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Pruce, Kate

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Covid-19

Social Policy Response Series

Kate Pruce

**Zambia's Social Policy  
Response to Covid-19:  
Protecting the Poorest  
or Political Survival?**



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of Social Policy CRC 1342

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**Kate Pruce**

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Postadresse / Postal Address:  
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# ZAMBIA'S SOCIAL POLICY RESPONSE TO COVID-19: PROTECTING THE POOREST OR POLITICAL SURVIVAL?

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Kate Pruce\*

## ABSTRACT

Zambia's social policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic is unfolding against a background of severe financial challenges, a squeezed social sector and limited state capacity. There are also concerns about the upcoming general election in August 2021, which is already beginning to shape policy and spending decisions. Much of Zambia's social policy response has focused on the formal sector, despite the country's large informal sector, high unemployment rate and food insecurity across urban and rural areas. A Covid-19 emergency cash transfer (ECT) has been the most significant social policy intervention to help the poorest households to cope with the effects of the pandemic. However, this programme has been largely driven and funded by international donors, while the government has increased payments to agricultural subsidies and empowerment funds. Claims that the ruling party is using the ECT for election rigging suggests that there is some political interest in this scheme, but other more powerful constituencies – particularly farmers and young people – continue to be prioritised. This reflects the political dynamics of Zambia's social protection response more broadly, with domestic incentives shaping the level of government support and funding directed at various programmes.

## INTRODUCTION

Zambia confirmed its first two cases of Covid-19 on 18 March 2020. A couple who had gone on holiday to France tested positive on their return, and quarantined with their children in designated isolation facilities in Lusaka. Numbers initially remained low, with just over 1,000 cases and 7 deaths recorded up to the end of May. However, the number of confirmed cases more than doubled from 1,489 on 24 June to 3,326 on 21 July (Africa News, 2020), coinciding with a predicted spike during Zambia's cold season. As of 25 October 2020, the official figures stood at 16,137 confirmed cases and 348 deaths classified as Covid-19 or Covid-19 associated according to Ministry of Health reports. However, the initial results of a Covid-19 seroprevalence survey suggest that up to 1.8 million Zambians may have been infected (UNOCHA, 2020), which would mean that the majority of infections are going unreported. Related to this, there are ongoing concerns about the country's low testing capacity (about 1,000 tests per day) and other data limitations such as time lag and sampling strategy.

Covid-19 has arrived at a time of severe financial challenges, a squeezed social sector and limited state capacity. Zambia is experiencing negative economic growth, depreciation of the local currency (kwacha) and unsustainable debt. Central government debt stood at 91.6 percent of GDP at the end of 2019 (IMF, 2019), and the country defaulted on its sovereign debt in November 2020, following the rejection of its request to delay payments. With debt servicing and the public sector wage bill taking up a large proportion of the budget, there is limited fiscal space for spending on social policies. As a share of the total budget, the social sector budget declined from 29.4% in 2019 to 26.1% in 2020 (ZIPAR, 2019). There is a historical backlog of pension arrears,

\*Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, [kate.pruce@manchester.ac.uk](mailto:kate.pruce@manchester.ac.uk)

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even as the National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA) has begun to extend social security, including pensions, to informal workers. Zambia's Covid-19 response has also been limited by inadequate health systems as well as poor road infrastructure and safety, particularly in terms of public transport. As a result, the majority of testing is taking place in Lusaka and other key hotspots such as Nakonde, on the border with Tanzania.

Zambia gained lower middle income status in 2011, with economic growth averaging 7.4% between 2004 and 2014 (Smith et al., 2016). However, the economy remains heavily reliant on copper which represents more than 70% of exports and the country continues to perform poorly on human development indicators (UN, 2015). While the re-introduction of multi-party elections in 1991 has led to two peaceful electoral turnovers, the continued predominance of patron-client relationships rather than programmatic politics has led to the characterisation of Zambia's political settlement as 'competitive clientelist' in nature. In such settings, personalised elite bargaining and access to state resources tend to take precedence over the provision of services to citizens (Levy, 2014). A more populist element to politics in Zambia has also emerged (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2010). Appealing to the urban poor, disenfranchised by the previous Movement for Multi-party Democracy government, the Patriotic Front (PF) came to power in 2011 with the promise to 'put money in the pockets of poor people'. The first PF president Michael Sata passed away in office in 2014, with Edgar Lungu emerging as his successor following an internal factional conflict. Under Lungu, a shift is taking place towards a more authoritarian settlement based on highly centralised executive powers, as well as suppression of civil society groups and previously vibrant independent media houses (Hinfelaar and Sichone, 2019). The ruling PF party is increasingly focused on political survival, rather than addressing the economic and health crises.

This essay will discuss Zambia's social policy response to Covid-19 in the context of these existing challenges and also the upcoming general election in August 2021, which is already beginning to shape policy and spending decisions. Zambia has introduced a wide range of Covid-19 related measures, including micro-economic and macro-economic policies which may have implications for social policy. This overview focuses on policy developments that are explicitly aimed at social protection in areas such as pensions, education and social assistance, while recognising that there is often overlap between economic and social objectives. Examples of this overlap include the provision of targeted economic empowerment funds as well as subsidies, such as the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) which has been categorised as a social protection programme by the Zambian government.

The next section briefly introduces the economic and social effects of Covid-19 on households, as well as the broader employment situation in Zambia. It then goes on to outline the government's initial response to the pandemic in Zambia, and the gaps that remained. The final section analyses the politics of the social protection response, which appears to be continuing established patterns in terms of government priorities and spending, particularly as the 2021 election approaches. Drawing on Lavers and Hickey's (2016) adapted political settlements framework, which suggests that political commitment to social protection is closely related to the domestic political economy, the essay argues that cash transfers remain dwarfed by programmes with more influential political constituencies such as FISP. This may explain why Zambia's Covid-19 emergency cash transfer is largely donor-funded, with worrying implications for the many Zambians experiencing income vulnerabilities and food insecurity.


## ZAMBIA'S SOCIAL POLICY RESPONSE

A study of Covid-19 in Zambia conducted in July 2020 by the University of Gothenburg's programme on Governance and Local Development (GLD) and the Southern African Institute for Policy and Research (SAIPAR) found that 68% of respondents report their income does not meet their needs, indicating significant income vulnerabilities (Metheney et al., 2020). Although women and men appear to be having similar experiences of losing jobs (14% of women, 16% of men) and losing income (42% of women, 44% of men), women are actually experiencing more negative financial impacts from Covid-19. This is because women are half as likely to have a job compared to men. A World Bank survey also found a considerable fall in household income since the start of the pandemic and a concerning impact on household food security across urban and rural areas (World Bank, 2020). The GLD-SAIPAR study identifies a gap between need and assistance with 43% of Zambians in need of assistance, while only 16% report receiving help. Types of assistance included financial and health-based, such as accessing masks and sanitiser. Family and friends are the most frequent source of assistance (31%), followed

by healthcare workers (18%) and employers (15%) (Metheney et al., 2020). The numbers of people turning to local councillors and Members of Parliament were much lower – at 9% and 7% respectively – suggesting that government programmes have been inadequate, leading people to seek alternative mechanisms of support.

Zambia has a very high level of informal employment, where the job holder is not entitled to any social security benefits or other protections provided by formal employment, such as paid annual and sick leave. The 2019 Labour Force Survey estimates that of the employed population, 68.6% are in informal employment while 31.4% are in formal employment. The unemployment rate is estimated at 12.5%, and overall is higher in rural areas (13.7%) than in urban areas (11.8%) (Zambia Statistics Agency and Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2019). However when disaggregated by gender, the rate of unemployment for men is higher in rural areas while for women it is higher in urban areas (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Percentage unemployment rate by rural/urban and sex, Zambia 2019



Source: Zambia Statistics Agency and Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Labour Force Report 2019

Zambia’s policy response in terms of containing the virus was largely delivered through presidential directives. President Edgar Lungu gave his first public address on 25 March, announcing the closure of all bars, nightclubs and restaurants as well as suspension of international flights, except monitored arrivals and departures at Kenneth Kaunda Airport in Lusaka. Initially, the opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema was supportive of these measures having called for a complete lockdown, but has since reverted to critiquing the government’s approach to Covid-19 and broader issues of debt and poverty. Hichilema also donated soap and hand sanitiser to the fight against Covid-19, attracting criticism from PF that he was seeking political mileage from the situation (News Diggers, 2020a). These events reflect the often personalised nature of political competition in Zambia.

In response to the impact of Covid-19 there were some quick policy moves driven mainly by the Ministries of Finance and Labour, with both economic and social implications. These included waiving charges for person-to-person electronic money transfers of up to ZMW 150,<sup>1</sup> making these transactions free of charge;<sup>2</sup> the release of ZMW 500 million to the public service pensions fund to pay over 1,500 retirees or their beneficiaries in an attempt to reduce outstanding arrears;<sup>3</sup> and Statutory Instrument No. 43 of 2020 signed by the Minister of Labour exempting employers and employees from several sections of the Employment Code Act Number 3 of 2019.

1 Equivalent to USD 7 at the exchange rate of USD 1 = ZMW 21.2 on 11 January 2021

2 Minister of Finance statement, 25 March 2020: [https://www.zambiahc.org.uk/news\\_events/statement-by-the-hon-minister-of-finance-on-covid-19/](https://www.zambiahc.org.uk/news_events/statement-by-the-hon-minister-of-finance-on-covid-19/)

3 Third National Address, 25 April 2020: <https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/04/25/president-lungus-full-third-national-address-speech-on-covid-19/>



This aimed to make provision for the placement of employees in the formal sector on paid annual leave, limiting forced leave to employers in the tourism and hospitality industry and avoiding undertaking redundancy exercises. However, these initiatives have little impact on the informal sector, the unemployed and the poorest households.

Education in Zambia has also been severely affected by Covid-19. The closure of schools on 17 March 2020 has disrupted the learning of 4.2 million students across the country, and has also impacted on Zambia's School Feeding Programme (SFP) leading to risk of hunger among vulnerable children. In response, the Ministry of General Education has put in place a contingency plan, working with partners including UNICEF and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). However, in the contingency plan many of the interventions have no available budget allocated leaving a significant funding gap (Ministry of General Education, 2020). Through GPE, Zambia received a USD 10 million Covid-19 emergency grant to support remote learning where possible. The plan also includes the provision of alternatives for school feeding at an estimated cost of over ZMW 10 million. However, this is one of the activities with no dedicated funds, beyond Plan International's provision of this facility in six schools in Central Province, demonstrating the limitations of the response in the absence of external intervention. This lack of funding is particularly concerning given the potential impact of this learning disruption on Zambia's young people, as over half of the population (53.4%) are under 18.<sup>4</sup> The effects of the pandemic on learner outcomes are likely to put these young people's futures and the projected 'demographic dividend' (Ministry of Finance, 2015) at risk.

The social assistance component of Zambia's response to Covid-19 has been driven in large part by funding from multilateral and bilateral donors – known in Zambia as cooperating partners or CPs. While the treasury has released ZMK 20 million (approximately USD 1.1 million) to the Ministry of Community Development towards the social protection response, the UN's emergency appeal has so far received USD 39.1 million. This support covers a range of areas including health, education and food security.<sup>5</sup> A number of donors, including the UK, Sweden and Germany, have channelled funds directly to emergency cash transfers. This initiative has so far been the main response to the food security and social protection needs of the most vulnerable and will be explored in more detail in the next section.

## FOOD, FERTILISER AND CASH: THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY CASH TRANSFERS

There is a precedent in Zambia for providing emergency relief to the most vulnerable in times of crisis. During the droughts in the 1990s and early 2000s, this largely took the form of food aid, supported by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and other donors. However, questions were raised about this approach in terms of costs and efficiency, disincentive effects for domestic production and the implications of introducing genetically modified maize. These concerns led Zambia to reject food aid from the US entirely in 2002 (del Ninno et al., 2007; Stewart, 2003; Zerbe, 2004) both for short-term emergency relief and as program food aid that helps address medium-term food "deficits", is often a major component of food security strategies in developing countries. This study reviews the experience with food aid of four major recipients of food aid (India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Zambia and donors to replace food transfers with regular cash assistance.

Donor agencies have played a central role in promoting, financing and in some cases implementing social cash transfers (SCT) in Zambia, since the first pilot was introduced by the German Development Agency (GTZ) in 2003. The coordinated and persistent efforts of a transnationalised policy coalition, including donor representatives and committed technocrats within the Ministry of Community Development, positioned cash transfers as a credible and effective policy solution to Zambia's high poverty levels. However, it was a perceived political threat that led to the scale-up of cash transfers after a decade of slow progress and resistance from politicians, demonstrating the interplay between the political settlement and the policy coalition (Pruce, 2019; Pruce and Hickey, 2019). In 2013 there was public outcry over a massive budget overspend on agricultural subsidy programmes, specifically the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) and the Food Reserve Agency (FRA). This prompted then President Michael Sata to make a statement announcing that the government was making 'progressive decisions' to remove fertiliser subsidies and that resources would be channelled to the poorest citizens (Lusaka Times, 2013). It was at this point that government funding of SCTs increased by 700%, suggesting the opportunistic redirection

4 <https://www.unicef.org/zambia/children-zambia>

5 Overview available at: <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/zambia/>

of funds from agricultural subsidies to the SCT programme. However, it is notable that both FISP and FRA remain in place and their budgets continue to rise.

The SCT scheme was included in Zambia's first National Social Protection Policy launched in 2014 (Ministry of Community Development, 2014), and the budget allocation was protected within the Medium Term Expenditure Framework. The 700% increase in the SCT budget marked a shift as the balance of contributions was reversed to 75% government funding and 25% donor funding (Chilombo and van Ufford, 2015). This emboldened the Ministry of Community Development to take greater control and responsibility of the management of the SCT programme, for example making decisions about the targeting model without consulting the donors. During the expansion, implementation was managed by the government with donors focused mainly on financial accountability and fiduciary risk, and the programme reached national coverage in 2017. However, allegations of embezzlement of USD 4.7 million of SCT funds being handled by ZamPost led to the sacking of the Minister of Community Development and the suspension of funding by the UK, Sweden and Ireland (The Guardian, 2018), leading to strained government-donor relations since 2018. The donors remain wary and are demanding high levels of accountability but are nonetheless re-engaging with the sector in the context of Covid-19 and other emergencies such as the recent droughts and floods experienced by the country.

There have been several emergency cash transfers implemented in response to these crises, with varying levels of connection to the existing SCT programme. For example, a joint Concern and Save the Children initiative in 2016–2017 to address food insecurity caused by the El Niño weather pattern introduced additional staff representing the consortium at provincial and district levels. The final evaluation of this intervention rated it as efficient, but the coordination at district and community levels was found to be average. This included lack of involvement of district staff from the Department of Social Welfare, and limited engagement of the volunteer Community Welfare Assistance Committees (Primson Management Services, 2017). UNICEF also introduced an emergency cash transfer initiative, delivered through existing SCT structures, to reach registered beneficiaries affected by the severe drought in Southern Province in 2019–2020.

These experiences have paved the way for emergency cash transfers (ECT) to become an additional tool in Zambia's social assistance response. The Covid-19 emergency cash transfer has been the most significant social policy intervention to help the poorest households to cope with the effects of the pandemic in Zambia to date. On 28 July 2020, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare launched an emergency Covid-19 cash transfer, supported by a range of partners including ILO, WFP, UNICEF, and the World Bank. This scheme combines cash and food assistance by providing ZMW 400 (USD 22) per month plus food hampers for six months, aiming to address food insecurity and other vulnerabilities. It targets beneficiaries already enrolled in the social cash transfer scheme as well as additional households identified as either vulnerable or food insecure. This initiative forms part of the UN Zambia's Covid-19 Emergency Appeal and will cover 18 districts, reaching an estimated 249,200 households (approximately 1.2 million people) in total. The regular SCT programme is also expanding, targeting 700,000 households in 2020, and the budget is continuing to increase. However these budget commitments frequently do not translate into disbursements, with the government underspending by 62% on the SCT programme between 2015 and 2020 (ZIPAR, 2020a). This has led to irregular and delayed payments to beneficiaries while other public spending has been increased (Siachiwena, 2017), suggesting that cash transfers do not yet represent an electoral priority.

Different donors are supporting different aspects of the ECT initiative. For example, WFP is focusing on food insecure urban areas, including Lusaka and Kafue where infection rates have been highest. In August 2020 the EU committed EUR 5 million to enable WFP to extend its assistance to two more cities, Livingstone and Kitwe, with a view to reaching 655,000 people. This marks an expansion of coverage beyond the regular SCT programme, which is largely concentrated in rural areas due to higher poverty levels. An estimated 54.4% of Zambia's population are poor, 76.6% of whom are found in rural areas (UNICEF, 2019). However, in the context of Covid-19, the highest caseloads have been reported in Lusaka, Livingstone and the Copperbelt. A rapid food security assessment conducted in urban and peri-urban settings found that the pandemic has affected the quantity, quality and diversity of meals consumed, particularly in high density and low-income areas (UNOCHA, 2020). Nonetheless, Covid-19 has now reached all ten Provinces and rural areas are also at risk of food insecurity, particularly in the wake of a combination of droughts and floods in 2019–2020.

The World Bank has committed additional funding to the existing Girls Education and Women's Empowerment and Livelihoods (GEWEL) programme, which includes credit from the International Development Associa-

tion (IDA) and co-financing grants from the UK Department for International Development and the Swedish International Development Association. In addition to providing secondary education for girls from poor households and livelihood packages for poor women, the GEWEL Project supports cash transfers to 245,000 extremely poor and vulnerable beneficiaries through the government's Social Cash Transfer (SCT) programme. Childfund International is also spending ZMW 1.8 million to deliver cash transfers to 4,355 households in Chilanga and Luangwa.

While there has been some level of coordination through the UN's emergency appeal, the level of donor involvement leads to a somewhat fragmented approach as indicated in a statement by the Minister of Community Development (News Diggers, 2020b):

*when you look at Lusaka District, Chilanga, Kafue, Livingstone, Kitwe, all those we are cooperating with ... World Food Programme (WFP), when you look at Chipata, Chililabombwe, Chirundu, Kalalushi, Ndola, Mufulira, Kabwe, Nakonde, Solwezi, Chingola, Mansa, Mongu, those we are partnering with UNICEF. When you look at Luangwa it is purely Child Fund. When you look at Chililabombwe, we are partnering with the Red Cross. Chisamba is Plan International. These co-operating partners have partnered with government in different portfolios in different districts. So, if you ask UNICEF about Lusaka, it doesn't know.*

The statement also highlights the extent to which the emergency cash transfer is reliant on donors for funding, and in some cases also delivery.

## THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IN ZAMBIA

As outlined in the previous section, donors have played a key role in introducing and promoting cash transfers as a policy idea in Zambia, with government support for the programme being determined by domestic political incentives, in particular political and electoral threats in the context of competitive elections (Pruce and Hickey, 2019). Indeed, the SCT budget for 2021 (an election year) has more than doubled from just over ZMW 1 billion in 2020 to ZMW 2.3 billion, and the amount per household has been increased from ZMW 90 to ZMW 110 per month (Ng'andu, 2020). This revision of the transfer amount is welcome, and long overdue, as inflation has increased by 150% between 2017 and 2020, reducing the value of the transfer in real terms (ZIPAR, 2020a). However, it may also provide basis for the claim that "President Edgar Lungu was the one gaining political mileage since he had risen the stakes by giving beneficiaries higher amounts of money" (News Diggers, 2020b). Based on performance in recent years, failure to disburse the SCT funds remains a threat and would undermine the government's apparent efforts to address the effects of the country's economic challenges on the poorest and most vulnerable. The government has also launched multi-sectoral youth empowerment funds in 2020, which feature prominently in the 2021 budget. While these are ostensibly intended to mitigate the economic impacts of Covid-19, previous iterations of such initiatives – such as the long-standing Youth Development Fund – have been found to perform poorly and be highly politicised.

Claims that PF are using the ECT programme to gather National Registration Card (NRC) numbers for the purposes of election rigging are being countered by the Minister of Community Development. Suspicions arose when beneficiaries were being given ZMW 1,600 rather than the monthly ZMW 400 allocated by the scheme. The explanation provided by the Minister is that this amount is an accumulation for four months of arrears due to the delayed start of the scheme. However, there have also been reports of cash transfers being handed out directly by PF, side-lining the existing bureaucratic structures, so these concerns are not entirely allayed. The UN appears to be distancing itself from these events, releasing a press release on 2 September clarifying their role in supporting the ECTs.<sup>6</sup>

While these events suggest that cash transfer beneficiaries are of growing political importance to the ruling party, the more established and powerful constituency of vested interests that benefit from agricultural subsidies retain their enduring power. FISP therefore continues to be expanded, particularly at election times, as these subsidies operate both as a means of distributing state resources and rewarding loyalty in elections (Mason et al., 2013). The budget for the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) has been significantly increased from

<sup>6</sup> <https://zambiareports.com/2020/09/02/press-release-un-supporting-govt-covid-19-emergency-cash-transfers/>

ZMW 1.1 billion in 2020 to ZMW 5.7 billion in 2021 (an election year), despite continuing complaints that it is being misused. In a recent Parliamentary debate,<sup>7</sup> an MP claimed that the inputs are being mismanaged by the Community Agriculture Committees and farmers are not receiving enough fertiliser. The introduction of the FISP e-voucher (e-FISP) was supposed to improve effectiveness, including access and timeliness, but a recent study suggests that initially it has either had no significant effect or has negatively affected input use due to implementation challenges (Mason et al., 2020). Donors are largely opposed to such programmes, although the World Bank is the only agency in Zambia to have challenged the government on its use of agricultural subsidies. Despite claims that FISP will support one million small-scale farmers across the country (Ng'andu, 2020), the benefits of this spending mostly go to better-off farmers with larger landholdings, and these schemes have been shown to fare poorly in terms of cost-effectiveness and impacts on agricultural productivity (Tesliuc et al., 2013). Also while the allocation to FISP has increased by more than 400%, there is no corresponding increase in the number of beneficiaries (ZIPAR, 2020b), leading to concerns that the additional spending may not reach farmers at all, but be diverted to benefit the ruling party in the run up to the election.

The Food Reserve Agency (FRA) has also been found to transfer funds to the relatively well-off, who are net sellers of maize, while net purchasers – including nearly all of the poorest – are potential losers from this programme (Tesliuc et al., 2013). The Food Reserve Bill 2020, which has now passed the committee stage, aims to ensure the continued existence of the FRA and redefine its functions. While strategic maize reserves undoubtedly play a vital role in Zambia's food security, particularly in the face of Covid-19, the Zambian think tank Centre for Trade Policy and Development (CTPD) have warned that the integration of social and commercial functions proposed by the Bill provides scope for inefficiencies and “rent-seeking behaviour by well-connected large-scale producers and political actors” (Lusaka Times, 2020). Studies by CTPD and others have found that while smallholder farmer welfare is a key goal in such maize purchase schemes, only a limited number of smallholders sell maize to FRA and that late payment of sellers is commonplace (CTPD, 2016; Fung et al., 2019).

## CONCLUSION

A key recommendation by the think tank ZIPAR (Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research) in their analysis of the 2021 budget is that the government needs to rationalise subsidies with little visible impact, with FISP explicitly mentioned, in order to increase the provision of social services (ZIPAR, 2020a). However, the sustained and increased funding of FISP and FRA demonstrates that these agricultural subsidy programmes retain their importance within the country's political settlement and wider distributional regime. They therefore remain a priority for the government, in spite of evidence that they are not achieving their goals or supporting the poorest Zambians, as well as the potential for misuse and politicisation. In the face of Covid-19, the government has prioritised the formal sector, expanded agricultural subsidies and funded high profile multi-sectoral empowerment funds. On the other hand, the Covid-19 emergency cash transfer targeting the poorest is heavily reliant on donor funding and is only a short-term intervention, but nonetheless appears to be susceptible to electioneering as Zambia moves towards the 2021 election.

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APPENDIX 1: SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 BY POLICY AREA  
(ZAMBIA, JANUARY–SEPTEMBER 2020)

	Policy Area	Pensions	Healthcare	Long-term care and disability	Labor market	Education
(1)	Have there been any significant legislative reforms in the indicated policy area during the indicated time period?	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
(2)	If (1) yes, have any of these reforms been explicit responses to the Covid-19 pandemic?	No	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes
(3)	If (2) yes, has there been significant regional variation in the implementation of these reforms?	N/A	Yes <sup>8</sup>	N/A	No	Yes
(4)	Have subnational governments enacted any significant legislative reforms in the indicated policy area during the indicated time period?	No	No	No	No	No
	Policy Area	Family benefits	Housing	Social assistance	Other*	
(1)	Have there been any significant legislative reforms in the indicated policy area during the indicated time period?	No	No	Yes	Yes	
(2)	If (1) yes, have any of these reforms been explicit responses to the Covid-19 pandemic?	N/A	N/A	Yes	No	
(3)	If (2) yes, has there been significant regional variation in the implementation of these reforms?	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	
(4)	Have subnational governments enacted any significant legislative reforms in the indicated policy area during the indicated time period?	No	No	No	No	

\* Legislative reforms in other policy areas explicitly aimed at social protection, e.g. food subsidies or tax cuts aimed at social protection.

Note: Zambia's political system is characterised by executive dominance with significant powers invested in the President, including decree powers and veto rights (Burnell, 2003; Rakner, 2012).<sup>9</sup> While legislative authority is vested in and exercised by Parliament through Bills passed by the National Assembly, government policy and spending is also shaped by Presidential directives and Ministerial statements. In the area of social policy, non-contributory social protection programmes have been introduced and implemented through non-Parliamentary reform, often with support and funding from multilateral and bilateral donors.

8 Many of the healthcare reforms are supported by health sector partners, and focused on specific regions or facilities e.g. support for oxygen therapy supplied to hospitals in Lusaka, Mansa and Mongu only

9 Burnell, P. (2003). 'Legislative-Executive Relations in Zambia: Parliamentary Reform on the Agenda', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 21 (1), 47–68; Rakner, L. (2012). 'Foreign aid and democratic consolidation in Zambia', WIDER Working Paper No. 2012/16, UNU-WIDER: Helsinki.

## APPENDIX 2: SOCIAL POLICY LEGISLATION IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 (ZAMBIA, JANUARY–SEPTEMBER 2020)

Note: This appendix covers all major national social policy legislation published between 1 January 2020 and 30 September 2020.

Law 1		
(1)	Number of law	Statutory Instrument No. 1 of 2020
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Not Applicable
(3)	Name of law (English)	The National Pension Scheme (Pensionable Earnings) (Amendment) Regulations 2020
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	Don't know
(5)	Date of law's enactment	31 December 2019
(6)	Date of law's publication	03 January 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	No
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	No
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	No
(10)	Note on (7)-(9)	This Statutory Instrument is an amendment to the National Pension Scheme (Pensionable Earnings) Regulations, 2000 under the National Pension Scheme Act 1996 (Laws, Volume 15, Cap. 256). It contains the updated national monthly average wage, social security ceiling and social security contribution tables for the period 1 January – 31 December 2020. These revisions take place annually and are not related to Covid-19.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	No
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	Not Applicable

Law 1: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Pensions
(14)	Brief description of reform component	This Statutory Instrument was issued to adjust the levels of pensionable earnings by an index based on average earnings and raised the social security ceiling to ZMW 22,992. This amendment shall be read as one with the National Pension Scheme (Pensionable Earnings) Regulations, 2000. It revokes and replaces Schedules 1-5 which provide the national average monthly wage, social security ceiling, minimum total monthly contributions, maximum total monthly contributions and social security contributions table for the period 1 January – 31 December 2020.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	This amendment only applies to formal sector employees who are contributing to the National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA).
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	If fix-term, duration in months	12 months
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	The adjustments to the national monthly average wages, the social security ceiling and the contributions are designed to prevent the erosion of benefits through a diminishment of their real value. The figures provided in the Statutory Instrument apply for the period of 1 January – 31 December 2020 at which point they will be revised again.



Law 1: Component 1		
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The legislation determines the level of taxable earnings and therefore affects the contributions made by members and employers, but does not have a direct cost attributed to the reform.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	completely

Law 2		
(1)	Number of law	Not Applicable
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Not Applicable
(3)	Name of law (English)	Waiving charges for person-to-person electronic money transfers of up to ZMW 150
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	Not Applicable
(5)	Date of law's enactment	Not Applicable
(6)	Date of law's publication	26 March 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	Yes
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Yes
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	No
(10)	Note on (7)-(9)	This measure was announced by the Minister of Finance in his statement in March 2020 on the impact of Covid-19 on Zambia's economy.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	No
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	Not Applicable

Law 2: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Other (Legislative reforms in other policy areas explicitly aimed at social protection (e.g. food subsidies or tax cuts aimed at social protection))
(14)	Brief description of reform component	This reform is a waiver which makes transactions of up to ZMW 150 free of charge. It is part of a package of measures aimed to encourage the use of digital financial services. These can be categorised as economic stimulus measures, which also aim to prevent the spread of Covid-19 by minimising person-to-person contact in conducting financial transactions, decongesting banks and reducing the use of cash. The World Bank has identified this measure as utility and financial support, which is a form of social assistance.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable

Law 2: Component 1		
(17)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	This is a new measure
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	This is a new measure
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Don't know
(25)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	The duration of the waiver was not indicated in the announcement
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	This is a new measure
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Not specified
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not specified
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	In the statement by the Hon. Minister of Finance, he did not mention the cost of this measure which affects revenue rather than expenditure.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 3		
(1)	Number of law	Not Applicable
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Not Applicable
(3)	Name of law (English)	Easing of liquidity: Public Service Pensions Fund
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	Not Applicable
(5)	Date of law's enactment	Not Applicable
(6)	Date of law's publication	24 April 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	Yes
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Yes
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	No
(10)	Note on (7)-(9)	This release of funds was announced in a statement by the Hon. Minister of Finance on further measures aimed at mitigating the impact of Covid-19 on the Zambian economy.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	No
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	Not Applicable

Law 3: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Pensions
(14)	Brief description of reform component	This was one of a number of measures introduced to alleviate the economic pressures associated with the Covid-19-induced liquidity challenges and in particular to prevent liquidity constraints to financial institutions degenerating into a solvency problem. The government released ZMW 500 million to the Public Service Pensions Fund to pay over 1,500 retirees or their beneficiaries.

Law 3: Component 1		
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	This measure addresses outstanding arrears within the Public Services Pension Fund, aiming to pay 1,500 retirees or their beneficiaries who already qualify for the benefits but have been waiting to receive their pensions.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	See (18)
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	No
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 500,000,000
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	This release of government funds was announced in a statement by the Minister of Finance in April 2020 and also in President Lungu's Third National Address. It is not clear whether this amount is additional to the ZMW 1,020,387,712 allocated to the Public Service Pension Fund in the 2020 budget.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 4 (Contingency plan released by the Ministry of General Education)		
(1)	Number of law	Not Applicable
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Not Applicable
(3)	Name of law (English)	Education Contingency Plan for Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19)
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	Not Applicable
(5)	Date of law's enactment	Not Applicable
(6)	Date of law's publication	01 April 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	Yes
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Yes
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	No
(10)	Note on (7)-(9)	This contingency plan is specifically designed in response to Covid-19. It includes a series of interventions to mitigate school closures as well as an early recovery plan for when schools resume. The social reform components covered in this overview are from the immediate response plan and do not include the activities in the early recovery plan, which at the time of planning did not have any funds allocated towards their delivery. The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) has contributed USD 10 million towards the delivery of this plan to support radio-based learning, teacher support and returning to schools safely. However, the breakdown of how these funds will be spent is not available.

Law 4 (Contingency plan released by the Ministry of General Education)		
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	Yes
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	10

Law 4: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Enhance awareness among children and youth through dissemination of age appropriate messages as supplementary to regular delivery of lessons
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Fix-term
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	While schools are closed
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate the impact
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	While schools are closed
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate the impact
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	While schools are closed
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	This component provides supplementary information while the regular delivery of lessons is suspended due to Covid-19
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate the impact
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Not specified
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not applicable as schools re-opened in September
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The details of the reform are provided in the Ministry of General Education's contingency plan but no costs are included for this component.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	to a large degree

Law 4: Component 2		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Implement continuity of learning through diverse platforms with particular focus on disadvantaged and marginalised children and adolescents
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Fix-term
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	6 months
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate the impact
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	6 months
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate the impact

Law 4: Component 2		
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	6 months
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	The reform introduces various new ways of delivering lessons, for examples through radio, TV and online learning
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate the impact
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 125,998,539
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The Ministry of General Education Contingency Plan estimates that the cost of the continuity of learning component is ZMW 127,350,539, but only ZMW 61,292,799 is available leaving a gap of ZMW 66,057,740.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	to a large degree

Law 4: Component 3		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Implement continuity of learning for children with special education needs through development of relevant content, identification of appropriate platforms and provision of teaching and learning materials
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Fix-term
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	3 months
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate the impact
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	3 months
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate the impact
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	3 months
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	This component includes the procurement and distribution of relevant materials and equipment to facilitate continuity of learning.
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate the impact
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 8,975,000
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allocated to this component.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 4: Component 4		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Empower teachers to provide remote learner support in structured lessons delivered through multiple platforms as well as provide guidance on self-directed learning
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Remote learner support is unique to the alternative learning methods
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Remote learner support is unique to the alternative learning methods
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	6 months
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	This component provides additional support and monitoring for learners which is not required during normal teaching
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 10,000,000
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allocated to this component.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 4: Component 5		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Community sensitisation to enhance usage of continuity of learning
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Unique to remote learning context
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Unique to remote learning context
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Throughout remote learning period
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	This component aims to enhance demand for continuity of learning through a new sensitisation campaign.
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 200,000
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967

Law 4: Component 5		
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allocated to this component.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 4: Component 6		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Design and implement strategies for monitoring coverage and access to continuity learning programme
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Unique to remote learning
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Unique to remote learning
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	6 months
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	This is not a benefit as such but is an integral part of the new remote learning interventions to improve access and quality, as well as prevent potential mis-application of funds.
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 1,352,000
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but only ZMW 237,562 has been allocated to this component, leaving a gap of ZMW 1,114,438.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 4: Component 7		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Provision of psychosocial support to teachers, learners and parents
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Expansion
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Fix-term
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Throughout remote learning period
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	The provision of psychosocial support will continue throughout the period of remote learning while schools are closed.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Not Applicable
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes

Law 4: Component 7		
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	2 weeks
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	This component includes training of guidance and counselling teachers on psychosocial support (through online and distance) which will last 2 weeks
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 2,437,500
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allocated to this component
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 4: Component 8		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Support feeding programmes through alternative mechanisms focusing on learners from drought/flood affected districts
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Fix-term
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Throughout the period of school closure
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	This component aims to continue providing school feeding to vulnerable children through alternative means, following MoH guidance on social distancing. It will continue throughout the period of school closure.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Throughout the period of school closure
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	See (18)
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	No
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 10,770,000
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allocated to this component.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know



Law 4: Component 9		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Planning for remedial programme and accelerated learning
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Unique to remote learning
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Unique to remote learning
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Throughout, as required
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	The planning and development of materials for the remedial programme and catch-up learning is estimated to take 1 month, then the remedial/catch up lessons will take place throughout, as required, during the early recovery phase.
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Unique to remote learning
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 8,177,500
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allocated to this component. This cost covers the planning and development for this component only, while the delivery falls into the early recovery phase which is not covered here.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 4: Component 10		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Utilise some already existing interventions and good practices, facilities and human resource in ICT at the two ICT Centres of Excellence.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Expansion
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Fix-term
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Throughout the period of school closure
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Not Applicable
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Expansion
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Throughout the period of school closure
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Not Applicable
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	No
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Not Specified

Law 4: Component 10		
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	No cost is included in the immediate response plan for the use of existing ICT resources. In the post-recovery system strengthening plan there is some provision for procuring ICT equipment and extending access particularly in rural areas.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 5		
(1)	Number of law	Not Applicable
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Not Applicable
(3)	Name of law (English)	Healthcare – support from health sector partners
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	Not Applicable
(5)	Date of law's enactment	Not Applicable
(6)	Date of law's publication	Not Applicable
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	Yes
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Yes
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	No
(10)	Note on (7)-(9)	The components included in this section are not part of a single reform but represent the most significant areas of support provided to the government by various health sector partners, specifically in response to Covid-19.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	Yes
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	6

Law 5: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Healthcare
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Support for operations in the two national call centres through hiring of additional call centre personnel. The centres are instrumental in addressing concerns from the community, following contacts to cases of Covid-19 and risk communication
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Not Applicable
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Not Applicable
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Don't know
(25)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	The response specifies hiring of call centre personnel but does not make it clear whether the support extends to covering their salaries.

Law 5: Component 1		
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Not specified
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not specified
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The costs are not included in the Zambia situation report
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 5: Component 2		
(13)	Policy Area	Healthcare
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Support for stabilisation of oxygen therapy supplies through the rehabilitation of Oxygen Plants in three hospitals including University Teaching Hospital (UTH) Lusaka (Children Hospital) that will improve and ensure smooth availability of oxygen therapy to support the life-saving treatment of patients with Covid-19 and other respiratory diseases. The rehabilitation of Oxygen Plants in University Teaching Hospital (UTH) Lusaka was completed and is now operational, while work will begin for Mansa General Hospital in Luapula and Lewanika General Hospital in Mongu. Sector partners organised a major visibility event officially handing over 259 oxygen concentrators, 1.3 million pairs of gloves and more than 500,000 surgical masks to the Minister of Health.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Expansion
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Indefinite
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	This response has improved existing oxygen therapy facilities in several hospitals across Zambia.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Not Applicable
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Dependent on how long the donated supplies last
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	The sector partners have also donated new equipment to assist with Zambia's Covid-19 response.
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Not specified
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The costs are not included in the Zambia situation report.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 5: Component 3		
(13)	Policy Area	Healthcare
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Support for the expansion of Levy Mwanawasa Hospital Bed Capacity from 300 to 800 through the connection of power supply by Zesco.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Expansion
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Indefinite
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	The response covers the expansion of the capacity of the existing Levy Mwanawasa Hospital in Lusaka, which is a permanent benefit.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Not Applicable
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	No
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 4,588,831
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The Zambia situation report includes a cost of USD 225,865.85
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 5: Component 4		
(13)	Policy Area	Healthcare
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Sector partners continue supporting the Government to procure and distribute supplies and commodities required for Covid-19 response in the areas of diagnostics, PPE and clinical management. During the reporting period: UNICEF procured and delivered 519,950 surgical masks, 1.3 million pairs of gloves, 266 sets of oxygen concentrators and 5,500 Covid-19 test kits (6880 Cobas and Gene-Xpert) to perform 10,000 tests and donated 31 units of oxygen concentrator machines that have since been installed in isolation centres. Donated laboratory supplies included 12,000 Viral Transport Media, 13,200 lab test kits and 83,520 PPEs.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Not Applicable
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Not Applicable
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Dependent on how long the donated supplies last
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable

Law 5: Component 4		
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Not specified
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The costs are not included in the Zambia situation report.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	to a large degree

Law 5: Component 5		
(13)	Policy Area	Healthcare
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Partners donated items to refugee settlements that included 20,000 medical masks, 9,000 surgical gloves for the use of some 70 health care workers in 12 health facilities across three settlements (Mayukwayukwa, Mehebe and Mantapala), eight megaphones (being donation from NCA) to reinforce community sensitisation activities in above locations. Donated Essential Reproductive Health Commodities to the MOH including IUDs (12 months of stock), DMPA SC (2.5 months of stock), Combined Oral Contraceptives (6 months of stock), Noristerat (2.2 months of stock) worth USD 2.1 million.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Not Applicable
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Not Applicable
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Dependent on how long the donated supplies last
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 42,665,317.31
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The Zambia situation report includes a cost of USD 2.1 million.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	to a large degree

Law 5: Component 6		
	Policy Area	Healthcare
	Brief description of reform component	Continuation of essential health services, standard vaccines (BCG, bOPV, Td and MR) for the entire country's three months' requirement was procured and delivered. Procurement order for another six months' requirement has been placed.
	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Maintenance
	Duration of coverage change?	Fix-term

Law 5: Component 6	
If fix-term, duration in months	9 months
Note on (15)-(17)	This response aims to support the government to continue accessing essential health services and vaccines for a period of nine months
Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
Note on (19)-(21)	Not Applicable
Introduction of new benefits?	No
Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
Note on (27)	Not Applicable
Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Not specified
Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
Source of cost estimation	Other
Note (29)-(31)	The costs are not included in the Zambia situation report.
If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	to a large degree

Law 6		
(1)	Number of law	Statutory Instrument No. 48 of 2020
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Not Applicable
(3)	Name of law (English)	The Employment Code (Exemption) Regulations 2020
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	Don't know
(5)	Date of law's enactment	08 May 2020
(6)	Date of law's publication	08 May 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	No
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Yes
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	No
(10)	Note on (7)-(9)	This Statutory Instrument provides numerous exemptions to the Employment Code Act No. 3 of 2019, in order to regulate employment and labour market relationships in the context of Covid-19. However, in a press statement the Minister of Labour and Social Security explained that the Statutory Instrument also supersedes the annual leave benefits formula as reflected in the Employment Code Act, as that formula contains a fundamental error where the originally intended division sign was replaced with a bracket. The error can only be resolved through an amendment of the Act.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	No
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	Not Applicable

Law 6: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Labor market
(14)	Brief description of reform component	This Statutory Instrument provides numerous exemptions from the Employment Code Act No. 3 of 2019. These include exemptions of all employers and employees from the provisions of section 36 which deals with annual leave because the section does not take into account the alternative of carrying forward leave days. Also the exemption of all employers and employees from the provisions of section 37 which deals with the calculations of annual leave benefits. It also indicates that some employers have been exempted from the provisions of section 48 where an employer is financially incapacitated, stating that the application for exemption shall be made to the office of the Labour Commissioner and certain criteria shall apply. Furthermore it exempts an employer from complying with the redundancy notice period set out in section 55 (2), where the employer proves financial incapacity to the Labour Commissioner and demonstrates the extreme urgency of undertaking the redundancy exercise immediately in line with the criteria in Resolution number (3) above. The employer may be granted a waiver relating to the notice period provided that the employees are paid in lieu of notice.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Retrenchment
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Don't know
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	The Statutory Instrument does not include a timeframe or a date for review.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Retrenchment
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Don't know
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	See (18)
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	No
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Yes
(28)	Note on (27)	Although the exemptions included in the Statutory Instrument were agreed at a Tripartite Consultative Labour Council meeting, they are likely to reduce the protection for employees for example in the area of redundancy.
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not Applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	Not Applicable
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 7 (New social protection intervention not covered by legislation)		
(1)	Number of law	Not Applicable
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Not Applicable
(3)	Name of law (English)	Emergency Covid-19 social cash transfer scheme
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	Not Applicable
(5)	Date of law's enactment	28 July 2020
(6)	Date of law's publication	28 July 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	Yes

Law 7 (New social protection intervention not covered by legislation)		
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Yes
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	Not Applicable
(10)	Note on (7)-(9)	While the emergency cash transfer programme is not included in any legislation, it is clearly a response to Covid-19. The programme is the result of collaboration between the UN, other donors and the Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare. It has been incorporated into the existing UN Joint Programme on Social Protection (UNJPSP) under the shock-responsive social protection outcome.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	No
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	Not Applicable

Law 7: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Social assistance
(14)	Brief description of reform component	The emergency cash transfer is designed as both a food security and multi-sectoral cash intervention. The scheme provides ZMW 400 (USD 22) per month in cash plus food hampers for a period of six months. It targets existing beneficiaries already enrolled in the social cash transfer scheme as well as additional households identified as either vulnerable or food insecure, particularly in high-density and low-income urban and peri-urban areas. In total, the Covid-19 ECT programme aims to cover 18 districts and reach an estimated 249,200 households (approximately 1.2 million people).
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Expansion
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Fix-term
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	6 months
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	The emergency cash transfer will extend coverage beyond existing beneficiaries of the social cash transfer to include additional households identified as either vulnerable or food insecure.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Expansion
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	6 months
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	For some existing beneficiaries of social cash transfers, the emergency cash transfer programme will provide additional cash and also food hampers which are not included with the regular transfers.
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	6 months
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	For households that are not currently receiving the social cash transfer, the emergency cash transfer will provide new benefits in the form of cash and food hampers for a limited period of 6 months.
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	The emergency cash transfer is not removing or reducing any existing benefits.
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 352,993,056
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Currently ending December 2020
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other



Law 7: Component 1		
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The cost estimation is based on UN Zambia's report on contributions to the GRZ Covid-19 Multi-sectoral Contingency Plan and Recovery Efforts which includes an overview of UN Socio-Economic Donor Engagements. According to this report, KFW, the European Union, DFID, Sweden and Ireland have either committed or pledged to support the Covid-19 Emergency Cash Transfers with the combined amount totalling ZMW 352,993,056. There is no reference to a government contribution within this report.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	partially

Law 8		
(1)	Number of law	Not Applicable
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Not Applicable
(3)	Name of law (English)	Presidential Youth Empowerment Fund
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	Not Applicable
(5)	Date of law's enactment	Not Applicable
(6)	Date of law's publication	15 August 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	Not Applicable
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Not Applicable
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	Not Applicable
(10)	Note on (7)-(9)	The Presidential announcement did not mention Covid-19, but rather focused on the need to provide opportunities for young people in the context of high youth unemployment. Cheques were distributed directly to youth groups across the country. However, the initiative has been criticised for not being linked to the 2015 National Youth Policy and for falling short of being a sustainable empowerment initiative.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	No
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	Not Applicable

Law 8: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Labor market
(14)	Brief description of reform component	The President announced a Youth Empowerment Fund to support youth entrepreneurs and a separate scheme targeting young artists. He also called on Ministers and councils to avail land to young entrepreneurs and to support them with business ideas.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	The Youth Empowerment Fund was presented as a new initiative, despite the existence of a Youth Development Fund established in 2000 which provided loans to youth beneficiaries but with a very low loan recovery rate.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	See section (18)
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Indefinite

Law 8: Component 1		
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	The announcement provided no specific time frame for support. A budget line for the Youth Empowerment Fund has been included in the 2021 budget statement, but the amount is much lower than the 2020 allocation of ZMW 500 million.
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(28)	Note on (27)	See section (18)
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 500,000,000
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	ZMW 155,237,025
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The ZMW 500 million for 2020 was announced by President Lungu although there is no budget line for Youth Empowerment Funds in the 2020 budget. The 2021 budget statement does include Youth Empowerment Funds but at the much lower figure of ZMW 155,237,025.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	partially

Law 9		
(1)	Number of law	Bill No. 6 of 2020
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Not Applicable
(3)	Name of law (English)	The Food Reserve Bill 2020
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	01 July 2020
(5)	Date of law's enactment	Not yet enacted
(6)	Date of law's publication	Not yet published
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	No
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	No
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	No
(10)	Note on (7)-(9)	The introduction of a Bill to amend the Food Reserve Act 1995 was approved in principle by Parliament in 2018. It is not directly related to Covid-19 but has implications for the operation of Zambia's strategic food reserves, which play an important role in food security particularly during crises such as Covid-19 and the droughts/floods Zambia has been experiencing in recent years.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	No
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	Not Applicable

Law 9: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Other (Legislative reforms in other policy areas explicitly aimed at social protection (e.g. food subsidies or tax cuts aimed at social protection))
(14)	Brief description of reform component	The Food Reserve Bill 2020 proposes to extend the existence of the Food Reserve Agency (Agency) by redefining and extending its functions. It also allows the Agency to integrate social functions of maintaining strategic grains on the one hand and commercial functions of grain marketing driven by profitability potential on the other. The Bill will allow the Agency to identify, enter and operate markets in rural areas; establish or determine prices and create a market for a designated agricultural commodity in rural areas; and enter a domestic market that may be identified by the Agency. This will have the effect of extending the mandate of the Agency beyond the social role of maintaining a strategic grain reserve and expand its role to a commercial player in the grain market.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Indefinite
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	The Bill will continue the existence of a strategic grain reserve in Zambia to ensure a reliable supply of a designated agricultural commodity for the country and respond to food emergencies caused by natural disasters.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	The Bill makes provisions for the quantity of the designated agricultural commodity to be determined by the Agency based on: lean period; human consumption; industrial requirement; livestock requirements; mobilisation of resources; importation period; climate change; or any other factor that the Agency may determine. Therefore the generosity of the benefit is not fixed.
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	The main benefits of the scheme remain the availability of strategic food reserves in case of shortfall or emergency and support for smallholder farmers who are able to sell their maize to the Agency.
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	Don't know
(28)	Note on (27)	The Bill aims to continue and extend the existence of the Food Reserve Agency, integrating commercial functions with government funding of the national strategic grain reserve. It is not yet clear how this will affect the quantity and prices of commodities, and whether buyers and sellers will gain or lose out.
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	ZMW 660,000,000
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	ZMW 517,500,000
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	ZMW 967
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	These figures are from the 2020 and 2021 budget statements delivered by the Minister of Finance. The reduction in the amount allocated in the 2021 budget may be attributed to reduced dependence of the Food Reserve Agency on government funding implied by the provision in the Bill for the Agency to enter domestic markets. The Bill also allows the Agency to receive donations of commodities and then sell them on.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Not Applicable