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# THE INTERROGATIVE FORCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL MEMORIES OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE VERSUS LONG-TERM DENIAL<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract.** Mega-violent actions against individuals, communities and nations, such as genocides under different forms, leave traces that can be located at various levels of social complexity from individual to societal (including global) levels and become part of the memorization, remembering and commemorative processes. I assume that the individual and societal memories of genocide form a dynamic field that nurtures the interrogative force that opposes the denial of any genocide. The interrogative force is activated by the wide range of cognitive dissonances that emerge at all levels of social complexity between the memories about any genocide and its denial by various individual and collective actors. The study explores the interrogative force of individual and societal memories in the case of the genocide suffered by the Armenians. Individual and societal memories are approached within the wider context provided by traces (physical, archeological, human remains, written, oral and iconic records), memories, remembering and commemorative processes. The study uses findings of previous research on various records and the technique of self-inquiry that gives to the participants the possibility to generate their own questions about the Genocide suffered by the Armenians. The study suggests that the interrogative force opposes denial and it increases as more individual and collective actors from different levels of social complexity are entering into the field of inquiry due to multiple cognitive dissonances that are identified during a long-term denial of genocide.

**Keywords:** interrogative force; individual and societal memories; Armenian Genocide; long-term denial.

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*How can Armenians endure? (Behold! I'm going, dear mother – Historical song-testimony, 1902)*

*"[N]ations fight over history because history is to a nation what autobiographical memory is to individuals: the perception of continuity over time that accompanies and justifies the perception of essence. If you temper with my history, you temper with who am I. Who am I is worth fighting for" (McCauley, 2012, p. 99)*

### **Introduction: interrogative force, time flow and cognitive discrepancies between individual and societal memories and long term-denial**

Individual and collective human actions, especially genocides, generate various traces such as physical, archeological, constructions (and ruins), human remains, personal (diaries, scripts, drawings, pictures, emotional and body traces)), interpersonal (letters, telegrams, etc.), collective records (cemeteries, folk stories and songs, collective graves, news papers, trial documents, governmental and international declarations, diplomatic reports, national archives) that can be recognized, recalled, hidden, forgotten, distorted, reconstructed, remembered and commemorated. Individual and societal memories include various components from the wide range of traces generated by genocide and by the events that lead and follow genocides. In the case in which a genocide is denied, first of all by the perpetrators, each of these components as well as their active correlations by various individual and collective actors (usually survivors from the victims' side) a plethora of cognitive dissonances (for the concept of cognitive dissonance see Festinger, 1957, and for that of social-cognitive conflict see Perret-Clermont, 1981) emerges, and some of these dissonances can take the form of *societal cognitive dissonance* that implies collective actors and societal processes (Mamali, Kivu, Kutnik, 2017). The societal cognitive dissonance even if it is related to that produced at the individual level "as meat eaters' paradox state" (Bastian & Loughnan 2017) suggests, it becomes much more painful in the case of genocide denial that affects entire societies. Besides the high complexity

of so many interacting factors from all levels of social complexity (as Hinde defined the concept, 1978) in the case of the denial of the Armenian Genocide time becomes an essential variable because of the long-term practice of official denial of the genocide of 1915. With time the discovered, collected, scientifically verified, and publicly displayed evidence is increasing while the official denial of the genocide and its related policy remain almost unchanged. Also the dynamics of the third parties (mainly official collective actors) who recognize genocide, who degrade it to tragic events, who deny it or remain silent on the issue changes and by the same token the societal cognitive dissonance (from national to international and global levels) increases due to many discrepancies discovered among the positions of different actors or between the positions of the same actors toward the genocide during a period longer than 100 years.. These various discrepancies become a fertile ground for increasing the interrogative trend about the denial of the 1915 genocide, about the reasons and causes regarding the practice of denial by so many actors, about the emergence and practice of justifications regarding the genocide (or massacres), about the radical changes of the views on genocide (either direction, from denial to recognition), about the relationships with the two sides (that of the victims and that of the perpetrators).and about those actors who are still undecided or silent.

Based on previous studies (Mamali, 1972, 1981, 2011, 2016) the interrogative force is understood as the ability and willingness to generate relevant questions on sensitive topics (injustice, crimes against humanity, dictatorship, theoretical and practical puzzles, corruption, immoral behaviors). The force of the interrogative tendency is basically understood as implying the validity of the questions (grounded in evidence, without false assumptions, and targeting unknown areas), persistence in time of the interrogative orientation, expression, timing (during or post denial), openness (public versus private), targets (perpetrators, authorities, tribunals, judging forums), number of questions and number of actors who ask them.

The concepts of trace and interrogative force due ask for a revision of a well-established concept and its major functions. This concept is “collective memory” that has been introduced by Halbwachs and

complements in a much needed mode the traditional concept of memory understood mainly as an individual ability, process and survival means. Halbwachs posits: "collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past [that] adapts the image of the ancient facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present" (1941, p. 7). Through his definition that stresses the possibility of joint mental reconstruction of the past by a community Halbwachs makes explicit that memory has a collective carrier (the group) and functions that serve the group while it faces present-day challenges. At the same time he replicates Bartlett's idea (1932) that remembering is a (re)constructive process that takes place in the head of the individual, but under the pressure of specific social settings and interests. Bartlett's model of reconstructed memory strongly suggests that this is carried out under the pressure to achieve consistency among all the recalled details: Social organization gives a persistent framework into which all the detailed recall must fit and all it powerfully influences both the manner and the matter of recall" (1932, p. 296). Bartlett's idea applies to dictatorial forms of government that practice the denial of genocide. It happens even when the iron fist leaders describe themselves as supporters of democracy (see Mango's works on Atatürk's biography, 1999 and Iorga's political diagnostic, 1935). The problem becomes more challenging when powerful collective bystanders become involved in these divergent perspectives that turn into sources of societal cognitive dissonances.

There is evidence that memory, both individual and collective, is a necessary component of individual and cultural identity, helps the continuity and solidarity processes. All aggressions (demolition of old traces, interdiction of rituals, customs, literature, language, denial of family trees, destruction of cemeteries etc.) against individual and collective memories, under the assumption that these memories are relatively accurate, are aggressions against individual and cultural identity. So, the dynamic preservation of the past and of the identity is served by memory, remembering, anniversaries and commemorations. However, according to Lowenthal (1985, p. 210) the master function of "memory is not to preserve the past, but to adapt it so as to enrich and manipulate the present". The relationship between memory (but also remembering, forgetting and commemorating the past which can be

systematic, accurate, biased, and selective or any combination thereof) and past is much more complex. Yes, we know that under totalitarian regimes it has been and always will be hard to “predict the past” because its remembering is function of present day dictates.

The case of the denial of the Armenian Genocide invites us to consider the interplay between two series of complex processes: time orientation on one side and memory processes, understood in the widest sense, as naturally, individually and culturally recorded events able the last beyond the production of the vent (from physical, biological, psychological to cultural processes ad manners of preserving the events) on the other side. A core element of individual and societal memories and practices related to them are the traces (material traces). We like it or not, human actions produce many traces that can survive the actors, be discovered, explored and, interpreted by following generations of social actors during long periods of time.

In the *specific case of the Genocide suffered by the Armenians*, basically the *unique case of an over 100 years of official denial of genocide* (with its peak in 1915) ***the interactions of past – present – future of all the memory objects and storages*** make obvious that the past becomes a target of new inspections, which might be enriched by new reliable data, carried out from the present perspective. Also the interactions past-present-future become targets of new tactics of denial. At the same time the present, including all its new records of denial and of recognition, turns into past and the previous future in relation to 1915 events (for instance, events and records produced in 1930's 1940's, 1950's) is turning (or turned) into past objects of memory. This complex dynamics feeds, by its many synchronic and diachronic discrepancies that emerge on the spectrum that ranges between genocide denial and recognition of genocide (Mamali, 2017), the interrogative potential that becomes actual and stronger making the perpetrators and deniers side more and more answerable. Answerability is a concept introduced by Bakhtin (1981) that overpasses the rhetoric borders and indicates that all actors must face and answer questions focused on their acts. Within the present context the dynamics questioning and answering is approached by taking into account the Oracle-Sphinx model (Mamali, 1992, 2010) and the method of self-inquiry (Mamali, 1972, 1982).


The schema (*Table 1*), despite the fact that it is a simplification, points out some aspects that have been neglected in previous studies on collective memory. They are however necessary for understanding memories and their use in the case of genocides. The first one is that the functions of memories are related with a set of processes that can have a systematic, intentional, or spontaneous character such as: preserving the past traces, remembering the past, re-construing the memories about the past, covering, distorting, destroying the traces/memories of the past, investing and using new methods to search the past (including traces/memories) and blocking the search of the past. The second one is that the human past, history as such, remains on open field of inquiry for new methods, theories, interpretative tools that do emerge. Just one possible example: in the case of the Armenian Genocide techniques used for DNA identification might become usable in order to investigate if human remains from mass graves of the genocide locations might be reliably linked with today people related to the victims. As a matter of fact the invention of new scientific methods and their possible use in the case of genocides is an area that can bring many unexpected results. The third point is that during time there might be discovered new connections and meanings of previously known facts that have been treated individually, not within a wider context. Finally this implies moral challenges due to the long term denial practiced by many official collective actors. This challenge regards tension between immoral and moral development of humankind. So, the knowledge and public representations of the past are not just under the control of present political interests: scientific methods, democratization of the social knowledge (Internet being a major tool) and moral considerations might influence them. The multiple discrepancies that are obvious both in time and across various forms of memories of different social actors that are either on the recognition or on the denial side are supposed to stimulate the questioning potential of each and every social actor (individuals or collective) who gets in touch with this problem. It is assumed that individual and societal memories generate an interrogative force that opposes the denial orientation. Sooner or later this interrogative force will reach a critical mass that will stimulate the elaboration of just political decisions, thus contributing significantly to the recognition of the 1915 genocide.

The schema (*Table 1*) helps to identify various sources of discrepancies among components of different levels of social complexity and within each of them across time. For instance, here are a few examples of discrepancies between views and representations of the 1915 genocide: a) striking difference between history textbooks for students in various countries (countries that officially recognized the genocide and countries that do not yet recognize it); b) the existence and growing numbers of memorials dedicated to 1915 in various countries versus no such memorial in Turkey and the decay and destruction of the Armenian material traces (ancient settlements, i.e. pre-Ottoman traces), buildings, cemeteries, churches and so on); c) conflicting official declarations, and treatises on the 1915 events; d) individual witnesses of the genocide survivors collected and recorded by experts that are opposing the denial of genocide; e) the existence and publications of memoirs, diplomatic documents, reports on the genocide that support the recognition of genocide and oppose the denial perspective; f) the opening of various archives on the 1915 genocide versus the period during which they have been closed to research access; g) the emergence of the Internet as a new tool for the democratization of social knowledge that offers direct access to many individual and collective actors to records, representations and interpretations of the 1915 events developed by all sides. The research also assumes that as the modern forms of “elemental media”, including the “marvelous cloud (Peters, 2015) develop so will increase the chances of common people to identify societal cognitive and moral dissonances and to inquire about their causes, origins and persistence.



Table 1

## Time flow and traces of Genocide



These are social facts, that also become objects of individual and societal memory, that are considered in this study as being just a few sources of individual and societal cognitive dissonances that challenge and activate the interrogative potential of laypersons, of individuals related to victims, individuals connected to perpetrators, of experts from many inquiring fields, of politicians and judges, among others. At the individual level there is the reality of repressed memories and the danger of creating false memories as Loftus's research strongly shows (1993, 1997). At the same time it is obvious that memories of painful, traumatic collective tragic events that are independently recalled by different survivors from different locations end up in a consistent pattern of macro-narrative *do fit reality*, being a reproduction not re-creation of the past events as supported by diverse sources (Boyajian & Grigorian, 2007; Cillière, 2010; Göçek Müge, 2014; Lepsius, 1919; Morgenthau, 1918; Svazlian, 2004, 2011).

#### **Types of individual and societal memory objects that potentially stimulate the interrogative force of various social actors**

Based on previous studies that used a wide range of records (material traces, diplomatic documents, international declarations and agreements, reports developed by people who made direct observations on the field, letters, the study of the press and official declarations during and after the genocide, records of trials, systematic collection of survivors' memories of their experiences during the genocide, diaries worked by people who survived the genocide and the use of such perusal documents by new generations to re-construct their journeys) I will focus on the interrogative potential expressed by laypersons about the 1915 genocide. This theme is part of a much wider project that includes up to present over a few thousands of participants from different countries. The focus is justified by the dilemma posed by many politicians from countries that officially do not yet recognize the genocide and consider that this is a problem to be decided by historians (Auron, 2000, 2003). The historical evidence is overwhelming and supports overwhelmingly the reality: in 1915 Armenians suffered

genocide within their own historical homeland under the Ottoman occupation, which invaded their land and other countries. Due to this stalemate on the political chessboard that include many countries, and to the moral paralysis of international organizations that have been founded to protect humankind against genocide but remain inefficient in this case it is observable that common persons of various walks of life, ethnic groups, religious orientations do show a high interrogative orientation directed toward the many obvious discrepancies produced by the distance between two blocks: recognizing the 1915 genocide and denial of the 1915 genocide.

Here is a brief presentation of the most important *categories of memory objects, records and traces* which, according to the perspective advanced by this study, are sources that stimulate and feed the interrogative force, mainly on the victims' but also on the third party and perpetrators side which might increase the societal pressure to recognize the genocide:

**Records of direct observations carried out by persons in the field who have been co-present with the genocidal events. These records have been publicly circulated very close to the 1915 events.** So, the co-presence of these traces have the value of direct witnesses who belong to different cultures than those of the victims and perpetrators. Among them these records that now are memories of highly significant value, those worked out by Rade (Meissner, 2010, p. 10), including his warnings about the future consequences of neglect, indifference or denial of the crimes, and those carried out by Lepsius (Hayruni & Hosfeld, 2017; Hosfeld, 2014). As it is documented, Lepsius's *Bericht* has been object to interdictions by German authorities but has been circulated due to its many translations (Hayruni & Hosfeld, 2017). These saving strategies of vital records have been used again and again during history. For instance, memoirs, letters, taped records and so on of dissidents from former totalitarian societies have been saved from censorship and destruction by translations and circulations in democratic societies. Unfortunately this strategy is sometimes manipulated against the principles of freedom of thinking and moral responsibility and selectively used. Once such records of the Armenian Genocide were accessed individually and entered the public

discourse they did stimulate and will stimulate social actors' interrogative attitude oriented toward the denial of the 1915 genocide.

**Records of direct observations carried out by persons in the field who have been co-present with the genocidal events.** These records have been delivered in real time to the authorities but have been discovered in official and personal archives recently being published for the first time many years after the events. For instance, to this category belong the direct, on the field, observations recorded by Cillière in 1894-1896 that identified various forms of violence against Armenians combined with strategies of denial. Trenon (2010, p. 231) identifies the emergence of a "*culture of denial*" practiced by the Sublime Porte. The massacres of the Armenians by the Ottomans in 1894-1896 have been at the same time minimized by high profile and gifted personalities as it is the case of Pierre Loti who attempted to diminish the guilt of the perpetrators (Dédéyan, 2010, pp. 19-20). The very fact of the existence of such records and the fact that these sources have remained unknown to researchers and the larger public for a long time are also assumed to be sources able to stimulate the interrogative orientation toward the violence against Armenians within the Ottoman Empire and its denial.

**Interpersonal record, such as letters and telegrams co-present to the events** that have a huge advantage on personal records (such as diaries and journals) because they are submitted to inter-subjective verification during the epistolary dialogue, many times complemented by the face-to-face dialogue (Mamali, 1988, 1990). For instance, in this category are the letters of Lepsius (Hosfeld, 2014), those of Cambon (1940) and those of non-Armenian populations, such as Jews who have witnessed the atrocities and felt unsafe for their own fate. For instance, Aronshon's correspondence (Auron, 2003) reveals in real time the crimes against the Armenians. Besides this epistolary evidence are the letters sent by lethally endangered populations in the Ottoman Empire such as the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, Makedo-Romanians (Aromanians) and others. I assume that the body of letters, including letters from survivors of the genocide is much wider and is just waiting to be discovered and systematically analyzed.

**Memoirs and reports of high-ranked diplomats who were co-present to the 1915 events.** Among them are the memoirs of the American Ambassador in Turkey Henry Morgenthau and many other similar documents such as the British Blue Book, records of the Austrian and German diplomats (Dadrian, 1997; Hosfeld, 2014, Hovannisian; 1992, 1999, 2007; Morgenthau, 1918; Toynbee's report presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 1916). Such records pose potential questions oriented toward the resistance of the Turkish officials to recognize the genocide and the inefficiency of major collective political actors in overcoming this resistance.

**Records of trials of Ottoman officials guilty of war crimes focused on the *Armenian genocide trials*** (Dadrian & Akçam, 2010). These records show also radical changes on the perpetrators' side of the genocide due to changes of the international context and power relationships between the combatant countries (Dadrian, 2010, pp. 101-107). Such radical changes, always toward denial, in the case of perpetrators' side, have been identified in the press of the time that reflected the course of the trials. These records document radical changes of the attitudes of the Kemalists (the supporters of Mustafa Kemal) toward the genocide and towards the treatment of its perpetrators. The analysis of these trials, of their documents and of the Turkish press coverage of the trials (Dadrian & Akçam, 2010), suggests a trend that is significant for the dynamics of individual and societal memories of the 1915 genocide in Turkey: both of them had suffered huge and systematic pressures to move away from recognition toward strategic denial. The various forms of denial of the Armenian Genocide as those identified by Hovannisian (1999) are part, as Gőçek (2015) proved, of a denial that officially engaged the entire Turkish society despite valuable works that ask for recognition of the genocide. Under such conditions it is assumed that the interrogative orientation of individual and societal actors will cover higher levels of social complexity.

**Memories of the trials of Armenians who used violence as a last resort to question publicly the denial by the Turkish authorities of the genocide. A paradigmatic case is that of Tehlirian, judged for killing Talât-Pascha (Ihrig, 2017) and set free, that turned into a widely publicized event that shackled (in Pataočka' sense) the moral consciousness of individuals and societies.** As reproduced in Power's study, Lemkin asked: *"It is a crime for Tehlirian to kill a man but it is not a crime for his oppressor to kill more than a million men? This is most inconsistent"* (cited by Power, 2007, p. 17). Tehlirian represents a critical moment from a chain of such events that might be considered a retaliatory movement (operation Nemesis, Nemesis being the symbol of retributive justice) that practiced a violent form of interrogation against denial. For the present study such last resort violent acts oriented against denial make clear that the systematic forgetting of the 1915 events related to the denial practiced by the Turkish and by other governments can trigger **extreme actions that are refreshing the individual and societal memories and belong to a long-term trend of remembering and recognition.** The violent question posed by Tehlirian is part of the wider and diverse field of interrogative forces triggered by the 1915 genocide and its denial by some actors and recognition by others.

**Memories and records of the "justificationalist" (Ihrig, 2016) practice combined with that of forgetting, and the strategic use of societal forgetting regarding crimes against humanity in order to detach present day actors from feelings of guilt and responsibility related to genocidal actions in which they are involved.** Ihrig's research documents and conceptually explores such strategies obvious in the German press during the Nazis rule (Ihrig, 2014, 2016). The records of justificationalism and of the social representations expressed by political leaders (Hitler, in this case) about the systematic and global forgetting of the crimes against humanity do reveal that forgetting is usable as a tool for moral disengagement, (as Bandura defines the process) for committing new crimes and at the same time that the unmasking of this strategy based on documents, as Ihrig did, strongly suggests that remembering even the historical moments of societal forgetting designed by various social actors do become parts of the long

term individual and societal memories, Traces of all kind can become objects of systematic forgetting as well as objects of systematic remembering that aims toward an accurate representation of the events.

**Records and memories of landmark international agreements concerning the 1915 crimes against the Armenian people.** The Sèvres Treaty (10<sup>th</sup> of August 1920) and Lausanne Treaty (July 1923, ratified in 1924) peace treaty are sources of societal dissonance. The unfulfilled treaty (Sèvres) and the signed international agreements (Lausanne) that are in conflict exist at the same time within a wider context that complicates the problem as it would be the case of the treaty of Brest-Litvosk (1918). Such records are essential for the dynamics of societal memories and they document both the vital importance of such international documents (treatises) as well the weaknesses and pitfalls of these approaches. I will mention just one because it has almost an exact co-presence with the crimes against humanity. This declaration of the great powers of the time (England, France, Russia) delivered on the 24<sup>th</sup> on May 1915 states:

*“En présence de ces nouveaux crimes de la Turquie contre l’humanité et la civilisation, les Gouvernements alliés font savoir publiquement à la Sublime Porte qu’ils tiendront personnellement responsables desdits crimes tous les membres du Gouvernement ottoman ainsi que ceux de ses agents qui se trouveraient impliqués dans de pareils massacres”* (the text is reproduced from Beylerian, 1983, p. 29).

Such records, which are now parts of societal memories, have a high relevance for the interrogative force because on the one side some of them are explicit condemnations of the crimes against humanity and on the other side, within the context of the long term denial of the 1915 genocide, such traces, that are and can be re-visited and remembered publicly and individually, make obvious that some of the same governments (France and Russia) officially recognized the genocide only after a long and painful delay while other governments, such as that of UK, still remain silent on the issue. The problem of ‘facing the Armenian genocide’ by collective actors has many sides that are approached in

different ways at different historical moments as suggested by Duclert for the case of France (2105). Across history and cultures are emerging societal dissonances that might reveal the abuse of double standards. This is one of the reasons why such striking dissonances are not just cognitive, they are political and moral and are able to stimulate the interrogative force of more and more actors.

**Recorded representations worked out by contemporary politicians and historians who selectively expressed historical facts, older records and interpretations regarding the Ottoman Empire and the 1915 events.** This aspect of societal memory has been discussed in previous studies, as it is the case of the institutions of janissary and the horrific violence and oppression practiced by the Ottoman Empire during centuries (Mamali, 2016). This is visible in works that otherwise have great scientific value, but neglect wars and violent practices initiated by the Ottoman Empire as it happens, for instance, with the work of İnalcık & Quataert (1996).

Cases of biased representations that created dissonances among various records are associated during long periods of time with confusing messages about the historical relations of certain countries with the former occupiers. For instance, the Romanian historian Boia (1997) rightly identifies the “double discourse” practiced in Romania, where the Turks have long been called “old enemies”, a representation that has been replaced, after 1989, with an opposite image that considers “Turks have come back now, with capital, goods, and political projects,” supporting Romania’s accession to NATO (p. 175). A similar positive representation has been expressed by many Turkish officials, such as the minister of economy, who stated in 2014 that “Among Turkey’s relations with its neighbors, Romania has a special place, as relations are grounded on a common history” (Zeyibekci, 2014). However it is blatantly neglected that such representations are in line with the statements made by the former dictator Ceaușescu who talked about the “traditional friendship between the Romanian and Turkish people” a record that must be known by Boia. These forms of doublespeak might be triggered by political interests that distort the past in order to gain popular support for present political choices. Boia’s view remains silent



on the similarities between the double discourse practiced in Romania before and after 1989 on this issue. Building up good economic, cultural and political relations is obviously a positive trend that should be maintained and developed. However, its justification is not served by false or exacerbated claims on past relations. What do “common history” and “traditional friendship” between a country which has been at the core of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) and a country such as Romania (more exactly its historical regions) that has been a few hundred years under the threats of the Ottoman Empire paying tribute, including in children, mean? Political interests practiced in a Machiavellian mode can generate a rhetoric that labels different realities such as demanding tribute in children, grains and money, using violent means to replace the local kings, having two cultures with very different languages (one is Latin) and different main religions (Christian and Muslim), two nations that have been at war many times, one with the intention of conquering (invaders) the other in self-defense (as invaded) as forming a shared “common history” and “traditional friendship”. Such a political rhetoric is in contradiction with many historical records and traces and generates deep dissonances that trigger questions. These dissonances evolve in time being nurtured by the dynamics of political, economic and financial interests as well as by the military alliances done and undone in some 150 years. It is highly significant that the accurate diagnostic made by Iorga on Kemal’s policy of de-nationalization (Turkification of different nations occupied by the Ottomans, Turks) are neglected. First, Iorga warned about the “fire hidden under the ashes” of the temporal peace in the land of the Ottoman Empire and its vicinities, as he posited (1907, republished 1999, p. 237). Second, Iorga, identified in the 30’s “Mr. Kemal, as a national *Turkish dictator*, [who] *dreams that in the region of the national Turkish state even the remembrance of any other nation shall be extinct*” (1935, republished in 1999, emphasis added). This political portrait of Mustafa Kemal, that is confirmed by the fate constructed by Kemalist authorities and by their followers to the different nationalities, is neglected even by nowadays first rank historians, such as Andrew Mango and others, born in a country that directly experienced the Ottoman violence. Iorga’s political diagnosis of M. Kemal stands in sharp contrast with the intellectual and political

portrait provided by Hanioglu 75 years later (2011) and with the self-portrait of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as presented to Grace Ellison (1928, p. 24) that says: *"I [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk] have no religion, and at times I wish all religions at the bottom of the sea. He is a weak ruler who needs religion to uphold his government; it is as if he would catch his people in a trap. My people are going to learn the principles of democracy, the dictates of truth and the teachings of science. Superstition must go. Let them worship as they will; every man can follow his own conscience, provided it does not interfere with sane reason or bid him against the liberty of his fellow-men"*. Of course, everyone can describe oneself in ways that are pleasing one's self-image and one's interests. However, an experienced historian who works hard to reconstruct the biography of a leader with a huge impact, as Atatürk, must consider the self-portrait within the widest context of personal actions, political decisions and social consequences of that given historical figure. Even an extremely well informed historian on Turkey, as Mango, in his voluminous biography of the "founder of modern Turkey" (1999) avoids systematically Atatürk's views, actions, historical facts, political decisions and their consequences that contradict this rosy self-portrait. For instance, there are no direct references to major authors such as Lepsius, Morgenthau and Toynbee, to mention just a few, which present an opposite view based on direct observations of the events; no systematic discussion of the 1915 events (genocide) and their size and just a brief overview on the massacres of 1890's (Mango, 1999, p. 14); no single word on Thilarian's trial related to the assassination of Talât Paşa (pp. 322-323), or on the Kemalists strategies to save the major perpetrators responsible for the "war crimes" this is to say the genocide (pp. 205-207); and the list of omissions of the dark side of Mustafa Kemal's actions can continue. Atatürk's self-portrait as well as Mango's image on the "enlightened despot" do not seem to be in tune with the state of the Armenians, and other nationalities, under Atatürk rule and after his death. Mango even interprets the cynical behavior of Atatürk, who dressed himself in an "authentic uniform of a Janissary" to a ball in Sofia (May 11<sup>th</sup>, 1914, p. 129) in the presence of King Ferdinand, as a sign of Atatürk's humor, love for jokes neglecting completely that *a Janissary has been a slave soldier*. Mango's view is part of a *linguistic and historical alchemy* turning past evil facts into objects of admiration (Mamali 2016).

Iorga's diagnosis and the fate of the Armenians contradict this carefully crafted political face-lift of the dictator. An expert in modern tyrants as well as in "a Balkan colony", as Chirot provides two perspectives on Atatürk: "both Franco and Atatürk left behind them societies that were better off for the majority *of their people* than what they found when they began their rule. Atatürk may be considered an unambiguously genuine *national savior* who controlled his impulses toward arbitrary brutality and dictatorial behavior..." (1994, p.169, emphasis added). Obviously Chirot does not consider the records regarding the immediate and long term consequences on Armenians of Atatürk's actions and of the Kemalist politics. The records tell that Armenians living in Turkey were not considered by Atatürk as part of his people. The portrait of Atatürk as a leader "who controlled his impulses toward arbitrary brutality and dictatorial behavior" collides with historical facts and with what Chirot himself says later on about Atatürk: "[he] used dictatorial methods and knew how to be ruthless" (p. 418). So, Chirot, based on his model on tyrants, assesses that Atatürk has not been a tyrant because "he did not have inflexible theories about human behavior" that led him "into excessive brutality" (p. 418). This assessment invites questions: Is tyranny restrained only to brutalities on one's own people and does not include the brutalities against other nations? The annihilation of other people (nationalities) that is not grounded in a theory (world view), if it is covered by demagogic rhetoric, and it is just "pragmatic," is not a form of tyranny, a theoryless tyranny? There are ideological tyrannies that last longer than concrete tyrants, but some tyrants might not conceptualize their mega-violence for tactical reasons, and due to a demagogic cautiousness.

The past and its actors receive not only different interpretations but even descriptions that change radically with the passage of time as a function of many political, moral, cognitive, cultural, financial, military and economic filters. It has to be reminded that these new interpretations and descriptions become objects of societal memories. A research on the knowledge on personalities that are perceived as having an important impact (positive or negative) on human history and on the degree in which such personalities are admired (accepted) versus despised (rejected) does show a great discrepancy between the way in

which Atatürk is perceived in Turkey in other countries (see the *Annex 2*, and the later discussion).

I think that too frequently a dangerous confusion emerges while present-day official political actors and politicized actors refer to past events: it is generated by a tendency to change the representations of the past in a mode that fits to the present-day interests and relations. If the representations of the past move away from historical facts and records sooner or later the distortions implied by these representations might become sources of new and renewed conflicts. They are potential blasts from the actual past and from previously embellished past. To have new, reciprocally useful and friendly relationships between countries that have been long time ago in wars is a desirable change that must be cultivated. However, such a change should not deny the historical truth. As a matter of fact recognizing a painful past could be a great asset for developing long-term reciprocally beneficial relations.

**The digital transcription of all kinds of traces, records of individual and collective actors and their placement on Internet that makes such traces available to a much larger number of viewers, readers, interpreters who might try to understand them and communicate about them. This is the new and rapidly evolving reality of democratization of information and knowledge open by the Internet that can be used and abused.** Witte, an expert of the field, posits: “A few hundred years ago, control of society’s knowledge was rested from the Church and relocated in academic institutions. Now... *our monopoly is under threat: society can collaboratively create, edit, and refine knowledge artifacts without even asking us*” (Witten, 2016, p. 132). For the present study these technologies are highly significant. I assume that such technologies have a strong influence on the potential of interrogative force by increasing the number of those who come with questions and look for answers, by multiplying the discourses, by making more visible the various dissonances that are implied by the tension between denial and recognition of the Armenian Genocide and by increasing the pressure on the perpetrator and other deniers to recognize the fact. This new tool might increase the chances to make answerability unavoidable.

**Written, oral and/or taped records of survivors of the 1915 genocide and their location within the hyper-traces (hyper-text) of societal memory of the Armenian genocide. Such traces have a vital importance due to the long-term and systematic denial of the 1915 genocide by the official Turkish representatives.** These traces have, as Gőçek-Müge (2015) suggests, a much wider significance that goes far beyond the official position and imply the entire society in various modes: In her landmark study on denial of violence that brings a new perspective, new data and a complex methodology to the research of the Ottoman past, Turkish present, and collective violence against Armenian, covering over 200 years, from 1789 to 2009, Gőçek advances an essential idea: *"I do not focus solely on official Turkish denial of the collective violence against Armenians but instead emphasize the interaction and inherent collaboration of state and society because the joining of forces is what sustains and reproduces denial over time and across space"* (2015, p. 10, emphases added). The investigation carried out by Gőçek using diaries, memoirs and other documents that cover from within and in real time the violent historical events strongly supports her perspective on *the joint forces that belong to the perpetrators actors and society*. This joint forces cover a large chronospace (Bakhtin, 1981), i.e., in this case the entire social space of genocidal actions and the long historical interval (over 200 years) of official denials. This means, according to Gőçek's construct on denial, that official representatives and a large part of the society belong to a network which initiates, sustains and reproduces denial of collective violence over a long period of time and large geo-cultural area. Gőçek's systemic conception, which points out the collaborative actions of *joint social forces*, makes possible to better understand the denial of collective violence on the perpetrators' side and opens the possibility of charting various field forces that could belong to denial or to recognition of the 1915 genocide. A model of these field forces that are related to various levels of denial has been introduced in a different study (Mamali, Kivu, Kutnik, 2017).

The collection of survivors' memories has been drastically hindered by the societal conditions and policies in Turkey. Also because a large part of survivors lived in Soviet Armenian, which has been marked by the systemic repression common for the entire totalitarian

system, the collection and records of such memories has been for a long time close to impossible. Sakharov's puzzle (Mamali, 2017) suggests that the Armenian Genocide has been pushed deep into the unconscious collective mind making its approach extremely hard even for moral exemplars such as Sakharov. So, the Genocide suffered by the Armenians has been for a long time a strict political and cultural taboo. In addition to these terrible political conditions such memories have been repressed or covered for a long time by dominant narratives that played an important role in the denial and the justification of the violent events of 1915. Such narratives have been identified also outside Turkey, for instance in the German Press (Ihrig, 2016). Among these representations are: the conception according to which the denial is natural because the violence, i.e., genocide against the Armenian is embedded within the foundational process of the birth of the Turkish Republic (Dündar, 2010; Ulgen, 2010; Bozarslan, Duclert & Kevorkian, 2015). Bozarslan et al. mention also the resistance to open the Turkish archives, the destruction of documents and the very late (after 2000) publication of some critical documents like the memoirs of the perpetrators, such as the "*Cahier noir*" (The Black Notebook) of Talât, who was directly involved in the genocide (Bozarslan, Duclert & Kévorkian, 2015, pp. 138-142). The individual (diaries, memoirs) and interindividual records (letters, telegrams) of the 1915 genocide, as well as of the pre and post peak periods produced by the perpetrators are at the same time highly significant and difficult to obtain due to the well documented official prohibitions regarding the access to the archives. As any other forms of repression, the interdiction placed on the exploration of the 1915 genocide can generate a reactance that can be expressed in interrogative forms once the circumstances are born. I assume that the interrogative force will target both the events as such as well as the old and new practices to deny, neglect, cover or remain silent about the genocide. The interrogative force is nurtured by a major feature of individual and societal memories that is still neglected by research; the individual and societal memories from a large store-house able to preserve accurate and false records, accurate and false previous memories and interpretations and the ways social actors did deal with them. One of the major cognitive and emotional sources of retaliatory actions, of individual and

collective acts of vengeance is this universal feature of individual and societal memories. The danger of retaliatory violence increases in the case of denial especially in the case when it is unresponsive, stocked within a non-answering mode, to cognitive, moral, legal, and political calls for responsible answers and reparatory actions. The ability of the individual and societal memories to preserve information on old events, traces, records, memories and the ways they have been and are remembered is a never ending source for narratives.

Life stories have a great healing and learning potential because they enhance the coherence at the personal level (Band-Wiinterstein, 2007). At the same time at societal level they help post-genocidal generations to build an integrated macro-narrative regarding the suffering of the previous generations. However, the development of the macro-narrative accepted also by the larger communities is not possible if the victims face a long term official denial of the genocide practiced mainly by the government that belongs to the other side.

Individual memories have not only a great variety but they are possible sources of informal recall networks that are able to grow. Even if such networks belong to the category of soft relationships their ability to grow and become parts of wider and more powerful networks is supported by the theoretical and empirical study of networks and of human beings as *Homo dictyous, network-man* as suggested by Christakis & Fowler (2011, pp. 222, 228). The model of *Homo dictyous* introduced by Christakis and Fowler helps to explore the spreading of the interrogative force against denial with wider and wider social networks and over time, in the social chronospace.

There are records produced by the victims, survivors and their direct descendants. Diaries and letters of the victims and of those who escaped the genocide represent reliable sources as is the journal of Stepan Miskjian (1897-1917). The fact that the diaries have been published almost half a century later (1964-1965) proves the resilience of such traces and the solidarity and will of the survivors to bring the past events to the light of the present day consciousness with all the implied questions about the events, their denial and delays in the public discussions of the records and events. In addition to this, Miskjian's granddaughter, Anahid MacKeen, based on the detailed notes of Miskjian,

achieved almost one hundred years later, began a re-constitutive journey from his birthplace to the deportation place – Deir-Zor (MacKeen, 2016).

Case studies based on the memories of a single actor bring highly significant information on various aspects of the 1915 genocide and associated political events such as the Kemalist movement (Ulgen, 2010). Such individual memories, despite the fact that they might initially have a very limited circulation area, can potentially trigger the interrogative force that is expected to be activated first within the circles (networks) of the first-hand readers and step by step, through networking, to cover a much wider real and virtual social space. There is a wider body of oral histories of survivors and relatives of survivors and shorter recollections of Armenians that are living or lived in different countries, such as Romania, a country that received a significant number of refugees during the 1915 genocide (Cazazian & Antonian, 1998; Horasangian, 2015; Kanterian, 2015; Agop Cividian in Rostas, 2002). Such documents grasp the traumas lived by victims and their survivors. Psychosocial studies based on in depth interviews with survivors (Boyajian & Grigorian, 2007, pp.108-114) reveal the long term consequences of the traumatic events.

All these individual testimonies have not just a high cognitive value but the potential to stimulate the interrogative orientation toward the 1915 Genocide despite the fact that this trend can start at the level of small networks. Once the process starts it has the chance, under specific conditions, to expand to larger real (face-to-face) and virtual networks. However, due to the quantitative (number of victims, survivors, records, area, time) and qualitative (human, political and moral) magnitude of the problem there is a necessity to build up and gain access to systematic, comprehensive and reliably collected and recorded testimonies. This access implies the resources for research that overpass by far the resources of this project that is self-sponsored. In addition such a project needs a stable interdisciplinary team. According to my knowledge, a major source of systematic and reliably collected and recorded testimonies of survivors (1896-1915) of the Armenian Genocide worked out during some 50 years under very hard circumstances has been worked out by Svazlian (2004, 2011). I will refer in the next section



just to one source that has been also surveyed in a previous study (Mamali, Kivu, Kutnik, 2017).

The present research assumes that all of the above types of traces and memories are significant sources of possible societal dissonances at cognitive, emotional, political and moral level. As such these dissonances can trigger questions at any level of social complexity. However, an essential source remains that of the 1915 genocide survivor testimonies and of the atrocities that preceded and followed it. The testimonies of the survivors of the same genocide share common narrative flows, regardless of the variety of places, size of families, names of victims and perpetrators.

*Testimonies and interrogative attitudes.* The deep traumatic consequences and the complex combination of negative feelings such as anger, sadness and desperation with positive feelings such as hope related to one's own survival, resilience and the birth of new generations of people with a strong Armenian identity are revealed by a 55 years long study of oral history with survivors of the 1915 genocide carried out by Svazlian, (2004, 2011). The testimonies collected and recorded by Svazlian that include also folk songs are covering a huge chrono-spatial interval, with the eldest survivor having been born in 1874 in Sansun. There are testimonies of later on generations of survivors that are living in the deportation area of Deir-el-Zor (Hakoub Moutafian, born in 1980, provided his testimony # 384, p. 545). This testimony is a paradigmatic example of the mindset of a descendent of the victims of the Armenian Genocide that is focused on the description of the traumatic events the Armenians went through and on the "sacred duty" of the Armenian government to protect the "national identity" (p. 546). This mindset is a common feature of the survivors of the 1915 genocide as well as of other individuals born long time after the genocide. The testimony of Khachik (Khachatarian) Grigor (born in 1900, Sassoun Shenik Village, # 2, pp. 88-90) after a detailed description of the atrocities suffered by his village and the killing of his two brothers, states "I miss my Country; I wish I would go to my Land, see it with my own eyes... The yearning for the Land is something special... There was a Genocide. If one is strong he can solve his land problem; with paper and pen no one gives back land" (pp. 89-90).

The atrocious experience turns in most cases into assertions that make clear who are the victims and the perpetrators. They use the lived experience and present it from the obvious perspective of the victims. They do not ask almost any questions directed to the perpetrators (why did they do this? for instance). They describe the lived reality and assert their feelings, thoughts and perspectives. The model Oracle-Sphinx (Mamali, (1981, 1992, 2010) that uses Oedipus as a paradigmatic case for exploring the dynamics of questioning and answering abilities across life-span case suggests that in dangerous situations, under high fear, the questioning mode is silenced. As a matter of fact Oedipus, under threat and in self-defense, kills his father without even considering the question: are you my father.

The testimonies collected and recorded by Svazlian do contain a few questions that by their orientation and types support this hypothesis. For instance, the few questions asked by the victims are: Where's mother? Where is my family? (Testimony 192, pp. 378-379). Similar questions about fathers, daughters, and other relatives come again. There are questions asked by helpers to the victims (most of the time close relatives) that have the function to find the identity of the victim and to connect is with relatives: Is your name Haykaz, your mother's name Makrouhi...? (testimony 102, p. 245). The testimonies contain a few comforting questions, the greatest part of them being generated by relatives and persons close to the victims. For instance: "Why are you crying?" Due to the deep confusion created by loss and terror there are a few cases that resort during their testimonies to self-directed questions... One of the most significant type of self-directed questions searches for self-clarification. For instance, the survivor Georg Mikritich Kiledjian (born in 1912, Yedessi), a parentless child who was three years old when he was sold as a slave by his owner, a Bedouin, to a non-Armenian family, expresses the following self-directed question, related to this bewildering recall: "What did I understand?" (p. 305). However, even self-directed questions are just a few.

The lethal questions come always, as the victims recall, from the side of perpetrators as it is obvious by a typical question asked by a Turk: "Papaz effendi [an Armenian priest], your last hour has come, what have you got to say?" After this question the Turks played football

with the head of the decapitated priest (testimony # 177, pp. 359-360). Most of the questions asked by the perpetrators had a threatening character. Also the perpetrators had questions about assets and the occupations of the victims, as they were looking for gold and for specific craftsmen they were in need of, such as smith.

The present analysis works with the assumption that the interrogative force expressed by the quantity and quality of questions develops mainly post genocide and especially under the conditions in which denial makes obvious many dissonances and enhances a social-cognitive conflict between victims and deniers, a conflict that is also moral and political. A content analysis of these testimonies that is part of a different project has identified 30 *major themes concerning the genocide*. These major themes have intersecting areas due to the nature of harms inflicted on the Armenians. For instance, the major theme “means of annihilation” (fire on crowded churches where Armenian children, women and older men took refuge, beheading, impaling, cutting the belly of the pregnant women to bet on the sex of the child, water deprivation, starvation) intersects with some specific areas of a different major theme such as “crimes against children” (killing the child in front of the parents, rape of the young girls and drowning, burying alive, separation from mothers, leprosy, starvation etc.) or with the major themes of “physical and symbolic violence on human body” (playing football with decapitated heads, setting the piles of corpses in cross shape, etc.) all documented by testimonies of the survivors. For the present approach these themes are highly relevant and this is why it is useful to list all of these 30 major themes present in the testimonies of the survivors of the 1915 genocide: (1) *Memories of the historic native cradle, peaceful family life within a generous natural environment and productive and friendly community*. These major themes include memories on all Armenian villages and cities and of villages shared in good neighborhood with the Ottoman Turks (testimonies 1, 35, 113, 118, 211, 268, 395, 626, 659, 677, 761); (2) *Historical landmarks from ancient times to more recent past of Armenians roots and continuity on the land* (for instance, since Tigran the Great and also older roots or recent events); (3) *Memories of previous massacres of the Armenians in 1896 and of waves of growing hostility against Armenians*; (4) *Recollections of a period of celebration and*

*hope nurtured by the Turkish Constitution* that provided equal rights to Armenians and other nationalities (“Hürriyet”, that means freedom and the dethronement of Sultan Hamid II, 1908); (5) *The anti-Armenians goals and actions ordered by the new Turkish government and by the high officials in the 1915-1923 genocide within the political context of WWI, the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and in the aftermath of WWI, as reflected by the experiences and observations of the survivors.* It includes *atrocities committed by Young Turks* (testimonies 2, 6, 11, 16, 19 83, 86, 105, 111, 117, 134, 145, 150, 152, 159, 187, 192, 194, 206, 241, 249, 251, 259, 267, 274, 288, 317, 327, 350, 450, 453, 460, 483, 507, 551, 556, 585, 687) ; (6) *Consistent patterns of genocidal procedures directed against the Armenians* such as: officially disarming the Armenians, removal (under the pretext of drafting) of the young men from their communities; mass arrests; public atrocities and killings, forced deportations on foot of the remaining women, children and old people, repeated plundering, stimulation of other ethnic groups (mainly Kurds and Chechens) to harass, threaten, plunder and kill the Armenians” (testimonies 18, 19,, 23, 24, 26, 99, 101, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 132, 142); (7) *Means used in the extermination of Armenians* such as: fire arms, cold steel arms, bayonets, swords (yataghans), axes, daggers, pouring kerosene through the roofs of crowded churches used as refuge by Armenians, mass-immolation, drowning, burying alive, burning older persons on bonfires, impaling, water deprivation, hanging, crucifixion, starvation, throwing into pits, dying of sunstroke” (testimonies 2, 6, 39, 42, 88, 112, 114, 147, 191, 228); (8) *Physical and symbolic brutalities against human body* such as: “beheading, impaling, rape, cutting off women breasts throwing them to the dogs, cutting nipples, cutting the belly of pregnant women and betting on the sex of the fetus [also “to lay the woman in childbirth on the ground, to drop a paving stone on her head and watch the fetus dart out of her womb”, “to cut open their belly and their digestive organs in search of gold coins”], playing football with decapitated heads, the corpses piled up in the shape of a cross” (testimonies 13, 17, 39, 59, 111, 121, 159, 170, 153, 155, 170, 171, 177, 192, 258, 307, 339, 445, 454); (9) *Loss*, mainly: loss of most members of the family [the witness being the only one survivor usually from a large family], separation of children from mothers, separation of siblings, loss of real estate and land, loss of

personal property, loss of cultural and religious artifacts and symbols (testimonies 1,2, 3, 10, 64, 67, 113, 200; (10) *Violence against children*: killings, tortures (some in front of the parents), impaling the baby on a stake [to fling him away], starvation [“grazed on grass like animals”, “drinking urine”], changes of names [“starting from now on you are a Turk”], selling children, children slavery, begging for food, forcing girls into Turkish marriages, placement into poorly administrated orphanages; (11) *Cultural and symbolic violence* such as: killings of intellectuals (teachers, writers, priests, notables) forced Turkification (name-changing, interdiction of Armenian language and imposing Turkish language), Arabization, forced Kurdification, forced Islamization, circumcision, destruction of churches, converting churches into flour mills, jails, mosques, burning of Armenian books, desecration of Armenian monuments (testimonies 1, 10, 14, 16, 22, 13, 48, 210; 346, 348, 377, 378, 445); (12) *Planned killings, deportations and atrocities during Armenian holy days*: in April 1909, during the Holy Week, Adana and its environs were put on fire, vicious crowds attacked and plundered Armenian inhabited quarters, on the 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1915, on the *Sunday of Vardavar* (the transfiguration holyday in the Armenian tradition) Armenians from the Taron plain were “slaughtered with swords, burned in fire, drowned” by Turks and Kurds, and the day was converted into the “*Sunday of Martavar*” (burning of people, in Armenian language, testimony 1). Themes 10, 11 and 12 (also themes 29 and 30) are mainly focused on violence against children, women and symbolic violence. These themes reveal the lethal *violence against the demographic capital* and the efforts of the Armenian individuals, communities, churches and international organizations to reverse this loss by finding the Armenian children that were denationalized (Turkified, Islamized) and returning them to their cultural matrix. For instance, Ekmekçioğlu (2013) explored in-depth the *forcible transfer of women and children from one ethnic group to a different ethnic group* and its partial reversal (pp. 534-541) in the Armenians’ case. It has to be reminded that within the Ottoman and Turkish cultural framework the abduction of children and women (used in ‘harems’) who belonged to other nationalities, inclusively to the enemy countries, was a long historical practice as was also the practice of yenicizerization (for boys) discussed previously. The studies of Svazilian (2004, 2011), and the

historical process of yeniciserisation strongly suggest that forced ethnic conversion, basically a brutal and systematic separation from one's family and cultural roots and its possible reversal is much more complex, being in some cases impossible; (13) *Forced labor camps, labor battalion ("amelé tabour")*: hard and forced physical work that ended with the killing of the workers after they finished the project (for instance 25 Armenian engineers killed after building a tunnel, testimony 251); (14) *Armenian armed resistance and self-defense groups*; (15) *Help received by the Armenians from local people of various ethnic and religious backgrounds*, such as Bedouins, Christian Arabs, Greeks, Gypsies, Kurds (kirva, kurmandji), Persians, Turks, Yezidis (testimonies 12, 23, 27, 57, 106, 111, 139, 159, 164, 169, 220, 221, 247, 355); (16) *Help received from foreign countries, powers: America, France, Russia* (testimonies 6, 26, 49, 84, 88, 174, 247, 281, 283); (17) *Discontent and anger toward the great powers that cooperated with the Turkish government*: mainly Germany, Great Britain and the Soviet Union under Lenin, testimonies 27, 51, 84, 77, 116, 203, 253, 652 – especially for the lost territories such as Kars, Ardahan, Igdir due to the Lenin-Kemal agreement). There is also the fact that the *Armenian Revolutionary Federation* joined in 1907 the *Second Communist International* (Minassian, 2015). A puzzling attitude on the Armenian Genocide is that of a moral example such as Gandhi, who designed and practiced ahimsa (Mamali, 1998) and brought a historic contribution to the practice of non-violent resistance and refused to join the *Communist International*. However, Gandhi did not express opposition to the Muslim violence that was quite well known during his life (Singh, 2004, 290); (18) *Children orphanages*: mostly run by American charity organizations; (19) *Repeated emigration in foreign countries* such as Bulgaria, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Irak, Lebanon, Romania, Soviet Armenia, the USA; (20) *Participation of Armenian survivors to the French Resistance against German occupation and to the Great Patriotic War* (Soviet Union) during WWII; (21) *Repatriation in Soviet Armenia, Sovietization and deportation of the Armenian survivors in Siberia under Stalin* (testimonies 4, 9, 13, 66, 75, 88, 114, 168, 24, 242, 297, 349, 683, 700, see also Selian, 1999); (22) *Life in exile, mainly in the Syrian desert*; (23) *Diversity* of various Armenian organizations and of their various political orientation. Other sources show the complexity of this issue pointing out the influence of

communist ideology on some Armenian refugees (Arachelian, 2011, Istrati, 1929); (24) *Armenians saving networks* during deportation, genocide, exile, that helped to reconnect the survivors and return to a safer life; (26) *Feelings toward the lost native cradle, family, cultural capital and homes*; (27) *Relations with the perpetrators – (killing gavūr, i.e. Christian, a sufficient condition for going to heaven)* (testimonies 1, 95, 97); (28) *Emotions experienced during and post-genocide and related to its long term consequences, denial and/or under-evaluation by powerful international actors*: bewilderment, desperation, anger, sadness inclusively suicide by self-burning and throwing oneself into the Euphrates, resilience, hope (testimonies 11, 25, 42, 87, 95, 97, 147, 155, 189, 473, 481, 495, 505); (29) *Reconstructive drive – demographic, cultural, political reconstructive trends*: most of the testimonies refer to a powerful demographic rebuilding tendency exemplified by the number of children (some 4-6 per couple); (30) *Identity resilience and development across generations urging the younger generations to remember the genocide (1915-1923) connecting the survival of the Armenian nation with living memory, using the names of the martyrs as anchoring names for the new generations, striving for the complete recognition of the genocide*. This represents a strong theme across almost all testimonies. It is supported by other studies on the Armenian genocide that are focused on the forcible separation of children from their biological, social, cultural and religious cradle and the efforts to reverse this violent acculturation process (Ekmekçioğlu, 2016). It is also supported by studies on “*perceived collective continuity*” (Sani, Bowe, Herrera, Manna, Cossa, Miao & Zhou, 2007), “*trans-generational groups*” (eternal group, Kahn, Klar & Roccas, 2017). The collective solidarity during long historical periods that starts with the birth event of a collective actor (a nation) seems to be strongly activated by existential threats to the group’s bio-cultural survival. Due to the context of global communication it is assumed that any public presentation of a significant open collective historic wound as it is the Armenian genocide that is not officially acknowledged yet by the Turkish government and by at least some 80 major international actors (countries) will trigger other recuperating actions that will become more vocal on the global scene. It seems that it is not by chance that the only country with a significant Islamic/Muslim population which recognized the genocide, out of the total of 28 countries who acknowledge officially

the genocide, is Lebanon, which has had and still does a significant Armenian population. Studies on the causes and effects of *moral shock* carried by Wisneski & Skitka (2017) are highly significant for historical issues too. Wisneski & Skitka (2017) show that the effects of the moral shock are mediated by disgust and not by anger (pp. 146-147). The question is: what might be the effect of the moral shock of common people who are exposed for the first time to history skeletons closets whose existence is denied by many official political actors?

An empirical research on the Armenian genocide carried out in Romania in April 2016 as a Master thesis (Grigore, 2016) on 10 members of the Bucharest Armenian community found that none of the interviewed individuals from the Armenian community “have any personal relationships with members of the Turkish community” (p. 35). The distance between the Turkish and Armenian communities in Romania might be surprising if we considered the study of Travers & Milgram (1969) on the number of moves (hops) necessary to reach a person at thousand miles distance which suggests that in six hops (through indirect personal contacts starting with a known person) one could reach anybody. The fact that there is no personal contact between members of the two communities in Romania, if confirmed by other studies, indicate the huge gap between the descendants of those involved in the 1915 events: denial is the obstacle that stands in the way of normal personal relationships.

**Memories and records of macro-historical events and collective bystanders’ actions.** There is evidence, at last for the case of the Armenian Genocide and synchronic events, that the chances of collective memory to reactivate knowledge on old events is highly dependent on the mode (accuracy, frequency and time of public presentation) in which such events are represented for the common audience (Mamali, Kivu, Kutnik, 2017). A highly important variable within this context is the behavior (decision on the spectrum recognition versus denial of the genocide) of official collective bystanders, mainly governments. Up to present only 29 such collective actors recognized the Armenian Genocide. Taking into account the landmark studies on the bystander phenomenon ((Darley & Latané 1968; Latané & Darley, 1968; Latané, &



Darley, 1969; Latané, & Darley, 1970; Latané, & Nida 1981; Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz & Darley, 2002) that applies mainly to short term emergencies with few actors as discussed in a previous study (Mamali, 2017), the transition from short-term emergencies with a few actors to a long-lasting critical situation – such as genocide and its denial – brings important changes to the bystander effect (Nida, 2018). Such changes are associated with the dynamics of individual and societal memories. As argued in the same study (2017) the specific features of the bystander phenomenon in the case of long-term emergency produced by the denial of a genocide that implies official collective actors increase tremendously the possible consequences of non-intervention on **immoral development at the global level**. Garcia suggests that the *diffusion of responsibility* changes qualitatively as we move from individual bystanders to collective bystanders: “diffusion of responsibility may actually explain the effect at a national level – UK could be diffusing responsibility of commenting to other countries (in addition to other political mechanisms and social mechanisms from the fields of political science and sociology, for example)” (Garcia, 2018). Such striking dissonances go beyond cognitive processes and involve moral and political processes. In some cases, such dissonances can be enhanced by the attitude reversals produced at the top of the political pyramid. For instance, this is obvious in the social, political and moral distance between Churchill’s attitude toward the 1915 genocide and the implicit attitude of many authority figures, including Prince Charles, who participated in 2015 in the commemoration of the Gallipoli battle but remained silent on the Armenian Genocide. Winston Churchill has the great merit of having condemned the atrocities against the Armenians in strong terms, stating that due to a policy that had been planned and executed “the clearance of a race from Asia Minor was about as complete as such an act on a scale so great could well be (1929, p. 405)”. It was also Churchill who proposed in December 1915 the use of the “poison gas” against the Turkish forces. Regardless of the present political position of any collective bystander the distances between the two perspectives is a powerful source of dissonance and invites many questions from all those who might come across such records as parts of societal memory. Also, despite the fact that it is reasonable to assume, as

McCauley suggested, “Memory of a genocide is greater in countries physically located nearer to the country in which genocide occurred” (McCauley, 2017), studies on Romanian national representative samples (Mamali, 2016) clearly suggest that individual and societal memories of genocide are not always higher in the countries that are close to the tragedy. This is a puzzling situation.

The denial of crimes against humanity, besides crimes as such, is not just a sign of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999, 2016) but also an indicator of *possible immoral development* (Mamali, 2016) and a serious warning sign for the global moral state. There are studies that suggest that while trying to cope with difficult moral issues there is a possibility of moral expansiveness (Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 2016; Crimston, Horney, Bain & Bastian, 2017). The Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) can be used to generate an aggregate score that “can be a powerful predictor of altruistic decision making... MES predicted the willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest” (Crimston et al., 2017, p. 15). Unfortunately none of the previous studies did look at what MES can tell us in the case of social actors who deny or recognize the Armenian Genocide. Also, despite the fact that moral expansiveness is a desirable process in the case of the long term-denial by perpetrators and collective bystanders (Mamali, 2017) of the Armenian Genocide the chances of a dangerous acceleration of immoral development are increasing.

I assume it is highly probable that these types of dissonances, which involve official collective bystanders, might stimulate questions focused on the societal moral emergency grounded in the existential gravity of the genocide as such as well as in its long-term denial. The long-term denial of the genocide, besides its intrinsic immoral character, might be an influential factor that stimulates immoral development at the global level.

It would be an over-simplification to consider that individual and societal memories take only linguistic forms. The past with its various traces and intentional records is captured also by iconic representations that might be part of inter-cultural interactions (Rúsen, 2004). Cross-cultural images are important components of inter-ethnic, inter-religious, inter-nations relationships, as Leerssen (2007) suggests. At the same time they are

rooted in history and can also shape the interaction among collective actors. Regardless of their form and origins, individual and societal memories are sources for the interrogative drive of actors from different generations and social spaces. Each of the above types of traces, records, memories are potential sources, via the dissonances implied, of interrogative trends. This project ideally aims to study each of them. For instance, it aims to explore the questions that can be generated by individuals when they have the chance to deal with the distance between the declarations of individual and collective official representatives on the 1915 events at a given moment and the actions and declarations of the same actors later on. This article cannot, however, approach all these sources and will instead focus on the core theme.

### **Hypotheses and methods**

*Hypotheses: a) perceived dissonances among various records on the 1915 genocide will trigger questions; b) the questioning potential will be strongly enhanced by the accurate basic knowledge, i.e., those participants who possess a basic historical knowledge will generate more questions, on a wider significant problematic spectrum than those who lack basic accurate historical knowledge (the collective actors involved and the size of the lethal violence).*

*Method and participants.* The main empirical method used in the present study is the technique of self-inquiry. I developed it in the late 1960's and beginning of the 70's and discussed it with Gh. Zapan and H.H. Stahl. It is a technique designed to activate the natural observer status of every person. It proved to be reliable also within repressive contexts (as Romania under communism) and in the case of social problems that are associated with radically different representations by different actors (questions addressed to former President of the USA Barack Obama in a study on values). The non-directive technique, self-inquiry (Mamali, 1972, 1982) puts the participants in the position to generate questions instead of answering the researcher's pre-established questions. It keeps a balance between the two major actors (Turks and Armenians) by reversing their order in the two forms of the technique in

order to avoid any possible influence of the order of the topics (actors included) toward which questions are oriented. Self-inquiry has three major levels: (a) the impersonal self-inquiring level, focused only on the problem that includes the two opposite representations on the events of 1915; (b) interpersonal inquiry oriented toward specific social actors and roles. This has two distinct phases. In the first phase the instructions orient the questioning potential toward past political leaders (active during the 1915 events). In the second phase the instructions orient the questions toward political leaders who are contemporary with the respondents; (c) directed self-inquiry, self-addressed questions (*Appendix 2*). Self-inquiry was applied in face to face situations (N = 268 respondents in the U.S.A. and Romania) on convenience samples. In the present study only the first sample will be used. The technique was also applied by M. Kivu by resorting to Facebook – but this part of the study is still in progress and is not used here. In addition to this the project includes a survey based on the work by Liu and collaborators (2007) on collective remembering, which investigated the rank order of authority figures (including political leaders) who were considered to have a strong impact (either positive or negative) in the last 1000 years and the degree to which such historical figures might be admired (two distinct criteria) as done in Liu's study. The present project explores how the historical impact and the degree of admiration for the same figures are represented in other cultures (see *Annex 2* for a few examples of answers).

*Findings.* The findings regarding the questioning potential activated by proposing to the participants to express their own questions on the 1915 events point out that this is indeed rich (See *Annex*). The invitation to generate questions was accepted by 81% of the participants to a convenience sample (volunteers, no material reward for participation, snowball approach). The procedure, as previously indicated, followed the following sequence: a) all participants answered the short questionnaire focused on basic historical knowledge about the events of 1915 to see if they can identify accurately the pair of actors involved in those events (Ottoman Turks vs. Armenians); b) the two groups (accurate answers *vs.* wrong answers) received the self-inquiry techniques with six different inquiring targets: impersonal (only the tragic events were presented as

the explicit questioning target); Turkish authorities in power in 1915; Armenian authorities in power in 1915; Turkish authorities in power today; Armenian authorities in power today; explicitly self-directed questions. The findings do show that those who provided accurate answers express a strong inquiring tendency (higher number of questions) at least in three ways: (1) *total number of generated questions* ( $\chi^2 = 48.687$ ,  $p < .001$ ); (2) *number of questions directed toward specific actors* ( $\chi^2 = 52.779$ ,  $p < .001$ ); (3) *number of self-directed questions* ( $\chi^2 = 28.433$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Even those who did not provide basic accurate answers on the 1915 events showed a high questioning potential (37.6% of the participants with wrong answers regarding the pair of collective actors involved in the 1915 events generated over 10 questions). This seems to show that in the present cultural and political context the 1915 events create a strong dissonance in the minds of people who, once faced with the problem, might look for information that can reduce the uncertainty, and provide some kind of cognitive closure. I take into account that this need might be very different for those who belong to the perpetrators' category and those who belong to the victims' category.

Regarding the part of the study which looks at real ranks (impact and admiration) in public representation of various historical figures within their culture of origin (example: Gandhi's impact assessed by Indians) and the representation of the same rank order by people from other cultures (Gandhi's impact as seen by American participants), the comparison was stimulated by the seminal researches initiated by J. Liu. I will present just one issue that refers to K. Atatürk, based on only one out of more convenience samples (U.S.A., 2007,  $N = 318$ , 59% females, average age 26.4). The data reveal an obvious difference, as expected, between the representations of the impact of various historical figures on World History and the degree of admiration (versus rejection) of the ingroup (insiders), *i.e.*, Turkish, and outgroup (outsiders), *i.e.* American, participants.

*Ingroup versus outgroup representations of historical impact  
of attitudes toward historical figures*

*Ingroup (insiders)*

**1. Impact (good or bad) of historical figures in the last 1000 years of World History**

**Real ranking (Liu) provided by**

**Turkish participants**

Rank I Atatürk

Rank II Hitler

Rank III Sultan Mehmed II

*Outgroup (outsiders)*

**Guessed ranking for the same figures**

**expressed by USA participants for Turkey**

0.9% had the same representation (guess) (VI)

83% had the same representation (guess) (I)

2.2% had the same representation (guess) (V)

**2. Degree of admiration (the most admired figures) in the last 1000 years of World History**

**Real ranking (Liu) provided by**

**Turkish participants**

Rank I Atatürk

Rank II Sultan Mehmed II

Rank III (Thomas Edison, Bill Gates)

**Guessed ranking of historical figures**

**expressed by USA participants for Turkey**

Rank I. Mother Teresa (85%)

Rank II. Bill Gates (47.8%)

Rank III. Thomas Edison (30.8%)

These explorative research data suggest that there is a high discrepancy between the way in which Mustafa Kemal-Atatürk, founder of post-Ottoman Empire Turkey, is represented within the Turkish society, by Turkish people, and how he is represented by participants from a different culture (the USA). These findings must be explored systematically through representative samples. However, they point out a possible powerful source of cross-cultural social dissonance that is able to trigger the interrogative force.

## Conclusions

It seems that there is a strong need for closure (cognitive but also with political and moral motives), or so it emerges from 14 out of the 30 themes of the testimonies (Svazilan, 2011) provided by survivors of the 1915 genocide as well as from the questions generated by the participants in the present research. The need for closure, on both sides of this historic conflict, is marked by a deep cognitive, political and moral conflict. *The postponement of a closure is aggravating this open historic wound and represents a negative model not just for moral disengagement of various collective actors, more or less powerful, in relation to crimes against*

*humanity but, hypothetically, increases the chances of immoral development at the global level.* The findings regarding the questioning potential that is activated in the common person by the Armenian genocide suggest an important area for future participatory action research. The great number of questions generated by participants of all ages and walks of life, races, ethnicity and religions underscore the importance of the “moral capital” and the costs of denial, as defined by Frederic. Denial of crimes of such a magnitude as the genocide suffered by the Armenians (in 1915-1923, and during the massacres of 1896) turns the problem of its costs into a global moral challenge. It might also represent a chance to increase what Volhardt (2016, p. 113) named “global mindedness”.

The fact that nowadays the Internet offers access to previously inaccessible information while denial continues to function and the official acknowledgment of the genocide by many powerful nations remains yet to be completed creates a global risk for what might be called *the global moral capital*. If the moral deficit (could we imagine an International Moral Bank?) is going to increase we should expect that the immoral collective behaviors will increase too.

Individual and societal memories are not the same. Moreover, not all memories (individual and societal) are equal (accuracy, persistence over time, vividness, action potential). A landmark study carried by Roediger & Karpicke (2006), which has been recently reviewed due to its high impact on the field (Roediger & Karpicke), strongly suggests that memorization of the same information after testing is much more resilient and accurate than the memorization that follows mere repetition, even as preparation for a test. This invites to a further exploration of the persistence of the vivid memories of survivors and their close relatives (Svazlian, (2004, 2011) versus bookish memories of genocides. In addition, it invites to a further assessment of the consequences of publicly applied knowledge tests on enhancing the ability to recall tragic events. The up to present studies on the accuracy of basic historical knowledge on the Armenian genocide suggest that public testing, in its various forms, of knowledge on mega-violent events can be a reliable pathway toward remembering, questioning and recognition. Persistent denial is associated not just with moral disengagement (Bandura, 2002, 2016) but with a lethal process of immoral development

(Mamali, 2016), which implies, with a high probability, a process of deeper and accelerated immoral engagement. In relation to the Armenian Genocide as in relation to any other genocide, the persistence of individual and societal remembering facilitates the bonding of recognition forces while the persistence of individual and societal forgetting is supporting the bonding of denial forces. There is a solidarity of remembering as well as one of forgetting. It seems that as the collision between these two opposite forces becomes more visible in the public space, the interrogative tendencies will increase as well, as will the active search for answers and solutions.

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
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## .ANNEX 1

*Levels of self-inquiry*

*Examples of generated questions. (The instructions are reproduced only for the first case, afterwards the instructions for each level are replaced by numbers (1-6). The orientation (Turks/Armenian has been reversed for half of the participants, but for clarity the reproduction is done in the same order (Male, 25, white, no religion, US citizenship)*

**1. Impersonal level of self-inquiry:**

Who are the people who provided historical knowledge on [the] Armenian genocide?  
 Did they experience anything first hand?  
 Which side were they on?  
 What age and what gender [were they]?  
 How would a historical source's bias affect his information?  
 How do you balance the variety of anecdotes with accurate statistics?

**2. Socially oriented level of self-inquiry - toward the Armenian authorities and persons who were in charge in 1915:**

None

**3. Socially oriented level of self-inquiry - toward the Turkish (Ottoman) authorities and persons who were in charge in 1915:**

To people used as first hand [providers of] accounts:

What side were you on?

What was your age?

Where [were] your words translated to another language?

What did you see?

What events led to the genocide?

**4. Socially oriented level of self-inquiry: toward the Armenian authorities and persons who discuss *today* the 1915 events:**

To present day Armenians:

Were you related to anyone who was killed in the genocide?

How do you feel about it?

What are your historical sources?

**5. Socially oriented level: toward the Turkish authorities and persons who discuss *today* the 1915 events:**

To modern day Turkish people:

Are you related to anyone involved?

Do you know any Armenians personally?

What are your own sources of information?

**6. Level of explicitly *self-focused inquiry* on 1915 events (questions directed to "your own self"):**

What are my sources?

Do I have any biases to examine?

**(Male, 25, 13 years of education, ethnicity – French-German, US citizenship)**

1. What are the names of the leaders involved?

What weapons were used?

2. What are the Armenians' names?

Why did this conflict happen?

Could you have avoided this conflict?

Do you think you did the right thing?

2. What are the important figures involved?

Who were the leaders?

What were some of the Turkish laws?

What are [were] the Ottoman laws in place against the people?

3. What are your lessons?

Was it worth it?

What negative effects happened?

Knowing the outcome would you do it all over again?

4. Was it worth it?

What other option did you have?

How did [this] effect [affect] your economy?

5. Would I [have] acted differently?

What would you do?

Could you find a better outcome?

Is your understanding of the topic enough for you to make a rashinal [rational] decision?

**(Female, 19, 14 years of education, race – African-American, US citizenship)**

1. Explain the differences between the Turkish and Armenians

What are the Turkish rulings?

What are the Armenian rulings?

When did this happen?

Where did this happen?

Why did this happen?

Why was violence between the two?

2. How did you feel about the violent behavior the Turkish [Turks] brought upon you?

Why did the [they] dislike the Armenian ruling?

Would you have responded in a different way if possible?

3. Why were you angry with the Armenians?

Did this conflict with the Armenians destroy your empire in any way?

Would you have considered solving the problem in a different way?

4. Why were you not prepared for a fighting?

Did this change the way the Armenian people rule their empire?

How bad did this affect the Armenian empire?

5. Why were you angry with the Armenians?

Why did you kill them?

Why you did not solve the problem in a different way?

Did you think about all the lives you killed or could have killed?

6. How could you learn about this issue?

Why would you learn about it?

Why is this important?

**(Male, 25, 13 years of education, ethnicity – American, US citizenship, no religion)**

1. Has been any trial held at world court level based on the inhumane atrocities committed against the Armenians by the Turkish empire?

The ninth world congress of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation made the decision to track down and execute the most culpable Ottoman leaders in a covert undertaking. By the end of 1922 dozens of Turkish leaders were brought to justice.

Has been any resolution between the Turks and Armenians in later years?

There has not been an opening of the international border or establishment of full diplomatic relations, but there is a feeling of collaboration between the two nations.

2. What have you done to protect your people?

Is it worth your people's lives to continue fighting for the territory?

Directed towards: Daniel Varoujan, Armenian poet

3. Who was the Turkish leader who carried out genocide against the Armenians?

"The Young Turks".

Why have you committed [committed] such a distasteful act?

To "Turkify" the empire. To rid our country of infidels.

Directed towards the "Young Turks", responsible for the Armenian genocide.

4. Do you feel justice has been achieved?

Are you satisfied or you think more should be done?

Are your [you] friends with the President of Turkey?

Yes, I [he] sent a letter of condolences on the recent terrorist attack that took place in Istanbul on June 28<sup>th</sup>.

Directed towards: Serzh Sargsyan, President of Armenia

5. Have you come to a peace agreement with the Armenians?

I don't believe this so. There are many Armenians that still label it a genocide.

Germany is blackmailing us with the events that occurred.

Have you educated your people of the criminal injustice that is genocide?

I think the news of it all has educated them enough. We haven't committed any form of genocide.

Directed towards: Recep T. Erdogan, president of Turkey

6. What have I learned from this research?

I have learned the importance of awareness on world issues. I have learned more horrifying occurrences of genocide. Also, that some countries may never find peace together in this world. It's disappointing that we are considered the most intelligent beings yet we are so quick to act as cavemen.

Is there anything I can learn about myself from this research?

I've learned to work on the better side of myself to maintain good reputation and more importantly be at peace with my conscious [conscience].

**(Female, 36, 15 years of education, ethnicity Mexican, US citizenship, atheist)**

1. What caused of this conflict?
2. After so many people were killed how you do not vocalize the heavy loss of life because of your revolution for human rights?
3. How were the Armenians viewed as a whole before the conflict started?  
Were the Armenians pushing or their rights in an appropriate manner or did the police/authorities act violently?  
How were there so many people killed while the authorities didn't respect the people of the land?  
Why would you try to act violently against human rights in a land that you are relatively new compared to people residing there?
4. What actions do you take now to heal these wounds?
5. Did you ask for forgiveness?
6. How was I unaware of this genocide even though I like/understand a good amount of history?  
Were any neighboring countries able to save some of the people fleeing from the land?  
Was this genocide shadowed by the atrocity of the genocide of the Jews committed by the Nazis because of the scale?  
How can so many people be unaware that this happened and why is this not taught regularly in the classroom?  
**(Male, 26, white, 17 years of education, ethnicity – German, US citizenship, Catholic)**

1. I have never heard of this event until I read this packet.  
What was the eve called?  
Where did it take place?  
When did it take place?  
Who was involved?  
What were the sides' motives?  
What actions did each take?  
What were significant turning points?  
Where [did] this information get documented?  
Are we sure these events were recorded accurately?  
What were the results of the event?  
How did they affect everyone?

2. How did this event affect you all?  
What part did you play?  
What were your orders?  
Authorities - representatives: did you try peaceful motives first?  
Authorities – representatives: were your initial methods effective?  
All: do you think more could have been done?  
All: how do you feel about the outcome?
3. All: what part did you play in this?  
All: how do you feel about the outcome?  
Authorities: what were your orders?  
Authorities: what methods did you use first?  
Authorities: were they peaceful?  
All: do you think more could have been done?  
All: how do you feel about the outcome?  
Authorities: did you agree with all of your orders?
4. All: do you feel today's records are accurate?  
All: do you feel you were represented accurately?  
Authorities: do you feel you got the credit you deserve?  
Representatives: do you feel enough people know this event?  
All: do you feel that this event needs to be taught in schools?  
Authorities: do you think people previously in your position should have done things differently?
5. All: do you feel you were represented correctly?  
All: do you feel that the records are inaccurate?  
Authorities: do you think you were given the credit you deserve?  
Representatives: is there anything you would have altered?  
All: do you think [that the representation on] this event as a whole is accurate?
6. How much do you know about this event?  
Are you familiar with those involved?  
Do you know what started this conflict?  
Do you understand the outcome of this event?  
Do you want to know about this conflict?  
Do you know where to learn more about this conflict?  
**(Male, 57, white, ethnicity Scottish-French, US citizenship, no religion)**
1. Are there many prior words (before 1915) to help establish the general mood of the two parts?  
Are the Turks known for prior genocides?

2. What was the reason for forming an organization against the Turks?  
Where there specific areas of the [Ottoman] empire where the violence occurred?  
What defenses were used during the battle?
3. How many people were involved?  
When did the first [Armenian] uprising occur?  
What was the response to the uprising?  
How many people were involved?
4. Was the attack in response to prior attack by the Turks?  
How many were killed or wounded?  
Did you go armed against the Turks?
5. Was the attack and the ensuing battle in response to an uprising?  
What is your opinion of the Armenian in this conflict?
6. Do my beliefs of a sovereign state oversee a belief of the Armenians to defend their lands?  
Are the Turks simply trying to maintain law and order or is there an attempt to remove the Armenians?  
How strong was the Turkish control of the empire?  
Were they [Turks] ruling with an iron fist?  
**(Male, 28, ethnicity American, US citizenship, Lutheran)**
1. Which Turkish Sultan stated "I will soon settle those Armenians" in an 1890 interview?  
In 1908, a group of governmental reformers was created in Turkey, what was their name?  
How many Armenians remained in the Ottoman Empire after the genocide was over in 1922?
2. What was the reason of your arrest?  
Do you have a family, if so, when is the last time you have seen them?  
Directed towards: Krikor Zohrab, Armenian writer, politician and lawyer
3. What is your purpose in killing innocent Armenian people?  
Do you think genocide gives a bad reputation for your country?  
Directed towards: "The Young Turks" perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide?
4. What have you done to bring about justice for the events that took place in 1915?  
Have you ever attempted to speak with Recep on the events that took place?  
Directed towards: S. Sargsyan, President of Armenia.

5. Have you come to peaceful terms with the Armenians?  
Have you held any trials to secure justice for the Armenian nation?  
Directed towards Recep T. Erdogan, President of Turkey
6. How can we learn to tolerate others beliefs and live in harmony with them?  
Why do people see violence as a solution?  
**(Female, 63, 12 years+ of education, Caucasian, US citizenship, Christian)**
1. Was the root cause of the conflict based on the Christian Armenian faith vs. the Muslim Ottoman rulers?  
Were the Armenians ever really an independent entity since an empire always controlled the region?  
Did fear of an uprising of the Armenians cause the Ottoman empire to take such a drastic measure of genocide?  
How did the Armenians try to establish their basic rights in the Ottoman empire? Other than protests?  
Were there more Armenians than Turkish in the Ottoman empire?  
How did the surviving Armenians in the Ottoman empire escape the genocide?
2. Prior to the 1915 genocide, it was known that the Ottoman religious authorities had declared jihad against the Armenian Christians. Why did you stay there knowing that they meant to commit genocide against your people? To Armenian rulers.  
Was it pride that caused the Armenian people to stay in their homes etc. –? To Armenian rulers.  
Why were there intellectuals targeted in the genocide first rather than religious leaders? Armenian rulers.
3. Why is still illegal today in Turkey to talk about these events? President of Turkey.  
Were Armenian people who married outside of the Armenian Christian faith targeted? *i.e.* Turkish and Armenian Christian marriages – to Muslim religious leaders.  
What happened to the property of the Christian Armenians who were killed or deported? Ottoman empire financial minister.  
Was this attack on the Armenian Christians based on greed, fear or intolerance of non-Muslim also known as infidels? To ALL parties involved
4. Based on what happened to the Armenian Christians in 1915, do you feel that the underlying feelings have changed towards your people?  
Do you feel it is safe to live in Turkey?  
Do you think that the method used by the Armenian Christians to establish basic rights in the Ottoman empire should have been handled differently?  
All the above to Armenian Christian leaders, religious leaders and civic leaders



5. To Turkish government:

Why is it illegal today in Turkey to talk about what happened in 1915?

Are the Armenians welcome in your country?

To Turkish religious leaders:

How are Christians, who are not of Armenian descent, received in your country?

Is there tolerance for those who are not of the Muslim faith?

6. Are the current facts as we know them written from both perspectives?

Why didn't the Armenians flee the Ottoman empire before the genocide of 1915?

Where do the Armenians who survived the 1915 Genocide now reside?

Did any world powers try to intervene during the genocide?

Did Germany use the same methods, as the Turkish Ottoman Empire, against the Jewish people?

**(Female, 20, American ethnicity, US citizenship, Christian)**

1. What caused the feud between the Turks and the Armenians?

Why would the Turkish government resort to such a violent solution?

Was there no other solution than a mass genocide?

What did the Armenian government do about the genocide?

Why didn't the [Armenian] government do more to prevent the genocide or at least the amount of people lost?

How similar was this genocide to the Holocaust? Both groups of people were raped, starved and treated poorly before death/execution. Both used concentration camps!

How was the genocide implemented?

What was the role religion played during the genocide?

What happened to the individuals responsible for the genocide?

2. Did you have no allies to help prevent the genocide?

What did you do to help the people you govern?

Why was there no better solution than a mass genocide?

Why let the Turkist [Turkish] government start a mass genocide?

What steps did the [Armenian] government take to stop the genocide?

Was the Armenian government planning an attack on the Turkist [Turkish] government before the genocide started?

3. Questions towards the Turkist [Turkish] government:

Why the need to be so violent?

Why not recognize the genocide and admit to having a faulty government back in 1915?

When were you planning to end the genocide?

Was the genocide a means to rid the earth of all Armenians?

Why a genocide?

Why not just murder the people who govern the Armenians?

4. Questions toward Armenian government today:  
How has your government learned from this experience?  
How do you remember April 24<sup>th</sup> 1915 and all the people who were executed?  
What steps has the government taken to prevent another genocide from occurring today?  
How the events of 1915 genocide affected the Armenians today?
5. Questions towards today's Turkist [Turkish] government:  
If you do not recognize the events of the 1915 as a genocide then what do you recognize it as?  
Why not admit to fault and learn from your mistakes?  
How has the events affected the [Turkish] government today?  
Does the Turkist [Turkish] government remember April 24<sup>th</sup> 1915?  
How [does it remember]?
6. Why so violent and deadly? There had to have been an easier / better solution.  
What is so important to fight for that several people died over?  
What has the United States government put in place to prevent genocide from occurring?

## ANNEX 2

Use a 4 digit code and memorize it: - - - -

### Thinking dialogically and critically about cross cultural surveys.

Cătălin Mamali, Ph.D., independent scholar POROI, UI (copy right – June 2007).

#### *Participation is volunteer and confidential*

Survey could be carried out on a variety of topics and their value could be increased by scientific knowledge and by the scientific imagination of the researcher. For instance, it could be applied to cross cultural issues and difficult social and historical questions as did *James H. Liu and his team: Liu, J, Paez, D., Salwuta, P., Cabechinas, R., Sen R., Techio, E., Kodemir, D., Vincz, O., Muluk, H., Wang, F., & Zlobina, A. (2007). Representing World History in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The impact of 9-11, the Iraq War, and the nation-State Dynamic on Collective Remembering. Wellington: Victoria University.* Each wave has been presented step by step on a single page, after participants answered to the previous wave and the answers have been collected.

#### Wave 1

Based on previous studies (Liu, 1999, 2005) on social representations focused on New Zealand history the researchers asked a few questions such as: **“Write down the names of 5 people born in the last 1,000 years whom you consider to have had the**

most impact, good or bad, on World History. When you are done, circle a number from 1 to seven to indicate how much you admire each of them". The scale endpoints range from: Don't admire at all/Very negative" to "Admire greatly/Very Positive).

Name of the 5 people born in the last 1,000 years whom you consider to have had the most impact, good or bad, on the World History	Rank the first 3 people (I – III) according to the size/magnitude of their impact on the World History (write close to the name I for the most, II for the second, III for the third impact)	Indicate how much you admire each of them:  1 = Don't admire At All  7 = Admire Greatly
-----	Not At All	Admire Greatly
-----	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
-----	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
-----	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
-----	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
-----	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	

Use the same for-digit number - - - -

Wave 2

Out of the 12 cultures studied by the researchers we are going to select only 6 cultures and present to you some results. **Your first task is to select out of a real list of 6 people the first 3 according to their impact on World History who were selected by the participants in the respective culture. There were selected 6 different cultures. Try to guess the answers of the participants from each respective culture who were all college students as you:**

Write in parenthesis your own guess for people with most impact on World History (1 = the most impact to 6 = the 6<sup>th</sup> rank order impact).

People with the most impact on World History in the last 1000 years. Be 100% sure that **all the people mentioned in the lists were named among the first 10 people with the most important impact on World History** by participants from the respective cultures.

<i>China</i>	<i>Your Guess</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Your Guess</i>	<i>Russia</i>	<i>Your Guess</i>
Newton	( )	Mother Teresa	( )	Czar Ivan IV	( )
Confucius	( )	Lincoln	( )	Napoleon	( )
Mao	( )	Osama bin Laden	( )	Hitler	( )
Einstein	( )	Gandhi	( )	Stalin	( )
Hitler	( )	Subhas C. Bose	( )	Boris Yeltsin	( )
Den Xiaoping	( )	Hitler	( )	Lenin	( )

<i>Poland</i>	<b>Your Guess</b>	<i>Turkey</i>	<b>Your Guess</b>	<i>Spain</i>	<b>Your Guess</b>
Columbus	( )	Mother Teresa	( )	Martin Luther	( )
Pope John Paul II	( )	Hitler	( )	Gandhi	( )
Stalin	( )	Kemal Ataturk	( )	Pope John Paul II	( )
Mother Teresa	( )	Bill Gates	( )	Franco	( )
Hitler	( )	Sultan Mehmed II	( )	Columbus	( )
Copernicus	( )	Thomas Edison	( )	Hitler	( )

Use the same four digit number - - - -

Wave 3

Your next task is to select out of a real list of 6 people the first 3 according to the degree in which they are ADMIRER by the participants in the respective culture. We present the cultures in alphabetic order. Try to guess the answers of the participants from each respective culture:

Write in parenthesis your own guess for people, from the last 1,000 years, who are most admired (1 = most admired; 2 = secondly admired; 3 = thirdly admired) by participants from the respective culture. Take care the list of admiration does not repeat exactly the least of impact. Impact and admiration are different things.

Be 100% sure that all the people mentioned in the lists were named by the participants from the respective cultures.

<i>China</i>	<b>Your Guess</b>	<i>India</i>	<b>Your Guess</b>	<i>Russia</i>	<b>Your Guess</b>
Newton	( )	Mother Teresa	( )	Stalin	( )
Confucius	( )	Lincoln	( )	Napoleon	( )
Mao	( )	Shivaj Bhonsle	( )	Vladimir Putin	( )
Einstein	( )	Gandhi	( )	Peter the Great	( )
Zhou Enlai	( )	Subhas C. Bose	( )	Mikhail Kutuzov	( )
Den Xiaoping	( )	Bhagat Singh	( )	Lenin	( )

<i>Poland</i>	<b>Your Guess</b>	<i>Turkey</i>	<b>Your Guess</b>	<i>Spain</i>	<b>Your Guess</b>
Columbus	( )	Mother Teresa	( )	Martin Luther	( )
Pope John Paul II	( )	Turgut Ozal	( )	Gandhi	( )
Lech Wlesla	( )	Kemal Ataturk	( )	Pope John Paul II	( )
Mother Teresa	( )	Bill Gates	( )	Che Guevara	( )
Einstein	( )	Sultan Mehmed II	( )	Einstein	( )
Copernicus	( )	Thomas Edison	( )	Mother Teresa	( )

Use the same 4 digit number: - - - -

Wave 4a

Here are the real results (rank order) of the cross cultural study:

The first 3 people with **most impact on World History** in the last 1,000 selected by participants from the following cultures:

<i>China</i>	<b>Real results</b>	<i>India</i>	<b>Real results</b>	<i>Russia</i>	<b>Real results</b>
Mao	(1)	Gandhi	(1)	Hitler	(1)
Hitler	(2)	Hitler	(2)	Stalin	(2)
Einstein	(3)	Osama bin Laden	(3)	Lenin	(3)
<i>Poland</i>	<b>Real results</b>	<i>Turkey</i>	<b>Real results</b>	<i>Spain</i>	<b>Real results</b>
Hitler	(1)	Kemal Ataturk	(1)	Hitler	(1)
Stalin	(2)	Hitler	(2)	Franco	(2)
Pope John Paul II	(3)	Sultan Mehmed II	(3)	Gandhi	(3)

**Your comments (compare your guess with the real results):**

#### Wave 4b

Here are the results regarding **the most admired people in World History** the last 1,000 years by participants from the following cultures:

<i>China</i>	<b>Real results</b>	<i>India</i>	<b>Real results</b>	<i>Russia</i>	<b>Real results</b>
Zhou Enlai	(1)	Subhas C. Bose	(1)	Vladimir Putin	(1)
Den Xiaoping	(2)	Bhagat Singh	(2)	Peter the Great	(2)
Einstein	(3)	Mother Teresa	(3)	Mikhail Kutuzov	(3)
<i>Poland</i>	<b>Real results</b>	<i>Turkey</i>	<b>Real results</b>	<i>Spain</i>	<b>Real results</b>
Pope John Paul II	(1)	Kemal Ataturk	(1)	Gandhi	(1)
Mother Teresa	(2)	Sultan Mehmed II	(2)	Mother Teresa	(2)
Einstein	(3)	Thomas Edison	(3)	Martin Luther	(3)
		Bill Gates	(3)	Che Guevara	(3)

**Your comments (compare your guess with the real results):**

#### Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared that there were no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article.

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