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NATO HUMINT CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

HUMAN ASPECTS IN AFGHANISTAN



HANDBOOK

ORADEA

- 2013 -

NATO HUMINT CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE



HUMAN ASPECTS IN AFGHANISTAN HANDBOOK

ORADEA 2013



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INTRODUCTION

When I took a decision or adapted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant and many irrelevant factors. Geography, tribal structures, religion, social customs, languages, appetites, standards, all were at my fingerprints.

Lawrence of Arabia

The Human Aspects of the Operational environment in Afghanistan Handbook was created as part of a broader project, “*Human Aspects of the Operational Environment (HAOE)*”, under the coordination of the Emerging Security Challenges Division / NATO HQ. The project aims to provide a comprehensive introduction to the human aspects in any theatre of operations and was conducted as a series of workshops spanning two years.

There are many country books, studies and reports, within and outside NATO community, that provide basic/specific information about Afghanistan. This handbook fuses information from the most relevant ones, adding the unique perspective and experience of eight contributors with various Afghanistan backgrounds.

The aim of this handbook is to present essential information concerning the Afghan population and patterns of life. The publication can help the NATO / ISAF community to better understand the Afghans and is recommended as part of the pre-deployment training. It is not a sociological study and does not intend to turn its readers into experts on Afghan society; instead it familiarizes them with those parts of the Afghan culture most likely to influence the operations on the ground.

This document provides direct support to the ISAF COIN strategy and is for official use only.

HISTORY

Overview

Afghanistan's history, its political development, the foreign relations, and its very existence as an independent state have largely been determined by its geographic location. Afghanistan is located at the crossroads of Central, Western, and Southern Asia. Migrating groups have passed through the region over the centuries and have left behind a blend of ethnic and linguistic influences. Evidence of human habitation of Afghanistan dates back to 50,000 B.C. Artefacts indicate that the people were small farmers and herdsman, as they are today, very probably grouped into tribes, with small local kingdoms rising and falling through the ages. Afghanistan has also seen its share of vast armies passing through and establishing temporary local control when necessary.

Urban civilization on the Iranian plateau, which includes most of Iran and Afghanistan, may have begun as early as 3,000 to 2,000 B.C. However, little is known about the area before the middle of the first millennium B.C., when its history began to be recorded during the Achaemenid Empire.

Early Conquests

The first of the conquerors who marched into Afghanistan was Darius the Great, who in 500 B.C. expanded the Achaemenid/Persian Empire as far east as the Kabul-Jalalabad-Peshawar area. The Achaemenids were enlightened rulers who permitted some regional autonomy through the creation of 20 separate provinces throughout the empire. A 2,500 kilometres road linked the provinces and, using relays of mounted couriers, the most remote areas of the empire could be reached in fifteen days.

Alexander the Great also marched through the territory of today's Afghanistan in 329 B.C., extending his own empire to the northernmost and easternmost parts. Alexander had to fight against the local inhabitants for every bit of territory that he gained.

The next major invasion of Afghanistan was in the 1st century B.C. The Kushans, a loose union of five central Asian nomadic tribes, took Afghanistan from the Greeks and held the power over the area for several centuries. At the same time, the Western world established cultural and economic ties with China, and many of the routes of the Silk Road ultimately ran through the Afghan area. The Silk Road carried Buddhism northward from India.

Arabs first brought Islam into Afghanistan in the seventh century A.D. and within one hundred years from the Prophet Mohammed's death—in 632—they had established a new Muslim empire that reached as far as Spain in the west and Central Asia and India in the east. Although, even the well-established Persians fell under the Muslim Arab influence, the Arab Empire borrowed much from the Persians, in the same way that the Roman Empire was influenced by the conquered Greeks. However, by the 10th century, the rule of the Arab Abbasid dynasty and its successor in Central Asia, the Samanid dynasty, had crumbled. The Ghaznavid dynasty, an offshoot of the Samanids, then became the first great Islamic dynasty to rule in Afghanistan.




Figure 1: Persian Empire

Various Empires

For the next several centuries, Afghanistan was under the power of one conqueror or another¹. Genghis Khan marched through today's Afghanistan in 1220, conquering (and destroying) as he went. After his death, some local chiefs established independent principalities, while others remained under Mongol rule. This situation continued until the end of the 14th century, when Tamerlane (also known as Timur)², a Central Asian Turk, conquered a large part of the country as part of the empire he established from India to the Mediterranean. Afghanistan remained fragmented until the 1380s, when Tamerlane consolidated his empire and since then it was ruled by his descendants until the early 16th century.

In 1504, the region fell under a new empire, the Mughals³ of northern India, who fought over Afghan territory with the Persian Safavi Dynasty over the next two centuries. In the 16th century, Babur, a descendant of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, made Kabul the capital of an independent principality. He went on to capture Kandahar in 1522 and in 1526 he established the Mughals Empire, which lasted until the middle of the 19th century. The Mughals Empire included the entire eastern Afghanistan south of the Hindu Kush.

Even while under the Mughals Empire, the native Afghan Pashtun tribes were beginning to gain power and exercise influence over increasing areas. In the 18th century, one of these tribal confederations, the Durrani, was granted authority over their homelands around present-day Kandahar. In 1747, following the decline or collapse of those regional empires, Afghanistan reverted to a feudal structure under the military prowess of Ahmad Shah Durrani⁴. He formed a

¹ During this time, modern-day Afghan territories were merely peripheral parts of powerful regional empires centred in Persia, India, and Central Asia. These were either independent kingdom ungoverned by a central power, or locally autonomous principalities that paid tribute to a political centre. For example, Herat and the west of present-day Afghanistan were tied culturally and politically to Persia; Kandahar and the south shifted between Persia and India; Central Asia dominated Balkh and the north; and in the east, the Afghan capital rotated between Kabul, Afghanistan's modern capital, and Peshawar, situated in present-day Pakistan. The Afghans eventually lost Peshawar to the Sikhs in 1834.

² Tamerlane (1336 - 1405), his Turkic name is Timur, which means 'iron'. From 1370 till his death in 1405, Timur built a powerful empire.

³ Also known as Mogul (or Moghul) in traditional English usage

⁴ Ahmad Shah was born in 1722 to Muhammed Zaman Khan Abdali, a chief of the Abdalis and governor of Herat, and Zarghuna Alakozai. In 1729, after the invasion of Nader Shah, the young Ahmad Shah fled with his family south to Kandahar and took refuge with the Ghilzais. He and his brother, Zulfikar, were later imprisoned inside a fortress by Hussain Hotaki, the Ghilzai ruler of Kandahar. After conquering Kandahar in 1738, Ahmad Shah and his brother were freed by Nader Shah and provided with leading careers in his administration. The Ghilzais were expelled from Kandahar city. Ahmad Shah

Muslim empire in the mid-18th century that was the second in the area⁵ just behind the Turks' Ottoman Empire. After Ahmad Shah's death, the empire was beset by rebellions on the side of local tribal chiefs, causing Ahmad Shah's son Timur to move the capital from Kandahar to Kabul in 1776.

Ahmad Shah's grandson Zaman seized the throne after his father's death in 1793. Zaman was interested in re-establishing power in India, but the British, who were well established in India by this time, persuaded the Shah of Persia to divert Zaman's attention from India by threatening the western side of his empire. The Shah complied and Zaman hurried back to Afghanistan in 1800 to defend his land. Finally he was defeated by his own brother, who meanwhile has allied with the Shah. This kind of struggle for power – tribe against tribe, family against family, brother against brother – characterizes the intertribal relationships among the Afghans⁶, and continued as their territory became crucial to the interests of the great powers, most notably the Czarist Russia in the north and the British Empire in the south. A century-long contest for domination of Central Asia and Afghanistan began. Although, the Afghan rulers were able to maintain their independence, some compromises were necessary. In the First Anglo – Afghan

became a commander of four thousand Abdali Pashtun soldiers. After the assassination of Nader Shah Afshar of Persia in June 1747, Abdali became the ruler of Khorasan. In October 1747, the chiefs of the Abdali tribes during Loya Jirga near Kandahar unanimously chose Ahmad Shah as leader. Ahmad Shah Durrani began his military conquest by capturing Ghazni from the Ghilzais and then wresting Kabul from the local ruler, and thus strengthened his hold over eastern Khorasan which is most of present-day Afghanistan. In continuous battles he built an extensive empire from Delhi to the Arabian Sea by 1760. Ahmad Shah's empire fragmented after his death, but Dost Mohammad led the Pashtun Muhammadzai tribe and restored order in 1826. Although Ahmad Shah was able to earn the political allegiance of various tribes, his kingdom was more a constellation of independent fiefdoms than anything approaching a cohesive nation state. Ahmad Shah allowed his enemies to govern their territories like vassals, enabling them to maintain their local base of support. Consequently, remote provinces were never fully incorporated during his lifetime and they gradually withdrew after he died. Ahmad Shah was the first Durrani ruler and is known as the founder of the Afghan nation. He united the Pashtun tribes and began a period of Durrani rule in Afghanistan that lasted until 1798.

⁵ Until Ahmad Shah's death in 1772, his kingdom encompassed all of modern-day Afghanistan, extended to Baluchistan and Iranian Khorasan, and included the former Mughal territories of Sindh, Punjab, and Kashmir.

⁶ Durrani's son, Timur, lost control of the fragile kingdom after he failed to name an heir. After his death, the region was gripped by a series of fratricidal wars among patrilineal cousins (*tarburwali*): Zaman Shah came to power in 1793, until his brother, Shah Mahmud, blinded him and gained control. Shah Mahmud reigned to 1800, until another brother, Shah Shuja, deposed him in 1803. In 1809, the year Elphinstone arrived in Peshawar, Shah Mahmud, who had been deposed in 1803, and Fatih Khan, from the Barakzai tribal lineage, gained power. But the two eventually had a falling out, and in 1818, Shah Mahmud had Fatih Khan blinded and cut into pieces. Once again the region devolved into an intense competition that further fractured the empire. Amid the anarchy, Fatih Khan's brother, Dost Mohammad, unseated Shah Mahmud and declared himself emir in 1826.

War (1839 – 1842)⁷, the British ousted Dost Mohammad, but later abandoned their Afghan garrisons in 1842 and Dost Mohammad became the ruler again⁸. However, the First Anglo – Afghan war had unintended consequences and influenced traditional standards of Afghan legitimacy. Before the war, Afghan rulers showered local chiefs with funds and land grants. This powerful patronage network was the glue that held the system together. The British viewed these arrangements as thoroughly corrupt and necessary to be reformed. They abolished the system of redistributive allowances, increased the power of the central government, and reduced the autonomy of local chiefs. Foreign subsidies to Afghan rulers and a banking system to pay for the occupation were combined to create a new set of winners and losers. This reorganization of the state and its finances altered the existing dynamic between the Afghan rulers and their society.

When Dost Mohammad died in 1863, he left behind 27 sons and 25 daughters born by 16 wives, setting the stage for yet another bloody competition to rule the empire. Dost, Mohammed's third son from his favourite wife, Sher Ali, soon have taken power, but in 1866, Sher Ali's brothers, Muhammad Afzal and Muhammad Azam, had joined their forces against him and Muhammad Afzal became emir. After his death a year later, Afzal was replaced by his brother, Muhammad Azam. Then, in 1868, after Sher Ali's son, Muhammad Yaqub Khan, took Kandahar from Muhammad Azam's son, Sher Ali returned to Kabul and ruled for the next ten years. In the following decades, the Russian forces approached the northern border of Afghanistan. In 1878, the British invaded and conquered the most part of Afghanistan in the Second Anglo-Afghan War⁹.

In the beginning of 1880, finding the occupation of Afghanistan financially crippling and the supply lines continuously harassed by the local tribes, the British Empire opened negotiations with Sher Ali's nephew, Abdur Rahman, who had recently returned to Afghanistan after a 12-year exile in Tashkent. Later

⁷ The Russian empire pushed south through Central Asia. The British, who pushed north from the Indus Valley, sought to extend their influence into Afghanistan and to establish the country as a buffer state; however, that ostensibly passive approach produced an expansionist strategy.

⁸ The British plan was to depose *Dost Mohammad* and replace him with *Shah Shuja*. But upon *Shah Shuja*'s return to Kabul in August of 1839, he was received without popular support. Even worse, Afghans began to view his government as a cloak for rule by foreign infidels. By 1840, locals thought the British presence overbearing.

⁹ Renewed British concern over Russian advances in the east prompted the British to occupy Jalalabad in January 1879. But once again, the imposition of direct foreign rule provoked regional revolts, and much like the first Anglo-Afghan War, the British were outmanoeuvred.

on Abdur Rahman Khan¹⁰, declared himself Emir of Kabul¹¹. During the next ten years, he engaged in a series of battles with the tribal leaders, gaining control over area after area until he controlled almost all of the modern Afghanistan¹². Emir Abdur Rahman came to believe that a centralized state and a European-style military would better suppress the tribal uprisings that had driven the British from power. To avert similar attempts to unseat him, the emir ruthlessly eliminated autonomous regional leaders, their feudal clients, and tribal and ethnic opponents.

He accomplished this partially by forcing movements of the rival Pashtuns to non-Pashtun areas north of the Hindu Kush, where their descendents still live¹³. Another of his strategies to divide the tribes was to establish provincial governorships with boundaries that did not coincide with tribal boundaries.

¹⁰ He was the third son of Mohammad Afzal Khan, and grandson of Dost Mohammad Khan. A Durrani Pashtun and a fine soldier he had learned military strategy from a British mentor. He became known as The Iron Emir.

¹¹ At the durbar (the Shah's noble court or a formal meeting where the Shah held all discussions regarding the state) on 22th July, 1880, Abdur Rahman was officially recognized as emir.

¹² However, Ayub Khan, one of Sher Ali Khan's sons, marched upon that city from Herat, defeated Abdur Rahman's troops, and occupied the place in July 1880. This serious reverse roused the emir, who had not at first displayed much activity. He led a force from Kabul, met Ayub's army close to Kandahar, and the complete victory which he there won forced Ayub Khan to fly into Persia. From that time Abdur Rahman was fairly seated on the throne at Kabul, and in the course of the next few years he consolidated his dominion over all Afghanistan, suppressing insurrections by a sharp and relentless use of his despotic authority. The powerful Ghilzai tribe revolted against the severity of his measures several times. In that same year, Ayub Khan made a fruitless inroad from Persia. In 1888, the Emir's cousin, Ishak Khan, rebelled against him in the north; but these two enterprises came to nothing.

¹³ In the late 1880s many of the Hazara tribes revolted against Abdur Rahman, the first ruler to bring the country of Afghanistan under a centralized Afghan government. In 1892 Abdur Rahman's succeeded in finally beating down the resistance of the Hazara people. Consequent on this unsuccessful revolt, numbers of Hazaras fled to Quetta in Baluchistan, in north-eastern Iran, Russia, Iraq, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, China and India. Most active in the revolt were the Uruzgani, the southernmost of the Hazara tribes. Following their defeat a considerable number of Uruzgani left the country, as did many Jaghori (is a major business centre and one of the main districts of Ghazni province in Afghanistan), their nearest neighbours to the northeast. Abdur Rahman could only succeed in subjugating Hazaras and conquering their land when he effectively utilized internal differences within the Hazara community, co-opting sold-out Hazara chiefs into his bureaucratic sales of the enslaved Hazara men, women and children in 1897, the Hazaras remained de facto slaves until King Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan's independence in 1919.

During the period 1895-1896 Abdur Rahman directed the invasion of Kafiristan (is a historical region that covered present-day Nuristan Province) and the forcible conversion of its indigenous peoples to Islam. The region was subsequently renamed Nuristan.

In 1893, the Durand Line was drawn to establish the spheres of influence between Afghanistan and British India. The line was named for Sir Mortimer Durand, who used subtle threats to persuade Abdurrahman to agree with the proposed boundary. The Durand Line was not originally intended as a boundary between Afghanistan and India, but it ultimately became just that and now forms the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Emir's dependency on foreign patronage and his centralization of the Afghan state left behind a ruinous legacy for the country and its people. Funding a state administration and a national army required heavily extractive policies for tax collection. But raising revenue creates risks for rebellion and that reality encouraged Rahman and future Afghan rulers to rely on foreign revenue sources as a way to avoid political conflict with their own people, a dynamic that undercut Afghan sovereignty and the legitimacy of its rulers up to now.

Abdur Rahman's son Habibullah, who ruled from 1901 to 1919, continued his father's administrative reforms and maintained Afghanistan's neutrality in World War I.

Recent History

The Third Anglo-Afghan War (6th May 1919 – 8th August 1919) was part of a long term strategic British-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan and occurred as a consequence of Habibullah double dealing foreign policy towards Russia and Britain¹⁴. On 19th August 1919, Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Rawalpindi, ending the Third Anglo-Afghan War and gaining full independence. Between World Wars I and II, Afghanistan again was a balancing point between two world powers. Habibullah's son, Amanullah that ruled from 1919 to 1929 had manipulated the new British-Soviet rivalry while establishing relations with other major countries.

In 1921, the Afghans concluded a treaty of friendship with the new Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union. Afghanistan became one of the first nations that recognized the Soviet government, and a special relationship evolved between the two governments lasting until December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded this country.

¹⁴ The Great Game was a term for the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia. The classic Great Game period is generally regarded as running approximately from the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. A less intensive phase followed the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Amanullah introduced his country's first constitution in 1923. After King Amanullah returned from Europe in 1928, he brought many Western ideas, including social and cultural changes. His aim was to modernize rapidly the country. These ideas upset the ultra-conservative Shinwari tribe from eastern part of Afghanistan, who began calling for the banishment of Amanullah from Afghanistan. With support from fellow Tajik forces Habibullah Kalakani¹⁵ took advantage of the tribal revolt by the Shinwaris and others. A civil war led to Amanullah abdication on 14th January 1929 and he left into exile in at that time British India¹⁶. His brother Inayatullah Khan became the next king of Afghanistan for few days¹⁷ until Habibullah Kalakani took over. However, Kalakani's¹⁸ nine month's rule was soon replaced by Nadir Khan on 13th October 1929. Zahir Khan was proclaimed King (Shah) on 8th November 1933 at the age of 19, after the assassination of his father Mohammed Nadir Shah¹⁹.

Over the next 40 years a series of cautious and moderate governments under the Afghan monarchy brought political stability to the country, and allowed it to make strides toward modernization and national unity. Always, however, there was resistance to any attempts at social change from the conservative religious elements of the society.

In 1931, the government drew up a constitution, an amalgamation of Turkish, Iranian, and French constitutions overlaid with aspects of the *Hanafi shari'a*²⁰. The constitution established a *loya jirga*²¹, a term used today in

¹⁵ Kalakani, also known as Bache Saqaw, a Kohistani Tajik, was born in the 1890s in the village of Kalakan, north of Kabul.

¹⁶ Amanullah Khan attempted to return to Afghanistan, but he had little support from the people. From British India, the ex-king traveled to Europe and settled in Italy, and later in Switzerland. Meanwhile, Nadir Khan made sure his return to Afghanistan was impossible by engaging in a propaganda war. Nadir Khan accused Amanullah Khan of misbeliever (kufir) with his pro western policies

¹⁷ In the middle of the night, on 14th January 1929, Amanullah Khan handed over his Kingdom to his brother Emir Inayatullah Khan and escaped from Kabul towards Kandahar in the south. Two days later, on 16 January 1929, Kalakani wrote a letter to King Inayatullah Khan to either surrender or prepare to fight. Inayatullah Khan's response was that he had never sought nor wished to be king and agreed to abdicate and proclaim Kalakani as the King on 17th January

¹⁸ Kalakani was executed by hanging on 1st November 1929 along with his brother and ten other rebel leaders

¹⁹ During a graduation ceremony at Kabul high school on 8th November 1933 Nadir Khan was shot to death by Abdul Khaliq during. Abdul Khaliq Hazara was a Hazara student, after the incident was immediately apprehended and later executed after being tortured.

²⁰ The *Hanafi* School is one of the four *Madhhabs* (schools of law) in jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) within Sunni Islam. Among the four established Sunni schools of legal thought in Islam, the *Hanafi* School is one of the oldest and by far, the largest in parts of the world (South Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Turkey).

discussions of future governments in Afghanistan. The constitution left the power in the hands of monarchy, gave judiciary power to religious leaders, and created an economic framework that allowed free enterprise. A national economy had started to develop in the 1930s under the leadership of several entrepreneurs who began small-scale industrial projects.

World War II brought about a slowdown in the development process. During the war, Afghanistan maintained its traditional neutrality.

For the first thirty years King Zahir Khan did not effectively rule, ceding power to his paternal uncles, Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan²² and Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan²³. Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan sanctioned free elections and a relatively free press. Lieutenant-General Mohammad Daoud Khan²⁴ was appointed as Prime Minister in September 1953 in an intra-family transfer of power that involved no violence and became prime minister for the next ten years.

The long-standing division of the *Pashtun* tribes caused tension with Pakistan upon the creation of that state in 1947. Much of the difficulty can be traced to the Durand Line, which unnaturally divides a number of the eastern Afghan *Pashtun* tribes. In response, Afghanistan shifted its foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. In keeping with the agreement of 1921, Daoud Khan turned to the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. The Soviets ultimately became Afghanistan's major aid and trade partner, but shared the stage with the United States. The competition between the superpowers in aid of non-aligned Afghanistan benefited Afghanistan's infrastructure: Its roads and hydroelectric dam systems were in turn funded and directed by the Soviets and Americans. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets also aided Afghanistan in developing ports on the Afghan side of the Amu Darya, opposite railheads on the Soviet side. Goods to and from Afghanistan were transported across the river by steamers and barges pulled by tugboats.

²¹ 'Grand Assembly' or, in modern terms, parliament.

²² Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan (1885-1953) was the elder brother of Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan and Sardar Shah Wali Khan. He governed Afghanistan as Royal Prime Minister from 14th November 1929 until May 1946.

²³ Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan was the Prime Minister of Afghanistan from May 1946 to 7th September 1953 and head of the Liberal Parliament. He was the uncle of Zahir Shah, the King of Afghanistan, from 1933 to 1973, and uncle of President Mohammed Daoud Khan.

²⁴ HRH Prince Mohammed Daoud was the eldest son of the diplomat HRH Prince Mohammed Aziz Khan (1877 – 1933) (an older half-brother of King Mohammed Nadir Shah). He lost his father to an assassination in Berlin in 1933, while his father was serving as the Afghan Ambassador to Germany.

Daoud Khan successfully introduced women into the labour force by allowing them to go unveiled if they wished and by abolishing the practice of secluding them from public view. When religious leaders protested, he challenged them to cite a single verse of the Qur'an specifically mandating veiling. When they continued to resist, he jailed them for a week.

Daoud supported a nationalistic and one-sided reunification of the Pashtun people with Afghanistan, but this would have involved taking a considerable amount of territory from the new nation of Pakistan and was in direct antagonism to an older plan of the 1950s whereby a confederation between the two countries was proposed. The move further worried the non-Pashtun populations of Afghanistan such as the minority Tajik and Uzbek who suspected Daoud Khan's intention was to increase the Pashtun's disproportionate hold on political power²⁵.

In 1961, as a result of Daoud's antagonistic policies and support to militias in areas along the Durand Line, Pakistan closed its borders with Afghanistan on 6th September 1961, causing an economic crisis and greater dependence on the USSR²⁶. In 1962, Daoud sent troops across the international border into the Bajaur region of Pakistan in an attempt to manipulate events in that area and to press the Pashtunistan issue, but the Afghan military forces were routed by Pakistani military. During this period, the propaganda war from Afghanistan, carried on by radio, was relentless.

By 1963, it became clear that neither Daoud Khan nor Ayub Khan, the ruler of Pakistan at that time, would yield; to settle the issue one of them would have to be removed from power. Despite growing criticism of Ayub in Pakistan, his position was generally strong, whereas Afghanistan's economy was suffering. The crisis was finally resolved with the forced resignation of Daoud Khan in March 1963 and the re-opening of the border in May. Pakistan has continued to remain suspicious of Afghan intentions and Daoud's policy has left a negative impression in the eyes of many Tajik tribesmen who felt they were being disenfranchised for the sake of Pashtun nationalism. Muhammad Yousuf, a non-Pashtun, German-educated technocrat who had been minister of mines and industries became prime minister.

²⁵ During that time, the Pashtuns (or Afghans) represented over 80% of the government and held all important ministries, such as the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, Defence and even most of the banks.

²⁶ The USSR became Afghanistan's principal trading partner. Within a few months, the USSR had sent jet airplanes, tanks, heavy and light artillery for a heavily discounted price tag of US\$25 million.

Two weeks after Daoud Khan's resignation, the king appointed a commission to draft a new constitution. In the spring of 1964, he ordered the convening of a *loya jirga*. Although the assemblage of 452 persons was composed primarily of officials who would support the royal line, the *loya jirga* also included members elected from around the entire nation. The new constitution should have liberalized the constitutional monarchy²⁷; however King Zahir's "New Democracy" promised much but delivered little. Daoud Khan seized power again in 1973 in a virtually bloodless coup. His comeback was seen as a welcome return to strongman rule. Leftist military officers assisted in the overthrow. Daoud Khan abolished the 1964 constitution and established the Republic of Afghanistan, with himself as chairman of the Central Committee of the Republic and prime minister. King Zahir Shah left into exile in Rome.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was formed in 1977, and seized control of the government in 1978 with Daoud Khan's assassination. Their Marxist reform programs sparked major rebellions in the country side. In 1979, 80,000 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan to quell the threat of an insurgency.

In the war that followed, groups of Afghan *mujahideen*²⁸ were able to mount a successful guerrilla resistance. The *mujahideen* were comprised mostly of Pashtuns. The struggle also attracted conservative Muslims to the Afghan cause. The United States supported the Afghan rebels, pouring supplies and weapons into the country via Pakistan. The guerrillas kept control of most of the countryside, and the Soviet troops held the cities and those areas near local garrisons. Millions of Afghan civilians fled into Pakistan and Iran to escape the destructive Soviet military campaigns against the insurgency. The Soviet Union agreed to create a neutral Afghan state in 1988 after peace accords were signed between Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Pakistan. After years of futile effort, the Soviet Union withdrew its 100,000 troops from Afghanistan from May 1988 to February 1989. After the Soviets had left the country, the United States withdrew as well, leaving Afghanistan to its own devices.

Although peace agreements were in place, differences between the Afghan government and the *mujahideen* were never resolved, which caused Afghanistan to descend into a civil war by 1992. Ahmad Shah Massoud, an ethnic

²⁷ The new constitution for the first time excluded all members of the royal family from the council of ministers.

²⁸ The struggle against the Soviets, which was styled a jihad, or religious war, was fought by the *mujahideen*, or freedom fighters.

Tajik; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun; and Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek, led the main groups that participated in the civil war. In April 1992, several rebel factions succeeded in capturing Kabul, overthrowing the communist government, and establishing a provisional Islamic republic headed by the Tajik northerner Bernahuddin Rabbani. A period of anarchy ensued, during which the government was powerless, and the rival groups seized everything of value in the country to pay and supply the troops with which they jockeyed for power. The economy was in a shambles, and the situation became so bad in the cities that it was dangerous to venture out into the streets, particularly for women.

Despite several temporary alliances, struggles among the armed groups continued until an Islamic fundamentalist group, the Taliban²⁹ emerged. The Taliban developed in religious schools in Pakistan. They were mostly young, poorly educated *Pashtuns*, many of whom lost their fathers and uncles in the struggle against the Soviets. The Taliban gained control of most of the country in 1996³⁰. Their success was largely due to their ability to restore civil order after the chaos of the preceding war years.

The Taliban restored order by imposing extreme interpretations of Islamic law, with severe restrictions on the activities of women. Measures were enforced with public floggings and stoning. Their extreme measures alienated most of the world. Only Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia recognized the Taliban government, while the rest of the world continued to recognize the Rabbani government, although by then it controlled little of the country. The economy did not improve, and most government services ceased to function.

Under the Taliban rule, the Arab terrorist organization Al Qaeda had been allowed to use Afghanistan as its operating base. Al Qaeda carried out a series of international terrorist acts that culminated with the 11th September 2001 attacks against the United States. International pressure was exacted on the Taliban to surrender Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. The Taliban government collapsed after the United States and its allies attacked it in autumn 2001³¹,

²⁹ Talib is the Arabic/Persian/Pashto word for 'student'; and Taliban is the Dari/Pashto plural.

³⁰ They fought off rival *mujahideen* and other warlords, and went on to take the city of Kandahar, beginning a successful campaign that ended with their capture of Kabul in September 1996.

³¹ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 of 12th September 2001, states that the Council "expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the September 11 attacks." This was widely interpreted as a UN authorization for military action in response to the attacks, but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the Resolution specifically reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to threats to international peace and security.

though many of the Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders escaped capture³². An International Security Assistance Force was established in Afghanistan (for details see International community role and involvement in recent history).

In 2001, Afghan leaders returning to power signed the Bonn Agreement, which laid the groundwork for the formation of an interim government, the Afghan Interim Administration, under the leadership of *Pashtun* moderate Hamid Karzai. Karzai was appointed president of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in 2002.

In early 2004, a new constitution was ratified by *Loya Jirga*³³. In October 2004, Hamid Karzai was elected president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan by an overwhelming popular vote³⁴. Large areas of Afghanistan were still under the control of regional warlords. Parliamentary elections in September 2005 gave regional warlords substantial power in the National Assembly and further jeopardized Karzai's ability to unite the country³⁵. After the 2005 elections the Bonn Agreement was replaced by the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006. The Afghanistan Compact outlined goals for international assistance in economic

³² Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on 7th October 2001. It consisted primarily of air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The purpose of these operations was to help the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces by providing information to direct air strikes against Taliban positions. In October - December 2001 combat units moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban. The Taliban regime unravelled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on 9th November 2001. Northern Alliance forces enter Kabul on 12th November 2001. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east of Afghanistan. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as 9th December 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Umar fled the city, leaving it under Pashtun tribal law.

³³ Nowadays a Loya Jirga or Grand Council is known as a constituent assembly of regional leaders usually prepared for major events such as choosing a new king, adoption of a constitution, or discussing important national political or emergency matters as well as disputes. The latest Loya Jirga took place in Kabul from 2nd to 4th June 2010 in which around 1,600 delegates of all ethnic groups attended for a peace talks with the Taliban.

³⁴ On 9th October 2004, Afghanistan held its first national democratic presidential election. More than 8 million Afghans voted, 41% of who were women. Hamid Karzai was announced as the official winner on November 3 and inaugurated on December 7 for a 5-year term as Afghanistan's first democratically elected president.

³⁵ An election was held on 18th September 2005 for the "Wolesi Jirga" (lower house) of Afghanistan's new bicameral National Assembly and for the country's 34 provincial councils. Turnout for the election was about 53% of the 12.5 million registered voters. The Afghan constitution provides for indirect election of the National Assembly's "Meshrano Jirga" (upper house) by the provincial councils and by reserved presidential appointments. The first democratically elected National Assembly since 1969 was inaugurated on 19th December 2005. Younus Qanooni and Sigbatullah Mojadeddi were elected Speakers of the Wolesi Jirga and Meshrano Jirga, respectively.

development, protection of human rights, security, and the fight against corruption and drug trafficking through 2010.

The second national democratic presidential and provincial council elections were held in August 2009, while National Assembly elections were scheduled for September 2010. Hamid Karzai's main competitor, Abdullah Abdullah, forced a run-off to be scheduled, but then withdrew. On 2nd November 2009, officials of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) declared Hamid Karzai President of Afghanistan for another 5-year term. Unlike previous election cycles, the elections were coordinated by the IEC, with assistance from the UN. NATO officials announced in March 2009 that 15.6 million voters had registered to vote, roughly half of the country's population, and that 35% to 38% of registered voters were women. The third presidential election is planned to be held on 5th April 2014.

While the 2009 Presidential Election was significantly undermined by the widespread fraud and corruption, there were high expectations from the government of Afghanistan to ensure a transparent, credible and inclusive parliamentary election for 2010. The Afghan parliamentary election 2010 to elect members of the Wolesi Jirga took place on 18th September 2010³⁶.

On 22nd June 2010, the full list of candidates was announced; 2,577 candidates filed to run, 406 of them women. Campaigning began on 23rd June 2010³⁷. On 18th August, Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced it would open 5,897³⁸ polling centres for the 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections. On Election Day, a total of 5,355 centres opened, 304 of those slated to open did not, and for 157 centres there was no information available.

Voter registration was conducted from 12th June to 12th August. According to the IEC, over 375,000 new voters were registered, and the number of eligible voters was about 11.3 million. On Election Day, about 5.6 million votes

³⁶ On 2nd January 2010, the Independent Election Commission (IEC - established in accordance with the article 156 of the Constitution of Afghanistan for the purpose of organizing and supervising all elections in the country) had initially set National Assembly elections for 22nd May 2010. IEC view was that this date was in line with a constitutional requirement for a new election to be held well prior to the expiry of the current Assembly's term. The international community pressed for a delay of all of these elections until August 2010 or, according to some donors, mid-2011. On 24th January 2010, the IEC announced that the parliamentary elections would be postponed until 18th September 2010.

³⁷ At least three candidates and 13 candidate supporters were killed by insurgent violence.

³⁸ This is 938 less than the original plan to have 6,835 centres opened, because the Afghan security forces say they would only be able to secure 5,897 of the planned 6,835 polling centres.

were cast out of about 11.3 million eligible voters. Turnout was therefore about 50%. A major issue was security.

However, regardless of consistent efforts of the international community particularly the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the 2010 Parliamentary Election took far longer than expected due to the widespread electoral fraud and corruption, the same as the fraud-tarnished 2009 Presidential Election. Preliminary results were announced on 20th October 2010, and final, certified results were to be announced by 30th October 2010, but were delayed until 24th November 2010, due to investigation of fraud complaints. Consequently the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) invalidated about 1.3 million of the 5.6 million votes to further disqualified 24 winners after receiving more than 5,000 complaints of fraud across nationwide polls. About 1,100 election workers have been questioned, and 413 candidates have been referred by the ECC to the Attorney General for having allegedly committed election fraud.

The final results of the 2010 Parliamentary Election particularly indicate that the government of Afghanistan has failed to have a majority of pro-government members in the new Parliament. The incoming lower house will have approximately 50% new membership, meaning that many incumbents apparently have lost their seats.

However, the new Parliament is significantly varied from that of the previous one due to the ethnic representation of Afghanistan. For instance, there were 45–48% Pashtun members, 24–27% Tajik members, 11–13% Hazara members, 8–9% Uzbek members, and 4–5% other ethnic groups' members in the previous Parliament of 2005³⁹. However, the Pashto-speaking majority in the new Parliament has now disappeared and Pashtun candidates have won only 88 seats out of 249 seats which accounts for 35% of the representatives in the new Afghan Parliament⁴⁰. Not only has the Pashto-speaking majority disappeared from the new parliament but Tajiks have reportedly won nearly the same number of seats as Pashtuns⁴¹. Based on the significant changes in the ethnic representation, the new Parliament is no longer dominated by a specific ethnic group.

President Karzai inaugurated the new lower house on 26th January 2011, six days after planned date. A special tribunal was set up to investigate the election results and on 23rd June 2011 it was ruled that 62 results were altered, prompting a backlash from those who might be deprived of seats resulting from

³⁹ Sultanpoor, 2005

⁴⁰ GGS-News, 2010

⁴¹ RFERL-News, 2010

this and threats of impeaching president Karzai. The crisis eased on 11th August 2011, when president Karzai disbanded the special tribunal and announced that only the election bodies have standing to overturn results. The Independent Election Commission announced on 21st August 2011 that nine lower house winners would be unseated for fraud. They were sworn in 4th September 2011; but a broad lower house boycott rendered it non-functional until 9th October 2011. For the upper house, 68 council seats are appointed to four-year terms by the elected provincial councils in each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, and remain in office. Karzai made his 34 appointments on 19th February 2011.

The stabilization process of Afghan society revealed the necessity of reintegration of and reconciliation with insurgents. The reintegration and reconciliation received at least some attention since 2002 in Afghan society. The whole process is an Afghan-lead initiative. A "Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation" operating in 2003 – 2008 by Afghan National Security Council was substituted by a more conceptual plan called "Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program" prepared by the Afghan government and endorsed by a "peace loya jirga" on 2nd – 4th June 2010. Reintegration efforts had marginal success so far and had little impact on the tenacity or strength of the insurgency. Negotiations with militant leaders as part of reconciliation have proceeded sporadically since early 2010 and a formal negotiation process stalled in early 2012. However, informal discussions have continued and, by the end of 2012, began to evolve into discussions of specific proposals to settle the conflict (for details see chapter on Reintegration and Reconciliation with Insurgents).

During the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon⁴² it was agreed that the transition to Afghan leadership would begin in 2011 and would be completed by the end of 2014. Key to the transition to Afghan lead is the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), consisting primarily of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) (for details see chapter on ANSF).

The conclusion of virtually every Administration and outside assessment has been that the Afghan central governmental capacity and effectiveness has increased, but that local governance remains weak and all levels of government are plagued particularly by governmental corruption. The deficiencies in governance could jeopardize stability after the 2014 transition. The Afghan government ability to deliver necessary social services will remain largely dependent on funds donated from the international community.

⁴² 19th – 20th November 2010

Role of the International Community in Afghan recent history

United Nations

The United Nations has been extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building from the beginning, primarily in the areas of factional conflict resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)⁴³. UNAMA has always been involved in local disputes resolution and disarmament of local militias, and is also playing a growing role in engaging regional actors in Afghan stability⁴⁴.

UNAMA co-chairs the joint Afghan-international community coordination body called the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement Afghanistan's development strategy based on Afghanistan's "National Strategy for Development," presented on 12th June 2008, in Paris. However, UNAMA's donor coordination role did not materialize because of the large numbers and size of donor-run projects in Afghanistan. The difficulties in coordinating U.N. with NATO efforts were evident in a 2007 proposal to create a new position of "super envoy" that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan. On 7th February 2010, in line with 2007 effort to improve civilian coordination between the NATO countries and the Afghan government, the NATO "Senior Civilian Representative" office was established. This office works with representatives of the embassies of partner countries and with UNAMA.

⁴³ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of 20th March 2008, expanded UNAMA's authority to strengthen cooperation between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. UNAMA is to open offices in as many of Afghanistan's 34 provinces as financially and logistically permissible. The mandate of UNAMA, was renewed for another year on 22nd March 2011, by Resolution 1974. As did Resolution 1917 the previous year, Resolution 1974 largely restated UNAMA's coordinating role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan and election support role, while referring to UNAMA's role in facilitating the coming transition to Afghan leadership. As part of the expansion of its mandate, UNAMA is playing a role in reintegration of surrendering insurgent fighters through a "Salaam (Peace) Support Group" that coordinates with Afghanistan's High Peace Council (that is promoting reconciliation and reintegration).

⁴⁴ It was a co-convenor of the 28th January 2010 and 20th July 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, respectively. Along with Turkey, UNAMA chairs a "Regional Working Group" to enlist regional support for Afghan integration.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in 2001 by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386⁴⁵, initially limited to Kabul. UN Security Council Resolution 1510⁴⁶ endorsed ISAF expansion and NATO took over command of ISAF. During 2001 to mid-2006, coalition forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent violence with focused combat operations against Taliban concentrations in the south and east. Toward the end of this period, it appeared that the insurgency had been mostly defeated. Anticipating further stabilization, NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan during 2005 – 2006. In 2004, NATO/ISAF took over the security responsibility for northern and western Afghanistan⁴⁷. The transition process continued in 2006, with the handover of the security responsibility in southern Afghanistan⁴⁸ and eastern Afghanistan⁴⁹. Whole process was completed on 5th October 2006.

The optimistic assessments proved misplaced when violence increased significantly in mid-2006, particularly in the east and the south, where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Reasons for the deterioration included popular unrest over the ineffectiveness and corruption in the Afghan government; the absence of governance or security forces in many rural areas; the safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; the reticence of some NATO contributors to actively combat insurgents; a popular backlash against civilian casualties caused by military operations; and unrealized expectations of economic development.

NATO counter-offensives during 2006 – 2008 focused on the Pashtun-dominated areas cleared key districts but did not prevent subsequent re-infiltration because Afghan governance was not established in cleared areas. NATO/ISAF also tried pre-emptive combat and increased development work, without durable success. In September 2008, NATO and partners began strategy reviews which resulted in newly defined goals⁵⁰ and strategy,⁵¹ including a short term increase of deployed troops for a surge leading to a troop's drawdown and the transition to Afghan security. The ISAF mission was renewed by U.N. Security

⁴⁵ 20th December 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution

⁴⁶ 14th October 2003

⁴⁷ Stage 1 - 2004, Regional Command (RC) North, and Stage 2 - 2005, Regional Command West

⁴⁸ Stage 3 – RC South

⁴⁹ Stage 4 – RC East

⁵⁰ To prevent terrorist networks in the region from again taking root in Afghanistan.

⁵¹ To build capable and transparent Afghan security and governing institutions and move to a support role in spring 2013, with transfer of full responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014.

Council Resolution 2011⁵² on 13th October 2012, which reiterated previous resolutions' support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Resolution 2069⁵³ renewed the mandate for another full year. In July 2011, the results of the surge were considered sufficient to permit the transition to Afghan security leadership to begin, as planned. The transition is being conducted in five "tranches"⁵⁴. By the end of 2013; the completion of transition in the third tranche would put 75% of the population under the security lead of Afghan forces, up from 50% covered in the first and second tranches⁵⁵. In each area of transition, the process of completing the transition to Afghan responsibility takes 12 - 18 months.

During the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago⁵⁶ it was agreed that the security mission would change from combat leadership to a mentoring and "over-watch"⁵⁷ role and that the NATO security strategy in place since 2001 will remain intact until the end of the transition in 2014. The coalition countries are gradually reducing military involvement in Afghanistan as the end of the formal international security mission approaches by the end of 2014. International troop's reduction goes along with local population fears that the Taliban and other insurgents will achieve success against Afghan forces once international troops leave Afghanistan. Some Afghan factions warn of civil war after 2014 and are preparing for that by rearming and recruiting militiamen; additionally, some Afghan elites are moving their businesses and funds out of Afghanistan out of fear of chaos and war after international forces end the ISAF mission.

⁵² 12th October 2011

⁵³ 10th October 2012

⁵⁴ The first was announced by Karzai in March 2011, the second in November 2011, and the third in May 2012.

⁵⁵ Tranche 3 (began transition in June 2012): Territory that includes 122 districts, bringing the total districts undergoing transition to 260 (out of 364) in all 34 provinces. All provincial capitals will be under Afghan security lead after this tranche is completed, and this tranche includes some of the most restive areas of Afghanistan—providing an opportunity to test the capabilities of the Afghan government.

Tranche 4. Locations to be announced later in February 2013, and, when completed, would put nearly 90% of the population under Afghan security lead.

Tranche 5. To be announced in conjunction with U.S. transition to supporting role in spring 2013, according to statements by President Obama following the meeting with President Karzai on 11th January 2013.

⁵⁶ 20th - 21st May 2012

⁵⁷ combat against high-value targets as well as training for the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)




Figure 3: ISAF Military assessment of situation – Kinetic events 2007 - 2009

Recent International Community Concerns

The International Community (IC) remains concerned that Afghan stability after 2014 is at risk because of a weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. Among other efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, IC officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 2014, will not experience the fraud of the elections in 2009 and 2010. An unexpected potential benefit to stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

Still, fearing instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power. Afghanistan's minorities and women's groups worry about a potential settlement, fearing it might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power sharing.




Figure 4: Surge assessment

Afghan history timeline

100,000 - 2,000 B.C.	Stone Age
5,000 - 1,000 B.C.	Bronze Age trading with Mesopotamia and Indus Valley
1,500 B.C.	Aryans warriors invade North Afghanistan
500 B.C.	Persians invade rise of Zoroastrianism
330 B.C.	Alexander the Great creates Afghan kingdom
250 B.C.	Buddhist Emperor Ashoka edicts carved in stone

300 B.C. – 50 A.D.	Bactrian Greeks rule North Afghanistan
50 – 300	Kushan Empire. Rise of Silk Route
100 – 700	Flourishing of Buddhism and Gandhara art
650 – 850	Arabs spread Islam through west and north
1000 – 1100	Ghazni and Bost flourish under Sultan Mahmud
1150	Ghorid dynasty flourishes under Alauddin. Minaret of Jam built
1220	Genghis Khan devastates much of west and north Afghanistan
1369 – 1530	Timurid empire, centred on Herat, lasts from Tamerlane to Babur
1749	Ahmed Shah Durrani, a Pashtun, begins creation of modern Afghanistan
1839 – 1842	British occupy then disastrously retreat from Kabul
1878	Second British invasion, as part of the 'Great Game'
1880 – 1901	More nation-building under Emir Abdur Rahman Khan
1893	Durand Line plotted, dividing Afghanistan from British India
1901 – 1919	Habibullah son of Emir Abdur Rahman Khan becomes Emir. Afghanistan neutrality during WWI
1919	Third Anglo-Afghan war ends, and Afghanistan gains independence
1919 – 1929	Amanullah Khan becomes king, but his progressive reforms backfire
1929	Kalaki resistance
1929 – 1933	Mohammed Nadir Shah period
1932	Kabul University established
1933 – 1973	Zahir Shah rules as a king. Rise of Soviet influence
1953 – 1963	Gen Mohammed Daoud becomes prime minister
1964	Creation of constitutional monarchy

1973	Daoud overthrows the king and establishes Republic
1978	Saur Revolution. Afghan communists assassinate Daoud. Their reforms backfire
1979 – 1980	Soviets invade Afghanistan and install Babrak Karmal as leader
1980 – 1985	Mujahideen supported by US, Pakistan, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia fight Soviets
1985	Mujahideen form alliance against Soviets, based in Peshawar
1986	US supply mujahideen with Stinger missiles. Najibullah replaces Karmal
1980 – 1989	Six million Afghan refugees flee as Soviet forces target civilians
1988 – 1989	Peace accord. Soviet troops pull out. Mujahideen fight Najibullah
1992	Mujahideen forces, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, overthrow Najibullah regime
1993	Najibullah replaced by Tajik mujahideen leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani
1992 – 1994	Devastating civil war between mujahideen factions
1994	Rise of Taliban, who take Kandahar and Herat
1996	Talibans capture Kabul, execute Najibullah, exile Rabbani, offer refuge to Osama Bin Laden and impose strict Islam. Northern Alliance formed to fight Taliban
1997	Talibans recognised by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Fierce fighting for control of Mazar-e-Sharif, which Taliban capture in 1999
1998	Two major earthquakes kill thousands. US fires missiles at suspected Bin Laden camps in retaliation for bombing of US embassies in East Africa
1999-2001	UN imposes sanctions in failed attempt to force Taliban to hand over Bin Laden

2001	Talibans destroy Bamiyan Buddhas. Massoud assassinated. Talibans ousted by coalition forces and Northern Alliance. Bonn Agreement signed
2002	5,000 peacekeepers arrive in Kabul. Hamid Karzai elected leader by Loya Jirga. Vice President Hajji Qadir assassinated. 3 million children go back to school
2003	Security deteriorates as Coalition forces hunt Talibans/Al Qaeda remnants. Third of country off-limits to international aid workers. New Constitution drafted and debated
2004	Karzai is elected as President in first free and fair nationwide elections in October. New Constitution ratified. Insecurity continues in east
2005	NATO agrees in February to expand ISAF to the whole of the country by the end of 2006. Parliamentary elections postponed till September
2006	ISAF expansion process completed. The Bonn Agreement replaced by the Afghanistan Compact. Revival of insurgency
2007	Continuous increase of insurgents activities
2008	“National Strategy for Development,” presented at Paris conference. Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board established. NATO strategy reviews
2009	The second presidential and provincial council elections. Hamid Karzai re-elected for another 5-year term
2010	The second parliamentary election. Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program endorsed by a “peace loya jirga”. London and Kabul Conferences. NATO “Senior Civilian Representative” office was established. ISAF “surge” phase. Kabul bank scandal
2011	End of ISAF “surge” phase and beginning of transition phase (until 2014)
2012	NATO summit in Chicago, changing role of ISAF

Afghan general perspective / view on importance of history

Afghans view history to be of great importance. Afghan identity relies heavily on its history and because of this; traditions and rituals are stronger in Afghanistan than in many Western societies. The collective Afghan memory keeps the defeat of the Arabs, the British, and the Russians fresh in its minds' eye (for example, children are named after heroes of war, keeping the stories of Afghan victory alive). As a result of their very dramatic history, many Afghans are given to a longer view of history and time in general (case-in-point: many Afghans consider insurgents to be merely biding their time rather than retreating; common sentiment is that the international forces have clocks and the insurgents have the time). The deep sense of community and nationalism important to Afghans is enforced by the importance placed on history.

POPULATION

Population Patterns

Afghanistan's population is estimated at 28 million people⁵⁸. Population patterns in Afghanistan have been unstable for decades due to domestic and international conflicts. In 1978, millions lost their homes due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. An estimated 6 million people became refugees, most of who fled to Pakistan or Iran⁵⁹. Others were internally displaced or migrated to Australia, various European countries, and the United States. After the Soviet withdrawal, the displacement of people continued due to civil conflict in the 1990s and the NATO intervention in 2001. Economic hardship and natural disasters, such as extreme drought, have also forced people to leave their homes. In 2001, there were about 4 million Afghan refugees. More than 5.7 million refugees have voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan in the last ten years, of whom more than 4.6 million were assisted by UNHCR. Nonetheless, some 2.7 million Afghans continue to live in exile in neighbouring countries. While displaced, refugees' families grew, and the number of "returnees" may eventually exceed the numbers of Afghans who departed Afghanistan as refugees. Domestic and international programs have been established to rebuild the war torn country. The government is unable to measure the population of some regions.

Afghanistan has made some progress in developing its economy in the last few years. However, until basic needs such as security, reliable electricity, and infrastructure are met, substantial economic improvement and sustainability remain questionable. Afghanistan must also develop economic institutions and laws that enable firms to engage industrial sectors. Lack of security in Afghanistan is the most significant obstacle to economic growth. Afghanistan will remain dependent on foreign aid and security forces. Opium production is also a major

⁵⁸ The estimates of Afghan populations are diverse starting from 23.8 million (UNICEF, 2003), through 27.2 million (World Bank, 2003), up to 30.5 million (CIA July 2012 est.).

⁵⁹ According to the UN-affiliated Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), at least five million Afghans had crossed into Pakistan as refugees at some point between 1979 and 2001. Similarly, according to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the number of Afghans residing in Iran reached nearly 2.5 million by November 2010.

impediment to economic development, and eradication of the crop is not likely in the near future. Agriculture remains an important but underdeveloped sector, and earnings remain dependent on the climate and weather conditions. Afghanistan is preparing to exploit its oil and natural gas resources and also serve as a transit point for regional trade. A large portion of the Afghan population is unemployed⁶⁰, many of whom have moved to urban areas. Basic services are rudimentary or non-existent. These factors may directly contribute to crime and lawlessness.

Only about 6% to 7% of Afghanistan's land area lies within the electrical power network. Even the areas of the country that have access to electricity have unreliable service. Fewer than 20% of people in Afghanistan have access to safe drinking water. The infant mortality rate in Afghanistan is among the highest in the world. More than 20% of children in Afghanistan die before reaching 5 years of age. The average life expectancy in Afghanistan is 49.72 years. About 77% of the Afghanistan population lives in rural areas. Half of the urban population live in Kabul city.

Ethnicity and Tribes

In Afghanistan, ethnic and tribal identity often transcends national identity, and underlies the culture of warlords that permeates the country, explaining much of the low level factional fighting. Afghanistan's various ethnic groups extend beyond its borders. The largest ethnic group in Afghanistan is the *Pashtuns*, which comprises 42% to 44% of the population. The *Tajiks* comprise the second largest ethnic group at 25% to 27%, followed by the *Hazaras* (9% to 10%), the *Uzbeks* (8% to 9%), the *Aimak* (4%), the *Turkmens* (3%), and the *Baluchi* (2%). A number of smaller ethnic groups make up the remaining 4% of the population.

The *Pashtuns* dominate the south of the country and extend into the western regions of Pakistan, along the Durrand Line. Ethnic minorities, mainly *Tajiks*, *Uzbeks* and *Hazaras* are located in the north, with occasional pockets of detribalized *Pashtuns*. Ethnic groups other than *Pashtun* historically have had to learn to live with the larger *Pashtun* group and on Pashtun terms.

⁶⁰ Unemployment rate – 40%.




Figure 5: Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Main Ethnic Groups

The Pashtuns

- **Population:** With an estimated population of more than 12 million (out of an estimated 28 million), the *Pashtun* ethnic group is the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, which makes up 42% to 44% of the population. The *Pashtuns* consist of more than 60 tribes.
- **Location:** The *Pashtuns* are largely located in the south and east part of Afghanistan. There are pockets of *Pashtuns* located around the country, but these are mostly the result of forced migration. There are an additional 14 million *Pashtuns* in Pakistan, mainly in Pakistan's northwest

provinces. Many ethnic *Pashtuns* believe they have a historic right to a national homeland called *Pashtunistan*⁶¹.

- **Language:** The *Pashtuns* speak several mutually intelligible dialects of *Pashto*. Many also speak *Dari* (the Afghan form of Farsi), especially in the area of Kabul.
- **Physical Appearance:** *Pashtuns* are of Mediterranean and Caucasian ancestry. The *Pashtuns* are usually fairly light-skinned, with a variety of eye colours, and high cheek bones. Most men have beards, per the requirements of Islam, but some are starting to shave them. The *Pashtun* ethnic group consists of numerous tribes that centre on common genealogies and geographic areas. The two major *Pashtun* tribal confederations include the *Durrani* (3.3 million), and *Ghilzai* (4.4 million).
- **Religion:** The *Pashtuns* are mainly Sunni Muslims with the exception of the Turi and part of the Bangash and Orakzai tribes in Pakistan, which are Shiites.
- **Politics:** The *Pashtuns* have dominated Afghan politics since the founding of the modern Afghan state in the 18th century. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the continuation of the civil war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance was largely a contest for control of Afghanistan between the major *Pashtuns* and the other large ethnic groups. The political parties supported mainly by *Pashtuns* are The Afghan Social Democratic Party, or Afghan Nation (*Afghan Mellat*), the Afghanistan's Islamic Mission Organization (*Tanzim-e Dahwat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan*) and The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan*).
- **Tribal Structure:** Historically, *Pashtuns* have led a tribal, agrarian lifestyle. The *Pashtun* tribes are organized in a non-hierarchical fashion. This tends to cause a diffusion of power but also makes political organisation extremely difficult. *Pashtuns* are divided into tribes, *kaum* or *qabili*, and sub-divided into sub-tribes or clans. *Pashtun* tribes and clans are nominally led by a *Khan* or *Malik*, but his rule is not absolute. The title of *Khan* is usually ascribed to the leader of a tribe, while *Malik* indicates leadership of a clan. All male members of the tribe have a vote in the tribal meeting known as a *jirga* (council of elders). Tribes usually join a tribal confederation, and a significant number are named after a legendary ancestor, to which the suffix *khel* (kin) or *zai*

⁶¹ In 1893, the British divided Pakistan and Afghanistan with the Durand Line, a 2,450 kilometres (1,522.4 miles) demarcation. Afghanistan supports *Pashtun* nationalism, which has caused a territorial dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan since Pakistan does not support these claims.

(son) is attached. Tribal history says that Qays Abd' al-Rashid is the ancestor of all *Pashtuns*. They also claim lineage from King Saul (first King of Israel). The three sons of al-Rashid are Sarban, Bitan, and Ghurghusht. Sarban's eldest son was Sharkhbun and his descendents are found in southern Afghanistan. Sarban's other son, Kharshbun, has descendants in the Peshawar valley. The Pashtuns of west Afghanistan are called the *Durrani*s and are descended from Sharkhbun's son Abdalis. The Pashtuns in Pakistan are descended from Kharshbun's son Yusufzay, and his descendents live north of Peshawar. The Shinwaris, Pashtuns in the Jalalabad vicinity, are descended from Kharshbun's son Kasi. Bitan had a daughter, Bibi Mato who married a foreigner named Husayn Ghur. She conceived an illegitimate son before they were wed and the *Ghilzai* tribe are descended from them. This accounts for the lower status of the *Ghilzai* among the Pashtun tribes. Qays Abdul Al-Rashid Pathan's third son was Ghurghusht and two tribes are descended from him; the Kakars and the Safis.

The two main tribal confederations in Afghanistan are the *Durrani*s and the *Ghilzai*, while a third, the *Mohmand* confederation, spans both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The fourth branches of the Pashtuns are found throughout western Pakistan. They are descendants of Karran, who was either Pathan's fourth son, or was adopted by Pathan. The tribes claiming *Karran* as an ancestor are the Afridis, Bangash (Shiites), Khataks, Mahsuds, Mangals, and the Waziris.

The *Durrani* or *Durrani Tareen* are the most powerful and influential tribal confederation in Afghanistan. The King of Afghanistan has always been a *Durrani*. However, the first to attain historical prominence were the *Ghilzai*, who destroyed the Safavi Empire. The *Durrani* are divided into two branches; the *Zirak* and the *Panjpai* or *Panjpao*. Tribes within the *Zirak* branch include the *Popolzai* (east of Kandahar and west of the Helmand River), the *Alkozai* (east of Kandahar and north of Helmand), the *Barakzai* (southwest of Kandahar in the Arghistan River Valley), and the *Achakzai* (Zamindawar region and along the Kohdaman Ridge). Tribes within the *Panjpai* branch include the *Noorzai* (southwest and western Afghanistan), the *Alizai* (Zamindawar and Helmand), and the *Ishaqzai* or *Sakzai* (west of Kandahar, Farah region, and in Seistan) *Khokani*, and *Maku*. According to a saying, *Ghilzai* have the sword, *Durrani* have the state. The split comes from their different political ecology. *Durrani* live in the irrigated southern plains, they inherit valuable land, and so their

politics are based around hierarchy and patronage, and they are risk averse. *Ghilzai* on the other hand, live in the eastern mountains, practice subsistence agriculture and have a more egalitarian political structure, exemplified by the *jirga* council. The *Ghilzai* tribal confederation has strong cultural predispositions toward equality that made it difficult for a leader to consolidate political power, hence in times of anarchy, *Ghilzai* do well. They value individual achievement, and aggressive leadership. Najibullah, Hekmatyar, Haqqani, and Mullah Omar all were/are *Ghilzai*. However, the skills that make good warlords do not necessarily make good peace time leaders. This is proved by history when from 1747 until 1978 the *Durrani* tribal confederation was to rule Afghanistan after defeating and expelling the *Ghilzai* ruler from Kandahar (1738). *Ghilzai* are also known historically as *Ghiljies*, *Ghaljis*, and possibly *Gharzais*. The *Ghilzai* confederacy is divided into two groups, the *Turan* (western) and the *Burhan* (eastern). The *Turan* include the *Nasir*, *Kharaoci*, *Hotaki*, and *Tokhi* (*Qalat-I Ghilzai*) tribes. The *Burhan* includes the *Sulaymen Khel* (southeast of Kabul to Jalalabad), the *Ali Khel* (Mukur region), and the *Tarakkis* (Mukur) tribes. In the 18th century, the *Ghilzai* led a series of revolts against the Persian Safavi Empire.




Figure 6: Pashtun's genealogy.

- **Rule of Law:** Tribal laws and customs vary from tribe to tribe, but one widely followed is the codes of The *Pashtunwali* (for more details see section on interpersonal relations) and *Isakhel*. The *Pashtunwali* is often in contradiction with the Islamic code of law, the *Sharia*. The differences between the *Pashtunwali* and the *Sharia* do not trouble the *Pashtuns*. They tend to view their identity as both *Pashtun* and Muslim by nature and do not feel compelled to reconcile the differences between the two codes of behaviour. The traditional notion of “rule of law” is less clear among the *Pashtuns* as they tend to obey civil law only if they believe that the law has been implemented and is enforced by a legitimate government. The legitimacy of a government depends on the extent to which *Pashtuns* control the government and to the extent in which the government recognize the authority of both the *Pashtunwali* and *Sharia*. *Isakhel* establishes the penalties for murder, assault, kidnapping of women, property damage, theft, and other transgressions. Murder is paid for in blood money known as *khun*⁶² and is based upon the victim’s standing. *Khun* for elders and soldiers is the highest. If a man beats his wife to death her father can take up her case and revenge the woman as he would a murder. Dishonouring a murdered person is doubled. It is also customary to return the victim’s weapon when paying the *khun*. Besides paying the *khun* in currency some tribes accept women and female babies as two-thirds of the *khun*. Failure to pay the *khun* could result in tribal warfare based on *badal*⁶³, but if the money is not available and the tribes do not want to go to war, a marriage will be arranged with the murderer.
For assault, the *khun* depends on whether the person is maimed and whether the maimed part of the body is visible or not. If a girl is forcibly kidnapped, the compensations are one and one-half *khun*. If the kidnapped girl consents to marry her kidnapper the *khun* is then doubled. However, the bride-to-be must obtain her father’s permission; otherwise he has the right to kill her.
In the case of adultery the husband can kill both his wife and her lover if he catches them in the act. Relatives of the deceased are denied revenge and *khun*. If a man kidnaps another’s wife he must pay seven-fold *khun*. For rape, the ear or nose of the rapist is cut off. For arson, the arsonist may pay for the lost property and pay a fine for dishonouring the

⁶² *Khun* means blood

⁶³ To seek justice or take revenge against the wrongdoer (for details see chapter on interpersonal relations)

household. The burning of a nomad's tent is treated more harshly than the burning of a house. The theft of livestock requires *khun* nine-fold. The destruction of farmland requires four times the value of the field. The illegal diversion of water is also subject to a fine.

- **Conflict Resolution:** Revenge may be taken on any member of an offending tribe, although liability is usually greater for those most closely related to the accused. The essentially decentralize independent communities within tribal subsections conduct both internal and external affairs according to provisions of the codes *Pashtunwali*. Both internal as well as inter-group conflicts are most often rooted in matters of honour and personal enmities, rather than in intrinsic attitudes of ethnic discrimination.
- **Role of State vs. Role of Ethnic Group:** Among *Pashtuns*, the Afghan state and the *Pashtun* nation often become blurred. *Pashtuns* have dominated the modern Afghan state history since 18th century with various *Pashtun* tribes providing its central leadership. Local *Pashtun* tribal leaders still have significant independent authority over much of the south and east Afghanistan.




Figure 7: ISAF RC-S Pashtuns tribal structure's link analyses

The Tajiks

- **Population:** *Tajiks*, Afghanistan's second largest ethnic group, make up 25% to 27% of the population. There are an estimated 7 million *Tajiks* in Afghanistan.
- **Location:** Many *Tajiks* in Afghanistan live in settled, permanent communities in the north-eastern part of Afghanistan. Some *Tajiks* live in the mountains and valleys of the extreme northeast maintaining limited nomadic patterns of behaviour. The Tajik populations are concentrated in the northeast, in the regions of Badakhshan, Parham, Takham, Baghlan, and in the Panjshir Valley. There are also significant populations of Tajiks in the west of Afghanistan, in the Central Highlands and north of the country. A sizable Tajik population lives in and around Kabul, where they have, to a large degree, assimilated with the urban and other ethnic population.
- **Language:** Afghan *Tajiks* are primarily *Dari* speakers.
- **Physical Appearance:** *Tajiks* are of Mediterranean ancestry and they are a Caucasoid people. They are described as slender, above average height, light skinned, and as having aquiline (long and curving) noses and usually black hair.
- **Religion:** Most Afghan *Tajiks* are *Sunni* Muslims.
- **Politics:** Except for the short rule of the *Tajik* known as Bacha Saqqao in 1928, the *Tajik* have not dominated politically. Since 1978, however, several *Tajik* military leaders have gained substantial recognition, the most renowned being Ahmad Shah Masood from the Panjsher Valley. Burhanuddin Rabbani who served as President of The Islamic State of Afghanistan from 1992 – 1996 is a *Tajik* from Badakhshan. The ethnic *Tajiks* are the opposition to Pashtuns for political power and prestige in Afghanistan. Historically, *Tajiks* played a role of political opposition to *Pashtuns*, and as a result a key division of political power in Afghanistan is divided between the *Pashtun*-dominated south and the *Tajik*- and *Uzbek*-dominated north. The political parties supported mainly by *Tajiks* are Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*), Revolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of Afghanistan (*Zazman-i Inqilabi Zahmatkishanan-i Afghanistan*), The National Movement of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e-Nuhzhat-e-Mili Afghanistan*) and The New Afghanistan Party (*Hizb-e Afghanistan-e Nawin*). *Tajik* ethnicity is supported by Tajikistan.
- **Tribal Structure:** The tribal organization has essentially disappeared. It has been replaced by village and family ties, and a strong sense of community loyalty. While Afghan Tajiks identify themselves as an ethnic

group and while Afghan Tajiks do generally share a common set of cultural and ethnic characteristics, Tajiks do not have a strong ethnic or tribal identity. They are not organized by tribe, but by geography and usually identify themselves with the village or valley in which they live. The Panjshir Valley is seen as a “spiritual home” for Afghan Tajiks and many of the most influential of the Tajik leaders within the Northern Alliance are originally from there. Tajiks are spread across much of Afghanistan’s north and west, and can be very roughly divided into three categories: mountain Tajik, urban and plain dwelling Tajik, and western Tajiks. Mountain Tajiks are the most widely dispersed Afghan Tajiks. They are concentrated in the north-eastern sector of the country, but are found throughout the entire northern part of the country. Nearly all mountain Tajiks live in settled communities. The urban dwelling Tajiks, particularly those in Kabul, are generally financially better off than the mountain Tajiks. These city Tajiks tend to be well placed and are often assimilated into a broader urban culture. The third group of Tajiks is the western Tajiks that dominate the area in and around Herat, near the Afghan border with Iran. These Tajiks bear a strong resemblance to their Persian neighbours in Iran. They also feel a much closer cultural bond with the Iranians and Persian culture than do the Tajiks of the north, northeast and those around Kabul. These Tajiks predominately speak Iranian Farsi, which makes them even closer to the Iranian Persians. Often these western Tajiks are referred to as “Farsiwan”, which means “Farsi speaker”. The major regional names indicating a common place of origin are the *Wakhani*, the *Ishkashimi*, the *Shunguns*, the *Munjani*, and the *Sarghulami*. The Wakhani are located within both Afghanistan and Pakistan they are Ismaili Shiites. The majority of the Ishkashimi live in the Pamir on the upper reaches of the River Pyandzh in the Province of Badakhshan in northern Afghanistan. In many instances, especially in Kabul and the central plains, *Tajiks* have adopted the social and cultural patterns of their neighbours. Urban *Tajiks* are the more educated group in Afghanistan and hold many government and business positions. Most *Tajiks* are Sunni Muslims. The term “*Tajik*” is often used loosely by other Afghan groups to refer to “de-tribalized” Afghans living in northern Afghanistan.

- **Rule of Law:** Most *Tajiks* in the Northern Alliance are devout and traditional Muslims who favour the use of some form of *Sharia*, although in a much less restrictive form than other groups. Over the past decade, there has been little civil law in the Tajik areas of northern Afghanistan. The rule of *Masoud* and the Northern Alliance was arbitrary and ruthless.

- **Conflict Resolution:** Because of their relatively fragmented ethnic make-up and their lack of tribal affiliations, the *Tajiks* do not have a specific method for conflict resolution. Tajik military and political leaders and warlords have not displayed a consistent method for conflict resolution throughout the twenty-plus years of war in Afghanistan. Negotiations are commonly used and can be successful as means of resolving conflicts. If negotiations fail, *Tajiks*, like all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups, have also proven quite capable of attempting to intimidate or brutalize a perceived opponent into submission.
- **Role of State vs. Role of Ethnic Group:** The political situation of the *Tajiks* changed radically in 2001, when the United States led a coalition in overthrowing the *Pashtun*-dominated Taliban government. Although led by a *Pashtun*, Hamid Karzai, the interim government set in place by 2002 was dominated by ethnic *Tajiks*. *Tajiks* are unlikely to rebel against the central state so long as they maintain representation. However, *Tajiks* continue to be involved in inter-communal conflict, primarily with *Pashtuns*, *Uzbeks*, and *Hazaras*. Until the central government is strong enough to contain warlordism, such clashes are likely to continue. *Tajiks* desire greater involvement in the central government and also greater control over *Tajik*-majority regions of the country. They also desire greater economic opportunities.
- **Relations with the Pashtuns:** Relations between the *Tajiks* and *Pashtuns* are tense and confrontational. The rivalry between *Tajiks* and *Pashtuns*, and the inability of these two groups to share power has been a strong and driving force in the domestic politics and conflicts of Afghanistan. The *Tajiks* have resisted the "*Pashtunnization*" of Afghanistan.

The Hazaras

- **Population:** *Hazaras* are the third most populous ethnic group at an estimated 9% to 10% of the Afghan population. There are an estimated 2.5 – 3 million *Hazaras* in Afghanistan.
- **Location:** The *Hazaras* are concentrated in a mountainous area in central Afghanistan called *Hazarajat*⁶⁴ (centred on / around Bamiyan province). Significant population of *Hazara* are also found in Kabul. They represent up to 30 percent of the city's population.

⁶⁴ "Land of the *Hazara*"

- **Language:** They speak a *Dari* dialect called *Hazaragi*, which has minor influences from Turkish and Mongolian languages.
- **Physical Appearance:** They are of Mongolian descent and arrived in the 13th and 14th centuries⁶⁵. The *Hazaras* are distinguished by Mongoloid (Asian) features. These features include broad faces, high and prominent cheekbones, slanted eyes and sparse beards. European and Iran-Afghan facial features may also be found among the *Hazaras*. As with all ethnic groups in Afghanistan, however, physical appearance alone is not always a conclusive and accurate indicator of an individual's ethnic identity.
- **Religion:** The majority of *Hazaras* are *Shia* Muslims, although some are *Sunni*. The *Hazaras* are culturally and religiously linked to Iran.
- **Politics:** The *Hazaras* joined the *Tajik* and *Uzbek* dominated Northern Alliance in its struggle against the Taliban. The *Shia* sect of Islam has not itself been an engine of *Hazara* political activity but reinforces the *Hazaras'* status as a minority. It is the *Hazaras'* distinct identity, which is a result of religious distinctions that motivates *Hazara* political activity and social organization. The political parties mainly supported by *Hazaras* and *Shia* Muslims are The Islamic People's Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakat-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan*), The Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan*) and The Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan (*Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan*). Iran provides support for *Hazaras* and severally presents concerns for the *Shiite* minority in Afghanistan.
- **Tribal Structure:** Like the other peoples of Afghanistan, the *Hazaras* are organized into tribes and clans and have traditionally been independent of the central government. The *Hazaras* also have a feudal social organization. The top social class is the landlords who rent land out and collect rent in the form of a share of the harvest. They are the richest people within *Hazara* society. The middle class are the family farmers who own their own land. The lowest social class are the *Hazaras* who rent land from the land owners. *Hazara* tribes are led by a *Malik*. The *Malik* is hereditary in some tribes and selected by consensus in others, but is always a wealthier land owner. The territory of the tribe consists on average of one to three villages, but larger tribes can be comprised of up to five villages. The *Malik* has also served in the past as a government official as well as a tribal official. The *Malik's* official duties include tax

⁶⁵ It is believed that *Hazara* are descendant of Genghis Khan who left 1,000 soldiers from his troops in Afghanistan. *Hazara* means thousand.

collection and implementation of government decrees. The *Hazara* are divided among eleven tribal groups, each with varying number of subgroups. The eleven tribal groups are the following: Dai Kundi, Dai Zangi, Behsud, Dai Mirdad, Ghazni Hazara, Jaghui, Polada, Uruzgani, Shaikh Ali, Walang and Kala Nau Hazara.

- **Rule of Law:** The *Sunni* and *Shia* sect have different interpretation of the *Sharia*, and the adherents of one sect do not recognize certain legal tenets of the other, and vice versa. The conflict between the versions of *Sharia* complicates the application of a single legal code throughout the country. The *Hazaras* are resentful that they are forced to adhere to the legal tenets of an Islamic sect they do not follow.
- **Conflict Resolution:** Conflicts are resolved at the local level, usually without resorting to appeals to government officials. As a rule, local populations try to prevent government intrusion in the affairs of the area because the population will then be subject to taxation and administrative regulations. Conflicts are resolved by local community leaders.
- **Role of State vs. Role of Ethnic Group:** The *Hazara* population in general feels a stronger affiliation to their ethnic group and the tribe, sub-tribe and family unit they belong to, than to the state. The *Hazara* have developed a strong self-perception that they are a subjugated minority that has been repressed and marginalized by the state. *Hazara* leaders have consistently been more influential than government officials within the *Hazara* community. The central government has always faced challenges from the *Hazaras* in its attempts to control the *Hazara* territory. The *Hazaras* are similar to the other ethnic groups of Afghanistan in that the greatest loyalty is felt for social and familial unit in the local area where the individual lives. However, the *Hazaras* have a strong ethnic identity than other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, with the exception of *Pashtuns*. The result is a greater ethnic consciousness among the *Hazaras*. Nevertheless, ethnic consciousness is not sufficiently strong to fully overcome tribal and local loyalties.
- **Relations with Other Ethnic Groups:** The *Hazaras* have experienced discrimination throughout the history of modern Afghanistan. *Hazaras* have been denounced by *Sunni* leaders as not being real Muslims due to their faith, and as agent of Iranian imperialism in Afghanistan.

The Uzbeks

- **Population:** *Uzbeks* are the fourth largest ethnic group in Afghanistan comprising approximately 8% of the Afghan population, or an estimated 2 – 2.5 million people.
- **Location:** *Uzbeks* used to be traditionally nomadic, but are now largely settled in the towns and villages, in the north. A small minority of *Uzbeks* continue to pursue a semi-nomadic life. Geographically, *Uzbeks* live in Afghanistan's northern region, the most ethnically diverse region in the country. The Uzbek cultural and political centre in Afghanistan is the strategic crossroads town of Mazar-e-Sharif.
- **Language:** *Uzbeks* speak a Turkic language dialect called *Uzbek*. A large minority of *Uzbeks* are also fully literate in *Dari*.
- **Physical Appearance:** *Uzbeks* migrated from Central Asia to Afghanistan centuries ago. They are mongoloid in appearance and have broad, flat faces and lighter skin than *Pashtuns*.
- **Religion:** Afghan *Uzbeks* are *Sunni* Muslim with the added influence of traditional beliefs. They are not generally strict Muslims. Many traditional secular beliefs have been woven into their Islamic practices. The Islamic faith, however, remains an important part of *Uzbek* cultural identity.
- **Politics:** Religion does not play a decisive role in the political life of Afghan *Uzbeks*. The *Uzbek* focus on cultural tradition and were influenced by the atheist Soviets over the past thirty years. Afghan *Uzbeks* are politically cohesive in Afghanistan and are represented by the *Junbishi Mili-yi Islami* (National Islamic Movement or National Islamic Front). Uzbekistan provides support for *Uzbeks* in Afghanistan.
- **Tribal Structure:** There are at least two main components to the Uzbek cultural identity in Afghanistan: sedentary Turkic peoples living in settled communities without tribal divisions and groups of semi-nomadic farmers and herders that have kept the name and sometimes the subdivisions of their tribe. Throughout Central Asia and Afghanistan settled *Uzbeks* without tribal divisions are also sometimes referred to as *Sarts*. The differences between the settled *sart* population and the semi-nomadic farmers and herders are primarily historical and cultural⁶⁶.

⁶⁶ The ethnic designation 'Uzbek' comes from one of the most powerful rulers of the Golden Horde named Ghiyath ad-Din Muhammad Uzbek Khan (who ruled 1312 – 1341). *Uzbeks* also claim to descend from Tamerlane conqueror of today Afghanistan in the 14th and 15th centuries. It was during the 16th century that many of the *Uzbeks* of the Golden Horde living in the plains north of the Caspian Sea

Uzbek cultural identity is rooted in geography, either in the valley or village where an *Uzbek* lives, or the town in Central Asia where an *Uzbek's* family is origin from. Some *Uzbeks* are rural and work in agriculture, but many live in cities as traders or goldsmiths, leatherworkers, and rug makers. Extended families with strict patriarchal authority play an important role in the organisation of Afghan *Uzbek* societies. Major Uzbek families are Kataghan (Kunduz), Sarai (Mazar-I-Sharif & Balkh), Ming (Mazar-I-Sharif & Balkh), Kungrat (Kunduz & Mazar-I-Sharif), Durmen (Hazret Imam Sahib) and Chagatai.

- **Rule of Law:** At a cultural level, *Uzbeks* are a very traditional people who adhere more closely to cultural values and traditions, than to either Muslim law or civil law. Afghan Uzbek forms of justice are rough; they focus on retribution and are not rooted in religious principles.
- **Conflict Resolution:** Same rules as for *Tajiks* are applicable.
- **Role of State vs. Role of Ethnic Group:** Afghan *Uzbeks* are suspicious of any Afghan central government. Much of this suspicion is rooted in the long history of *Pashtun* rule over Afghanistan and their use of power to advance *Pashtun* economic, social and political well being, often to the perceived detriment of other ethnic groups. *Uzbeks* have never held the position of highest authority in the central government of Afghanistan.
- **Relations with the Pashtuns:** *Uzbeks* feel a considerable amount of resentment towards the *Pashtuns*. Most of this is rooted in the long history of Pashtun domination of Afghanistan, and the perception that *Pashtuns* have used their power to aid other ethnic *Pashtuns* at the expense of the *Tajiks*, *Hazaras* and *Uzbeks*. This antagonism towards *Pashtuns* is seen and felt at several levels among the *Uzbeks*. While *Uzbeks* prefer to marry with their own ethnic groups, *Uzbeks* will intermarry with *Tajiks*. However *Uzbeks* will rarely intermarry with *Pashtuns*.
- **Relations with the Tajiks:** The relationship between the *Uzbeks* and the *Tajiks* is marked by a series of conflict and alliances. The relationship between these two ethnic groups is generally not, however, as confrontational as the between the *Uzbeks* and the *Pashtuns*.

migrated to Central Asia and to northern Afghanistan. These Golden Horde *Uzbeks* then mixed with the *Uzbeks* that had already settled in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Some Other Ethnic Groups

Aimak

The Aimaks (Chahar Aimak) are another minority ethnic group of mixed Iranian and Mongolian descent who live primarily in north-western Afghanistan (Badghis, Farah, Faryab, Jowzjan, Ghor, Herat and Sar-e Pol provinces). The term Aimak derives from the Mongolian term for tribe (Aimag), meaning tribe in Turkish and is not an ethnic classification, but differentiates semi nomadic herders and agricultural tribal groups of various ethnic origins, including the Turkic Hazara and Baluch that were formed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They also speak a Dari dialect and are mostly Sunni Muslim. The Aimak continue to identify themselves through tribal ties and lead an agrarian or pastoral lifestyle. Population estimates vary widely, between 250,000 and 2 million. They are Sunni Muslims, in contrast to the Hazara, who are Shiahs. The best estimates of the Aimak population in Afghanistan hover around 1-2 million. A group of about 120,000 lives in the Iranian Khorasan. The tally is made difficult since, as a consequence of centuries of oppression of the Hazara people in Afghanistan, some Aimagh Hazaras are classified by the state as Tajik, or Persian instead of Aimaks.

The main Aimak tribes are Firozkohi, Jamshidi, Taimani and Timuri all being subdivided into more than 250 sub-tribes.

Arab

Large groups of Sunni Arabs living in the vicinity of *Bokhara* in Central Asia fled to north-eastern Afghanistan following Russian conquests in the 19th century. By the 1880s they were, with the Uzbek with whom they established close ties, the second most populous ethnic group in present day Kunduz, Takhar, and Baghlan provinces. Smaller groups settled in scattered communities as far west as Maimana, Faryab Province.

The Arabs are pastoralists who raise sheep and grow cotton and wheat. Some among the eastern groups make summer migrations of up to 300 kilometres to reach the lush high pastures in Badakhshan. Government development schemes, especially those which brought large numbers of *Pashtuns* to the area in the 1940s, relegated the Arabs to a small proportion of the population and the Arabs ceased to hold a monopoly on long distance migration. Bilingual in *Dari* and *Uzbek*, but speaking no Arabic, they continue to identify

themselves as Arab although they have had no contact with the Arabs of the Middle East since the late 14th century.

Baluchi

The *Baluch* are another Iranian ethnic group that numbers around 100,000 in Afghanistan (making up 0.3% of the population). The homeland of the Sunni *Baluch* in south-western Afghanistan is in the sparsely settled deserts and semi-deserts of Helmand Province, although *Baluch* enclaves are also found in north-western *Faryab* Province. The main *Baluch* areas are located in Baluchistan province in Pakistan and Sistan and Baluchistan province of Iran. There are approximately 5 – 6 million Baluch living in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.

The *Baluch* language offers evidence that the *Baluch* originated from the Caspian region, and reached the region sometime between 1000 and 1300 B.C. These semi-sedentary and semi-nomadic populations are famed for camel breeding; they are mainly pastoral and desert dwellers. The *Baluch* are Sunni Muslim. The *Baluch* speak *Baluchi*, an Iranian branch in the Indo-European language family; most speak *Dari* and *Pashto* as well. *Baluch* society is tribal, highly segmented and centrally organized under powerful chieftains known as *sardars*.

Brahui

The *Sunni Brahui* is another distinctive group settled in the desert areas of south-western Afghanistan. They numbered less than 200,000 in Afghanistan. The basic *Brahui* physical type is *Veddoid* of South India, and they speak *Brahui* which is allied to Dravidian, a major language of South India, with a heavy mixture of *Baluchi* and *Pashto*. *Brahui* used to work as tenant farmers or hired herders for *Baluch* or *Pashtun Khans*. Larger communities of *Brahui* reside in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province.

Farsiwan

The *Farsiwans* are primarily a linguistic group that has developed an historical identity. The *Farsiwan* are Persian-speaking Afghans of the Tajik and Pashtun ethnic groups. *Farsiwans* are *Farsi* or *Dari*-speaking village agriculturalists of Mediterranean sub-stock that live in the west near the Afghan-Iranian border

or in districts of Herat, Kandahar and Ghazni provinces. Estimates for 1995 vary from 600,000 to 830,000. Most are Imami Shia; in urban centres some are Sunni.

Gujjar

So very little about the *Gujjars* is known that the mere mention of them sends one scrambling for dust-covered manuscripts of the British Raj. It is thought they were initially encountered by Alexander during his thrust into India, although this and every theory about the *Gujjars* remains in dispute. They speak a tongue wholly unrelated to any Indo-European language, although many have by now learned local languages for commercial purposes. They roam with their herds, usually of cows, from the high Himalayas in India to the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan (although rarely are they seen in Afghanistan anymore, as Pakistan has hindered their passage through its territory and most preferred to stay within India). Some in India remain Hindu, although further west many are Muslim. Often they can be recognized by their avoidance of others, and their brightly hennaed beards. They are proud, fierce, and loyal. Their traditions are millennia old, and they have preserved them well in the face of great adversity. They are somewhat related to *Nuristanis*, although exactly how is a subject of conjecture. Similar to *Nuristanis*, some genetic root gives many *Gujjars* a distinctly European appearance, up to and including blond hair and blue eyes.

Jat

There are other small marginal communities of occupational specialists based in eastern Afghanistan in provinces such as Laghman. They are commonly referred to as *Jat* which is a generic term indiscriminately applied by others with derogatory connotations implying low descent and low occupations. The groups reject the term and refer to themselves by specific names. Of Mediterranean-Indian type physically, speaking Indo-Aryan dialects in addition to *Pashto* and *Dari*, they are primarily gypsy-like itinerant petty traders, bangle sellers, fortune-tellers, musicians, jugglers, snake-charmers and performers with animals such as bears and monkeys. Some are specialized craftsmen, working as weavers, potters, sieve makers, knife-makers, and leather-workers. Some hire out as seasonal itinerant farm labourers. They rank lowest on the social scale and are stigmatized by many in the society.

Kabuli

Kabuli is an ambiguous term which provides a sense of identity for Afghanistan's largest heterogeneous urban population without designating distinct ethnic associations. The city of Kabul has drawn members of all ethnic groups in growing numbers since 1776 when it was declared the capital in favour of Kandahar; generations of intermarriages have also taken place. Nevertheless, ethnic roots and regional links have always also remained important. This is reflected in the spatial layout of the city which, before two-thirds of the city was reduced to rubble after 1992, consisted of ethnic, geographic or religious-oriented wards and suburbs. Social stratification along occupational lines was also clear although over the past few decades lines tended to blur significantly.

A typical *Kabuli* speaks *Dari* in addition to his mother tongue and, whether male or female, is urbane, favours European fashions, is secularly educated, and most probably works as a bureaucrat, shopkeeper/owner or in the service sector. Many have had professional education or experience abroad, live in apartments or single-family dwellings, are Western-oriented in outlook and enjoy cosmopolitan lifestyles. It is this image which conservatives, especially those such as the rural Taliban find unpalatable, a symbol of moral degradation which must be eradicated if a truly Islamic state is to be established in Afghanistan.

Many *Kabuli* who remained in Kabul during the Soviet-Afghan War have since left because they find the attitudes of the new leadership incompatible. They are now displaced in cities inside Afghanistan, living as refugees in Pakistan or resettled abroad. Their absence will severely hinder the reestablishment of viable administrative and economic systems necessary for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.

Kirghiz

The *Kirghiz* are a Sunni Mongoloid group speaking *Kirghiz*, a Turkic language written in Arabic script. The *Kirghiz* are geographically isolated from the rest of Afghan society. This isolation has a significant impact on the *Kirghiz* culture and lifestyle. About 3,000 lived in the Pamir Mountains east of the *Wakhan Corridor*⁶⁷. Only a small group remains. A majority moved to Pakistan in 1978

⁶⁷ The *Wakhan Corridor* is one of the more inaccessible regions in the world where relatively flat valleys suitable for habitation lie at altitudes over 3,000 meters above sea level between ranges rising over 5,000 meters.

after Soviet and Afghan troops occupied the Wakhan; later, in 1983, resettled in Turkey.

The Kirghiz lived in yurts called *oey* (pronounced *oowee*), tended large flocks of sheep and herded yak which are found only in this area of Afghanistan.

There are four levels of *Kirghiz* social organization. *Kirghiz* identify with the *oey*, the primary social and economic unit of *Kirghiz* society, first and foremost. The unit of the *oey* is composed of a nuclear or an extended family that shares in the duties of herding and raising livestock with other *oey* units. Each *oey* has a leader called an *oey bashi* or “head of the household”. Several *oey* encamped together compose an *aiel* or *qorow*. The terms are used to designate groups that live in the same camp and herd their animals together. Each camp is represented by a camp elder, called *be*. The *kechek oruq* is roughly equivalent to a sub-tribe; it is the level of social organization directly below the four *zor oruq*, which is roughly equivalent to a tribe. The *kechek oruq* acts as a political unit and is led by an *aqsagal*. The highest level of social organization in *Kirghiz* society is the *zor oruq*. The *zor oruq* is led by a *khan*. Each *Kirghiz* of Afghanistan is a member of one of four *zor oruq*⁶⁸. Each *zor oruq* traces its descent to one of four ancestors - *Teyet*, *Kesak*, *Qepchak* (*Kipchak*) and *Naiman* (who were supposedly brothers). The *Teyet oruq* is the largest of the four *zor oruq*, with about 1,000 members. The *Kesak oruq* is the next largest, with about 500 hundred persons, followed by the *Maiman* and *Qepchak*. The *Teyet oruq* lived in the Little Pamir area, but left Afghanistan in 1978. The *Kesak oruq* remains in the Great Pamir. A few *Qepchak* and *Naiman Kirghiz* inhabit the Afghan Pamir, but most live in the ranges of the Pamir Mountains in China and Tajikistan.

The *Kirghiz* have Mongoloid (Asian) features. These features include broad faces, high and prominent cheekbones, slanted eyes and sparse beards.

Kuchi

*Kuchis*⁶⁹ are Afghan nomadic pastoralists, primarily from the Ghilzai tribal confederacy. Some of the most notable *Ghilzai Kuchi* tribes include the *Kharoti*,

⁶⁸ Lineage is of particular importance among the *Kirghiz*, who trace ancestry back seven generations as proof of identity and membership in a particular *oruq*.

⁶⁹ ‘Kuchi’, an Afghan Persian word meaning ‘those who go on migrations’, is the common generic term, used by both Afghans and International community, for the nomads of Afghanistan, as it has been for many decades. Most if not all the nomads, and indeed many long-settled former nomads, now acknowledge this name. In fact it is a term that can cause confusion, since it refers to both a lifestyle (migratory), a production mode (livestock dependent), and a cultural identity.

Andar and *Ahmadzai*. Sometimes *Durrani* tribes can be found among the *Kuchi*. Although a large majority of nomads are *Pashtun* and nomadic pastoralists are also found among the *Aimak*, *Baluch*, *Arabs*, *Kirghiz*, *Turkmen* and *Uzbeks* and occasionally there may also be some *Baluch* people among them that live a pastoral nomadic lifestyle.

There are estimated to be around three million *Kuchi* (nomads) in Afghanistan, with at least 60% remaining fully nomadic.

They mostly keep sheep and goats and the produce of the animals (meat, dairy products, hair and wool) is exchanged or sold in order to purchase grain, vegetables, fruit and other products of settled life. In this way an extensive network of exchange has developed along the main routes annually followed by the nomads. They have a very high illiteracy rate.

Nomads were also favoured by the Kings of Afghanistan, themselves of *Pashtun* origin, since the late 1880s. They were awarded "firman", or royal proclamations, granting them use of summer pastures all over Afghanistan. Partially settled by socialist governments, they were supporters of the Taliban, both ideologically and pragmatically, as they came into possession of many Hazara lands thanks to the repression of the *Shiite Hazaras* by the Taliban. As a result, the northern ethnic groups (*Hazara*, *Tajiks*, *Uzbeks* and *Turkmens*) have a distrust of the *Pashtun* nomads. This political dispute has been deepened over the decades of *Pashtun* nomads' seasonal migrations, whereby some *Pashtun* nomads became absentee landlords in their summer areas in the north through customary seizure procedures to attach debtors' land. However, the *Pashtun* nomads themselves see the northern minority groups as a non-Afghan race, and claim that the *Pashtun* nomads were natives of the northern Afghan region, and that during many years of invasion such as those of Genghis Khan and Timur, they escaped south.

In recent decades, seasonal migrations still continue inside Afghanistan. In Pakistan, some Afghan nomads are found in Karachi in Sindh. Dispersed and well-travelled, they often receive news from distant relations in far-away provinces relatively quickly.

The Afghan government has taken some positive steps, for example by ensuring nomad political participation, both in elections and through representation in parliament⁷⁰ and local councils. Nomad affairs are the explicit

⁷⁰ Afghanistan's constitution grants ten elected seats for Kuchis and ten in the lower house of parliament, three of them for women.

responsibility of the Ministry of Frontier and Tribal Affairs, but they also concern several other departments, such as the Ministry of Agriculture.

The nomadic groups have been identified by UNAMA as one of the vulnerable groups in the country because of an increasing number of conflicts with locally settled population. As Afghanistan's population grows, competing claims over summer pastures, both for random cultivation and for grazing of the settled communities' livestock, have created conflict over land across central and northern Afghanistan. Paying head-count fees for each animal crossing someone else's property is exacting a harsh economic toll on the *Kuchi* way of life, one that already has to contend with recurrent droughts that are now occurring with increasing frequency.

The Afghan nomads are increasingly pragmatic and in the current situation acknowledging the name 'Kuchi' may bring access to resources offered by Afghan government and NGOs.

Nuristani

The *Nuristani* are an Indo-Iranian people, who live in isolated regions of north-eastern Afghanistan (in the mountains of the Hindu Kush east of Kabul) as well as across the border in the district of Chitral in Pakistan. The *Nuristani* reside throughout an 8,000 square kilometres area in the east bordering Pakistan that is heavily forested and so rugged that much of it is accessible only by foot trails. The *Nuristani* designate themselves by the local geographical names of the five major north-south valleys and 30 east-west lateral valleys leading into the major valleys where they live. In 1990 the province of Nuristan was created from parts of the provinces of Laghman and Kunar. The population in the 1990s was estimated at 125,000 by some; the *Nuristani* prefer a figure of 300,000⁷¹.

Physically, the *Nuristani* are of the Mediterranean physical type with mixtures from Indian stocks on the fringes. The *Nuristanis* have two primary myths about their origins. One version of their cultural history links the *Nuristanis* to the occupying Greek forces of Alexander the Great, who invaded the region in 327 B.C. Another version of their cultural history identifies the *Nuristani* tribes

⁷¹ Better known historically as the Kafirs of what was once known as Kafiristan (land of pagans). They were forcibly converted to Sunni Islam in 1895 during the reign of Emir Abdur Rahman but retain many unique features in their material culture. Their country was renamed "Nuristan", meaning "Land of Light" (as in the light of Islam). A small unconquered portion of Kafiristan inhabited by the Kalash tribe who still practice their pre-Islamic religion still exists across the border in highlands of Chitral, northwestern Pakistan.

with the original *Qureish*, the tribe of Mohammed the Prophet⁷². However there is a lack of genetic evidence for these myths. For centuries the Nuristanis were known as “kafirs,” or infidels (this is still a pejorative term for them). This has changed as most converted to Islam at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. They are largely Sunni Muslims.

There are fifteen Nuristani tribes with numerous sub-groups. Five languages and numerous dialects are spoken by the Nuristani; including Nuristani and its dialects and *Dardic*.

They do not have overly positive relations with other Afghans or Pakistanis and a strong animosity toward Arabs. Between two of the largest tribes, the Kamozi (or Kam) and the Kushtaz, there was a series of conflicts since the fall of the Taliban. Additionally, for over two decades foreign-funded Wahhabi preachers have been working to convert the tribes to their more hard-line interpretation of Islam. Nuristanis, however, remain protective of their distinctive culture.

The *Nuristani* are mountaineer herders, dairymen and farmers. They hold a respected place in the social order and many have raised to high government positions, particularly in the army.

Pashai

There is very little useful data on the Pashai, outside of some intense research on their language. They inhabit Nuristan, parts of Laghman, and northern Nangarhar, seemingly between the *Pashtun* and *Nuristanis*. Many consider themselves *Pashtun*. They speak a Dardic language referred to as *Pashai*. Often they are associated with or referred to as *Kohistani*. The majority of *Pashai* in Laghman rely on the livestock and timber business.

Qizilbash

The *Qizilbash* of Mediterranean sub-stock speak *Dari*, are Imami *Shiites*, and scattered throughout Afghanistan, primarily in urban centres. There are perhaps 50,000 *Qizilbash* living in Afghanistan although it is difficult to say for some claim to be *Sunni Tajik* since *Shia* Islam permits the practice of *taqiya* or

⁷² According to this legend, when Islam was established in Mecca, a group of the Qureish left present-day Saudi Arabia and traveled to Afghanistan to preserve their old religion. This group is believed by some Nuristanis to have led to the formation of the Nuristani tribes.

dissimulation to avoid religious discrimination. The *Qizilbash* form one of the more literate groups in Afghanistan; they hold important administrative and professional positions⁷³. In order to play a role in government and society, the *Qizilbash*, like other *Imami Shiites*, publicly portrayed themselves as *Sunnis* or *Pashtuns* while they privately maintained their *Shia* faith.

Sayyid (Sadat)

Claiming descent from the family of the Prophet Mohammad, the *Sayyids* hold a revered place in Afghanistan. The majority, centred in Balkh and Kunduz in the North and Nangarhar in the East, are Sunni Muslims, but interestingly there are some in Bamiyan Province and elsewhere that adhere to Shia Islam. These are often referred to as *Sadat*, a word that traditionally referred to the descendants of Hasan and Hussein, grandsons of the Prophet Mohammad. “⁷⁴.

Tatar

The first Central Asian Muslims to come under the Russian yoke, *Tatars* still retain their own republic within the Russian Federation. During the colonial era they were often used as spies and guides for Russian and later Soviet efforts, and are renowned for their commercial prowess. The *Tatars* settled in Afghanistan after either trying to escape the Russians, or came to Afghanistan as traders.

Turkmen

The *Turkmen* ethnic group in Afghanistan numbers an estimated 200,000. *Turkmens* live in Badghis, Balkh, Faryab, Herat, and Jowzjan provinces, mostly in rural areas along the north-western border with Turkmenistan, though

⁷³ The *Qizilbash* are traditionally considered to be the descendants of Persian Shi'a mercenaries and administrators left behind by Nadir Shah Afshar (1736 – 1747) to govern the Afghan provinces. Under Ahmad Shah Durrani, who served in Nadir Shah's bodyguard, and his successors, the *Qizilbash* acquired power and influence at court out of proportion to their numbers. This created resentment among the dominant Pashtun which hardened over the years, especially after the *Qizilbash* openly allied themselves with the British during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838 – 1842). Emir Abdur Rahman accused the *Qizilbash* of being partisan of the enemy during his campaigns against the Shi'a Hazara in 1891-1893, declared them enemies of the state, confiscated their property and persecuted them.

⁷⁴ The first Shiite martyrs, sons of Ali and Grandsons of Mohammad

there is a concentration of *Turkmens* in the city of Herat and other small towns of the region. The *Turkmens* are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School. The Hanafi *sharia*, or law, coexists with a tribal law known as the *Dab* or *Dap*. *Turkmens* speak Turkmen, a Turkic language closely related to Turkish and Azerbaijani, and more distantly to Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Uzbek. Most Afghan *Turkmens* are bilingual in Dari. *Turkmen* are descended from tribes that moved to Afghanistan from east of the Caspian Sea at various periods, particularly after the end of the nineteenth century when the Russians moved into their territory. Turkmen tribes, of which there are twelve major groups in Afghanistan, base their structure on genealogies traced through the male line. The most important of these are the *Ersari*, the *Tekke*, and the *Yamud*. Other major tribes are the *Chakra*, *Lakai*, *Mawri*, *Saroq*, and *Tariq*⁷⁵. Senior members wield considerable authority⁷⁶. Formerly a nomadic and warlike people feared for their lightening raids on caravans, Turkmen in Afghanistan are farmer-herdsmen and important contributors to the economy. They brought karakul sheep to Afghanistan and are also renowned makers of carpets, which, with karakul pelts, are major hard currency export commodities. Turkmen jewellery is also highly prized. Because the *Turkmen* population in Afghanistan is so small, *Turkmens* have often aligned themselves politically with the *Uzbeks*, who speak a similar language and have similar cultural traditions.

Wakhi

The neighbouring *Wakhi*, along with several thousand other Mountain Tajik who are physically of the Mediterranean sub-stock with Mongoloid admixture, speak *Dari* and various eastern Iranian dialects. They live in small, remote villages located at lower altitudes in the *Wakhan* Corridor and upper *Badakhshan*. They are often Ismaili *Shiites*, but some are Imami *Shiites* and *Sunni*.

Non-Muslims

Hindus and *Sikhs* have traditionally been prominent among Afghanistan's mercantile community. Many *Sikhs* are known for their craftsmanship, and many *Hindus* for their money lending. Although persecuted under the Taliban and

⁷⁵ Each tribe has its own carpet pattern and subtle distinctions in the way clothing and headgear are worn distinguish members of clans and tribes from one another.

⁷⁶ Turkmen society has traditionally had no leaders. Although *iasbulys*, or elders, do help guide decision making, in the end all adult males in the group must consent to any decision made by a family, clan, or tribe.

forced to wear identifying badges, *Sikhs* and *Hindus* have returned to Afghanistan in significant numbers. Some *Hindu* and *Sikh* families have been in Afghanistan for generations. *Hindus* and *Sikhs* live mostly in urban centres throughout Afghanistan⁷⁷.

The Jewish community of Kabul is totally depleted. One family remained in 1996 to care for the synagogue which partially remains in an area otherwise pulverized.

Interethnic Relations

Afghanistan's ethnic mosaic has no precise boundaries; nor is its national culture uniform. Few of its ethnic groups are indigenous; few maintaining racial homogeneity. Many zones overlap and interactions broadened as the economic infrastructure improved and educational opportunities widened.

Resentment rising out of wars and conquests remains long after the power of conquerors dissipates. This is true with regard to the *Uzbeks*. The distrust and discrimination between *Hazara* and *Pashtun* set during late 19th century confrontations is still abundantly present. The causes of prejudice against the *Qizilbash* go back to the 18th century.

There were significant effects of successful land reclamation projects, beginning in the 1930s, which offered attractive incentives to new settlers. These invariably favoured the *Pashtun* over local populations. The land settlement schemes in Helmand in the southwest, begun in 1910 and massively extended after 1946, were similarly disruptive. Settlers from all parts of Afghanistan were recruited into this predominantly *Pashtun* and *Baluch* area, creating new tensions not only among the new disparate groups, but also among new and old *Pashtun* groups.

There have always been tensions between groups, from petty squabbles to feuds lasting for generations, rising from a variety of causes but rarely from intrinsic attitudes of ethnic discrimination. Considering the disparate and volatile ingredients that exist, Afghanistan's history records remarkably few internal explosions that are specifically focussed on ethnicity.

During the Soviet-Afghan War, the shared goals of the *mujahideen* were reminiscent to familial, tribal, and ethnic group construction. As such, the appeal

⁷⁷ In 1978 they numbered about 30,000. Many left in 1992, but are slowly returning to such cities as Ghazni and Jalalabad.

of the *mujahideen* was a strong and familiar rallying cry and source of solidarity for Afghans in their struggle for national liberation.

Afghan ethnic identities emerged more clearly during the Soviet-Afghan War. Five groups could be easily distinguished: *Tajik*, including all *Sunni Dari* speakers; *Hazara*; *Uzbek*; *Durrani Pashtun*; *Ghilzai Pashtun* and *Eastern Pashtun*. Fighting among Afghans in the years following the fall of Najibullah's government in 1992 exceeded levels of violence experienced even during the wars of Emir Abdur Rahman against the *Hazara* and the *Nuristani* between 1891 and 1896. Some would say that these conflicts are evidence that Afghan society must now be fragmented between groups identified by religious, ethnic, or regional labels. There is no doubt that the Soviet-Afghan War severely disturbed the delicate social infrastructure constructed over many centuries, yet according to many Afghans the present turmoil is driven more by political greed and external interference than by ethnic, religious or regional considerations. While traditional structures were not equitable for all Afghan citizens, they did permit extended periods of civic stability. Even in the mid-1990s, there was ample evidence in a number of areas outside the present arenas of conflict to suggest that a return to the old order could occur.

Elements of material culture are used by all ethnic groups to build pride and a sense of social superiority, particularly in mixed ethnic zones. Each group uses folktales to reinforce the uniqueness and superiority of the one over the other, as well as to describe their individual ideals.

Ethnic identities fade in importance when Afghans sense that they are confronted with a common enemy who seek to control Afghanistan. Afghanistan's ethnic diversity does not mean that the members of the different ethnic groups do not interact. There is a substantial amount of intermarriage between the ethnic groups. This intermarriage tends to blur lines of loyalty between different ethnic groups⁷⁸.

Afghanistan's ethnic diversity is also complicated by the fact that the Afghan notion of ethnicity is different than the view commonly held in the West. Ethnicity or identity, known as *qawm* in Afghanistan, is not only defined by a common cultural or genetic group, but also by tribes, families, and geographic

⁷⁸ For example, the main Tajik commander around Mazar-e-Sharif, Atta Mohammed, is married to a Pashtun and owes his life to his in-laws who were able to smuggle him out of the area when the Taliban took over. Similarly, Dr. Abdullah had a Pashtun father from Kandahar while his mother was a Tajik from the Panjshir valley. One of the former deputy defense ministers, Zabet Saleh Registani, has a Hazara mother and a Tajik father. Yunus Qanuni is married to a Pashtun, and the former Tajik President, Burhanuddin Rabbani, has a Pashtun daughter-in-law.

regions, or even occupations. In fact, in many instances an Afghan will not primarily define himself as a “Pashtun” or a “Tajik,” but as a member of the “Zadran” tribe or an inhabitant of the “Panjshir” valley. These types of identifiers include a sense of loyalty to a group that is providing the individual with things that are essential to live. These types of identifiers are not traditionally what westerners view as ethnic characteristics, but are relevant in understanding how an individual will react in a given situation. This makes it difficult to understand Afghan ethnicity and the relationship of ethnicity to politics and security. While the larger ethnic identities of Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, etc., do exist, and while they are important at a general level in understanding Afghan society, politics, economics, and security, these categories are only general descriptions of how Afghans view themselves and one another.

Afghan general perspective / view on Afghan society

Many Afghans are of the opinion that ethnic differences have been exploited by foreign conquering armies to divide the country or that ethnic differences have been used in a reductionist way to analyze a very complex nation and this results in exacerbating any existing ethnic differences. Following the Russian occupation of Afghanistan and the subsequent power vacuum, the infighting triggered by religious and ethnic based groups loyal to neighbouring countries resulted in very strong ethnic clashes. This was the first time in Afghanistan’s history that ethnic groups fought each other. Since that time, there has been a strong effort to overcome ethnic differences, especially under the banner of Islam. The ethnic diversity of Afghanistan has been strength rather than a weakness and for centuries, the different ethnic groups lived side by side and intermarried. Although the older generation experienced ethnic differences in the 1990s infighting, the newer generation of Afghans consider this ethnic fighting as bitter history best forgotten.

Religion

About 99% of the people of Afghanistan are Muslims. Apart from a few very small minority groups (1% - Sikhs, Hindus and Christian), Afghans are either *Sunni* Muslims (84%) or *Shiite* Muslims (15%).The divide between Sunni and Shia Islam is deep-rooted and has been a source of considerable tension in the past, particularly under the Taliban.

Muslims follow the Qur'an, which they believe contains the will of Allah. Muslims are expected to live by the five pillars of Islam: make one pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia (holy city) during one's lifetime; pray five times a day; give to the poor; acknowledge that there is one god, Allah, and that Muhammad is his prophet; and fast during the month of Ramadan (For more details see section on Ramadan). Muslims consider Friday a holy day. (For more details see section on Interpersonal relations, *Sharia*).

One of the main differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims is that Shiites follows religious leaders called imams. Imams are considered Mohammed's successors and intermediaries between Allah and Muslims.

In Afghanistan, traditional beliefs are commonly mixed with those of Islam. Many people hold traditional family beliefs to a higher regard than those of the religious scholars, such as the *Pashtuns*, who combine *Pashtunwali* with Islamic values.

The *madrassa*, religious schools attached to Mosques, are the primary means of education for many youths, especially in the south. The *Ulema* (Muslim clerics), as opposed to the media, are thus the most important means of transmitting information on national and world events.

Religious leaders⁷⁹ and networks have always played a prominent role as civil society forces in Afghanistan. In times of crisis, Islamic networks have taken on key functions either in the form of legitimizing resistance, or through forming the backbone of resistance.

Each community has one or two *mullahs*, who are responsible for teaching the *Qur'an*, leading group prayers, and performing weddings, funerals, and other ceremonies. There are fewer *mullahs* in the countryside; *mullahs* often have other jobs such as farming. *Mullahs* are chosen by the government, which consults with each community. Being chosen a *mullah* is a great honour. Other important people in the Muslim community are the *muezzin*, who calls people to prayer from a mosque's minarets; the *qazi*, who is a religious judge responsible for administering the *Sharria*; and the *khadim*, who maintains and cleans the mosque.

Religious and spiritual leaders can be further divided to:

⁷⁹ The Ulema Council consists of a network of 3,000 clerics throughout Afghanistan. Each cleric in the council is paid about US\$100 per month by Afghan government and, in return, is expected to promote the government line. However, in August 2010, 350 members of the Council voted to demand that Islamic law (*Sharia*) be implemented.

- *Talib* - knowledge seeker but in Afghanistan refer to student who study religion.
- *Mullah* – leaders of the prayer in mosque who has very basic knowledge of religion.
- *Maulavi* – Religious scholar who finished higher religious education.
- *Maulana* – Religious Scholar who has highest knowledge of religion.
- *Mufti* – The one who has higher religious authority of interpretation of religious matters.
- *Pir* or *Sufis* – Spiritual leader to his disciples and followers
- *Murid* – Followers of Pir or Sufis
- *Khalifa* – Disciples of Pir or Sufi (for reading purpose, you can read “Heroes of the Age” and “Before Taliban, Genealogy of Afghan Jihad” by Prof. David Edwards.
- *Ulema* – Plural of religious scholars
- *Hajatul Islam* – given to middle ranking Shia clerics
- *Ayatullah* – literally, “Sign of Allah”, one of the highest ranks for a Shia Muslim cleric, an expert in Islamic studies

Shia personal status law

The Shia community constitutes approximately 10% of the country’s total population, predominately of the *Hazara* ethnic group.

Article 131 of the 2004 Afghan Constitution recognises that Shia laws governing personal matters may differ from the country’s main legal system, which is based on civil law principles shared with the religious laws of the majority Sunni community.

According to Article 131, Shia law should be applied by Afghan Courts “in cases dealing with personal matters involving the followers of [the] Shia Sect in accordance with the provisions of law”. Also is stated that “in other cases “if no clarification by this constitution and other laws exist and both sides of the case are followers of the Shia Sect, courts will resolve the matter according to laws of this Sect”.

The law consists of 249 articles in total, of which only 10% are currently available in English translation. The Afghan Ministry of Justice has said the full text of the law will be available after all various and unidentified technical problems have been resolved.

No Peace without Justice is an international non-profit organization that works for the protection and promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and international justice. This organization made an analysis of Afghanistan's Shia Personal Status Law, based on the 26 Articles which were considered by analysts at the USAID Afghanistan Rule of Law Assistance Project to be of greatest concern as discriminatory toward women and in violation of human rights norms.

The main points of the analysis are as follows:

The Shia Personal Status Law violates the rights of women by:

- Severely limiting women's guardianship rights.
- Giving men control over the behaviour of their female relatives.
- Requiring women to seek permission to marry.
- Allowing forced marriage.
- Permitting men to have multiple wives.
- Restricting women's freedom to leave home.
- Treating women as property.
- Failing to recognise rape inside or outside marriage as a crime against a person.
- Legalising marital rape.
- Obliging a woman to have sex with her husband at least every four nights.
- Making a woman's subsistence dependent on her having sex with her husband.
- Allowing a woman's husband or guardian to deny her permission to work.

The Shia Personal Status Law violates the rights of children by:

- Determining that a girl can be married at 16 and a boy at 18.
- Allowing marriage to or between minors.
- Legalising intercourse with a minor, including rape, both within and outside of marriage.
- Treating a child as property and failing to recognize that rape of a minor is a serious crime.

The Shia laws to be applied in the personal matters cases had not been incorporated into Afghanistan's national law, having traditionally been defined only within the customs of the Shia sect. In order to make it legal, the Shia Personal Status Law was introduced in the Afghan Parliament in 2007. When the Parliament referred the Bill to the Supreme Court in February 2009, it requested

that the Court take into account Article 131 of the Constitution when considering the constitutionality of the law. The Bill was approved by the House of Representatives on 3rd February 2009, after a debate among 249 members including 68 women. It passed to the House of Elders on 7th February 2009, where it was later passed and referred to the Supreme Court for approval. The Court approved the law in late February 2009.

The law applies only to Afghanistan's Shia community and it is widely considered as a concession made by President Hamid Karzai to Hazara leaders in order to gain the support of this ethnic group, who always has been a shifting voting bloc, in Afghanistan's elections. Shia Personal Status Law has strong support among many Hazara leaders.

Rites of passage

Many important rites of passage in Afghan society are derived from Islam. When a baby is born, the father whispers the call to prayer and command to worship in the baby's ear. Sugar or a piece of date is then placed in the baby's mouth so that the first thing the baby tastes is sweet. The baby's head is shaved on the seventh day to symbolize service to Allah. The family weighs the hair and donates an equal amount of gold or silver to charity. Boys are also circumcised within a week of birth. On the seventh day, a name is given to the child and *aqiqah* (feast) is held to give thanks. *Halal* meat is prepared for the feast and some food is given to the poor. Children begin reading the *Qur'an* in Arabic at an early age and hold *bismillah* (recital) at the age of four.

Although Afghan children typically follow Muslim rituals such as fasting before adolescence, they are required to join rituals after reaching sexual maturity. Boys wear turbans, and women must cover their hair and spend less time outdoors. Dating is not permitted, due to the separation of men and women. Marriages are commonly arranged when men and women are in their teens. The government is attempting to curb forced marriage of young women.

Families usually consider tribe and status when arranging marriages and prefer to choose cousins. The families negotiate a bride price and dowry before the marriage. The bride-price is given to the family of the bride, which provides financial security to the bride in case of divorce, and the dowry is a gift to the groom from the family of the bride. Since marriage is a social and economic relationship, both families decide publicly. The marriage is complete after the signing of a contract and a reading from the *Qur'an*. Wedding festivities called

walima can last for up to 3 days at the family homes of the bride and groom. Men are permitted to have up to four wives, but rarely have more than one.

Before a Muslim dies, the call to prayer is whispered in the person's ear, as it was at birth. Immediately after death, the body is washed and rubbed with perfumes and spices. It is then wrapped in white cloth and buried without a casket, facing Mecca. The family of the deceased gathers for memorial dinners several times during the year following the death.

Ramadan

The sacred month of Ramadan⁸⁰ is a period where Muslims fast, pray and feast. The purpose is to teach Muslims about patience, humility and spirituality. Ramadan is the 4th of the 5th pillars of Islam. During Ramadan, Muslims refrain from smoking, eating, and drinking from sunrise to sunset. According to Islam there is no limit on the amount of hours of work during the month of Ramadan, however the Afghan government decree specifies the working hours from 7 a.m. to 1 p.m. Non-Muslims are expected to recognize Ramadan and act accordingly while in public, but can do as they wish in private.

The Significance of Ramadan

- Month in which the *Qur'an* was revealed.
- Special month of: Fasting, Repentance, Increased prayer, Increased charity.
- Ends with the festival of *Eid-ul-Fitr*: Day of celebration and gratitude.



Figure 8: Phases of Ramadan

⁸⁰ Ramadan is an Arabic word; its root "Ar-Ramad" means "dryness / heat." Ramadan is the ninth month of the *Hijri* (lunar calendar) calendar. The Lunar calendar is 11-12 days shorter than Gregorian calendar; therefore, Ramadan is 10-11 days earlier every year.

Fasting

By fasting Muslim can attain *taqwa* (God consciousness/ self-discipline)⁸¹. A fasting person experiences some of the hardships of the poor and hungry. Physiological effects include lowering of blood sugar, cholesterol and systolic blood pressure. It improves strength, endurance and self-discipline through physical abstentions.

Spiritual objectives/benefits of Ramadan are:

- Helps Muslims draw closer to God through increased recitation and reflection of the *Qur'an* and additional prayers/worship.
- Aids in increase of *iman* (faith) and *ihsan* (sincerity and righteousness) and removal of *riyya'* (showing off).
- Aids in purification of the heart/soul and helps to improve one's character.
- Trains the person to do praiseworthy acts e.g. charity, kindness, generosity, patience and forgiveness.

Fasting begins at the break of dawn and ends at sunset. Physical aspect of fasting is to refrain from food, drink and intimacy during fasting hours. Depending on location and season, it can vary from 12 hrs to 17 hrs. Spiritual aspect of fasting is to refrain from blameworthy thoughts and acts e.g. foul language, vain talk, hurtful behaviour, during all hours. Fasting is mandatory for all Muslims except children, unhealthy adults (mentally or physically), adults travelling long distances, and women who are menstruating, in post-childbirth care, pregnant or breast-feeding.

The typical activities of Ramadan

- *Sahoor*: Meal before dawn and the first prayer of the day.
- *Iftar*: breaking of the fast at Sunset (coincides with the 4th daily prayer).
- *Ziarat*: Social gatherings e.g. visiting relatives, sharing food with neighbours, friends, and the poor.
- *Tarawih*: Optional Prayers at early night
- *Qiraat*: Reading of the *Qur'an* during free time.
- *Qiam*: Optional late-night prayers in the last 10 days.

⁸¹ *Taqwa* is an Arabic word that comes from the root "wiqaya" which means prevention/protection

Lailat-ul Qadr

This blessed night is also called the night of Power. It is the particular night in the month of Ramadan when the Holy Koran first began to be revealed.

Eid-ul-Fitr: Marking the End of Ramadan

- *Eid-ul Fitr*: Eid al-Fitr often abbreviated to Eid and holds a significant importance and is celebrated widely for three days that marks the end of the Ramadan.
- *Zakat-ul Fitr*: A prescribed amount of money obligatory for every Muslim to pay, calculated to feed one poor person in his region for one day.
- *Eid* activities include:
 - *Eid* prayer in the early morning.
 - Visiting family, friends, neighbours, the sick, elderly etc.
 - Enjoying festive meals.
 - Modest gift-giving especially to children.
 - The greeting on that day is: *Eid Mubarak*

Afghan general perspective / view on religion

There exists in Afghanistan almost a two-tiered sense of religion; a highly conservative and sometimes radical sense, sometimes sincerely practiced and other times merely outwardly practiced for the sake of protection, and a more moderate form of Islam. Islam and Afghan identity have been inseparably tied to one another for hundreds of years. Historically, Afghanistan was Zoroastrian but following the Arab conquest it became Islamic and has remained so up to the present time.

Religion is the most unifying dynamic among the varied ethnic and linguistic tribes that comprise Afghanistan. To be Afghan is to be Muslim. However, in the 1970s and 80s, in the context of the Russian presence, patriotism emerged as an additional, and significant unifying factor. During the Mujahideen and Taliban rule and the subsequent large-scale fleeing and expatriation of many (especially well-educated and urban) Afghans, religion reasserted itself as the main unifying factor. This is in large part because many Afghans spent some 10 – 15 years as refugees in the neighbouring countries,

particularly Pakistan and Iran. There, they found that Islam was a point of connection and validation. Particularly for the Afghans who fled Afghanistan as children and returned as adults, this connection to neighbouring countries weakened the nationalistic feelings of the previous generation and increased a sense of Islamic brotherhood over nationalism. Some of the Afghan refugees were further exposed to local, radical Islamic elements and began to adopt these beliefs. The Afghans remaining in Afghanistan at this time became outwardly, and in some cases, genuinely more conservative and radical in their beliefs due to the Mujahideen and Taliban rule.

What remains is an Afghanistan that identifies itself by its religion. There remains, especially in the urban areas, a fear of any movement away from Islam, especially in relation to the effect such a change would make on relationships with the Taliban shadow government and strong men. This being said, the temporary, though extended presence of foreign troops has found many Afghans holding their breath in a sense, waiting to see whether radical Islam will return as the dominating dynamic. There does exist a small, but growing sense of discontent with Islam in general, as many young Afghans, exposed to the internet, the foreign aid and military community wonder if there is another way of life, a new way to be Afghan, preserving the Afghan spirit but without the harshness and control of radicalism.

Languages

Of the 32 languages and dialects spoken in Afghanistan, the official languages are *Pashto* or *Pashtun* (35%), and *Dari* (50%), with minority languages acting as third languages in the regions where they predominate. Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) are spoken by 11% and 30 minor languages (primarily *Baluchi* and *Pashai*) by 4%.

Pashto, which is spoken by *Pashtuns*, has two major variants and many dialects. *Pashto* was designated a national language of Afghanistan by the *Pashtuns* in the various constitutions. During the period of modernization, all non-*Pashto*-speaking government workers were required to learn the language. *Pashto* was also required as a subject in elementary schools where instruction was in *Dari*. The *Pashto* language also served as a national symbol because it is commonly associated with Afghanistan, despite the fact that around half its speakers live in Pakistan. Even so, *Pashto* has never had the status of *Dari*, which has a vast cultural and literary tradition.

Dari is similar to *Farsi* spoken in Iran. *Dari* is very much an urban language, and is the language in which business is most frequently conducted. *Dari* has always been the prestige language in Afghanistan. It is the language used when speakers of different languages need to conduct business or otherwise communicate. In Afghanistan, all education above primary school is conducted in *Dari*, except specific *Pashto* language study. *Pashto* speakers are frequently bilingual in *Dari*, but *Dari* speakers rarely learn more than a few words of *Pashto*. Speakers of other languages in Afghanistan frequently pick up *Dari* as a matter of course, except in the totally *Pashtun* areas of the south. Most educated Afghans can use both *Dari* and *Pashto* as they are related.

Both *Dari* and *Pashto* are written using the Arabic alphabet. Although they are different languages, they share common roots in the Iranian family of languages. *Dari* and *Pashto* are similar in written form, but are not similar in speech. As such, they share common letters and some words, and their word order and verb systems are similar.

Both languages have a basic word order in which the direct object comes before the verb. They also have verb systems that resemble the English verb system in basic ways. *Dari* nouns have no grammatical gender, but are marked for person and number (singular and plural). Verbs agree with the subject in person and number. *Pashto* is more complex than *Dari* in terms of word formation. It has several classes of masculine and feminine nouns and adjectives and is highly inflected. It also has complex sets of weak and strong pronouns.

Dari and *Pashto* have many words in common. This overlapping vocabulary is a result of the ancestral words they both share as members of the Iranian language family, as well as the fact that they have been spoken side by side for centuries. Both languages have a number of words borrowed from Arabic, as do all the languages spoken by Islamic peoples. Also, as is true of all languages, the dialects of *Dari* and *Pashto* spoken in areas adjacent to other languages are likely to have more borrowed words from those languages.

As both languages are written in the Arabic alphabet, they are read from right to left and connect letters in cursive style, except for numbers. *Dari* has four extra letters to represent sounds that don't occur in Arabic. *Pashto* has the four extra letters that occur in *Dari*, plus an additional eight letters. Because the Arabic alphabet does not use symbols to represent vowels (except in the Qur'an), it is impossible to transliterate from *Dari* or *Pashto* to English letter by letter, and there are a number of ways to spell the vowels.




Figure 9: Diagram of languages used in Afghanistan

Historically, Afghans have an extremely strong aptitude for language learning. Many Afghans speak multiple languages depending on their region, and English, German or Russian are commonly used.

Education and Literacy

Afghanistan has gone through wars and internal conflicts more than three decades. As a result of war, the education system collapsed and several generations of Afghans became illiterate. Fewer than 10% of Afghans attended school during times of war. The Taliban shut down secular schools and prohibited women older than 12 from going to school. Many teachers fled Afghanistan. At the end of the 1990s, only 5% of girls attended school compared to 60% of boys. Afghanistan has the lowest literacy rate in the region and one of the lowest in the world. It is estimated that 51% of men and 21% of women are literate⁸².

⁸² Estimated literacy rate in 2012 was 28% of population over 15 years of age; 43% of males and 12.6% of females

Since the fall of the Taliban, domestic and international initiatives have been established to provide education for all Afghans. In February 2002, more than a thousand women took entrance exams for university enrolment. That same year, the Back-to-School campaign began and has resulted in more than 3 million children, and 70,000 teachers attending school. A major achievement was bringing the literacy rate from 12% in 2002 to 30% in 2010 (women literacy rate raised to 18% from 5% in 2002). Women make up 30% of the student population, which is much higher than in previous years.

However, as many as half the children are still not attending school. In some rural provinces, more than 80% of girls are not enrolled in school and as few as 5% are literate. Of the rural provinces surveyed, more than 70% of households claim that a lack of schools was the main reason for girls not attending.

According to a study on literacy and adult education in Afghanistan⁸³, still 10.5 million people aged 15 and above are illiterate while the current capacity of the government and its partners in literacy program covering 600,000 learners per year. About five million school-age children (7-18) are currently out of school.

Afghan general perspective / view on languages and education

Both Pashto and Dari (historically, used almost interchangeably with Dari Farsi) have rich literary histories. Both languages are spoken on either side of the Afghan borders, with Farsi spoken in Iran and Pashto spoken in Pakistan, especially along the border with Afghanistan. More and more, younger, educated Afghans refer to their language as Dari, rather than Farsi, in a telling indication of the increasingly resentful feelings towards Iran. Conversely, Pashto is not significantly different than Pakistani Pashto. Many Pashtuns feel that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (The Durrand line) is a very careless and illogical mistake of the British Raj, as it is unwise to divide a tribe not only in half but also into two countries merely for political gain.

⁸³ Literacy and adult education in Afghanistan, The Asia-Pacific Cultural Centre for UNESCO (ACCU), 2010

SOCIAL ASPECTS

Society

Afghanistan is located at the crossroads of several civilizations, and its people reflect a diverse culture. Islamic traditions provide a common framework for many different ethnic groups in Afghan society. Nearly all Afghans are Muslim and live their lives accordingly.

Daily life in many rural areas is semi-nomadic and affected by tribal heritage⁸⁴. While some of the ethnic groups retain strong tribal affiliations, many primarily identify themselves as Afghans. Some Afghans have moved to cities, but many remain in rural areas. Decades of international and civil war have disrupted social, educational, health, and economic opportunity, but Afghans have begun to rebuild as a united people.

Afghans have a rich tradition in the arts. Although wars and strict Taliban censorship temporarily prevented many people from engaging the arts, song and dance and other indigenous traditional arts have re-emerged. Each ethnic group and region has traditional songs and music. Live music usually consists of song, drums, and stringed instruments similar to banjos and lutes. Dancing is popular, but men and women dance separately. Also, female musicians entertain women and male musicians entertain men. Storytelling and poetry are developed over generations. Religion, love, and war are common themes in songs and stories.

Afghan buildings are decorated with beautiful and complex flourishes and calligraphy. Afghan handicrafts are highly valued. Woven materials decorated with intricate embroidery add colour and vibrancy to clothing and accessories. Persian carpets are world renowned, and a source of pride among many Afghans.

⁸⁴ Afghanistan has a substantial number of nomadic people, often estimated at 10% of the country's total population.

Interpersonal Relations

Interpersonal relations among Afghans are largely ruled by the code of honour called *Pashtunwali* which is a national heritage. *Pashtunwali* (Pakhtunwali or Pathanwali) means "the way of the Pashtuns" and refers to the pre-Islamic religion, honour code and traditional lifestyle of the *Pashtun* people. Other non-*Pashtun* Afghans have also adopted many of its laws. *Pashtunwali* is socially practiced by the majority and followed by almost all Afghans. *Pashtunwali* is an ancient code of life or unwritten codes of ethics belonging to the *Pashtun* ethnicity. *Pashtunwali* promotes self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, love, forgiveness, revenge and tolerance toward all (especially to strangers or guests). It is considered a personal responsibility of every *Pashtun* to discover and rediscover *Pashtunwali's* essence and meaning. Though *Pashtunwali* is believed to date back to the pre-Islamic period, its usage or practice does not contravene basic Islamic principles. There are nine main principles of *Pashtunwali*:

- *Melmatia* (hospitality) - Showing hospitality and profound respect to all visitors, regardless of distinctions of race, religion, national affiliation as well as economic status and doing so without any hope of remuneration or favour. *Pashtuns* are widely considered to be the most hospitable people in the world and a *Pashtun* will go to great extents to show his hospitality.
- *Nanawati* (asylum) - Derived from the verb meaning to go in, this is used for protection given to a person who requests protection against his/her enemies. The people are protected at all costs; in many cases even people running from the law must be given refuge until the situation is clarified. It can also be used when the vanquished party is prepared to go in to the house of the victors and ask for their forgiveness⁸⁵.
- *Badal* (justice) - To seek justice or take revenge against the wrongdoer. This applies to injustices committed yesterday or 1000 years ago if the wrongdoer still exists. Justice in *Pashtun* lore needs elaborating: even a mere taunt (or "*Paighor*") is regarded as an insult - which can only usually be redressed by shedding of the taunter's blood (and if he isn't available, then his next closest male

⁸⁵ To refuse a person shelter, or sanctuary, is unthinkable to an Afghan. Even if the person seeking hospitality is a bitter enemy he cannot be refused. While in that man's house he is absolutely safe; his host would fight to protect him, give him the choicest food, and treat him as a member of his close family. A stranger, particularly a foreigner, sitting down to eat with a group of Afghans from the large communal pot will get the meatiest portions handed to him without hesitation.

relation). This in turn leads to a blood feud that can last generations and involve whole tribes with the loss of hundreds of lives. Normally blood feuds in this all male dominated setup are then settled in a number of ways⁸⁶.

- Tureh (bravery) - A *Pashtun* must defend his land/property, family and women from incursions wherever he or she might reside. A *Pashtun* should always stand brave against tyranny and he should always be able to defend his property, family, women and the honour of his name. Death can follow if anyone mistreats these traits.
- Sabat (loyalty) - Loyalty must be paid to one's family, friends, and tribe members. Loyalty is a must and a *Pashtun* can never become disloyal as this would be utterly shameful towards themselves and their families.
- Imamdari (righteousness) - A *Pashtun* must always strive towards thinking good thoughts, speaking good words and doing other good deeds. *Pashtuns* must behave respectfully towards all creations including people, animals and the environment around them. Pollution of the environment or its destruction is against the *Pashtunwali*.
- Isteqamat (persistence) – Trust in God. The notion of trusting in the one Creator generally comports to Islamic idea of belief in only one God (*tawheed*).
- Ghayrat (self honour or dignity) - *Pashtuns* must maintain their human dignity. Honour has great importance in *Pashtun* society and most other codes of life are aimed towards the preservation of one's honour or pride. They must respect themselves and others in order to be able to do so, especially those they do not know. Respect begins at home, among family members and relatives.
- *Namus* (Honour of women) - A *Pashtun* must defend the honour of *Pashtun* women at all costs and must protect them from vocal and physical harm.

⁸⁶ The Afghan will never turn the other cheek, a killing must be avenged by a killing, and so it goes on from generation to generation. A family will never forget a debt of honour. Revenge may not be swift, the injured party may bide his time for years if need be, until at the right moment he strikes. A son must kill his father's murderer. In many instances his mother will insist he does so, otherwise she will disown him and he will be disgraced. If the murderer himself is dead, then his son, or his brother, or his uncle, must die.

Other principles or concepts of *Pashtunwali* are:

- Freedom and independence - the belief that freedom in physical, mental, religious, spiritual, political and economic realms is for all to pursue, male and female, so long as it is done without bringing harm to others. The free have nothing to gain of freedom without discipline.
- Justice and forgiveness - If one intentionally wrongs another, the victim has the right, even an obligation, to avenge this injustice in equal proportion. If one has intentionally wronged you, and you did not seek justice nor did the wrongdoer ask you for his/her forgiveness, then a debt, is owed to you by him/her, which can only be fulfilled once justice (through an act of revenge or the decision of the *Jirga* council) has been provided to recompense the wrong done. Furthermore, justice and forgiveness extends to pardon any wrong, except for murder, when asked to do so by a woman, the wrongdoer's family, a sayyid (an Afghan who claims Arab descent), or a mullah; and to spare the life of anyone who takes refuge in a mosque or anyone in battle who begs for mercy.
- Honesty and promise - A *Pashtun* is known for keeping their promises and being honest at all situations and times. A true *Pashtun* will never break his/her promise.
- Unity and equality - above the languages they speak, above the blood they keep, above the amount of money they make, *Pashtunwali* unites the *Pashtuns* as one people across the world. Where there is true unity, every effort to disunite them will only serve to strengthen the unity they have. What happens to one - happens to all. Every man is equal. It is this concept which has necessitated the development amongst *Pashtuns* of a *Jirga* system, whereby decision making takes place with the participation of all members of the *Pashtun* society. Every man wants a say in his future and he will fight for his right to have his opinions heard. All people must therefore deal with each other, with the proper civility or respect and no one may impose their will on to another.
- Family and trust - the belief that fellow *Pashtun* brothers or sisters should be trusted and assisted to the greatest extent possible. The family must be glorified under a sacred conviction of responsibility and duty with respect for wives, daughters, elders, parents, sons, and husbands. Fellow *Pashtuns* must be cared for. There may be

hundreds of tribes, but they have one destiny in union with each other.

- Compassion and cooperation - The poor and the weak must be supported.
- Knowledge and history - *Pashtuns* seek objective knowledge in life, art, science, and culture, which are considered fruits granted by God. Great value is placed in *Pashtun* history, with all its depth and pluralism, tragedies and victories. It teaches *Pashtuns* "to keep the mind open, to continue the search for the truth, much of which has vanished under history itself".
- Fight evil - Evil is at constant war with good. Evil must be fought and good must prevail over evil. It is a *Pashtun's* duty to fight evil when he/she comes face to face with it.
- Hewad (nation) - Love for one's nation in *Pashtun* culture isn't just important, it's essential. A *Pashtun* is always indebted to their nation and must strive to perfect and improve it. A *Pashtun* considers it his obligation to defend his country *Pakhtara* ("*Pakhtun-khwa*" in modern colloquial Pashto) against any type of foreign incursion. Defence of nation means defence of honour, values, culture, tradition, countrymen and self.
- Dod-pashani (Protecting *Pashtun* culture) - It is obligatory for a *Pashtun* to protect *Pashtun* culture from dilution and disintegration. *Pashtunwali* advises that in order to successfully accomplish this, a *Pashtun* must retain the Pashto language since Pashto is the prime source of *Pashtun* culture.
- Tokham-Pashbanni (Protecting the *Pashtun* Race) – *Pashtuns* must marry *Pashtuns*. This stems from the idea that "half-*Pashtuns*" do not retain the *Pashtun* language, culture and physical features.
- Lashkar (The tribal army) - It implements the decisions of the *jirga*.
- Jirga or Loya Jirga (assembly or grand assembly) - an assembly of tribal elders called for various purposes whether waging war or composing peace, tribal or inter-tribal.
- Tsalweshti - derived from the word for forty, this refers to the tribal force that would implement the decision of a *jirga*. Every fortieth man of the tribe would be a member. A *shalgoon* is a force derived from the number twenty.

- Badragga - a tribal escort composed of members of that tribe through which the travellers are passing. If a *badragga* is violated a tribal feud will follow.
- Hamsaya - a non-Pashtun dependent group who attaches themselves to a *Pashtun* group, usually for protection. The *Pashtun* protector group is called a *naik*. Any attack on a hamsaya is considered an attack on the protector.
- Mlatar - literally, *tying the back* or "support". This refers to those members of the tribe who will actually fight on behalf of their leaders.
- Nagha - a tribal fine decided by the council of elders and imposed upon the wrongdoer.
- Rogha - settlement of a dispute between warring factions.
- Hujra - a common sitting or sleeping place for males in the village. Visitors and unmarried young men sleep in the hujra.
- Lokhay Warkawal - Literally means 'giving of pot'. The idea that the tribe will do everything to protect an individual from an enemy.

In addition to *Pashtunwali* most Afghans also follow the Islamic code of law, the *Sharia*. *Sharia* is the sacred law of Islam. All Muslims believe *Sharia* is God's law, but they have differences among themselves as to exactly what it entails. Modernists, traditionalists and fundamentalists all hold different views of *Sharia*, as do adherents to different schools of Islamic thought and scholarship. Different countries and cultures have varying interpretations of *Sharia* as well. *Sharia* is a comprehensive code of behaviour that embraces both private and public activities. The *Sharia* encompasses and governs every sphere of human activity including the spiritual, moral, social, economic and political aspects of life. The *Sharia* protects and defends life, property, honour, religion and intellect.

Muslims believe all *Sharia* is derived from two primary sources, the divine revelations set forth in the *Qur'an*, and the sayings and example set by the Islamic Prophet Muhammad in the *Sunnah*. *Fiqh*, or "jurisprudence," interprets and extends the application of *Sharia* to questions not directly addressed in the primary sources, by including secondary sources. These secondary sources usually include the consensus of the religious scholars embodied in *ijma*⁸⁷, and analogy

⁸⁷ In addition to the "Basic Code" of the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, traditional Sunni Muslims also add the consensus (*ijma*) of Muhammad's companions (*sahaba*) and Islamic jurists (*ulema*) on certain issues. In situations where no concrete rule exists in the sources, law scholars use *qiyas* — various forms of reasoning, including analogy, to derive law from the essence of divine principles and preceding rulings.

from the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* through *qiyas*. *Shia*⁸⁸ jurists replace *qiyas* analogy with '*aql*, or "reason". Where it enjoys official status, *Sharia* is applied by Islamic judges, or *qadis*. The *imam* has varying responsibilities depending on the interpretation of *Sharia*. While the term is commonly used to refer to the leader of communal prayers, the *imam* may also be a scholar, religious leader or political leader. *Sharia* deals with many topics addressed by secular law, including crime, politics and economics, as well as personal matters such as sexuality, hygiene, diet, prayer, and fasting. The practices called *Sharia* today, however, also have roots in comparative law and local customs (*urf*). The Afghan legal system is strongly influenced by *Sharia*, but also cedes ultimate authority to their constitutions and the rule of law.

Sharia can be divided into five main branches:

- *Ibadah* (ritual worship) - In terms of Islam, *ibadah* is the ultimate obedience, the ultimate submission, and the ultimate humility to Allah (God) along with the ultimate love for Him. Muslims believe that *ibadah* is the reason for the existence of all humanity. That is, Muslims believe that all people exist only to worship Allah. *Ibadah* consequently means following Islamic beliefs and practices – its commands, prohibitions, the *halal*, and the *haraam*. For Muslims, *ibadah* is also something that comes from the heart, or sincerity, as a result of belief in Islam. Therefore, *ibadah* is something that cannot be forced upon another person. The acts of *ibadah* (worship), like we find it in Classic Islamic law, includes:
 - *Wudu* (Ritual Purification) - Purification is both a spiritual and a physical matter for Muslims.

The consensus of the community, public interest, and other sources are used as an adjunct to *Sharia* where the primary and secondary sources allow. This description can be applied to the major schools of Sunni *fiqh*, which include the *Hanafi*, *Shafi'i*, *Maliki* and *Hanbali*.

⁸⁸ Shia Muslims also extend the "Basic Code" with *fiqh*, but strongly reject analogy (*qiyas*) as an easy way to innovations (*bid'ah*), and reject consensus (*ijma*) as not having any particular value in its own. During the period that the *Sunni* scholars developed those two tools, the *Shi'a* Imams were alive, and *Shi'a* view them as an extension of the *Sunnah*, so they view themselves as deriving their laws (*fiqh*) only from the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*. A recurring theme in *Shi'a* jurisprudence is logic (*mantiq*), something most *Shi'a* believe they mention, employ and value to a higher degree than most *Sunnis* do. They do not view logic as a third source for laws, rather a way to see if the derived work is compatible with the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*. In *Imami-Shi'i* law, the sources of law (*usul al-fiqh*) are the *Qur'an*, anecdotes of Muhammad's practices and those of The Twelve Imams, and the intellect ('*aql*). Most *Shi'a* Muslims followed the *Ja'fari* school of thought.

- *Salah* (Prayers) - Muslims are enjoined to pray five times each day, with certain exceptions.
- *Ramadan* and *Sawm* (Fasts) - During the Islamic month of Ramadan, Muslims abstain from food, drink, sex and tobacco between dawn and sunset. Exceptions to this obligation are made for the young, the infirm, and women during their periods of menstruation or pregnancy. During Ramadan, the daylight hours will often begin and end with a large meal.
- *Zakat* (Charities) - All Muslims who live above the subsistence level must pay an annual poor tax, known as *zakat*.
- *Hajj* (Pilgrimage to Mecca) - At least once in each Muslim's lifetime, they must attempt a visit to the Holy Places of Islam located in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
- *Mu'amalat* (Human interaction, transactions and contracts)
- *Mu'amalat* are basic rules that Muslim has to follow in human interaction and during conducting business. It covers following areas:
 - Financial transactions / Trade – Islamic law recognizes private and community property, as well as overlapping forms of entitlement for charitable purposes, known as *waqf* or trusts. Classic Islamic law details the manner of contracting, the types of transactions, the assignment of liability and reward, and the responsibilities of the parties in Islamic trade.
 - Laws of inheritance - The rules of inheritance under *Sharia* law are intricate, and a female's portion is generally half the amount a male would receive under the same circumstances. Up to one third of a person's property may be distributed as bequests, or *wasiyya*, upon their death. After debts are settled, the remainder of the estate will be divided among the family of the deceased according to the rules of inheritance, or *irth*. Classic Islamic law details the division of property, the shares family members are entitled to, adjustments and redistributions in the shares, orders of precedence among inheritors, and substitution among inheritors.
- Marriage - The laws governing Islamic marriage vary substantially between sects, schools, states and cultures.

Requirements for Islamic Marriages:

- *The man who is not currently a fornicator may marry only a woman who is not currently a fornicatress or a chaste woman from the people of the Book.*
- *The woman who is not currently a fornicatress may marry only a man who is not currently a fornicator.*
- *The fornicator may marry only a fornicatress.*
- *The Muslim woman may marry only a Muslim man.*
- *Permission for a virgin female to marry must be given by her guardian, usually her father.*
- *The father, or in some cases the paternal grandfather, may choose a suitable partner for a virgin girl. No other person designated as a girl's guardian may compel her marriage.*
- *The guardian may not marry the divorced woman or the widow if she did not ask to be married.*
- *It is obligatory for a man to give bride wealth (gifts) to the woman he marries.*

- Polygamy - In *Sharia* law, a Muslim man is permitted up to four wives under the rules for *nikah*. All wives are entitled to separate living quarters at the behest of the husband and if possible. All should receive equal attention, support, treatment and inheritance. In modern practice, it is uncommon for a Muslim man to have more than one wife; if he does so, it is often due to the infertility of his first wife. The practice of polygamy has been regulated or abolished in some Muslim states.
- Divorce - The laws governing divorce vary substantially between sects, schools, states and cultures.
- Foods and drinks - Islamic law does not present a comprehensive list of pure foods and drinks. However, it prohibits:

- Swine, blood, meat of dead animals and animals slaughtered in the name of someone other than God⁸⁹.
 - Slaughtering an animal in any other way except in the prescribed manner of *tazkiyah* (cleansing) by taking God's name, which involves cutting the throat of the animal and draining the blood. Causing the animal unnecessary pain, slaughtering with a blunt blade or physically ripping out the esophagus is strictly forbidden. Modern methods of slaughter like the captive bolt stunning and electrocuting are also prohibited.
 - Intoxicants.
 - Liquor and gambling are expressly prohibited in the *Qur'an*, and *Sharia* law.
- Judicial matters (including witnesses and forms of evidence) - Sharia judicial proceedings have significant differences with other legal traditions, including those in both common law and civil law. Sharia courts do not generally employ lawyers; plaintiffs and defendants represent themselves. Non-Muslim minorities, however, could and did use Sharia courts, even amongst themselves.
- *Adab* (morals and manners) - *Adab*, in the context of behaviour, refers to prescribed Islamic etiquette: "refinement, good manners, morals, decorum, decency, humaneness". Islam has rules of etiquette and an ethical code involving every aspect of life. Muslims refer to *Adab* as good manners, courtesy, respect, and appropriateness, covering acts such as entering or exiting a washroom, posture when sitting, and cleansing oneself.

Practitioners of Islam are generally taught to follow some specific customs in their daily lives. It includes customs like:

- Saying *Bismillah* (in the name of God) before eating and drinking.

⁸⁹ The prohibition of dead meat is not applicable to fish and locusts. Also *hadith* literature prohibits beasts having sharp canine teeth, birds having claws and talons in their feet, *Jallalah* (animals whose meat carries a stink in it because they feed on filth), tamed donkeys, and any piece cut from a living animal.

- Using the right hand for drinking and eating.
 - Saying "*As-Salamu Alaykum*" (peace be upon you) when meeting someone and answering with "*Wa 'alaikumus salam*" (and peace be upon you).
 - Saying "*Alhamdulillah*" (all gratitude is for only God) when sneezing and responding with "*Yarhamukallah*" (God have mercy on you).
 - Saying the "*Adhan*" (prayer call) in the right ear of a newborn and the *Iqama* in its left.
 - In the sphere of hygiene, it includes:
 - Clipping the moustache
 - Cutting nails
 - Circumcising the male offspring
 - Cleaning the nostrils, the mouth, and the teeth and
 - Cleaning the body after urination and defecation
 - Abstention from sexual relations during the menstrual cycle and the puerperal discharge, and ceremonial bath after the menstrual cycle, and *Janabah* (seminal/ovular discharge or sexual intercourse).
 - Burial rituals include funeral prayer of bathed and enshrouded body in coffin cloth and burying it in a grave.
- *I'tiqadat* (beliefs) – Muslims enumerate their creed to include the six articles of belief. There is a consensus on the elements of this creed across all spectrums as they are clearly articulated in the Qur'an. Sectarian differences between Shiites and Sunnis are often expressed in differences in braches or elaboration of creedal beliefs as opposed to the core creed (*aqidah*).

The six articles of belief are:

- Belief in God (*Allah*) the one and only one worthy of all worship (*tawhid*).
- Belief in the Angels (*mala'ika*).
- Belief in the Books (*katab*) sent by Allah (including the *Qur'an*).
- Belief in all Messengers (*rusul*) sent by Allah.
- Belief in the Day of Judgement (*qiyama*) and in the resurrection (life after death).
- Belief in Destiny (*qadar*).

In Sunni and Shia view, having an Imam literally means to have belief in this six articles. Islam explicitly asserts that belief should be maintained in that which cause proven using faculties of perception and conception.

- 'Uqubat (punishments) - the Islamic penal system is just one of many branches of *Sharia*. In an Islamic state, punishment follows a long series of prohibitory and reformatory steps where all efforts are made to engender attitudes of contempt for crime and eliminate all the root 'causes'. Islam, being cognizant of human conditions, provides for this when it divides its penal penalties in three categories:
 - *hudood* (singular *haad*) meaning a thing which restrains or prevents since a punishment "prevents a man from doing crimes". However, it is a strictly defined penalty which is mentioned in the *Qur'an* or the *Hadith* and it includes adultery, fornication, false imputation of unchastity (*qadhaf*), drunkenness, armed robbery, sedition and apostasy, though there are some disagreements on whether one or two are technically described as '*hudood*'. Because of "the decisive nature of *haad*, its severity and its exactness and its strictness in the rules of evidence", it has "considerably limited the severest penalties".
 - *qisas* (equitable retribution), is inflicted for deliberate killing or wounding of a person. Unlike *haad*, the penalty could be waived by the victim or his heir in lieu of blood-money (*diya*), but for unintentional homicide or wounding there is no retribution and only compensation is paid.
 - *ta'zeer* (discretionary punishment) and it is "a sentence or punishment whose measure is not fixed by the *Sharia* neither as to the offence nor the penalty. It helps to meet varying circumstances (e.g. if a definitional element is short in a *haad* offence) and the punishment that was generally inflicted in the past was whipping, though other alternatives such as a warning, fines and imprisonment could be given, but the quantum of punishment for *ta'zeer* is generally much below that of *haad* (e.g. ten lashes).

Sharia recognizes 3 types of punishment:

- Lashing - Among the *hudood* punishments, the offences of fornication, slander and drunkenness carry the penalty of lashing and it could also be prescribed for a number of *ta'zeer* offences. Even with respect to lashing at the time of sentencing, certain conditions and restrictions are imposed; the punishment should not be inflicted by vicious executioners and it should not be carried out in severe hot or cold weather. It is also prescribed that the whip be of medium size, the lashing is done with average intensity and it should not be inflicted on the naked body nor on the head, face and private parts and the lashing should not cause any wound and it should be distributed evenly in various parts of the body and not only on the same parts.
- Stoning - This is the most severe of all the punishments that exist in Islamic law. Islamic law aims to ensure the stability of society from its very base - the family - which is the 'nucleus' of society that breeds society's values and holds together the various institutions in society. Chastity is highly esteemed as a supreme virtue in Islamic societies and *zina*, the unlawful sexual union between a man and a woman who are not married to each other, is unacceptable. *Zina* is the most deadly of all social crimes. For fornication between unmarried couples the penalty is 100 lashes and for adultery between married couples the penalty is stoning to death (*rajm*).
- Mutilating - In Islamic law, its application is only confined to the *hudood* punishments for armed robbery and theft, except of course that it might be applicable to the retributive punishments of *qisas*. However, under Islamic law, the type of theft (*sariqah*) that invokes the *haad* punishment is very restrictive in scope and is more akin to 'burglary. Even with that restrictive definition of theft, "all elements of the crime must be committed by one person" and all the definitional elements of theft must be there such as the following:

1. it is committed intentionally by a sane and mature person who is not driven by force of circumstances (e.g. poverty);
2. the property must lawfully belong to another and have some value, that the value of the stolen property reaches a minimum value of 3 or 10 *dirhams* and the property must have been taken from a sufficiently 'safe' place or proximity suitable for the safety of the object;
3. the act of stealing must be attested by at least two witnesses who physically saw the crime being committed.

Several of these severe penalties were administered under the rule of the Taliban – but very often in a total unjustified extent – therefore these punishments are not generally accepted anymore by the moderate Afghans.

Based on *Qur'anic* verses, classic *Sharia* distinguishes between Muslims, pagans, and the followers of other monotheistic religions⁹⁰. Jews and Christians have been afforded a special status known as *dhimmi*, derived from a theoretical contract - "*dhimma*" or "residence in return for taxes". There are parallels for this in Roman and Jewish law. Hindus were originally considered pagans and given the choice between conversion to Islam and death (or slavery)⁹¹. By the middle Ages, the Hindus of India had come to be considered *dhimmis* by their Muslim rulers. Eventually, the largest school of Islamic scholarship applied this term to all non-Muslims living in Islamic lands outside the sacred area surrounding Mecca, Saudi Arabia. *Sharia* attributes different legal rights to different groups; in practice, this consists of less right for non-Muslims.

Afghan general perspective / view on interpersonal relationship

Interpersonal relationships are of the utmost importance in Afghanistan and accomplish a great deal in any business or political transaction. Collective history and mutual understanding are mandatory for effective interpersonal relationships. Loyalty is very important while insults (in any form) to character or family are far more offensive than to property or possessions.

⁹⁰ Often referred to as "people of The Book".

⁹¹ Pagans are not afforded the rights and protections of the *dhimma* contract.

At the same time, because of the numbers of refugees who fled the country and spent many years in neighbouring countries with different value systems, followed by an influx of foreigners and western media to Afghanistan there has been somewhat of a loss of traditional Afghan values and culture, leaving many Afghans negotiating a new Afghan identity.

Family

Although variations may exist between ethnic groups and those practicing different modes of subsistence, the family remains the single most important institution in Afghan society. Characteristically, the Afghan family is endogamous (with parallel and cross-cousin marriages preferred), patriarchal (authority vested in male elders), patrilineal (inheritance through the male line), and patrilocal (girl moves to husband's place of residence on marriage). Polygamy (multiple wives) is permitted, but is no longer so widely practiced.

Within families there is a tendency toward respect for age, male or female, reverence for motherhood, eagerness for children, especially sons, and avoidance of divorce. Rigorously honoured ideals emphasizing family cohesiveness through extended kinship networks endow the family with its primary function as a support system.

The extended family, the major economic and social unit in the society, replaces government because of the absence of an adequate nation-wide service infrastructure. Child socialization takes place within the family because of deficiencies in the education system. Thus, individual social, economic and political rights and obligations are found within the family which guarantees security to each man and woman, from birth to death.

The strength of this sense of family solidarity has been amply evident throughout the past years of disruption. Although families may be split and now reside on separate continents a world apart, those that are more affluent regularly send remittances to less fortunate family members. Many urban Afghan refugee families in Pakistan would otherwise be totally destitute. Similarly, newly arrived refugees always find shelter with families already established in Pakistan. At times, single family living spaces will be stretched to accommodate up to twenty new persons because family members cannot be turned away. Similar obligations extend to finding employment for relatives. This at times leads to the blatant nepotism which plagues the aid assistance network in Pakistan.

This is not to say that no tensions exist within the extended family system. Fierce competition over authority, inheritance, and individual aspirations do develop. The violent enmity that rises between cousins, for example, particularly over the selection of brides, is so often present that it has become a favourite theme of countless songs and folktales.

In Afghanistan extended families are characterized by residential unity being it in a valley, a village or a single compound. Extended family households may contain three to four generations including the male head of family and his wife, his brothers, several sons and their families, cousins with their families, as well as all unmarried and widowed females. Nuclear family households geographically grouped within extended family settings are also common. These will frequently accommodate elderly grandparents and single or widowed aunts. No matter how they may be spaced, these multigenerational units practice close economic cooperation and come together on all life-crisis occasions. This permits cohesive in-group solidarity to be maintained.

The core of the family consists of the mother-in-law, the daughters-in-law and daughters, with the senior woman reigning at the top of the power hierarchy within the household. In families with multiple wives, each wife has her own room, with her own belongings and furnishings; sometimes her own cooking space is provided. The courtyard provides space for joint household activities and entertainment.

The practice of taking more than one wife became less and less prevalent over the past few decades. Few men could afford to do so. Barrenness and a failure to produce sons are common reasons for its continuation. Barrenness is a frightening social stigma, not only for wives but for her family as well. Most men feel obliged to rectify the situation, but because divorce is so repugnant the option of a second wife is preferred by all.

In other cases, multiple wives are taken in order to fulfil familial obligations to provide unmarried kin or young widows with a home and security. Although the institution of the levirate in which a widow is married, with or without her consent, to a member of her deceased husband's family is explicitly forbidden in the Qur'an, it functions traditionally to stabilize family identification and ensure economic security. By the 1960s the levirate had all but ceased to function in many areas, but it was increasingly employed after 1978 because of the unprecedented number of war widows. The vulnerability of widows too young to have established a commanding status in the family hierarchy is more frequently addressed through the levirate today than in pre-exodus Afghanistan.

While male authority in the family is paramount in all groups, some important differences in male-female interrelations can be noted within rural and urban environments. In the rural areas interrelated responsibilities between men and women establish a bond of partnership that builds mutual respect. One highly important family activity performed by rural women that is often overlooked is their management of family food supplies. A woman, often an elderly member of the household, receives the household's supply of grain following the harvest. She must make sure that this supply of the family's basic food staple is apportioned correctly over the year until the next harvest comes in. Otherwise the family must go into debt, or starve. Household management and responsibility for the upbringing of children thus give rural women considerable authority in their domestic sphere.

By contrast, in traditional urban lower and middle class homes men daily leave the house to work at jobs with which women are not involved and about which they have little knowledge or interest. These women are consequently more rigidly relegated to purely domestic duties of serving husbands and caring for children. Remarkable changes took place among middle class and elite families after 1959 when the government supported the voluntary end to seclusion for women. Women sought education and moved into the public sphere in ever increasing numbers. Nevertheless, working women are still expected to socialize within the family, not with their colleagues at work.

The innate belief in male superiority provides an ideological basis for the acceptance of male control over families. Socially circumscribed and male determined roles open to women are believed necessary to maintain social order, and when women do not appear to be controlled in traditional ways, as, for example, when they take up unusual public career or behavioural roles, this is taken as a danger sign heralding social disintegration. Life crisis decisions about education, careers and marriage are, therefore, made by male family members.

Embodied in the acceptance of the male right to control decisions on female behaviour is the dual concept of male prestige and family honour. Any evidence of independent female action is regarded as evidence of lost male control and results in ostracism, which adversely affects the entire family's standing within the community. Community pressures thus make women dependent on men, even among modernized urban families. On the other hand, since the construction of family and male reputations, notably their much valued honour, depends upon the good behaviour of women, women derive a certain amount of leverage within family relationships from their ability to damage family

prestige through subtle nonconformist behaviour, such as simply failing to provide adequate hospitality, or a lack of rectitude within the home.

Afghan society places much emphasis on hospitality and the rules of etiquette that distinguish good behaviour toward guests. By disregarding social niceties a person diminishes the reputation of both the immediate family and the extended family or group. Conversely, families gain respect, maintain status and enhance their standing in the community through exemplary behaviour.

Since the family is so central to the lives of men, women and children, and since women's roles are pivotal to family well-being, the selection of spouses is of prime concern. The preferred spouse is a close relative or at least within a related lineage; the ideal being the father's brother's daughter, or first cousin, although this is not always feasible. In reality the process is far more complicated and involves a multiplicity of considerations, including strengthening group solidarity, sustaining social order, confirming social status, enhancing wealth and power or economic and political standing, increasing control over resources, resolving disputes, and compensating for injury and death.

Within this complicated web governing marriage negotiations, other factors must also be taken into account such as sectarian membership, ethnic group, family status, kin relationships, and economic benefits. The bride's skills, industriousness and temperament are also considered and, with all, the happiness and welfare of the girl is often not neglected.

Although endogamous marriage is prevalent in all groups, marriages between ethnic groups have always occurred. Over the past few decades these have increased because large populations have settled outside their ancestral areas, communication networks have improved and industrial complexes have drawn workers from many areas. In addition, political and economic changes occasioned by these developments shifted the balance of various types of productive resources and this led to forging marital links between unrelated and previously unconnected groups for benefits other than expressions of status.

Except in cases in which the institution of marriage is manipulated for political and economic purposes, female family members initiate the elaborate process of betrothal through their own women's networks. Men are generally not involved in the initial stages although sometimes a son will elicit the support of his mother; sometimes a brother will bring about a match for his sister with one of his friends, or even a young man she has observed from the rooftop of her home. Brother-sister bonds are very strong.

Men enter the process in order to set the financial agreements before the engagement is announced. These entail the transfer of money, property or livestock from the groom's family to the bride's family. The large sums frequently demanded should not be seen only as evidence of avaricious fathers. Brides gain status according to the value set for them; too meagre sums devalue both father and bride in the eyes of their community. Islam does not prescribe such a bride-price, but does enjoin the giving of *mahr* in the form of money or property for the personal use of the bride so that her financial welfare may be ensured in the event of divorce. Islamic law does not include the concept of alimony.

In many cases, however, the bride fails to receive her legitimate portion of the marriage settlement. This causes friction, and cases concerning inheritance are frequently brought before the urban family courts, to which rural women seldom have access. In addition, because exorbitant sums are often demanded, many men are unable to marry until they are older. Very young girls, therefore, are frequently married with much older men. As a result young widowhood is common, giving rise to the practice of the levirate described above. Under normal circumstances, however, girls are married while in their teens to boys in their mid-twenties. Cases of child marriage, however, are not unknown.

Every marriage entails two exchanges. The dowry brought by the bride to her husband's home normally equals the value of the bride-price. It includes clothing, bedding and household utensils which are expected to last the couple for fifteen years. Most importantly, the quality of the dowry often influences the treatment and status accorded the bride on her arrival at her husband's home. A majority of the items are made by the girl, in cooperation with her female relatives and friends. The preparation of the bridal hope chest, therefore, constitutes a crucial female activity in every home. The trousseau of embroidered, woven and tailored items is important to the prestige of both families and must be as impressive as possible.

The ratio of inheritance is two to one in favour of males; a wife receives one-third of her son's shares. In practice, women are often denied their rightful inheritance, again causing tensions not only within nuclear families, but among kin groups of the wife as well.

Various tribal and ethnic groups follow practices which are not strictly consistent with Islamic law. Past governments have sought to institutionalize social reforms pertaining to the family for over one hundred years. Using the dictates of Islam, Afghan monarchs since Emir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) have decreed and legislated against child marriages, forced marriages, the levirate and

exorbitant bride-prices. They upheld hereditary rights of women, authorized women to receive the *mahr* for their personal use, and supported the right of women to seek divorce under certain circumstances such as non-support, maltreatment and impotency.

Afghan general perspective / view on family

Afghan life revolves around family, including extended family. Families often live together, with parents living with their sons and their families in one compound. The women of the family care for the home and children and the grandmother delegates domestic chores. In the home, women have significant power but little in public. Children are considered a blessing from God and elders are highly respected and cared for. Marrying, raising children, funerals and all other life events are collective.

Tribe

Tribalism is not a feature of every ethnic group in Afghanistan; and even within tribally organized groups, tribalism is a flexible concept that allows variations to exist and changes to occur as kinship groups rise and fall.

Tribal identity which merges with ethnicity rests on unified genealogies consisting of descendants of a common male ancestor whose name often provides the name of the group. Internal divisions consist of the descendants of intermediate descendants of the original founder. Thus an entire tribe may descend from a man ten or more generations in the past. Smaller segmented patrilineages composed of great-grandsons and grandsons form units of residence and strong personal loyalty.

Although preferred marriages for males are to father's brother's daughters, genealogies reflect political, economic and social alliances outside strict descent lines. Typically, it is men from dominant groups who will seek to marry with females outside their own ethnic group.

The *Pashtuns* represent the largest tribal entities in Afghanistan; among them tribal institutions are strongest within the *Ghilzai*. Common characteristics

of *Pashtun* tribal organization ideally feature egalitarianism, democratic decision-making through councils called *jirga* or *shura*⁹².

The aristocratic elites, who lead subdivisions, raise to their positions primarily through personal charisma, patronage, and leadership abilities rather than by primogeniture, which is not recognized in Muslim law, or any type of prescribed hereditary rights. Tribal organization is therefore a cephalous or without a paramount chief. And the measure of their power differs. Heads of nomadic tribal groups, for instance, act principally as spokesmen, but have no right to make decisions binding on others.

The absence of recognized principles governing the assumption of leadership allows for intense competition. Rivalries within and between tribal segments and between tribes and sub-tribes consequently have always existed. It is these internecine feuds that have earned the *Pashtuns* their reputation as an unruly and warlike people. Nonetheless, when outside forces threaten, the *Pashtuns* are equally reputed for their ability to forge formidable alliances, among themselves and with other ethnic groups.

Both internal as well as inter-group conflicts are most often rooted in matters of personal and group honour, personal enmities, family dissensions concerning brides and property, struggles for material possession, access to resources, territorial integrity and extensions of power, rather than in intrinsic attitudes of ethnic discrimination.

Gender Roles

Afghan society is consistent in its attitudes toward the underlying principles of gender. It is the application of these principles that varies from group to group; and there is a wide range of standards set for accepted female behaviour, as well as differences in male attitudes toward correct treatment of women. Contradictions arise between traditional customary practices, many of which impinge on the rights of women and are alien to the spirit of Islam, the other functioning canon which emphasizes equality, justice, education and community service for both men and women. Further, the dictates of Islam are themselves subject to diverse interpretation among reformists, Islamists and ultraconservatives. Debates between these groups can be highly volatile.

⁹² During the *jirga* a decision has to be made. *Shura* allows only discussion on certain topic and does not require a decision.

Differences between men and women exist and are best preserved through recognized standards of behaviour. None dispute the centrality of women in the society. Respect for women is a notable characteristic and few wish to destroy this esteemed status, nor deny what Islam enjoins or Afghan culture values. The argument rages over definitions of precisely what constitutes honourable behaviour for women in terms of modern realities, especially in the light of today's monumental reconstruction needs which demand full participation from every Afghan citizen.

The current zealous need to protect women's morality stems from the fact that Afghan society regards women as the perpetuators of the ideals of the society. As such they symbolize honour of family, community and nation and must be controlled as well as protected so as to maintain moral purity. By imposing strict restraints directly on women, the society's most sensitive component symbolizing male honour, authorities convey their intent to subordinate personal autonomy and thereby strengthen the impression that they are capable of exercising control over all aspects of social behaviour, male and female.

The practice of *purdah*, seclusion⁹³, including veiling, is the most visible manifestation of this attitude. This concept includes an insistence on separate spaces for men and women and proscriptions against interactions between the sexes outside the *mahrammat*⁹⁴. These restrictions severely limit women's activities, including access to education and employment outside the home. Many are largely confined to their homes. Such restrictions are deemed necessary by conservative males because they consider women socially immature, with less moral control and physical restraint; women's hyper sexuality precludes responsible behaviour. Consequently, women are untrustworthy and must be kept behind the curtain so as not to disrupt the social order. The need for their seclusion therefore is paramount.

Afghan women view their sexuality more positively and question male maturity and self-control. In reality the differences between private and public behaviour are significant. In private, there is a noticeable sharing of ideas and responsibilities and in many households individual charisma and strength of character surmounts conventional subordinate roles. Even moral misconduct can be largely overlooked until it becomes a matter of public knowledge. Then punishment must be severe for male and family honour must be vindicated. It is

⁹³ In Persian, literally meaning curtain.

⁹⁴ Acceptable male guardians such as father, brother son, and any other male with whom women may not marry.

the public image that counts. As a result, urban women are models of reticence in public and rural women appear properly submissive.

That a family's social position depends on the public behaviour of its female members is a guiding reality. Stepping outside prescribed roles and behavioural norms, publicly, results in moral condemnation and social ostracism. It is the dictates of society that place a burden on both men and women to conform.

Under such circumstances gender roles necessarily follow defined paths. Male prerogatives reside in family economic welfare, politics, and relationships with outsiders; within the family they are expected to be disciplinarians and providers for aged parents. Female roles stress motherhood, child socialization and family nurturing. Even among professional career women, family responsibilities remain a top priority. Thus women's self-perception of their roles, among the majority, urban and rural, contributes to the perpetuation of patriarchal values.

Within the vast store of Afghan folktales covering religion, history and moral values, many reinforce the values governing male and female behaviour. They illustrate what can or cannot be done, describe rewards and punishments, and define ideal personality types. Thus they serve to perpetuate the existing gender order and through example make it psychologically satisfying.

The status and power of a girl increases as she moves from child to bride to mother to grandmother. A successful marriage with many sons is the principal goal of Afghan women, wholeheartedly shared by Afghan men. Women's nurturing roles are also crucial. This does not mean that women are confined to domestic roles. The stereotyping of Afghan women as chattel living lives of unremitting labour, valued by men solely for sexual pleasure and reproductive services is patently false.

Women's work varies from group to group. Among most settled rural families, women participate in agricultural work only during light harvesting periods, and are responsible for the production of milk products.

Although statistics indicate that by 1978 women were joining the workforce in increasing numbers, only about eight percent of the female population received an income. Most of these women lived in urban centres, and the majority were professionals, technicians and administrators employed by the government which continued its strong support. A majority worked in health and education, the two sectors considered most appropriate for women as they are

extensions of traditional women's roles. Others worked in the police, the army, and with the airlines; in government textile, ceramic, food processing and prefab construction factories. A few worked in private industry; a few were self-employed.

The current revival of conservative attitudes toward appropriate extra domestic roles for women and the criticism of women's visibility in public have largely impacted these professional women. Islamic texts do not delineate roles for women. What they imply is open to interpretation. What they command is equality and justice guaranteeing that women be treated as in no way lesser than men. Educated Afghan women are standing fast in their determination to find ways in which they may participate in the nation's reconstruction according to their interpretations of Islam's tenets. This is a powerful challenge now facing the society.

Afghan general perspective / view on gender roles

While gender roles are clearly defined in Afghanistan and especially in the most religiously conservative and illiterate families, this area is perhaps the most stereotyped segment of Afghan society and therefore, prone to numerous misunderstandings. The extent to which public gender roles are influenced by a particular government depends to a large degree on how religiously conservative a government is; Islam and its various interpretations are perhaps the most significant factors dictating gender roles in Afghanistan. In the 1960s and early 1970s, especially in the large urban centres, women were very "free"; miniskirts were acceptable as was employment outside the home and male-female socializing. The much more conservative period under the Taliban however, resulted in the suppression of this type of interaction.

Gender roles in the privacy of the family are not as strictly defined as the public gender roles. In the family and home, women are given great responsibility and motherhood is highly regarded. Despite otherwise defined roles, there is room for women who extend their influence outside of the typical roles, such as the few, but highly respected, women tribal leaders or military personal.

Recreation

Afghans are competitive and love sports, although only men are allowed to play sports. Popular sports include soccer, wrestling, and field hockey. Afghan refugees returning to Afghanistan are introducing more sports, including tennis, golf, cricket, and basketball.

Cricket teams have been organized in several cities.

Traditional sports are also widely played. *Buzkashi* is an ancient game that originated in central Asia. It is most popular in northern Afghanistan, where the Uzbeks are considered *buzkashi* champions.

In the game, teams of men on horseback attempt to gain possession of a headless animal carcass (usually that of a calf), carry it from the centre of the field to a post, and then return it to the centre. Opposing teams attempt to stop the player with possession with whips and other means of physical force. Horses are specially trained for *buzkashi*, and players must have excellent riding ability to master the sport.

Another traditional sport in Afghanistan is *pahlwani*, a form of wrestling that is usually held alongside *buzkashi* matches. The sport entails an individual pinning an opponent to the ground without touching his legs. Boys and young men also play a game consisting of two teams of players with linked arms. They face each other, and one person runs across trying to break through the other team.

Afghan children, including girls, enjoy playing tag, hopscotch, and marbles. Snowball fights are popular in the winter. Kite fighting is also a popular game for children. Kites are made with bamboo sticks and tissue paper and flown across the sky attempting to cut the lines of other kites. Some competitive kite fighters soak the kite line in glue and glass to make their stings sharper. *Gursai* is a rural sport where children hold their left feet with their right hands and hop around trying to throw each other off balance.

Singing and dancing is popular in Afghanistan. Instead of dancing with a partner, Afghans dance alone or in circles. Teahouses are popular among men, where they talk, listen to music, and drink tea. Men also gamble on animal fighting, usually roosters. Music is represented chiefly by traditional folk songs, ballads, and dances.

Among the stringed instruments, the six-stringed *rohab* is thought to be the ancestor to the Western violin and cello. Other instruments include the *santur*

(a kind of zither), a hand-pumped harmonium, the *chang* (a plucked mouth harp), and a variety of drums beaten with the palm and fingers. The *attan* dance derived from *Pashtun* areas is the national dance. It is performed in a large circle with the dancers clapping their hands and quickening the movements of their feet to the beat of the music. On vacation holidays or weekends Afghans often gather to play music and sing at a picnic on a riverbank or in woodland.

The art of telling stories with music and spoken word has been highly developed and passes on traditional folk tales and culture to future generations.

Four national parks are being established in Afghanistan. Tourism companies lead expeditions through the beautiful mountains and valleys of Afghanistan. Other attractions include the Minaret of Jam, which was built in the 12th century and is on the UNESCO world heritage list and Buddhist ruins from the 4th century.

Afghan general perspective / view on recreation

Part of leisure time activities include storytelling, music, dance, sport (taekwondo has become highly popular in recent years), kite flying and buzkashi. Dog fights and cock fights, camel fighting fights are also popular. Mehimonie, or visiting, is also very important and most weekends include visits to one's friends and relatives. Receiving guests well is very important and one must always be prepared to serve anything from a light snack and tea to a full meal to any guests who grace one's home.

GOVERNANCE

Community Councils

At present in Afghanistan there are two separate decisions making bodies that should help a local population to meet their basic needs. There are community councils and the centralized system of local government.

A variety of community councils exist throughout Afghanistan, with considerable variation between regions and between rural and urban areas. Traditionally, an Afghan *jirga* or *shura* is a place where all the men in the community can meet to discuss issues of mutual interest. Its membership is not fixed, but varies from one meeting to the next; in principle, all adult men have the right to attend. The members would be mainly elders and people with religious knowledge, as well as those who have economic power or social power.

The State

Those Afghan rulers who attempted to rapidly introduce models of strong, direct rule; whether democratic or dictatorial, consistently found themselves without sufficient political support from the periphery. Many contentious struggles raged about the creation of the nation-state. Although Ahmad Shah Durrani set the stage for *Pashtun* dominance, his successors lacked both his personal charisma and his leadership abilities. His son, Timur Shah (1772 – 1783), further compounded the problem by leaving behind 23 sons born of wives from ten different tribes without designating a successor. Similarly, the next charismatic leader to consolidate the area, Emir Dost Mohammad (1834-38; 1842-63) left 20 sons to fight for the throne. Violent episodes involving individual quests for power characterized much of the 18th and 19th centuries.

With the advent of Emir Abdur Rahman (1880 – 1901), a grandson of Emir Dost Mohammad and the first real Afghan state builder, the situation changed dramatically. Emir Abdur Rahman utilized his powerful personality in combination with adroit politics and judicious use of financial subsidies and weaponry provided by the British. To further his ambition to establish a

centralized state under his authoritarian control, he created the first standing army and relied heavily on the support of his own *Mohammadzai* section of the *Barakzai Durrani*, to whom he granted annual allowances. Thus he raised the *Mohammadzai* to a privileged group and reduced the power of the tribal *Sardars*. At his death in 1901 he was succeeded by his son without the usual violent upheavals. His strategies were successful because they involved brute force and violence, instruments unavailable to modern-day peace builders.

The most contentious issues between the Afghan state and society in the 20th century were policies concerning the rights of women, conscription, marriage customs, and secular education, issues deeply rooted in Afghan cultural values and the social framework of Islam. State institution building was met with periodic open revolts such as that of the eastern *Pashtuns* which ended the rule of King Amanullah in 1929. He instituted reforms that delineated citizenship, nationality, and the rule of law in order to make real the link between the capital and the rest of the country. The PDPA communist regime of the late 1970s most radically reframed the Afghan state, inserting itself into the social, economic, and family lives of the Afghan people in unprecedented fashion. Both Amanullah and the communists eventually met with extraordinary resistance from peripheral elites as well as ordinary citizens. The reaction to the communist regime and the subsequent Soviet invasion resulted in a profound crisis for the state society relationship and an eventual plunge into decades of civil war.

Most historic recollections of the state in Afghanistan focus on these highly turbulent periods of ambitious state building. But the mid-twentieth century involved several decades of rule by the *Musahiban* kings, whose approach to governing involved fairly limited intrusion on the part of the central state into the lives of its citizens. King Nadir (1929 – 1933) restored the pre-eminence of central *Mohammadzai* control with tribal assistance. These rulers had witnessed the radical and costly state building approach of their predecessor, Amanullah, and chose a different set of strategies. Nadir Shah, his brothers and, eventually, his son, Zahir Shah, pursued a limited state-building strategy, one that kept the state's role in the realm of conflict management, dispute resolution, and other matters of social or private concern minimal. Direct taxation and troop conscription, two of the more intrusive instruments of the state, either vanished or were mediated by local power holders. The state's legitimacy as a governing agent involved the following set of essential, but limited, activities: "keep the peace, administer justice, see that conscription went smoothly, and collect small amounts of taxes." Afghan communities kept control over and set limits on the state's role in their lives, and informal power holders maintained a prominent role in the social and political lives of the population. Nevertheless, even this period

endured several secessionist struggles, including the Safi Rebellion (1945-46), a Pashtun revolt in Kandahar (1959), and an Islamist uprising in the Panjshir Valley (1975).

The 1964 constitution, upon which the 2004 document is largely based, advanced the idea of direct and responsive statehood, but, in reality, the regime continued to have limited reach beyond Kabul and the major provincial centres. King Zahir Shah's constitution promised a new form of participatory politics intended to inoculate the regime from growing elite unrest and calls for a more open form of government. Unlike the attempts at institution building made today, however, this framework did not translate into substantial action on the part of the monarchy to encourage formal institutional growth. For most Afghans in the countryside, the state continued to represent an institution of last resort in which they had limited faith and trust: only if informal institutions (tribal, religious, elders) proved unable to address a given problem, would district, provincial, or national officials become involved in the politics of daily life. The ever expansive visions of the state imposed on the Afghan population by Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan and then the communist PDPA regime represented a dramatic and ultimately catastrophic departure from the more limited Musahiban model.

Parallels can be drawn between the Musahiban approach to state building and that of President Karzai: both administrations gave priority to regime preservation and formed pacts with informal power holders who dominated the periphery and had the capacity to threaten the state in serious ways. The resilience of the Musahiban kings, compared to those who came before and after them, offers an interesting lens through which to view the politics of President Karzai.

The most successful model of Afghan governance employed the Swiss cheese approach, in which regimes expected their writs to run completely only in the most populated and economically prosperous parts of the country. The people in the poorer high mountains, steppes, and deserts were left to fend for themselves as long as they did not challenge state authorities. If they did, the state resorted to a range of weapons well short of direct rule to get them to cease. These included support of internal rivals, denial of access to vital urban markets, and one-off punitive campaigns designed to emphasize the cost of resistance. The goal was to intimidate a population and its leaders into acquiescence without changing the existing political structure. It was a strategy that required constant maintenance. A change in policy or local mismanagement could quickly turn cooperative groups into enemies, but none of these enemies were so beyond the

pale that they might be co-opted if the right opportunity presented itself. Rulers effectively controlled Afghanistan for many centuries with this model of government, and the fall of one regime and its replacement by another rarely resulted in chaos since the structure remained intact.




Figure 10: *Afghan Ethno - Tribal Concepts*

Based on Abdur Rahman's late 19th century success in creating the country's first centralized state, successor Afghan governments developed a taste for American cheese models of governance that posited a single rule of law and administration. Those regimes which attempted to make theory a reality (Amanullah, the PDPA, and the Taliban) experienced state collapse because they provoked more opposition than they could handle. By contrast, the long-lived Musahiban rulers of Afghanistan maintained fifty years of peace and stability by proclaiming their right to rule everywhere in theory, but recognizing that enforcing such a vision was neither practicable nor desirable.

The post 2001 model of government in Afghanistan that attempted to restore a direct rule model remains as odds with the realities of Afghanistan, especially rural Afghanistan, and the Kabul government lacks the military and administrative capacity to implement it. United States and Britain rediscovered

the virtues of the indirect approach while seeking to bring order to the Pashtun regions in south and east of the country. It was realized that local order could be more easily had if negotiated directly with local political leaders, enabling them to circumvent the dysfunctional national institutions.

The interesting observation can be drawn from the modern history of state building in Afghanistan; all of the rulers since 1901 neither left in exile nor were killed.

Government

Through differing regimes of widely varying ideologies, Afghanistan's governing structure has historically consisted of a weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant financial or administrative mandates on the 80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. The tribal, clan, village, and district political structures that provided governance and security until the late 1970s were weakened by decades of subsequent war and Taliban rule. Some traditional local authority figures fled or were killed; others were displaced by mujahedin commanders, militia leaders, Taliban militants, and others. Traditional elders are widely respected, although highly conservative in orientation. The local power brokers who emerged from the constant warfare are far less popular and are widely accused of selectively applying Afghan law and of using their authority to enrich themselves. Some of the traditional tribal councils that have remained intact continue to exercise their writ rather than accept the authority of the central government or even local government appointees. Still other community authorities prefer to accommodate local insurgent commanders (whom they see as wayward but not irreconcilable members of the community) rather than help the government secure their areas.

At the national level, Afghanistan had virtually no Western-style democratic institutions prior to the international intervention that took place after the 11th September 2001, attacks on the United States. There were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah⁹⁵, but the parliament during that era was not a significant check on presidential power. The elected institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on 5th December 2001, (the

⁹⁵ The last were in 1969, before his reign was ended in a 1973 military coup

“Bonn Agreement”), after the Taliban had fallen. Karzai is the first directly elected president in Afghan history.

Some believe that the elements of Western-style democracy introduced since 2001 are supported by traditional Afghan patterns of decision making that have some democratic and representative elements. Meetings called *shuras*, or *jirgas* (consultative councils) often composed of designated notables, are key mechanisms for making authoritative decisions or dispensing justice. Some of these mechanisms are practiced by Taliban members in areas under their control. On the other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing mechanisms that resist change and modernization, generally minimize the role of women, and do not meet international standards of democratic governance. At the national level, the convening of a *loya jirga*, an assembly consisting of about 1,500 delegates from all over Afghanistan, has been used on several occasions. In the post-Taliban period, *loya jirgas* have been convened to endorse Karzai’s leadership, to adopt a constitution, and to back long-term defence relations with the IC.

A major peace *jirga* was held on 2nd – 4th June 2010, to review government plans to offer incentives for insurgent fighters to end their armed struggle and rejoin society.

Afghan governing capacity has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but many positions, particularly at the local level, are unfilled or the governing function performed by unaccountable power brokers. It is believed that weak governance is causing some Afghans to acquiesce to, or even support, Taliban insurgents as providers of security and impartial justice. Since 2007, in line with those Afghan public perceptions, the IC and Afghan focus has been on reforming and reducing corruption within the central government, and on expanding local governance.

Afghanistan’s government

Afghanistan’s government is an Islamic republic consisting of three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The constitution went into effect on 4th January 2004. Afghanistan’s first national democratic presidential election was held on 9th October 2004. All laws must comply with Islam. Equal rights are guaranteed to women. Suffrage is universal at age 18.

Executive Branch

The president is the most powerful post; he is the chief of state and the head of the government. Two vice presidents serve under the president. The president and vice presidents are elected to 5-year terms by popular vote. The presidential candidate chooses the two vice presidential candidates to run on his ticket. In the first round of voting, if no presidential candidate receives at least 50 percent of the vote, the two candidates with the most votes will run in the second round. A president cannot be elected for more than two terms.

Presidential and vice presidential candidates must be at least 40 years of age; adhere to Islam; hold only Afghan citizenship; have Afghan parents; and have no court convictions of crimes against humanity, criminal acts, or denial of civil rights.

Presidential responsibilities and powers include serving as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces; enforcing the constitution; assembling the Grand Council; signing laws and decrees; and appointing, dismissing, or accepting the resignation of members of the Supreme Court, ministers, the attorney general, judges, officers of the armed forces, police, national security, and high-ranking officials. The following presidential powers require the approval of the National Assembly: determining policies of the state, declaring war and peace, and declaring or ending a state of emergency.

The cabinet is composed of 25 ministers. Ministers are appointed by the president and approved by the National Assembly. Influential regional and military groups are appointed to the ministries. A National Security Council is located in the presidential palace complex.

Legislative Branch

The bicameral National Assembly is composed of a 249-member House of Representatives (*Wolesi Jirga*) and a 102-member senate (*Meshrano Jirga*). Members of the House of Representatives are elected to 5-year terms by popular vote. The constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the upper house and 68 seats of the 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. Members of the senate are elected as follows: the provincial councils appoint 34 members for 4-year terms, the district councils appoint 34 members for 3-year terms, and the president appoints 34 members for 5-year terms. According to the constitution, half of the 34 presidential appointees from the senate must be women, 2 must represent the Kuchi tribe, and 2 must represent the disabled.

Qualifications for National Assembly members include Afghan citizenship (citizenship for at least ten years), minimum age of 25 for the House of Representatives and 35 for the senate, and no convictions for crimes against humanity, criminal acts, or denial of civil rights by a court.




Figure 11: Executive and legislative branch structure

The powers of the National Assembly include ratifying, modifying, or abolishing laws or legislative decrees; approving plans for economic, social, cultural, and technological developments; authorizing the state budget; granting acceptance for loans; developing and adapting administrative units; and ratifying international treaties and agreements.

The powers of the House of Representatives include approving appointments and accepting or rejecting state development programs and the state budget when the House of Representatives and the senate are not in agreement.

Proposals for laws are introduced by the government and presented to the House of Representatives. If a proposed law includes new taxes or a reduction in revenues and there is an alternate recommendation, it is included in a working agenda. The House approves or rejects the proposal. A proposed law cannot be delayed for more than one month. The drafted law is submitted to the Senate

after approval from the House. The Senate decides on the draft in 15 days. Laws, treaties, and development plans in need of special examination are given priority upon request of the government. To be considered by a house, a proposed bill must be sponsored by 10 members and approved by one-fifth of that house.

The government may occasionally convene a Grand Council (*Loya Jirga*) to decide pressing matters of independence, national sovereignty, or territorial integrity. The assembly is composed of members of the national assembly and chairpersons of the provincial and district councils. The assembly can amend the constitution and bring charges against the president.

Judicial Branch

The judicial branch is made up of a Supreme Court (*Stera Mahkama*), high courts, and appeals courts. The nine members of the Supreme Court are appointed to ten-year terms by the president with approval of the House of Representatives. Initial appointments for members are as follows: three members are appointed for a period of four years, three members for seven years, and three members for ten years. Later appointments are for ten years. Members only serve one term. The president appoints one member as the Head of the Supreme Court.

Qualification for members of the Supreme Court include Afghan citizenship; minimum age of forty; a higher education in law or Islam; adequate experience in the Afghan justice system; high ethics and a positive reputation; no convictions for crimes against humanity, criminal acts, or deprivation of civil rights by the court; and no membership in any political party during their term.

Judges are appointed by recommendation of the Supreme Court and approval from the president. They are responsible for managing the personnel, budgets, and policy decisions of the entire national, regional, and local court system.

Although every province has a higher and lower court, the supply of trained judges is limited. Most local court officials come from Muslim religious schools and lack judicial skills, so judicial procedures are influenced by local authorities and traditions. The roles of Islamic and secular law in the new national judicial system have not been well established. Much of the current legal code is based on laws passed under the last king. In rural areas, where local elders and tribal authorities resolve criminal cases, Taliban laws have remained in effect.

A National Security Court handles cases of terrorism and other threats to national security. A separate Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission investigates human rights abuses and war crimes.

Local Level

The local government is divided into 34 provinces: Badakhshan, Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Bamian, Daikundi, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghowr, Helmand, Herat, Jowzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Khowst, Konar, Kunduz, Laghman, Lowgar, Nangarhar, Nimruz, Nuristan, Oruzgan, Paktia, Paktika, Panjshir, Parvan, Samangan, Sar-e Pol, Takhar, Wardak, and Zabul. Each province is governed by a provincial council. Members of the provincial council are elected by popular vote every four years. The chief executive of the province is the governor (*Wa-lee*), who is appointed by the president. The provinces are further subdivided into districts and sub-districts, headed by appointed mayor (Chief of district or *Ha-k'am*). Districts and villages have councils that organize community activities and allow people to participate in the local administration. Members of district and village councils are elected by popular vote every three years. Municipalities administer city affairs. Representative or Head of a village are called Malik (in *Pashtun* area) or *Arbab* or *Qaryadar* (in Northern provinces). Head of section in municipality area is *Kalantar*. In a village there is *Wakil Gozar* (Chief of street); civilian person elected by the people to serve as interface between the population and government officials. A chief of shopkeepers (*Kaa-Lan-tar*) could be elected in a village to serve as interface between business class and government officials. The mayor and members of the municipal councils are elected by popular vote. Ethnic differences heavily influence any progress within local government and based on historical experience Afghan population in general mistrust local governments due to their inability to solve basic problems of population.

An inseparable component of Afghanistan's stabilization process is the local government reform whose main aim is to improve visibility of government of the Islamic republic of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it is mandatory condition for establishing real Afghan state; this reform has achieved limited success until now. Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent governors in all 34 Afghan provinces. International studies and reports all point to the beneficial effects (reduction in narcotics trafficking, economic growth, less violence) of some of the strong Afghan civilian appointments at the provincial level. However, many of the governors are considered weak, ineffective, or corrupt. Still, there are widespread concerns about the governing

capacity at the local level⁹⁶. One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on 20th August 2009, concurrent with the presidential elections and the results were certified on 29th December 2009. In most provinces, the provincial councils do not act as true legislatures, and they are considered weak compared to the power and influence of the provincial governors.

In the relationship between local representatives of the central government ministries and district governments, some difficulties have been noted. The provincial governors and district governors do not control Afghan government funds; all budgeting and budget administration is done through the central government, either at ministry headquarters or through provincial offices of those ministries. Local officials sometimes disagree on priorities or on implementation mechanisms.

District governors are appointed by the president, at the recommendation of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). In some districts there were no district governors in place at all. Some of the district governors returned after the expulsion of Taliban militants. The difficulty plaguing the expansion of district governance, in addition to security issues, is lack of resources. Only about half of all district governors⁹⁷ have any staff or vehicles. No elections for district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties.

Similarly to district governors, mayors of large municipalities are appointed as well. There are about 42 mayors nationwide, many with deputy mayors. However, no municipal elections have been held and none are scheduled.

As noted throughout, there has traditionally been village-level governance by groups of tribal elders and other notables. That structure remains, particularly in secure areas, while village councils have been absent or only sporadically active in areas where there is combat. The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering localities to decide on development priorities by forming Community Development Councils (CDC's).

⁹⁶ For example, out of over 200 job slots available for the Qandahar provincial and Qandahar city government, only about 30% are filled. In four key districts around Qandahar city, there are 44 significant jobs, including district governors, but only about 12 officials are routinely present for work. As noted above, only a few dozen of the 150 local representative positions of the various ministry positions of the central government in Qandahar are filled. Similar percentages are reported in neighbouring Helmand Province.

⁹⁷ There are 364 districts in Afghanistan

Thus far there are about 30,000 CDC's established and they are eventually to all be elected.

The Afghan Civil Service

The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a number of ways, although slowly. There are about 500,000 Afghan government employees, and although the majority of them are in the security force, a large proportion works in the education sector.

The IC does not have a broad program in place to train Afghan government officials themselves, but instead fund Afghan institutions to conduct such training. Issues of standardizing job descriptions, salaries, bonuses, benefits and the like are being addressed by Afghanistan's Civil Service Commission. The commission redefined more than 80,000 civil servant job descriptions by 2010. The Afghan cabinet is drafting a revised civil service law.

Technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the commission is provided under a program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan. One of the commission's subordinate organizations is the Afghan Civil Service Institute, which envisions training over 16,000 additional bureaucrats by the end of 2010.

Many Afghan civil service personnel undergo training in India, building on growing relations between Afghanistan and India. Japan and Singapore are also training Afghan civil servants on good governance, anti-corruption, and civil aviation⁹⁸. In order to address the problem of international donors luring away Afghan talent with higher salaries, Kabul conference⁹⁹ included a pledge by the Afghan government to reach an understanding with donors on a harmonized salary scale for donor funded salaries of Afghan government personnel.

⁹⁸ Singapore and Germany since 2011 jointly provide technical assistance in the field of civil aviation. Some of these programs are conducted in partnership with the German Federal Foreign Office and the Asia Foundation.

⁹⁹ 20th July 2010

POLITICAL ASPECTS

Politics

Patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and other relationships remain. These patterns have been evident in every Afghan election since the fall of the Taliban. All candidates, including President Karzai, have pursued campaign strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of ethnic and geographic votes, although some have also sought to advance specific new programs and ideas. The traditional patterns have been even more pronounced in province-based campaigns such as those for the provincial councils and the parliament. In these cases, electorates¹⁰⁰ are small and candidates can easily appeal to clan and familial relationships.

While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there has been a sense among Afghans that their country now welcomes members of all political and ethnic groups and factions. There have been very few incidents of ethnic-based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but jealousies over relative economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes.

Ethnic *Pashtuns*, as the largest single ethnicity, have historically asserted a right to rule. Pashtuns are about 42% of the population and, with few exceptions, have governed Afghanistan. The sentiment of the “right to lead” is particularly strong among *Pashtuns* of the *Durrani* tribal confederation, which predominates in the south and is a rival to the *Ghilzai* confederation, which predominates in the east¹⁰¹.

¹⁰⁰ The eligible voters of a specific province

¹⁰¹ One recent exception was the 1992-1996 presidency of the *mujahedin* government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik. President Karzai is a *Durrani Pashtun*, and his cabinet and inner advisory circle has come to be progressively dominated by *Pashtuns* and to exclude members of the other communities. The Taliban government was and its insurgency is composed almost completely of *Pashtuns*.

Political Parties

One major issue in Afghan political culture is that there is little overarching glue that holds factions together. The concept of nation is widely held, but not as strongly as are traditional patterns of affiliation. The major factions in Afghanistan identify only loosely with Afghanistan's 110 registered political parties, which would serve as an alternate organizing principle for Afghan politics. There is a popular aversion to formal "parties" as a perception stemming from the war against the Soviet Union when seven *mujahedin* parties were funded by and considered tools of outside parties.

Some believe that Afghan political parties are weak because the Single, Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, in which each voter casts a ballot for only one candidate, favours candidates running as independents rather than as members of parties. Moreover, Western-style parties are generally identified by specific ideologies, ideas, or ideals, while most Afghans, as discussed above, retain their traditional affiliations.

All political parties are required by the Political Parties Law of 2003 to register with the Ministry of Justice and confirm that they practice Islam. Candidates were not permitted to affiliate with a party in the 2005 parliamentary election. Most political groups are based on alliances that formed during the military struggles during the past few decades. For example, the Northern Alliance is an influential loose confederation of several Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek groups who fought against the Taliban. Factions of the alliance became powerful players in the parliament of 2006. A key division of political power is between the Pashtun-dominated south and the Tajik- and Uzbek-dominated north.

Main Political Parties

- **The Afghan Social Democratic Party** or Afghan Nation (*Afghan Mellat*) is a political party with a large following of educated *Pashtuns* living in urban areas of eastern Afghanistan.
- **The Afghanistan's Islamic Mission Organization** (*Tanzim-e Dahwat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan*) is composed of a small group of extremely conservative Islamists. Its original name was Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (*Ittihad-e Islami Barai Azadi Afghanistan*), which was popular in the 1980s and 1990s. This group has substantial financial resources and links to Islamists outside Afghanistan, especially in the Arab Gulf states.

- **The Islamic People's Movement of Afghanistan** (*Harakat-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan*) is an offshoot of the jihadi parties of the 1980s and 1990s, with strong ties to the Shi'ite community of Kabul and surrounding provinces.
- **The Islamic Society of Afghanistan** (*Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan*), provisionally headed by Salahuddin Rabbani since the 2011 death of his father, Burhanuddin Rabbani. It is deeply divided between several factions, but remains the dominant party in northern Afghanistan and the most active representative of the Tajik ethnic group.
- **The Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan** (*Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan*) is the successor to a party of the same name that was established in 1990 when several Iran-based Shia jihadi parties merged. The main supporters of this political party are from the Hazaras ethnic group.
- **The Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan** (*Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan*) is an offshoot of the original Wahdat group formed by the merger of Iran-based, Shia jihadi groups. The main supporters of this political party are from the Hazaras ethnic group.
- **The National Congress Party of Afghanistan** (*Hezb-e-Congrae-Mili Afghanistan*) is a liberal political party that supports the creation of a secular and democratic political system in Afghanistan. Its key supporters are non-Pashtun, leftist intellectuals.
- **The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan** (*Mahaz-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan*) is one of the original jihadi parties of seven Pakistan-based groups that fiercely resisted Soviet occupation. This group is popular among the Pashtun ethnic group.
- **The National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan** (*Hizb-e Junbish-e-Melli-ye Afghanistan*) represents the Uzbek minority.
- **The National Movement of Afghanistan** (*Hezb-e-Nuhzhat-e-Mili Afghanistan*) is a coalition of 11 political parties that serves as a platform for ethnic Tajiks.
- **The New Afghanistan Party** (*Hizb-e Afghanistan-e Nawin*) represents the interests of Panjshiri Tajiks.
- **The Youth Solidarity Party of Afghanistan** (*Hizb-e Hambastagi-ye Melli-ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan*) promotes democratic ideas and encourages younger people to participate in the government.

Afghan general perspective / view on governance and politics

Governance has been traditionally handled by tribal leaders (councils) and in some cases, has little tangible connection to a centralized government. In many cases, the significance of interpersonal relationships dictates adherence to or rebellion against a centralized government. In recent years, the unprecedented level of corruption has severely alienated many Afghans from the central Karzai government. Few Afghans see any of the potential leaders as reliable, and a sense that after a politician has “filled his pockets” (with money), there is less danger to the common person. That is, a new politician is not only unpredictable, but hungry for money, and this can instil distrust in many minds. Despite the international community’s efforts in persuading the government to use merit based hiring processes for government employees, the local population strongly believes that all government positions from the highest to the lowest district level are managed by a government mafia system where an individual must pay for the position in order to get appointed. These problems, however, have not bred apathy: on the contrary, Afghans are very involved in the political processes and even the youngest child can lisp the names of power holders. This is a reflection on how daily life is affected by even minor changes in the government.

Foreign Relations

Before the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Afghanistan was neutral in its foreign policy. Between 1979 and 1989, Afghanistan’s foreign policy reflected that of the Soviet Union. Few countries supported the Soviet occupation (1979 to 1989) or the Taliban regime (1996 to 2001). Attempts by the Taliban to occupy Afghanistan’s seat at the UN and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) failed.

Afghanistan’s foreign relations improved dramatically after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, and most countries now maintain diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. In December 2002, Afghanistan’s six bordering countries signed a Good Neighbour Declaration that pledged to respect Afghanistan’s independence and territorial boundaries. Afghanistan has been slowly integrated into regional security and economic organizations. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and, in June 2012,

Afghanistan was granted full observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The Afghan government has established two tripartite border commissions with Pakistan (including the US) and Iran (including the UK) to deal with security issues of mutual concern. Afghanistan and its neighbours signed a declaration of cooperation on counter narcotics at the Berlin Conference¹⁰².

Pakistan

Afghanistan has had many differences with its neighbour Pakistan. Many in each country maintain visceral distrust and prejudice toward the other. Pakistan took the lead in diplomatically opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Soviet-backed regimes. During the war against Soviet occupation, Pakistan served as the main supply point for Afghan resistance. Pakistan developed close ties to the Taliban regime in the late 1990s, but reversed its support under U.S. pressure after the Taliban refused to surrender Osama bin Laden in 2001.

Strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan result from the separation of Pashtun tribes, the growing Islamist insurgency on both sides of the border, and disagreements on border security procedures and smuggling. The presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Pakistan's border provinces and Afghanistan's increasing relations with India further strain the relationship. Pakistan wants to minimize India's influence in Afghanistan to avoid being surrounded by unfriendly states. Anti-Pakistan sentiment is particularly strong among the minority communities of northern and western Afghanistan, particularly the Tajiks. After the end of the rule of Pakistani military leader and President Pervez Musharraf in 2008, there was improvement in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations¹⁰³. The September 2011 attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the killing of former President Rabbani worsened again relations significantly. Pakistan's worst fears about Indian influence in Afghanistan were inflamed when President Karzai, on 5th October 2011, and perhaps as a reaction to the Haqqani attacks in Kabul, flew to India to sign a significant trade and security pact.

¹⁰² 1st April 2004

¹⁰³ President Karzai attended the 9th September 2008, inauguration of civilian President Asif Zardari. President Zardari visited Kabul on 9th January 2009, where he and President Karzai signed a joint declaration against terrorism that affects both countries. (A September 2010 meeting between them reaffirmed this declaration.) Afghan and Pakistani ministers jointly visited Washington, DC, during 23rd – 27th February 2009; to participate in the first Obama Administration strategic review, and Karzai and Zardari conducted a joint visit to Washington, DC, in May 2009.

Relations have improved substantially since late 2012 in line with Pakistan's possible shift toward more cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan, as demonstrated by its release of Afghan Taliban figures who reputedly seek reconciliation.

Regarding the long-term relationship, Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the "Durand Line". Afghanistan and Pakistan are engaged in dialogue through the Tripartite Commission¹⁰⁴ to resolve bilateral issues. They agreed to set up five "border coordination centres" (BCCs) which include networks of radar nodes to give liaison officers a common view of the border area. These centres build on an agreement in May 2007 to share intelligence on extremists' movements. Four have been established to date, but all four are on the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan has not fulfilled its May 2009 pledge to establish one on the Pakistani side of the border.

Economically, Pakistan is Afghanistan's vital corridor to the Arabian Sea, while Afghanistan is a vital connection for Pakistan to the natural resources of Central Asia. Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) was signed on 18 July 2010, allowing easier flow of Afghan products. On 12th June 2011, in the context of a President Karzai visit to Pakistan, both countries began full implementation of the agreement. It is expected to greatly expand the US\$2 billion in trade per year the two countries were doing prior to the agreement. A drawback to the agreement is that Afghan trucks, under the agreement, are not permitted to take back cargo from India after dropping off goods there. The Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement followed agreements to send more Afghan graduate students to study in Pakistan, and a June 2010 Afghan agreement resulting in sending small numbers of ANA officers to undergo training in Pakistan.

Iran

Relations between Afghanistan and Iran are generally good. Iran opposed the Soviet occupation and the Taliban. During the Soviet occupation, Iran supported Afghan resistance and provided financial and military assistance to rebel leaders who pledged loyalty to the Iranian vision of Islamic revolution.

The Taliban seized the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif and executed Iranian diplomats in 1998, severely damaging relations between Iran and the Taliban. Afghanistan's relations with Iran have improved since the fall of the Taliban. Iran has been active in Afghan reconstruction.

¹⁰⁴ Afghanistan, Pakistan, and ISAF

There is a dispute over water rights on the Helmand River, which irrigates Afghanistan's southern agricultural region before flowing into Iran. The Afghan government has felt pressure from the West to create closer ties to Iran. Other issues between Iran and Afghanistan include Afghan expatriates and refugees in Iran, Iranian support for warlords in Afghanistan's border provinces, and Iranian concerns for the Shia minority in Afghanistan.

Tajikistan

Afghanistan's role in Tajikistan's long civil war has complicated relations. Tajik insurgents used Afghanistan as a base for military operations, and about 100,000 Tajiks took refuge in northern Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Tajikistan provided assistance to the Northern Alliance because of the Taliban's harsh treatment of Afghanistan's Tajik minority. A planned bridge over the Amu Darya River will enhance the trade route north into Tajikistan.

Uzbekistan

Relations between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan have been limited. Uzbekistan has enforced harsh border controls to prevent the entry of narcotics smugglers and Islamic fundamentalists from Afghanistan. Uzbekistan's ongoing support for Uzbek warlords who control parts of Afghanistan has also been a source of contention.

Turkmenistan

Throughout the post-Soviet era, Turkmenistan has taken a neutral position on almost all international issues. In the late 1990s the country maintained relations with the Taliban and its chief opponent in Afghanistan, the United Front. Turkmenistan offered limited support to the military campaign against the Taliban following 11th September 2001. Relations with Afghanistan have gained importance in the early 2000s with the prospect of a trans-Afghan pipeline moving Turkmenistan gas to markets in India and Pakistan. Turkmenistan and Afghanistan are seeking closer cooperation through a broad package of mutual cooperation that includes reiteration of support for a trans-Afghan gas pipeline, transit of Turkmen electricity to Afghanistan, extension of a Turkmen rail network to Afghanistan, and a common struggle against narcotics and terrorism.

China

Of all the bordering countries, China has had the least direct influence on Afghanistan. Although technically a neighbour, China's border with Afghanistan is

only 76 km long and is located in the remote and largely inaccessible Pamir Mountain range. An old Silk Route camel caravan trail that used to pass through it was closed by the People's Republic of China in 1949. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China began to play a larger role in Central Asian politics and economic development. Alarmed by the Taliban's support of Uighur separatists seeking the independence of the western Xinjiang Province, China founded an international alliance in 1996 known as the "Shanghai Five"¹⁰⁵ that focused on battling terrorist threats and drug smuggling emanating from Afghanistan. These diplomatic moves and increasing investment in its western Xinjiang province have given China more prominence in Central Asia than it has had for many centuries.

China has been supportive of the Karzai government but its aid program had been relatively small and low profile if compared with that of Iran or India. This changed in May 2008 when China signed a US\$3 billion agreement for a 30-year lease to develop Afghanistan's biggest untapped copper deposit that has an estimated value of US\$88 billion. China also agreed to construct a 400-megawatt power plant for the project that would electrify much of Kabul. To get the ore out of Afghanistan, China plans to build the country's first railroad north through the Hindu Kush Mountains to its western province of Xinjiang. If the project is completed, China would have the largest direct economic stake in Afghanistan and would facilitate investments in Afghanistan's extensive iron, aluminium, and marble deposits. Although China is currently the least important of Afghanistan's immediate neighbours, it may become one of the most important in the next decade. It is unclear whether Chinese investment is part of a broader political strategy by the People's Republic of China to gain future influence in Afghanistan or just another example of its willingness to take on risky investments to meet its economy's growing need for raw materials.

India

The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are the inverse of those of Pakistan: India's goals are to deny Pakistan "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan the ability to block India from trade and other connections to Central Asia and beyond, and to prevent militants in Afghanistan from attacking Indian targets in Afghanistan. India saw the Afghan Taliban's hosting of Al Qaeda during 1996 - 2001 as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda's association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan, such as LET

¹⁰⁵ China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. In 2001, when Uzbekistan joined, the group was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; it now includes India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan as observers.

(Laskhar-e-Tayyiba, or Army of the Righteous), one of the groups that was formed in Pakistan to challenge India's control of part of the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir¹⁰⁶.

Afghanistan has sought close ties to India but without alarming Pakistan. During a May 2011 visit to Afghanistan by India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India and Afghanistan announced a "Strategic Partnership to better integrate Afghanistan into regional political, economic, and security structures. On 5th October 2011 President Karzai visited Delhi to sign the pact. The pact affirmed Pakistan's worst fears because it gave India, for the first time, a formal role as one of the guarantors of Afghan stability, and it provided for expanded India-Afghanistan political and cultural ties. Indian experts noted that no Indian troops or security forces would deploy to Afghanistan as a consequence of the pact, but it did lead to a late 2011 agreement for India to train some ANSF personnel in India¹⁰⁷.

India has stressed its economic aid activities there, showcased by its hosting of a 28th June 2012 meeting in Delhi to discuss investment and economic development in Afghanistan. India publicly expressed support for the ongoing reconciliation process.

Persian Gulf States

The Gulf States are considered a key part of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. The Gulf States have also been a source of development funds and for influence with some Afghan clerics and factions.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has a role to play in Afghanistan in part because, during the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channelled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan *mujahedin*, primarily the Islamist factions. In doing so, Saudi Arabia developed extensive intelligence ties to these factions as well as to the Taliban. A majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam similar to that of the Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and

¹⁰⁶ Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India, including the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 and in July 2011.

¹⁰⁷ As an outgrowth of a four-day president Karzai follow-up visit to India in November 2012, India reportedly agreed to train up to 600 ANSF per year at the Indian Army's jungle warfare school.

quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. air strikes from it.

Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between the Afghan government and “moderate” Taliban figures. The Afghan government also sees Saudi Arabia as a potential new source of investment; in early November 2012 it was reported that the Saudis will fund a US\$100 million mosque and education centre in Kabul. Some see the investment as a Saudi effort to enhance its influence in Afghanistan as international involvement there wanes.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)

The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban regime, is emerging as another major donor to Afghanistan. It contributes about 300 troops to OEF and ISAF missions¹⁰⁸ in southern Afghanistan, including Helmand province.

The UAE has donated at least US\$135 million to Afghanistan since 2002, according to the Afghan Finance Ministry¹⁰⁹. At the same time, the UAE property market has been an outlet for investment by Afghan leaders who may have acquired their funds through soft loans from the scandal-plagued Kabul Bank or through corruption connected to donor contracts or other businesses.

Qatar

Until 2011, Qatar was not regarded as a significant player on the Afghanistan issue. It had not recognized the Taliban regime when it was in power, and had little influence with Taliban figures interested in reconciliation. However, since late 2011, Qatar has increased its profile as host of some Taliban negotiators there. Qatar is viewed as less influenced by Pakistan than is Saudi Arabia, and this might explain why the United States has pushed for Qatar to be the accepted host of a Taliban presence.

International Organizations

Afghanistan participates in many international organizations, to include the following:

¹⁰⁸ Some are military medical personnel who run small clinics and health programs for Afghans in the provinces where they operate.

¹⁰⁹ Projects funded include housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in Zabol province, and a university in Khost.

- Asian Development Bank (AsDB)
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- World Bank
- International Criminal Court (ICt)
- International Development Association (IDA)
- Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
- International Finance Corporation (IFC)
- International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (partner) (OSCE)
- United Nations (UN)
- World Health Organization (WHO)

Afghan general perspective / view on Afghanistan international relationship

On a personal level, many Afghans are open to foreigners, have been overseas or have relatives overseas. In contrast, the public political, international relationship between Afghanistan and other nations is much more structured. In the 1970s, Afghanistan maintained relationships with both the US and the USSR and benefited in the form of aid. Following the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan's international relations conformed to those of the Soviet government. The Taliban take-over notably alienated the country and only the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan recognized its government. Since 2001, diplomatic ties have been re-established with many of the countries that previously supported Afghanistan. The Karzai government has concentrated on winning continued aid for its military, infrastructure and economy and is heavily dependent on this support.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS


Economy

Afghanistan is the poorest country in Asia, and one of the poorest in the world. Security threats remain the most significant deterrents to economic development. Afghanistan relies heavily on foreign troops and international aid. However, in the aftermath of the NATO-led invasion in 2001, domestic and international initiatives work to revitalize the economy by developing government institutions, constructing and repairing nationwide infrastructure, developing public and private industries, and developing natural resources.

The construction industry is promising. Large contracts focus on building needed infrastructure, including a reliable electrical power grid, water distribution networks, and major highways. Afghanistan is taking steps to exploit its resources, especially precious stones and newly discovered oil and natural gas.

Afghanistan is transitioning to a free market economy and creating incentives for foreign investors. Improvements have been made to the banking sector, tax policy, and customs regulations. A new currency has been established, and inflation is under control. These policies have created potential economic growth in various sectors, but the need for development and reform in many areas remains.

Afghanistan has made some progress in developing its economy in the last few years. However, until basic needs such as security, reliable electricity, and infrastructure are met, substantial economic improvement and sustainability remain questionable. Afghanistan must also develop economic institutions and laws that enable firms to engage industrial sectors. Lack of security in Afghanistan is the most significant obstacle to economic growth. Afghanistan will remain dependent on foreign aid and security forces. Opium production is also a major impediment to economic development, and eradication of the crop is not likely in the near future. Agriculture remains an important but underdeveloped sector, and earnings remain dependent on the climate and weather conditions. Afghanistan is preparing to exploit its oil and natural gas resources and also serve as a transit point for regional trade.



Source: Central Statistics Office, National Accounts 2011

Figure 12: *Share of economic sectors in GDP, 2011*

Since 2001, the Afghan national economy has been growing steadily and, during 2008 – 2011 reached a total real GDP growth of 85 percent, while the rate of inflation has been kept at around 10%. Although real GDP growth slowed, to 7.3% in 2011 (from 8.4% in 2010), due mainly to unfavourable weather and a poor harvest, the agriculture sector rebounded strongly in 2012 and is expected to boost economic growth to over 10%. The good harvest has also brought Afghanistan to near food self-sufficiency¹¹⁰ and slowed inflation to 4.6% in July 2012. Services, which account for about half of GDP, grew by over 12% in 2011. Telecommunication, transport, and public services were the most dynamic sub-sectors. Mining saw progress in the development of oil and gas resources. On the demand side, private consumption accounted for more than half of GDP growth.

The medium-term outlook for Afghanistan remains optimistic. At the Tokyo conference in July 2012, donors pledged sufficient funds to fill the financing gap, and this should allow the government to sustain development gains and continue making progress towards achievement of the UN's Millennium Development Goals. Nevertheless, the transition process and the upcoming presidential elections will further increase uncertainty in the medium term and will likely take a toll on investor confidence.

¹¹⁰ Self-sufficiency in wheat production as of May 2009 (first time in 30 years)

Statistics

GDP (purchasing power parity)	US\$ 29.74 billion (2011 est.) – 109 th in the world
GDP (official exchange rate)	US\$ 18.02 billion (2011 est.)
GDP (growth rate)	5.8% (2011 est.)
GDP Per Capita	US\$ 1.000 (2011 est.) – 212 th in the world
Industry (% of GDP)	25%
Agriculture (% of GDP)	34.9%
Services (% of GDP)	40%
Inflation Rate	16.3% (2005)
Debt	US\$ 1.28 billion (FY 10/11)
Unemployment Rate	about 8%, but underemployment rate may be nearly 50%
Imports	US\$ 9.152 billion (2010 est.), food, energy, capital goods, textiles, autos. Top five trading partners (in descending order): Pakistan, Russia, Iran, India, United States.
Exports	US\$ 2.625 billion (2010 est.) fruits, raisins, melons, pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets, lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber products
Labour Force	15 million (2004 est.)

Resources

In the 1980s, natural gas accounted for 56% of export revenue. However, the Soviet Union capped natural gas fields before withdrawing troops in 1989. Since then, Afghanistan has not been able to benefit from these resources until recently. In 2006, the U.S. Geological Survey completed a 2-year assessment of oil and natural gas potential in Afghanistan and discovered many more resources than expected. Reports claim that Afghanistan has 18 times more oil resources and more than three times the natural gas resources previously known. Northern Afghanistan contains 100 billion to 1 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, 0.4 billion barrels to 3.6 billion barrels of oil, and 126 million barrels to 1,325 million barrels of natural gas liquids. Afghanistan has completed several important steps in the process of developing its resources, including assessing petroleum resources, certifying reserves, and passing petroleum legislation.

Afghanistan also has deposits of barites, bauxite, beryllium, chromium, coal, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, manganese, mercury, nickel, salt, silver, sulphur, talc, tin, uranium, zinc, and zinc. Other precious and semi-precious minerals include alabaster, amethyst, beryl, emerald, jade, lapis lazuli, quartz, ruby, sapphire, and tourmaline. Mining throughout Afghanistan is underdeveloped for several reasons, including violence in much of the country. There are few railways and major roads, making travel and transport difficult and costly. Some materials are used in small-scale hand crafted items, but few are exploited for larger commercial use. Materials for the construction industry are in demand, including bricks, cement and cement blocks, glass, gravel, marble, paving stones, steel, sand, tile, and wood.

Agricultural resources include grazing land and fertile soil land for growing crops in the northern province of Kunduz and the southern province of Helmand. Less than 3% of Afghanistan was forested, and after years of war and illegal cutting for fuel, about half of the forest remains. Afghanistan has a significant water shortage.




Figure 13: Natural resources in Afghanistan

Industry

Afghanistan's industrial sector once processed large quantities of sugar, textiles, and chemical fertilizers, and exported hundreds of millions of dollars worth of natural gas. By 2004, however, almost all Afghan industry had been destroyed by years of conflict, and reconstruction efforts were focused more on the slow rebuilding of national infrastructure than on industry.

Industry faces many challenges in Afghanistan. Regional warlords often extort or take resources from private firms, and corruption in the construction sector also deters prospective investors and hinders many projects. Domestic and international organizations are working to rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure using donations from the international community. These initiatives have made construction and construction materials one of the largest industrial sectors in Afghanistan. These efforts include projects to build high quality industrial parks with reliable power supply near important industrial areas. These professionally managed industrial parks will provide incentive for investment and development in Afghan industry.

Afghanistan is considering privatizing some state industries such as oil, gas, and precious and semi-precious stones. Newly discovered oil and natural gas deposits will soon be exploited. Medium and small scale industry that has investor attention includes telecommunications, hand woven carpet making, and agricultural processing. Small factories and plants in Kabul and other cities produce textiles, leather goods, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizers, cement, and copper. The United Nations established a project aimed to resume sugar production in Baghlan. Development of the dried fruit and nut industry has strong potential.

Another main commodity, especially in rural areas, is carpet weaving. Due to the demand for world famous Afghan carpets and their importance to the rural economy, the government has given significant attention to the revitalization of this sector.

The capital market in Afghanistan developed rapidly despite deficiencies in the legal framework in 2001 – 2004, notably weak formal mechanisms for contract enforcement. New banking laws were passed in 2003 and 2004 establishing the Afghanistan central bank Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB); as of 2009 there were 17 licensed commercial banks providing long-term credit that were supervised by the DAB (for more details see chapter on Afghan Bank system).

Agriculture

Afghanistan's rough terrain and arid climate leave little land use for agriculture. Only 12% of the land is arable, and not all of that is actually used to cultivate crops¹¹¹. Prolonged and severe drought adds to the challenges of growing food and raising livestock. Despite these obstacles, 70% to 85% of people in Afghanistan rely on agriculture for their livelihood. Almost 40% of Afghanistan's legitimate GDP is agricultural, but poor conditions have forced million of rural Afghans to rely on food aid.

Since the early 1950s, billions of dollars of international assistance have been spent in Afghanistan, much of it directed towards upgrading agriculture and increasing production through the development of large-scale infrastructure, and the expansion of forestry and natural resource management. Some of this aid was shockingly misguided. By 1978 Afghanistan was largely self-sufficient in food. It was also a significant exporter of high quality fruit, silk, cotton and other products. Between 1978 and 1989, international assistance, mainly from the Soviet bloc, focused on bringing government-controlled land into production through large-scale development and state farms. During the decade-long Soviet occupation, much of Afghanistan's agricultural infrastructure was ruined¹¹². The mass exodus of one-third of all Afghans to Pakistan and Iran during the 1980s (the majority from rural areas) also severely affected the agricultural situation. Afghanistan suffered further destruction of the countryside during civil war and Taliban regime.

During the 1990s, donor aid to Afghanistan was primarily humanitarian. Current approaches are now shifting from quick-impact activities to longer-term development. As the cash economy expands, pressures will grow for greater capital accumulation and investment. This is already happening in certain parts of the country such as Helmand and Wardak. Aid groups maintain that increasing overall food supply and creating saleable surpluses will provide the greatest potential access to food for all Afghans. With better quality seeds and improved agricultural methods, coupled with more marketable new crops, such as

¹¹¹ Three-quarters of the country supports only sparse but extensive grazing in the mountains and deserts. A mere five percent of the land area, mainly in the irrigated valleys, produces 85% of overall agricultural output.

¹¹² An estimated 22,000 villages in the country's provinces were destroyed or severely damaged. In many areas, Soviet and Afghan government troops cut down vineyards, orchards, ornamental trees and shrubs for security reasons. The Soviets also destroyed some 3,000 ancient irrigation systems as a means of deliberately disabling the local economy, particularly in parts known to support the mujahideen

sunflower seed, there is no reason why Afghanistan should not become a significant food exporter.

The most common legal crop grown in Afghanistan is wheat. Farmers also grow barley, beets, castor beans, corn, cotton, fruits, madder, nuts, mutton, rice, sugar, tobacco, various vegetables, and wheat and produce wool. Farming methods are outdated, using few modern machines, chemical fertilizers, or pesticides. A failure to modernize irrigation methods hampers effective agricultural production. However, programs are in place to improve cultivation, including reforming land titles, improving irrigation, distributing seeds, conducting cultivation and farm-related training sessions, establishing demonstration centres, practicing fertilizer use, and building roads to town markets.

Opium production is illegal but widespread. Poor agricultural conditions and extreme poverty create incentives for farmers to turn to growing opium poppies, which are easy to grow in the harsh terrain and climate of Afghanistan and sell for a high price (for details see Drug Cultivation).

Utilities

Electricity

Only about 15% to 20% of Afghanistan's land area lies within the electrical power network¹¹³. Even the areas of the country that have access to electricity have unreliable service. Challenges to solving Afghanistan's electrical shortage include severe damage to physical infrastructure, lack of qualified personnel, organizational limitations, dependence on funds from donors, and lack of security.

Afghanistan has an installed electricity generating capacity of 450 megawatts, but only about 270 megawatts are available. Electrical demand is much higher, about 750 gigawatt-hour, and expected to rise to 3,334 gigawatt-hour by 2015¹¹⁴. Afghanistan operates one natural gas-burning power plant in Mazar-I-Sharif, two gas turbines functioning on diesel fuel in Kabul, and five hydroelectric power plants¹¹⁵. The Naghlu Hydro Power Station has a production

¹¹³ The Afghan government set a goal for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010, a goal that was not met.

¹¹⁴ Electricity production – 913.1 million kWh (2009 est.), electricity consumption – 2.226 billion kWh (2009 est.)

¹¹⁵ 23.5% electricity from fossil fuels (2009 est.) and 76.5% from hydroelectric plants (2009 est.)

capacity of 100 megawatts and is Afghanistan's largest plant. However, the plant is in poor condition and may fail. Many more plants, power lines, and substations are needed. Much of the existing electricity generating components are outdated and incompatible with modern efficient systems. Afghanistan imports power from neighbouring countries, including Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan¹¹⁶.

Electrical sector projects include providing Afghanistan with technical and organizational assistance; developing the Kajaki Dam for hydroelectricity in southern Afghanistan; constructing a natural gas power plant in northern Afghanistan; supplying diesel fuel to thermal power plants in various major cities; and developing power lines to import more electricity from Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Due to the lack of security, the United Nations declared that construction of a power plant in the Farah province will not start until local warlords disarm and declare themselves disbanded.

Hydrocarbons energy sector

Years of war have stunted development of a hydrocarbons energy sector in Afghanistan. The country has no hydrocarbons export industry and a small refining sector that provides some of Afghanistan's needs for gasoline or other fuels. Most of Afghanistan's fuel comes from neighbouring states. However, Afghanistan's prospects in this sector appeared to brighten by the announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves, amounts that could make Afghanistan self-sufficient in energy or even able to export. In a major development, on 15th December 2010, the Afghan government signed a six-month contract with a local firm, Ghazanfar Neft Gas, to collect and market crude oil from the Angot field in northern Afghanistan (part of a field that may contain 80 million barrels of oil), initially producing at the low rate of 800 barrels per day.

Water

Fewer than 20% of people in Afghanistan have access to safe drinking water. Afghanistan's climate varies between arid and semiarid and is prone to prolonged and severe droughts. Water distribution systems need to be replaced.

Afghanistan has 75,000 million cubic meters of water resources, but only one-third of these resources are being used. The Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources, and Environment is responsible for designing, constructing, and

¹¹⁶ Electricity imports – 1.377 billion kWh (2009 est.)

maintaining irrigation canals and reservoirs. Several projects aim to explore Afghanistan's terrain for additional sources of water. Other projects include developing deep wells and water pumps for communities and building pipes to transport water to provincial towns. Regional cooperatives similar to the Aral Sea Basin Program may help to address the water shortage.

Foreign Investments

Many obstacles deter foreign investors in Afghanistan. The lack of sea access and adequate infrastructure makes exporting products expensive. Customs regulations and property laws are underdeveloped. The banking system is also underdeveloped and raises little revenue. Law enforcement is sporadic, and corruption and extortion are rampant. Airports cannot handle large-scale transport of expensive items. Basic necessities such as water and electricity are sometimes unreliable, even in Kabul.

Another major obstacle is nationalized industry. Some of the most attractive industries, such as oil, gas, and precious stones, are state-owned and unavailable to foreign investors.

Despite these challenges to foreign investment, Afghanistan's new government is creating liberal trade laws, tax reforms, and incentives to encourage much needed foreign investment. Incentives to foreign investors include 100% foreign ownership and the ability to transfer all profits abroad. The Afghan Investment Support Agency assists foreign investors with required documents and information on starting a business enterprise.

Construction contracts are the most plentiful, but this sector has been tainted by corruption. Many contracts awarded to firms are small-scale community based programs. Other enterprises include Afghan carpets, leather goods, and processed foods.

Modes of Subsistence

Afghans have developed a number of different strategies to wrest a living from their difficult, often marginal environment. Some pastoralist or herdsmen groups live a seasonally nomadic existence although other herding communities are sedentary. Often groups combine animal husbandry with agriculture; some rely very little on livestock. These subsistence patterns are to some extent fluid;

pastoralists often change their degree of reliance on cultivation, depending on ecological, economic, and political factors.

"Pastoralism"

Afghanistan has fine pastures permitting a considerable portion of its population, perhaps 9%, to engage in nomadic "pastoralism". This entails annual migrations with large flocks of sheep and goats from lowland winter settlements, where they sow and reap crops and live in housing of a fairly permanent nature, to highland summer pastures located above 1,000 meters; sometimes as high as 3,500 meters. Here they occupy fixed grazing grounds which they do not own but on which they have traditional grazing rights. Sometimes they pay a fee. Other nomadic groups practice various types of trading. Uniquely adapted to the environment, pastoral nomads help maintain the nation's ecosystem and contribute substantially to the national economy.

Estimates of nomadic populations are even more uncertain than those for settled populations. The figure of 1.5 million given in many official publications in 1996 is an average of 1970 estimates which varied from 800,000 to over 2.5 million.

Nomadic groups are found among the *Pashtun*, *Baluch*, *Aimak*, *Turkmen*, *Arab*, *Uzbek*, and *Kirghiz*; perhaps over 80% are *Durrani* and *Ghilzai Pashtun*. Within each of these groups, however, the nomads form a minority.

Many differences between groups have been described by leading social scientists noted in the bibliography. Yet a few patterns may be noted. During the fall and winter, nomadic groups live in permanent or temporary housing on steppes and plains; in the spring they move to lush pastures in the central mountains. The big herds that travel along high mountain trails are composed largely of sheep, including a highly valuable breed called *karakul* or Persian lamb, a major export. Only 10% - 40% of the herds are goats because the market price for sheep is usually twice that of goats.

The flocks belong to single nuclear families from different segments of sub-tribes and each household will own an average of about 100 animals. Typically 4-6 households will join together to form herd units of optimum size consistent with the labour capacities of individual families and prevailing conditions of the pastures. Each herd unit is tended by a shepherd, who is paid a share of the lambs and kids born under his care.

Nuclear households grouped again by tribal segments move along lower routes more suitable for the heavily laden camels, horses and donkeys carrying household goods, women, children and the elderly. These groups, accompanied by smaller numbers of animals and guarded by fierce mastiff-like herd dogs, follow traditional routes with little variation, moving only 5 kilometres or so a day when travelling through grassy regions, but up to 20 kilometres a day when the terrain is barren. For some, the migration may be only a matter of a few kilometres; others move up to 500 kilometres away from their winter headquarters.

Camp sites seldom include more than 100 single household dwellings; often no more than 5. These portable dwellings are of distinct shapes, including several variants of the classic rectangular black goat's hair tent predominately used by the Pashtuns and Baluchi.

The nomads neither move nor live in isolation for they maintain relationships with both agriculturalists and merchants to whom they sell pastoral products, mainly live animals, wool, skins and dairy products, in exchange for agricultural produce, primarily cereals, household and luxury items, including radios. Poorer nomadic families may serve farmers as seasonal labour during harvest periods while richer nomads who extend credit may acquire land from farmers who, unable to pay their debts, become their tenants. Nomads also act as disseminators of local news.

Internally, the effects of increases in population, modernization, state interventions and abnormal climatic conditions causing market prices to fall necessitated severe adjustments. For many nomads by the end of the 1970s their situation deteriorated to such an extent that they were obliged to settle down. The Soviet-Afghan war exacerbated these trends. Despite this, many nomadic groups acquired significant political power because of their major roles in the resistance, particularly in the transportation of arms. They became one of the best armed groups in Afghanistan.

This laid the ground for potential tensions over settlement rights in the future as evidenced by controversies between nomadic and settled groups that arose when nomads occupied land around Khost because their traditional movement patterns had been disrupted. In resolving the issue, the Taliban were obliged to sanction the nomad occupations because of their superior strength.

Other groups have also been forced to abandon their nomadic way of life. Numbers of nomads have purchased shops in provincial centres such as Khost and Gardez. A major portion of the Kirghiz has resettled in Turkey. Among

nomadic groups forming part of refugee populations in Pakistan, few have been able to retain their flocks and the assistance community has been unable to address their special needs. Yet, among the refugees there are a few who have accumulated fabulous riches and live opulently in elite suburbs of Peshawar, Islamabad and Karachi.

Mixed Subsistence Patterns

Mixtures of “pastoralism” with limited migration and agriculture are very common. In all ethnic groups there are fully sedentary villages with semi-sedentary elements, such as short vertical summer migrations into the hills to graze flocks or harvest grains and melons. The picture does not remain static as the degrees of agricultural versus pastoralist strategies increases during difficult times, such as periods of drought, because of disease, or the inability to repay debts. Poorer nomads can become sedentary because they lose their flocks. On the other hand, wealthy nomads who invest in land may eventually prefer to settle in order to manage their holdings.

Sedentary populations can also take up elements of “pastoralism” and generate new semi-nomadic units. Farmers practicing a mixed subsistence tend to invest surpluses in enlarging their flocks which may soon overgraze lands surrounding the irrigated oases around settlements if they are not kept moving. Agriculturists with relatively large herds will therefore assign nomadic pastoralist duties to younger brothers who in time may elect to remain nomadic and relinquish land inheritance in favour of increased livestock. A new nomad family is thus born, although the process may take more than one generation.

Former nomads may also return to “nomadism” if, after being forced through poverty to give up herding, they manage to earn enough to start another herd. Pastoral “nomadism” and sedentary agriculture, therefore, are not necessarily permanent adaptations and vary in any given place at any given time.

Agricultural subsistence patterns differ with the terrain. The majority of cultivators own their own land. Holdings are typically small and there are relatively few landowners with large estates. But in all areas water is the most important determining factor and must be carefully managed. Because of the scarcity of water, only 10% - 12% of the surface of Afghanistan is cultivated, and of this only one-quarter is irrigated. The rest depends on vulnerable rain-fed dry farming known as *lalmi*. Ingenious indigenous water technologies are practiced throughout the country, including hand dug underground water channel systems

called *karez*. These carry water for many miles from the base of mountains to fields on the plains.

Rural-urban migration increased measurably as the road system improved and industrial complexes near cities proliferated. Urban expansion brought in new architectural styles and building materials; prefabricated cement apartment blocks required adjustments in living styles. Still, despite monumental jumps in urban populations nowhere are slums evident.

Development of economic situation in recent years

In late 2001 Afghanistan faced a daunting set of challenges. Over a million Afghans, mostly civilians had been killed in two decades of fighting. Severe drought (which continued through 2003) reduced cereal grain production by half and decimated livestock herds. Agricultural land had been rendered useless by unexploded mines. Roads, bridges, irrigation canals and power lines had been laid waste. The risk of famine was real. Nearly six million people, including much of Afghanistan's educated elites, had taken refuge in neighbouring countries and around the world. The Afghan state had become non-functional in terms of policy-making, service delivery and revenue collection.

From this dire state, very significant progress has been made, but enormous challenges remain. Today, Afghanistan still remains a conflict-affected state with many parts of the south and east difficult to access for government and development workers.

At the early beginning of the Afghan reconstruction and development, a large amount of assistance had been channelled through different GO, NGO's, IC and contractors which has resulted in duplication, mismanagement, and in some cases corruption. The London Conference (2006) which followed the Bonn agreement¹¹⁷ recognized the urgent need for channelling assistance via the Afghan government. During the conferences, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), an interim strategy for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction, was presented. Subsequently The Afghanistan Compact has been agreed upon among the participants.

¹¹⁷ The Afghanistan Compact to be agreed in London on 31st January 2006 succeeds the Bonn Agreement signed on 05th December 2001. Bonn agreement provided a framework for the international community to help Afghans create a legitimate government, while the Afghanistan Compact provides a framework for the international community to help rebuild Afghanistan.

The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) was set up as the outcome of the London Conference to oversee the implementation of the “Afghanistan Compact” and to ensure greater coherence of the efforts by the Afghan Government and the international community in meeting the objectives agreed upon in the Afghanistan Compact.

Following the adoption of the Afghan National Development Strategy at the Paris Conference (June 2008)¹¹⁸, the JCMB expanded its focus from merely monitoring the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact to include the provision of strategic and policy guidance on the prioritized implementation of the ANDS as well as the political visions and priorities agreed upon between the Afghan government and the international community at subsequent international conferences on Afghanistan in The Hague (March 2009), London (January 2010) and Kabul (2010).

In 2010, the Government of Afghanistan initiated the Kabul Process, which aims to support full Afghan leadership and responsibility for the development of Afghanistan over the coming years. The Afghan Government has initiated 22 National Priority Programs (NPPs) and for effective implementation of NPPs, these 22 NPPs are grouped together into 6 clusters:

- Security: (Peace and Reintegration);
- Human Resource Development: (Skills Development and Labour, Education for All, Higher Education, Women Affairs, Capacity Building for Health);
- Infrastructure Development: (National Regional Resource Corridor, Extractive Industries, National Energy Program, Urban Development);
- Private Sector Development: (Trade Facilitation and SME, E-Afghanistan);
- Agriculture and Rural Development: (Water and Natural Resource Management, Comprehensive Agriculture, Rural Access, Strengthening Local Institutions);
- Governance: (Economic and Financial Reform, Transparency and Accountability, Efficient and Effective Government, Local Governance, Justice for all, Human Rights).

¹¹⁸ An updated ANDS for years 2008 – 2013 was presented during Paris Conference which reflects the Afghan government’s vision, principles and goals for Afghanistan based on implementation of the Afghanistan Compact.

The government asked donors to align their programs with the NPPs to coordinate and target development efforts in support of principles of aid effectiveness. The Kabul Process is fully supported by and coordinated with JCMB.

Achievements in reconstruction and development of Afghanistan:

- The annual per annum income rose from US\$ 85.00 to US\$ 350.00. Community Empowerment efforts reaching 19 million people in all of the country's 34 provinces. As of 4th March 2011, approximately 26,623 communities have been mobilized, and 26,311 communities have successfully elected Community Development Councils (CDCs). A total of 45,220 sub-projects have been completed to date.
- 2,350 kilometres of ring roads around Afghanistan has been rebuilt (78% completed). Kabul-Kandahar drive reduced to 6 hours. The National Emergency Rural Access Project (NERAP) is working to provide year-round access to the rural areas. Since 2007, over 1,251 km of district and village roads and more than 9,000 meters of cross drainage structures have been completed.
- Three railway projects are under way. One, a 70 km line from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairaton, on the border with Uzbekistan, was completed in March 2011 with US\$165 million from the Asian Development Bank. It began operations in early 2012 and shortly thereafter began carrying its peak capacity of 4,000 tons of cargo per month. On the other hand, some other rail lines might not be built if foreign investors believe they will not yield a significant payoff for their projects in the mining sector. In particular, China has committed to building a line from its Aynak copper mine project to the northern border. A spur to the Hajji Gak iron mine would be funded by India (about US\$1 billion) as part of its project there. However, there are indications India and China might opt not to build these lines and to instead truck their minerals out, a process that would slow full exploitation of these mines. There are also plans to build a line from Herat and Kabul to Kandahar, and then on to the border with Pakistan. The planned railways will link Afghanistan to the former Soviet railway system in Central Asia, and to Pakistan's railway system, increasing Afghanistan's economic integration in the region.
- The health system in Afghanistan has improved dramatically since 2002 with the creation and implementation of the basic package

of health services (BPHS) and later the essential package of hospital services (EPHS). 680 clinics built affording 65% of population basic health services access-compared to 8% during Taliban era. The death rate of children and infants has been reduced from 257 and 165 to 97 and 77 per 1,000 live births.

- Since 2002, the achievements in the academic system have been impressive. School enrolment has increased from 1 million in 2002 to 7.2 million children in 2011, of which 2.7 million (37%) are girls. Tertiary/post-secondary education has increased from 23,000 students in 2002 to more than 70,000 in 2010, including over 12,000 females. The number of female university students has grown from zero to 19.3% and the percentage of female faculty members from zero to 14.8%. Different programs helped train 137,681 teachers, including 39,003 female teachers. More than 150 teachers received their master's degrees from foreign universities. 1,659 schools have been built to enhance access to education in remote areas. Over 3,000 new classrooms and over 540 schools were built by the Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUP) program. Eleven partnerships between Afghan and foreign universities has been established focusing on curriculum development, teacher training, lab equipment, and establishment of laboratories and libraries. Still Afghanistan's university system is woefully underfunded, in part because Afghans are entitled to free higher education (to the B.A. level) by the Constitution, which means that demand for the higher education far outstrips Afghan resources. The shortfall is impeding the development of a large enough pool of skilled workers for the Afghan government. Afghanistan requires about US\$35 million to operate its universities and institutes for one year
- Over 1,000 judges (incl. 200 women) trained since the fall of Taliban.
- Afghanistan has created a competitive, transparent mining investment climate that has attracted large foreign direct investment commitments of more than US\$8 billion (2010 – 2012) across a portfolio of oil & gas, copper, iron ore, and gold.
 - Mes Aynak Copper Field. A major project, signed in November 2007, is with China Metallurgical Group for the company to invest US\$3.0 billion to develop Afghanistan's Mes Aynak copper field in Logar Province. The agreement

- includes construction of two coal-fired electric power plants (one of which will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a segment of railway; and a road from the project to Kabul. Actual digging at the mine was expected to begin in mid-2012.
- Hajji Gak Iron Ore Project. In September 2011 seven bids were submitted for another large mining project, the Hajji Gak iron ore mine (which may contain 60 billion tons of iron ore) in Bamiyan Province. The Steel Authority for India Ltd. (SAIL) was awarded the largest share of the project. The project is expected to generate US\$200 million in annual government revenues when fully operational, expected by 2017.
 - The energy sector took a major step forward with the awarding in early 2012 of development rights to the Amu Darya basin (northern Afghanistan) oil fields to China National Petroleum Co. The field is expected to start producing 5,000 barrels per day by early 2013, with a longer-term potential of 145,000 barrels per day. The US\$3 billion development has a local partner, the Watan Group.
 - Another long-stalled major energy project that appears to be gaining momentum is TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) Gas Pipeline Project. During 1996 – 1998 a consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a US\$7.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India. The project stopped in 1998. At a summit meeting in late May 2002, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan agreed to revive the project. Sponsors held an inaugural meeting on 9th July 2002, in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. On 12th December 2010, in the Turkmenistan capital Ashkabad, the relevant leaders reaffirmed their intent to complete the project. In late 2011, the Asian Development Bank agreed to finance the project. TAPI could be a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
- Afghanistan now has approximately 8 million fixed and mobile telecommunication subscribers across 4 GSM based networks and

1 CDMA based network throughout the country covering 75 percent of the population compared to services available to one percent of the population in 2002.

- As of 31st December 2011, the incremental irrigated area resulting from rehabilitation of more than 750 irrigation schemes exceeded 800,000 hectares, which is more than the end-of-project target of 715,000 hectares. The number of beneficiaries is over 840,000 people. Under the Horticulture Component of the Horticulture and Livestock Project, over 2,700 ha of new orchards (grapes, apricots, almonds, and pomegranates) have been planted so far, and over 600 women have participated in the program.
- 14 microfinance institutions (MFIs) to fill a huge gap in financial services have been created, with a network of 294 branches in 26 provinces, and more than 429,989 clients. Sixty percent of the clients are women and 30% of the businesses are run by women.
- National park opened in Bamiyan in June 2009.

Afghan general perspective / view on economy

The economy from 2001 onwards drastically changed as a result of the immense foreign presence. Average Afghans found prices soaring and wistfully remembered the prices of the previous, hard (Taliban) years when food was more affordable. The foreign presence has created a sense of a “bubble” economy and many fears what will happen when the number of foreigners is significantly reduced. Unemployment continues to be high, especially as many have not received higher education. The years of war have meant an absence of time to develop highly skilled workers in various trades with high quality work. This plagues the best of work, while a high level of corruption reduces chances of fair growth.

Islamic business contracts

Business contracts in Afghanistan follow the principles of *Mu'amalat* of *Sharia* law. Broad-based economic well-being, social and economic justice, and equitable distribution of income and wealth is the primary objective of Islamic economics. The intense commitment of Islam to brotherhood and justice makes the well-being or '*falah*' of all human beings the principal goal of Islam. Among

the most important teachings of Islam for establishing justice and eliminating exploitation in business transactions is the prohibition of all sources of unjustified enrichment. Three aspects of forbidden elements in contracts which may induce people for unjustified enrichment are: *Riba* (Interest), *Gharar* (Dubiousness in Contract) and *Maysir* (Gambling).

- *Riba* or Interest: *Riba* or interest is completely prohibited under Islamic law. *Riba* is a prominent source of unjustified advantage, because *Sharia* does not consider money as a commodity such that there should be a price for its use. Money is a medium of exchange in an asset oriented economy, and a store of value. However, the term *riba* is used in the *Sharia* in two senses, *riba-an-nasiah* and *riba-al-fadl*.
 - *Riba-an-nasiah*¹¹⁹ refers to the time allowed to the borrower to repay the loan in return for additional funds (financial increment). It makes no difference whether the return is a fixed or a variable percentage of the principal, an absolute amount to be paid in advance or on maturity, or a gift or service to be received as a condition for the loan. This leaves no room for arguing that *riba* refers to usury and not interest.
 - *Riba-al-fadl*, on the other hand, is related to the transactions of the homogeneous goods. *Riba-al-fadl* arises if gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates, and salt are exchanged against themselves with unequal proportion. That is, they should be exchanged on the spot and be equal and alike, otherwise any change in transactions will create *riba-al-fadl*.

However, the absolute prohibition of *riba* or interest in the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* is a command to establish an economic system from which all forms of exploitation are eliminated, in particular, the injustice of the financier being assured of a positive return without doing any work or sharing in the risk, while the entrepreneur, in spite of his management and hard work, is not assured of such a positive return. The prohibition of interest is, therefore, a way to establish justice between the financier and entrepreneur.

¹¹⁹ *nasiah* is related to the verb *nasa'a*, meaning to postpone, defer or wait

- *Gharar* or Dubiousness in Contract: The *Sharia* determined that in the interest of fair and transparent dealing in the contracts between the parties, any unjustified enrichment arising out of uncertainty or undefined essential pillars of contract are prohibited. *Gharar* is originated out of deception through ignorance by one or more parties to a contract. Gambling is also a form of *gharar* because the gambler is ignorant of the result of the gamble. There are several types of *gharar*, all of which are forbidden (*haraam*). The following are some examples:
 - Selling goods that the seller is unable to deliver;
 - Selling known or unknown goods against an unknown price, such as selling the contents of a sealed box;
 - Selling goods without proper description, such as shop owner selling clothes with unspecified sizes;
 - Selling goods without specifying the price, such as selling at the 'going price';
 - Making a contract conditional on an unknown event, such as when a friend arrives if the time is not specified;
 - Selling goods on the basis of false description; and
 - Selling goods without allowing the buyer to properly examine the goods.

In order to avoid *gharar*, the contracting parties must

- ascertain that both the subject and prices of the sale exist, and are able to be delivered;
 - specify the characteristics and amounts of the counter values;
 - define the quantity, quality and date of future delivery, if any.
- *Maysir* or Gambling: The prohibition of *maysir* arises from the premise that an apparent agreement between the parties is in actuality the result of immoral inducement provided by false hopes in the parties' mind that they will profit unduly by the contract.

The Nature of the Forbidden Contracts

A number of barter arrangements peculiar to pre-Islamic market trading were expressly forbidden by the Prophet Muhammad. The characteristic they have in common is that they depend on conjectured or uncertain definition of the goods being traded. It is from the explicit prohibition of such barter arrangements that Islamic law developed its strict rules about definition of the objects (and terms) of contract. Examples of forbidden contracts are:

- *Muzabana*: The exchange of fresh fruits for dry such that the quantity of the dry fruit is measured and fixed but the quantity of the fresh to be given in exchange is estimated while still on the trees.
- *Muhaqalah*: The sale of grains still growing (that is, unharvested) in exchange for an equal quantity of harvested grains¹²⁰.
- *Mulamasah*: An historic sales contract in which the sale was finalised with the buyer or seller touching a piece of cloth.
- *Munabudhah*: An historic sales contract in which the sale was finalised with the buyer or seller throwing a piece of cloth towards the other.

Bank System

In late 2001 the financial and banking systems of Afghanistan were devastated. Afghanistan had six licensed state-owned commercial banks that were almost entirely Kabul-based and, to a large extent, inactive. The banks lacked connectivity, reliable information on assets and liabilities, and did not follow commonly agreed and accepted accounting standards. Nonperforming loans were not written off and no provisioning was made for them. Managers were political appointees with little or no banking experience; knowledge and capacity of bank staff were low. The operation of commercial banks had been hampered during the Taliban era as banks were not allowed to pay or to charge interest, in line with Islamic law. As a result, banks had ceased all lending activities, which had moved into the informal sector. Nevertheless, the banks had substantial assets (primarily real estate) on their books; they were solvent and some earned income from foreign currency deposits held abroad.

¹²⁰ (The prohibition of this particular transaction is an important element in the general discussion of *gharar* (uncertainty), the basis of the prohibition of futures trading in grain and other foodstuff and stock commodities.

The lack of confidence in the banking system and uncertainties and difficulties faced by the population and businesspeople led them to rely almost exclusively on the long-established, highly efficient, informal “Hawala” system (for details see chapter below) – based on trust and reputation, where participants engaged in self-regulation of activities. During the Taliban period the Hawala system replaced commercial banks, including deposit taking, the provision of credit, and foreign exchange operations. IMF estimates that, at the time, Kabul alone had approximately 5,000 money traders.

New banking laws were passed in 2003 and in early 2004, based largely on international best practice. The laws include the Law of central bank Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), which was introduced in February 2004. With the help of the international community and donors, DAB started to develop the capacity to carry out bank supervision and monetary policy operations. The Banking Law came into force in September 2003, establishing the legal framework for commercial bank operation in Afghanistan. The law stipulates that the central bank is authorized to register, regulate and monitor commercial banks.

The banking system grew rapidly in the post-Taliban period: by 2005 there were eleven licensed banks: three state-owned banks and eight private local and foreign banks. Most banks offered basic services and their operations were constrained severely due to deficiencies with regard to inadequate laws and regulations (including bankruptcy, mortgage and contract laws), property rights and inaccurate, incomplete and flawed title deeds and inefficient and corrupt courts. Uncertainty and security issues limited the operation of commercial banks in remote areas.

As of March 2008, the financial system of Afghanistan comprised 15 licensed commercial banks with 183 branches in 20 provinces; 332 foreign exchange dealers; and 100 licensed money service providers.

In 2009, the banking system increased its number of Banks to 17, generating 5,000 jobs since 2003, when the Afghan Central Bank resumed licensing.

In 2010, the biggest scandal in the Afghan bank sector emerged, with serious consequences on the Afghan economy and public trust of the financial sector, when Kabul Bank Chairman and other insiders were spending the bank's US\$1 billion¹²¹ for their own profit. The Kabul Bank management activities were

¹²¹ An USAID inspector general report in 2011 estimated that fraudulent loans diverted US\$850 million to bank insiders. Kabul Bank have been accused for providing extended huge loans to a coterie of well-

compounded by the erroneous audit of international company, which was blamed on ineffective international technical assistance and supervision. The crisis threatened to be a trigger of a broader collapse in Afghanistan's financial system and exposed graft rampant in the banking sector¹²². The government has decided that all private banks in Afghanistan, including Kabul Bank, will be a subject to audits. More than a year after the government seized control, officials recovered less than 10% of the nearly US\$1 billion that went missing. The crisis has weighed on Afghanistan's attempts to win a resumption of support from the International Monetary Fund, which has refused to agree to a new package until Kabul enacts bolder reforms. Subsequently the Afghan government had to pay 5% - 6% of its GDP to save the bank in order to avoid a huge blow to the country's economy.

In 2011 and 2012, the banking sector was still recovering from the Kabul Bank crisis. The official authorities made little progress in recovering the assets owned by the previous shareholders¹²³ and related parties of Kabul Bank and subsequently shifted their asset recovery strategy. The privatization of New Kabul Bank (NKB) was moving forward but with a risk of insufficient interest from the investor community to buy NKB. Sector-wide audits have revealed considerable weaknesses at all levels of banking governance and operations, which also affect the micro finance sector.

Without a successful resolution of Kabul Bank's crisis, the Afghan financial sector could face continued distrust of public¹²⁴.

List of Afghan banks:

- Afghan United Bank
- Afghanistan International Bank (AIB)

connected businessmen, ministers and relatives of Afghan president Mr Karzai whose brother Mahmood was a seven percent shareholder in the bank.

¹²² In September 2010 depositors had withdrawn US\$180 million in two days that could destroy the country's financial system.

¹²³ The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee report stated on 28th November, 2012 that US\$5 billion, including US\$400 million the Kabul Bank's shareholders, were illegally transferred abroad. About 22 people are accused of embezzlement in the case, and their trial started. Some US\$935 million of the bank assets was transferred abroad through various systems and US\$825 million are needed to bail out the bank.

¹²⁴ Prior to the crisis, the banking sector experienced strong growth (from a very low base), reaching US\$4.1 billion in total assets and over US\$3.6 billion in total deposits. While still small and nascent, the crisis has stalled development of the sector. Growth of bank deposits slowed from an annual average of 79.7% between 2005 and 2010 to an average of 6.5% over the 2011 – 2012 years. Growth of commercial loans, which were nearly doubling annually in the years before the crisis, has plummeted to -15% since 2011. Subsequently Afghanistan's banking performance is the lowest in the region.

- Alfalah Bank
- Aryanbank
- Azizi Bank
- Bakter Bank
- Bank e Mili
- Brak Afghanistan Bank
- Central Bank
- First MicroFinance Bank
- Ghazanfar Bank
- Habib Bank Afghanistan
- Kabulbank
- Miawand Bank
- National Bank Of Afghanistan
- Pashtany Bank
- Standard Chartered Bank

The Hawala system remained important for many transactions because the public was comfortable with its procedures. This system is perceived to provide services more rapidly, at a lower cost, and in a more convenient manner than commercial banks because it appears better-suited to many aspects of local circumstances: it requires no paperwork or bureaucratic procedures for client verification, risk assessment or transaction approval.

The mechanics of the hawala system

In Arabic, the term "*hawala*" means "transfer", and in simple terms denotes the practice of transferring money and value from one place to another through service providers, known as *hawaladars*. The practice is understood in Arabic legal commentaries as the "exchange of debt", particularly in its historical context of long-distance trade. When the word was adopted into Hindi and Urdu, it retained this sense but gained the additional meanings "trust" and "reference", which reflect the code by which the system functions. Afghans involved in the trade tend to call themselves *sarafi*, or the singular, *saraf*, which means "money changer".

Informal money service providers, or *hawaladars*, have gained an enhanced role as an important informal institution and key economic agents in Afghanistan. The *hawala* system, handling both financial transfers and currency exchange, was important in Afghanistan even before the war. But during the long

period of conflict, and especially under the Taliban regime, the *hawala* markets fully replaced the formal banking system, providing people with the only facility to transfer money into and out of the country. These markets became host to a complex interplay of actors from the benign through to the ethically questionable and patently criminal. Today, *hawala* continues to be the system of choice for most cash payments, transfers, currency exchange, and remittances in the country. This is partly due to restricted public access to modern banking services.

The *hawala* process consists of three main functions: money exchange, the sending and receiving of money¹²⁵, and the settlement of transactions. In the transfer of money, various intermediaries tend to be engaged, but this does not generally delay the payment or affect its reliability, cost, or convenience to the customer. These features make it the remittance system of choice for many labour migrants wanting to remit money back home.

When a *hawaladar* sends payment instructions to his counterpart, an informal debt is created which must at some stage be settled. Kinship and family ties usually ensure a smooth settlement process. In Afghanistan, intermarriages between the families of *hawaladars* are commonplace because they are seen as a way of cementing the trust between parties. It is common for a number of brothers to operate in the same *hawala* business, covering some of the world's major financial centres such as Karachi, Dubai, London, Mumbai, New York, and Shanghai.

Despite the emphasis on familial connections, it should be noted that the business is like any other, driven first and foremost by profit¹²⁶. In this sense, *hawaladars* should be perceived in their true form as financial entrepreneurs operating as part of the informal economy; instead, they are portrayed in some accounts as motivated primarily by ethnic ties to distant relations abroad, or tarnished with the brush of terrorist and insurgent financing in others.

Hawaladars utilise the services of formally constituted banks to affect transfers. Deposits are occasionally fragmented and wired to various banks throughout the world before being brought back together in an aggregate (the "starburst" effect), or they can be sent on a circuitous trip and returned back to the account of origin (the "boomerang" effect). The movement and layering of funds from informal to formal institutions blurs the boundary between the two.

¹²⁵ "outbound" and "inbound" transmissions

¹²⁶ In reality, if it maximizes profit to deal with a *Tajik* when the dealer is *Pashtun*, he will not hesitate to do so after verifying that the other party is trustworthy. Ethnicity is thus a poor explanatory factor in the cooperation among *hawala* dealers.

The formal and informal banking systems become interlocked, just like the official and unofficial markets serviced by the *hawala* system itself.

The fieldwork conducted indicates that the widespread perception of the *hawala* system as being paperless is incorrect. Access to financial records reveals that each transaction is carefully logged, and follows its own accounting procedures. Not surprisingly, transfers made on behalf of drug traffickers tend to be kept more discreet, either by maintaining very simple notes locked in the safe, or by not keeping a record at all. However, one *hawaladar* confided that he documents all the shop's drug-related financial transfers on his home computer.




Figure 14: *Hawala transaction*

It should now be clear that, while anonymity and potential for nominal documentation make the hawala system an attractive means to transfer money, these qualities also make it vulnerable to abuse. But it is notoriously difficult to draw a simplistic distinction between the illicit and licit forms of Afghanistan's informal economy, especially when evaluating the extent of drug money passing through the hawala system. A glance at the various users of the system reveals that it is critical to the movement of both illicit and licit finance.

Conclusion

It would be virtually impossible for a country like Afghanistan to piece together its shattered economy without relying on this kind of informal financial system. Although only occupying small shop fronts the *hawala* system is immense, transmitting million of dollars outside of formal legal reckoning through familial ties, ethnic linkages, and important business partnerships. It remains, legally and morally, an indeterminate grey area where the money changing hands straddles numerous illicit/licit boundaries. Like any other financial market, it is a place where fortunes are won and lost, and those willing to take risks are rewarded accordingly.

As long as Afghanistan depends on the *hawala* system, the door for large-scale money laundering activities remains wide open. Policy makers should thus aspire to develop over time a fully functioning banking system. However, they must also recognize that there will be no quick transition, and that any new banking system has to be developed in a manner that is sensitive to the needs of an emerging licit economy in Afghanistan. The application of rigid rules in this context could turn out to be counter-productive. The business sector and the general public will still have to be convinced of the advantages of a modern banking system. In the meantime, it is also clear that Afghanistan will have to live with its traditional *hawala* system. While recognizing the likelihood of abuse of the *hawala* system for illegal business activities, such as drug-related money laundering, it is also clear that without the *hawala* system, the provision of even basic financial transfers could not be guaranteed in Afghanistan for the time being.

Afghan general perspective / view on money transfer

Money transfer from Afghanistan to other countries and vice versa takes place through banks, institutions such as Western Union and Hawala. Hawala is based on honour and a wide network of money brokers. Historically, it began in Islamic law in the Middle East and provided a reliable method of money transfer for traders before modern banking institutions arose. It is still in wide use today, especially in areas where banking systems are less complex. It allows an individual to receive or send money internationally without funds actually being “moved” anywhere and is entirely based on the honour system. In many cases, it has lower commission rates attached to exchanges than other systems do

and is convenient and fast.

CRIMINALITY AND SECURITY THREATS

Corruption

Corruption is generally considered to be a symptom and outcome of weak governance, in the case of Afghanistan reflecting in large part the legacy of a quarter-century of conflict and erosion of state institutions, irregular financing of the conflict from various sources, worsening tensions among ethnic and tribal groups, and the growth of informal/illicit economic activities. Hence in the Afghan context corruption has been intimately linked with the development (and destruction) of the state. Since 2001 the burgeoning drug economy (combined with unintended adverse side effects of counter-narcotics efforts) and large inflows of aid have greatly increased opportunities for corruption, including, to some extent, through the revival of the economy.

Afghanistan currently ranks in the second lowest percentile on the World Bank's corruption index¹²⁷. A significant component of this index is based on the activities of corruption prone government agencies.

Corruption has multiple and severe adverse effects on Afghanistan. In addition to the direct financial costs of corruption (higher costs of contracts and public services, loss of public funds due to theft or misuse of government facilities and assets) there are substantial costs related to time devoted to corrupt practices by government officials, private businesses, and the public as well as, especially in the case of the security sector, the human costs (e.g. of threats, intimidation, victimization of people by security forces).

Moreover, widespread corruption (or perceptions about the level of corruption in Afghanistan) deters and distorts private investment. But perhaps most important, are the adverse implications of corruption, and popular perceptions of widespread corruption, for the effective functioning, credibility, and legitimacy of the state. A particular problem in this regard is drug-related

¹²⁷ <http://info.worldbank.org/governance>.

corruption, allegedly involving senior Government officials, which interacts destructively with corruption in the security sector (especially the police) and justice sector.

“Transparent” is not an apt description of the general business culture of Afghanistan. Corruption and collusion between government and business is believed to be commonplace. Business is conducted based on personal, familial, ethnic and historical relationships, and businesses must negotiate a maze of bribes, taxes and murky government requirements that raise the risks and costs of doing business.

Those businesses with the right connections are able to sidestep many of these costs and risks. They are also more successful in getting access to land and capital, two critical constraints in the business enabling environment of Afghanistan. However, for small businesses and potential new investors or entrepreneurs without political influence, there are significant and sometimes insurmountable barriers to entry.

Some experts assert that the Afghan market and economy are actually highly regulated by informal social norms that restrict competition and participation and ultimately result in a consolidation of market benefits in the hands of the already wealthy and powerful. According to these experts, the major traders in today’s market are the same ones who emerged in the 1970s and operated under the mujahideen and the Taliban, often from Pakistan. They are a relatively small group of businessmen who dominate the sectors in which they are involved, having access to capital and political influence that small and medium-sized businesses do not. Most deal in many commodities within their region of operation, e.g. carpets, dried fruits and nuts, televisions and fertilizers — depending on price and demand — allowing an exporter of carpets to import televisions to get his money back into the country.

It has been observed that many of the traders operating today originally obtained their capital base through illicit activities, even though they may now be dealing mainly in licit commodities. Whatever they are involved with now, they must maintain good relationships with those involved in the illicit economy because they are often the ones who control the supply routes and transport systems.

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, and the last few decades of war have seriously disrupted its mainly agricultural economy. The illicit opium trade is the one economic activity that not only survived, but flourished, during and after the war. Now it accounts for more than half of GDP and is said to

involve corrupt government officials at every level. Tribal warlords control the poppy-growing areas, using the proceeds to fund their militias and arms purchases.

Most interactions with government services in Afghanistan generally involve some form of bribery. The judicial branch is quite weak and regarded as corrupt. Property rights are a major constraint on business expansion. Land ownership is required as collateral for bank loans, and many people do not have titles to the land they have occupied for generations. Other land has been appropriated by the military, police or government. Popular perception is that property rights are for sale by the government to insiders with influence. Thus acquiring land or the rights to use land for business purposes is regarded as a bureaucratic ordeal fraught with many risks, including that the government might grant title to land but then re-appropriate it after investments have been made. Whether this is actually a prevalent practice or not, the perception is that it seems to be a strong hindrance to new investments.

The Afghan National Police is part of the problem; ill trained and badly paid, they are notorious for preying on the citizens they are supposed to protect. Security is a problem throughout the country, and growing worse in the east and southeast. Insurgents attack the population, government and ISAF. The police are widely seen as incompetent and corrupt, allowing criminal behaviour to increase and perpetrating a fair amount of it themselves. Police, like bandits, are said to stop trucks hauling produce to market and order them to pay “taxes” and bribes before they can continue.

The war criminals of the post-Soviet period have gone unpunished; indeed, many of the worst offenders are now members of the current local, provincial or national administrations. This has angered the population, sowing mistrust and bitter disillusionment that yet another corrupt, predatory regime has replaced the last.

Corruption in Afghanistan, which is morally rejected on the grounds of being against the basic principles of Islam, further undermines the social fabric and erodes trust, possibly contributing to persistence or resurgence of conflict. Corruption comprises one of the main obstacles to state-building and development in Afghanistan. NATO estimates that about US\$2.5 billion in total bribes are paid by Afghans each year. Transparency International, a German organization that assesses governmental corruption worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180 countries ranked in terms of government corruption.

At the 28th January 2010, London conference, the Afghan government committed to 32 different steps to curb corruption. Only a few of the pledges have been completed outright, others have had their deadlines extended or been modified. The following are measures pledged:

- Assets Declarations and Verifications
- Establishment of High Office of Oversight
- Establishment of Additional Investigative Bodies: Major Crimes Task Force and Sensitive Investigations Unit
- Anti-Corruption Unit,” and an “Anti-Corruption Tribunal
- Implementation: Prosecutions and Investigations of High-Level Officials
- Salary Levels
- Bulk Cash Transfers
- Auditing Capabilities
- Legal Review
- Local Anti-Corruption Bodies

Afghan general perspective / view on corruption

The wide spread corruption since 2001 has been a new experience for Afghanistan. Many Afghans feel this is the result of exposure to highly corrupt practices in neighbouring countries, lack of accountability, the absence of a radical interpretation of Islam in politics and the foreign presence creating inflation. Previously, central government accountability, honour and loyalty played major roles in preventing widespread corruption. The breakdown in government structure, traditional Afghan structures, values and identity is blamed for the rising levels of corruption.

Organized Crime

Post-conflict societies are particularly vulnerable to the growth of organized crime. The decline of authoritarian rule or the ending of conflict often leads to a transition to democratic governance and in many cases steps toward the establishment of market economies. This may frequently take place in the context of a legislative void, lack of transparency, lack of capacity in key government institutions, and, as a result, increased vulnerability to criminal and

corrupt practices. Historical and institutional factors, such as continuing political tensions, the existence of patronage networks, non-applicability of the rule of law, and fragile civil society provide fertile grounds for organized criminal activities. In such circumstances law enforcement agencies often are not capable (due to extensive corruption or involvement in criminal activities themselves), or lack adequate resources or credibility, to effectively combat or prevent illegal activities. Organized crime groups, warlords, terrorists, opponents, and even members of the government (or a combination of these) may take advantage of institutional and legal weaknesses and engage in illegal activities, impeding the establishment of democratic norms and principles. Law enforcement (including any international presence) may be slow in adjusting to new trends, whereas organized crime groups are able to rapidly adapt to changing social, economic, and political contexts.

Obtaining reliable data on organized crime in any setting is a significant research challenge. In Afghanistan in particular, this challenge is accentuated by the weakness of state institutions, the blurring of political and criminal interests, and the increasing secrecy in which drug trafficking is being conducted. Studying organized crime in such a context has been compared to palaeontology¹²⁸, i.e. the collection of small fragments of evidence from which broader hypotheses can be constructed and tested against other ideas and new finds. Such a process is crucial, since understanding the evolving nature of organized crime in a fragile post-conflict setting such as Afghanistan has critical policy implications.

Criminal groups are the main organizers and beneficiaries of the opium trade in Afghanistan. They are critical to the transportation of drugs, contributing substantially to corruption and undermining state capacity. Many of the criminal industries these groups engage in encourage or require international connections. In addition to drug trafficking, organized criminal syndicates are engaged in arms trafficking, human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants, all activities that tend to be transnational. On a local level, the recent upsurge in violent crime across Afghanistan, including burglary and kidnapping, is viewed by many as an indicator of rising organized crime activity. The emergence of these groups in Afghanistan has been facilitated by several factors, including: a recent and continuing history of conflict which has helped breed an environment conducive to crime; widespread economic hardship; and nepotism/corruption. In short, Afghanistan provides multiple opportunities and few constraints on organized crime growth and activity.

¹²⁸ the study of fossils




Figure 28: Complexity of organized crime in Afghanistan

Organized criminal groups in Afghanistan are mostly indigenous, even if some members have their residences in border areas of neighbouring countries. Groups appear to be ethnically-based and can generally be classified as small gangs. At the top of the pyramid are organizations with recognizable structures, leaders and established modus operandi, invariably involving transnational linkages into Afghanistan's neighbours and beyond.

In Afghanistan the most powerful criminal organizations (unsurprisingly given the amount of resources involved) are engaged in the trafficking of drugs. In this respect there is evidence of consolidation of control into fewer hands and of the emergence of a limited number of criminal organizations. The locus of this control is in the south of the country, with strong links to Kabul. The nature of the emerging criminal organizations suggests a close linkage with state institutions; indeed, the protection provided by state functionaries is critical for their survival

and prosperity. While it is clear that a considerable degree of consolidation is occurring in the control of drug trafficking in Afghanistan, and that those involved have powerful political protectors, there is no evidence that the key traffickers act together to set prices and regulate the market through a cartel. However, there does appear to be a surprising level of contact between key traffickers and those who provide them with political protection, particularly in facilitating cross-provincial trading. What form such communications take is difficult to discern, and whether there have been detailed discussions among key players on issues such as what quantity of drugs are "in-stock" and how much should be released is impossible to say. The overall impression is that the market at higher levels still remains competitive, in part because the process of consolidation of organized criminal control is not yet complete. Given the rapidity with which the current consolidation has taken place, it is not inconceivable that a cartel of powerful groups could form in the future.

The borders between licit and illicit markets in Afghanistan are exceedingly blurry and many of the players involved in both the licit and illicit streams are the same.

Drug Cultivation

Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant negative factors in Afghanistan's fragile political and economic order over the past 25 years. In 2007, poppy cultivation and opium production reached record highs. This is despite ongoing efforts by the Afghan government, and international community to combat poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. The magnitude and importance of Afghanistan's opium economy are virtually unprecedented and unique in global experience¹²⁹. The sheer size and illicit nature of the opium economy mean that not surprisingly, it infiltrates and seriously affects Afghanistan's economy, state, society, and politics. It generates large amounts of effective demand in the economy, provides incomes and employment including in rural areas (even though most of the final "value" from Afghan opium accrues outside the country), and supports the balance of payments and indirectly (through Customs duties on drug-financed imports) government revenues. The opium economy by all accounts is a massive source of corruption and undermines public institutions especially in (but not limited to) the security and justice sectors.

¹²⁹ It has been roughly estimated as equivalent to 36% of licit (i.e. non-drug) GDP in 2004/05, or if drugs are also included in the denominator, 27% of total drug-inclusive GDP.

There are worrying signs of infiltration by the drug industry into higher levels of government and into the emergent politics of the country.

Farmers in Afghanistan usually cultivate crops twice a year in irrigated areas, typically growing maize, rice, vegetables or cotton after harvesting opium or wheat. Some farmers grow cannabis after the first summer harvest. None of Afghanistan's licit agricultural products can currently match the gross income per hectare from opium, although the difference is not as high as it used to be some years ago.




Figure 15: Global potential opium production, 1980 - 2009 (Tons)

Across Afghanistan, warlords, regional militia commanders, criminal organizations, and corrupt government officials have exploited opium production and drug trafficking as reliable sources of revenue and patronage. This has perpetuated the threat these groups pose to the country's fragile internal security and the legitimacy of its nascent democratic government. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears to provide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue to operate in and around Afghanistan, including the resurgent remnants of the Taliban and some al-Qaeda operatives. Although coalition forces may be less frequently relying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, many observers have warned that drug-related corruption among appointed and elected Afghan officials may create new political obstacles that will hinder progress. Afghan president Hamid Karzai has identified the opium economy as "the single greatest challenge to the long-term security, development, and effective governance of Afghanistan."

It can now be said that all actors involved in destabilizing Afghanistan are directly or indirectly linked to the drug economy. Insurgents' access to the opium economy translates into increased military capabilities and prolongs conflict. Opiates also fuel insecurity across Afghanistan as groups fight for control of routes and territory. Finally, the drug trade also indirectly contributes to political instability in Pakistan, Central Asia and the Chinese province of Xinjiang (bordering Central Asia and Afghanistan). These are all consumption markets in their own right, but also transit regions for heroin travelling to western, Chinese and Russian markets, in which organized crime groups control distribution networks.

Afghanistan provides 85% of the estimated global heroin and morphine supply, a near monopoly¹³⁰. Production in Afghanistan increased from around 200 tons in 1980 to 3,300 tons in 2000, reaching a peak of 8,200 tons in 2007, before dropping slightly to 7,700 tons in 2008 and again to 6,900 in 2009. Expressed as a proportion of the global illicit opium production, Afghanistan's share rose from around 20% in 1980 to 70% in 2000, and to more than 90% since 2006. Although Afghanistan's potential opium production decreased by 10% from 2008 to 2009, it is still well above the average annual production recorded during the 1990 - 2006 period. In 2008, approximately 2,700 tons of Afghanistan's opium was refined into an estimated 380 tons of heroin to supply the global market. Generally speaking, there is a geographical overlap between regions of opium production and heroin processing. It is established that there is a considerable number of heroin laboratories in Afghanistan¹³¹.

Since 2007, opium cultivation in Afghanistan has actually declined, although it remains at high levels. In 2010, opium production in Afghanistan declined (-48%) and it is linked to lower yields as a consequence of various plant diseases that affected poppy plants. After a blip in global production in 2010, production in Afghanistan in 2011 returned to its 2009 level. Potential opium

¹³⁰ Favourable cultivation conditions: Owing to favourable conditions, yields in Afghanistan have been consistently higher than in other opium-producing countries.

High morphine content: In many opium producing countries, notably in Southeast Asia, about 10 kg of opium is needed to produce one kg of heroin. However, the transformation yields are much higher in Afghanistan, where on average only 6 to 7 kg of opium is needed to produce one kg of heroin.

Poor infrastructure: Opium is relatively drought-resistant, making its cultivation easier than wheat in areas where irrigation is limited. Moreover, dry opium is easy to store and transport, which, given the poor state of roads and stocking facilities in Afghanistan, gives it an advantage over other crops.

¹³¹ This is evidenced by reports from the Afghan authorities on the destruction of 69 facilities in 2008 (against 57 in 2007) while UNODC surveyors identified 97 laboratories that same year.

production in Afghanistan fell to 3,600 tons in 2010 but resurged to 5,800 tons in 2011. Opium production is expected to again increase in 2012.




Figure 16: Detailed global potential opium production, 1997 - 2011 (Tons)

Afghanistan remained the world's largest illicit opium-producing country, accounting for 63% of global opium production in 2011, down from 74% in 2010, 88% in 2009 and 92% in 2007.




Figure 17: Main source countries of cannabis resin, 2002 - 2010

Cannabis continues to be an attractive cash crop in Afghanistan. The extent of cannabis cultivation and production in Afghanistan could only be estimated as ranges with a high level of uncertainty at between 9,000 and 29,000 ha in 2010. However, the large yield of the Afghan cannabis crop (128 kg of cannabis resin per hectare, compared with about 40 kg per hectare in Morocco), which led to the production of between 1,200 and 3,700 tons of cannabis resin in 2010, makes Afghanistan a very important producer of cannabis resin worldwide.




Figure 18: Average farm-gate price for opium and cannabis resin (first "garda") in Afghanistan 2005 - 2011

In Afghanistan, processing (and cultivation) is concentrated in the southern provinces, such as Helmand, Kandahar and Nimroz, where the insurgency and lack of government control provide the ideal cover. Notably, Kandahar's Spin Boldak district was the location of the largest acetic anhydride seizure in 2008, with 7,500 litres (enough for over 3.5 tons of heroin) confiscated in a single incident. But Helmand province is at the core of the global trade in Afghan opiates. As well as its vast production of opium, it is also the location of large, fixed heroin processing facilities. In 2008, Helmand province alone accounted for almost 50% of Afghanistan's opium seizures. Of the known district locations, Dishu in the south and Nad Ali in the centre saw the greatest seizure

volumes. The latter district is a major opium poppy cultivation area on the Helmand River, while Dishu is a processing district and a hub for trafficking into Pakistan. However, all of the laboratories dismantled in Helmand in 2008 were in central and northern districts. Well known opiate bazaars in places such as Lashkar Gah, Baramcha and Girishk continue to operate, although they were the scene of several seizures in 2008.

U.N. officials estimate that in-country illicit revenue from the 2006 opium poppy crop would be more than US\$3 billion, sustaining fears that Afghanistan's economic recovery continues to be underwritten by drug profits and those large sums are reaching criminals, corrupt officials, and extremists. Since 2007, market forces have played a major role in influencing farmers' decisions against opium cultivation. This is under threat as the price of licit crops (especially wheat at -43%) is falling faster than that of (dry) opium (-6%). Yet the reversal is not imminent: in the south-west, where most of the opium is grown, a quarter of farmers cited low prices and low yields as the main reasons for not growing opium this year.

Good governance and control of the territory are vital factors to uphold the law. In the more stable (north-western) provinces most farmers (61%)¹³² refrained from growing opium in 2010 "because it is illegal". This figure is significantly lower (39%)¹³³ in the south-west where "governance is poorer and insecurity higher". Actually, the strongest correlation is between insurgency and cultivation. The UN survey indicates that almost 80% of villages with very poor security conditions grew poppies, while opium only grows in 7% of villages unaffected by violence.

¹³² Reasons for not cultivating opium in 2010 are: Reasons reported by headmen for not cultivating opium differed between the southern and western region and the rest of the country. The predominant reasons given by 39% of respondents for not growing poppy in the Southern and Western regions are 'banned by the Government', 13% responded with the reason 'not enough yield' and 12% mentioned the 'low sale price of opium'. 'Cultivating opium is against Islam', 'elders and *shura's* decision' and 'fear of eradication' were also mentioned, but by fewer headmen.

¹³³ Reasons for opium cultivation in 2010 are: "Higher sales price of poppy as compared to other crops" was the predominant reason (39%) for growing opium. Although the opium price continues to decrease, its level is still higher than other crops and for some farmers; opium continues to be a more lucrative investment than other crops. About 32% of respondents also cited 'poverty' as the most dominant reason. Interestingly, in 8% of the responses, the reason for growing opium poppy was the "lack of governmental control".




Figure 19: Cultivation trend vs. security situation 2010

Following the 22 % reduction in opium cultivation in 2009 (123,000 ha), the UNDOC anticipates an overall stable opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2010¹³⁴. Of the estimated 380 tons of heroin produced in Afghanistan, approximately 5 tons stay in the country for local consumption or is seized by local law enforcement. The remaining 375 tons are exported to the world via routes flowing into and through the neighbouring countries of Pakistan (150 tons), the Islamic Republic of Iran (105 tons) and the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (95 tons) towards their final destinations in Europe, the Russian Federation and Asia.

About a third of the heroin produced in Afghanistan travels to Europe (110 tons) while a quarter goes north to Central Asia and the Russian Federation. Afghan heroin is also increasingly meeting a rapidly growing share of Asian, mainly Chinese, demand. Approximately 15 – 20 tons are estimated to be

¹³⁴ The global area under opium poppy cultivation declined to 181,400 hectares (ha) in 2009 (15%) or by 23% since 2007, however in 2010 increased to 191,000 hectares (ha) up to some 207,000 ha in 2011.

trafficked to China while another 35 tons are trafficked to other South and South-East Asian countries. Perhaps 35 tons are shipped to Africa, while the remainder supplies markets in other parts of Asia, North America and Oceania.

In addition to heroin, Afghanistan also exports some 1,000 tons of opium annually to its immediate neighbours (the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia) and further to a global market of some 4 million opium consumers - most of which are in Asia. With the exception of South and Central America, Afghan opiates are now trafficked and sold in virtually every corner of the globe.

Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian States continue to be the countries with opiate use higher than the global estimate.

Complex pyramids of protection and patronage

The developments, in the specific circumstances of Afghanistan, have resulted in complex pyramids of protection and patronage, effectively providing state protection to criminal trafficking activities. A schematic representation of such a pyramid of protection and patronage is shown in Figure 20 below.




Figure 20: Pyramid of Protection and Patronage

A brief description of the various levels illustrated in the figure is as follows.

Farmers: At the base of the pyramid are the opium poppy farmers themselves. A great deal of excellent work has focused on the factors contributing to decisions by farmers to cultivate opium poppy as well as the specific dynamics of the Afghan rural economy. While these issues largely fall outside the scope of this assessment, several specific points are worth recording. First, there is still relatively free entry at the cultivation stage. Farmers who have access to land, credit, and seed (the latter two typically provided by the trafficking organisations themselves) are able to farm cultivate opium poppy. Second, the process of poppy eradication has imposed additional financial burdens on farmers in some areas. That is, payment must be provided to local authorities, usually the police or the local commander, to avoid eradication.

Small-scale traders: Also at the base of the pyramid are small-scale traders. These traders generally live within the rural communities and know the opium poppy farmers in their areas well. Farmers often sell directly to such small-scale traders, both because they know them and have developed a relationship of trust over a period of time, and also for the sake of convenience, as it may be difficult for farmers to travel to the village to sell directly to village traders. Moreover, farmers may, for example, fear that they would have to pay off the local police during such a journey. The market at this, the lowest level, is relatively open, and a farmer generally may choose the small-scale trader to whom he sells. Such small-scale traders are normally local shopkeepers or general traders who may exchange goods such as sugar, flour, or food directly for opium.

Local traders: Generally situated in villages, local opium traders buy up the produce of a number of small-scale traders or farmers. The market at this level also remains relatively open, with there being some choice with respect to who small-scale traders can sell their produce to, although this is generally based on existing networks and connections. Depending on the area, such local traders may have to provide payments to the local police, administration officials, or local commander. Interviews suggest, however, that the relationship between local traders and those they sell to is now much more organized and operates with a greater degree of secrecy than in the past.

Middle-level traders: These traders buy up opium from local traders. The market at this level remains relatively fluid, with middle-level traders still having some degree of choice on who they sell to at the next level. Nevertheless, several informants reported that levels of secrecy at this level are considerably higher now, and that there are now restrictions on who can enter the market. Middle-level traders therefore operate on the edge of the criminal underworld (represented by the "line of criminal control" in Figure 8). The individuals and

operations above this point in the pyramid are highly secretive, and entry is very restricted for new players without the necessary resources or connections.

Traffickers: Traffickers buy opium from middle-level traders and sell it to connections on the other side of the border. These individuals are reported to be highly organized and comparatively wealthy. Their link to the next level is on the basis of key contacts and connections. Interviews repeatedly confirmed that new operators are excluded from entering at this level, and that the relationship between traffickers and the "trafficking elite" is characterised by a high degree of secrecy and "discipline". In some cases, traffickers at this level may have connections to two or three of the key traffickers (described below), but in the vast majority of cases they owe their allegiance to a single individual. There may, however, be some cooperation between such traffickers, particularly where they owe their allegiance to the same member of the "trafficking elite". Traffickers are engaged in the movement of the drugs themselves and also pay off local commanders and police chiefs as required.

Key traffickers: The apex of the operational component of the pyramid is the "trafficking elite". This constitutes a limited number of players country-wide. The individuals at this level have important political connections which ensure that their operations are not compromised and for which they provide payments. These individuals are extremely wealthy and sometimes play key roles in their communities or political environment. For this reason, they do not "dirty their hands" with the actual process of trafficking. They do appear in most cases to play a critical role in regulating supply, in two ways. The first is supervision of the laboratories and the processed heroin that is produced at them. This includes control over the trafficking of precursor chemicals, although the actual work is done by the traffickers described above. The second is regulating the market through the stock they hold, and when it is released for trafficking. It is estimated that as many as 20 - 30 traffickers may be clustered around each of the key traffickers.

Paying for Protection

The provision of protection to the trafficking pyramid is surprisingly complex, with what several interviewees described as an in-built system of checks and balances. Protection is paid at all levels of the pyramid, although such payments are much more clearly regulated at its apex. Key issues in relation to the system of protection payments are summarized below:

- Farmers may in some areas have to pay in order to cultivate their crops. The threat of opium poppy eradication has also introduced new protection payments into the system. This generally takes two forms. The first is direct payment to the local police or other authority not to eradicate. The second is an undertaking to turn over a portion of the crop in exchange for not having it eradicated. It was reported in a number of cases that farmers may be "taxed" in this way several times. Small-scale, local, and middle-level traders may have to pay some form of protection fee, whether to the local police or to relevant commanders, for them to be able to continue trading.
- The district chief of police (or an equivalent official) receives payment directly from traffickers in order to operate. A separate set of payments is made to move the products themselves (for more detail on this aspect see below). The district level official makes a payment to the provincial police chief (or equivalent official) who in turn provides payment to the individual who provides overall political protection (either at a high level in the provinces or at the centre) for the trafficking pyramid to operate.
- The system of checks and balances operates when the key trafficker, who maintains relations with all of the other principal players, "checks" with both the district chief of police (and his equivalent) and his provincial counterpart as to the amounts that have been received. This contact is in part to ensure that traffickers working within the network are not withholding protection payments for themselves and also to ensure that all relations are being adequately maintained to facilitate trafficking. If the key trafficker is displeased with the protection that is being provided, he may petition the individual providing overall political protection to replace the chief of police, or for the provincial chief of police to replace one of the district chiefs. Players outside of the trafficking pyramid who do not have the required protection will be excluded from the system, which, as argued above, has led to a consolidation of trafficking activities in fewer hands.
- If the district police chief (or equivalent official) does not provide adequate payment (which means of course ensuring payment from others in the system), he runs the risk of being replaced (or killed). Thus while such posts are lucrative in that a portion of the payments is kept for personal enrichment, there are also inherent

dangers in occupying them, and these relationships may often be relatively fragile. For these reasons swapping of police chiefs from various districts or provinces is very destructive to established trafficking networks. Equally, there is anecdotal evidence that some new appointments may have been carried out to favour certain traffickers over others.

The Consolidation of Control over Drug Trafficking

The system of protection described above has been critical in consolidating the criminal organizations engaged in the drug trade, but also in concentrating control over drug trafficking in fewer hands. As already indicated, two inter-linked processes have been underway in the last few years. The first is consolidation among drug traffickers at all levels, with some players excluded. The second is that overall control of drug trafficking now lies in fewer hands, with the emerging locus of control of the drug market lying increasingly among criminal organizations in the south of the country.

Figure 21 provides a simplified diagrammatic overview of the process through which consolidation has been occurring. As already described, until 2001/02 drug trafficking was more loosely organized, with opium being traded openly. While at the more senior levels of the trafficking hierarchy some key figures did exist, below them the market was relatively open, with new players able to enter with relative ease. In some parts of the country local or regional strongmen/warlords levied a "tax" on trafficking and provided protection. Warlord controlled armed groups remained relatively cohesive and in many cases received external payments, although when these were transferred to the Ministry of Defence the flow of financial resources diminished and slowed.




Figure 21: Schematic Overview of the Process of Consolidation of Criminal Groups

The deepening of the political normalization process resulted in important changes during 2003/04. Most critical was the role of political developments in ensuring that (at least publicly) prominent individual warlords and commanders were not involved in drug trafficking. Interest groups within the state used their influence and connections to eliminate some of those involved in drug trafficking at several levels. Some key players who did not have political protection in the emerging order were excluded, as were others further down in the trafficking pyramid. As international pressure increased, and with the closing of open markets for opium, the level of secrecy under which trafficking is conducted and the level of "organization" and "discipline" also has increased. New players have been effectively prevented from entering the market. The net result resembles the pyramid of protection and patronage described earlier. This process continues to evolve.

It is difficult based on currently available information to provide a reliable indication of the numbers of individuals involved in drug trafficking at various levels, and in particular the number of key traffickers who exert control. Figure 22 provides rough estimates of the numbers of people involved in the trafficking hierarchy. These are drawn from various interviews and should be seen as an illustration of the scale of the problem rather than as a conclusive picture.




Figure 22: Rough Estimates of Numbers of People at Each Level of Trafficking

A number of bazaars openly operated, with traders travelling from Pakistan, Iran, become sometimes further places to purchase opium. In contrast, in the east of the country at the time control was much more centralised, with trading concentrated in one location. The closing of the opium markets in the south, significant international and law enforcement pressure in the east, and the greater secrecy under which opium trafficking and trading now operate, have led to important shifts how and by whom the illicit drug market is controlled.

Significant changes have been occurring in the nature of drug trafficking and the criminal organisations that control it in the south. These changes also appear to have important implications for trafficking in other parts of the country and thus for Afghanistan as a whole. The two most important and interconnected changes in the south are that drug trafficking has been consolidated in the hands of a relatively small number of people, and that trafficking networks from the south have extended northward and have played a pivotal role in the expansion of opium production in the north. In this process it is reported that a number of small and medium-level traders have become excluded from the market, with one estimate suggesting that about half of all traders have been excluded in this way, leaving the trade to a smaller number of people who have connections with the emerging organized criminal structure. Interviews conducted in the south of the country suggest that the opium trade has become much more organized and that trafficking is now controlled by a limited number of individuals with powerful political connections.

Political protection for the operation of trafficking networks from the south in the north most likely runs through Kabul. Traffickers in the north of the country have based themselves in *Pashtun* dominated areas with close connections and networks in the south. The people who collect the harvest are locals, but the traffickers are from the south¹³⁵. One of the factors which has facilitated the development of the north-south axis is that, as already indicated, the ongoing political process in the country has forced powerful warlords in the north to avoid being closely associated with drug trafficking.

The drug markets in the east and northeast display different patterns. Of all regions, the east has received the greatest attention from the international community and the Afghan government. Officials in the east report that while in the past most of the commanders were involved in drugs; the number of key traffickers in the east has been reduced to only a handful, possibly 5-6. Law

¹³⁵ In one Northern Province, it is reported that the Chief of Police has for the last number of years been appointed from Kandahar.

enforcement initiatives have also forced many of the laboratories in the east to close, or to shift to more inaccessible areas in the mountains. Drug traders from the south (primarily Kandahar) were reported to have been active in the east until the fall of the Taliban.

The processes by which internal trafficking occurs, and the organization of the necessary payments and protection that are required, are complex. When consignments are moved from the north to the south, local strongmen (often now appointed as police) are paid off to ensure a smooth transfer. As in the case of the systems of political protection that have already been described, there is some "oversight" of this process, with interventions from central or provincial level possible if required. Bulk consignments are moved southward in convoys, complete with sophisticated communication systems and armed guards.




Figure 23: Arrangements for Cross Provincial Trafficking from the East to the South

If transfers are made between the east and the south, representatives of key traffickers may be sent to the "borders" between provinces or areas of

influence to meet the consignment and ensure a trouble-free handover. The practical organization of the transfers takes place between middle-level traffickers, although higher levels of "oversight" of the process, including contacts between the key traffickers or if necessary those responsible for political protection at a higher level. The necessary "taxes" are paid to ensure smooth transfer of shipments, and payments for consignment are generally handled through the *hawala* system. The arrangements required for transferring drug consignments between two criminal organizations in the east and south are illustrated in Figure 23.

There is general agreement among those interviewed that Afghan trafficking groups control the drug trade up to the borders of Afghanistan, from where consignments are sold to trafficking networks in the surrounding countries. There is, however, substantial evidence that the networks and contacts of Afghan traffickers, particularly those based in the south, extend well beyond the borders of the country, with Dubai serving as a key financial hub for transactions conducted outside of Afghanistan. There is limited evidence that some Afghan trafficking groups have sought to transport drugs to their end destinations in Europe (where some arrests have been made), but this is not yet a widespread phenomenon.

Drug trafficking

Some 25% of all Afghan heroin (95 tons) is trafficked each year from Afghanistan into Central Asia to meet a demand of some 70 tons in the Russian Federation, along the 'Northern Route'. From Afghanistan to the north, traffickers are offered a choice of three countries: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are nine official crossings between Afghanistan and Central Asia, including two river ports, one on the Uzbek border and one on the Tajik border.

Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan is short (137 km) and well-policed. While armed attempts at night crossings still occur, traffickers generally prefer to avoid this border in favour of easier alternatives such as the Tajik border. It appears instead that most opiates that do enter Uzbekistan first transit Tajikistan and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan. What cannot be excluded, however, is that larger, long-distance shipments by well-protected networks may find it convenient to use the better-developed infrastructure of Hayraton, or even to import precursor chemicals.

Afghanistan's border with Turkmenistan is lengthy (744 km) and mostly desert. There is some lab activity in the border areas of adjoining Afghan provinces (such as Badghis), which is of concern since traffickers generally export opiates over the closest border. The Turkmen route is facilitated by the presence of approximately 1 million ethnic Turkmens in Herat, Badghis and Faryab provinces.

From a law enforcement perspective, control of the Tajik-Afghan border (1,387 km) is becoming more and more elusive. Outside fixed border points, traffickers continue to swim, wade or cross the Amu Darya River by boat, with the majority reportedly crossing undetected. The building of new bridges across the Amu Darya River, while crucial for the development of regional trade, is misused by traffickers. These developing corridors can also be potentially misused for precursor conveyance destined for laboratories in north-eastern Afghanistan.

One small stream (approximately 1 ton) veers east towards China's Xinjiang province to supply the Chinese market. This route may have grown in significance although it is unclear if one or all of Central Asia's borders with China are used for trafficking.

There is also evidence that traffickers are increasingly resorting to violence in order to protect shipments. Armed clashes used to occur mostly on the Tajik-Afghan border.

Drug traffickers are able to offer substantial bribes to poorly paid local police, border guards and customs to turn a blind eye to suspicious shipments.

Approximately 105 tons of heroin are smuggled from the Afghan provinces of Nimroz, Herat and Farah into eastern Iran. Possibly due to increased law enforcement efforts at that border, Afghan traffickers are thought to increasingly rely on the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran route, estimated to handle an additional 35 tons of heroin. To do this, they must first cross into the Pakistani province of Baluchistan and veer east into the Iran.

Iran's eastern border with Afghanistan and Pakistan is 1,845 km long and consists of mainly mountainous or harsh desert terrain. Given the huge sums involved and the serious penalties if caught, traffickers along the Iran-Afghanistan borders are generally well-organized and well-armed. Depending on the border region, smugglers may be *Baluchi* tribesmen or *Kuchi* nomads. If opiates are trafficked through Baluchistan – via the largely uncontrolled borders of the Nimroz, Helmand and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan – Taliban insurgents are known to provide security to drug convoys up to the border. Baluchistan-based

organized crime groups then transport the heroin to the Iran – Pakistan border. Shared ethnicity and language undoubtedly helps smugglers to facilitate opiate trafficking from the source, through the Iran-Pakistan and Afghanistan-Pakistan borders. At the same time, different ethnic groups cooperate seamlessly.




Figure 24: Global heroin flows of Asian origins

Some 150 tons (40%) of Afghan heroin/morphine are trafficked to Pakistan. More Afghan opiates pass through Pakistan than any other country bordering Afghanistan. Controlling this border is a major challenge; the long, thinly guarded boundary (2,500 km) follows a chain of mountains with long sections reaching altitudes of more than 4,000 metres gradually ceding to open plains and dunes in Baluchistan province facing southern Afghanistan.

The most important points for all trade, both licit and illicit, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are the Torkham crossing in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (formerly, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Chaman checkpoint in Baluchistan province. In addition to these, there are hundreds of natural passes and desert roads coursing across the entire border, most of which are unmanned and unsupervised.

A cross-border insurgency has precluded effective law enforcement work in much of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and in parts of Baluchistan province. The biggest vulnerability, however, is Pakistan's immediate proximity to heroin processing zones in Afghanistan, notably the adjoining provinces of Helmand, Nimroz and Kandahar.

Finished heroin is smuggled into Pakistan using multiple methods of transportation, including the wide usage of camels and pack animals. Although significant quantities are shipped from Eastern Afghanistan into Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, the Pakistani province of Baluchistan is the primary transit area.

The first stage of the route offers relatively few challenges to experienced traffickers, many of whom belong to ethnic groups that live on both sides of the border. In *Baluchistan*, drug trafficking convoys consist mostly of *Baluch* traffickers receiving from *Pashtuns* in Afghanistan. These convoys are heavily militarized and intimidation/violence occurs all around their business, including in areas of *Baluchistan* that suffer from having very low penetration of government security forces.




Figure 25: Major drug trafficking routes in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Trafficking from eastern Afghanistan into Khyber Pukhtunkhwa generally involves the use of mountain trails and pack animals. Violence is rarely reported during crossings (which often occur at night). The cross-border trade is under the control of several prominent cross-border *Pashtun* tribes, notably the *Afridi* and *Shinwari*, but also others such as members of the *Mohmand* and *Waziri* sub-tribes.

Major destinations for heroin trafficked through Pakistan include Iran (35 tons, most for onward shipment to Europe), various countries in Asia (25 tons), Africa (some 20 tons) and the United Arab Emirates (11 tons for onward shipment to China and East/Southern Africa). Pakistani traffickers also operate numerous air (and sea) trafficking routes to Europe, mostly to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, shipping an estimated 5 tons annually via these direct connections.




Figure 26: Drug trafficking routes in Pakistan

Afghan general perspective / view on drugs

Afghanistan has been a producer of the majority of worldwide opium. Following the fall of the Taliban, the opium production continued and even increased. This production is a many faceted issue, involving warlords, corrupt

official practices, poor farmers, and ambivalent attitudes from local and foreign power holders. Some farmers are forced into growing opium by drug traffickers through unpaid debts while others are pushed into it in order to provide for their families as there is little other profitable growing option.

Terrorism and Insurgency

Security in Afghanistan is challenged by several armed groups, loosely allied with each other. There has not been agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in all of the areas where they operate.

The Taliban

The core insurgent faction in Afghanistan remains the Taliban¹³⁶ movement, much of which remains at least nominally loyal to Mullah Muhammad Umar, leader of the Taliban regime during 1996 – 2001. Following the Taliban's collapse as the ruling faction of over 80% of Afghanistan in November 2001, the movement quickly receded into hiding. Mullah Muhammad Umar and his subordinates still operate from Pakistan, probably the city of Quetta but possibly also Karachi, thus are called "Quetta Shura Taliban" (QST). The Taliban remain highly popular among many non-tribal Pakistanis, including key elements of the Pakistani armed forces, especially the powerful Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) organization.

Taliban can be characterized as a traditionalist's movement. Until the Taliban came to prominence, it was the Islamists who combated the rising forces of secularism and, later, communism in Afghanistan. It is important to notice the distinction between traditionalists epitomised by the Taliban and Islamists

¹³⁶ "Taliban" is the Pashto plural for "Talib". "Talib" is originally an Arabic word meaning 'seeker.' The Prophet of Islam urged believers to 'seek' knowledge thus the word become commonly used for a seeker of religious knowledge a religious student. Afghan students have become used to travelling, first to India Deoband (*Darul Uloom, Deoband*) and to a lesser extent Delhi (*Darul Uloom Aminiyya*) and then to Pakistan, for acquiring knowledge of religion. Following the independence of India and Pakistan, leading scholars of the Deobandi School opted to open *madrassas* in Lahore, Karachi and Akora Khattak in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. With the establishment of these *madrassas*, there was a gradual increase in the number of students from Afghanistan crossing the Durand Line to receive Islamic education. Until the independence of India and Pakistan, the "Afghan connection" of the Deobandi School was synonymous with anti-British sedition. The number of Pakistani *madrassas* increased dramatically with the beginning of the Afghan war in 1978, and the Islamization policies followed by the President of Pakistan, Mohammed Zia-ul Haq.

represented by such parties as the Jamiat-e-Islami of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani¹³⁷ and Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Taliban were educated in religious schools called *madrassas* while the Islamists are generally products of the state education system. Moreover, the Taliban are traditionalists seeking to return to the purity of the teachings of the Koran and the *Sunnah*, the practice of the Prophet. The Islamists, meanwhile, are modernists in that they are seeking a contemporary, albeit political, interpretation of Islam. The Taliban, being products of religious *madrassas* in Pakistan, are more inclined towards that country, while the Islamists have mostly received higher religious education in Al-Azhar University in Egypt, where they have been influenced by the political thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamists, particularly the Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, have been able to form highly organized political parties whereas the Taliban are still not organized along party lines. By the time of the fall of Kabul, the Taliban movement had been hijacked by tribal, ethnic and even nationalist elements to a certain degree.

There is evidence of the Taliban being organized on a provincial basis from the time of the *jihad* (holy war) against the Soviet army and Communist government in Afghanistan. Organizations of Taliban took the form more of regional associations than political parties. The majority of Taliban are from the Pashto-speaking areas particularly the Pashtun strongholds of Greater Paktia (Khost, Paktia and Paktika), Wardak, Ghazni and Kandahar. However there were also organizations of Talibs from predominantly non-Pashtun provinces such as Takhar, Badakhshan and Baghlan.

During most of their years in power (1994 – 2001), the Taliban enjoyed broad popular support in the Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. However, as early as 1999 or 2000, the movement's leadership was beginning to implode, with splits between the Kandahar-based Taliban and other factions in Jalalabad, Khost and elsewhere¹³⁸. Moreover the IC since 1998 increased the pressure to countries to withhold their support to Taliban severely reduced their financial resources. In the autumn of 2001, the Taliban were unable to resist heavy military pressure by the Northern Alliance supported by massive coalition forces support. Although the Coalition succeeded in collapsing the regime, many of the Taliban's leaders and supporters simply escaped into Pakistan, or went into hiding in Afghanistan's Pashtun belt. From late 2002

¹³⁷ The former alliance president of Afghanistan ousted from Kabul by the Taliban in September 1996

¹³⁸ As has often happened in Afghan history, one group sought to monopolize its control by not consulting with its counterparts.

onwards, however, the Taliban began to re-emerge¹³⁹. In recent years, Mullah Umar has lost some of his top aides and commanders in military operations or Pakistan arrests, including Mullah Dadullah, Mullah Obeidullah Akhund, and Mullah Usmani. His top aide, Mullah Abdul Ghani Bradar, was arrested by Pakistan in February 2010.

Some of Umar's inner circle has remained intact, and the release by Pakistan in late 2012 of several top Taliban figures close to Umar has helped him fill out his leadership circle. Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, a logistics expert, is head of the Taliban's senior *shura* council and a reputed pragmatist. Other senior pragmatists include Shahabuddin Delawar, who attended informal talks with Afghan officials in late 2012, and Noorudin Turabi, who was released by Pakistan in December 2012.

The pragmatists are facing debate from younger and reputedly hardliner, anti-compromise leaders such as Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir¹⁴⁰. Zakir is the top military commander of the Taliban and purportedly believes outright Taliban victory is possible after 2014. The Taliban has several official spokespersons at large; including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, and it operates a clandestine radio station, "Voice of Shariat" and publishes videos.

It is quite clear that the phenomenon of the Taliban was not artificially created. The Taliban have deep roots in Afghan society. Because these roots were indigenous to Afghan society, others may have decided that they were a force worth supporting. Numerous Afghans, particularly in rural areas, are increasingly nostalgic about the Taliban, who reined in abusive armed groups (including former *mujahideen*) and brought peace to much of the country, even if their methods proved harsh¹⁴¹.

¹³⁹ Coalition Forces have been inadvertently contributing to the re-emergence of the Taliban and other anti-government groups through often heavy-handed operations against the local Afghan population. Another factor in the re-emergence of the Taliban is a rising sense of grievance among Pashtuns in the south and east of the country. Pashtun resentment is further fuelled by a perception that both foreign military forces and international aid agencies are pro-Kabul or focus their attention on Kabul at the expense of the east and south.

¹⁴⁰ A U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba until 2007

¹⁴¹ During 1996-97, the Taliban's Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice issued various decrees, aimed to prevent:

- Girls going to school
- Women working for or visiting foreign aid agencies
- Women participating in politics
- Women revealing any part of their body (even ankles) in public
- Young women washing clothes by the river

Al Qaeda

It is considered Al Qaeda to have been largely expelled from Afghanistan itself, characterizing Al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan as facilitators of militant incursions into Afghanistan rather than active fighters. The number of Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan is about 50 – 100; some are believed to belong to Al Qaeda affiliates such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). It is assumed that Al Qaeda has still some safe havens in areas of eastern Afghanistan, and can move back and forth from Pakistan.

After the death of Bin Laden on 1st May 2011 in Pakistan, counter terrorist efforts focused on his close ally Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is also presumed to be on the Pakistani side of the border and who was named new leader of Al Qaeda in June 2011. Primarily armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) strikes have killed numerous other senior Al Qaeda operatives in recent years. In August 2008, an air strike was confirmed to have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri. Another two senior operatives allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa were reportedly killed by an UAV strike in January 2009. Following the killing of Bin Laden, three top operational leaders, Ilyas Kashmiri, Attiyah Abd al-Rahman, and Abu Yahya al-Libi were killed in Pakistan by armed drone strikes in June 2011 and August 2011 and June 2012, respectively.

-
- Men shaving or cutting beards
 - Men growing long hair
 - Men measuring for and tailoring ladies' clothes
 - Music or drumming in any buildings or vehicles
 - Music and dancing at weddings
 - Displaying any representations of the human face
 - Shopping during prayer time
 - Keeping pigeons or playing with birds
 - Kite flying and selling
 - Drug pushing and addiction
 - Gambling
 - Interest charges on loans and money changing
 - Sorcery
 - Homosexuality

Punishments were harsh: beating with whips and imprisonment for minor offences; amputation of hands for theft; burial alive for homosexuality; execution for murder; and death by stoning for adultery or "multiple intercourse" (sleeping with two men in one month) if witnessed by at least four people.

Hikmatyar Faction

Another significant insurgent leader is former *mujahedin* party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who leads Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). The faction received extensive support against the Soviet Union, but turned against its *mujahedin* colleagues after the Communist government fell in 1992. Hikmatyar was displaced by the Taliban as the main opposition to the 1992 – 1996 Rabbani government, but it is now active against coalition and Afghan forces in Kunar, Nuristan, Kapisa, and Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul. The group is ideologically and politically allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents but sometimes has armed clashes with Taliban fighters over control of territory.

At the same time, HIG is widely considered amenable to a reconciliation deal with the Afghan government. In January 2010, Hikmatyar outlined specific conditions for reconciliation, including elections under a neutral caretaker government following a coalition troop's withdrawal¹⁴².

Haqqani Faction

Another militant faction, perhaps the most potent threat to Afghan security, is the “Haqqani Network,” founded by Jalaludin Haqqani, a *mujahedin* commander. He subsequently joined the Taliban regime (1996 – 2001), serving as its Minister of Tribal Affairs. Since 2001, the network has staunchly opposed the Karzai government and his faction is believed closer to Al Qaeda than to the Taliban in part because one of the elder Haqqani's wives is Arab. Over the past few years, he has delegated operation control to his sons Siraj (Sirajjudin), Badruddin, and Nasiruddin, although Badruddin was reportedly killed in a strike in late August 2012.

Suggesting it may sometimes act as a tool of Pakistani interests, the Haqqani network, which reputedly has 3,000 fighters and supporters, has primarily targeted Indian interests. The attacks on the U.S. Embassy and ISAF

¹⁴² On 22nd March 2010, both the Afghan government and HIG representatives confirmed talks in Kabul, including meetings with Karzai, and Karzai subsequently acknowledged additional meetings with group representatives.

HIG representatives attended the consultative peace *loya jirga* on 2nd – 4th June 2010, which discussed the reconciliation issue. HIG figures met government representatives at a June 2012 academic conference in Paris and a follow up meeting in Chantilly, France on 20th – 21st December 2012.

headquarters in Kabul on 13th September 2011 were the work of the faction as well¹⁴³.

The faction is tolerated or protected in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan and also its purported ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) has caused sharp criticism of Pakistan. The ISI is believed to see the Haqqanis as a potential ally in any Afghan political structure that might be produced by a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Experts debate whether the faction is amenable to a political settlement with the Afghan government. Many consider the faction less ideological than either the Taliban or Al Qaeda; experts say the group is primarily interested in earning funds through licit and illicit businesses in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf and in controlling parts of Khost Province. Such interests could potentially be accommodated as part of a political settlement. On 13th November 2012, a top Haqqani commander said that the Haqqani Network would participate in political settlement talks with the United States if Taliban leader Mullah Umar decided to undertake such talks

Pakistani Groups

A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), is primarily seeking to challenge the government of Pakistan, but it supports the Afghan Taliban goals of recapturing Afghanistan and some of its fighters reportedly are operating from safe havens in Taliban-controlled areas on the Afghan side of the border. Its current leader is Hakimullah Mehsud.¹⁴⁴

Another Pakistani group to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan is Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET is an Islamist militant group that has previously been focused on operations against Indian control of Kashmir. Some assess the group as increasingly active in South Asia and elsewhere, and could rival Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliates.

Another Pakistan-based group that is somewhat active in Afghanistan is Lashkar-i-Janghvi. It has been accused of several attacks on Afghanistan's Hazara Shia community during 2011 – 2012.

¹⁴³ It claimed responsibility for two attacks on India's embassy in Kabul (July 2008 and October 2009), and reportedly was involved, possibly with other groups, on the December 2009 attack on a CIA base in Khost (that killed seven CIA officers), on the 28th June 2011 Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul attack, 10th September 2011 truck bombing in Wardak Province (which injured 77 USA soldiers) to the group.

¹⁴⁴ He succeeded Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in August 2009.

Insurgent Financing

All of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan benefit, at least in part, from narcotics trafficking. However, the adverse effects are not limited to funding insurgents; the trafficking also undermines the rule of law within government ranks. In particular, the trafficking generates an estimated US\$70 million – US\$100 million per year for insurgents.

Another source of financial support is continuous donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. Two money exchange networks (*hawalas*) in Afghanistan and Pakistan allegedly used by the Taliban to move its funds earned from narcotics and other sources has been sanctioned on 29th June 2012 by US administration.

A multinational task force to combat Taliban financing has been established.

Reintegration and Reconciliation with Insurgents

The issues of reintegrating insurgent fighters into society and reconciling with insurgent leaders have received high-level attention. Both are Afghan-led processes but they have some concerned in the international community and Afghanistan because of the potential for compromises with insurgents that may produce backsliding on human rights. Most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists who agreed with the limitations in women's rights that characterized Taliban rule. Many leaders of ethnic minorities are also sceptical of the effort because they fear that it might further Pashtun political strength within Afghanistan, and enhance the influence of Pakistan in Afghan politics. Any settlement with insurgents requires that fighters and leaders agree on three basic principles:

- To cease fighting,
- To accept the Afghan constitution,
- To sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.

Reintegration

The concept of providing incentives to persuade insurgents to surrender and re-enter their communities has received at least some attention since 2002. A "Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation" operated during 2003 –

2008, headed by then Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and Vice President Karim Khalili, and overseen by National Security Council. The program persuaded 9,000 Taliban figures and commanders to renounce violence and join the political process. This effort had marginal success and made little impact on the tenacity or strength of the insurgency.

A more conceptual approach was chosen by Afghan government, which drafted a formal reintegration plan¹⁴⁵. This plan was adopted by a “peace loya jirga” during a June 2nd – 4th 2010 meeting¹⁴⁶. The plan included elements of providing surrendering fighters with jobs, amnesty, protection, and an opportunity to be part of the security architecture for their communities. Later in June 2010, President Karzai issued a decree to implement the plan, which involves outreach by Afghan local leaders to tribes and others who can convince insurgents to lay down their arms.

As of the end of 2012, about 6,800 fighters had entered the reintegration process. However, the pace of reintegration slowed somewhat in 2012 compared to 2011. Those reintegrated are still mostly overwhelmingly (about 3,900 of the reintegrates) from the north and west, with perhaps some gradually increasing participation from militants in the more violent south and east. Some observers say there have been cases in which reintegrated fighters have committed Taliban-style human rights abuses against women and others, suggesting that the reintegration process might have unintended consequences.

The reintegration effort received formal international backing at the 20th July 2010, Kabul Conference. An international donation fund to support the reintegration process has been established with a total amount of about US\$235 million.

Reconciliation with Militant Leaders

Reconciliation is an initiative to reach a conflict-ending settlement with the Taliban. Many in the international community initially withheld endorsement of the concept, fearing it might result in insurgent leaders incorporation into the Afghan political system, especially those who retain ties to Al Qaeda and will roll back freedoms instituted since 2011. The minority communities in the north, women, intellectuals, and others remain sceptical that their freedoms can be

¹⁴⁵ Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program

¹⁴⁶ The Taliban as a movement was not invited to the consultative peace jirga, but some Taliban sympathizers reportedly were there.

preserved if there is a political settlement with the Taliban. These groups fear that the Taliban could be given major ministries, seats in parliament, or even tacit control over territory as part of any deal.

To respond to those fears the outcome of a settlement would require the Taliban to drop at least some of their demands that:

- foreign troops have to leave Afghanistan;
- a new “Islamic” constitution must be adopted;
- Islamic law has to be imposed.

An “Afghan High Peace Council” which oversees the settlement process was established on 5th September 2010. Former President and Northern Alliance political leader Burhanuddin Rabbani was appointed by President Karzai¹⁴⁷ to head it. Among other accomplishments, Rabbani established provincial representative offices of the Council in at least 27 provinces. On 20th September, 2011, Rabbani was assassinated by a Taliban infiltrator posing as an intermediary. On 14th April 2012, the High Peace Council members voted Rabbani’s son, Salahuddin, as his replacement.

Prior to the Rabbani killing, a different negotiation meeting took place in 2011. However, the process stalled after the Rabbani assassination and Pakistan’s boycott of the Bonn Conference¹⁴⁸ due to a 26th November 2011, security incident in which 24 Pakistani border troops were killed. In December 2011 officials agreed to open a Taliban political office in Qatar to facilitate talks. A release of Taliban captives from the Guantanamo detention facility to a form of house arrest in Qatar had been discussed as well. However there is still valid demand for a public Taliban statement severing its ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, possibly as a prelude to a limited battlefield ceasefire. Talks stalled in March 2012 reportedly in large part over Qatar’s failure to fully assure officials that the detainees would not be able to escape custody. The joint statement of President Karzai and President Obama on 11th January 2013 revived the issue, stating both presidents had agreed to support the formal opening of a Taliban office in Qatar. However, in early February 2013, President Karzai appeared to balk on the Taliban office issue, insisting on written guarantees about the validity of the Taliban representatives and controls on the Taliban representatives’ activities by Qatar.

¹⁴⁷ Appointment of Rabani should be viewed as a President Karzai effort to bring sceptical Tajiks and other minorities to support reconciliation. These minority figures fear that reconciliation with the Taliban will strengthen Pashtun control of government to the detriment of the non-Pashtun minorities.

¹⁴⁸ 5th December 2011

Still, even without a formal office, several Taliban figures are operating in Qatar informally, using it as a base to conduct negotiation meetings.

Some Afghan officials express optimism the talks will yield a settlement eventually, particularly if the Afghan government provides assurances of security for Taliban leaders who reconcile. In late June 2012, Afghan government officials and Taliban representatives held talks at two meetings, one in Paris, and one an academic conference in Kyoto¹⁴⁹, Japan, on reconciliation issues. The Kyoto meeting appeared to represent an acceptance by the Taliban of direct talks with Afghan government officials. In August 2012, Afghan officials reportedly held talks with high-ranking Taliban figure Mullah Abdul Ghani Bradar, who was arrested by Pakistan in February 2010, purportedly to halt between Bradar and Afghan intermediaries. A potentially even more significant meeting took place in Paris, France during 20th – 21st December 2012, because talks took place between senior Taliban figures and members of the Northern Alliance faction, considered least amenable to reconciling with the Taliban, and included submission by the Taliban of a political platform that signalled acceptance of some aspects of human rights and women's rights provisions of the current constitution.

Highly significantly, Pakistan is signalling that it wants to play a more active role in the reconciliation process. In February 2012, Pakistani leaders, for the first time, publicly encouraged Taliban leaders to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. More significant steps came in the course of a visit to Pakistan in mid-November 2012, by Salahuddin Rabbani and other High Peace Council members, as well as a subsequent visit by Afghan Foreign Minister Rassoul. As a result of the visits, Pakistan released at least eighteen high ranking Taliban figures who favour reconciliation, and it released another eight in December 2012¹⁵⁰. Additional releases by Pakistan are reportedly planned, although it is not clear if Mullah Bradar will be among them.

A key Taliban demand in negotiations which is supported by the Afghan government is the removal of the names of some Taliban figures from UN lists of terrorists¹⁵¹. Before the 20th July 2010, Kabul Conference the Afghan government

¹⁴⁹ At the Kyoto meeting, the Afghan government was represented by Mohammad Stanekzai, a member of the High Peace Council, and the Taliban was represented by Qari Din Mohammad, a member of the Taliban political council who had traveled from Qatar.

¹⁵⁰ Among the released was the son of the late mujahedin party leader Yunus Khalis and Noorudin Turabi, the Justice Minister in the Taliban regime.

¹⁵¹ These lists were established pursuant to Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333 (15th October 1999, and 19th December, 2000, both pre-September 11 sanctions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda) and Resolution 1390 (16th January 2002)

had submitted a list of 50 Taliban figures it wants taken off this list¹⁵² as a confidence-building measure. International community officials attending the conference express their willingness to support de-listings on a case-by-case basis. On 17th June 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1988 and 1989 which drew a separation between the Taliban and Al Qaeda with regard to the sanctions. However, a decision on whether to remove the 50 Taliban figures from the list, as suggested by Afghanistan, was deferred. On 21st July 2011, 14 Taliban figures were removed from the “1267” sanctions list; among them were four members of the High Peace Council.

The Warlords

Years of wars in Afghanistan created a security vacuum within a country, and in some areas this has resulted in the formation of new phenomena in Afghan tribal society called warlords. The term “warlord” (or newly used powerbrokers) is commonly linked to actors who are diametrically opposed or hostile towards the state. The sole motivation of warlords is their personal economic profit and enrichment. The warlords have military forces and together with their control over a territory, give them in turn a political role, but without the benefits of political legitimacy.

Nevertheless there are still areas in Afghanistan where only a just few warlords emerged, and only a few of those who did lasted very long. These are mainly areas where tribal structures work well and it appears obvious that the weak presence of warlords must be due to local factors.

Until the early 1980s, *Pashtun* tribes were frequently described as an extreme example of a segmented society. The power of the tribal leaders, *maliks* and *khans*, was described as limited and subject to the approval of tribal councils (*jirgas*). The tribes, therefore, were seen as very egalitarian, providing a type of political environment in which warlord polities could hardly establish themselves. Those leaders in many cases went far beyond the role attributed to them. Khans have long been reported to be manipulating the election of *jirgas* so that their own people were selected. As the Afghan state started developing during the 20th century, the leaders frequently and often successfully attempted to get their own relatives and friends into positions within the administration.

¹⁵² The list includes about 140 Taliban-related persons or entities.

The ousting of Mohammad Daud Khan in 1978 destabilised the tribal environment, creating a situation in which the old established khan families lost much of their influence as security became the primary concern. This development opened the way to a new generation of “rougher” tribal leaders, who were more likely to be proficient in the handling of militias and armed groups. Although this dynamic was focused on the local level, a key aspect of this loss of influence was the severing of the link to the central government, due to the removal of the old aristocratic elite from Kabul. This was by no means a weakening of tribal and ethnic affiliations themselves, since these reasserted themselves when the state started to collapse during the 1980s and the centre progressively lost its authority over the periphery.

The tribes stepped in to provide a modicum of security in the absence of the central state. This in turn favoured the emergence of “warlords or strongmen”, who claimed tribal leadership on the basis of a real or alleged unifying role within the different tribes or tribal segments. However, the role of warlords becomes problematic once the external threat disappears, since their military legitimacy loses importance and competition from tribally rooted rivals can reassert itself and this led in civil war in Afghanistan. The importance of warlord support increased during the invasion of coalition forces in Afghanistan. After 2001 this allowed them to reach a certain level within society hierarchy enabling them to establish powerful political entities. Using a net of followers and supporters they still benefit from their power and can influence the future of the state on a high political level or local level.

On the one hand, warlords take over state functions and posts as governors, ministers, police chiefs or military officers, while on the other they pursue their own interests and do not hesitate to deploy state resources to accomplish their private goals. The relationship between warlords and the state can be described as a process in which the former take over state positions and simultaneously fail to fulfil state functions and to obey the state rules.

Most of these warlords are embedded in social-economic contexts and are part of reciprocal interpersonal networks. The loyalty of their militiamen depends not only on economic benefits, but is often tied by family, clan, tribal, ethnic or religious relationships. Many of the Afghan warlords spend their revenues to strengthen their networks. The exchange of women through marriage is a common strategy used to tighten relationships with important allies. Functional differentiations between politics, economics, and the military are virtually non-existent in non-modern societies such as those we find in Afghanistan. Moreover, social status is not necessarily defined by wealth. In most

cases, it is rather achieved by conforming to a certain positively connoted archetype of Afghan society such as the “brave warrior” (Rashid Dostum) or the “wise emir” (Ismail Khan). Thus individual behaviour is tied to ideal figures of Afghan society in a positive way. But alongside the variety of actors, regional differences play a crucial role.

Party	Leader	Ideology / Ethnicity	Regional Bases
Taliban	Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large possibly in Afghanistan). Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan province, is about 65 years old.	Ultraorthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Throughout south and east. Small numbers elsewhere.
Haqqani Network	Jalaludin Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to be supported, or at least tolerated, by Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence (ISI).	Ultraorthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kabul
Islamic Society (leader of “Northern Alliance”)	Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower house) / Muhammad Fahim / Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan, a so-called “warlord,” heads faction of the grouping in Herat area. Former party head, Burhanuddi Rabbani, assassinated by Taliban in September 2011.	Moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik	Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul
National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan	Abdul Rashid Dostum. He was Karzai’s rival in October 2004 presidential election, then his top “security adviser”. As of October 2011, reportedly he has joined new opposition movement called “Truth and Justice Party”.	Secular, left-leaning, Uzbek	Jowzjan, Balkh, Faryab, Sar-i-Pol, and Samangan provinces.
Hizb-e-Wahdat	Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan. A former member Karim Khalili is vice president, but Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival. Generally pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan. Still revered by Hazaras is	Shiite, Hazara tribes	Bamiyan, Ghazni, Dai Kundi province

Party	Leader	Ideology / Ethnicity	Regional Bases
	the former leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari, who was captured and killed by the Taliban in March 1995.		
Pashtun tribal/ regional leaders	Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.	Moderate Islamic, Pashtun	Dominant in the south and east
Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin (HIG)	Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. It was part of Soviet-era "Afghan Interim Government" based in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal "prime minister" in 1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actually took office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in 1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still active in operations east of Kabul, but open to ending militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006.	Orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Small groups in Nangarhar, Nuristan, and Kunar provinces
Islamic Union	Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his "Wahhabi" ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf's faction, with Hikmatyar was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. Criticized the war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.	Orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Paghman (west of Kabul)
Source: CRS			

Figure 27: Major Fractions in Afghanistan

Afghan general perspective / view on warlords

Warlords held the most power in the period between 1992 and 1996. The Taliban rose as a reaction to the chaos of warlordism. They brought a tight,

Islamic, law enforcing presence, limiting the power of the warlords and in some cases eliminating them. Following the fall of the Taliban, many warlords have regained power in the government, especially in respect to the drug trade and organized crime. Officials throughout the country vacillate between pacifying leaders of organized crime (sometimes for personal protection) and carrying out their official duties.

COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA

Communications

Telecommunications

Afghanistan has limited telephone and telegraph services although domestic telephone service is improving with the licensing of four private wireless GSM telephone service providers as of 2007; the two largest are Roshan and Afghan Wireless Communications Company. In the early 2000s, expansion occurred almost entirely in mobile phones; between 2002 and 2004, only 7,000 new landlines went into service.

Internet

Under Taliban rule, internet access was forbidden by anyone not associated with the government. Much of the country is in the beginning stages of acquiring internet access. The number of Afghans with internet access has increased rapidly since 2000, multiplying from an estimated 1,000 to 25,000.

There are thirty-five internet service providers licensed with the Afghan Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Companies include Ariana Telecom, CeReTechs, Neda, Insta Telecom, New Dunia Telecom, KBI AF, and LiwalNet.

As of 2004, public internet facilities were available in Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, although they have been increasingly targeted by terrorists. Customers are charged up to US\$3 per hour depending on the venue. Internet terminals have recently been installed at post offices as well.

Satellites

Afghanistan has 5 VSATs (Very Small Aperture Terminals) installed in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad to provide domestic and international voice and data connectivity.

Since June 2004, Afghanistan has been serviced by the NSS-6 satellite. NSS-6 is a powerful satellite that delivers broadband internet connections to the Middle East region, former Soviet Union countries, and northwest Africa.

In July 2006, Afghanistan launched an earth satellite station in Kabul that consists of an 8-meter (26-feet) satellite dish to act as an international gateway for international voice, data, and TV services. It provides transmissions of telephone, television programs, data communication, and internet services and allows the Ministry of Communication to offer space segment for rent to mobile and internet service providers.

Postal Service

Afghan Post, the national postal service of Afghanistan, provides 397 post offices across the country, including 32 central post offices and 36 city post offices.

Domestic mail service offers pick-up and deliveries from Kabul to the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, Khowst, Ghazni, and neighbouring cities/provinces two to three times per week. Kandahar and neighboring provinces are serviced four to five times per week while Herat, Ghowr, and neighboring provinces, six times per week.

International mail services arrive via Kabul International Airport. Mail destined for the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium is flown out twice a week. Mail destined for the UAE, India, Russia, Kuwait, Turkey, Japan, China, Australia, Pakistan, Qatar, Thailand, and Iran is flown out once a week.

The Afghan Post has issued operating licenses to four mail delivery companies:

- DHL,
- FedEx,
- TNT, and
- Bakhter Speedy Post.

Media

Radio

Radio is the most popular communications medium in Afghanistan, with 21 AM and 23 FM stations. All stations broadcast in a variety of languages and dialects such as Pashto, Dari (Afghan Persian), Urdu, and English. Additionally, relays of foreign radio stations or stations funded from overseas are on the air in Kabul, including the BBC; Radio France Internationale; Deutsche Welle; and U.S.-funded broadcasts from Radio Free Afghanistan, which uses the name Azadi Radio, and the Voice of America, which broadcasts in Dari and Pashto as Radio Ashna (Friend).

BBC World Service is available on FM and AM in other parts of Afghanistan. In 2003 there were 167,000 radios in Afghanistan, but the Coalition and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have distributed thousands of free radios to the Afghan population over the past few years.

Radio Stations	Programming
<i>Arman Radio 98.1 FM</i>	Music, talk; (privately-owned)
<i>Azad Afghan Radio (10 shortwave frequencies)</i>	News, music; (operated by Radio-Free Europe)
<i>Radio Afghanistan 1107 AM</i>	24-hr news, state-run by Radio-TV Afghanistan (RTA)
<i>Radio Herat 94.7 FM</i>	News, music
<i>Radio Killid 88 FM</i>	Private talk radio

Figure 29: Major radio stations

Television

There are at least 10 television broadcast stations in Afghanistan, with 1 government-run central television station in Kabul and regional stations in 9 of the 34 provinces. The regional stations operate on a reduced schedule. The state-owned Radio-Television Afghanistan was the most powerful broadcast outlet. Four cable stations operate in Afghanistan, carrying Indian and U.S. programs. In 2003, cable television was banned by the Supreme Court. The ban on cable television was lifted after a few months, but programs deemed immoral remained banned.

All current television channels are broadcast by satellite; channel numbers/frequencies vary by location. There are 100,000 televisions in use throughout the country.

Television Stations	Owner
<i>National Television Afghanistan</i>	Operated by RTA
<i>Tolo Television</i>	Private, KABUL-based with provincial relays
<i>Aina Television</i>	Private, based in the city of SHEBERGHAN
<i>Ariana Television</i>	Private, KABUL-based with provincial relays
<i>Afghan Television</i>	Private, KABUL-based
<i>Balkh Province Television</i>	Local to MAZAR-E-SHARIF
<i>Herat Province Television</i>	Local to HERAT

Figure 30: *Main television stations*

Newspapers and Magazines

The circulation of independent print publications has been confined to the Kabul region. Although freedom of the press was instituted shortly after the fall of the Taliban, a 2004 media law requires registration of periodicals with the

Ministry of Culture and Youth Affairs (formerly Ministry of Information and Culture).

In 2005, 250 periodicals were registered. There are now an estimated 300 independent publications in Afghanistan; 50 to 70 are active, 20 are published regularly.

Publications	Frequency	Language	Politics
<i>Hewad</i>	Daily	Pashto-Dari	Government-sponsored
<i>Anis</i>	Daily	Dari-Pashto	Government-sponsored
<i>Kabul Times</i>	Daily	English	Official
<i>Kabul Weekly</i>	Wednesdays	English, Pashto-Dari	Private
<i>Payam-e Mojahed</i>	Weekly	Pashto-Dari	Northern Alliance

Figure 31: *Main publications*

Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms

Afghanistan's conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media freedoms, which were hailed during 2002 – 2008 as a major benefit of the IC effort in Afghanistan. A press law was passed in September 2008 that gives some independence to the official media outlet, but also contains a number of content restrictions, and requires that new newspapers and electronic media be licensed by the government. Backed by Islamic conservatives in parliament and Shiite clerics such from conservative Council of Ulema (Islamic scholars) has been ascendant. At the same time there has been a growing number of arrests or intimidation of journalists who criticize the central government or local leaders. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's "Radio Azadi" service for Afghanistan has distributed 20,000 solar powered radios to poor (and usually illiterate) Afghans to improve their access to information.

Afghan general perspective / view on media and communication

The media and communication industry has steadily expanded since the fall of the Taliban and most Afghans have access to a mobile telephone (land lines are nearly non-existent). Even the most remote districts have a combination of mobile phones, televisions, satellites, radios or internet connections and keep abreast of the ever-changing situation. Many Afghans have taken advantage of the communication opportunities provided by Facebook, Twitter and email, for communicating both in Afghanistan and outside of it. However, word-of-mouth communication is still the most important mode of communication.

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ANSF)

The ANSF have expanded considerably since 2002. With international community support, including more than 40 countries participating in Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Afghan government's capacity to secure Afghanistan's borders and maintain internal order is increasing.

The joint UN-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB) agreed on 21st January 2010 that, by October 2011, the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000, (total ANSF of 305,600). Both forces reached that level in September 2011. In August 2011, a larger target size of 352,000 (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) was set, to be reached by November 2012. The gross size of the force reached approximately that level by the end of September 2012, although some of the later recruits have not been trained. About 1,700 women serve in the ANSF, of which about 1,370 are police.

A core element of NATO’s training efforts is its mentoring teams known as Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs). These teams are responsible for training and mentoring deployed ANSF units. The whole process is overviewed by NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). Working with NTM-A is a separate European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) that has been established to train Afghan forces in the provinces. The European Union is providing a “EUPOL” training effort and experts to help train the ANP.

The ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. The ANA now leads about 80% of all combat operations, and it leads operations in 261 of Afghanistan’s 364 districts. However, according to the Defence Department report of December 2012, only one of 23 ANA Kandaks (battalions) is assessed as able to operate “Independent with Advisors”. The commando forces of the ANA are considered well-trained and are taking the lead in some operations against high-value targets. Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan Air Force, and it remains

mostly a support force for ground operations rather than a combat-oriented force. However, the Afghan Air Force has been able to make ANA units nearly self-sufficient in airlift.

Building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important to combating the insurgency as building the ANA. ANP training significantly strides in professionalizing of ANP. However, outside assessments of the ANP are widely disparaging, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where citizens mistrust and fear the ANP. Among other criticisms are a desertion rate far higher than that of the ANA; substantial illiteracy; involvement in local factional or ethnic disputes because the ANP works in the communities its personnel come from; and widespread use of drugs. It is this view that has led to consideration of stepped up efforts to promote local security solutions.

There are still widespread doubts about their ability to take the lead on the increased responsibility. About 35% of the force does not re-enlist each year, meaning that about one-third of the force must be recruited to replenish its ranks. Many believe that the force was expanded too quickly since 2009 to allow for thorough vetting or for recruitment of the most qualified personnel. Incidents of ANSF attacks on coalition personnel have increased since early 2011 and created increased tensions between the Afghans and their mentors. This complicates the transition in cases in which there is less interaction between Afghan forces and their mentors. Many units also suffer from a deficiency of weaponry, spare parts, and fuel and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in late October 2012 that the Afghan government will likely prove incapable of sustaining ANSF installations after 2014, mainly because of a lack of skilled maintenance personnel. There is still an ongoing problem of absenteeism within the ANSF.

Some of the deficiency throughout the ANSF is due to illiteracy, which prompted NTM-A to increasingly focus on providing literacy training. Over 70% of the ANSF now have at least first grade literacy, up from only 14% in 2009.

The subject of long term sustaining the ANSF after 2014 was a major issue at the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago because the Afghan security sector is funded almost entirely through international donations. An agreement was reached to reduce the total ANSF to 228,500 by 2017, although this level will be subject to constant review. This figure reduces the cost of sustaining ANSF to US\$4.1 billion per year¹⁵³. In 2007 ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions

¹⁵³ Sustaining the 352,000 force would cost an estimated US\$6 billion per year, a figure that some donors balked at as too expensive.

to fund the transportation of equipment donated to and the training of the ANA; the mandate was expanded in 2009 to include sustainment costs. In November 2010 a further expansion was agreed on to support literacy training for the ANA. As of 30th September 2012, donor contributions and pledges to the ANA Trust Fund total about US\$570 million. Another donation program is a “NATO Equipment Donation Program,” through which donor countries supply the ANSF with equipment. Since 2002, about US\$2.9 billion in assistance to the ANSF has come from these sources.

There is also a NATO – Russia Council Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund. Launched in March 2011, this fund provides maintenance and repair capacity to the Afghan Air Force helicopter fleet, much of which is Russian-made.

There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan” (LOTFA), run by the UN Development Program (UNDP), which is used to pay the salaries of the ANP and other police related functions. From 2002 – 2012, donors contributed US\$2.3 billion to the Fund.

The major subunits of the ANSF are the following:

Afghan National Army (ANA):

- National HQ – Kabul
- National Commando Brigade – Kabul
- 111st Division – Kabul
- 201st Corps – Kabul
- 203rd Corps – Gardez
- 205th Corps – Kandahar
- 207th Corps – Herat
- 209th Corps – Mazar-e-Sharif
- 215th Corps – Lashkar Gah

Afghan National Police (ANP)

- Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)
- Afghan Border Police (ABP)
- Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
- Criminal Investigation Division
- Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)
- Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)




Figure 32: ANA Order of Battle

Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC)

- ANAAC Headquarters – Kabul
- Kabul Air Wing
- Kandahar Air Wing
- Shindand Air Wing (planned)
- Jalalabad Detachment
- Mazir e Sharif Detachment
- Gardez Detachment
- Herat Detachment

The failure of several police training efforts led to efforts, beginning in 2008, to develop local forces to protect their communities.

- *Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (ALP)* – The ALP initiative was also an adaptation of another program, begun in 2008, termed the “Afghan Provincial Protection Program” (APPP, commonly called “AP3”). These local units are under the control of district police chiefs and each fighter is vetted by a local shura as well as Afghan intelligence. There are about 17,000 ALP operating in over 60 different districts. A total of 137 districts have been approved for the program, which is expected to bring the target size of the program to about 30,000 by the end of 2015. However, the ALP and other similar program were heavily criticized due to wide-scale human rights abuses (killings, rapes, arbitrary detentions, and land grabs) committed by the recruits.
- *Afghan Public Protection Force*. This force is growing, under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, to guard development sites and organizations. The force was developed to implement president Karzai’s decree No. 62 on 17th August 2010, that private security contractor forces are disbanded and their functions performed by official Afghan government forces by 20th March 2012. That deadline was extended to March 2013 because of the slow pace of standing up the new protection force, and some development organizations continue to use locally hired guard forces. At about 11,000 personnel as of October 2012, it has begun operations to secure supply convoys. It is intended to grow to 30,000 personnel by March 2013, the revised deadline for it to assume full responsibilities. Until it reaches full capability,

embassies and other diplomatic entities can still use private security firms.

The local security programs discussed above appear to reverse the 2002 – 2007 efforts to disarm local sources of armed force¹⁵⁴. There have sometimes been clashes and disputes between ALP and ANSF units, particularly in cases where the units are of different ethnicities.

¹⁵⁴ The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) campaign helped to further establish the authority of the Afghan central government as 63,000 official military personnel went through the DDR program as of June 2005. The DDR program began with a pilot project in October 2003 and concluded in June 2006. The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program followed the DDR program. The goal of DIAG is to disarm as many as 180,000 illegally armed men in Afghanistan who pose a potential hindrance to the reestablishment of state institutions. The DIAG program is supported internationally, but primarily administered by the government of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), and the government of Japan. The program is funded primarily by the Japanese government and implemented by Afghanistan's national security agency and interior and defence ministries. The DIAG program has been completed by the end of 2007.

CULTURAL ASPECTS

Afghan calendar

There are two calendars used in Afghanistan, both starting in 622 A.D. The solar Hijri calendar is the official calendar of the government of Afghanistan, and all national holidays and administrative issues are fixed according to the Solar Hijri calendar. The first day of the calendar year is also the day of the greatest festival of the year in Afghanistan, called *Nowruz* (21st March). Religious celebrations follow the lunar Hijri calendar¹⁵⁵.

Significant festive days

- *Eid al-Adha*: Falls on the tenth day of the twelfth month (according to the *Hijra* Calendar). Celebrates the fact that the Prophet Abraham offered his son Ismael to God. Instead of accepting Ismael, God provided a lamb as the offering. Animals, such as sheep, goats, and camels are sacrificed, especially by those who have already performed the hajj. One third of the slaughtered animal is used by the family, another third is distributed to relatives and the rest is given to the poor. Though contested, it is widely believed there is no significant connection between Hajj and Eid al-Adha, though they fall within a few days of one another. Hajj is the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca Muslims make at least once in their lifetime and is a pillar of Islam.
- *Ashura*: Tenth day of the month of *Muharram* (according to the *Hijra* Calendar). It is a day of mourning, commemorating the death of Hussain, grandson of Muhammad, who died in battle defending Islam against the corrupt caliph of the day in Karbala (present day southern Iraq). Shia

¹⁵⁵ The Islamic calendar, Muslim calendar or *Hijri* calendar is a lunar calendar consisting of 12 months in a year of 354 or 355 days. Being a purely lunar calendar, it is not synchronized with the seasons. With an annual drift of 10 or 11 days, the seasonal relation repeats about every 33 Islamic years (every 32 solar years). The first year was the Islamic year beginning in AD 622 during which the emigration of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, known as the *Hijra*, occurred. Muslims typically call their calendar the *Hijri* calendar.

Muslims mark this event by self-flagellation to demonstrate their grief and distribution of a yellow lentil dish and sweets to neighbours.

- *Mount Arafat Day (22nd February)* Falls on the 2nd day of Hajj, a day when pilgrims pray on the Mount Arafat plain (east of Mecca), making supplication for forgiveness of sins and drawing closer to Allah. It is believed that Mohammad made the last speech of his life this location. Muslims who are not present on the plain often spend the day fasting and devotion to Allah.
- *Mawlud al-Nabi or Roz-e-Mawlud*: The twelfth day of the month of *Rabi al-Awal* (according to *Hijra* Calendar), this celebration commemorates the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. The extent of the festivities, on this occasion, is restricted because of the fact that the same day marks the death anniversary of the Prophet as well. On this occasion public meetings are held in the mosques where religious leaders and scholars make speeches about different aspects of the life of the Holy Prophet. The stories of the Prophet's birth, childhood, youth and adult life, his character, teachings, sufferings and forgiveness of even his most bitter enemies, his fortitude in the face of general opposition, leadership in battles, bravery, wisdom, preaching and his final triumph through Allah's mercy over the hearts of people are narrated in detail. Salutations and songs in his praise are recited. Affluent Muslims generously donate to charity. Feasts are arranged and food is served to guests and the poor.
- *Nowruz (21st March)*: ("New Day", originally "New Light") is the traditional celebration of the ancient Iranian New Year. Nowruz is also widely referred to as the Persian New Year. *Nowruz* is the first day of spring. This festival dates back to the time when Zoroastrianism was still a powerful religion, long before Islam arrived in Afghanistan. During the celebrations, lavish meals are prepared in Afghan homes. Two dishes, *Samanak* and *haftmehwah* (*literally: seven fruits*) are specially cooked for the occasion. Celebrating this day was forbidden by Taliban.
- *Mujahideen Victory Day (28th April)*: This commemorates the day when Afghan mujahideen overthrew the socialist government in Afghanistan in 1992.
- *Labour Day (1st May)*: Also known as the Day of the Worker, it is a celebration of worker solidarity.

- *Jeshen Azadi* (19th August): Afghan Independence Day, commemorating the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. The British Empire ended its political influence in Afghanistan. The most important national holiday. Businesses close for three days of celebrations. People wear colourful clothes, set off fireworks, dance, and hold parades and *buzkashi* matches (for details see the chapter on Recreation).
- *Eid al-Fitr*: The feast of Eid al-Fitr marks the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting and falls on the first day of the month of Shawal. Eid al-Fitr celebrations usually last for three days and are greatly anticipated. For men, congregational prayers are held in mosques, after which families visit their friends and relatives. Celebratory food is prepared and served. New clothes, especially for the children, are made and children get presents called “Eidi”, usually money.

Cultural Awareness

General rules

- Afghans are a mixture of tribes, with a mixture of languages and cultures. But share a common religion - Islam. Islam provides a way of life and moral code to all groups. Besides a common religion, only foreign invaders from Alexander the Great to the British in the 19th century, and the Soviets in the 20th have united the Afghans.
- Bringing shame upon a Muslim can have dangerous, and sometimes deadly, consequences. It is important to understand actions that can shame a Muslim and to avoid those actions wherever possible. For example, correcting an Afghan in public can shame an Afghan, as can using the left-hand to hand something to an Afghan.
- Shame, in this culture, is something to be avoided. However, if it happens, the first response may be to hide it from view. If this is not possible, then the shame must be avenged. The Qur'an states that revenge is the only way to eliminate a shame.
- Afghans way of thinking is totally different from the Western mid-set. It can lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretation of different events.
- Do not underestimate Afghans. In some areas they live in conditions similar to 18th century however they life experience created an own survivability philosophy.

- Afghans are typically friendly and hospitable, but their lives have been rife with years of conflict and they can be stern.
- Perceptions are greatly influenced by a faith that Allah controls everything and that everything happens according to His will. This belief helps Afghans tolerate extreme hardships.
- Like other Muslims, most Afghans consider dogs unclean and will be very reluctant to touch one. Those Afghans who have anything to do with raising animals may have guard dogs for their flocks, but even so, are not accustomed to the notion of dogs in the house. An Afghan who has touched a dog will want to wash his or her hands, either immediately afterwards or most certainly before eating.
- Muslims do, however, like cats. Mohammed, the founder of Islam, was once said to have cut off the hem of his robe rather than disturb the cat sleeping on it.
- While Afghans may engage in discussions relating to religion and politics, these subjects can be provocative. To avoid conflict, it would be best to avoid such topics.
- Afghans display pride in their religion, country, ancestry (history), and above all, their independence.
- Afghans' primary loyalty is to their family, kin group, clan, or tribe, through which they express their identity. Their social mores are often strict and inflexible; they stress honour and individuals' responsibility to fulfil expected roles.
- Personal disputes are not solved easily because of the need to protect one's honour.
- Family honour is affected by personal behaviour, so living according to these rigid rules is considered essential.
- Afghan society is consistent in its attitudes toward the underlying principles of gender. Traditional civil society activities in Afghanistan are strictly sex-segregated with patent ideological support to male authority over women in the public domain. Application of these principles varies from group to group; and there is a wide range of standards set for accepted female behaviour, as well as differences in male attitudes toward correct treatment of women.
- Courage, and physical courage, is central to the Afghan character. They have ability to suffer pain stoically, without fuss, and silently. It is deemed unmanly for an Afghan to cry out, or scream, if gravely injured. This is inculcated into his character as a child, as a part of his upbringing.

- Afghan spirituality leads to suspicion of new technology. An Afghan will tell you that new technology and materialism must be balanced against family bonds and the potential harm against people.
- All footwear is removed for prayers. This rule applies for visiting mosque.
- Be aware that forcing a Muslim's head to touch the ground may make him an enemy. Muslims only touch their heads to the ground when praying.
- Soldiers in tanks or trucks should avoid sitting on them in urban areas or villages. Afghan males see this as an attempt to look in their women quarters which are normally hidden behind a wall.

Customs, courtesies and greetings

- Greetings vary by region and ethnic groups, but Arabic greetings are universally accepted. Greetings in Afghanistan can differ between urban and rural settings. Afghans in urban areas are usually familiar with Western greetings, and handshaking is common but men must not touch a woman in greeting. Placing the right hand on one's heart is a common way of greeting.
- Although the many ethnic groups in Afghanistan have their own greetings and expressions, they all recognize Muslim greetings. *Assalam alaikum* (Peace being upon you) is used to greet at any time of day. The traditional reply is *Waalaikum assalaam* (And peace also upon you).
- A common Dari greeting is *Khubus ti?* (How are you?), and the Pashto equivalent is *Sanga ye?*
- When addressing others in a formal situation, using an academic or professional title is essential.
- A religious leader is called *Mullah* (giver of knowledge).
- Socioeconomic status can also determine which title to use (such as *Khan*, meaning "sir").
- Some people are respectfully referred to only by titles, for example *Haji Khan*. Usually, however, titles are combined with names.
- *Haji* (pilgrim) is reserved for those who have made a pilgrimage to Mecca (Saudi Arabia).
- Friends use given names and nicknames among themselves.
- A handshake is common among men, who tend to be expressive in greeting friends and may pat backs during an embrace, or sometimes fully embrace one another with a hug and kiss on the cheek.

- Women friends embrace and kiss three times on alternating cheeks. Women might also shake hands with other women.
- A man **does not** shake hands with or otherwise touch a woman in public, although he may greet her verbally in an indirect way. Eye contact between men and women should also be avoided. Usually women may hold their right hand to their chest as a greeting.
- Both men and women may greet verbally with their right hand placed over their heart.
- It is impolite to ask an Afghan for his ethnic origin, about his wife, daughter or sisters.
- Whenever possible ensure that your interpreter is of the same ethnicity as the party you are dealing with. A non-Afghan contracted interpreter of a different ethnicity may be acceptable.
- When approaching a male/female couple **do not** look at the female.
- The left hand is considered unclean in Afghanistan and should not be used alone when passing items.
- Blowing your nose in public is unacceptable.
- Always ask permission before taking photographs of people.

Talking distances and gestures

- Western hand gestures and finger pointing should be avoided.
- Men often work worry beads (*tasbe*) with their fingers while they converse.
- Male friends link arms or hold hands while walking.
- Members of the opposite sex do not touch in public.
- To beckon a person, one motions downward with the palm of the hand facing down.
- To request divine assistance, one holds both hands in front of the chest, palms up as if holding a book.
- Muslim women gaze downward when speaking to men. They may look down just during introductions, or even during conversations days afterward.
- The talking distance can be closer by Western standards, pulling back may be considered offensive. It is not applicable for conversations between males and females. Personal space should be considered when working with Afghan women. Getting too close will be interpreted as dishonouring a woman.

- It is considered inappropriate for a man and a woman to be alone together in a room with a closed door.
- Speaking to a woman in a social context is dishonourable, as well as speaking to a woman in the street.
- Wherever possibly, avoidance of profanity in the presence of Afghans is recommended. Many Muslim people can be sensitive to bad language. Further, it is essential to avoid any references that Afghans may find derogatory.
- Remember that the Afghan people are not part of the Middle East, nor do they consider themselves Arabs. It is their shared Islamic religion, which accounts for many of the similarities in culture between Afghanistan and other countries that are considered Arab.
- At all times, it is important to be honest when interacting with the Afghan people. Try to avoid blunt refusals when asked to perform a favour for an Afghan. Such refusals are considered rude or impolite. A response that suggests that an effort will be made ("I'll see what I can do.") is usually more appropriate.
- When pointing to something or somebody **never** use the finger but rather use the whole hand.

Jirga and Shura

- Make sure to arrive at the meeting and confirm your attendance
- Get enough information about people, their villages and the nature of the Shura prior to meeting date.
- Arrive on time.
- Do not plan any other meeting after the Shura and do not leave the Shura half-way through.
- Beware of cultural sensitivities (Greetings, Starting the meeting, etc)
- Take someone to take notes.
- Have the right interpreter. Do not assume your interpreter knows everything.
- Do wait to speak when spoken to, if elders are present.
- Do not take side with one tribe.
- Do not create false hope.
- Do not cross the cultural line.
- Do not criticise tribal elders, ANSF officers and other authorities publicly.
- Do not impose your thoughts and ideas on Shura Elders.

- Focus and pay attention to the subject. The subject is the most important thing in their world. Always show interest and concern.
- Use active listening. Do not interrupt or complete the subject's speech.
- Confront inconsistent messages. Match what the subject says with his body mannerisms. Make eye contact or use other body language to make or reinforce a point.
- Do not walk away from someone who is speaking to you.

Gifts, favours and taxes

- It should be noted that the giving of gifts is an important part of the Afghan culture. It is a way to showing a respect to someone else. People often bring gifts to a house if invited as a guest. When visiting a high ranking person in Afghan hierarchy it is expected that you bring a gift.
- If you are given a gift, plan on giving something in return. Gifts from your country or hometown will be treasured while postcards are appropriate. Fruit, sweets, or pastries are appropriate and should be wrapped nicely.
- One should not present the gift, but set it down without calling attention.
- Honour demands "favours", everyone must offer a "favour" and "favours" must always be returned.
- Cultural acceptance of "favours":
 - *Fisad-i-edori* - Paying an official to quicken a process
 - *Bakhsheesh* - Small gift
 - *Sifarish* - Recommendation for an appointment
 - *Mushkiltarashi* - Delay of service unless a favour/bribe is paid
 - *Wasita* - Payment for invitation of officials
- Do not accept cigarettes from locals. Exploding cigarettes were used against Russian troops.
- Taxes:
 - *Ushr* – 10% tax on agricultural products to support local mullahs and mosques
 - *Zakat* – 2.5% wealth tax applied to traders
 - *Baspana* – assistance tax levied in name of war

How to work with someone who you think is corrupt?

- Try to understand and categorise the level of corruption.
- Do not blame the person in front of everyone.
- Do not show to the person that you know about him, but you still keep your eyes closed.
- Always try to build a strong relationship with his superior first before reporting the corruption.
- Sometimes it is impossible to remove the corrupt person – all you can do is to mentor them so they can take measures to prevent the corruption.
- Sometimes you cannot even report the corruption to his superior.

Doing business

- The concept of time in Afghanistan is not measured as strictly as time in western countries. Therefore, even though your Afghan counterparts may not arrive to business meetings on time, punctuality will be expected of foreigners.
- The Afghan working week begins on Sunday and ends on Thursday. Friday is the Muslim holy day and considered part of the weekend. However, it is not uncommon for some businesses to also close on a Thursday.
- Afghanistan is predominantly Muslim and for this reason time must be allocated during the working day for prayer. This may interrupt the daily business schedule; therefore you should take this into consideration when making business appointments.
- Afghan business culture dictates a strict hierarchical structure where leaders separate themselves from the group and power is distributed from the top.
- There is generally only one key decision maker - the most senior person in the company. Those in a more subordinate position represent the business during meetings but do not have the authority to make decisions.
- In Afghan business etiquette, initial introductions tend to follow an informal procedure. First, as a reflection of the importance of hospitality in Afghan culture, there is a drink of tea. Then there follows some general conversation in which business is not typically mentioned or

discussed. This process is vital for establishing trust and getting to know your Afghan counterparts on a more personal level.

- Business relationships in Afghanistan are typically established after personal relationships, and time for building trust is considered crucial. Afghans are typically warm and friendly, although some have been hardened by war.
- Negotiation is a part of Afghanistan history and it is an inseparable element of life. Meetings are usually led by an individual who sets the agenda and content, and governs the pace of the meeting. Do not expect to open conversation on an important topic immediately upon being introduced. Afghans follow a pattern of etiquette where there is first a cup of tea, and then some pleasant conversation - conversation in which little or no mention is made of business to be discussed. You should not refuse tea.
- Meetings in Afghanistan are used to provide information and make decisions rather than share ideas and discussion. Meetings are often unstructured, and people will casually walk out or take telephone calls. Afghan communication style is indirect, and information may be between the lines rather than directly stated. Answers to questions will rarely be “no,” even when a negative answer is intended. It is considered rude to directly blame someone for failure. Condescension is considered an affront.
- Generally speaking, the Afghan people prefer to get to know the new person before entering into full conversation that may lead to commitments. This may very well take time - you will find the true pace of action to be that of doing things “slowly, slowly.” The passing of time indeed varies according to the mood of the moment.
- Afghans place great emphasis on respect and dignity, and are therefore cautious to maintain each other’s honour. For this reason, younger colleagues in particular, must address their business counterparts with the appropriate title and act in a respectful manner at all times.
- The negotiation process in Afghanistan is one based on building strong relationships and establishing company benefit. Forging a deal with your Afghan counterparts will take time and persistence, since Afghans generally negotiate using a bartering system that relies on a stronger and weaker party being involved.
- Purchases can often take a substantial amount of time. Patience is required in all negotiations.

- Also, remember that time must often be allowed for prayer - five times a day for the devout Muslim - which may interrupt a scheduled course of action.
- During the negotiation process different kinds of topic could be touched e.g. Afghanistan history, country side, family (especially triumph stories). Good knowledge of Afghanistan history is recommended for final success.
- In some occasions, such as in a bazaar, negotiation is nearly mandatory. This negotiation has its own traditional rules and a quick deal is understood as a bad one. Incorrect or refused negotiations can insult vendor's honour.
- Business cards are uncommon in Afghanistan and are considered important if given. If one receives a business card, a comment should be made about the person's credentials. The card should then be placed in a holder or someplace respectful.
- If you are responsible for set up of the meeting, never place an Afghan in the place with the door behind him. That shows he is not important person.

Diet and dining

- Footwear should be removed when entering a home.
- Do wait to be seated by the host when dining in a home.
- Afghans usually sit on the floor around a mat ("tablecloth") on which food is served in a communal dish. Do not step on or over the tablecloth or over other guests, but walk behind them. Always use Islamic etiquette.
- Afghans typically sit with legs crossed, but pointing the soles of the feet towards someone else is impolite.
- Afghans may pray after an occasion such as dinner by holding both hands in front of the body with palms facing up.
- To eat, one uses the fingers of the right hand only or a piece of *naan* (unleavened bread). Never use the left hand to eat; the left hand is reserved for what the culture characterizes as unclean tasks¹⁵⁶.
- Families normally eat together, but if a male guest is present, females eat separately.

¹⁵⁶ In the Muslim world, the left hand serves a specific purpose – hygiene after using the toilet. Afghans will cleanse their hands immediately after.

- In many areas, belches are considered an expression of appreciation for a meal but do not engage in this.
- Afghans in rural areas usually eat only breakfast and dinner, but sometimes snack between meals. Most Afghans follow the Muslim dietary code and refrain from eating pork and drinking alcohol.
- Diet changes from group to group, although bread, rice and tea are dietary staples everywhere. Other major food items include potatoes, tomatoes, spinach, carrots, peas, cucumbers, and eggplant. Snacks include fresh and dried fruit such as apples, apricots, melons, mulberries, oranges, and plums. Nuts are also common, especially almonds, pistachios, and walnuts. The Uzbek include many pasta dishes in their cuisine. For details see Annex D.
- Traditional Afghan drink is different types of tea, usually green tea. Tea is usually served without milk, and a guest's cup is constantly refilled. Generally alcohol is not a part of dining, but due to foreign influence it could be served in very specific cases.
- As a traditional part of hospitality Afghans can offer you to smoke a water pipe after eating.
- In some areas Afghans used to smoke marihuana or other psychotropic matter.



Figure 33: *Afghan cuisine*

Sense of time, distance, locations

- Afghans have a very different sense of time than Westerners and are frequently late for meetings.
- Often, the length of time a task will take is of no importance. Afghans are primarily concerned with seeing that the task is accomplished.
- Personal identification card called *tazkara* is issued when person apply for driving license (usually around 18). A *Tazkara* includes a date of birth based on the Muslim calendar.
- Afghans have a very different sense of geographical distance than Westerners and it may happen that the distance will be in reality greater than it was communicated.
- Poor cadastral system, except major cities, non-existing cadastral maps of streets and building numbers can influence your orientation.
- Be aware of different spellings of names or places provided by your interpreter.
- Afghans have a very different sense of estimate than Westerners and it could happen that described number of personnel, colour or car type is in reality different.
- Afghans have a very different standard of truth's perception than Westerns. They believe in stories that coming from relevant source (relatives, close friends); even if this story sound for Westerns unrealistic.

Ramadan Etiquette

- Try to avoid the following for your Muslim colleagues:
 - meetings which include lunch
 - meetings extending after 5 p.m.
 - department parties (or social events) during Ramadan.
- Be understanding that it is the most special month in the Muslim calendar.
- It is common to take vacation during the last week of Ramadan.
- *Eid* Day is off, especially for those with family.
- Greeting colleagues saying: "Ramadan Mubarak" (Blessed Ramadan).
- During the Month of Ramadan be considerate of and supportive to the Muslims around you.

Ramadan DOs

- After every day's fast, Muslims have an evening meal called *Iftar* where friends, family and loved ones get together and have a feast. Accept an invitation if invited and make sure to bring some sweets and flowers. Muslims regard this as a sign of friendship. But don't be offended if the host refuses to put your sweets on the table for everyone else since this might indicate he has no sweets to offer.
- Ask after the health and well being of your host but do not inquire about his wife in her absence. Also express your wishes that his family is well.
- Take your own food when going to work since restaurants will be closed during the day.

Ramadan DON'Ts

- Do not eat, drink or smoke in public during the sacred month of Ramadan, since it is against the law in most Muslim countries and is viewed as disrespectful and insensitive. Some companies, educational facilities and other establishments assign designated places where non-Muslims can eat, smoke and drink in the day during Ramadan.
- If you happen to receive Muslim visitors during the day, be careful about serving them refreshments. If you happen to find out they are not fasting, invite them for a meal at one of your company's designated areas.
- When invited for an *Iftar*, do not eat and leave immediately. Hang around and enjoy some more food, perhaps coffee or tea, but be alert for the call to *Isha*, the evening prayer, as your host may want to end the visit at this time and proceed to have prayers.
- Since Ramadan is a month of spiritual renewal and piety, among other things, women are advised to dress very modestly.

Cross-Cultural Commonalities

Human beings commonly take for granted that every individual throughout the world thinks and act just like them. However different cultures have different attitudes, beliefs and values. This lack of intercultural vision makes mutual misunderstanding predictable in such cases, when both parties think and express themselves in different languages. Moreover, culture shock, which is a

common stress reaction that individuals have when they find themselves immersed in an unfamiliar culture, can complicate the situation.

In this situation we must apply the communicative approach with an interactive, reciprocal and empathetic attitude towards our partners and find cultural intersection or commonalities.

Cultural intersection situations materialize when that which is foreign to us becomes significant to our own cultural reference system, thus establishing a reciprocal interaction between both cultures. Therefore, between our own cultural values and those that portray the alien culture, an intermediate space is created, a space made up of vagueness, novelties and ambiguities that could lead to misunderstandings in the communicative interaction.




Figure 34: *Cultural intersection*

In case of limited or no language knowledge the role of interpreter as mediator in the intercultural communication is critical for success or failure of involved parties' purposes.

Between two different cultures there are quantities of cultural intersections. However each one depends on both sides' personalities involved in rapport building. Humbleness and a genuine respect for the new culture will go much farther than any predetermined set of cultural guidelines.

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan has been widely considered an ungovernable country. This is mainly the effect of a heterogeneous population with multiethnic composition, driven by specific goals even within a specific group. Lacking constraints of a strong central government along the time, the numerous existing groups determined a large variety of cultural identities, each following its own well-established code of conduct.

The complexity of the Afghan human aspects makes even more difficult the cultural adaptation, defined as a process of learning the locals' culture, behaviours and language in an effort to understand and interact successfully with them. This process cannot be accomplished overnight and requires an important effort of collective and individual preparation. However, individuals might still experience the "cultural shock" when deployed and their performance and decisions might be affected.

Objectively observing the culture around us and learning from it is essential, but it is incomplete because humans are not natural at objective observation. Remember that the DOs and DON'Ts approach is situational and it is impossible to anticipate all situations and prescribe appropriate responses for each possible situation. It tends to overly simplify a complex phenomenon. Different age groups; educational levels; socio-economic levels will have different behaviours.

We cannot expect the local population to change their behaviour to suit our expectations; but rather we must change our expectations to suit their behaviour. When we make a judgment we must remember that it is based on the experience of our own culture. An interactive, reciprocal and empathic approach can facilitate this cultural adaptation process.

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ANNEX A

CULTURAL SUMMARY DOs AND DON'Ts

DOs:

- ***Do*** shake hands with the right hand, firmly but gently in greeting and departure.
- ***Do*** learn and use a few Afghan greetings.
- ***Do*** reply to the greeting “Asalaam Alaykum” with “ Waalaykum as salaam”
- ***Do*** shake with everyone when you meet or leave, starting with the most senior person.
- ***Do*** rise to show respect when an important person enters or leaves a room.
- ***Do*** be relaxed and take your time during conversations.
- ***Do*** be courteous, polite and patient.
- ***Do*** politely accept hospitality.
- ***Do*** offer guests non-alcoholic refreshments.
- ***Do*** wash your hands before you touch or pass food or drinks.
- ***Do*** use your right hand when eating, drinking or passing food.
- ***Do*** expect Afghans to ask lots of personal questions as they try to know you and work out if they can trust you.
- ***Do*** grow a beard if possible; this helps to establish your position as an elder.
- ***Do*** respect that Afghanistan is a strictly Islamic society.
- ***Do*** show great respect to Islamic religious leaders.

- **Do** treat mosques with respect at all times. If ever need to enter one remember to always remove your shoes.
- **Do** remember that Friday is a holy day.
- **Do** appreciate that status always plays in conversations, meetings and negotiations.
- **Do** identify and deal with the high status individual, he will have influence over others.
- **Do** return the gesture of placing the right hand over the heart after shaking hands.
- **Do** try all food offered to acknowledge the hospitality of the host.
- **Do** offer a cigarette to everyone in the group.
- **Do** recognize the nature of Afghan hospitality.
- **Do** expect to spend much of a visit socializing and drinking tea before discussing business.
- **Do** use applicable professional or academic titles, such as “engineer,” “doctor,” and “professor.”
- **Do** expect Afghans to have a different sense of time and punctuality.
- **Do** give a gift in return for one received.
- **Do** sit with your legs under you or tucked away.
- **Do** summon people using you whole hand facing down and motioning inwards.
- **Do** remove your shoes when visiting a home.
- **Do** wait to be seated by the host when dining in a home.
- **Do** wait to speak when spoken to, if elders are present.

DON'Ts:

- **Don't** use the left hand for physical contact with others, to eat, or to make gestures.
- **Don't** sit with the soles of your feet facing someone.

- ***Don't*** walk away from someone who is speaking to you.
- ***Don't*** show a woman attention by addressing, touching, or staring at her.
- ***Don't*** ask men direct questions about their female relatives.
- ***Don't*** tell an Afghan he is wrong if he gives incorrect information.
- ***Don't*** express emotion in public.
- ***Don't*** expect Afghans to be able to read, especially outside urban centres.
- ***Don't*** wag or point your finger.
- ***Don't*** wear sunglasses indoors.
- ***Don't*** offer an Afghan food or drink or publicly consume either during Ramadan.
- ***Don't*** ask an Afghan not to smoke.
- ***Don't*** use the OK sign or thumbs-up.
- ***Don't*** summon people using a crooked finger.
- ***Don't*** confront a Muslim on his religious beliefs.
- ***Don't*** maintain prolonged eye contact with an Afghan male.
- ***Don't*** rush or hurry an Afghan.
- ***Don't*** shame an Afghan in public.
- ***Don't*** bring a dog into an Afghan's home.
- ***Don't*** force a Muslim's head to touch the ground.
- ***Don't*** pass wind (fart) in public; it is unacceptable.
- ***Don't*** blow your nose in public; it is unacceptable.
- ***Don't*** worry too much about making mistakes, if you are the guest and are humble you will be forgiven.
- ***Don't*** obviously admire something - Afghans may feel that they have to give it to you.
- ***Don't*** expect to start talking business straight away.

- ***Don't*** cause anyone to lose face, but be prepared to stand your ground.
- ***Don't*** offer a Muslim alcohol, pork or any product from a pig, including leather products.
- ***Don't*** touch or move the Qur'an (Muslims' holy book).
- ***Don't*** stand in front of, or disturb a Muslim who is praying.
- ***Don't*** criticise an Afghan in front of others or cause him to lose face.

ANNEX B

BASISCS OF DARI AND PASHTO

ث	ت	پ	ب	ا	Numbers ۰ 0 ۱ 1 ۲ 2 ۳ 3 ۴ 4 ۵ 5 ۶ 6 ۷ 7 ۸ 8 ۹ 9 ۱۰ 10
sthay	tay	pay	bay	alif	
د	خ	ح	چ	ج	
dal	khay	hay	chay	geem	
س	ژ	ز	ر	ذ	
seen	zhjay	zay	ray	zal	
ظ	ط	ض	ص	ش	
zoy	toy	duwat	suwat	sheen	
ک	ق	ف	غ	ع	
cawf	qhof	fay	gheine	eine	
ی	ھ				
ee yaw	hay-du-chesma				

Figure B1: Dari alphabet

آزاد indep	پای Final	منح Medial	پیل initial	or	Name	آزاد indep	پای Final	منح Medial	پیل initial	or	Name
ا	-l	-l	-l	(a)aa	Alif	ط	ط	ط	ط	t	Sad
ب	ب	ب	ب	b	Be	ظ	ظ	ظ	ظ	z	Ta
پ	پ	پ	پ	p	Pe	ع	ع	ع	ع	r	Za
ت	ت	ت	ت	t	Te	غ	غ	غ	غ	g/gh	Ayn
ث	ث	ث	ث	ʔ/ʔt	T te	ف	ف	ف	ف	f	Ghayn_Ghayn
ج	ج	ج	ج	s	Se						Fe
چ	چ	چ	چ	j	Gim						
ح	ح	ح	ح	c/ch	Ce-che	ق	ق	ق	ق	g	Oef
خ	خ	خ	خ	dz/z	Dze-Ze	ک	ک	ک	ک	k	Kaf
د	د	د	د	esch	Ce-Sche	گ	گ	گ	گ	g	Gaf
ذ	ذ	ذ	ذ	h	He	ل	ل	ل	ل	l	Lam
ر	ر	ر	ر	x/kh	Xe-khe	م	م	م	م	m	Mim
ز	ز	ز	ز	d	Dal	ن	ن	ن	ن	n	Num
ژ	ژ	ژ	ژ	d/Dd	Dal-Ddal						
س	س	س	س	z	Zal	و	و	و	و	w/u/o	Waw
ش	ش	ش	ش	r	Re						
ص	ص	ص	ص	f/Rr	Re-Rre						
ض	ض	ض	ض	z	Ze						
ط	ط	ط	ط	z/zh	Ze-Zhe						
ق	ق	ق	ق	g	Ge						
ک	ک	ک	ک	s	Sin						
گ	گ	گ	گ	s/sh	Sin-shin						
خ	خ	خ	خ	x/sh	Xe,Xin-shin						
د	د	د	د	s	Sad						
ذ	ذ	ذ	ذ	z	Zad						

ey ey ye(e) nn sh G Rr dd tt (C-sch -ts) Z-dz

Figure B2: Pashto alphabet

Pronunciation guide/tips

Pronunciation in Pashto:

Gh as Guttural hard g, as "r" in Parisian French Route e.g. Ghat: Big

Kh guttural hard h, as "kh" in khan e.g. Khpelwan: Relatives

Zh as "j" in French jour, e.g. Zher: fast

T as "t" in French tour, e.g. Toor-Black

T as "t" in English town, e.g. Ta-kaar-Accident

D as "d" in French docteur, e.g. Dround: Havey

D as "d" in English doctor, e.g. Dan-gar:Skinny

Ch as "ch" in English Church, e.g. Ch'er-ta: Where

Q Guttural Hard k, e.g. Qaanoon-Rule –Law

R e.g. Rawral--Bring

Pronunciation in Dari:

Gh Guttural hard g, e.g. Gham-Geen: Sad

kh in Scotch in loch = Khaa-l'eq=Creator

Zh as "j" in French jour, e.g. Zhaala: Hail

Ch as "ch" in English Church, e.g. Cha-har: Four

Q Guttural hard k, e.g. Qaanoon-Rul: Law

Glossary of terms

Askar	Soldier	Soldat
Caravanserais	Inns	Auberge
Chaykhanas	Teahouses	Maison de thé
Ghar	Mountain	Montagne
Jaheel/DanD	Lake	Lac
Jirga	Council	Conseil
Jumaat	Mosque	Mosquée
Kéley	Village	Village
Koor	House	Maison
Mullah	Teacher (giver of knowledge)	Guide spirituel

Pul	Bridge	Pont
Rooghtoon/Shefaa/Khaana	Hospital	Hôpital
Salak / Láar(a)	Road	Route
Sarrak	Street	Rue
Shaar	City (town)	Cité (ville)
Shah	King	Roi
Taliban	Student	Étudiant
Tsalorlaari	Crossroads	Carrefour
Waadi	Valley	Vallée
Wali	Code	Code

Key phrases

Introductions

English	Pashto	Dari
Do you speak english? french?	T'e P'e Engleesi (Fraansawee) Khabara Kaw'ei?	Ba Engleesi (Fraansawee) Sohbat Mekonee?
I can't speak Pashtun.	Z'e Pa Pashtun Khaburai Nash'um Kawolai.	Man B'e Pashto Gap-Za-da Na-Mi-Ta-Va-Nam
I am a soldier.	Z'e Yow Askar Y'um	Man Askar Hastam
My name is _____	Zèma Noom Dai	Naam-A Man _____

What is your name?	Çè Noommèizhèi	Naam-A Shuma Chee Ast?
--------------------	----------------	------------------------

Greetings

English	Pashto	Dari
Hello!	Salaam Alaikum	Salaam Alaikum
Good morning, afternoon, Evening!	Salaam Alaikum	Salaam Alaikum
Response to good morning, etc	Wa Alaikum Salaam	Wa Alaikum Salaam
How are you?	Senga Ye'i?	Che-toar Has-tain?
I am fine	Z'e Sh'e Y'um (Kandahar) Z'e kh'e Y'um	Man khob Hastam
Goodbye	Dè Khudai Pè Amaan	Kho-Da Hafaz
See you next time	D'e Khodai P'e Maan	Kho-Da Hafaz
Yes/No	Ho/Na	Ba Lee/Na
Alright (OK)	Sama Da	Do-'Rost-ast
Is every thing alright? What is going on?	Khairit Da? Se-Kha-bera Da?	Khairit Ast? Ch'e Gup Ast?
It's OK, isn't it?	Da Sama Da	Do-Rost Ast

Basic questions

English	Pashto	Dari
What?	S'e	Ch'e

English	Pashto	Dari
What do you want?	S'e Ghwal'ei?	Ch'e May-kha-Haid?
When?	S'e Wakht	Ch'e Wakht
Where is Place ?	Cheeray DaZaay?	Koaja AstMonteqa?
Where?	Ch'er'ei	Dar Ko-Ja
Where do you go?	Cheir Ta' Zei?	Kauja Mayraveed?
Which one?	Koom Yow	Ku-Dm
Who?	Sook/ Chaa	Ki
Why?	Wal'ei	Ch'era
How?	Senga	Ch'e Towr
How much is this?	Dè Dèi Baya Çoomra da?	Qee-mat chand ast
How many?	Soo?	Chand
How old are you?	T'e So Kal'un Y'ei?	Chand Sala Asti ?
Can I come in?	Kawolay Sham Ch'e NaNa Wozam?	Man Maytaawanam Daakhil Shawam?

Directions

English	Pashto	Dari
Up	Paas	Baala
Down	Laandei	Paaeen
Left	Keen	Cha'up

Right	Shai	Raast
-------	------	-------

Days of the Week

English	Dari	Pashto
Sunday	Yak Shanba	Yak Shanba
Monday	Do Shanba	Do Shanba
Tuesday	S'ei Shamb'ei	S'ei Shamb'ei
Wednesday	Chaar Shamb'ei	Chaar Shamb'ei
Thursday	Panj Shanb'ei	Panj Shanb'ei
Friday	Juma	Juma
Saturday	Shanbai	Shanbai

Time

English	Dari	Pashto
Sunday	Yak Shanba	Yak Shanba
Monday	Do Shanba	Do Shanba
Tuesday	S'ei Shamb'ei	S'ei Shamb'ei
Wednesday	Chaar Shamb'ei	Chaar Shamb'ei
Thursday	Panj Shanb'ei	Panj Shanb'ei
Friday	Juma	Juma
Saturday	Shanbai	Shanbai

Seasons

English	Pashto	Dari
Winter	Zh'eimai	Zameestan
Spring	Psarlay	Bahaar
Summer	Oolai / Dobai	Tabestan
Fall	M'einai	Khazan

Weapons and Equipment

English	Pashto	Dari
Armored Personal Carrier	Z'er'ehdaar	Z'er'ehdaar
Arsenal	Jabha Khaana	Jabha Khaana
Artillery	Toopchee Quwwaa/ Toopkhana	Quwwaa-eToopchee / Toopkhana
Ball	Toop	Toop
Bomb	Baam	Baam
Car	Mootar./Teiz Raftaar	Mootar./Teiz Raftaar
Detonator	Chawd'eidoonkee	Enfejaar Dehenda
Explosives	Chawd'eidoonkee Mawaad	Mawaad-e Enfejaaree
Gun	Toop	Toop
Helicopter	Haleekooptar	Haleekooptar
Jeep	Jeep	Jeep

Knife	Cha-Qoo	Cha-Qoo
Knife	Kard / Barcha	Kard / Barcha
Landmine	Zmakanai Maain	Maain Zameeni
Machine gun	Maasheendar	Maasheendar
Military vehicle	Askaree Mootar	Mootar-e Askaree
Pistol	Tamaancha	Tofungcha
Rocket / Missile	Raakit	Raakit
Rocket Launcher	Raakit Andaaaz	Raakit Andaaaz
Shotgun	Toopak	Taufung
Tank	Taank	Taank
Truck	Laarai	Laari

Conversations

English	Pashto	Dari
Almost.	Taqreeban	Taqreeban
Always	Ham'eisha Ya Har K'ela	Ham'eisha
Are you done? Have you finished?	Tas'ei Khlās Shwai?	Shoama Khalas Sho-dead
Divide this among yourselves.	Daa Pa Khp'ul M'enz K'ei Wo 'eishai	'Een Ra Dar B'ean Khod Taq- s'eem Konid
Everywhere.	Har Ch'eir Ta	Hama Ja

English	Pashto	Dari
I am cold / I feel cold / it is cold	Z'ema Yakhnee keizhee Ya Sala Mei Keizhee	Kho-N'uk'Mee-kho-Ram
I am hot / I feel hot / it is hot	Z'ema Garmmee K'eigee	Garmmee Kardeem
I am not sure.	Z'e 'Da 'De Na 'Yum	Man Mut Maen Nestam
I am surprised / astonished	Z'e Hairaan Y'um	Man Hairaan Hastam
I am tired.	Z'e Ste' Lai Y'um	Mon-da Sho Deam
I as well/ Me too	Z'e Ham	Man Ham
I can.	Kawolai Sh'um	May-Ta-Va-Nam
I cannot.	Na Sh'um Kawolai	Na-May-Ta-Va-Nam
I don't like it.	Khwakh M'ei Na Da	Kho-Sham Na May-ya-yad
I don't think so.	Z'e Hamdasei Fekr Na Kawum/Ze taasara muwafeq neyom.	Ha-Meen Towr Fekr Na Mikonam/ Hamrayat muwafeq nestam
I don't know.	Z'e Na Poh'ei g'um	Man Na Fah-Mam
I take it.	Khwakh M'ei Da/ Daa Akhlom	Kho-Sham May-ya-yad/ In Ra Megeeram
I think so.	Z'e Hamdasei Fekr Kawum	Ha-Meen Towr Fekr Mikonam
I wish / I hope	Heela Lar' um	Ar'e Zo Daram
It is so / It is like that.	Ham-dasei Da	Ha-Meen Towr Ast
Not all/ all	Tul Na/ Tul	Ha-Ma Ne/Ha Ma
Not always	Ham'eisha Ya Har K'ela Na	Ham'eisha Na

English	Pashto	Dari
Not now	Oos Na Pas Ta	Ha-laa Ne
Not often/ Often	Deir Wakhtona Na / Aksaran	Ham'eisha Ne/ Ak-Sa-Run
Not so much	Doomra D'eir Na	Een 'Qa-Dar Na
Nothing.	H'eis Shai	H'ech Cheez
Perfect.	B'el Kul Durusta Da	B'el Kul Durust Ast
Sometimes.	K'ela-K'ela	Ba-Zai Wokht
This is good.	Daa Kh'e Da	Khob-Bast
This is not good.	Daa Kh'e Na Da	Khob-N'ei-st
We are not very happy.	Moong D'eir Kushala Na You	Ma Khosh-Hal N'ei asteam
We are very happy.	Moong D'eir Khwakh You	Ma Khosh-Hal Hasteam
What do you do?	S'e Kar Kaw'ei?	Ch'e Wa-zi-fa Da-ri
Are you married?	Taasee Waada Klai Yai?	'Aa Rossi Kar-Di

Check Point Activities

English	Pashto	Dari
Stop!	Dr'eish	Dr'eish
Stop right there (Plural).	Humhalta Wudareizhai.	Dar Homan Ja Estad Show
Stop or I'll shoot you.	Wudar'eizha Ka Na D'e wulum	Estad Sho Ya Mayzanamat

English	Pashto	Dari
Hands up! (Singular).	Laasoonā D'e Jeg Wuneesa!	D'ast Ha Baala
Put your hands on your head! (Plural).	Laasoonā Mu P'er Sar K'eshizhdai!	Dast Hay Khod Ra Baalay Saarat Begzar!
Put your hands down! (Plural).	Laasoonā De' Mu ' Shkata KLai	Daast Hi Tan Ra Paaeen Konid
Lay on the ground! (Plural).	Pe' Zme'ka Wughazeizhai!	Prooth
Get up! (Plural).	Paas saizhai!	B'eKh'ezeed
Are you armed?	Wasla larei?	Mosala Hasteed?
Turn in your weapon (Sing.)	Wasla De Raaka.	Aslaha Khod Ra Tasleem Konen
Where is the weapon?	Sallah Cheirta Da?	Sallah Tan Koja Ast?
Lay your weapon down. (Plural).	Wasla Mu P'er Zm;aka K'eshizhdai	Aslaha Khod Ra Dar Zameen B'egzareed
Show me your national ID document.	Tazkera D'e Rata Wushaya.	Tazkera tan Ra Neshan Bedeheed
May I search your car?	Ejaaza Da Ch'e Staasoo Mootar Wultawum?	Ejaaza Ast K'e Mootar Shoama Ra Talaashee Konam?
I should search you. (Singular).	Ze Baayad Taa Wulatawum	Man Shoama Ra Baayad T'alashee Konam.
We are searching your car.	Moonzh Oos Staasoo Mootar Lata woo.	Maa Mootar Shoama Ra Talashee Makoniam.
Get off the truck.	L'e laarai Sakha Shkata Sha.	Az Laarai Paeen Shavad
Open the trunk.	Tool Baks Khlaasa Ka.	Tool Baks Ra Baz Kun

English	Pashto	Dari
Open the glove compartment.	Sewechboord Khlaasa Ka.	Sewechboord Ra Baz kun.
Stay aside / away from the truck.	La Laarai Na Eesta Sha	Az Laarai Dour Shovaid
Clear the way (Plural).	Laara Khlaasa Klai.	Raah Ra Baz Konid
You cannot stay here (Plural).	D'elta Paatei Keidai Na Sh'ei	Dar Eenja Manda Na Meetavanid.
Go now (singular).	Oos No Laal Sha	Bayad B'eraveed
Go (Plural).	Zai/ Laal Shai	B'eraveed
Leave this area (Plural).	Iad'ei Zaaya Eesta Shai	Az Eenja P'ass Shaveed
Go home (Plural).	Koor ta Laal Sh'ai	Ba Khana Beraveed
Come here (Singular).	Delta Raasha	Eenja Baya.
I know	Z'e Pooh'eig'um	Man MayfahMam
Who is authorized?	Saalahyat D'e Chaa P'e Laas Ksh'ei Da?	Saalahyat Dar Dast Keest?
Stand up (Singular).	Wulaal Sha / Pa S'eizha	Eestad Sho
Turn (Singular)	Taaow Sha	Dawr Bekhor
Go forward (Plural).	Wlaandai Laal Shai	Peesh Beraveed
Let's go	Zai Ch'e Zoo	Bayaid K'e B'eraveem
Fast	Zher	Zood
Slow	Wuroo	Aahesta

English	Pashto	Dari
Don't talk (Plural).	Khber'ei Makawai	Gaap Na Zaneed
Be quiet (Singular).	Chup Sha	Chup Bash
Let us pass.	Pr'eizhda Ch'e Teir Shoo	Beg Zar Teir Shaveem
Wait here	Dèlta Entazaar Wubaasai	In Jaa Entazaar Bashed
Wait here (Plural).	Delta Entzar Wubaasai	Dar Eenja Entazar B'ekasheed
Don't interfere (Singular).	T'e Kaar M'elara	Modakhela Nakun
Come and see (Singular).	Razai Wugoora	Byaeed Sayel Konid
Come with me (Singular).	Maa Sara Raasha.	Humrai Man B'eya Aid
Wait for me. (Singular).	Maata Wu Dareizha	Braeem Moontazar Basheed
Don't talk (Plural).	Khber'ei Makawai	Gaap Na Zaneed
Be quiet (Singular).	Chup Sha	Chup Bash
Give yourselves up.	Tasleem Shai.	Tasleem Shaveed.
Don't forget (Singular).	Heir D'e Na Shee	Faramoosh Na Konid
Excuse me. I am in a hurry.	Bakhshena Ghwalum. Z'e Ajala Larum	Babakhsheed Ajala Daram.
Leave me alone (Singular).	Karar M'ei Pr'eizhda	Mazahamat Nakun
Don't do that (Singular).	Hagha Kar Mekawa	Een Kar Ra Na kun
The situation is chaotic.	Waz'a Naa Ra Maa da	Waza Naa Ram Ast
Resistance is useless.	Muqawumat Faaida Na Laree.	Muqawumat Faaida Na Daraad

English	Pashto	Dari
Do you have children?	Maashoomaan Larai?	'Ao-lad Darid
Do you have a pen?	Taa Soo Qalam Larai?	Shoama Qalam Darid?
Can you help me?	Kawolai Sh'ei Ch'e Maa Sara Kumak Woklai?	Shoama Mita Wanid Mara Kumak Konid
Where can we find it / him / she	Ch'erta Y'ei Paida Kawolai Shoo	Dar Koja Mita-Vanim Oo-ra Payda Kunim

Vocabulary

English	Pashto	Dari
Baby	Koochnai Maashoom	Tefel
Bullet	Kaartoos	Kaartoos
Brother	Wuroor	B'eradar
Businessman	Saowdaagar	Saowdaagar / Taajeer
Cook	Aashpaz	Aashpaz
Daughter	Loor	Dokhtar
Diplomat	Deploomaat	Deploomat
Driver	Mootarvan	Mootarwan
Enemy	Dushman	Dushman
Family	Kooranai	Khanavada
Farmer	Bazgar	Dehqan

English	Pashto	Dari
Father	Plaar	Padar
Friend	Dost	Dost
Girl	Njlai	Dokh-Tar
Grandfather	Neeka	Padar Kalaan
Grandmother	Anaa	Maadar Kalaan
Guard / Watchman	Paira Daar	Paira Daar
Guerrilla	Chereek	Chereek
Huge	Looy / Ghat	Khily Bozroug
Journalist	KhabareeYaal	KhabareeYaal
Kid / child	Maashoom	Tafail
Killer	Qaatel	Qaatel
Leader	Rahbar	Rahbar
Man	SaLai	Maard
Messenger	Qaasad	Qaasad
Mother	Moor	Maadar
Officer	Afsar / Mansabdaar	Afsar / Mansabdaar
Old men	Boodaa	Boba
Pilot	Peeloot	Peeloot
Police	Pooless / Saarandooy	Pooless / Saarandooy

English	Pashto	Dari
POW	Aseer	Aseer
Priest	Ksheesh	Ksheesh
Prisoner	Baandee	Baandee
Refugee	Muhaajer	Muhaa-Jer
Relative	KhpulWaan	Kheesha Wond
Security Post	Amneyatee Poosta	Poosta Amneyatee
Security Post	Amneyatee Poosta	Poosta Amneyatee
Shooter	Daz'ei Kawoonkai	Faer Kunaanda
Sister	Khoor	Khahaar
Son	Zooy	Bacha
Surgeon	Jarraah	Jarrah
Teacher	Showonkai / Muallem	Muallem
Terror	Turoor	Turoor
Terrorist	Turooreest	Turooreest
Thief	Ghal	Dozd
Translator / Interpreter	Tarjumaan	Tarjumaan
Translator / Interpreter	Tarjumaan	Tarjumaan
Uncle	Tra / Akaa	Ka-kaa
Uzbek	Oozbak	Oozbak

English	Pashto	Dari
Watch	Paira	Paira
Women	Shuza	Zaan

Numbers

Latin	Dari	Pashto
0	sefer	sefer
1	yak	Yao
2	du	Dwa
3	she	Dre
4	chor	Salor
5	panj	Pinza
6	shish	Shpag
7	haft	Uwe
8	hasht	Atu
9	nuh	Naha
10	Las	dah
11	Yaow Lass	Yaz-daa
12	Dow lass	Davaz-Daa
13	Dyaar Lass	Seez-daa
14	Sowaar Lass	Chaar-daa

Latin	Dari	Pashto
15	Penz'e Lass	Paanz-daa
16	Shpa Lass	Shaanz-daa
17	Owwa Lass	Haf-daa
18	At'e Lass	Haazh-Daa
19	No Lass	Nooz-Daa
20	Sh'el	Beast
21	Yaow Weesht	Beast to Yak
30	D'eirsh	See
31	Yaow D'eirsh	See wo Yak
40	Salweesht	Chel
41	Yaow Salweesht	Chel O Yak
50	Penzoos	Pan-ja
51	Yaow Penzoos	Pan-Ja O Yak
60	Shp'eit'e	Shast
61	Yaow Shp'eit'e	Shast O Yak
70	Aowyaa	Haftad
71	Yaow Aowyaa	Haaf-tad O Yak
80	Atyaa	Hash-tad
81	Yaow Tyaa	Hash-tad O Yak

Latin	Dari	Pashto
90	Nawee	Nav-ad
91	Yaow Nawee	Nav-ad O Yak
100	S'ell	Saad
200	Dowa Sawa	Doe Saad
1,000	Yaow Z'er	Hazaar
10,000	Lass Z'ara	Da-Hazaar
100,000	Sell Zara	Saad Hazaar
1,000,000	Yaow Milioon	Yak Milioon

ANNEX C

TRADITIONAL AFGHAN CLOTHING

Traditionally, Afghan dress reflects ethnic diversity and the socio-cultural, historical, and geopolitical dynamics of the region. The country and its people are positioned at the crossroads between the Arab, Persian, Turkish, and Asian empires. Consequently, Afghan dress shows strong aesthetic connections to areas contiguous to its borders: the Arab and Islamic Middle East and Persia, the Turkish Ottoman Empire, and, to a lesser degree, Mughal India.

Since the 1920s, Afghanistan's leaders, in an effort to maintain control of both human and natural resources, have struggled with the definition of women's rights and independence as exemplified in the propriety of dress. Afghan dress also reflects other aspects of identity in a variety of inseparable yet interrelated ways: gendered and generational status; religious affiliation; rural and urban differences; stages of the life cycle; and everyday or special occasions.

Afghan dress first and foremost distinguishes gender. Women customarily wear four items of dress: the pants (*tomba*an), an overdress (*para*haan), a head covering (*cha*adar), and footwear (*pay*zaar)¹⁵⁷. This ensemble is referred to as *kalaa* Afghani, or Afghan women's dress. Men wear *tomba*an, an overshirt (*pay*raan), a hat or cap (*kullaa*), and footwear or boots. In addition to this basic ensemble, Afghan men wear a vest (*wa*askaat), another hat (*poko*ol), and a shawl (*sha*al or *patu*) during colder seasons.

Women's *tomba*an are made of approximately two yards of cotton or silk-like rayon or acetate fabric. They are usually solid white, gathered drawstring pants with full legs. Frequently the pant cuffs are decorated with white machine- or hand-embroidered patterns. The *para*haan are typically made from five yards of cotton, silk (or silk-like acetate), and plain or satin woven fabrics in bright colors (for young women) and darker colors (for older women), usually in tone-on-tone or floral patterns. Necklines vary but usually are rounded; occasionally pointed collars are added, as are gathered set-in sleeves with fitted or buttoned cuffs.

¹⁵⁷ Some 25 – 30 years ago people in the countryside and remote areas use to wear this kind of shoes but with import of cheap Chinese goods it's not anymore common.

Dress skirts are full and gathered at the waist and worn mid-calf length. Chaadars are made of similar fabrics— usually rectangular pieces of lightweight cotton or silk-like crepe, woven with machine- or hand-embroidered edges. Men's *tombaani* and *payraan* feature fewer decorative details and are typically in natural-colored cotton fabric. *Kulla* exhibit the most variety in shapes, colors, and embroidered patterns.

Dress also differentiates the age and generational status of the wearer. For example, though all females wear pants, overdress, and head and foot coverings, aesthetic characteristics vary according to age throughout women's lives. More costly materials and surface design embellishments are added to women's dowries. The decorative focus is on pants cuffs, dress bodices, and head covering borders as female's age and gain more status when they become engaged, marry, and become mothers. These differences are evident to a lesser degree in men's dress as well. Shirtsleeves, bodice shirtfronts, and hats are embroidered in regional and ethnic patterns by either their betrothed or wife.

Two items of dress are worth mentioning since they are the most visible to non-Afghans and are the most politically recognizable dress that Afghans wear. The *pokool* hat worn by Afghan men is a symbol of the Afghan freedom fighters, or the *Mujahideen*. It is a naturally colored wool hat with the characteristic versatile rolled edge. The second distinctive item of dress worn by Afghans is the woman's full body covering known as the *chaadaree*. The *chaadaree*, constructed of nine to ten yards of fabric with an embroidered face piece, conceals the entire women's dress ensemble of pants, overdress, and head covering. The original *chaadaree* is of Persian origins but over time became associated with the urban dress of middle and upper class Afghan women. The *chaadaree* has been incorrectly attributed as Afghan women's traditional dress; it only became mandated women's wear after dress sanctions were imposed by the Taliban in 1996. During the Taliban government, women appeared in public very rarely and when they did they were wearing a *chadiri* or *burka* (head-to-toe covering) over their clothing.

In recent years the dress code has changed a lot, some 35 years of conflict, civil war, government of Mujahideen and Taliban, their interpretation of Wahabi style Islam, militancy and extremism has forced people especially women to dress according to wish of rulers. Even today 12 years after the collapse of Taliban's regime women are afraid to wear what they want or wish because they never know who they will meet outside of their houses. In some cases former refugees or returnees (women) wear "*hijab*" Arabic or Iranian style, they have

brought the custom of their former host country now to Afghanistan-it does not have anything to do with original Afghan culture or custom.

The most striking differences between ethnic groups are noted in dress, particularly in headgear. Turbans are worn mainly by the *Pashtuns* and *Hazaras*. They are usually grey or black in colour although white is a sacred colour worn by Iman, Haji and Sheiks. Light colours are generally worn by Northern Afghans. *Pashtuns* tend to leave some of the turban cloth hanging down. The shape of caps, round, conical or peaked, their material and decoration are distinctive indicators between and within many groups. In winter, men cover their heads with a flat wool cap, a turban with *kolah* (turban cap) in a colour and design distinctive to the wearer's ethnicity background or *qarakuli* sheepskin cap.

Afghan dress also suggests religious affiliation. The majority of Afghans are Muslim, and presumed Islamic prescriptions of propriety and observance govern the manner in which items of dress are worn. For example, Islamic prescriptions govern the fit, transparency, and drape of dress. In general, the everyday dress for both males and females fit loosely so that the contours of the body are less noticeable. Prescriptions also determine the patterns embroidered on men's shirts and hats and women's pants, over dresses, and head coverings. The majority of these embroidered designs are floral, geometric, and abstract shapes, presumably because of Islamic prohibitions on representational art and aesthetics.

Afghan dress is also notable for its embroidery. Embroidery styles tend to be associated with geographic regions and ethnic groups. Whether from Herat, Kandahar, or Kabul, regional associations are made. Styles generally are distinguishable by the fiber content of the fabric (plain weave cottons, pile woven velvets, or synthetic satin weaves) as well as the kind of thread (cotton, silk or gold metallic threads); a variety of embroidery techniques and the complexity of their execution; the floral and geometric motifs; and the design placement of the embroidery. Three such embroidery styles are the gold stitched embroidery or *chirma dozi*, known for the unique kind of metallic thread and braid used; *tashamaar dozi*, recognizable by the intricate counted stitch technique; and silk stitched flower embroidery or *gul dozi*, distinctive because of the rich use of colored threads.

In the larger cities, particularly Kabul, Western-style clothing is becoming popular, for both men and women. In Kabul, many men are clean-shaven.

Afghan dress observed in the context of daily life and during special occasions of secular and religious contexts distinguishes gender and generational,

ethnic and regional, and religious identity. Dress serves to unify and maintain a sense of Afghan identity not only among Afghans living in Afghanistan, but also as Afghans differentiate themselves from other Middle Eastern and Central and South Asian populations in the Afghan Diaspora.

Jewellery in Afghanistan is usually made of gold or silver. Lapis lazuli and garnet are abundant in Afghanistan. *Tawiz* amulets are worn by many people to ward off evil.



Pashtun Style Pakol Hat



Pakol




Chitrali Pakols



Turban Cap / Prayer Cap



Khosti Turbans



Afghan Turban (Lungee) Cloth



Karakul Hat

Figure C1: Male head dresses



Payraan Tumbaan



Waskats - Vests

Figure C2: Male dresses



Chitrali Chugha (Long Coat)

Badakhshani Chakman Coat



Chapan / Khalat (Coat)



Wool Jacket

Figure C3: Male coats and jacket



Figure C4: Buzkashi dresses



Keffiyeh - Scarf

Karakul Scarf

Figure C5: Scarfs



Figure C6: Footwear and Socks




Figure C7: Female head covers and burqas



Women's Perahan Tunban
(Payraan Tumbaen or Salwar Kameez)

Shami Dress

Figure C8: Female formal clothing



Figure C9: Female traditional formal dresses



Kuchi Style Tribal Dresses



Kandahari Style Dress

Baluchi Design Black Dress

Figure C10: Female traditional formal dresses



Aradozi Dress

Hazara Style Dresse






Pashtun Style Black Dress





Rajistani Style Dress





Figure C11: Female traditional formal dresses





ANNEX D





AFGHAN FOOD





Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Bread	Naan	Flour, Water, Quick raising yeast.	
	Naan with spinach	Flour, Water, Quick raising yeast, Spinach.	
Sweet Bread	Roht	Flour, Water, Quick raising yeast, Sugar, Cardamom, Butter, Yogurt.	





Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Soup	Shorwa e Ghosht	Beef, Bean, Garlic, Tomatoes, Tomato pasta, Coriander, Spices.	
Meat dishes	Qabuli Pilau	Basmati (long grain rice), lamb on the bone (or chicken), carrots, Onion, Spices.	
Meat dishes	Kufta Kebab	Lamb steak, Onion, Spices.	
	Tender Kebab	Lamb steak, Onion, Spices.	





Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Meat dishes	Korma Sabzi	Beef or Lamb meat, Onion, Garlic, Spinach, Coriander, Spices.	
	Mourgh	Chicken breasts, Garlic, Milk yogurt, Lemon, Salt and Black pepper.	
	Afghani Lamb with Spinach	Lamb stew meat, Onions, Garlic, Tomatoes, Spinach, Spices, Yogurt, Pine nuts.	
	Kofta Nakhod	Meatballs and Chick-Peas - Dried chick-peas, Beef, Onion, Pepper, Spices.	





Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Meat dishes	Sambousek	Flour, Onion, Leek, Beef or Lamb meat, Spices.	
	Boulanee	Potatoes, Beef meat, Coriander, Cilantro, Green onions.	
	Chelo nachodo	Chicken & chick-pea stew with rice - Chicken legs and thighs, Dried chick-peas, Rib celery, Carrot, Coriander, dill, Lemon juice, Rice.	
	Khoresht-e Seib	Chicken leg, or Duck breast, or Meat (Lamb, Veal, Beef), Onion, Lime juice, Sugar, Spices.	





Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Meat dishes	Kaddo Bourani	Yogurt, Pumpkins, Garlic, Beef, Onion, Spices.	
	Meatballs With Noodles Tossed In Yogurt	Beef, Garlic, Tomatoes, Yogurt, Spices.	
Vegetarian Dishes	Samoosi Yirakot	Fine matzoh meal, Egg, Onion, Garlic, Potato, Cauliflower, Carrot, Green peas, Beans, Spices.	
	Chakha Eggplant	Eggplants, Onion, Green Pepper, Tomatoes, Garlic, Yogurt.	





Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Vegetarian Dishes	Vegetable Fritters	Flour, Cream of tartar, Potatoes, Coriander, Cauliflower, Lemon juice, Spices.	
	Tamarind Potatoes	Tamarind, Potatoes, Onion, Ginger, Garlic, Spices, Pepper.	
	Lentil Stuffed Peppers	Red Lentil, Green Peppers, Ginger, Coriander, Onions, Spices.	
	Bouranee Baunjan	Eggplant With Yoghurt Sauce – Eggplant, Onion, Green Pepper, Tomatoes, Yogurt, Garlic.	





Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Vegetarian Dishes	Sabse Borani	Spinach leaves, Onion, Garlic, Yogurt.	
	Ginger Tamarind Eggplant	Tamarind, Eggplant, Garlic, Coriander, Cinnamon, Cloves, Spices.	
	Boolawnee	Fried Leek Pastries – Leek, Spices, Plain Flour.	
Side dish	Bendee / Baamiyah	Okra, Onion, Garlic, Tomatoes, Spices.	



Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Side dish	Badenjan	Eggplant, Onion, Garlic, Tomatoes, Spices.	
Noodle	Aush	Noodles with Pulses, Meat and Yoghurt - Flour, Spices, Daul nakhud (Yellow split peas), Beans, Spinach, Onion, Lamb or Beef, Tomato puree, Drained yogurt	
Salads	Bonjan Salad	Spicy Eggplant Salad – Eggplant, Tomato Sauce, Spices.	
	Tomato Salad	Tomatoes, Cucumber, Red Onion, Cilantro, Lemon juice, Vinegar, Spices.	

Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
	Tangy Afghan Potato Salad with Cilantro Dressing	Russet potatoes, Scallions, white and light green parts Cilantro White wine vinegar Salt Ground black pepper Chickpeas	
Desserts	Asabia el Aroos	Brides Fingers - Chou dough, Almonds or Pistachios, Sugar, Egg, Lemon.	
	Baklava	Chou dough, Cinnamon, Sugar, Cardamom, Lemon juice, Pistachios.	
	Kadu Bouranee	Sweet Pumpkin - Pumpkin or Squash, Tomato Sauce, Garlic, Sugar, Ginger, Coriander, Spices, Yogurt, Mint leaves.	

Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Deserts	Khatai Cookies	White Flour, Sugar, Cardamom, Pistachios	
	Firnee	Milk, Sugar, Corn Starch, Cardamom, Pistachios, Rose water.	
	Fresh Cherries with Savory Yogurt	Yogurt, Garlic, Cherries, Mint.	
	Sundaes: Falooda	Afghan Ice Cream – Cardamom, Rosewater, and Vermicelli noodles, Afghan cream (qaymaq), Pistachios.	

Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Deserts	Sheer Payra Fudge	Sugar, Milk, Corn Syrup, Butter, Pistachios, Walnuts.	
	Gosh Feel	Elephant Ear Pastries – Eggs, Sugar, Milk, Flour, Cardamom, Pistachios.	
	Halwaua-e-Aurd-e-Sujee	Sugar, Ghee, Coarse semolina (farina), Pistachios, Almonds, Cardamom.	
Drinks	Dough	Persian Cucumber, Yogurt, Mint.	

Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Drinks	Chai	Green Tea	
Sauces & Rubs	Meat Sauce	Yellow Onion, Ground Beef, Tomato Sauce, Garlic, Coriander, Spices.	
	Korma Sauce	Yellow Onion, Tomato Sauce, Spices.	
	Salad Dressing	Cucumber, Yogurt, Dry Mint, Apple Cider Vinegar, Water, Salt	

Type	Name	Main ingredients	Picture
Sauces & Rubs	Afghan Spice Rub	Black peppercorns, Ground cardamom, Cumin seed, Ground coriander, Turmeric	
	Coriander Sauce	Cilantro, Garlic, Jalapeno, Walnut Lemon juice or White vinegar Salt, black pepper Ground cumin, Water.	

ANNEX E

AFGHAN ETHNIC GROUPS

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
DURRANI	PANJPAI	Alizai					
		Ishakzai					
		Khugiani	Gulbaz				
			Khabast				
			Kharbun	Kharal			
				Najbi			
			Khyrbun/ Karbun	Karai/Garai	Ghundi		
					Hamza		
					Jaji/Jagi		
					Khidar		
					Mukar		
					Paria		
					Tori		
				Motik			
				Najibi	Ali		
					Api		
					Daulat		
					Mando		
					Masto		
			Sherzad	Dopai			
				Khodi			
				Lughmani			
				Mama			
				Marki			
				Panjpai			
				Shadi			

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
DURRANI	PANJPAI	Khugiani	Wazir	Motik/ Motki	Ahmad/ Khel		
					Kanga		
					Khojak		
					Khozeh Khel		
					Pira Khel		
					Piro		
					Taraki		
				Sarki/ Sirki	Agam Khel		
					Barak		
					Bibo		
					Nani Khel		
					Rani Khel		
		Nurzai	Adinzai				
			Adozai				
			Alizai				
			Badizai				
			Baharduzai				
			Chalakzai				
			Ghorizai				
			Gurgan				
			Jamalzai				
			Jiji				
			Kurezai				
			Mirgian				
			Pataz				
			Samirzai				
			Umarzai				
		Sagzai					

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
DURRANI	ZIRAK	Achakzai					
		Alikozai	Bashozai				
			Dadozai				
			Daolatzai				
			Jaluzai				
			Karazai				
			Khalozai				
			Khanizai				
			Kutezai				
			Melazai				
			Nasozai				
			Nausazai				
			Sandarzai				
			Surkani				
		Barakzai	Angizai				
			Bakilzai				
			Gaibizai				
			Gurujizai				
			Hutmanzai				
		Barakzai	Khanchazai				
			Khirzai				
			Khojakhzai				
			Khunsezai				
			Malikdinzai				
			Muhamadzai				
			Nasizai				
			Nasratzai	Musazai			
				Nasratzai			
				Shahinchiba			
			Sherzai				
			Sulimanzai				
			Sundarzai				
			Umarkhanzai				
		Popalzai	Sadozai				

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
DAULATZAI	KHADI and BARAT	Ali Shah					
		Angural					
		Jinigar & Hassan Khel					
		Qalandar Khel					
		Sultan Khel					
		Taapparal					
	Kholdad Khel	Alama Khel					
		Mantwal					
		Nurwal					
		Shinkiwai					
DOTANI	Bana Khel						
	Hasan Khel Hasan Khel	Labizai Labizai	Sado Khel	Adam Khel			
				Kukarai			
				Nuso/Khel			
				Shakar Khel			
		Farid Khel		Bazar Khel			
				Madar Khel			
				Malamand			
				Sherdad			
		Hassanzai	Mamai				
			Gandalai	Nurbi Khel	Mazdu Khel		
					Khangi Khel		
			Mulia Khel	Madu Khel			
				Paindai			
				Pirzal Khel			
				Surghwahzai			
		Sanda Khel		Dadu Khel			
				Jumi Khel			
				Nuri Khel			
	Umar Khel	Badin Khel					
		Gurbaz					
		Ibrahim K					
		Ranra Khel					
		Sankizai					
	Usmanzai						

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHILZAI	Bran/ Burhan	Hezab	Suleiman Khel	Ahmadzai	Abubakar	Ghani Khel	
						Hussain Khel	
						Painda Khel	
						Shahzada	
						Tor Khel	
					Alladin Khel	Firoz Khel	
						Tandan	
						Zafran Khel	
					Bahram Khel		
					Dandi Khel		
					Khojak		
					Khurani Khel		
					Maruf Khel	Bata Khel	
						Gulu Khel	
						Jafar Khel	
						Laighari	
						Muhammad Khel	
						Shahzada K	
						Tangiwal	
						Yar Gul Khel	
						Zafar Khel	
					Mirguta		
					Musa Khel	Imran Khel	Akbar Khel
							Albeg Khel
							Balu Khel
						Imran Khel	Dadu Khel
							Fateh Khel
							Hanif Khel
							Jalal Khel
							Jamba Khel
							Khanan K

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHILZAI	Burhan	Hezab	Suleiman Khel	Ahmadzai	Musa Khel		Muhammad Yar Khel
							Qasim Khel
							Sadi Khel
							Sahib Khel
							Saifuddin K
							Swambi Khel
							Talu Khel
						Karim Khel	Gul Muhammad Khel
							Jan Khel
							Sulaiman Khel
							Sultan Khel
					Isa Khel	Kwajadad Khel	Bahadurwal
							Madu Khel
							Musazai
							Pacho Khel
							Shah Murad
						Masti Khel	Bazu Khel
							Mirgul Khel
							Neknam Khel
							Nura Khel
							Taru Khel
						Pali Khel	
					Jabar Khel	Ahmad Khel	
						Chilzai	
						Mariam Khel	Gul Khel
							Mirza Khel
						Khugiani Khel	Abdulrahman
							Arsala Khel
					Ya Khel	Hassan Khel	Firoz Khel
							Kamran Khel

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHILZAI	Burhan	Hezab	Suleiman Khel	Ahmadzai	Ya Khel	Hassan Khel	Saiad Khel
							Salam Khel
							Umar Khel
						Khalil Khel	Karu Khel
							Paında Khel
							Taghar
							Wali Khel
					Zandak Khel	Adin Khel	Dreplari
							Muhammad Afzal
							Sadiq Khel
							Sadu Khel
					Zandak Khel	Fateh Khel	Bahauddin
							Bakhtar Khel
							Ghairat Khel
							Saiad Khel
				Astanazai	Liasi Khel		
				Babikar Khel	Sak	Edu Khel	
							Gada Khel
							Kharoti
							Mir Ali Khel
							Umar Khel
							Uria Khel
							Utkhel
							Utman Khel
					Sherpai	Edu Khel	
							Karoti
							Mir Ali Khel
							Umar Khel
							Uria Khel
							Ut Khel

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHILZAI	Burhan	Hezab	Suleiman K	Chakmani	Babu Khel		
					Baghiar		
					Darman K		
					Hisarak		
					Kamzai		
					Mada Khel		
					Sulaiman Khel		
				Kaisar Khel	Adan Khel		
					Hasanzai	Adin Khel	
						Kala Khel	
						Nasu Khel	
					Kalandar K		
					Mali Khel	Babak Khel	Ana Khel
							Lalbeg Khel
							Shah Khel
						Mita Khel	Kenai
							Khwaji Khel
							Spinsarai
						Shatorai	Khankakai
						Taghar	
						Utu Khel	
				Khojak			
				Khwazak			
				Minzai			
				Piaro Khel			
				Samalzai			
				Sarpekara			
				Stanizai			
				Tuta Khel			
	Ibrahim	Musa	Andarh	Awood	Jala Zai	Ali Sher Kh	
						Bakhshi Kh	
						Gambeer K	
						Gandh Khel	
						Haroni	

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHILZAI	Ibrahim	Musa	Andarh	Awood	Jala Zai	Jani khel	
						Noor Khan	
						Suliman Kh	
						Thob Wal	
					Koti Khel	Habib Khel	
						Ibrahim Kh	
						Pathan Kh	
						Polaad Kh	
						Shamshi Kh	
				Ghafoori			
				Musa	Dolat Khel	Brahim Zai	Dre Plaari
							Jani khel
							Karhsoo Kh
							Katti
							Laasi Khel
							Lewaan
							Matta Khel
							Merai Wal
							Meri
							Nur Sahab
							Paro khel
							Qalandar
							Rustam
							Shamsi khel
							Shathori
							Sher Khan
						Dana Khel	Ala Khel
							Daakar Khel
							Madhi khel
							Payi Luths
							Sgar Wal
						Pir Khel	Alo Khel
							Badwaan
							Balaani Wal
							Dalil Khan

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHILZAI	Ibrahim	Musa	Andarh	Musa	Dolat Khel	Pir Khel	Faqiri
							Hamesh Kh
							Khasti
							Shakhar Zai
					Lgan Khel	Acho Khel	
						Barakud Din Khel	Aimal khel
							Ghali khel
							Himat Khel
							Naso Khel
							Nazar Khel
						Haider Khel	
						Imran Khel	
						Parti khel	Kamran
							Taghar
						Rashid Khel	
						Saabit Khel	
						Shaali khel	
						Waali Khel	Aimah Khel
							Hassan Khel
							Shaanu
							Sheroo Khel
							Spargi
						Zahab Khel	Khwaja Zai
							Mamo Zai
							Musa Khel
			Sahaak	Alo Zai			
				Bakhtar Kh			
				Hassan Kh			
				Khado Khel			
				Yakub Khel			
				Yusuf Khel	Unknown	Gadayi Khel	
				Ismail Khel			
				Panji Payi			

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHILZAI	Ibrahim	Musa	Sahaak	Yusuf Khel	Unknown	Awryi Khel	
						Tota Khel	
				Baadin Khel	Abdar Khel		
					Kabir Khel		
					Khairo Khel	Qabad Khel	
						Santhi Zai	Firat khel
							Khan Khel
							Paigo khel
							Sahab Dad
							Shah Abdul
							Zalo Khel
						Shahbaz K	Bosi Khel
							Braham Zai
							Gran Khel
							Malak Din
							Thor Zai
					Qital khel		
					Saleh khel		
					Zarin Khel		
				Feroz Khel	Ghor Khel		
					Jamal Khel	Noor Khan	
						Sado Khel	
						Shaagal K	
						Sheikh Noor Khel	
				Gorbaz Khel	Barak Khel		
					Gulaan Khel	Al Mari	
						Dilbar Khel	
						Shabki Khel	
						Taarak khel	
					Harif Khel	Gula Khel	
						Kanju Khel	
						Mewi Khel	
				Naa Khel	Hasan Khel	Ghula Khel	
						Lalo Khel	

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHILZAI	Ibrahim	Musa	Sahaak	Naa Khel	Lalo Khel	Akbar Khel	
						Kabir Khel	
						Khairo Khel	
						Qital Khel	
						Saleh Khel	
						Zarin Khel	
				Saak Khel			
				Taswid Khel			
	Toran/ Turan	Baabar	Laaghar	Yahya Zi			
				Shahoo			
				Tahini			
		Baaroo	Hotak	Malak Yar	Hussein Zi	Ishaq	Qutab Omar
					Eesak Zi		
				Dolat Yar	Aeso Zi		
					Ma'ruf Zi		
					Utman Khel		
				Yusuf	Kati Zi		
					Gadin Zi		
					Kundli Zi		
					Khadi Zi		
					Sidiq Zi		
					Omar Zi		
				Ghon	Ama Zi		
					Baye Zi		
					Baba Zi		
					Sufaid Zi		
					Ali Zi		
					Yolad		
		Nasir Khel	Hassan Khel	Malezai	Danger Khel		
					Ibrahim Kh		
					Khwajazai		
					Nur Khel		
					Stan Khel		

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHILZAI	Toran/ Turan	Nasir Khel	Hassan Khel	Malezai	Ut Khel	Abbas Khel	
						Bazu Khel	
						Budin Khel	
						Faizullah Kh	
						Saiad Khel	
						Uria Khel	
				Mandezai			
				Utman	Marwat	Nasu Khel	Habibzai
							Ush Khel
						Umarzai	Bazid
							Inas
					Masezai		
		Tokhi	Ahmand	Mando Khel			
				Popal khel			
				Rustam Kh			
				Yunus Khel			
			Ayo Zai				
			Hasan Zai				
			Tor Khel				
GHORYA KHEL	Chamkani	Arni	Barham				
			Camar				
			Darya				
			Dreplara				
			Husein				
			Khuki				
			Lashkari				
			Nasar				
		Khani	Gorga				
			Jamal				
			Madi				
			Mamut				
			Mustafa				
			Shero				
			Sultan				
			Tola				

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHORYA KHEL	Chamkani	Khoja	Dari				
			Fatah				
			Gulsher				
			Hakim				
			Jalal				
			Langar				
			Mirza				
			Shomi				
	Daulatiar	Daud/ Daudzai	Ali				
			Bazid				
			Bhagal				
			Bibi				
			Mamur				
			Mandaki	Babu			
				Husen			
				Neko			
			Mandar				
			Tajo				
			Yunus				
			Yusuf				
		Mahmand	Darani	Aba			
				Ahmad			
				Ama			
				Ayub			
				Azgar			
				Babi			
				Buchal			
				Dadu			
				Darbi			
				Ghazi			
				Haji			
				Halim			
				Haraira			
				Hasan			

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHORYA KHEL	Daulatiar	Mahmand	Darani	Ibrahim			
				Isa			
				Jaeli			
				Jani beg			
				Kala			
				Khojar			
				Langar			
				Makh			
				Mandar			
				Mando			
				Marcha			
				Mati			
				Musa			
				Nasal			
				Nekbi			
				Nur			
				Pandiali			
				Rawal			
				Sado			
				Sak			
				Sarbedal			
				Suleman			
				Taraki			
				Umar			
				Wali Beg			
				Ya'cub			
			Khatuni	Baci			
				Ali			
				Bai			
				Bota			
				Gandao			
				Hado			
				Haji			
				Isa			
				Ismail			

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
GHORYA KHEL	Daulatiar	Mahmand	Khatuni	Janga			
				Katasar			
				Khwajo			
				Koko			
				Mahyar			
				Maryamzi	Abbas		
					Aka		
					Barak		
					Bayan		
					Ghori		
				Masturazi	Ahmad		
					Atara		
					Bakhtyar		
					Barwid		
					Casim		
					Daulat		
					Hydra		
					Kodin		
					Kotak		
					Maina		
					Pash		
					Sanjar		
				Mita			
				Musa			
				Rami			
				Razar			
				Sarah			
				Shani			
				Sihpah			
				Suleman			
				Tana			
				Umar			
				Urya			
				Usman			
				Yahya			
				Yusuf			
				Zakarya			

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
KAKAR	Abdulazai						
	Alizai						
	Charmi						
	Dhamad						
	Hamazarai						
	Lalazai						
	Kabizai						
	Khidarazai						
	Kudizai						
	Mandu Kh						
	Nurzai						
	Panazai						
	Psein	Kiral					
		Zaku					
	Sanatial						
	Shabozai						
	Sini						
	Siona						
	Suliman Kh						
	Tenizai						
	Utmankhel						
KHOSTWAL	Alisher						
	Arun Khel						
	Bakir Khel						
	Ismail Khel	Aidar Khel					
		Barkhan Kh					
		Dadwal					
		Dilpari					
		Mardi Khel					
		Pirs					
	Lakkan	Adam Khel					
		Ismail Khel					
		Kamar Khel					
		Kurian					
		Machar					

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
KHOSTWAL	Lakkan	Mali Khel					
		Manz					
		Saky Khel					
		Sarki Khel					
		Tsalari					
		Zaki Khel					
	Mail						
	Mandozai	Hasan					
		Muhammad					
	Mandu						
	Matun	Ahmad Khel					
		Haji Khan					
		Kajuri					
		Khojal Wazir					
		Kundi Khel					
		Landiwal					
		Mangash					
		Modi khel					
		Patara					
		Sodi khel					
		Zaghu					
	Mula	Saban					
		Sabari					
		Shamil	Malizai				
			Narezai				
			Parbah				
			Pirs				
		Tani	Arevzai				
			Dumami				
			Khabbi Khel				
			Mari Khel				
			Sinkai				
		Tarawi					
		Tarwizai					

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
MANGAL	Karlari	Kodi	Dalazak				
			Orakzai				
			Musa Zai				
			Mangal	Musa Khel	Hasan khel		
					Kharsorhi		
					Haibi		
					Margay		
					Kamal Khel		
				Jani Khel			
			Hani				
			Wardak				
SHINWARI	Alisher Khel	Adi Khel	Kuru Khel				
			Usman Khel				
		Ash Khel	Alijan Nmasi				
			Kamal Nmasi				
			Shahmad Nmasi				
		De Saruk					
		Khali Khel					
		Khuga Khel	Alam Khan Nmasi				
			Ashrapai Nmasi				
			Basai Nmasi				
			Fatima Nmasi				
		Khwaja Khel					
		Kuhai					
		Lohargai					
		Mirdad Khel	Ganjan Nmasi				
			Tirai Khel				
		Otar Khel	Badia Nmasi				
			Kadir Nmasi				
		Otar Khel	Nur Gholam				
		Pa Khel					

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
SHINWARI	Alisher Khel	Past Khel					
		Pekha					
		Piro Khel	Mat Khel				
			Shudan Kh				
		Pirwal Khel					
		Piest Khel	Rostam Kh				
			Shamu Khel				
		Shaikhai Khel					
		Shekmal Khel	Ghani Nmasi				
			Talib Khel				
	Manduzai	Hamza Khel	Ahmad Khel				
			Maghdud Khel				
		Hasan Khel	Da Oghaz Khel				
			Musi Khel				
			Umar Khel				
		Ilias Khel	Daulat Khel				
			Kotwal				
			Kukhi Khel				
	Mullagori						
	Sangu Khel	Gadu					
		Ghani khel	Akan Nmasi				
			Baba Nmasi				
			Dada Nmasi				
		Haidar Khel	Badia Nmasi				
			Bazai Nmasi				
		Kachkal Khel	Hazarmia Nmasi				
			Sahib Nmasi				
		Karmo Khel					
		Karmu Khel	Azara Nmasi				
			Shah Wali Nmasi				

PASHTUNS							
Supertribe	Tribe	Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
SHINWARI	Sangu Khel	Karmu Khel	Walak Nmasi				
		Khani Khel	Janun Nmasi				
			Khwajun Nmasi				
			Malun Nmasi				
		Mai Khel	Ata Khan				
			Masha				
		Mirjan Khel	Ana Nmasi				
			Darbaba Nmasi				
			Wari Nmasi				
		Mullagoris	Kamal Khel				
			Par Khel				
			Tar Khel				
		Soulor Ptar	Bara Khel				
			Kandi Khel				
			Kirki Khel				
			Mazid Khel				
			Zarin Nmasi				
	Sipai	Babar Khel	Aka Nmasi				
			Ata Nmasi				
			Fatima Nmasi				
			Lala Nmasi				
		Haidar Khel	Mama Khel				
			Nimidar				
		Rahimdad Khel	Aka Khel				
			Mamai Khel				
			Ya Khel				
		Shabul Khel					
		Suliman Kh					

TAJIK ETHNIC GROUP					
Subgroup	Division				
Aimak	Chobaki				
Akil					
Allahyari					
Arbab Zai					
Baraki	Ragan				
Bazi					
Furmuli					
Jagatai					
Jotegh					
Kabuli					
Khamar					
Khoja					
Kohistani					
Larkhabi					
Murghabi	Dara Takhi				
	Isparfi				
	Isperwani				
	Jahi				
Pehlwan					
Sar Dehi					
Sek					
Tabraki					
Tarbulaki					
Urtabulaki					
Yamchi					
Zadagan	Khawanin				
Zuri					

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
Abak					
Allakah					
Allaudin					
Bacha Sadi					
Baighazi					
Baiyah					
Barat					
Barbari					
Begal					
Beguji					
Besud/ Behsud	Abdul				
	Ata				
	Babaka				
	Babali				
	Baian				
	Behbud				
	Bul Hussum				
	Boorjugye				
	Bul Hasan	Jama-i-Ali			
		Mir Bacha			
		Pir Husain			
		Pir Nazar			
	Burjagai				
	Burjigali				
	Chuli				
	Dai Mirdad	Bachari Ghulam	Allah Quli		
		Bambi			
		Chachi			
		Chawarchi			
		Jambogha			
		Sadmarda			
		Tolakshah			

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
		Tutu			
	Darghan				
	Darvesh				
	Daultapai	Dostar			
		Mir Bacha			
		Nuri			
		Tezak			
		Ulama			
	Dayah				
	Dihkhan				
	Doulatfa				
	Isutonsumur				
	Jhalak				
	Dih Murdagan				
	Dilkan				
	Durweish Ali				
	Jangzie				
Besud/ Behsud	Jirghai	Dosa			
		Iskandarai			
		Kadakh			
		Kul Ali			
		Lal Beg			
	Jirgahi Usi				
	Junglye				
	Kambar Ali				
	Kaptasan	Kaum-i-Dehkan			
		Mumrak			
		Nauroz Beg			
		Shadi Beg			
	Khalik				
	Koh-i-Biruni				
	Kulritan				
	Maksud				
	Mazid				

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
	Mir Bacha				
	Mir-i-Ali				
	Mizad				
	Mumarak				
	Naoroz	Jumbud			
	Ramuz				
	Saoz-iKah Sepai				
	Sargal				
	Sehkam				
	Sheikh				
	Shelkhani				
	Sokfa				
	Sugfa				
	Dahla				
	Tulighali				
Bolgor					
Bubak					
Chagai	Chahil Ghorl				
Chahar Dasta	Akzar				
	Aladai				
	Bed Dara				
	Chahar Deh-i-Bebud				
	Kuluj				
	Param				
	Roshan				
	Sheri Jan Gul				
	Shirin				
	Tamaki				
	Zardalu				
Chula Kur					
Dahla					
Dai Barka					
Dai Chopo					
Dai Dehqo					

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
Dai Kundi	Ainak				
	Alak				
	Babuli				
	Baibagha				
	Barat				
	Bubak				
	Chahkuk				
	Chahush				
	Chora				
	daulat Beg				
	Doda				
	Fihristan				
	Haider Beg				
	Jami				
	Jasha				
	Kalanzai				
	Burmain				
	Chora				
	Kaum-i-Ali				
	Khudi				
	Khushak				
	Mamaka				
	Mir Hazar				
	Neka				
	Qaum-I Ali				
	Roshan beg				
	Saru				
	Moshun				
	Peristan				
	Sargin				
	Sarun				
	Taristan				
	Urdu Sah				
Dai Mardah					
Dai Mirak					
Dai Mirkasha					
Dai Qozi					

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
Dai Zangi	Bacha Ghulam	Bubak			
		Gaoshak			
		Ghulam Ali			
		Ismail			
		Kaum-i-Barfi			
		Kaum-i-Mirza			
		Kaum-i-Yari			
		Neka			
		Shah Masid			
		Waras			
	Bubali				
	Dai Khundi				
	Gedi				
	Kamyaba				
	Kara-kul				
	Kham-i-aba	Beg ali			
		Gangsu			
		Halwakhor			
		Kam-i-dah			
		Kam-i-mattal			
		Kam-i-saburi			
		Km-i-sadat			
		Kirigu			
	Mimgak				
Daltamur					
Damarda					
Darghun					
Dastam					
Dayah					
Dayu					
Deh Zengi					
Di meri					
Di Mirlas					
Dinyari					

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
Dosti					
Faoladi	Chingar				
	Elibai				
	Kara Jangal				
	Muhammad				
	Zai Golak				
Gadi / Gadai					
Gangsu					
Garhi					
Gavi					
Ghaznichi					
Gudar					
Hasbah	Jiblai				
	Ketar				
	Khalik				
	Wazir				
	Zai Wahid				
Jaghatu	Ahmada				
	Alishgi/Aishgi				
	Aludini				
	Baiat				
	Farash				
	Karasuf				
	Karghani				
	Karim dad khel				
	Khataghan				
	Khwaja Miri				
	Kimlut				
	Laghri				
	Shakha				
Jaghuri/Jaghori	Ata	Maska			
	Baghuchari				
	Bubak				
	Damardah				
	Gari				

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
	Gujaristan				
	Izri	Musqua	Baba		
	Kalandar				
	Malistan				
	Tughai Bugha				
	Zaoli				
Jaokar					
Kadelan					
Kaghai					
Kala	Surkhabi				
Kala Nao	Bai Baka				
	Barankari				
	Barat				
	Beguja/ begujai				
	Bubak				
	Dai Zangi	Karianash			
	Faristan				
	Ihsankaka				
	Kadi				
	Kah Kah				
	Khwaja Hazara				
	Kohmari				
	Kokdari				
	Laghari				
	Mamakah				
	Mirmarg				
	Najak				
	Surkhabi				
	Tah Tah				
	Zaimat				
Kalak					
Kalanzai					
Kalta					
Kamarda					
Kara Mali					

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
Karabagh	Aldai				
Kazlak					
Kham-i-Aba	Kirigu				
Khatai					
Khozi					
Khubzat					
Khwaja					
Khwaja Sayyd					
Koh-e-Gadi					
Kohistani					
Kolian					
Kubti					
Kundelane					
Kuru					
Lal	She-Pai				
Logai					
Mingak					
Milrale					
Muhammad Khoja	Alam				
	Amin				
	Bahi				
	Bahram				
	Bandali				
	Bubak				
	Chalma				
	Doka				
	Ikhtiar				
	Jaffah				
	Jamal				
	Karachah				
	Khapar				
	Khazar				
	Khushal				
	Khwaja				

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
	Mirak				
	Nur Muhammada				
	Omee				
	Sagadee				
	Shatu				
	Tamakee Taltamoor				
	Tochin				
Nadir					
Najik					
Nakodari					
Nek Pai					
Neka					
Paraganda					
Pas-i-Koh					
Polada /Fuladi	Aji				
	Basi				
	Besudi				
	Butao				
	Chakar				
	Dahla				
	Daulat Khan				
	Daulat Pai				
	Khesh				
	Dayah	Daulat Khan			
		Deh Barka			
	Haidar				
	Haji				
	Inal				
	Iska				
	Jamal				
	Kalanzai				
	Khoninda				
	Khubzat				
	Khurdakzai				

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
	Kimsan-Dangula				
	Kimsung				
	Malanak				
	Mir Adina				
	Musat				
	Panjpai				
Sadat					
Sadmarda					
Sagpah					
Sahkdar					
Sar Jangali					
Sayyd					
Sayyd Ishan					
Shani					
Shahi					
Sharistani	Tajik				
Sheikh Ali	Daolat Pah				
	Darghan				
	Deh-e Mirag				
	Gadai				
	Gadhi				
	Gaohi/Garhi				
	Gawi				
	Habash				
	Hasht Khoja				
	Kaghai				
	Kalu				
	Karai				
	Karam Ali				
	Karluck /Kalluk				
	Koh-i-Gadi				
	Kollak				
	Naiman				
	Nekpai				

HAZARA TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan		
	Pai-i-Kundi				
	Pasira				
	Sad Marda				
	Sagpa				
	Tarmush				
	Tatar				
	Tili/ Thuli				
	Tokhta				
	Toth				
	Turmush				
	Wala				
Shakhdar					
Surkhabi					
Takana	Begal				
Taraghai					
Tli					
Timuri	Afghani				
	Beika'i				
	Hasani				
	Malang	Sir Ahmad			
	Odil				
	Sabs				
	Shir Ahmad				
Turkoman					
Uruzgani	Mir Adina				
Yangur	Mukadam				
Yangur					
Yasumbagha					
Yek Aulang	Sayed				
Zaidnat					
Zamiat					
Zirak	Achakzai				

BALUCH TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan				
Baji Zai					
Bazi Zai					
Borzai					
Dah Mardah					
Darizai					
Gargeg					
Garm Seli					
Ghallahacha					
Ghurghij					
Gorgeg					
Gorget					
Gurej					
Gurgej					
Hasanzai					
Kabdani					
Kalbali					
Kautani					
Lajai					
Makaki					
Malki					
Mamasani	Kirai				
Mrad khan					
Nahrui					
Nothani					
Pahlwan					
Rakhshani	Badini				
	Gurgech				
Rakhshani	Jamaldini				
	Jianzai				

BALUCH TRIBE					
Subtribe	Clan				
	Saruni				
	Usbakzai				
Reki					
Safarzai					
Sanjarani					
Sargul Zai					
Saruni					
Shadi					
Shahuzai					
Taoki					
Taoli					
Yasinzai	Dura Khel				
	Manjar Khel				
	Muhammad Umar Khel				
	Qadir Khel				
	Tor Khel				
	Umar Khel				
Zarozai					

KIRGHIZ ETHNIC GROUPS					
Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
Teyet/Tait	Sari Teyet	Qutan Oghlu	Alaichi		
			Barqi		
			Chegeter		
			Chogghoroq		
			Quezil Bash		
		Mama Oghlu	Alapa		
			Nowroz	Durbowel	
				Tekereng	
			Sait Mat		
			Shayem		
		Haider Oghlu	Bori		
			Burqa		
			Qochqar	Choja	
				Eshibul	
				Mouju	
				Qulbul	
			Jamanang		
			Wotunchi		
			Zarif		
	Chal Teyet				
	Chapan Teyet				
	Laqay				
	Qara Teyet				
	Qarleg				
	Yaman				
Kesak / Kasak	Qezil Ayagh	Baqi Jan			
		Jelma			

KIRGHIZ ETHNIC GROUPS					
Subtribe	Infratribe	Superclan	Clan	Subclan	Infraclan
		Meta			
		Mirza			
	Bustan	Mowlawey			
		Sar Washel			
	Chawugh				
	Gherdisha	Engerchaq			
		Hait Aka			
	Jeghjem				
	Mama Char				
	Mushke				
	Qara Sadaq				
	Quralay				
	Qushqulaq				
Naiman	Basterghay				
	Bowa				
	Ghuran				
	Jawun Put				
	Jowru				
	Jurde				
	Ken				
	Keyek				
	Kok Echke				
	Mirza Naiman				
Qepchaq	Chela				
	Kara Qepchak				
	Qulchaq				
	Sart Qepchaq				

NURISTANI ETHNIC GROUPS					
Subtribe	Clan	Subclan			
Ashkun/Ashkund					
Bashgul Katir	Barmodari				
	Charedari				
	Jannahdari				
	Mutadawadari				
	Shakladari				
	Shtukdari				
	Sowadari				
Chanak					
Dutak					
Gramsana					
Istrat/ Gordesh					
Kalasha	Chima-nishei				
	Vai				
	Vata				
Kantor	Kaymgal	Atergam			
		Bairkama			
		Pimichgram			
Kastan/ Kashtan					
Kata					
Katir	Kti/ Katawar				
	Kullum/ Kulam				
	Ramguli/ Gabarik				
Kieth					
Kam/Kom	Batardari				
	Bilezhdari				
	Demidari				

Kam/Kom	Garakdari				
	Gutkechdari				
	Kanardari				
	Lananadari				
	Sukdari				
	Utahdari				
	Waidari				
Kshto					
Madugal/					
Mumo					
Paintar					
Paj					
Pashgai					
Peh					
Pendesh					
Presun					
Rahrah					
Sanu					
Tapahkal					
Tregami	Devi				
	Gumbeer				
	Kaltar				
Vasi					
Wadihu					
Wai/ Waegal	Bungalee				
	Painter				
	Willwal				
Wama					

TATAR ETHNIC GROUP					
Subgroup	Division				
Chagai	Chahil Ghor				
Hai Hubi					
Mekhzari					
Miriji					
Muhammad Khuli					
Zai Batur					
Zai Bi					
Zai Chopan					
Zai Chunika					
Zai Ghola					
Zai Hubi					
Zai Hundu					
Zai Kara					
Zai Mahmad					
Zai Mirzari					
Zai Murtumu					
Zai Nabaki					
Zai Nazar					
Zai Payandabeg					
Zai Qabiz					
Zai qara					
Zai Shakur					
Zai Shola					
Zai Ulusi					

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