant agreements range from contracts that implied forced migration movements, such as the Treaty of Lausanne from 1923 and the ‘population exchange’ between Turkey and Greece, to bilateral agreements concerning labour recruitment, typical for the phase of reconstruction in the post-war period after 1945. The agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey neither

had such a connotation of labour migration, nor was it dedicated to a policy of forced migration typical of post-war periods.<sup>46</sup> Instead, the Yugoslav side officially considered this open option of migration to Turkey as a ‘human’ and ‘democratic’ act towards members of the Turkish minority who wanted to emigrate for personal reasons.<sup>47</sup> Nevertheless, for parts of the Muslim population this agreement caused unrest. They perceived this non-official agreement as an ethno-political tool ‘to get rid of’ them, especially when rumours spread that Yugoslavia and Turkey agreed to reactivate the convention of 1938.<sup>48</sup> This convention stipulated the emigration of Turks from the southern parts of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and foresaw the need to resettle nearly all of the Turkish population. In fact, the main objective of the convention from 1938 was to resettle a large number of Albanians from the southern parts of the country. Officially, the never-realized convention of 1938 provided for the resettlement of 40,000 ‘Turkish’ families. Indeed, the convention would have affected many more than 200,000 people, as it was planned not to count children under the age of 10 years in the fixed quotas.<sup>49</sup>

In fact, the 1953 bilateral agreement was of crucial importance for this migration process, opening the doors for potential migrants. Nevertheless, we know little about the framework of this agreement, also known as the *Gentlemen’s Agreement*, which is sometimes wrongly equated with the already mentioned convention of 1938.<sup>50</sup> The agreement was reached in the context of improving relationships between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece, after Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952 and they signed the ‘Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation’ with Yugoslavia in February 1953, also known as the ‘Balkan Pact’.<sup>51</sup> However, first interventions made by the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade regarding emigration preceded the negotiations of 1953.

Already in January 1951, the Yugoslav Foreign Office agreed, at the request of the Turkish embassy, to consider the emigration of individual members of the Turkish minority population for family reunification.<sup>52</sup> This issue proved no less important for the Turkish side, as exemplified by the case of the Turkish ambassador Kemal Köprülü in Belgrade, who made the question of Turkish emigration a subject of discussion during a meeting with Leo Mates, assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 1 July 1952. The latter reported that Köprülü, ambassador in Belgrade from October 1949 to October 1952, who allegedly asked at an earlier date to suspend the issuing of passports for emigration to Turkey, as Turkey was not ready to receive them all, now referred to the ‘return of the Turks, our [Yugoslav] citizens, to Turkey’. In the meantime, a certain number of them were granted Turkish immigration permits, but the Yugoslav side did not issue passports. Therefore, Köprülü sought to resolve the matter by issuing passports to all those who had been granted a Turkish immigration permit.<sup>53</sup> A solution regarding this issue was only achieved after the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü, in Belgrade at the end of January 1953, when he met high ranking members of the Yugoslav government such as Josip Broz Tito. Even though the question of emigration was not the official subject of the discussions and consultations, it can be assumed that a *Gentlemen’s Agreement*, which, I argue, did not have a

contractual nature, was reached. The agreement was concluded in order to allow the emigration of Turks from Yugoslavia to Turkey; shortly afterwards, important points of the framework regarding this issue were determined; in the end, the actual agreement. On the initiative of the Turkish ambassador, Agah Aksel, an outline for the further policy was drafted on 17 February 1953, together with Aleš Bebler, Yugoslav Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.<sup>54</sup> The results were reported by the Legal Counsel of the Foreign Office as follows: applications of members of the close family circle – if there were no formal legal reason – were to be accepted and each case should be examined individually. Furthermore, emigration was linked to the following conditions: the emigrant had to apply for release from Yugoslav citizenship and the Turkish embassy had to declare that that person, if the application was approved, would receive Turkish citizenship. In addition, the emigrants should receive the option to sell their property and the Legal Counsel also suggested limiting the numbers of families who should be allowed to sell their property and to emigrate, thus emphasizing the exception.<sup>55</sup> Shortly afterwards, the Yugoslav Ministry of Interior no longer mentioned this exceptional situation. However, the federal Ministry of Interior confirmed the other statements in an order to its regional authorities and added that the emigration of Yugoslav citizens of Turkish nationality for the purpose of family reunification should be treated as generously as possible.<sup>56</sup>

Those internal instructions laid the ground for the subsequent development of the emigration process to Turkey. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the Yugoslav authorities did not foresee mass migration in the second half of 1953. The Ministry of Interior expected up to 30,000 emigrants at that time.<sup>57</sup> However, a liberal treatment of emigration to Turkey, and above all the extension of the circle of eligible persons, from members of the close family circle to distant relatives, enabled large numbers of emigrants.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless, the question of their ethnic background was important as well. Of no importance on paper, as it was agreed to open the doors only for ‘Turks’, it became a problem in practice leading to a meeting of Yugoslav decision-makers in the spring of the year 1955 regarding the emigration of Albanians and ‘Muslims of Macedonian nationality’, described in section 5 below. While the emigration from Yugoslavia was officially permitted only to ‘Turks’, Muslims of Slavic or Albanian origin also participated by declaring themselves as Turks (see the next section). This was also possible because a strong sense of national belonging was still not pronounced in the majority of the Muslim population. That said, religion remained an important identity marker and a sometimes fluid ethnic self-designation was therefore not unusual. Apart from this, the Turkish migration policy, already formulated in the interwar period as an important tool for constructing a Turkish national identity,<sup>59</sup> indirectly enabled such an attitude. Key concepts of the Turkish Settlement Law, formulated in the Settlement Law No. 2510 of 1934, allowed making concessions in the face of the highly complex sense of ethnic and national belonging within the Muslim world outside Turkey. Therefore, immigrants had to fulfil the vaguely defined criteria of ‘Turkish descent and culture’.<sup>60</sup> In practice, people willing to leave the country

first had to prove knowledge of the Turkish language. Under these circumstances, Albanian- or Slavic-speaking Muslims with relevant language skills enjoyed the opportunity to emigrate to Turkey. Despite the fact that the Turkish immigration policy preferred some groups of non-Turkish immigrants suitable for assimilation, such as the Slavic-speaking Bosniaks or Torbeši, others such as the Albanians were refused. Nevertheless, Albanians tried to emigrate and, as the Yugoslavs reported, the Turkish side occasionally tacitly tolerated their immigration early on.<sup>61</sup>

#### 4. Muslim Emigration from Yugoslavia after the Second World War: Some Statistical Observations

The emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey was well documented by Yugoslav as well as Turkish state organs, as the emigrants had to fulfil some administrative conditions, beginning with the fact that anyone willing to migrate to Turkey had to have an immigration application form for family reunification filled out by relatives in Turkey. Following this, the applicants had to attend the Turkish Consulate General in Skopje to verify their ‘Turkishness’ (with regard to language and culture), from which they received a certificate that confirmed they would be granted Turkish citizenship. This was necessary in order to apply for release from Yugoslav citizenship.<sup>62</sup> These administrative burdens provided dense statistical records on both the Yugoslav and Turkish sides, allowing us to make reliable assessments regarding the emigration volume and its temporal development. Thus, looking at the period from 1951 to 1970 – the number of immigrants moving from Yugoslavia to Turkey between 1945 and 1951, recorded by the Turkish statistical office, are negligible – the Turkish Statistical Yearbook reveals that the peak years of emigration from Yugoslavia were between 1956 and 1958, when these migrants made up 50.59 per cent of all of from Yugoslavia coming immigrants. Afterwards, the immigration numbers fell significantly (Table 2 and Figure 1). It should also be noted that the peak of applications for relinquishing Yugoslav citizenship, considering the numbers for Macedonia, was in 1955. Afterwards, a decrease in such applications was noted.<sup>63</sup> The discrepancy between the Turkish and Yugoslav figures could be explained by a time delay between the date of application and the actual emigration.

Nevertheless, assessments concerning the ethnic background of the emigrants are problematic. Certainly all of them were Muslims, but not all of them were ethnic Turks, even when they had to confirm their ‘Turkishness’. In fact, the group of emigrating people was very heterogeneous, with respect to a sometimes fluid ethnic self-designation, as well as their social background.<sup>64</sup> As described above, it seems that the first emigrants from Macedonia were urban Muslims, primarily merchants and craftsmen. Later, the emigration movement affected larger parts of the Muslim society, especially in Macedonia. Thus, one report documented 86,380 people registered until the end of 1956, followed by numbers for the employed male migrants from Macedonia: 15,883 farmers, of which 14,828 were smallholders, 7493 workers, 2785 craftsmen, 287 students and pupils, and 682 employees.<sup>65</sup>

Table 2. Emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey, 1951–1970.

	Number	% of total
1951	–	–
1952	73	0.04%
1953	1113	0.61%
1954	9728	5.33%
1955	17,000	9.32%
1956	31,969	17.53%
1957	30,162	16.54%
1958	30,137	16.52%
1959	18,403	10.09%
1960	13,304	7.29%
1961	7091	3.89%
1962	3399	1.86%
1963	2603	1.43%
1964	1288	0.71%
1965	1998	1.10%
1966	3672	2.01%
1967	3452	1.89%
1968	3472	1.90%
1969	2233	1.22%
1970	1294	0.71%
Total	182,391	100.00%

Source: *Istatistik yılığı* 1959 (Ankara [not dated]), 111; *Türkiye istatistik yılığı* 1963 (Ankara [not dated]), 97; *Türkiye istatistik yılığı* 1971 (Ankara 1973), 72.

Note: Turkish statistics distinguish between the ‘immigrants’ (*göçmenler*) – here documented – and ‘refugees’ (*sığınanlar*). The statistical numbers of refugees from Yugoslavia are very small and therefore negligible.

Moreover, the emigrants came from different parts of Yugoslavia, primarily from Macedonia but also from Kosovo, the Sandzak, and Montenegro as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, a second migration movement can be observed, as the emigration to Turkey caused an intra-state migration dynamic. As it was much easier to emigrate from Macedonia to Turkey, numerous Muslims from other Yugoslav republics settled there, mostly in Skopje, where, also as a result of this development, the population grew by approximately 31 per cent between 1953 and 1961.<sup>66</sup> To express this in figures: 18,110 migrants settled in Macedonia between 1951 and 1 December 1956, out of which 11,526 (63.64%) came from Kosovo, 4540 (25.07%) from the Sandzak, 1184 (6.54%) from Montenegro and 860 (4.75%) from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as reported by the Central Committee of the Macedonian League of Communists (MLC).<sup>67</sup> Two




Figure 1. Emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey, 1951–1970

Source: *Istatistik yıllığı* 1959 (Ankara [not dated]), 111; *Türkiye istatistik yıllığı* 1963 (Ankara [not dated]), 97; *Türkiye istatistik yıllığı* 1971 (Ankara 1973), 72.

years later, the Macedonian Commission for Minority Issues counted, excluding those who had already emigrated, 22,776 people settled in Macedonia: 17,779 from Serbia (12,972 from Kosovo, 2,965 from the Sandzak and 1842 from the rest of Serbia), 2,850 from Montenegro and 2,147 from Bosnia and Hercegovina.<sup>68</sup>

A rough differentiation can be made between non-Slavic and Slavic Muslims; the former as Turkish- or Albanian-speaking and the latter with a Serbo-Croatian or Macedonian-speaking background. Both governments, in Ankara as in Belgrade, were aware of this and at certain times tried to exert influence on the emigration of different groups due to their current migration policy.<sup>69</sup> Nevertheless, the majority of emigrants were probably Turkish-speaking Muslims, although it is highly problematic to classify them accurately, as the Communists had to admit:

It is impossible to determine how many members of the Turkish national minority migrated to Turkey really, because of the quite large overflow of Albanians and Pomaks (Macedonians of Muslim religion) into Turks.<sup>70</sup>

This quotation shows a widespread phenomenon in the non-Turkish Muslim population, namely the declarative change to the Turkish nationality, which allowed them to undermine the existing measures of the state to restrict the emigration of non-Turkish Muslims (see in detail in section 5 below).

The statistical materials compiled for the Central Committee of the MLC are highly significant. This is also the case for the demographic trends derived from the censuses between 1948 and 1961. According to these statistics, Turks were the most numerous group among emigrants from Macedonia. The number of Albanians was probably much higher, whereas the number of Macedonian-speaking Muslims registered as Pomaks or Torbeš was remarkably high (Table 3). Besides, it was

Table 3. Emigration from Macedonia on the basis of ethnic origin.

	Turks	Albanians	Torbeš/Pomaks	Others	Total
1951	–	–	–	31	31
1952	144	–	7	2	153
1953	1678	168	135	18	1999
1954	13,806	1054	2436	100	17,396
1955	30,634	964	6390	57	38,045
1956	21,634	2208	4958	16	28,816
Total	67,896	4394	13,926	224	86,440

Source: AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K 4/7. [Skopje] Pov. Br. 6/30.1.1957, Informacije o problemima iseljavanja turske nacionalne manjine sa teritorije NR Makedonije, 1.

claimed that the centres of emigration were areas with a traditionally large Turkish population.<sup>71</sup>

Another result of the massive emigration of Muslims from Macedonia in the 1950s was the statistical decline in absolute and relative terms of people who identified themselves as Albanians, Turks or ‘ethnic Muslims’. While the total population increased from 1,305,514 (1953) to 1,406,003 (1961) in Macedonia, the total number of the listed Muslim groups decreased significantly, from 368,053 or 28.21 per cent of the total population (1953) to 317,591 (22.59%) in 1961, with their percentage even falling below the level of 1948 (25.58%) (see Table 4). Such a development did not occur in Kosovo, where there was a steady increase of people identifying themselves as Albanians, Turks or ‘ethnic Muslims’ in absolute numbers, from 506,236 in 1948 to 565,383 in 1953 and 680,395 in 1961. Although their percentage of the total population stagnated, taking into account the statistics of 1953 (69.96%) and 1961 (70.58%) – presumably also as a result of the emigration process – there was no significant decrease (see Table 5).

Furthermore, as Tables 4 and 5 show, the census data of 1948 and 1953 regarding ethnic self-identification are highly questionable. If we want to explain the extreme difference between the number of people registered as ‘Turks’ in Macedonia (1948: 95,940; 1953: 203,938) and Kosovo (1948: 1,315; 1953: 34,583) in 1948 and 1953, we have to take account of external and internal political factors. With regard to Yugoslavia’s external policy, we can note that Yugoslavia’s bilateral relations during the census of 1948 were very good with Albania but tense with Turkey. The situation changed in 1953, when relations with Turkey were better than they had been since the Second World War but relations with Albania had declined, pushing Muslims to declare themselves Turks. Concerning the domestic policy and the results of the 1953 population census, the literature has accused state organs, stating that, ‘in order to encourage Albanians to leave, direct pressures were imposed, with the forcing of Albanians to declare themselves Turkish



Table 4. Census data for Albanians, Turks and 'ethnic Muslims' in Macedonia, 1948–1961.

Macedonia					
	Albanians	Turks	'Ethnic Muslims'	Total	Total population of Macedonia
1948	197,389	95,940	1560	294,889 (25.58%)	1,152,986 (100%)
1953	162,524	203,938	1591	368,053 (28.21%)	1,304,514 (100%)
1961	183,108	131,481	3002	317,591 (22.59%)	1,406,003 (100%)

Source: Calculated on the basis of Dušan Bubevski, 'Nekoi aspekti na nacionalniot sostav na naselenieto vo SR Makedonija vo periodot 1948–1981 godina', in Makedonska akademija na naukite i umetnostite (ed.), *Problemi na demografskiot razvoj na SR Makedonija. Trudovi od naučniot sobir (Leunovo, 3 i 4 noemvri 1983)* (Skopje 1985), 536.

Table 5. Census data for Albanians, Turks and 'ethnic Muslims' in Kosovo, 1948–1961.

Kosovo					
	Albanians	Turks	'Ethnic Muslims'	Total	Total population
1948	498,242	1315	6679	506,236 (68.99%)	733,820 (100%)
1953	524,559	34,583	6241	565,383 (69.96%)	808,141 (100%)
1961	646,605	25,764	8026	680,395 (70.58%)	963,988 (100%)

Source: Calculated on the basis of Konrad Clewing, 'Mythen und Fakten zur Ethnostruktur in Kosovo – Ein geschichtlicher Überblick', in Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing (eds), *Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursachen – Verlauf – Perspektiven* (Klagenfurt et al. 2000), 51.

nationals'.<sup>72</sup> For the purpose of this 'Turkification' of Albanians, allegedly, Turks in Kosovo were declared a national minority in 1951 and Turkish schools were opened at the beginning of the 1950s with the aim of removing large numbers of Albanians to Turkey.<sup>73</sup>

The reason why the communists decided to recognize the Turkish minority at the beginning of the 1950s is still unclear and needs to be analysed in a highly systematic way. Considering contemporary estimations from the Ministry of the Interior, this could be a reaction to demands from a group, which understood themselves as Turks claiming minority rights. However, reorganization of the Turkish minority provoked harsh reactions among the Albanian population, which accused the state of creating discord amongst them. Looking at an eventually forced resettlement of Albanians, as is sometimes assumed in the secondary literature, it should be mentioned that all this happened at a time when a bilateral emigration agreement was not even a prospect.<sup>74</sup> Therefore, with regard to this and the timing of the migration policy considering the emigration of Muslims from Yugoslavia, the accusation against the state loses its validity.

## 5. Governmental Attempts to Manage, Restrict and Control Emigration to Turkey

In our case, the dynamic spread of immigration to Turkey revealed different governmental attempts to control, manage and restrict the migration movement. The first mechanisms and restrictions had already been imposed through the above-mentioned framework of the *Gentlemen's Agreement* by defining the eligible group of people. Another limitation came in Macedonia, which provided the main source of migrants. The Yugoslav authorities introduced further restrictions at the insistence of the Turkish side, for which the issue of emigration was of prime importance, as well as for bilateral relations, as noted by the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>75</sup> These restrictions were based on the ethnic origin of the migrants. From mid-1954 at the latest, the Turkish side insisted it would only receive 'real Turks' as immigrants. Obviously, in Macedonia numerous Albanian Muslims tried to emigrate to Turkey.<sup>76</sup> The (Macedonian) authorities, indifferent to the emigration of Albanian Muslims until that moment, now had to react. However, the massive emigration of Muslims from the southern parts of the country was not only a 'Macedonian problem', as this issue reached the state level. It caused an unofficial meeting of eight outstanding Yugoslav decision-makers from the field of internal and external policies held in March 1955, chaired by Aleksandar Ranković<sup>77</sup> vice president of the Federal Executive Council (SIV), who was also the co-founder and is still today a symbol of the Yugoslav secret police. The results were recorded in a note in which Ranković emphasized the internal and external significance of this occurrence of emigration, and stressed that the emigration – i.e. the permanent emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey – should be allowed only to people of Turkish nationality and not to Albanians or 'Muslims of Macedonian nationality'.<sup>78</sup> This group was extended to 'nationally indeterminate Muslims' (Bosniaks) in the final instruction of the Ministry of Interior.<sup>79</sup> Applications should not be approved in general, only in duly justified cases and after the examination of each individual case by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In cases of doubt, the criteria should be the (Turkish) language use in the family in line with their declaration of (Turkish) nationality to the competent authorities. Only if these requirements corresponded to the characteristics of each person willing to emigrate could they be recognized as a member of the Turkish nationality.<sup>80</sup> In June 1955, these guidelines contributed to the instructions given by the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs to their subordinates on the level of the Republics.<sup>81</sup>

Henceforth the migrants had to pass this kind of litmus test, which remained in force during the entire 1950s, at least in theory.<sup>82</sup> However, whether this approach was strictly implemented in practice or not, it is evident that an effort had been made to restrict the emigration of non-Turkish Muslims. In any case, the emigration to Turkey attracted much greater attention from the SIV, aside from the spring meeting in the office of the vice president of the Federal Executive Council in 1955, the issue also appeared on the agenda within the Commission on Internal Affairs of the SIV in 1956 and 1957.<sup>83</sup>

To prevent the emigration of non-Turkish Muslims, the previously mentioned requirements had to be fulfilled, beginning in the second half of 1955. In addition, state organs defined specific areas of (non-)emigration in Macedonia in order to prevent the emigration of Albanians. This concerned regions with a high percentage of Albanians. In those areas the government believed that emigration should be forbidden in general, and that the local branches of the Ministry of Internal Affairs should not accept applications for dismissal from Yugoslav citizenship.<sup>84</sup> However, it seems that the efforts related to these specific areas had only limited success. Already in the report, compiled for the meeting of the SIV-Commission on Internal Affairs of 18 April 1956, it was suggested that these areas should be abolished due to difficulties in defining them and because of the opposition of the local population, which had submitted complaints to higher government authorities. Finally, the authorities experienced great problems in defining the nationality of Muslims, especially in regions where Albanians and Turks lived together. In the end, non-Turkish Muslims willing to emigrate found a way to change declaratively their nationality into a Turkish one and, if necessary, they moved out of the forbidden areas to places from which they could emigrate.<sup>85</sup> Therefore, existing state measures to restrict the emigration of non-Turkish Muslims were undermined in many cases. Different reports confirmed this with regard to emigration from Macedonia. Thus, at the beginning of 1957, Macedonia's Executive Committee reaffirmed the on-going and enormous process of a declarative change of the Albanian nationality into a Turkish one 'despite all our measures'.<sup>86</sup> The situation changed only in 1958, following the December meeting of the SIV-Commission on Internal Affairs in 1957, with its final discussion on the emigration movement to Turkey and especially regarding the question of how to stop the emigration of Albanians. Afterwards, their members reaffirmed that emigration should be allowed only for those of Turkish nationality who satisfied the conditions for obtaining an emigration passport. Furthermore, the Executive Councils of Serbia and Macedonia were advised to consider the population census of 1948 as the possible basis for the determination of the nationality. Moreover, they should agree on the period of time in which the emigration of members of Turkish nationality satisfying the necessary conditions should be completed.<sup>87</sup> However, seen from outside, the December meeting seems to be a watershed for the question of migration to Turkey. Not only did the members of the SIV-Commission on Internal Affairs signal that they would finally solve an ongoing internal policy problem, but also it seems that effective measures were taken, as afterwards Macedonia's courts began to refuse requests for a change of nationality.<sup>88</sup>

Whether the ensuing decline of emigrants from 1958 onwards (see Table 2) is the result of this measure alone is to be questioned. At about the same time there are signs of a more restrictive Turkish immigration policy and economic growth in Yugoslavia, while a simultaneous economic deterioration in Turkey can also be observed. In addition, the fact that probably the majority of potential migrants had already left the country should also be taken into consideration.<sup>89</sup>

The Government's efforts to restrict the migration process were also visible in the Socialist Republic of Serbia, in the Sandzak, and especially in Kosovo towards the Albanian population. Here a restrictive policy dominated for several years and a policy change is visible only from 1957 when Serbia's Executive Committee decided to enable unofficially the emigration of Albanians to Turkey, if Turkey continued with its immigration policy.<sup>90</sup>

## 6. Opposition among the Muslim Population to the Process of Emigration and the Economic Consequences of Emigration in the Region

The mass emigration to Turkey not only had certain consequences in the spheres of politics, economy and culture, it also unsettled the Muslim society in the southern parts of the country. In a climate of uncertainty, where many members of Muslim communities faced the risk of a social disintegration of their own group, opposition among the Muslim population to the migration process was also evident. A prominent opponent was the Islamic Religious Community (IRC). Due to existing gaps in research into the history of the IRC in the 1950s, it is difficult to evaluate its behaviour precisely. However, it seems that the lower level of the IRC, at least in the Sandzak and in Kosovo, had contradictory opinions and, apparently, some Muslim leaders worked for emigration.<sup>91</sup> However, the highest-ranking leaders condemned the emigration to Turkey, as did the highest official of the IRC, Reis-ül-ulema Sulejman ef. Kemura. During his visits to the Sandzak and to Kosovo in the second half of 1958, he warned of the harm the emigration caused to the Muslim population.<sup>92</sup> However, it also seems that the IRC followed the state policy, as there are no known indications that they seriously tried to stop the emigration of ethnic Turks.<sup>93</sup>

Within the Turkish population of Macedonia, there is little evidence of resistance. One report mentioned a group of Turks in Skopje, the so-called 'Atalaodžisti', who were actively opposing the emigration process, but without significant success.<sup>94</sup> Contrary to this, the opposition among the Albanians of Macedonia against the emigration to Turkey seems to have been much higher. It was, as noted by Macedonia's Commission for Minority Issues, the 'most sensitive issue for reactionary elements among the Albanian minority'.<sup>95</sup> Often described by the authorities as nationalistic or reactionary elements, they allegedly agitated for a Greater Albania and against the emigration of Albanians and their declarative change of nationality, while accusing the Macedonian political elite of a denationalizing policy which aimed to cleanse Macedonia of Albanians and Turks.<sup>96</sup> Such a narrative, showing the emigration to Turkey as a threat for the Albanians, existed also among some of the religious leaders. As the Central Committee of the MLC informed the Commission for Minority Issues in Belgrade in 1957, in Macedonia, a stronger activation of religious leaders was noticeable and mosques were used for propaganda against emigration.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, influence from Albania was also documented, especially after

Enver Hoxha's accusations against the Yugoslav government, made in the plenary session of Albania's Central Committee in February 1957, of 'denationalizing' the Albanians and forcing them into emigration.<sup>98</sup> At the end of 1958, the Commission for Minority Issues even reported that within Albania's anti-Yugoslav campaign in Macedonia 'reactionary elements ... proclaimed as biggest enemy each Albanian who wants to immigrate to Turkey under the pretext that it is necessary to save the majority of Albanian population in Western Macedonia to connect these regions easier to Albania'.<sup>99</sup>

Based on the currently known facts, a more detailed assessment of Albania's influence within the emigration process is difficult. However, quite apart from the rhetorical level, it seems that even members of the Albanian Embassy were included in efforts to stop the emigration of Albanians.<sup>100</sup> Nevertheless, the emigration of Albanians additionally burdened the already difficult relationship between Albania and Yugoslavia.

Beside the disputes and conflicts within the Muslim society, the emigration process of the 1950s triggered serious consequences at different social levels which preoccupied the League of Communists. The problems that accompanied this process were diverse and noticeable in many areas. As described by Ramiz Crnišanin for the Sandzak in 1956:

This problem with the emigration movement began to cause very serious economic problems, too. People show almost no interest in anything. They feel somehow temporary and they don't worry about any actions or undertakings. Many take their children out of middle school and some students gave up their studies due to the departure of their families.<sup>101</sup>

Therefore, different areas of society, from the political, cultural and educational to the economic, were affected. Nevertheless, we can briefly mention that observers noted in emigration regions the political inaction of branches of Macedonia's League of Communists as well as of Turkish party members. Moreover, many Turkish-language elementary schools had to be closed since numerous teachers and pupils had emigrated. Simultaneously, relevant cultural associations of the Turks dissolved because their members had emigrated.<sup>102</sup>

Very soon, the economic issue was identified as a problem for the state. Already in February 1954, the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the emigration issue presented certain economic difficulties, as the migrants took with them goods such as agricultural equipment and livestock, which was not in the economic interests of the country.<sup>103</sup> This criticism has to be seen in the light of the difficult economic situation in the country. Therefore, considerations regarding the loss of economic power were present within the political system, but not with respect to the loss of human capital. That was tacitly condoned, in contrast to South Slavic ethnic co-national economic migrants abroad, as they were viewed as a potential tool for popularizing Yugoslavia abroad and as an external revenue source.<sup>104</sup>

The emigration of Turks was primarily understood with regard to negative economic effects in Macedonia, for example in agricultural production, in reductions in livestock and in goods for the market. However, the change of ownership of agricultural land was also regarded as a problem. New owners – often Albanians from Kosovo, coming to Macedonia in order to take up the opportunity to emigrate to Turkey – did not much care for traditional crop farming and they did not cultivate the land with the same intensity as the former owners.<sup>105</sup> Therefore, the cultural landscape of the emigration area changed.

Apart from the negative effects described above, opportunities for positive developments were discussed as well, but more on the margins. For example, Serbia's Executive Committee of the Central Committee noted that, for the Sandzak, emigration could somehow relieve the situation relating to overpopulation.<sup>106</sup> Similarly, a report on the Albanian national minority in Kosovo noted the usefulness of the emigration for economic and political reasons because of the 'limited opportunities regarding an economic development [in Kosovo] and due to the fact that the most backward and reactionary forces/nationalist forces of reaction most susceptible element emigrate'.<sup>107</sup> Other positive effects were seen in the possibility for individuals to consolidate fragmented properties up to the maximum of possible private ownership, or in the opportunity for the state to acquire fertile land for the purpose of installing agricultural service institutions. At the same time, it was suggested that the acquisition of estates from emigrants could help to solve existing housing problems or to consolidate the land tenure of national committees.<sup>108</sup>

Such reflections were to be expected partly in consideration of the country's difficult economic situation, especially in the south, where the national income made up only a fraction of the level in the north. For example, while the per capita income in Slovenia was 173,703 Dinar in 1957, in Macedonia this figure was 65,449 Dinar and in Kosovo only 41,222 Dinar, far below the national average of 96,395 Dinar.<sup>109</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising that Lazar Koliševski, Macedonia's representative in the Executive Committee of the Central Committee, during a meeting with regard to the state investment policy in 1956 complained about the difficult situation in Skopje because of the on-going arrival of Muslims from so-called forbidden areas in Macedonia and other republics (see above), willing to emigrate.<sup>110</sup> Nonetheless, due to the immigration to Skopje, unemployment became a problem; the Housing Fund was burdened as the number of delinquents increased.<sup>111</sup> Hence, because of its diverse repercussions, the economic effects of the emigration movement to Turkey should not be underestimated. Overall, a calculation of the economic effects caused by the emigration movement to Turkey and the related loss of human capital remains a gap in the literature.

## 7. Conclusion

This examination of Muslim emigration from Yugoslavia has revealed several social implications of migration, as well as the complexity of migration issues in

socialist Yugoslavia. It has also clarified the emotionally fraught issue of the Muslim emigration of the 1950s, whose facets are often underexplored, especially with regard to the alleged importance of state violence for this migration movement. Equally, the case of Muslim emigration from Yugoslavia has shown us an inefficient migration policy in a time of deep social and political engineering and upheaval during the years of the Cold War. This article has also highlighted the entanglement of migration with a particular political regime, namely the political will of the government to control migration streams and to intervene in them for the protection of state interests.

The primary forces responsible for the emigration movement were the political circumstances of the state-building process in Yugoslavia. These forces encompassed not only rigid approaches to the implementation of a socialist model of society, but also the related economic effects of such a policy, including the state's interference in the life-world of Yugoslavia's heterogeneous Muslim society. These developments contributed to the creation of a self-generating dynamic emigration process.

At the start of our period, migration policy that specifically sought to address the emigration of Muslims was not pronounced. Rather, the framework of this process indicates, above all else, the features of a reactive policy. In the first years of emigration, no real active government-led policy planning initiative regarding this issue of migration from either Belgrade or Skopje was evident. The government did not help with the burden of emigration; nor did it seek to accelerate the emigration of the Muslim population. Instead, indifference towards the emigrating Muslims dominated throughout the 1950s. As the emigrant Muslims in most cases did not belong to one of the southern Slavic constitutive nations, they were not perceived as an integral part of the Yugoslav state-building project. Additionally, the emigrating Muslims were often perceived within the ruling League of Communists as conservative and closed to the project of a socialist society. Therefore, it was easy for the government to characterize the emigration of these people as a 'humane' and 'democratic' act in the service of family reunification. Nevertheless, the migration movement became a political issue when it began to cause internal as well as foreign policy problems. These problems in turn revealed the limits of state surveillance and control over issues of migration, as migrants often successfully undermined existing restrictions.

These limits of state surveillance and control demonstrated not only the complexity of the pillars of migration policy, but also the high degree of their entanglement within society as a whole. Based on a set of hard and soft institutionalized restrictions, the pillars were built on by the government to shape legal channels for permanent emigration. In the case of the emigrating Muslims, these pillars were based on an approach which sought to form and control socialist statehood, ranging from a centrally coordinated policy of release from citizenship (hard restrictions) to internal and mostly non-official instructions (soft restrictions). The approach also reveals the hierarchy of effective power and the limited space of governmental action at the level of the republics, particularly in the case of

Macedonia, the main emigration region. On the other side, though the agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey had been reached in 1953, Belgrade only began to react to the steadily growing number of emigrants once constrained by domestic and international pressures. The leadership's interest in this emigration stream was limited in so far as it concerned primarily non-Slavic Muslims who were not perceived as an essential part of a South Slavic nation state. Nevertheless, governmental bodies also demonstrated that they could act in cases where their interests had been damaged to protect their agenda.

### Acknowledgements

I want to thank Željka Oparnica, Patrick Rolph, Sabine Rutar, Rachel Trode and Stefano Petrungero for their most helpful comments and suggestions.

### Notes

1. For practical reasons, I am using the term 'Kosovo' in this paper instead of the official contemporary designation 'Kosovo and Metohija'.
2. Cf. with further literature: Wolfgang Höpken, 'Der Exodus. Muslimische Emigration aus Bulgarien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert', in Reinhard Lauer and Hans Georg Majer, eds, *Osmanen und Islam in Südosteuropa* (Berlin 2014), 356, 367–9.
3. Paradigmatic for the culture of remembrance are history textbooks. See with regard to the Albanian view on the question of emigration to Turkey, the chapter on Kosovo in Yugoslavia, 1945–1990, in Shkëlzen Gashi, *The History of Kosovo in the History Textbooks of Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia* (Prishtinë 2016).
4. Cf. with regard to the Communist Emigration Regime in Yugoslavia: Ulf Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State Since the Late Nineteenth Century* (Lanham, MD 2016), 257–309.
5. Holm Sundhaussen spoke of probably well over two million victims in the years from the beginning of the Second World War to the end of the 1940s; cf. Holm Sundhaussen, 'Südosteuropa', in Klaus Bade, Pieter C. Emmer, Leo Lucassen, et al., eds, *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa. Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn 2007), 304. Still worth reading for the period until 1947 is the work of Eugene M. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917–47* (New York 1948). Newer research findings about the phenomena of forced migration in Europe between 1938 and 1950 can be found in Ralph Melville, Jiří Pešek and Claus Scharf, eds, *Zwangsmigrationen im mittleren und östlichen Europa. Völkerrecht – Konzeptionen – Praxis (1938–1950)* (Mainz 2007); for the German case in Yugoslavia, see Zoran Janjetović, *Between Hitler and Tito: The disappearance of the Vojvodina Germans* (Belgrade 2005). On Croatia during the time of the Second World War and the post-war period, reflecting among others the situation of the Jewish, German, Italian and Hungarian population, see the case study by Marica Karakaš Obradov, *Novi mozaici nacija u 'novim poredcima'. Migracije stanovništva na hrvatskom području tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata i poraća* (Zagreb 2014).
6. M.[arina] C.[attaruzza], 'Italiener aus Istrien, Fiume und Zara', in Detlef Brandes, Holm Sundhaussen and Stefan Troebst, eds, *Lexikon der Vertreibungen. Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Wien 2010), 308.



7. Husnija Kamberović, *Prema modernom društvu. Bosna i Hercegovina od 1945. do 1953. godine* (Tešanj 2000), 46–56.
8. Slobodan Selinić, *Jugoslovensko-čehoslovački odnosi 1945–1955* (Beograd 2010), 333–47; Mladenka Ivanković, *Jevreji u Jugoslaviji (1944–1952). Kraj ili novi početak* (Beograd 2009), 314–15, 320; also Milan R. Radovanović, *Iseljavanje Jevreja iz Jugoslavije u Izrael (1948–1952)* (Beograd 2015 [PhD thesis, submitted to University of Belgrade – Philosophical Faculty]), 118–20. It should be mentioned as well that the case of emigrating Jews who survived is a specific one as the initiative for the emigration to Israel came from leading Yugoslav Jews whereas the initiatives in the cases of Poland and Czechoslovakia came from these two states.
9. Radmila Radić, 'Iseljavanje stanovništva sa jugoslovenskog prostora sredinom pedesetih godina', *Istorijski zapisi*, Vol. 72, Nos 1–2 (1999), 147 (for 1955), 149 (for 1956).
10. National Archives, Washington, D.C., Department of State, Dec. File 768, 1955–1959, Record Group 00/1-2357; Belgrade, Nr. 407/23.1.1957. Evidence of Current Unrest, Tensions and Dissatisfactions in Yugoslavia.
11. Edvin Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten? Jugoslawische Migrationspolitik und die Auswanderung von Muslimen in die Türkei (1918 bis 1966)* (München 2013), 99–100.
12. Ulf Brunnbauer, 'Emigration Policies and Nation-building in Interwar Yugoslavia', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2012), 602–627, 604.
13. The demand to manage and control migration movements was high in the first and second Yugoslavia and oriented towards the needs of a South Slavic nation-state project, as could be seen through the example of Yugoslav citizenship policy, an important tool used to influence emigration movements, in particular with respect to Yugoslav emigrants; cf. Edvin Pezo, 'Jugoslawiens Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetze und ihre national-staatlichen und migrationspolitischen Dimensionen (1918–1964)', in Katrin Boeckh, Krisztina Busa, Antje Himmelreich, et al., eds, *Staatsbürgerschaft und Teilhabe: Bürgerliche, politische und soziale Rechte in Ost- und Südosteuropa* (München 2014), 199–212.
14. Cf. for the national question in socialist Yugoslavia, Hilde Katrine Haug, *Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia: Tito, Communist Leadership and the National Question* (London 2012).
15. For example: Albanians, Bulgarians, Germans, Hungarians, Italians, Romanians, Slovaks, Turks, etc. Cf., in detail, Kateřina Králová, Jiří Kocian, and Kamil Pikal, eds, *Minderheiten im sozialistischen Jugoslawien. Brüderlichkeit und Eigenheit* (Frankfurt 2016).
16. Even if the rights of 'national minorities' were confirmed during the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1948, there was no consistent state policy on minorities. The Republics of Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Macedonia had their own Minority Commissions already at the beginning of the 1950s, but on the state level, a Minority Commission was established only in December 1956. Cf. 'Program Komunističke partije Jugoslavije', in *V. Kongres Komunističke partije Jugoslavije. 21.–28. jula 1948. Stenografske bilješke* (Beograd 1949), 830–1; cf. for the first years of Yugoslav minority policy, Robert R. King, *Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, MA 1973), 124–8, as well as Paul Shoup, 'Yugoslavia's National Minorities under Communism', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1963); cf. with regard to the discussion relating to questions about national minorities within the Executive Council of the

- League of Communists in 1959: Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, henceforth abbreviated as AJ, Savez komunista Jugoslavije, f. 507; XVIII – K 3/1: Stenogr. bel. sa savetovanja pri Izvršnog komiteta CK SKJ održanog 2.3.1959. po pitanjima nacionalnih manjina.
17. The following archives were considered: the Archive of Yugoslavia, the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Archive of Serbia and the State Archive of Macedonia. Unfortunately I was not able to access materials from the Serbian state security services, located at the Archive of Serbia.
  18. See Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (London 1998), 322; Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Kosovo. Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft* (Wien 2008), 228; or Klejda Mulaj, 'A Recurrent Tragedy: Ethnic Cleansing as a Tool of State Building in the Yugoslav Multinational Setting', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2006), 21–50, 34.
  19. See the multi-volume work of the Academy of Sciences of Albania: *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar*. Vol. 4: *Shqiptarët gjatë luftës së Dytë Botërore dhe pas saj. 1939–1990* (Tiranë 2008), 347; Aliriza Selmani, 'Afera e regjistrimit masiv të shqiptarëve për shpërngulje në Turqi (Rrethi i Gjilanit)', *Gjurmime albanologjike: Seria e shkencave historike*, Vol. 39 (2009), 117; or Qerim Lita, 'Shpërngulja e shqiptarëve nga Maqedonia në Turqi (1953–1959)', *Studime Albanologjike* (Shkup), Vol. 1 (2009), 75.
  20. With regard to historiographical works from non-Albanian authors, to be mentioned are – in alphabetical order – Violeta Aćkoska, *Bratstvoto i edinstvoto pomeđu harmonija i disharmonija, 1944–1974* (Skopje 2003), 89–102; Safet Bandžović, *Iseljavanje Muslimana Crne Gore u Tursku, Vol. 2* (Podgorica 2011); Borče Ilievski, 'The Ethno-Demographic Changes in the 1950s in the People's Republic of Macedonia. The Emigration Process of the Turkish and Muslim Population', *Macedonian Historical Review*, Vol. 1 (2010); Vladan Jovanović, *Slike jedne neuspele integracije. Kosovo, Makedonija, Srbija, Jugoslavija* (Beograd 2014); and Sabina Pačarić, *The Migrations of Bosniaks to Turkey from 1945 to 1974: The Case of Sandžak* (Sarajevo 2016).
  21. William Peterson, 'International Migration', *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1978), 533–75, 558–9.
  22. Burcu Akan Ellis, *Shadow Genealogies. Memory and Identity among Urban Muslims in Macedonia* (Boulder, CO 2003), 57.
  23. Anthony H. Richmond, 'Sociological Theories of International Migration: The Case of Refugees', *Current Sociology*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1988), 7–25, 19–20.
  24. Explanations for processes of 'ethnic cleansing' and 'forced migration' are offered by Norman Naimark, 'Ethnic Cleansing', *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence* [online], published on 4 November 2007, accessed 24 November 2014, URL: <http://www.mass-violence.org/Ethnic-Cleansing>; Philipp Ther, *Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten. 'Ethische Säuberungen' im modernen Europa* (Göttingen 2011), 7–14; Jochen Oltmer, 'Krieg, Migration und Zwangsarbeit im 20. Jahrhundert', in Hans-Christoph Seidel and Klaus Tenfelde (eds), *Zwangsarbeit im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts. Bewältigung und vergleichende Aspekte* (Essen 2007), 131–2.
  25. Cf. Isabel Ströhle, 'The Brioni Plenum (July 1966) and its Aftermath in Kosovo: Uncovering "Deformations" and Physical Violence in the State Security Agencies', unpublished paper.
  26. Cf. AJ f. 130/992/1502, sveska 1/56: Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za unutrašnju politiku SIV-a, održane dana 18. aprila 1956; Tempo iseljavanja pripadnika turske nacionalne manjine iz NR Makedonije, 16.

27. AJ f. 130/993/1503, sveska 3/57: Zapisnik sa sednice Odbora za unutrašnju politiku SIV-a, održane 19.12.1957; Problem iseljenja Turaka iz Jugoslavije, 9.
28. Ibid., 10–11.
29. Ibid., 11–12. The campaign of lifting the veil (zar/feredža) started in 1947. It affected Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Sandzak and Macedonia, and laws in this context were passed in 1950 and 1951. See for the Macedonian case and the widespread resistance amongst the Muslim population with reference to the emigration to Turkey, Violeta Achkoska, 'Lifting the Veils from Muslim Women in the Republic of Macedonia Following the Second World War', in Miroslav Jovanović and Slobodan Naumović, eds, *Gender Relations in South Eastern Europa: Historical Perspectives on Womanhood and Manhood in 19th and 20th Century* (Münster 2004), 183–94.
30. Cf. regarding the relationship between the Yugoslav state and the Islamic Community, Radmila Radić, 'Islamska verska zajednica 1945–1970. godine', *Forum Bosnae*, Vol. 32 (2005), 99–134.
31. Cf. Aneta Svetieva, 'On the Migration of the Balkan Muslims and of the "Nashinci" – the Torbesh, Pomaks and other (Turks) in Turkey', *EthnoAnthropoZoom*, No. 6 (2009), 51, 53; Ellis, *Shadow Genealogies*, 53–7; Munevera Hadžišehović, *Muslimanka u Titovoj Jugoslaviji* (Tuzla 2006), 148–50; Lejla Voloder, 'Secular Citizenship and Muslim Belonging in Turkey: Migrant Perspectives', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 36 (2013), No. 5, 838–856, 845f.; Pačariz, *The Migrations of Bosniaks*.
32. Archive of Serbia, Belgrade, henceforth abbreviated as AS, Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (CK SKS), u2, Zaspisnici sa sastanaka i sednica IK CK SKS, kutija br. 1: Zapisnik sa sednice Izvršnog komiteta CK SKS, 8.11.1956, 2.
33. AS CK SKS, u2, Zaspisnici sa sastanaka i sednica IK CK SKS, br. kut. 1: Zapisnik sa sednice Izvršnog komiteta CK SKS, 13.2.1957, 15.
34. Ramiz Crnišanin, 'Uvodno izlaganje o političkoj situaciji i zadacima SK u opštini Novi Pazar na sednici OK SKS (1956)', in Ramiz Crnišanin, *Rasprave. Dokumente, polemike, članci i predlozi* (Beograd 1999), 17–18.
35. Cf. Isabel Ströhle, *Aus den Ruinen der alten erschaffen wir die neue Welt! Herrschaftspraxis und Loyalitäten in Kosovo, 1944–1974* (München 2016), 61–3.
36. See also with regard to the number of people sentenced to prison (17) and the claims of other authors with respect to death sentences: Nikolina Rajkovic, 'The Post-Second World War Immigration of the Yugoslav Muslims to Turkey (1953–1968)' (Budapest 2012 [Masters Thesis, submitted to CEU – History Department; available also online]), 86 and footnote 210.
37. Wolfgang Höpken, "'Durchherrschte Freiheit'". Wie "'autoritär (oder wie 'liberal' war Titos Jugoslawien?)"', in Hannes Grandits and Holm Sundhaussen, eds, *Jugoslawien in den 1960er Jahren: Auf dem Weg zu einem (a)normalen Staat?* (Wiesbaden 2013), 45. The prosecution of several hundred members of the Muslim movement in Bosnia and Hercegovina, called the Young Muslims (Mladi muslimani), between 1946 and 1949, is to be seen in this context as well; cf. Denis Bećirović, *Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini za vrijeme avnojevske Jugoslavije (1945–1953)* (Zagreb 2012), 482–8.
38. Vojin Lukić, *Briunski plenum. Obračun sa Aleksandrom Rankovićem. Sećanja i saznanja* (Beograd 1990), 198–9.
39. AS CK SKS, u2, Zaspisnici sa sastanaka i sednica IK CK SKS, br. kut. 1: Zapisnik. Sa sastanka Izvršnog komiteta CK SKS, 6.10.1956, 10.

40. In July 1966, a Commission of the Serbian Central Committee mentioned a death toll of 69 people, and a Report of the Province Committee for Kosovo and Metohija from September 1966 spoke of the number of dead as 16 [AS CK SKS, u2, Izvršni komitet CK SKS – materijali u vezi zaključaka IV plenuma CK SKJ (1966), br. kut. 22: Beleška sa sastanka predsednika komisija CK SK Srbije održanog, 14. jula 1966. godine, 4; and: Ocena deformacija u SUP-u i DB-i, njihovi uzroci, idejni koreni i posledice i predlog mera za njihovo razrešavanje na Kosovu i Metohiji, 6 (Pristina, Sept. 1966)]. The summary report, prepared by a Commission of the Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija and sent to Josip Broz Tito at the end of November 1966, mentioned 37 persons who died in the course of confiscating weapons in the winter 1955/56, AJ, f. 837; II-5-d/46: Informacija Komisije Izvršnog veća Kosova i Metohije o zloupotrebama i deformacijama u Službi državne bezbednosti i organima unutrašnjih poslova na području APKM, 21.11.-2.12.1966.
41. AS CK SKS, u2, Izvršni komitet CK SKS – materijali u vezi zaključaka IV plenuma CK SKJ (1966), br. kut. 22: Beleška sa sastanka predsednika komisija CK SK Srbije, održanog 14. jula 1966. godine, 6.
42. AS CK SKS, u2, Izvršni komitet CK SKS – materijali u vezi zaključaka IV plenuma CK SKJ (1966), br. kut. 22: Ocena deformacija u SUP-u i DB-i, njihovi uzroci, idejni koreni i posledice i predlog mera za njihovo razrešavanje na Kosovu i Metohiji, 7 (Pristina, Sept. 1966).
43. AJ, f. 837; II-5-d/46: Informacija Komisije Izvršnog veća Kosova i Metohije o zloupotrebama i deformacijama u Službi državne bezbednosti i organima unutrašnjih poslova na području APKM, 21.11.-2.12.1966, 12.
44. Cf. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 279–87.
45. Cf. Ströhle, ‘The Brioni Plenum’.
46. Cf. Brandes, Sundhaussen and Troebst (eds), *Lexikon der Vertreibungen*.
47. See as an example of this official position the interview given by Lazar Koliševski, President of the People’s Assembly of Macedonia, in the spring of 1954; *Nova Makedonija*, 28. March 1954, 1–2, 1.
48. Cf. with regard to the rumours in the 1950s, Koliševski’s interview in *Nova Makedonija*, 28. March 1954, 2; also AJ, f. 130/992/1502, sveska 1/56: Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za unutrašnju politiku SIV-a, održane dana 18. aprila 1956; Tempo iseljavanja pripadnika turske nacionalne manjine iz NR Makedonije, 16–17.
49. See with regard to formation and content of the convention from 1938 Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 165–184; a detailed comparison of the convention of 1938 and the *Gentlemen’s Agreement* of 1953 is made by Edvin Pezo, ‘Komparativna analiza jugoslovensko-turske konvencije iz 1938. i “džentlemenskog sporazuma” iz 1953.: pregovori oko iseljavanja muslimana iz Jugoslavije u Tursku’, *Tokovi istorije*, No. 2 (2013), 97–120.
50. See for instance Qerim Lita, *Načertania K. Červenkovski dhe identiteti shqiptar në Maqedoni (1945–1954). Vol. 1: Rrethanat arsimore, kulturore, politike, fetare dhe organizative* (Skup 2007), 324, 466; Bandžović, *Iseljavanje Muslimana Crne Gore*, 68.
51. See, with regard to the formation of the Balkan Pact from an American viewpoint, David R. Stone, ‘The Balkan Pact and American Policy’, *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1994), 393–405.
52. Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, henceforth abbreviated as DAMFA, Politički arhiv (PA), 1954, F 95: Turska, [Beograd] February 1954, 107

53. AJ, Kancelarija Maršala Jugoslavije, f. 836; I-3-b/851: Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Matesa sa g. Koprulu-em, ambasadorom Turske 1 jula 1952 g.
54. DAMFA, PA, 1953, F 96: Modaliteti za iseljenje naših državljana turske narodnosti radi spajanja sa porodicama koje su već u Turskoj, Beograd, 3.3.1953, Pov.br. 91737.
55. Ibid.
56. The instruction of the Ministry of Interior, dated 9.5.1953, is cited in DAMFA, PA, 1953, F 96: Zabeleška, Beograd, 30.10.1953.
57. Ibid.
58. According to Yugoslav archival materials, the Turkish side insisted on the extension of the circle of eligible migrants very soon after the creation of an outline for the further emigration policy. See the note of Milan Bartoš of 20 April 1953, where he stated that the Turkish Ambassador Aksel had spoken in favour of a liberal interpretation of the term family during a visit by the Ambassador. AJ, f. 837; I-5-b/115-1: Zabeleška o poseti turskog Ambasadora g. Aksela kod druga Bartoša na dan 20 aprila 1953 g. Cf. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 197, for the acceptance of that proposal.
59. Kemal Kirişçi, 'Migration and Turkey: The Dynamics of State, Society and Politics' in Reşat Kasaba, ed., *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. 4: Turkey in the Modern World* (Cambridge 2008), 180.
60. Ibid, 181, 186; Erol Ülker, 'Assimilation, Security and Geographical Nationalization in Interwar Turkey: The Settlement Law of 1934', *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, No. 7 (2008), <http://ejts.revues.org/2123>, § 7-8.
61. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 146, 197.
62. State Archive of Macedonia, Skopje, henceforth abbreviated as DAM, Centralni komitet Komunističke partije Makedonije / Saveza komunista Makedonije – Komisija za nacionalna malcinstva, f. 427/60/7,93-115: Izveštaj po prašanjetu za iseluvanjeto na Turcite, uproštuvanje procedurata na iseluvanjeto i imovinskite prašanja [Skopje, 1955]. See also Borče Ilievski, 'The Ethno-Demographic Changes in the 1950s in the People's Republic of Macedonia.
63. The vast majority of the applications came from Macedonia. Out of a total of 92,564 from the whole of Yugoslavia, 86,380 applications came from Macedonia between 1951 and 1956. While there were 17,396 applications in 1954, the number of applications from Macedonia had more than doubled to 38,045 in 1955. Afterwards, the numbers fell steadily to 28,816 (1956), 27,432 (1957) and 23,626 (1958). Cf. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 79.
64. See with regard to questions of identity among Muslims in Macedonia Ellis, *Shadow Genealogies*.
65. DAM, f.427/60/7, 116-129: Izveštaj po prašanjetu za iseluvanjeto na Turcite, uproštuvanje procedurata na iseluvanjeto i imovinskite prašanja: Prilog kon izveštajot [Skopje, 1955]. AJ, f. 507; XVIII-K 4/7. [Skopje] Pov. Br. 6/30.1.1957, Informacije o problemima iseljavanja turske nacionalne manjine sa teritorije NR Makedonije, 9-10.
66. See for the population increase in Skopje, Mitko Panov, 'Neki aktuelni antropogeografski problemi SR Makedonije' in Milisav Lutovac, ed., *Cvijičev zbornik. U spomen 100 godišnjice njegovog rođenja* (Beograd 1968), 258.
67. AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K 4/7. [Skopje] Pov. Br. 6/30.1.1957, Informacije o problemima iseljavanja turske nacionalne manjine sa teritorije NR Makedonije, 6.
68. DAM, f. 427/128/5, 23-39: Informacija za iseluvanjeto na pripadnicite na turskoto nacionalno malcinstvo od teritorijata na Narodna Republika Makedonija (Skopje, 24.8.1959).

69. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 146 and 307–12.
70. AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K 4/8. Beograd 22.2.1957, Neki problemi nastali iseljavanjem turske nacionalne manjine sa područja NR Makedonije.
71. As a report from 1955 stated, the epicentres of emigration from Macedonia were the regions of Gevgelija, Kičevo, Kočani, Ovče Pole, Kumanovo and the city of Titov Veles; DAM, f. 427/60/7, 93-115: Izveštaj po prašanjetu za iseluvanjeto na Turcite, uproštuvanje procedurata na iseluvanjeto i imovinsките prašanja [Skopje, 1955]. To be compared with a later compiled documentation with regard to the main districts (Titov Veles, Skopje, Štip and Bitola) and towns of emigration in 1954 and 1955: AJ, Savezno izvršno veće, f. 130/992/1502, sveska 1/56: Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za unutrašnju politiku SIV-a, održane dana 18. aprila 1956; document: Tempo iseljavanja pripadnika turske nacionalne manjine iz NR Makedonije, 6, 8.
72. Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (London 1998), 149. Hajredin Hoxha states that this action had already started in 1951, especially in the towns; Hajredin Hodža, *Afirmacija albanske nacionalnosti u Jugoslaviji* (Priština 1984), S, 68; and Hivzi Islami, *Studime demografike. 100 vjet të zhvillimit demografik të Kosovës* (Prishtinë 2008 [2nd and enlarged edition]), 310.
73. See Lita, ‘Shpërngulja e shqiptarëve nga Maqedonia’, 77–82; Selmani, ‘Afera e regjistrimit masiv të shqiptarëve’, 115–16; also Aydin Babuna, ‘The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity Superseding Religion’, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2000), 67–92, 69–70.
74. See in detail Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 289–294.
75. DAMFA, PA, 1955, F 69: Informacija, [Beograd], 9.4.1955, .br. 9.
76. Cf. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 146, 307.
77. Apart from Ranković, among the people who attended the meeting were: Svetislav Stefanović, State Secretary for Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia; Krste Crvenkovski, member of the Executive Committee of the People’s Republic of Macedonia; Vojin Lukić, State Secretary for Internal Affairs of the People’s Republic of Serbia; and Milan Bartoš, Chief Legal Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
78. AJ, f. 837; II-5-c-2/45: Zabeleška o sastanku održanom u Kabinetu potpredsednika SIV-a Aleksandra Rankovića o pitanjima u vezi sa iseljenjem u Tursku iz narodnih republika Makedonije i Srbije (AKMO), 16.3.1955.
79. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 310.
80. AJ, f. 837; II-5-c-2/45: Zabeleška o sastanku održanom u Kabinetu potpredsednika SIV-a Aleksandra Rankovića o pitanjima u vezi sa iseljenjem u Tursku iz narodnih republika Makedonije i Srbije (AKMO), 16.3.1955.
81. Cf. the wording of this Directive in Radić, ‘Iseljavanje stanovništva’, 161.
82. Cf. the reference to these instructions in DAM, f. 427/128/5,23-39: Informacija za iseluvanjeto na pripadnicite na turskoto nacionalno malcinstvo od teritorijata na Narodna Republika Makedonija (Skopje, 24.8.1959).
83. This discussion is described by Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 312–17.
84. Cf. AJ f. 130/992/1502, sveska 1/56: Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za unutrašnju politiku SIV-a, održane dana 18. aprila 1956; Tempo iseljavanja pripadnika turske nacionalne manjine iz NR Makedonije, 9.
85. See as described in *ibid.*, 9–12.
86. DAM, f. 427/66/44, 353-355: Zapisnik br. 1 sa sastanka Izvršnog komiteta CK SKM, održanog 18.1.1957 god.

87. Cf. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 313.
88. *Ibid.*, 309.
89. *Ibid.*, 312.
90. *Ibid.*, 311f. Cf. also AS CK SKS, Đ2, Zaspisnici sa sastanaka i sednica IK CK SKS, br. kut. 1: Zapisnik sa sednice Izvršnog komiteta CK SKS, 13.2.1957, 9.
91. Cf. Izveštaj o stanju verskih organizacija i sekti u NR Srbiji (Beograd, 13.6.1955), in: *Zapisnici sa sednica Komisije za verska pitanja NR/SR Srbije 1945–1978. godine*, Radmila Radić, Momčilo Mitrović (eds), Beograd 2012, 669; Izveštaj o verskoj delatnosti i odnosima crkve i države u NR Srbiji (Beograd, 13.6.1959), in: *ibid.*, 738.
92. Cf. ‘Reis-ul-ulema u posjeti Sandžaku’, *Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starješinstva u Federativnoj Narodnoj Republici Jugoslaviji*, Vol. 9 No. 9–12, (1958), 454; ‘Izveštaj o radu Vrhovnog islamskog starješinstva’, *Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starješinstva u Federativnoj Narodnoj Republici Jugoslaviji*, Vol. 10, Nos 1–3 (1959), 132.
93. As the American Consul Stephen Palmer noted, asking Reis-ül-ulema Kemura on the successfulness of his trip to Kosovo in ‘somewhat stemming the tide of Yugoslav Moslem emigration to Turkey’, the remaining Turkish minority was not being actively discouraged from leaving, but Kemura said that ‘we are doing all we can to convince the Albanians to remain’, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Department of State, Decimal File 868, Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia, 1955–59, Record Group 413/2-2759, Despatch No. 105/27.2.1959.
94. Cf. the comprehensive report ‘Tempo iseljavanja ...’, prepared for the meeting of the SIV-Commission on Internal Affairs of 18 April 1956; AJ f. 130/992/1502, sveska 1/56: Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za unutrašnju politiku SIV-a, održane dana 18. aprila 1956; Tempo iseljavanja pripadnika turske nacionalne manjine iz NR Makedonije, 16.
95. DAM, f. 427/84/88, 493-508: Nekoi aktuelni prašanja za neprijateljskata dejnost među učitelite od šiptarskoto malcinstvo ([Skopje], 30.9.1955).
96. AJ f. 130/992/1502, sveska 1/56: Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za unutrašnju politiku SIV-a, održane dana 18. aprila 1956; Tempo iseljavanja pripadnika turske nacionalne manjine iz NR Makedonije, 18.
97. AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K 4/7. [Skopje] Pov. Br. 6/30.1.1957, Informacije o problemima iseljavanja turske nacionalne manjine sa teritorije NR Makedonije, 11.
98. Cf. ‘Die albanisch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen seit 1944’, *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa*, Vol. 7, No. 11/12 (1958), 154; Jurij Hadalin, *Boj za Albanijo. Propad jugoslovanske širitve na Balkan* (Ljubljana 2011), 269.
99. AJ, f. 507, XVIII – K 1/20. Beograd, 14.12.1958, Izveštaj o nacionalnim manjinama u FNRJ (classified as strictly confidential), 100.
100. Cf. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 150.
101. Crnišanin, ‘Uvodno izlaganje’, 19f.
102. Cf. with further examples Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?*, 317–27.
103. DAMFA, PA, 1954, F 95: Turska, [Beograd] February 1954, 108.
104. Cf. the assessment of the department for emigration affairs of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs; DAMFA, PA, 1955, F 33: Letter dated July 13, 1955 (Pov.Br. 49504).
105. AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K 4/7. [Skopje] Pov. Br. 6/30.1.1957, Informacije o problemima iseljavanja turske nacionalne manjine sa teritorije NR Makedonije, 6, 13f.; DAMFA, PA, 1957, F 104: Pitanje iseljenja Turaka, Beograd, 5.4.1957 (Pov.br. 91428/1).

106. AS CK SKS, Đ2, Zapisnici sa sastanaka i sednica IK CK SKS, br. kut. 1: Zapisnik sa sednice Izvršnog komiteta CK SKS, 8.11.1956, 2.
107. AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K 4/11. Deo izveštaja o albanskoj nacionalnoj manjini, 6f.
108. AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K 4/8. Beograd 22.2.1957, Neki problemi nastali iseljavanjem turske nacionalne manjine sa područja NR Makedonije; AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K 4/7. [Skopje] Pov. Br. 6/30.1.1957, Informacije o problemima iseljavanja turske nacionalne manjine sa teritorije NR Makedonije, 14f.
109. AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K.11/2. [Beograd] 8.6.1959. Podaci o privrednoj situaciji srezova nastanjenih nacionalnih manjina.
110. AJ, f. 507; III/67. Zapisnik proširene sednice IK CK SKJ, održane u Ljubljani 6.11.1956, 45f.
111. AJ f. 130/992/1502, sveska 1/56: Stenografske beleške sa sednice Odbora za unutrašnju politiku SIV-a, održane dana 18. aprila 1956; Tempo iseljavanja pripadnika turske nacionalne manjine iz NR Makedonije, 12f.

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