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Containing Conflict and Enforcing Consent in Titoist Yugoslavia: The 1970 Dockworkers’ Strike in Koper (Slovenia)

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Abstract
The port of Koper (It. Capodistria) in the Slovenian part of the Istrian peninsula was built in the second half of the 1950s as a socialist modernization project. In 1970, it witnessed the only violently escalating dockers’ unrest in its socialist history. Using the personal archive of Danilo Petrinja, the port’s second director, which has been pre-served in the Regional Archive of Koper, the author takes a micro-historical approach to this incident, and views it at the historical moment in Yugoslavia between the student protests of 1968 and the ‘Croatian spring’ of 1971. She adds a perspective on the interconnectedness of the early 1970s and the late 1980s, when social unrest was an integral part of Yugoslavia’s demise. The episode of public violence in the Yugoslav border city of Koper offers proof of the multi-layered nature of explanatory tropes: the border perspective from Koper is interwoven with the perspective of Yugoslavia as a whole, and a comparison with workers’ violence in neighbouring Trieste during the same years adds yet another twist to a reassessment of the applicability of the Cold War framework to an examination of labour relations and violence.

Keywords
Dockyard workers, general strike, Koper/Capodistria, Italo-Yugoslav border region, public violence, self-management, Trieste

Introduction
Violence obviously played a very specific role in the recent history of Yugoslavia and its successor states. The wars accompanying the dissolution of the state have

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largely shaped the parameters of research during the last two decades. After the end of state socialism and Yugoslavia, any topic other than the exhausted one of the ideologized 'heroes of (industrial) labour' seemed desirable. As a result, the history of industrial workers has been over-studied from a certain perspective and thoroughly neglected from many others. The oversaturation of ideologized narra-tives consigned the history of socialist Yugoslavia's workers to oblivion rather than stimulating the sort of rewriting of history that has occurred in other fields. This approach has fostered a focus on the new or renewed nation-state frameworks of the post-socialist states in a process that has valued studies in this framework above all others.

From the recent global perspectives that have characterized labour history, European state socialist experiences have remained on the empirical margins, as a conceptual outpost. Whilst colonial and post-colonial experiences have received considerable attention, more often than not the state socialist economies have been disregarded. Past events have tended to be approached from the premise that 'a history of the world of labour always is part of a transnational history of capital-ism'. With respect to Yugoslavia, labour unrest and strikes have been studied selectively and mostly with a focus on the very last phase of state socialism. The clear aim has been to contribute to an explanation of the horrific aftermath and, to that end, to convey a sense of the utter gravity of the situation in the second half of the 1980s, with its perceived incongruities in the socialist system, economic crisis and nationalist confrontations. In the mid-1980s, there was 'a qualitative increase in the number, duration and scope of strikes right across the country'. Social unrest and strikes were triggered by an ever-sharper decrease in the standard of living and, eventually, by a wage freeze and other austerity measures in May 1988. The level of mobilization of industrial workers in Yugoslavia is said to have matched that of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in terms of violence and to have exceeded the numbers mobilized in other East European states, the social diversity of the participants and the temporal and geographical reach of such mobilization.

Recently, Yugoslav studies have turned their attention to the 1960s and 1970s and have focused on the emblematic images of Yugoslavs entertaining themselves on shopping trips to Trieste and of tourists basking on the Croatian coast, on consumerism, Americanization and the perceived 'golden decade' of the 1960s, on student unrest in 1968 and on the 'Croatian spring' of 1971. The absence of workers from this historiographic narrative, especially with regard to the peak protest years between 1968 and 1971, requires further scrutiny. This study seeks to fill in the existing gaps in knowledge, complementing this new sociocultural history and adding a critical eye from a different perspective on the orchestration of consent in socialist Yugoslavia.

An examination of the outburst of public violence among workers during the years between 1968 and 1971 seems especially pertinent because, as noted previ-ously, the mid-1980s in Yugoslavia displayed an amplified version of many features of the mid-1960s: economic stagnation, mass unemployment, rising inflation and
labour unrest. Research concerning violence in socialist Yugoslavia has tended to focus on ethnonationally motivated violence, in Kosovo and in Croatia, above all. Contemporary observers perceived such violence as potentially far more dangerous to the system than other types, and there was a belief, widespread and imposed from above, that social conflicts could be reined in by systemic adjustments. Such adjustments were a perpetual feature of Yugoslav self-management, ‘a unique economic and societal experiment’, accompanied by a surprisingly open debate on the failures involved in putting the experiment into practice.

**Yugoslavia’s North-Western Border**

Yugoslavia’s north-western border region was not a theatre of war in the 1990s, but it had been an emblematic location during the Cold War. Whilst the shopping habits of Yugoslavs travelling to Trieste reflected the use of one of the most open Cold War borders, the Italo-Yugoslav border represented unresolved state-building issues until the mid-1970s, and it fostered both local identity and mutual exclusiveness. Only in November 1975 did the Treaty of Osimo provide a legal determination of the post-war border that had been established as a de facto boundary by the London Memorandum in 1954. The Treaty of Osimo was ratified in the context of the Helsinki Accords of August 1975, signed by both Italy and Yugoslavia. This major diplomatic agreement was generally perceived as a ‘watershed’ in the Cold War, and it turned out to mark the end of the socio-economic boom. As will be shown, questions about the political ideology and the social role of the workforce in the post-war border region require explanation on many levels.

There was a long tradition of political violence in the multi-ethnic border region. When the region belonged to fascist Italy during the interwar period, there were considerable communist underground activities by the workforce in the cities of Trieste, Monfalcone and Rijeka, as well as the smaller urban centres of the region, like Rovinj (It. Rovigno), Labin (It. Albona), Piran (It. Pirano), and Koper, with no industrial port at the time. After 1945, the workers looked back not only on the catastrophe of the Second World War, but also on the preceding 20 years of violent Fascist repression. When the labour milieu was re-established, these memories remained, yet the community began anew with a significant number of unqualified and previously non-industrial workers. The labour community had been transformed by war casualties and massive migratory waves that deprived Istria of the majority of its Italian inhabitants, and of most of the region’s skilled and industrial workers. At this Cold War border, the national-ideological confrontation was deeply interwoven with the political-ideological one, even among the region’s Italian and Yugoslav (Slovene and Croatian) Communists: After the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, the Italian Communist Party had remained Stalinist and thus had entered into conflict with those Communists who now renounced Stalin and adhered to Titoism. Paradoxically, the ensuing quests for political loyalty were, in part, ethnically motivated.
The present study is informed by a reshaping of the classical concepts of labour history to accommodate more comprehensive questions regarding labour. Common obstacles to research regarding popular protest, especially in authoritarian societies, include the difficulty of gathering information about specific episodes. It is here that an examination of factory archives provides interesting insights. Danilo Petrinja (1922–2002), a founding father of the port of Koper, left a personal archive that is preserved in the Regional Archive of Koper (Pokrajinski Arhiv Koper). Petrinja became the port’s second director in 1959. His term in office ended in April 1970, with the huge and violently escalating strike that is the focus of attention here. As I will show, attempts to keep conflict in check and to enforce outward harmony, social peace, among the various agents of the self-management system were not only part of the complex relationships between work-ers and managers, but also an expression of the entangled relationships among the elite functionaries, as suggested by the continual restructuring of self-management. The question of the origin of violence, apart from nationally motivated unrest – the question of when social conflict turned violent, and why – can promote a change of perspective that keeps the final dissolution of Yugoslavia in sight. The northwestern border of the country lends itself particularly to such a case study, precisely because the region adjoined the West, was relatively prosperous within Yugoslavia, and was indicative in its ideological and national complexities.

The 1970 Strike in the Port of Koper

The founding and development of the port of Koper was a genuinely socialist endeavour. After it became clear that Trieste would not become a part of Yugoslavia/Slovenia, and especially after the London Memorandum of 1954 had established a de facto boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia, the project of constructing a new port on the Slovenian coast gained momentum. The port was formally created in December 1958. Its symbolic meaning was at least threefold: it was intended as a competitive endeavour to vie with the ‘lost’ Trieste; it was Slovenia’s first international industrial port (and remains its only one); and it was a symbol of the growth of socialist industrialization, intended to complement the nearby port of Rijeka in Croatia.

The Iron Curtain that Churchill in 1946 had seen falling ‘from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic’ was often ignored by the local residents. In June 1969, the port’s managers began their account of the enterprise’s future economic plan with the words: “Together with Rijeka and Trieste, Koper represents the Northern Adriatic basin of ports, towards which gravitates the larger part of Central Europe”. Whilst this clearly expressed the wish to place the port of Koper, in the tenth year of its existence, in the framework of the larger and traditional ports of the north-eastern Adriatic region, the disregard of the systemic divide is striking.

Scarcely one year later, in March 1970, Koper experienced the biggest workers’ protest in its socialist history. The protest was the only one to affect all entities of
the port and to develop into an aggressive demonstration. Workers not only rioted at
their workplace, but for the first time left the port and occupied the public space of the
city’s centre. On the main square, a further escalation of violence was pre-vented at the
last moment by a direct intervention by the director, Petrinja.

What was the reason for the acute dissatisfaction? In the first decade of its existence,
the port had grown impressively. Yet, neither infrastructure nor wages had kept pace. As
a result, there was a continuously high turnover of the work-force. Insufficient
equipment and lack of personnel meant that sometimes more than thirty ships were
lined up waiting to be unloaded. Most importantly, the 32-kilometre-long railway
connection between Koper and Presˇ nica, 460 metres above sea level, between the sea
and the Karst plateau and connecting the port to the century-old Vienna–Trieste
railway, the Austrian-built Su¨dbahn, was financed by direct investment by the
enterprise, as neither Ljubljana nor the federal authorities in Belgrade had consented to
subsidize the railway connection so vital to the fur-ther development of the port. The
railway line was opened in 1967, but its electri-fication was not completed until 1976.
The lack of both federal and republican support is conspicuous, and it mirrors the
combined effect of Yugoslav distributive policies regarding the more prosperous north-
western republics and the southern ones, Belgrade’s (as well as Ljubljana’s) hesitant and
ambiguous economic policy regarding Yugoslavia’s Adriatic coastline, as well as the
prevailing insecurity result-ing from the merely de facto border settlement.\textsuperscript{28}

Overall, the port was the first large infrastructure project on the Slovenian coast after
the provisional settling of the border in 1954. It was successful: at the begin-ning of
1970, in terms of commodities flow, Koper had become the second-largest port in
Yugoslavia after Rijeka and the first project completed without the financial help of the
federal authorities in Belgrade. In the beginning, it had operated with-out an adequate
railway link to the hinterland, without any tradition of dock work, and with huge
competition from the traditional ports of the region in both Trieste and Rijeka. In 1970,
it had progressed to being the only Yugoslav port apart from Split to operate without a
loss and at the same time to manage considerable expansion.\textsuperscript{29}

The huge investments, made exclusively with the company’s revenues, together with
housing and catering facilities and hygienic conditions on the shop floor, failed to keep
pace with the increase in the workforce. This failure led to the violent eruption of social
protest in March 1970. The workers perceived the investment policy as being carried out
largely at the expense of their wages, which had been reduced in the previous years, after
having been effectively linked to their product-ivity during the first years of the port’s
speedy development, despite different ideo-logical provisions.\textsuperscript{30}

The final impetus for the strike was a decision made by the workers’ council,
implementing a demand from the management, to introduce stricter shop floor
regulations. The new measures eliminated pay for working hours not spent work-ing
(idle time), introduced piecework, limited the amount of overtime and required
presentation of a medical certificate in case of illness. The individual work units
organized ‘forced meetings’ (izsiljeni sestanki), the most intense of which took place in the mechanization unit. It seems that the leading engineer of that unit did little to explain the situation to the workers or to attenuate the tension. It was here that the strike broke out.\textsuperscript{31}

In an interview in March 2000, Danilo Petrinja firmly linked the beginning of social tensions to the influx of workers from more remote regions of Yugoslavia, beyond Koper’s immediate hinterland, during the second half of the 1960s. He spoke of ‘new mentalities’ and ‘bad workers’ (slabi delavci) that entered the workforce, whilst a large number of the original workers left. Supervisory personnel continued to be scarce.\textsuperscript{32} To Petrinja’s mind, the interest in the industrial growth that the port had brought to the region was firmly rooted locally. The initial small group of skilled workers and engineers had been supported by foremen who led workers who came from ‘Istria, the Brkini mountains and the Karst’ and believed in the significance of the port for the development of Istria.\textsuperscript{33} The liberalizing reforms of 1965 produced an increase of courage in the workers. For Petrinja, these were ‘individual groups of workers’ (posamezne skupine delavcev) whose requests damaged the overall project, and who were aggressive: ‘Pay us [more], or else we don’t work’ (plačajte, drugače ne delamo).\textsuperscript{34} The initial idealism and willingness to sacrifice, as he saw it, had vanished. It seems as if the general regulations that the reforms of 1965 had brought in favour of the workers’ effective self-management potential had contributed to the decline in labour relations in Koper, where at the very same moment investments were largely concentrated on construction of the railway connection to the hinterland, and wages were diminishing as a result.

Petrinja’s memory corresponds to his discursive framing of the strike when it occurred. In a report written immediately after the strike, in July 1970, on the ‘strained economic problems and relations’ in the port, he insistently praised workers who had been unusually committed. The port, he repeated over and over, had been built exclusively by the initiative of such workers, with little support from banks and state institutions. He admitted, however, that the majority of workers had been affected by the harsh working conditions. Turnover among the workforce had always been high.\textsuperscript{35} In 1969, 703 new workers were hired, many of whom had arrived from other parts of Yugoslavia, whilst 490 had left the company. There was a rising shortage of domestic labour. Although self-management clearly was designed to bind workers to their workplace, obviously little feeling of belonging, of loyalty towards the enterprise, had developed.\textsuperscript{36}

In the interview, Petrinja recalled both the international dimensions of the port’s beginnings and communication across the immediate border, which he said had taken place through illegal channels. For example, he recalled, about 500 (sic) villages in the port’s catchment area were electrified as a result of profits from illegal exports to, and re-imports from, Italy. Similarly, water pipes in the Karst were illegally built across the state border. It would have been ten times as costly to build them legally.\textsuperscript{37}
Petrinja blamed both the Yugoslav central government in Belgrade and the political nomenklatura in Slovenia for their lack of interest in making the port an economic success, and he praised the zeal of the workers in trying to accomplish their task despite such circumstances. He mentioned having been the object of investigation several times; his recollection was that he had accomplished modernizing initiatives in spite of the authorities, rather than in pursuit of their declared ideological goals. Yet, he had led a model Titoist life. Scarcely three months before the strike, he received the Boris Kraigher Award, bestowed on successful company directors, in acknowledgement of his sustained commitment to development of the region. At the award ceremony, mention was made of his having joined the national liberation movement at the age of 21 and his offices after the war as secretary and head of several committees appointed by the Yugoslav administration of Zone B and as the director of the Koper waterworks.

The year 1969 had seen a massive influx of new workers from other parts of Yugoslavia. As the proceedings of the management meetings reveal, Petrinja thought this was a rather useless development, as we now practically have three workshops at our disposal and a group of layabouts (lenuhov) who refuse to take on any work in a serious way. The third problem, however, is the poor organization of work, the lack of discipline and damages that come about through carelessness as well as theft.

Contradicting several of his co-managers, he insisted that any measures to mend the situation would have to be carried out with due severity. This discussion about the situation on the shop floor, the perceived lack of discipline and poor organization of labour had dominated the managerial meetings for weeks. Petrinja had insisted that beyond the ‘objective reasons’ for the difficulties – the investment in the railway link to the hinterland, the inefficiency of forwarding agents, delays in building additional infrastructure capacity – there were ‘too many subjective weaknesses and organizational shortcomings’. The huge rate at which workers joined and left the workforce, caused by the far-too-low wages, was a key issue. The workforce lacked both qualifications and information about the workflow and the specific needs of the dock. As it seems, even the foremen in the cargo-loading section, the ‘carriers of organizational tasks’ (nosilci organizacije), had largely departed for better-paid positions. No measures had taken effect to improve the quality of the work performed and discipline, and it seemed that the only solution was to get rid of incompetent employees. In addition, any substantial improvement was thought to be dependent on a wage level that was above average with respect to similar positions in Slovenia. And this goal could be achieved only by reducing the size of the workforce and increasing individual responsibility. Planned dismissals were to be carried out by May 1970, and the managers discussed how they could get the workers’ council (delavski svet) to support their objectives. When the council announced new regulations, including dismissals, the workers went on strike.
Apart from the habitual quests for higher wages and relaxation of the new regulations concerning illness, idle time and piecework, however, the strike was a moment of fierce conflict between the acting director and several members of the management. As already suggested, the latter helped to incite the strike or at least skilfully fomented it. Their aim was Petrinja’s dismissal.

The reforms of 1965 had laid the groundwork for a more liberally oriented, younger generation of managers to arise. The constitutional amendment of December 1968 had strengthened the powers of the workers’ councils. However, because the Koper port was founded only in 1958, the struggle for power at the end of the 1960s cannot be interpreted simply as the result of policies aimed at creating a better-educated economic elite. In 1970, Petrinja was 48 years old. His dismissal took place in a general atmosphere of intense debate concerning checks and balances between the various levels of self-management functionaries, who sought to replace the paternalistic, if not authoritarian, early post-war directors. The debate focused on how conflicts were to be resolved at all levels of the enterprise. During the period after the Koper strike, 1971–1973, as part of the ‘cleansing’ efforts after the Croatian crisis, Slovenia’s directors were subject to an ‘open hunt’ (odprt lov) if they were suspected of not toeing the Party line. This political-ideological, as well as intergenerational, struggle was an essential component of the process that led to the changes of 1974–1976, when another fragmentizing rearrangement of personnel, another step in the process of technocratization and bureaucratization, was reached.45

In Koper, at the moment of the strike, the company files report that the director, Petrinja, was ill. Evidently he had overexerted himself. Engineer Egon Prinčič, who substituted for him, let things escalate rather than undertaking a mediating role. He joined the striking mass of workers and marched at its head, carrying the Yugoslav flag, towards the city’s central square. There, the strike culminated in noisy, violent agitation, prompting the municipal party secretary to take the initiative to try to prevent further violence. He went to fetch Petrinja and convinced him to come and talk to the workers, despite his illness. Petrinja succeeded in persuading the dockers to return to the port. Here, however, they continued to riot and prevent any dialogue.46

The next day, the workers’ council gave in and agreed to the workers’ demands. It reintroduced pay for all idle time and granted the desired wage increases. The issue was raised of the enterprise’s share in subsidizing employees’ lunches. In the middle of these accommodations, the council received Petrinja’s written resignation. Refusing to accept it, the council members reminded the director of his obligation to continue to manage the port even under such circumstances.47

The president of the Executive Committee of the Slovene Government, Stane Kavčič, supported the workers’ council in its wish to retain Petrinja. Kavčič promised to intensify government support for the port’s development.48 Petrinja’s challenger, Prinčič, however, continued to work towards the director’s dismissal and was effectively supported in this effort by a group of younger engineers.
The company files speak of ‘conspiracy’. A few weeks after the end of the strike, the workers’ council finally consented and installed Prinčić as the new director, most probably with both Kavčić’s and Petrinja’s approval, the latter having apparently accepted the inevitable.49

The municipal party committee empowered a commission to investigate the reasons for the strike. As a result, the workers’ council was reproached for having made decisions without consulting those who had the necessary know-how, meaning the management. Given that the workers’ council had introduced the regulatory measures upon the request of the managing committee, of which the ‘conspiring’ engineers were a part, it remains difficult to distinguish between lip-service statements and the real power struggle.50 No evidence is available that Petrinja had prompted the workers’ council to act exclusively on his behalf, thereby disregarding other personnel. However, the handling of the strike, including the concession to all the demands, corresponded to the way strikes and work stoppages were habitually dealt with in Yugoslavia, and may well have concealed settlements behind the scenes. In any case, a concerted and conscious initiative to control the public space and to contain conflict by implementing self-management regulations emerged.

The overall atmosphere in Koper remained tense. The former director and the new one publicly blamed each other for the strike and more generally for the port’s difficult socioeconomic situation. In a private letter to Prinčić some months after the new director had taken office, Petrinja threatened him with dire consequences should the public mud-slinging continue. In his letter, he repeated the accusation that concerted action had been directed against him. The workers, he maintained, had been incited to strike because the decision of the workers’ council regarding the labour regulation measures was combined with a piece of false information about the economic situation of the port. Those who spread this information took advantage of the acting director’s absence at that moment, due to his illness. He, Petrinja, wished to make it very clear that his personal life was wrapped up in the construction of the port, and that he would insist that the port be further developed ‘for the interest of the wider societal community, and not for the interest of several overbearing and ambitious individuals’.51

With Petrinja’s dismissal and the acceptance of the workers’ demands, the existing problems were in fact perpetuated. The port became part of Yugoslavia’s general technocratic and procedural approach to self-managed labour relations and regulations, and, as such, deeply entangled in the increasing difficulties of a society that ‘lived through a permanent, almost manic change of the institutional order of the system, driven by the ideological imperative of the idea of a self-managed society’.52 By the time the organizational structure of enterprises was adapted once again in 1974, in the framework of Yugoslavia’s constitutional changes, the Koper port had begun to suffer from debt, excessive increases in labour costs, a continuing high rate of turnover in the workforce and organizational instability.53

Until the 1970 strike, the new port had functioned in a somewhat anti-cyclical manner with respect to the general socioeconomic direction of the
self-management system. This situation changed by the second half of the 1970s. Before the breakup of Yugoslavia, no other major strike occurred in the port, with the exception of a work stoppage in 1976 when the request to reintroduce beer during lunch in the company cafeteria was granted. When Bruno Korelič took office in 1977, installed, as were his predecessors, by the Slovene government in order to restructure the port’s management strategies, the port embarked on a more stable course of development that brought rising amounts of transit freight throughout the 1980s. At that time, the range of capacities, for example, the completion of the bulk cargo terminal and grain silo and the introduction of the shipment of automobiles, was extended to those that characterize the port today. Korelič held the positions of director or vice-director between 1977 and 2005, with two interruptions to serve as the mayor of Koper (1982–1984) and as the director of the bureau of commercial relations of Yugoslavia’s chamber of commerce in Trieste (1990–1992). Given that this period includes the last years of Yugoslavia and the post-socialist transition, Korelič’s significance in the history of the port’s performance matches that of Petrinja.

Beyond the Yugoslav Border: Workers’ Unrest in Trieste

A freight forwarder and commercial agent employed in the port of Koper from 1963 until his retirement in the 1980s, notes, when recalling the strike of 1970, that ‘the workers in Koper learned about the culture of striking from Italy’, that they ‘saw what the workers in Trieste had obtained in terms of wage increase with their strikes’. He describes a political apprenticeship that is at least peculiar, with the Western labourer teaching the socialist one to fight for his rights, violently, if necessary. If one considers that the Italian strikes had to have a decidedly public character in order to be noticed by the dockers in Koper, then one perceives not only the open character of this Cold War border region but also the way in which social discontent could bridge the systemic divide by ‘going public’. At the time, Italy had the largest communist party in Western Europe, and in the mid-1970s the Italian Communist Party (PCI) came close to becoming part of the Italian government. In addition, it should not be forgotten that in the 1970s and early 1980s, the political elites of several Western European countries, including Italy, viewed public political violence as a serious threat to state stability. In examining the attempts of the functionaries in Koper to deal with or to instrumentalize the workers’ discontent, it is useful to consider how violence was present, as a threat and as an act, in the Italian workers’ milieu in the border region at the same time period but in a different socio-political system.

It is no surprise that violence in the Italian workers’ milieu is much easier to detect than in the Yugoslav one. Yet, just as in Yugoslavia socially motivated strikes and protests were interpreted as showing a need either for suppression or for increased participatory rights in the self-managed economy, the political debate in Italy was polarized between those who conceived protest as a threat and those who viewed it as an essential part of a democratic society.
Three instances of public riots during workers’ protests at the San Marco shipyard in Trieste seem significant for the Koper strike of March 1970, and these occurred in the autumn of 1966, in June 1968, and in the autumn of 1969. The last of these is known in Italian collective memory as the ‘hot autumn of 1969’, because a huge wave of violent workers’ protests swept the whole of northern Italy at the time. As a result, in 1970 the government in Rome issued a Workers’ Statute (Statuto dei Lavoratori), which granted the hitherto heavily dependent workers a large degree of self-management and an almost unlimited right to strike. Dismissals from work became virtually impossible. In 1975, the Scala mobile, the automatic adaptation of salaries to the cost of living, was introduced.61

In August 1966, workers in Trieste’s San Marco shipyard called a general strike. The background for the protests was the imminent closure of the shipyard. When in October of that year the Italian Interministry Committee for Economic Planning accepted the plan to close the century-old enterprise, protests escalated violently, to the point of a day-long urban guerrilla fight against the police. Over 500 were arrested, about eighty injured, and a number of public buildings throughout the city were damaged.62

Between 20 and 22 June 1968, workers’ protests broke out again, in a further attempt to save the Trieste shipyard. The workers erected barricades and again fought the police. This time, about 135 were arrested, and about fifty policemen and 16 civilians were injured.63 A year later, in the course of the ‘hot autumn’ of 1969, the workers at the San Marco shipyard again occupied the docks.64

There was thus an apparent choreography of public labour violence in the border region, in 1966, 1968 and 1969 in Trieste and in 1970 in Koper. One may add that in 1969 and 1971 there were also massive and violent strikes in the nearby city of Rijeka (It. Fiume), in Croatia.65 A direct influence of Italian public riots on events in Yugoslavia seems plausible. An entangled investigation of the communication between analogous industries on both sides of this comparatively open Cold War border might produce an illustration of what Charles S. Maier and others have hypothesized to be a ‘crisis of industrialization’ that affected both capitalist and state socialist societies, and cannot be properly understood if exploration is limited to only one of the two economic and political systems.66

How to Contain Workers’ Dissatisfaction?

Considered from a strictly Yugoslav perspective, the strike in Koper was one of a large number of work stoppages that had marked Yugoslavia’s self-management system since the end of the 1950s. Between January 1958 and September 1969, more than 1,500 work stoppages had occurred, most of them in Yugoslavia’s most prosperous republics, Slovenia and Croatia. There was no need for any Western-incited political apprenticeship, it seems. Whilst the central position of the working class in communist ideology and the cult of labour implied that workers’ strikes deserved a special, gentler treatment by the authorities than protests by other groups, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) claimed that strikes
were superfluous in a workers’ self-management system. Yet, strikes occurred more frequently in Yugoslavia than in any other East European socialist state. As was the case in Koper, strikes were generally short because the authorities dealt quickly with the workers’ demands, largely by satisfying them. The strikes’ organizers were often targeted, but repression, if it occurred at all, was highly selective, and more often than not it was the managers who were the accused parties. In Koper, it seems that a group of ‘conspirators’ who knew the procedure used it skilfully to achieve their own ambitions.

As elsewhere, disagreements on the shop floor in Titoist Yugoslavia continuously brought potential conflict into everyday working life, especially when it came to salary arrangements, the immediate cause of the 1970 strike in Koper. To be sure, the quantity of strikes and work stoppages cannot be interpreted as a per se threat to the system. Their frequency, however, reveals discontent among the workforce. In contrast, outbursts of public violence on the shop floor, as happened in Koper in 1970, were rare. The manifest need for a reassessment of the social contract in the face of a considerable amount of local protest led to an open discussion among industrial sociologists and social engineers of the Yugoslav self-management system about how to contain social conflict. The aim was to incorporate strikes into the system as legitimate events, forming part of the contemplated participation of workers in the enterprise.

Two years after the 1974 Constitution, an intricate regulatory piece amounting to one of the longest constitutions in the world, the Law on Associated Labour (Zakon o udruženom radu) was introduced in November 1976. The Law was also called the ‘little constitution’ because it added another 600 articles to the 1974 Constitution. It transformed the autonomy of enterprises with respect to the state, and it minutely defined workers’ participation in the management of enterprises in an attempt to codify entirely the relations between management and workers. Each Yugoslav worker would belong to a Basic Organization of Associated Labour (BOAL) based on the precise role played by the worker in the production process. The expectation was that the state would gradually withdraw from intervention in the economy, leaving market forces to operate within a framework regulated by the decisions of the organizations of associated labour. This idea, however, proved unrealistic.

Whilst the workers’ councils may have represented, at least ideologically, a well-meant attempt to put management tasks in the hands of the workers, all political power continued to be monopolized by the Party, which controlled the recruitment of the administrative personnel. In view of the attempts to put a firm lid on self-managed labour relations, those rare moments when violence erupted made the ‘seismograph of social change’ register a considerable tremor. Strikes, especially when carried out fiercely enough to erupt in violence, defined the border between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour more clearly in an authoritarian society like Yugoslavia than in a liberal democratic society. In Yugoslavia, reactions to such incidents remained procedural, in line with the mentioned ‘legitimation’ of work stoppages, ensuring ever-increasing measures of control, decentralization and
ultimately fragmentation of labour relations, through a futile attempt to match and control ideology and practice.\textsuperscript{72}

In Koper, the prospect of (and possibly the demand for) wage increases was sacrificed to huge investments. Director Petrinja deemed the railway connection to the hinterland an indispensable priority. His rhetoric of the ‘heroes of labour’ was marked by the expectation that these ‘heroes’ would understand the necessities and would sacrifice their workforce to this goal. The result was a discursive division between ‘good workers’ and ‘layabouts’, as well as an attempt to construct a locally rooted loyalty, a borderland loyalty, by denouncing as ‘layabouts’ precisely those workers who had come from parts of Yugoslavia beyond the immediate Istrian hinterland. It was they who were accused of having brought social tensions into the enterprise. Given that Istria had been emptied of labour capacities, largely ethnic Italians but also Slovenes and Croats, by the massive emigration of its inhabitants to Italy and elsewhere, such discursive inner-Yugoslav divisions had implications that require further scrutiny.\textsuperscript{73}

Conclusion

This study suggests that ‘a stronger micro-historical inspection of Yugoslav socialism’ will indeed reveal ‘considerable local difference in the actual grasp of authority on society.’\textsuperscript{74} In the late 1980s, contemporary Yugoslav socioeconomic analysts were clearly aware of the looming socio-political earthquakes, as Sergej Kraigher wrote in 1987 in the foreword to a volume on ‘the self-managed practice of common interests in the SFRJ’:\textsuperscript{75}

Work stoppages and strikes and other expressions of dissatisfaction reveal that the working people and citizens are ever-less content with the fact that the crisis and its consequences and other problems vital for their lives and future are solved above their heads.

Kraigher denounced the overwhelming urge of the state organs to control social practices. He had inherited the functions of the ‘father’ of self-management, Edvard Kardelj, after the latter’s death in 1979, and had led an expert commission that was to prepare recommendations for economic recovery. The recommendations were expressed along free market lines, but once more without basically questioning self-management practices. Such proposals met with little response. There has been a lack of historiographic investigation into attempts to reform and refine the mechanisms of social control, meaning attempts to contain violence discursively and practically. At the same time, the suggested \textit{longue durée} linkages between the late 1960s/early 1970s and the late 1980s call for further investigation.

The example of Koper indicates, almost paradoxically, that a charismatic personality in the top management position was needed to steer a company successfully through the sea of self-managed technocracy and codified relational prescriptions. The director of the port of Koper, Danilo Petrinja, seems to have
acted, or tried to act, with a free market rationale from the beginning, possibly relying on the ideology that viewed workers as systemic heroes whilst at the same time exercising authoritarian social control. When this approach failed, his career as director and main initiator of the local industrial growth ended. The 1970 strike was to remain the only significant violent public labour conflict in the Koper port until the breakup of Yugoslavia. Given the symbolic significance of the port as part of Yugoslavia’s north-western borderland and as one of the major modernizing projects in Slovenia, its relative economic success in the crisis-ridden 1980s, again under a charismatic director, seems to support the conclusion that Slovenia offered a special story in socialist Yugoslavia (and afterwards). 76

In all societies, regardless of the political system, social control offers a valuable key to understanding violence, conflict and issues related to the formation and acceptance of social norms. As Pieter Spierenburg has pointed out, control is always a ‘sensitizing concept’: it draws attention to the relationships between various mechanisms that are designed to make people act in a way that is desirable according to a certain standard or ideal. 77 In Yugoslavia, the imperative to contain both social and national conflict, to declare the former ideologically non-existent and the latter resolved, made social relationships in the workplace one of the central loci of the Titoist socialist system and shaped the ways in which control and mediating mechanisms functioned or failed.

Branka Magaš has pointed out that a change in political semantics in Slovenia and Croatia preceded the change in the system, transforming ‘comrades’ into ‘citizens’ long before the end of state socialism. 78 Inherent in the present case study, with Trieste serving to permit a brief glimpse into the workings of an analogous industry in a democratic political system barely 20 kilometres away, are more substantial questions about the genesis of repertoires of action in modern social conflict. Lastly, the tensions within workers’ milieus, placed in their respective contexts, bring into question the value of viewing the Cold War as a bipolar divide, with the repercussions that this interpretation continues to have for the scholarly imagination. 79

Notes
2. Only very recently has this situation started to change, and almost exclusively with regard to the Cold War era. Apart from my own work, see also several PhD dissertations in progress: Ulrike Schult, ‘Arbeitswelten im selbstverwalteten Sozialismus: Jugoslawien 1960–1990’ (University of Jena); Kathrin Jurkat, ‘Auswirkungen der Transformation auf die Arbeiter_innenchaft - eine Untersuchung serbischer Arbeitswelten’ (Humboldt University of Berlin); Adrian Grama, ‘The Labor Question in Postwar Romania, 1944–1955’ (Central European University Budapest); and Rory Archer and Goran Musić, ‘Between Class and Nation: Working Class Communities in 1980s Serbia and Montenegro’ (University of Graz).
3. As was true in the past, the historiographic frame more often than not has been the republic and/or nation rather than the Yugoslav state, see Božo Repe, ‘Razpad historiografije, ki nikoli ni obstajala: institucionalne povezave jugoslovenskih zgodovinarjev in skupni projekti’, Zgodovina za vse – vse za zgodovino, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1996), 69–78. Since 1990, this approach has become much more programmatic, however.


7. Nebojša Vladisljević, Serbia’s Antitbureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization (Basingstoke, New York 2008), 105ff.


12. Magaš, ‘The Kosovo Watershed and its Aftermath’, 53f. Writing in September 1986, Magaš observed that the shift of attention was a nationalizing one: ‘Party and non-party intellectuals alike have largely trimmed their reactions to the perceived interests of their own republics or provinces; even those on the left, mesmerized by economic indicators,
have largely remained silent in the face of this latest attempt to make workers pay the price for bureaucratic incompetence’, 54.


14. A concise summary of the system in Sundhaussen, Jugoslawien, 98–100, quote 98, but see also passim.


19. Galliano Fogar, L’antifascismo operaio monfalconese tra le due guerre (Trieste 1989); Paolo Sema, El mestro de Piran. Ricordando Antonio Sema, la vita, la famiglia, l’insegnamento tra l’Istria e Trieste a cavallo di due guerre (Tricesimo 1995).

20. For a study that scrutinizes transformative milieus between Eastern and Western social and economic orders, see Peter Alheit, Hendrik Bunke et al., Gebrochene Modernisierung – der langsame Wandel proletarischer Milieus: eine empirische Vergleichsstudie ost- und westdeutscher Arbeitermilieus in den 1950er Jahren, 2 vols (Bremen 1999).


24. For a good assessment of the idiosyncracies of Titoist self-managed society, see Wolfgang Höpken, “‘Durchherrschte Freiheit’: Wie “authoritär” (oder wie “liberal”) war Titos Jugoslawien?”, in Grandits and Sundhaussen, eds, Jugoslawien in den 1960er Jahren, 40–65. For an assessment of the role of directors in Slovene socialist labour relations and Slovenia’s economy, see Jurij Fikfak and Jože Prinčič, eds, Biti direktor v času socializma. Med idejami in praksami (Ljubljana 2008). The authors have interviewed former directors of several larger Slovenian companies, but the port of Koper is not among them.


27. This also mirrors a traditionally strong Adriatic self-perception transcending state borders, which, after all, were a fairly new phenomenon in this region, see Dunja Rihtman-Auguštin, ‘A Croatian Controversy: Mediterranean – Danube – Balkans’, Narodna Umjetnost, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1999), 103–19.


32. Ugrin, ‘Naj gospodje’.


34. PAK, Fond 728, Zaostreni gospodarski problemi in odnosi v Luki Koper, 2 July 1970.

35. See Unkovski-Korica, ‘Workers’ Councils in the Service of the Market’, on the problem of labour fluctuation, preoccupying both ideologues and practitioners since the instalment of the self-management system in 1950, in their attempt to effectively direct the workforce in the course of Yugoslavia’s accelerated industrialization.

36. Ibid. See Alf Lüdtke, ‘“Helden der Arbeit” – Mühen beim Arbeiten. Zur mißmutigen Loyalität von Industriearbeitern in der DDR’, in Hartmut Kaelble, Jürgen Kocka and Hartmut Zwahr, eds, Sozialgeschichte der DDR (Stuttgart 1994), 188–213, who points out the great fluctuation among workers in the GDR, in the face of differentiated, yet not ‘just’ wage-related differences in various industries, scarce labour organization and generally bad working conditions. More generally refocusing the field of research on social inequalities in state socialism is Jens Gieseke, ‘Social Inequality in State

37. Ugrin, ‘Naj gospodje’.
38. Ibid.
39. This biographical data is to be found in PAK, Fond 728, unidentified press clipping, 4 January 1970. The clip was published on the occasion of the receipt of the award. On this award for successful directors, see Jože Prinčič, ‘Pot do uspešnega direktorja’, in Fikfak and Prinčič, eds, Biti direktor, 103–33, 128–30. On Petrinja’s life, see Branko Marušič, ‘Danilo Petrinja’, in Paulina Bobič et al., Tvorci slovenske pomorske identitete (Ljubljana 2010), 189–200.
40. PAK, Fond 728, Proceedings of the Directors’ Meeting, 23 February 1970. To give an example, in the ‘coffee affair’ the provincial court sentenced several former employees as well as two customs officers to sentences ranging from ten months to almost three years in prison for having stolen around 4,000 kg of coffee and 70,000 cigarettes from the storehouses in the port. ‘Konec “Kavne afere”’, Luški glasnik, Vol. 2, No. 6 (March 1971), 11.
42. PAK, Fond 728, Proceedings of the Directors’ Meeting, 4 February 1970.
43. Ibid. See Jože Prinčič, ‘Direktorska funkcija v jugoslovanskem socialističnem gospodarskem sistemu’, in Fikfak and Prinčič, eds, Biti direktor, 57–101, on the changing power relationships between Party, workers’ councils, and directors. After the establishment of self-management in 1950, the workers’ council formally carried out the installation and dismissal of company directors.
44. PAK, Fond 728, Proceedings of the Directors’ Meeting, 4 February 1970.
46. PAK, Fond 728, Zaostreni gospodarski problemi in odnosi v Luki Koper, 2 July 1970.
47. Ibid.
49. PAK, Fond 728, Zaostreni gospodarski problemi in odnosi v Luki Koper, 2 July 1970.
50. PAK, Fond 728, IX. redno zasedanje DS, 18 April 1970.
52. Höpken, ‘Durchherrschte Freiheit’, 54f.
53. Andrej Vovko, ‘Rudi Dujč’, in Bobič et al., Tvorci, 37–48, 43. Dujč was director Bruno Korelič’s deputy for several years, and between 1982 and 1986, he served as the port’s director when Korelič was mayor of Koper.
55. Vovko, ‘Rudi Dujč’.
56. Interview with Ludvik Hravatin, Koper, 4 January 2006, quoted in Dato, I tre porti, 80f.
57. In the satirical documentary film Sajko, Kje je železna zavesa? (Ljubljana 1961), one of the comments about Trieste, as seen from the Yugoslav side, concerns ‘the always-ready-for-strike shipyard’. See the film on YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLLeltOUp4
58. See Adriano Guerra, La solitudine di Berlinguer. Governo, etica e politica dal ‘no’ a Mosca alla ‘questione morale’ (Rome 2009).
59. See Petra Terhoeven, *Deutscher Herbst in Europa. Der Linksterrorismus der siebziger Jahre als transnationales Phänomen* (Munich 2014), with a focus on Germany, Italy and France.


63. Ibid., 213ff.

64. Ibid., 195f.


70. Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 82.


72. As Sundhaussen, *Jugoslavien*, 27, puts it: ‘Not the existing problems were the problem, but the non-acceptance of any form of political pluralism’.

73. See Ballinger, *History in Exile*.

75. Čedo Maleš and Blagoja Brajanovski, eds, *Samoupravno ostvarivanje zajedničkih interesa u SFRJ* (Belgrade, Skopje 1987), quotation V.

76. Sundhaussen, *Jugoslavien*, 266–80. Admir Mulaosmanović has scrutinized another enterprise that remained relatively untouched by the economic disaster of the 1980s. In the food combine *Agrokomerc* in Bosnia, the close cooperation of the managers, Bosnian politicians and the Yugoslav People’s Army, which was deeply involved in the company’s economy, as well as corrupt and illegal financial dealings, helped steer the company through every crisis. In the end, clientelism and corruption led to concerted action by Slobodan Milošević and his entourage, including the secret service and legal authorities, to enforce the allegiance of the Bosnian Communists to their goals. See Admir Mulaosmanović, *Bihaćka Krajina 1971–1991. Utjecaj politike i političkih elita na privredni razvoj* (Sarajevo 2010), 73–120.

