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Chapter 7

Anti-gender discourse in Hungary: A discourse without a movement?

Eszter Kováts and Andrea Pető

The Hungarian National Bank set up educational foundations and educational programmes which are outside the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Accreditation Committee. They are, however, using as much state funding as the whole Hungarian state education system. One of these programmes recently appointed German sociologist Gabriele Kuby, one of the main ideologists of anti-gender movement in Europe, as a regular visiting professor. The appointment stirred the academic environment in Hungary sensitive to government interventions, as it shows that representatives of anti-gender activism receive preferential treatment in some circles. The appointment of Kuby might reinforce the already-existing anti-gender discourse in Hungary, which is the topic of this chapter.

Unlike in some other East-Central European countries, there is currently no significant anti-gender movement in Hungary. However, there is a palpable anti-gender discourse, which started to grab scientific attention in the past few years, although only to a modest extent (Balogh 2014; Félix 2015; Kováts and Põim 2015; Kováts and Soós 2014; Perintfalvi 2015; Pető 2015a, 2015b). Given the local structural features, the question is why a full-fledged movement has not appeared yet? We argue that the major reason for that is the lack of a culturally liberal agenda of the current government, as well as the (so far) lack of a motive on the government's behalf to initiate such a movement.¹ Having said this, we cannot exclude the emergence of such a captured movement, organized with the support of collateral organizations in the near future (Metz 2015), should the creation of a new enemy served the purposes of the government. Indeed, creating an enemy is often used as a mobilization strategy by the current government between two elections. For instance, in 2015, during the refugee crisis, the communication went far beyond policy questions and was directed towards stirring fear and hatred.

The same happened during the campaign leading to the government-initiated referendum in October 2016 on whether or not the Hungarian Parliament should have a say in approving of refugee quotas set by the EU.

However, one must also bear in mind the analytical limits of the framework of “a need for creating an enemy”, for such an approach would walk us into a trap of interpreting the emergence or non-emergence of a movement solely from a local and national point of view. As we argued elsewhere (Kováts 2017; Pető 2016a, 2016b), these movements are rooted in a broader crisis phenomenon and the scale is much larger than specific local or national government or Church interests.

This chapter is organized in three parts. We first discuss the emergence and evolution of the anti-gender discourse, which has only sporadically appeared in Hungarian public debates. We also examine the actors, who initiated this discourse and/or might become the engines of a movement. Second, we elaborate on why no movement has emerged yet. Third, we discuss why we could however expect such a mobilization in Hungary.

THE HISTORY OF A DISCOURSE

In this section, we discuss the emergence of an anti-gender discourse as framed by different actors, and we discuss the relationship between the European level and local actors.

The emergence of a discourse (2008–2009)

In Hungary, “gender ideology” as an expression first appeared in 2008 in relation to a textbook for high school students (Pető and Tarajossy 2008), which was meant to assist the teaching of history through a gendered lens. An MP of FIDESZ identified the presence of “gender ideology” in this textbook, claiming that “the greatest danger of this trend is that society will lose its sexual identity. Traditional identity will be lost”. She also stated that “[t]his is the beginning of the final takeover of the *culture of death*, of denial, of the opposition to our creaturehood”.²

The expression “culture of death” itself, which originates in Pope John Paul II’s 1995 *Evangelium vitae* encyclical letter (Robcis 2015), was popularized in Hungary by the translation of Gabriele Kuby’s book *Die Gender Revolution – Relativismus in Aktion* (2008). The book is indeed freely downloadable from the website of the Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP, Christian Democratic People Party). The blurb for the Hungarian edition of the book was written by the Hungarian bishop László Bíró and the Austrian

bishop Andreas Laun, whose book “Christian Man in a Modern World” on the same topic was published in Hungarian in 2014.

The Lexicon on Ambiguous and Debatable Terms Regarding Family Life and Ethical Questions, which became a key theoretical foundation of anti-gender mobilization in several countries, was only translated in 2012 (in Hungarian Lexicon of the Family, *Családlektion* 2012). Nonetheless, its most important articles on gender had already been published earlier in a journal for caring professionals. Furthermore, one of the arguments put forward in the *Lexicon* – that differences measured by statistics between men and women in any given profession can be the result of some natural differences between men and women and not discrimination – appeared also in one of the earliest articles on “gender ideology” by theology teacher Tomka. In a piece published in 2010, Tomka argues that while “[t]he equal rights of women is a principle that we all agree on”, it is only the first step that eventually leads to a slippery slope. Through a “Trojan horse” argument, he claims that, while the first appearance of women’s equality is in a beautiful cloak, it later leads to the mingling of sexes. In other words, any action aiming at gender equality can be interpreted as the first step to a slippery slope.

Framing anti-gender discourse

Although the texts quoted above paved the way for the anti-gender discourse, “gender ideology” explicitly appeared on the political agenda for the first time in 2010 in response to an amendment of the curricula for preschool education by the socialist government. It then got wide publicity in right-wing media. According to this amendment, preschool teachers should “deliberately avoid any strengthening of gender stereotypes and facilitate the dismantling of the prejudices concerning the social equality of genders”.³ Kornél Papp, the head of the Synod’s Education Office of the Reformed Church in Hungary, denounced this as “wholly frightening”, arguing:

What does it entail in practice to avoid gender stereotypes? For instance, does it mean that in fairy tales the parents will no longer be called Dad and Mom, but rather Parent One and Parent Two? Or that one has to intervene if a little girl plays too much with her dolls. One should rather convince her to play with an excavator? Girly outfits are also gender stereotypes: the skirt, the long hair, the ribbon and the patent leather shoes. If we take the amendment seriously, we should ask the parents to have the little girls wear pants from now on.⁴

It is no surprise that the right-wing conservative FIDESZ-KDNP government, which stepped into office in June 2010, removed the contested sentence from the curricula. Rózsa Hoffmann, Undersecretary of Education, explained that

the sentence had to be deleted as it “introduced the foundations of the so-called gender ideology into preschool education, which in the name of equality dismisses the differentiation of sexes as senseless”.⁵

After this event, the issue of “gender ideology” disappeared both from political debates and mainstream media and only marginal voices such as the anti-feminist blog *Férfigang* (Men’s Voice) and the Far-Right portal *kuruc.info*, continued to keep the issue on the agenda.

While in several European countries anti-gender mobilizations started in 2012 or 2013, Hungary remained relatively quiet. Nevertheless, the translation of the Slovakian Episcopacy’s Pastoral Letter to Advent (1 December 2013), which warned against gender equality as being a Trojan horse aiming at erasing the differences between sexes, was read out loud in Hungarian churches.⁶

In the media, the largest right-wing weekly *Heti Válasz* also emphasized in its article “A tolerancia diktatúrája” (The Dictatorship of Tolerance) that the gay lobby was about to restrict the rights of the majority. This text, which was published soon after the Budapest Pride Parade of 2013, further claimed:

This year homosexual activists have shifted into a higher gear worldwide. While beforehand their stated goal was the elimination of discrimination, today it is the rights of the majority that are being endangered. Those committed to a family model based on the relationship between a man and a woman are on the losing side all the way from Sweden to the United States.⁷

The reception of EU developments

From 2014 onwards, anti-gender discourse became denser. This was triggered by two reports discussed at the European Parliament: the – unsuccessful – Estrela report on sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the Lunacek report against homophobia and other forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, which was adopted by the European Parliament in February 2014.⁸ At the time, the right-wing press published numerous articles denouncing “gender ideology”. According to the *Heti Válasz*, which applied again the trope of majority-turning-minority:

Europe once again is loud with questions of bioethics. Gay rights organizations want to extend the privileges of homosexuals, the gender ideologists shifted into a higher gear, and in Belgium active euthanasia for children has become legal. But why did two FIDESZ European Parliament MPs vote for the LGBT-lobby’s proposal? . . . Twelve-year old girls could have abortions without parental consent, popularization of homosexuality would become obligatory in preschools, and member countries would be obliged to legalize gay marriage. This is the gist of the two reports against which hundreds of thousands of Europeans petitioned recently.⁹

Such right-wing media reports sparked an increasing interest among conservative politicians, who started to use the phrase “gender ideology”. For example Zsolt Semjén, deputy prime minister and the president of KDNP, said in an interview for Hír TV that “gender ideology gets a brutal amount of support from Brussels. Small but loud interest groups in my opinion want to impose on the world a deviant worldview”.¹⁰ The same frame was used by Katalin Novák, Undersecretary of Family Affairs. She claimed in a deploring tone, discussing between the lines the term “gender”, that some Western governments are trying to sneak into EU and the UN documents expressions, which are expanding the notion of the family. She also stressed out that the Hungarian government does not agree with having hardly definable terms and controversial principles in these documents and would initiate a coalition with those countries which share Hungarian standpoint.¹¹

Anti-gender discourse was further strengthened by the activity of the conservative news portal Mandiner, which, for example, published an interview with Gabriele Kuby, in which she warns Hungarians that “gender ideology” is an international conspiracy that could soon reach Hungary. A translation of bishop Laun’s *Der Christ in der modernen Welt* (“Christian Man in a Modern World”) was also translated into Hungarian at the time. In this book, Laun compares “gender ideology” with Marxism and socialism and sees it as an attack on the Church. According to him, criticisms against the Catholic Church would show that religious identity is under attack, as it was under state socialism (Balogh 2014, 11–12).

Dissident voices

Alternative voices emerged in early 2015. In February, the Hungarian translation of a study by an Austrian Catholic moral theologian Gerhard Marschütz, who criticizes the Catholic Church for its role in mobilizing against “gender ideology”, was published in the *2014 Keresztény-Zsidó Teológiai Évkönyv* (Christian-Jewish Theological Yearbook 2014). In this piece, Marschütz criticizes the Catholic Church’s wholesale adaptation of Gabriele Kuby’s thoughts, as well as her role in drafting the above-mentioned Slovakian Pastoral Letter. He proceeds with an analysis of Kuby’s argumentation, refutes her claims from a moral theological point of view and discusses the reasons why the Catholic Church should learn from the discipline of gender studies (Marschütz 2014). This is a radical approach in the Hungarian Catholic context which shows that Hungarian Catholic context is multilayered, which offers chance to think about future alliance between progressive actors.

Piarist monk József Urbán also hits an unusual tone in his response to a statement by deputy prime minister, Zsolt Semjén, in which the latter, when commenting on the Slovak referendum against marriage equality, said that

“the Slovak nation bore witness to our common Christian values and normality”.¹² József Urbán¹³ questioned Semjén’s gesture and wondered whether Christianity unconditionally leads to voting “yes” on the referendum. He also raised doubts about whether this referendum was necessary. This blog entry was followed by an intense debate, first under the entry itself and later in the press. As a response to a question on his blog, Urbán refined his argument, arguing: “Gay marriage is not my fundamental concern. My concern is how we could, as Christians, avoid contributing to spreading hatred, violence, shaming and fear. How could a topic like that of marriage, which . . . became a question of the referendum, exert violence? That’s my concern. The way I see it, this is truly the question” (Urbán 2015).

This comment led a journalist of the conservative weekly *Heti Válasz* to interview Urbán about the alleged contradiction between the Catholic teaching and his opinion. Urbán’s response was about overcoming fear and listening to each other: “What would greatly help – and perhaps it is downright indispensable for the conversation – if we stopped using the words of the magisterium as shields, and if we stopped saying – or suggesting – that the other is “not normal”, or “not a Christian”.¹⁴

A third element should be mentioned: the shifts in Katalin Novák’s – and more broadly the governmental – communication. In 2011, during the Hungarian EU-presidency, the government’s standpoint was that family mainstreaming should be supported instead of gender mainstreaming, which they perceived as an anti-family agenda (Juhász 2012). In early March 2015, however, at the UN Commission on the Status of Women’s 59th Congress in New York City, the Undersecretary of State announced that “family policy cannot be pitched against women’s equality. It can be effectively pursued in parallel with women’s politics” and advocated women’s increased political representation.¹⁵ Novák did apparently not consider the issue of gender equality to be against family, nor to be a Trojan horse via which fierce ideas make their way into international organizations. However, the fact that Novák held a speech at a conference of the One of Us Association in Paris in March 2016, and her receiving an award by the World Congress of Families in Georgia in May 2016 indicate that she is somehow involved in the transnational networks mobilizing against “gender ideology”.

The activities of the local office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) should be mentioned as well. Indeed, the FES – to which belongs one author of this chapter – organized the first dialogue forums explicitly focusing on the anti-gender mobilizations in Europe in February and June 2014. It was about initiating a dialogue between conservative and progressive opinion makers in Hungary in order to prevent similar fundamentalist movements locally. Given the great interest, the series proceeded from the fall of 2014 on, touching upon social issues that representatives of different world views and disciplinary backgrounds could connect to, like motherhood, masculinities,

childbearing, love and dignity.¹⁶ The aim of the dialogue series is to build trust among actors, to create a space of (self)reflection and to search for a common vocabulary, without which the various actors cannot communicate with respect. Such self-reflection is deemed to hinder the construction of conspiracy theories and the demonization of opponents, allowing all actors to move forward on gender issues (Kováts 2015b, 10). The experience of the forums seem to be so far that there are progressive and conservative opinion makers committed to overcome the trenches and the mistrust. Whether it could contribute to prevent an anti-gender movement or even bring about progressive changes is yet to be seen.

Turning the tide: The “female principium” discussion

Change in the anti-gender discourse happened with an intervention of an influential FIDESZ politician, who made the concept of “gender” a topic of discussion not only in media but also in everyday life. On 13 December 2015 László Kövér, president of the Parliament, declared at the annual congress of the FIDESZ that the highest form of self-fulfilment of women is to give birth, complaining about the spread of “gender madness” in Europe. This was followed by a statement by the heavily state sponsored conservative pop icon Ákos Kovács, who claimed that the task of women is to “fulfill the female principium”, which is giving birth and belonging to someone.

These two statements are embedded in the general fear of demographic decline of the Hungarian government. In the upcoming weeks, 10 to 15 pro and contra articles and numerous blog posts were published daily about the “duty or role of women”. This discussion, involving critical voices from progressive men and conservative thinkers, however, only sporadically touched upon issues relevant to the anti-gender debates and remained in the framework of a feminist debate. It is also important to emphasize that this “female principium” discussion was a national centred debate without visible connections to other anti-feminist or anti-gender movements in Europe. In winter 2015/2016, the government started to finance a street poster and advertisement campaign on the theme of family, the first topics being siblings and fatherhood. When finalizing this chapter (October 2016), there was no sign this campaign would be continued, but this discussion can be renewed at any moment in the context of the demographic discourse.

WHY IS THERE NO MOVEMENT? DISCOURAGING FACTORS

A comparison with the emergence of anti-gender movements across Europe points towards several discouraging factors, which might explain why there is (still) no visible anti-gender movement in Hungary. They relate to the (lack

of) institutionalization of gender equality policies – there is nothing one can protest against – and the state of affairs with the current government, which nearly eliminated all NGOs that could be advocates for gender equality. The Orbán government is opposing any liberal agenda and it rejects any kind of gender equality mechanism at governmental level. For that reason, only a few weak and non-influential NGOs can be labelled representatives of “gender ideology”.

First, as opposed to France, Slovakia or Poland for instance, there is no gender mainstreaming policy in Hungary.¹⁷ The institutionalization of gender equality is relatively weak today and cannot serve as a possible catalyst for the movement. The same is true for the LGBT issues. Unlike in Slovakia, Slovenia or France, where recent LGBT-related legislation helped activating anti-gender mobilization, such pro-LGBT legislation is currently not imaginable in Hungary. Hungary had already adopted a relatively progressive law on registered partnership in 2009, and no future improvement of LGBT rights can be envisaged at short sight. Finally, unlike countries where anti-gender mobilizations could piggyback on general public discontent with the government, it does not seem to be case in Hungary (Kováts and Soós 2014, 119–120).

Second, the status of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary does not facilitate the establishment of a movement. According to the 2011 census, 39% of the population declares to be Catholic, 11% belongs to the Protestant Reformed Church and 2.2% to the Lutheran Church (18% does not belong to any religion; 27% didn't answer). Balogh (2014) showed that in Hungary the number of practitioners of Catholicism is significantly smaller than in those countries where the anti-gender mobilization was powerful. Whereas the Roman Catholic Church plays a significant role in the mobilizations all over Europe, in Hungary the Church does not possess such a leading opinion making character. This leads to wonder whether the Church is capable of initiating and mobilizing large networks of active citizens and whether such a potential can be found in civil society outside the Church circles. For now it seems that in both Church and civil circles there is no “political culture within which mobilization and street politics would be accepted and considered valuable” (Kováts and Soós 2014, 120). However, the CitizenGO initiative, which has an active Hungarian branch, may prove this wrong. The initiative seems to be quite successful in mobilizing networks of people along conservative values by collecting their signatures.

Third, several structural particularities of Hungarian conservatism must be emphasized. While there is often a continuity in conservative tradition in Western Europe, there was a fundamental break in 1945 in Hungary, as in other post-communist countries. This resulted in an alternative trajectory in the development of conservative subculture (Pető 2003). From 1990,

Hungarian conservatism had to rebuild itself and hinged on key questions: What tradition(s) would it rely on? What would it borrow from the political toolkit of pre-1945 conservatism? This led to the selection of specific features (“chosen tradition”). For this reason, there are no traceable differences between the gender discourses of the Hungarian right-wing conservatives and that of the Far Right. Both follow the traditional normative family model. They aim at the same discursive space of “family”, which in turn makes conservative discourse more susceptible to fundamentalism (Pető 2003). It will be a question for the future if right-wing conservatives can protect their version of normative family discourse from the Far Right.

Finally, the absence of an organized anti-gender movement in Hungary could be partly attributed to the success of conflict-avoiding initiatives. As shown with the experience of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, many representatives of conservative and human rights organizations are open to dialogue, certainly when the issue is not yet polarized. As presented, dissident voices have also emerged among Christian communities. This includes the rise of the Magyarországi Teológusnők Ökumenikus Egyesülete (Hungarian Women Theologians’ Ecumenical Association), the Lutheran blog *Kötőszó* and the recent publication of a volume with studies on theology and gender from various Christian confessions, published by the publishing house of the Lutheran Church (Hausmann et al. 2016).

WHY WE COULD EXPECT THE EMERGENCE OF A MOVEMENT

In countries like France (Chetcuti 2014; Robcis 2015) and Poland (Grzebalska 2015) smaller mobilizations preceded a particular catalysing issue, which then prompted the development of a structured anti-gender movement. These mobilizations were not necessarily part of a deliberate strategy escalating from isolated, sporadic cases of resistance towards a greater opposition, but made the general public more conscious of certain concepts and of their alleged dangers, serving as the scaffolding of a larger movement. Hungary has experienced, as detailed earlier, small events in the past years, such as the 2010 debate about avoiding gender stereotypes in preschool teaching and the 2014 debate about the reports by Estrela and Lunacek. Therefore, the theoretical background work and arguments necessary to the emergence of a movement are already present in the country.

Indeed, one of the precondition for the emergence of a movement is the recognition of the dangers of gender. As we have highlighted, this discourse is actively promoted by right-wing media and civil society actors in Hungary. Moreover, some political actors, journalists, representatives of churches and

conservative civil organizations are ready to advocate this cause publicly. One can mention, among others, the already mentioned Hungarian branch of the transnational network of CitizenGO initiative, which mobilizes for the European Citizen initiative MumDad&Kids; the party foundation of the minor coalition partner Christian Democrats KDNP (Barankovics Foundation), the Magyarországi Aquinói Szent Tamás Társaság (Hungarian Thomas Aquinas Association), the community university who invited Kuby to Hungary (Wekerle Business School), the Association of Conservative Students at ELTE University Budapest which organized in March 2016 a debate about “gender ideology” and protested against a lesbian flash mob in May; the Századvég Foundation, a think tank heavily sponsored by the government, which has recently published a book against same-sex marriage and organized a conference on the “human rights fundamentalism”.

Several media outlets have also published on the issue: newspapers (*Magyar Hírlap*, *Magyar Idők*), a weekly magazine (*Heti Válasz*), television channels (*HírTV*, *EchoTV*), a radio station (*Kossuth Rádió*), popular Internet portals and blogs (mandiner, 888.hu), Christian fundamentalist evangelical forums (Hetek) and far-right-wing related portals (kuruc.info).

Furthermore, although there is no significant conservative civil sphere beyond these media outlets, the government has its own civil organizations, which can be easily mobilized if the government has to be defended from what they perceive as an unjustified external attack (Pető and Vasali 2014). Therefore, the Hungarian government with its anti-EU discourse could ostensibly support and encourage the development of an anti-gender movement, as well as the construction of a captivating vision of the enemy. In 2015, Orbán’s government started a new communication campaign in order to strengthen the “family-friendly thinking”, to promote pro-family world views and to provide “information about the positive results of family politics”.¹⁸ As the refugee crisis deepened, the campaign was postponed, but based on the experience of the anti-refugee campaign over the spring and summer 2015 as well as prior to the government-initiated referendum about refugee quotas in October 2016, we assume that this “family-friendly” campaign could become another territory to mobilize afresh the vision of the enemy. If the government for any reason needs a (new) image of an enemy, it is poised to harness public support behind it, through which it can relay the message to otherwise uninvolved social groups as well.

Finally, progressive actors and voices in Hungary are weak. This could imply lesser triggers for the emergence of a conservative movement, but it also means that a possible anti-gender mobilization would face a frail opposition. Indeed, the anti-gender movement is partly built on the weaknesses of progressive politics (Pető 2016b; Wimbauer, Motakef and Teschlade 2015).

In such a political constellation, the “gender ideology” discourse offers a fertile ground for an organized movement, potentially feeding into many fears and insecurities. In Hungary, human rights–focused civil networks dealing with women’s and LGBT issues have weak social grounding. They have not performed the “radical re-thinking of the toolkit of the critique of the regime” (Pető 2014) and their agenda remained reactive. This proves to be especially challenging in the defensive stance into which stigmatizing government politics have pushed them, which in turn justifies their positions and increases their urgent demands for the EU and the UN norms (Pető 2014; Pető and Vasali 2014). Wimbauer and her colleagues (2015) also argue that discourses against gender equality are an explicit or implicit attempt to get experiences of precarity and precarization under control and that the feminist and LGBT struggles have found a comfortable place in the neoliberal order and are therefore made co-responsible by the anti-gender actors for the damage it causes.

CONCLUSION

In the context of (Central and Eastern) European countries Hungary remains a unique case with a rather long history of anti-gender discourse, but without any palpable anti-gender movement. This, however, can easily change, should the Orbán’s government or the NGOs near the government build up the new enemy “gender”. So far progressive actors have offered neither visible nor popular alternatives to the Orbán government (which uses partly Leftist and anti-systemic arguments to neoliberalism), and this opens the scene also to anti-EU discourses and to the more forceful Far Right party Jobbik and other anti-modernist alternatives (Pető and Vasali 2014). At the moment, the anti-gender rhetoric is one of the possible rhetorical frames besides the anti-migrant narrative to be used for political purposes of polarization. As the refugee crisis intensifies anti-gender rhetoric might be integrated in this frame and then has a potential of mass mobilization. On the opposite side, as we have argued elsewhere (Kováts 2015a, 2017; Kováts and Pöim 2015; Pető 2015a, 2015b, 2016a), it is indispensable for scholars seeking to understand anti-gender movements and for activists and politicians on the progressive side seeking to counteract them, to reflect on the content of progressive politics (questioning neoliberalism, and the rooting of the identity politics in neoliberalism), on the language of equality (statistical equality, human rights, EU as a neoliberal project while being sold as norm owner of gender equality and human rights) and on the language of politics (technocratic, policy-based). This is all the more necessary because what remains of the post–World War II

consensus is becoming more and more challenged by the growing fundamentalism represented by the Far Right and now by anti-gender movements.

At the end of September 2016, Hungarian tax authorities closed down the quasi university where Gabriele Kuby was appointed as a visiting professor. This shows that maybe the anti-gender movement will not be supported wholeheartedly by the Hungarian state. This restraint may open up space for those political forces who are fighting against hate and discrimination to look and to maybe find allies in unexpected places.

NOTES

1. FIDESZ (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége* – Alliance of Young Democrats), a right-wing conservative party, with its minor coalition partner, the KDNP (*Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt* – Christian Democratic People Party) was elected with a two-thirds majority in 2010 and brought about a profound change in the Hungarian legal system, including constitution, electoral law and media law. The party alliance was re-elected again with two-thirds majority in 2014 with PM Viktor Orbán (however, because of an interim election necessary in a single-member constituency they lost the two-thirds majority since then). The biggest opposition party is Jobbik, a Far-Right party, which obtained 20% of the votes in 2014.

2. Mizsei, Bernadett. 2009. “Nőkről és Férfiakról egy kicsit másként.” *Magyar Nemzet Online*, 4 May. Accessed 28 May 2016. http://mno.hu/migr_1834/nokrol_es_ferfiakrol_egy_kicsit_maskent-305202.

3. The amendment: 255/2009 (XI.20).

4. Farkas, Melinda. 2010. “Semleges neműnek kell nevelni az óvodást.” *Magyar Nemzet Online*, 1 March. Accessed 28 May 2016. http://mno.hu/migr_1834/semleges_nemunek_kell_nevelni_az_ovodast-254593

5. Mti. 2010. “Hoffmann Rózsák nem gyengítenék a nemi sztereotípiákat az óvodákban.” *Hvg.hu*, 30 July. Accessed 28 May 2016. http://hvg.hu/itthon/20100730_nemi_sztereotipiak_ovoda

6. <http://www.magyarkurir.hu/hirek/szlovak-katolikus-puspoki-konferencia-adventi-korlevele>. Accessed 15 June 2016.

7. Szőnyi, Szilárd. 2013. “A tolerancia diktatúrája.” *Válasz.hu*, 17 July. Accessed 28 May 2016. <http://valasz.hu/vilag/a-tolerancia-diktaturaja-66215>.

8. Estrela report: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0426+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>. Accessed 15 June 2016.

Lunacek report: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2014-0009+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>. Accessed 15 June 2016.

9. Szőnyi, Szilárd. 2013. “A tolerancia diktatúrája.” *Válasz.hu*, 17 July. Accessed 28 May 2016. <http://valasz.hu/vilag/a-tolerancia-diktaturaja-66215>. The CitizenGO online petition forum collected 130,000 opposing signatures. The CitizenGO website also has a Hungarian coordinator, and the organization is active in Hungary. Via this signature-collecting website it is possible to gather the addresses of those interested in further initiations; hence it also acts as a networking forum that may serve as the base for future mobilization.

10. “Semjén Zsolt és brüsszeli buzilobbi.” 2014. *YouTube* video, 0:49, posted by Vastagbőr blog, 22 June. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2W06DJiYTHI>. Accessed 15 June 2016.

11. Kossuth Rádió. 2014. “Családügyi államtitkár: Hadd döntse el Magyarország, mit gondol férfi és nő kapcsolatáról.” *Hirado.hu*, 13 July. Accessed 28 May 2016. <http://www.hirado.hu/2014/07/13/csaladugyi-allamtitkhar-hadd-dontse-el-magyarorszag-mit-gondol-ferfi-es-no-kapcsolatarol/>

12. <http://semjenzsolt.hu>. Accessed 15 June 2016.

13. <http://urbanjosef.piarista.hu/>. Accessed 15 June 2016.

14. Szőnyi, Szilárd. 2015. “Abcúg melegházasság? Piarista pap vitatja Semjén álláspontját.” *Válasz.hu*, 26 February. Accessed 28 May 2016. <http://valasz.hu/itthon/abcug-meleghazassag-piarista-pap-vitatja-semjen-allaspontjat-110020>.

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