

Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: experimental evidence

Bó, Inácio; Hakimov, Rustamdjan

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Bó, I., & Hakimov, R. (2016). *Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: experimental evidence*. (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2016-209). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148566>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use:

This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public.

By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

Bó, Inácio; Hakimov, Rustamdjan

Working Paper

Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence

WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP II 2016-209

Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Suggested Citation: Bó, Inácio; Hakimov, Rustamdjan (2016) : Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence, WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP II 2016-209, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin

This Version is available at:
<http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148566>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

WZB

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
für Sozialforschung



Inácio Bó
Rustamdjan Hakimov

Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence

Discussion Paper

SP II 2016–209

December 2016

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Research Area

Markets and Choice

Research Unit

Market Behavior

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Reichpietschufer 50
10785 Berlin
Germany
www.wzb.eu

Copyright remains with the author(s).

Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole.

Inácio Bó, Rustamdjan Hakimov

Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence

Affiliation of the authors:

Inácio Bó

WZB

Rustamdjan Hakimov

WZB

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Reichpietschufer 50
10785 Berlin
Germany
www.wzb.eu

Abstract

Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence

by Inácio Bó and Rustamdjan Hakimov^{*}

We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test the Gale–Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching mechanism based on a new family of procedures being used in the field, in which information about tentative allocations is provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the tentative cutoff values for acceptance at each school (IDAM). A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached both under IDAM and IDAM-NC than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium strategy akin to truthful behavior under IDAM and IDAM-NC than truthful behavior itself under DA. Moreover, the provision of intermediate cutoff values in IDAM leads to higher rates of equilibrium behavior than in IDAM-NC and a higher robustness of stability between the rounds of experiments. Our findings provide substantial support for the rising practice of using iterative mechanisms in centralized college admissions in practice.

Keywords: Market Design, Matching, Iterative Mechanisms, College Admissions, Experiments.

JEL classification: C78, C92, D63, D78, D82

^{*} E-mail: inacio.bo@wzb.eu, rhakimov@wzb.eu.

We thank Marina Agranov, Nina Bonge, Li Chen, Yan Chen, Morimitsu Kurino, Dorothea Kübler, Jennifer Rontganger, Alexander Nesterov, Alvin Roth, Andrew Schotter, and Utku Ünver for helpful comments.

1 Introduction

The use of central clearinghouses for matching prospective students to universities or schools,¹ as well as theoretical and empirical studies of those procedures that are used have been steadily increasing in recent decades. The vast majority of them consist of procedures in which students submit rank-ordered lists of universities, universities submit rankings (or priorities) of students (often based on the students' grades in exams), and produce a matching of students to universities. Since considerations of fairness based on these priorities are often important, one of the primary goals of the designers of these procedures is to ensure the stability of the allocation. Given that designers also account for the incentives induced in the students, from the theoretical perspective the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism is often seen as the best mechanism: it is strategy-proof and (constrained) efficient from the students' perspective [Balinski and Sönmez, 1999]. One problem, however, is that growing experimental and empirical evidence suggests that participants often misreport their preferences under DA despite truth-telling being a dominant strategy under the mechanism. This may lead to unstable, and thus to unfair allocations.

Bo and Hakimov [2016] have recently proposed a mechanism for matching students to colleges, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), based on a modification of a mechanism currently being used to match students to university programs in Brazil. IDAM asks students to apply to one of the universities available in each of a number of periods. Throughout the allocation process, a university can hold no more applications than its number of seats and if a university receives more applications than its capacity then it rejects the students with lower priorities, while the remaining applications are retained. After each step, all students are informed about whether their application was rejected or retained. Moreover, the minimum corresponding grades among the retained students of each university are publicly announced at the end of each step. If an applicant is rejected, she can apply to any other university where the cutoff grade is lower than her grade. Students are not allowed to make applications while tentatively selected by some university. IDAM is based on a family of mechanisms that we have observed in the field over the last few years, notably in Brazil and in the province of Inner Mongolia (China). These mechanisms differ from most other ones analyzed in the literature in that they do not require students to submit rank-ordered lists of colleges, but instead repeatedly ask them to choose one college among a set of "available" ones. Another common feature of these mechanisms is that they

¹From this point on, we will refer to the institutions as universities. Unless explicitly stated, all arguments also hold for schools.

provide feedback about tentative cut-off grades after each step of the mechanism. If students follow the simple strategy of choosing the most preferred college among those available at each step of the IDAM mechanism (denoted the *straightforward strategy*), the matching produced as an outcome is the Student Optimal Stable Matching, that is, the matching that is the most preferred by all students among all stable matchings. While, unlike the standard DA mechanism, IDAM does not have a dominant strategy, the authors show that stable outcomes are equilibrium outcomes under a robust equilibrium concept – Ordinal Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (OPBE) [Bo and Hakimov, 2016]. In a sequential game, a strategy profile is an OPBE if any deviation strategy is stochastically dominated by following the equilibrium strategy. Though in theory, IDAM has arguably “worse” incentive properties for students than its direct counterpart (DA), in practice, students might benefit from the iterative nature of the game induced, as there is a repeated interaction with the mechanism during the determination of the allocation, which we show experimentally to consistently produce stable outcomes.

This paper addresses the following questions: Are there benefits of using iterative, non-direct, mechanisms when compared to the theoretically superior DA? Is the equilibrium straightforward strategy in IDAM a better predictor of behavior than the dominant strategy of truthful reporting in DA? What effect does the provision of intermediate cutoff values in the IDAM have on individual behavior and the stability of outcomes?

To answer these questions, we run laboratory experiments. Subjects interact with the mechanism for 20 rounds, playing new market parameters (preferences and priorities) in every round. Subjects know their preferences and the preferences of other students, they know their grades, but not the grades of other students. Additionally, they know that grades were drawn uniformly from a distribution with support $[0,100]$. We run three treatments between subjects: DA, IDAM and IDAM-NC. Unlike in IDAM, in IDAM-NC students do not observe intermediate cut-off grades at every step. Thus, by comparing IDAM and IDAM-NC, we can identify the effect of the provision of cutoffs on the students’ behaviors and in the final allocations. We show that both IDAM and IDAM-NC dominate DA in terms of stability. As for individual strategies, there is a significant and large increase in the proportion of straightforward and truthful behavior in all treatments comparing the first ten to the last ten rounds of each treatment, but the proportion of truthful (or straightforward) behavior is the highest in IDAM, second highest in IDAM-NC and the lowest in DA, with all pairwise differences being statistically significant.

What drives the success of those iterative mechanisms when compared to DA? First, IDAM and IDAM-NC are easier to understand and learn, as they “open the box” of the

mechanism through repeated interaction with it during the determination of the allocation, while in DA the only interaction that a student has with the mechanism is the submission of preferences, and thus subjects have to think through the procedure themselves. This feature of both iterative mechanisms provides the biggest advantage in terms of stability improvements and proportions of “truthful” behavior relative to DA. Second, the provision of cutoffs in IDAM leads to a higher proportion of subjects following the straightforward strategy than in IDAM-NC. This difference is driven by an almost universal adoption of the straightforward strategy by subjects who were rejected at some step of the mechanism, and thus observed intermediate cutoffs. Additionally, the provision of cutoffs allows subjects to observe the fairness of the allocation, which is especially crucial for the persistence of stability between rounds. In other words, a student can see that any envy she may have results from her not choosing a university that was more desirable, when that was still available. The first feature shows a disparity between theory and practice: DA’s theoretical properties lead one to expect the submission of truthful preferences, as it is a weakly dominant strategy, while IDAM and IDAM-NC, which have behavior predictions that are less robust, turned out to lead to higher rates the straightforward behavior of subjects. The findings of the experiment emphasize the importance of behavioral consideration when designing matching mechanisms.

2 Related literature

One common objective of policymakers, when designing college and school admission mechanisms, is to ensure that the outcomes produced are fair. In a fair matching, if a student is not matched to a more preferred university then every student who is matched to that university has a higher priority than her. While this objective is debatable, for university admissions it is the most natural, as the priorities of students are almost always based on grades or other performance-based measures. [Balinski and Sönmez \[1999\]](#) showed that DA can be characterized as the “best” fair mechanism, in that it is strategy-proof and Pareto dominates any other fair mechanism (that is, it is constrained efficient). In fact, variations of the DA mechanism are used in many real-life student matching programs around the world. College and secondary school admissions in Hungary [[Biró, 2012](#)], high school admissions in Chicago [[Pathak and Sönmez, 2013](#)] and New York City [[Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2009](#)] as well as elementary school admissions in Boston [[Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2006](#)] are examples of real life use of the DA mechanism.

While strategy-proofness itself may be considered an element of fairness [[Pathak and](#)

Sönmez, 2008], it also aligns the students’ incentives such that the outcomes have the desirable efficiency and fairness properties. Recent empirical and experimental evidence suggests, however, that those incentives may not be fully understood by the subjects and may lead to assignments that are neither fair nor constrained efficient.

The seminal matching experiment in Chen and Sönmez [2006] suggests that truth-telling rates are higher under DA than under the Boston mechanism in the school choice problem. Later experiments, however, showed that truth-telling rates might drop if more information was made available to the participants [Pais and Pintér, 2008, Pais et al., 2011]. Lately, some experiments have been conducted to study learning in DA, in which subjects interact with the mechanism for several rounds. In the baseline treatment of Ding and Schotter [2015a], subjects play DA repeatedly and only limited learning is observed after 20 periods. Similar results are presented in Zhu [2015], where the subjects increase the truth-telling rates with experience, but only in one out of the two markets analyzed. Chen and He [2016] show that subjects in the experiments are ready to invest in information about the preferences and priorities of others in DA even after gaining experience with the mechanism, thus showing that they do not fully understand its strategy-proofness. Moreover, evidence of manipulation was found in the flagship application of the student-proposing DA – the match of medical doctors to residency programs in the US (the National Resident Matching Program). Rees-Jones [2015] shows that around 17% of participants manipulate preference reports, and around 5% of them declare this manipulation as strategic.² The numbers might come across as small, but the misreporting of preferences by even a small fraction of students often translates into non-stable allocations. Similarly, Hassidim et al. [2015] show that some students manipulate submitted lists in the Israeli college admissions and Chen and Pereyra [2015] identify manipulations for school admissions in Mexico City.

Several papers have also tried to address the question of how factors outside of the mechanism being used affect truth-telling. Guillen and Hing [2014] and Guillén and Hakimov [2015] test the effect of advice on the properties of the mechanism (in their case, the top trading cycles mechanism, which is also strategy-proof) on the truthful reporting in the lab and the field, respectively. Ding and Schotter [2015b] test how the ability to communicate with other participants before the submission of preferences affects truth-telling rates and obtain a negative result: communication makes more subjects change their rank-order lists

²Though the participants can use only constrained lists of preferences, and thus DA is not -strategy proof, the manipulations that are identified cannot be rationalized by the constrained lists. For instance, the switch of the order of any two hospitals in the submitted list is clearly pointing to misunderstanding of incentives of DA.

relative to the no communication case, but changes go both in the direction of truth-telling and in the opposite direction. [Ding and Schotter \[2015a\]](#) test the effect of inter-generational advice on the truth-telling rates and show that it has a detrimental effect on truth-telling under DA. Summing up, most of the experimental and empirical evidence raises concerns about participants' understanding of incentives to report truthfully under DA.

[Dur et al. \[2015\]](#) use the fact that the school choice mechanism used in the Wake County Public School System allows for students to interact multiple times with the procedure as a method for empirically identifying strategic players. Interestingly, the dynamic nature of the procedure, and the information that is made available during the process to the participants, makes it somewhat comparable to the IDAM mechanism.

Three recent papers also evaluate experimentally indirect sequential mechanisms. [Echenique et al. \[2015\]](#) consider a two-sided market, with DA being implemented dynamically. The authors found that 48% of outcomes are stable and, surprisingly, the receiving side optimal stable matching is more likely to be reached than the proposing side. Our results are not comparable to these results as we run experiments in one-sided settings, where colleges are not strategic agents. Moreover, authors do not compare the performance of the dynamic DA to the static counterpart. [Gong and Liang \[2016\]](#) consider, both theoretically and experimentally, the mechanism currently in use to match students to universities in the province of Inner Mongolia, in China. The authors find that, when compared to DA, the Inner Mongolia mechanism exhibits higher truth-telling rates in the environment with low preference correlation, but that this does not translate into a higher rate of stable outcomes. In the high preference correlation environment, on the other hand, there is a higher proportion of stable outcomes under DA. Although the dynamic mechanism used in [Gong and Liang \[2016\]](#) has some similarities to IDAM, such as the availability of tentative cutoff grades, it is in fact a different mechanism, with different timing and incentives. Our results, therefore, are not directly comparable. [Klijn et al. \[2016\]](#) compare dynamic versions of both the school-proposing and student-proposing versions of DA to its static counterparts in one-sided settings of the school choice problem. The dynamic version of the student-proposing DA that they implement is equivalent to our IDAM-NC treatment.³ In contrast to our results, however, [Klijn et al. \[2016\]](#) find no statistically significant difference in the proportion of stable outcomes between the standard and dynamic student-proposing DA. We attribute the distinct results to two differences in the experimental setup: the size of the market and the information environment. First, we consider the size of the market, i.e. the number of schools or univer-

³Despite the similarities, those experiments in [Klijn et al. \[2016\]](#) were performed simultaneous and independently from the ones in this paper.

sities. While the market size used in [Klijn et al. \[2016\]](#) is of four schools and four students, we use markets with eight universities and eight students. Experimental evidence suggests that larger markets (and thus longer rank-order lists) lead to lower truth-telling rates in direct strategy-proof mechanisms, such as DA and TTC [[Chen and Kesten, 2015](#), [Hakimov and Kesten, 2014](#)], and thus the larger the market the higher is the potential scope for improvement over DA. Moreover, larger markets make subjects have more interactions with the iterative mechanism within one round, involving on average more choices and observations of its operation, emphasizing its contrast with the one-shot nature of DA. Considering the fact that the mechanism used, IDAM-NC, differs from DA essentially in its sequentiality, a larger market is more likely to lead to the differences between the mechanisms. Regarding the information environment, the difference in the information that subjects have about preferences and priorities might also influence the results: [Klijn et al. \[2016\]](#) use complete information, while in our setup there is uncertainty regarding priorities.

3 Mechanisms and hypotheses

In this section we describe the matching mechanisms that we test in the lab. They correspond to the three treatments that we run. At the end of the section we formulate the experimental hypotheses.

The student-proposing Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism (DA)

DA is a direct mechanism. It collects universities capacities and students' submitted rank-order lists of universities simultaneously, which are used by the algorithm below to produce the final allocation. Universities' priorities over students are strict and exogenously given.⁴

- Step 1
 - Every student applies to her first choice. Each university rejects the least-ranked students in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others.
- Step $k > 1$
 - Every student who is rejected in step $k - 1$ applies to the next most preferred university according to the submitted rank-order list. Each university pools together new applicants and those who are held from step $k - 1$ and rejects the

⁴Note that for the goal of this study we use students' grades as an instrument to impose priorities.

lowest-ranked students in excess of its capacity. Those who are not rejected are temporarily held by the universities.

The process terminates after any step without rejections. Each university is then matched to the students being held.

The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism with no cutoffs (IDAM-NC)

IDAM-NC is not a direct mechanism. The allocation procedure is implemented in an iterative way, with students receiving intermediate feedback (whether a student was temporarily accepted or rejected at a previous step) during the execution of the mechanism, and might be required to perform additional actions. Whenever a student is asked to make a choice, the only restriction is that she cannot choose a university which has rejected her in a previous step. More specifically:

- Step 1
 - All students are asked to apply to one of the universities.
 - Each university rejects the least-ranked students, among those who applied to it, in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others. If no application is rejected, the procedure will stop at this step, matching the universities to the students they hold.

- Step $t > 1$
 - Students who are not held at some university are asked to apply to any universities which have not rejected them in a previous step.
 - Each university rejects the least-ranked students, among those held and those who applied to it, in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others. If no application is rejected, the procedure will stop at this step, matching the universities to the students they hold.

The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism (IDAM)

IDAM is not a direct mechanism. Just like in IDAM-NC, the allocation procedure is implemented in an iterative way, with students receiving intermediate feedback during the execution of the mechanism, and might be required to perform additional actions. Differently

from the IDAM-NC mechanism, in the IDAM students are additionally informed about cutoff values at the end of each step, or even the universities which would reject their application based on the grades of the students currently held. More specifically:

- Step 1
 - All students are asked to apply to one of the universities.
 - Each university rejects the least-ranked students, among those who applied to it, in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others. If no application is rejected, the procedure will stop at this step, matching the universities to the students they hold.
 - The cutoffs of each university is made public. For universities where the number of students held is smaller than their capacities, the value of the cutoff by the end of step 1 is zero. For the other universities, the value of the cutoff in each one of them is the lowest grade in that university among its retained students.

- Step $t > 1$
 - Students who are not held at some university are asked to apply to universities where the cutoff value is lower than their grades in those universities.
 - Each university rejects the least-ranked students, among those held and those who applied to it, in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others. If no application is rejected, the procedure will stop at this step, matching the universities to the students they hold, and leaving students who are not held at any university unmatched.
 - The cutoffs of each university is made public.

The summary of treatments and predictions of individual behavior are presented in Table 1. In DA, truthful submission of rank-ordered list is a weakly dominant strategy, while straightforward strategy is an equilibrium in IDAM and IDAM-NC.⁵

Based on these observations, we form the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The proportion of subjects submitting truthful rank-order lists in DA is higher than the proportion of subjects playing the straightforward strategy in IDAM and IDAM-NC.

⁵Even in the absence of cutoffs, a straightforward strategy may not dominant if the strategy of a student depends, for instance, on the step when she is rejected from a certain college.

Table 1: Predictions of individual behavior by treatments

DA	IDAM	IDAM-NC
Truthful reporting (weakly dominant strategy)	Straightforward strategy (OPBE)	Straightforward strategy (OPBE)

Hypothesis 2: The proportion of stable outcomes is higher in DA than in IDAM and IDAM-NC.

The second hypothesis is based on hypothesis 1. If subjects do not follow the predictions in Table 1, any matching can be produced as an outcome. Therefore, as we expect more subjects to submit truthfully in DA, on average, we should expect a higher proportion of stable outcomes in DA than in IDAM or IDAM-NC.

4 The Experiment

In this section, we present a series of experiments designed to test DA versus IDAM and IDAM-NC. This experimental design is not the first one we tried. Originally we ran sessions under constant market conditions (the same preference profiles and priorities) and complete information. Our findings were in line with findings of the current experiments from perspective of stability and efficiency. However, we identified that some of the design choices made did not allow us to observe individual strategies in a robust way, and so we ran additional experiments which are reported here. As this experiment supersedes the previous one, we report the results of the first one in the online appendix.⁶ It does not mean, however, that the value of the first experiments is zero, to contrary, we think they prove the robustness of our findings.

4.1 Experimental design

In the experiment, there were eight universities that differed in quality and specialization. Each university had only one seat. Universities admitted students based on an exam grade. There were eight students who applied for seats at universities, and each student had a grade for math and a grade for language. Universities M1, M2, M3 accepted based on the math grade only. Universities L1, L2, L3 accepted based on the language grade only. Universities H1 and H2 accepted based on the average grade between math and language. In all treatments, students received 22 euros if they were assigned to their most preferred

⁶The online appendix can be found at <http://www.inaciobo.com/research.html>.

university, 19 euros to their second most preferred university, 16 euros to their fourth most preferred university, and so on. Students received 1 euro if they were assigned to their least preferred university. Each treatment lasted for 20 rounds. At the end of the experiment, one round was randomly drawn to determine the participants' payoffs. Each round represents a new market. The preferences used in each market were generated following the designed market idea of [Chen and Sönmez \[2006\]](#). For each of markets, we generated the qualities of universities uniformly and randomly distributed between $[0,40]$. It corresponded to the utility of each university for subjects and was common for all subjects. Additionally, for each subject and university we generated a random component of utility from the interval $[0,20]$. Finally, each subject had an additional utility of 20 for one of the groups of universities: either math, language or hybrid. This is to model the student specific preference for a field of study. The group for each subject was determined randomly. The resulting utilities were transformed into ordinal preferences. The grades were independently drawn, in each round, from the uniform distribution with support $[1,100]$, for math and language.⁷ There is a unique stable matching in all markets except for those used in rounds 8, 14, and 20, where there are two stable matchings.

In the experiment, subjects could see tables with the ordinal preference of all students, as well as the distribution of exam grades, but they could only see the realization of their own exam grade. This design choice was done for the following reasons: complete information about preferences make it closer to reality than no information, as by observing the preference table, subjects could have an idea about the popularity of each university, which is typically known in reality. The realizations of the grades of other students were not known, and we argue that this also approximates the informational conditions to reality. After each round a subject received the feedback about the university in which she got a slot, and not the allocation of other students.

We use markets with eight schools, which are relatively large if compared with the experimental literature, for two reasons:

1. There is evidence that relatively high share (from 65 to 85 percents) all subjects converge to submitting truthfully in DA in markets with three or four schools ([Chen and Kesten \[2015\]](#), [Zhu \[2015\]](#)) in repeated experiments. However, based on cross studies observations and evidence in [Chen and Kesten \[2015\]](#)⁸ for DA and [Hakimov and Kesten \[2014\]](#) for TTC, we expect lower proportions of truthful submissions in DA when the

⁷The details of all markets are presented in the online Appendix.

⁸The truth-telling rates are lower in six schools environment than in four school environment (75% versus 45% in the last 10 periods).

rank-ordered lists are longer. Thus, we create a larger room for potential improvement for the iterative mechanisms.⁹

2. The large number of schools is crucial to test the difference between DA and IDAM, as the iterative mechanisms are less sensitive than the direct ones to the increase in the number of universities, as the decision in each step is the submission of just one university from the list.¹⁰

As mentioned in the previous section we use three treatments: DA, IDAM and IDAM-NC. The comparison of iterative mechanisms with DA is the focus of current paper. We use both IDAM and IDAM-NC to disentangle the effect that the provision of cut-off grades during the execution of the mechanism has from the simple iterative nature of the procedure, on both subjects' behavior and the allocation properties.

The experiment was run at the experimental economics lab at the Technical University of Berlin. We recruited student subjects from our pool with the help of ORSEE [Greiner et al., 2003]. The experiments were programmed in z-Tree [Fischbacher, 2007]. For each of the three treatments, independent sessions were carried out. Each session consisted of 24 participants that were split into three matching groups of eight for the entire session. We use fixed matching groups in order to increase the number of independent observations and allow for maximum learning. We are not concerned about repeated game caveats, due to the fact that every round represents a new environment, and incomplete information does not allow subjects to identify strategies of the players in previous rounds.¹¹ In total, 12 sessions with 288 subjects were conducted. Thus we have 96 subjects and 12 independent observations per treatment. On average, the experiment lasted 115 minutes and the average earnings per subject were 25.20 euros, including a show up fee of 5 euros.

At the beginning of the experiment, printed instructions were given to the participants (see Appendix). Participants were informed that the experiment was about the study of decision-

⁹Our markets with eight universities and eight students are the largest markets considered so far in repeated matching experiments: Ding and Schotter [2015a] use a market with five students but only four different profiles, Chen and Kesten [2015] with four and six students, Gong and Liang [2016] and Klijn et al. [2016] both use markets with four students and four schools, and Zhu [2015] with three students. The only exception is the large-scale experiment by Chen et al. [2015], however, the large market in the experiment was created by increasing the number of students with similar profiles, while we create a higher number of different student profiles.

¹⁰In the case of one school, DA and IDAM are the same, while in the case of 1,000 schools, the submission of the full list in DA is almost unfeasible in practice, while following the straightforward strategy in IDAM still constitutes a simple task at each given step.

¹¹Additionally, there are no reputational concerns in the matching game, that would hamper interpretation of subjects' strategies as possible strategies in a one-shot game, given the experience.

making, and that their payoff depended on their own decisions and the decisions of the other participants. The instructions were identical for all participants of a treatment, explaining in detail the experimental setting. Questions were answered in private. After reading the instructions, the experimenter went through the solution of an example of an allocation task on the whiteboard and allowed for public questions. After that, all individuals participated in a multiple choice quiz to make sure that everybody understood the main features of the experiment.

After the quiz, and before the start of the first round, participants were asked to solve an allocation task which appeared on the screen of their computers. The correct solution of the task had to be typed in and, if it was correct, participants earned 2 euros. For the DA treatment, participants were shown the submitted list of virtual students on the screen and their grades and they had to determine the final allocation. For the IDAM and IDAM-NC treatments, participants saw the decision of each student in the first step and had to determine the retained and rejected students in each school. If it was done correctly they were informed about the decisions of rejected students, and so on until a final allocation was reached. In case of a mistake at any step the task stopped and the solution was counted as incorrect. We introduced the incentivized task to be sure that every participant paid enough attention to the details of the mechanisms and to have a measure of the understanding of the mechanics of mechanisms.

4.2 Results

We first present the aggregate results on the level of allocations in order to compare the treatments. In the second step, we study individual behavior in the treatments to compare it to the equilibrium predictions and to shed light on the reasons for the aggregate findings. The significance level of all our results is 5%, unless otherwise stated. In the section we use for tests, either non-parametric tests if the data are defined on the level of independent observations or clustered regressions on the level of independent observations if the data are defined on the individual or round level. The details of the regression are presented in notes of tables with p-values. In the main text we only use p-values, without mentioning the details in order to simplify the exposition. We use signs $>$ in the results between treatments to communicate significantly higher. We use $=>$ to communicate higher at the 10% significance level.

Table 2: Proportions of stable allocations by treatments:

	DA	IDAM	IDAM-NC	DA=IDAM, p -value	DA=IDAM-NC p-value	IDAM=IDAM-NC p-value
Round 1-10 (1)	26.7%	54.2%	52.5%	0.00	0.01	0.85
Round 11-20 (2)	47.5%	76.7%	68.3%	0.00	0.01	0.34
All rounds (3)	37.1%	65.4%	60.4%	0.00	0.00	0.47
p-value first 10 = last 10 (4)	0.00	0.01	0.03			

Notes: All the p-values are p-values for the coefficient of the dummy in the probit regression of the dummy for stable outcome on the dummy for the corresponding treatment (columns 5, 6, 7) or the last 10 rounds (row 4). The standard errors of the probit models are clustered on the level of the matching groups. Thus for within-treatment regressions we have 12 clusters (row 4), and for between treatments 24 clusters (columns 5, 6, 7).

4.2.1 Aggregate results: Stability and efficiency

In this section, we compare properties of the allocations reached in each of the treatments. We take two perspectives on each of the parameters: learning within treatments and comparison of the outcomes between treatments in the last 10 rounds of the experiment and in all 20 rounds..

Result 1 (Stability):

1. There is a significant increase in the proportion of stable outcomes reached in the last 10 when compared to the first 10 rounds in all treatments.
2. Comparison of average proportions of stable outcomes in the last 10 rounds leads to the following results: IDAM>DA, IDAM-NC>DA. Comparison of average proportions of stable outcomes in all rounds leads to the following results: IDAM>DA, IDAM-NC>DA.

Support.

Figure 1 presents the average proportions of stable outcomes by treatments grouped by five rounds.

The proportions of stable outcomes by treatments and rounds are presented in Table 2. We observe a significant increase in the proportions of stable outcomes in all treatments. The average proportion of stable outcomes is significantly higher in IDAM and IDAM-NC than in DA. The difference is significant in both the first 10 and the last 10 rounds of the experiment. Thus we reject Hypothesis 2. As for the difference in the number of stable outcomes between IDAM and IDAM-NC, we observe no significant difference. This indicates that the difference regarding stability between DA and two treatments with iterative mechanisms is driven




Figure 1: Proportions of stable outcomes

mainly by the iterative nature of these mechanisms, and not by the provision of information about cutoffs. Note, however, that in the last five rounds of the experiment, the proportion of stable outcomes is on average 15% higher in IDAM than in IDAM-NC (and the difference is 10% significant, $p=0.09$).

Another way to look at the stability results is to consider only persistent stable outcomes. Sometimes a stable outcome is reached by a group for one or two rounds, but it is not reached in the following rounds. In the following, we treat these outcomes as non-persistent stable outcomes, as this pattern might be a sign that some subjects are still trying to change strategies, hoping that could lead them to obtain a better outcome. Next, we consider only persistent stable outcomes i.e., situations in which stable outcomes are reached in a certain period and then in all rounds until the last period of the experiment. For each group, we calculate the number of consecutive stable outcomes before the last round. Thus, for instance, if a group reached stable outcomes in rounds 16, 18, 19, and 20, but not in 17, we count the persistent stability of this group to be equal 3. If a group failed to reach a stable outcome in the round 20 then the variable is equal to 0. The number of consecutive stable allocations can be interpreted as an indicator of how robust the groups are in reaching a stable allocation, despite the different parameters of the markets between rounds.¹²

¹²For the markets in which there are more stable allocations, we consider any stable allocation. This choice is inconsequential, though. There were only four instances in which an allocation which is stable but not student-optimal: two groups in DA, one in IDAM and one in IDAM-NC. All of them in the 20th round.




Figure 2: Number of consecutive stable outcomes

Result 2 (Persistent stability): The comparison of the average number of consecutive stable allocations before the last round leads to the following results: $IDAM > DA$, $IDAM > IDAM-NC$.

Support. Figure 2 presents the average number of consecutive stable allocations before the last round by treatments.

The average number of consecutive stable allocations in IDAM is the highest among the three treatments and is equal to 5.7. Thus, on average, in rounds 14 or 15, stable allocations are reached in IDAM and remain so until round 20. The difference is significant in comparison to both other treatments: Wilcoxon rank-sum test (12 values versus 12 values) two-sided p-values for the comparison of IDAM with DA is 0.01, and IDAM with IDAM-NC 0.05. The difference between DA and IDAM-NC is not significant (p-value 0.38). Thus, despite the absence of difference between the average proportions of stable allocations in IDAM and IDAM-NC, once the persistent, or robust, stability is considered, IDAM performs significantly better than IDAM-NC. Thus, persistence of stability can be attributed to the effect of the information: providing intermediate feedback about the cut-off grades reveal to students the fact that the allocation reached is stable or “fair” with respect to their last choices, while in IDAM-NC, students do not know that and it might induce them to change their strategies between rounds. We investigate this hypothesis in further details in the next section, when we analyze individual strategies.

Table 3: Average efficiency of allocations by treatments:

	DA	IDAM	IDAM-NC	DA=IDAM, p -value	DA=IDAM-NC p-value	IDAM=IDAM-NC p-value
Round 1-10 (1)	97.4%	99.2%	99.4%	0.06	0.03	0.66
Round 11-20 (2)	98.3%	99.0%	99.4%	0.44	0.27	0.67
All rounds (3)	97.8%	99.1%	99.4%	0.04	0.00	0.60
p-value first10 = last 10 (4)	0.55	0.84	0.97			

Notes: All the p-values are p-values for the coefficient of the dummy in the OLS regression of the average payoff of allocations on the dummy for the corresponding treatment (columns 5, 6, 7) or the last 10 rounds (row 4). The standard errors of the regressions are clustered on the level of the matching groups. Thus, for within-treatment regressions we have 12 clusters (row 4), and for between treatments 24 clusters (columns 5, 6, 7).

Summing up results 1 and 2, we observe that both treatments with an iterative deferred acceptance mechanism lead to higher proportions of stable outcomes. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in the proportion of stable outcomes for IDAM and IDAM-NC, but the availability of information about cutoffs leads to a higher persistence of stable allocations between rounds.

Though the main focus of this paper from the perspective of allocation analysis is stability, as we are motivated by college admissions where priorities have to be respected, we also compare the efficiency of the outcomes produced by the mechanisms evaluated. In order to analyze the efficiency of an allocation, we define efficiency as the sum of the payoffs of all the subjects in the allocation produced, divided by the sum of the payoff in the student-optimal stable allocation.

Result 3 (Efficiency): There is no significant difference in efficiency between treatments in the last 10 rounds, but if all rounds are considered, a comparison of the average efficiency lead to the following: IDAM>DA, IDAM-NC>DA

Support. Table 3 presents the average payoffs of participants by treatments and rounds, grouped by five.

Row 4 in Table 3 presents the p-values for the significance of difference in efficiency between the first 10 and the last 10 rounds in each treatment. Efficiency does not differ between the first 10 and the last 10 rounds in any of the treatments. However, the level of efficiency is close to 100%. This can be explained by the fact that not every violation of stability of an allocation leads to a lower sum of payoffs, and some may even lead to a higher sum of payoffs. As for the between-treatment comparison, in IDAM and IDAM-NC treatments we observe a higher average efficiency than in DA in the first 10 rounds of the

experiment. The difference is also significant if all rounds are considered (see rows 5 and 6 of Table 3).

This completes our analysis of allocations by treatments. IDAM and IDAM-NC perform significantly better than DA from perspective of stability, and also outperform DA from the efficiency perspective.

4.2.2 Individual behavior

Next, we analyze individual strategies of experimental subjects in order to test hypothesis 1 and better understand the drivers of the observed differences between the proportions of stable outcomes produced between treatments. We consider the proportions of subjects following straightforward behavior in IDAM and IDAM-NC, and the proportion of subjects submitting truthful rank-ordered lists in DA. To simplify the language, we introduce the Truthful Criterion:

- **Truthful Criterion:**
 - DA: Truthful submitted list.¹³
 - IDAM: Straightforward strategy: applying to the best university from the preference list among the universities that have a cutoff value lower than the student’s exam grade.
 - IDAM-NC: Straightforward strategy: applying to the best university from which she was not previously rejected.

The Truthful Criterion is based on the theoretical properties of the mechanisms. In DA it is a weakly dominant strategy, while in IDAM and IDAM-NC it is an OPBE. It leads to a student-optimal stable match in all treatments, if played by all subjects of a group.

Result 4 (Behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion):

1. There is a significant increase in the proportion of subjects submitting in line with the Truthful Criterion in the last 10 compared to the first 10 rounds in all treatments.
2. The comparison of average proportions of subjects submitting in line with the Truthful Criterion in the last 10 rounds leads to the following results: IDAM>DA, IDAM-NC>DA, IDAM>IDAM-NC. The comparison of the average proportions of subjects

¹³Note, that the only non-dominated strategy given the information available for subjects at the experiments is to submit the full truthful list. In our setting there is no “minimum guaranteed allocation”, like a district school, for instance, as the grades of other students are unknown.




Figure 3: Behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion

Table 4: Proportions of behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion by treatments:

	DA	IDAM	IDAM-NC	DA=IDAM, p-value	DA=IDAM-NC p-value	IDAM=IDAM-NC p-value
Round 1-10 (1)	41%	59%	54%	0.00	0.01	0.42
Round 11-20 (2)	55%	82%	74%	0.00	0.00	0.04
All rounds (3)	48%	70%	64%	0.00	0.00	0.15
p-value first10=last10 (4)	0.00	0.00	0.00			

Notes: All the p-values are p-values for the coefficient of the dummy in the probit regression of the dummy for strategy in line with the Truthful Criterion on the dummy for the corresponding treatment (columns 5, 6, 7) or the last 10 rounds (row 4). The standard errors of the probit models are clustered on the level of the matching groups. Thus, for within-treatment regressions we have 12 clusters (row 4), and for between treatments 24 clusters (columns 5, 6, 7).

submitting in line with the Truthful Criterion in all rounds leads to the following results: IDAM>DA, IDAM-NC>DA.

Support: Table 4 presents the proportions of behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion and the p-values for test of equality of these proportions between treatments and between the first 10 and the last 10 rounds.

Row 4 in Table 4 presents the p-values for the difference between the first 10 and the last 10 rounds of the experiment by treatments. We observe a significant increase in the Truthful Criterion behavior in all treatments, including DA (see row 4 of Table 4). Despite the relatively high increase in truthful submissions in DA, the increase of straightforward

behavior in IDAM and IDAM-NC is even higher.

Figure 3 presents the average proportions of behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion by treatments and rounds. Overall, the proportion of strategies in line with the Truthful Criterion is higher in IDAM and IDAM-NC than in DA. The difference is significant for the first 10, last 10 and all rounds jointly. Thus we can reject Hypothesis 1. Despite the fact that from a theoretical perspective we should expect higher truthful rates in DA, as it is a weakly dominant strategy, it turned out that IDAM and IDAM-NC lead to higher rates of straightforward behavior by subjects. As for the difference between IDAM and IDAM-NC, the proportions of behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion is higher in IDAM, with the difference being significant for the last 10 rounds of the experiment. Note that this dominance of IDAM relative to IDAM-NC in the last 10 rounds is translated into a higher proportion of stable outcomes, but the difference in the proportion of stable outcomes is not significant. Thus we can conclude that the provision of intermediate feedback about cutoffs has a positive effect on the proportion of straightforward behavior.

Next, we take a closer look at the manipulations in all three treatments.

Result 5 (Violation of the Truthful Criterion and its determinants):

1. In all three treatments, the probability of violation of the Truthful Criterion is higher the lower the students' grades are.
2. The correct solution of the incentivized allocation task at the beginning of the experiment significantly increases the probability of submission in line with the Truthful Criterion in IDAM and IDAM-NC but not in DA.
3. If IDAM and IDAM-NC are considered: in IDAM, the most common violation of straightforward behavior is skipping the most preferred university in the first step of the mechanism. The proportion of violations of straightforward behavior (that is, not choosing the most preferred option among the available ones,) decreases dramatically after the first step and reaches almost zero after the third step of the mechanism. In IDAM-NC the proportion of violations does not change between steps. Controlling for the number of options available, the proportion of violations in IDAM-NC is significantly higher than in IDAM, starting from the second step of the procedure.

Support: Table 5 presents the marginal effects of probit regressions of dummy for play in line with the Truthful Criterion by treatments. In all treatments, in line with result 4, the probability of submission in line with the Truthful Criterion increases with the experience

and its marginal effect is higher in IDAM and IDAM-NC than in DA. The probability of submitting in line with the Truthful Criterion is also higher the higher the student's grades. In all three treatments, the coefficient for average grade is positive and significant. Notably, this observation is in line with field data for college admissions in Israel, where the DA mechanism is used [Hassidim et al., 2015].

The dummy for the correct solution of the allocation task at the beginning of the experiment is positive and significant in IDAM and IDAM-NC, while not significant in DA. It is an interesting finding: if a participant of the experiment was successful in understanding mechanics of the iterative mechanism from instructions and examples, she is 12.9% and 16.2% more likely to use a straightforward strategy in IDAM and IDAM-NC respectively. In DA, the fact that a participant of the experiment could produce the allocation of the DA mechanism in the task does not translate into a higher probability of truthful submissions. This is potentially one of the main concerns about the DA mechanism: the fact that truthful reporting is a weakly dominant strategy is not easy to infer even having a good understanding of the mechanics of the mechanism. For IDAM and IDAM-NC, going through the steps of an allocation problem by the mechanism one by one, subjects are more likely to use a straightforward strategy when interacting with the mechanism.

Table 5: Marginal effects of probit model of submissions in line with the Truthful Criterion by treatments

	(1) Truthful Criterion dummy DA	(2) Truthful Criterion dummy IDAM	(3) Truthful Criterion dummy IDAM-NC
Round	.015*** (.002)	.025*** (.003)	.024*** (.003)
Average grade	.003*** (.001)	.004*** (.001)	.006*** (.001)
Correct solution of the allocation task	-.048 (.076)	.129*** (.031)	.162*** (.059)
Female dummy	-.005 (.077)	.008 (.048)	.057 (.064)
Math-related major dummy	.081 (.070)	.017 (.037)	.058 (.063)
Observations	1920	1920	1920
No. of clusters	12	12	12
log(likelihood)	-1282.22	-1042.37	-1110.40

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Math-related major dummy is equal to 1 if a subject study economics, computer science or math, and 0 otherwise.




Figure 4: Behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion

Next, we take a closer look at the differences in straightforward behavior between IDAM and IDAM-NC. Table 6 presents the marginal effects of probit regressions of straightforward submission (that is, choosing the most preferred available university in each step) depending on the round, the number of available options, and the treatment by steps of the mechanism (the sample includes only IDAM and IDAM-NC). Figure 4 presents the average proportions of straightforward behavior by groups of five rounds in IDAM and IDAM-NC, depending on the step of the mechanism. Decision in step 1 are the first decisions, and being straightforward requires choosing the most preferred university. There is no significant difference between IDAM and IDAM-NC in terms of the proportions of truthful most preferred university submissions (see column one of Table 6). Note that one of the possible explanations for deviations from straightforward behavior is that subjects try to skip applications to universities where they think they are likely to be rejected. We call this “skipping” behavior. The fact that we observe average grade as a predictor of straightforward behavior supports this explanation.

Decisions in steps 2 and 3 are taken after one and two rejections, respectively. Note that, in IDAM, straightforward behavior requires the application to the best university among those available given the published cutoffs. In IDAM-NC subjects are not aware of the cutoffs, and thus straightforward behavior requires the application to their second choice in the second step. In the third step of IDAM-NC, straightforward behavior requires the application to

Table 6: Marginal effects of probit model of straightforward submission depending on the average grade by cycles of the mechanism.

	(1) Straightforward step=1	(2) Straightforward step=2 or step=3	(3) Straightforward step=4 or step=5	(4) Straightforward step>5
Round	.017*** (.002)	.011*** (.001)	.008*** (.002)	.020*** (.004)
IDAM	.007 (.041)	.186*** (.033)	.215*** (.031)	.272*** (.042)
# of available options		-.009 (.006)	-.074*** (.012)	-.025*** (.008)
Observations	3840	3081	1290	1269
log(likelihood)	-2107.61	-1228.01	-578.49	-672.46

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. # of available options represents the number of universities with corresponding cutoff grades being lower than the student's at the moment of decision in IDAM, and equals the number of schools that have not rejected the student before the current step of the mechanism.

the next choice relative to the university they were rejected from in the second step. This leads to the following: due to the simple fact that the number of options available after each step in IDAM is weakly smaller than under IDAM-NC, the likelihood of a behavior being consistent with a straightforward strategy, by pure mechanics, is greater under IDAM than under IDAM-NC. To control for that fact, we added the number of options available to the student at each step to the regression.

Starting from steps 2 and 3, the probability of straightforward behavior is significantly higher in IDAM than in IDAM-NC, controlling for the number of options available (see columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 6). The difference can be explained by the fact that in IDAM participants see the cutoffs in the feedback of the first and all consequent steps, which makes the mechanism different from IDAM-NC. Skipping behavior is most likely driven by participants' beliefs about which university is available to them and a desire to avoid unnecessary choices and rejections. In IDAM-NC, the feedback of each step does not provide any information except that the chosen university is not available to them (the one that rejected them in the previous step). In IDAM, however, starting from the second step, participants see the cutoffs and thus some uncertainty about the availability of universities is resolved, and thus subjects do not need to form beliefs about universities where they have chances to be accepted.

Summing up the results of the experiment, we found that IDAM and IDAM-NC lead to a significantly higher proportion of stable allocations than DA. The iterative structure of the game leads to a higher proportion of stable allocations, while the provision of intermediate

feedback during the procedure contributes to the persistence of this stability between rounds. The aggregate findings are explained by a higher proportion of subjects playing in line with the Truthful Criterion: the iterative nature of the game leads to a large improvement in the proportion of Truthful Criterion behavior when compared to DA, but the provision of cutoffs makes the improvement significantly larger. The latter is explained by an almost universal adoption of a straightforward behavior by the subjects after the first rejection, once the cut-off grades of universities are published.

5 Discussion

Our findings demonstrate the benefits of the IDAM mechanism, especially with the provision of intermediate feedback about the cutoff grades, when compared to the standard student-proposing DA. We mainly attribute the success of the iterative mechanism to the fact that subjects find it easier to understand, in terms of its incentives and strategic considerations.

The comparison between the IDAM and DA mechanisms is somewhat similar to the comparison of English and second-price sealed bid auctions. Li [2015] presented one possible explanation for the difference in behavior observed in the lab in these two strategically equivalent auction formats: while English auction is obviously strategy-proof, the second-price sealed bid auction is not. That, however, cannot be used to explain our results between IDAM and DA, as the former is not even strategy-proof, but we believe that the intuition is somewhat similar. Although here, unlike in the English auction, subjects do not see a perfect connection between the actions at each step and the final outcome, as acceptances are only tentative, in IDAM, unlike DA, they can track the intermediate consequences of their actions. Additionally, the cut-off grades published at every step of the mechanism lead subjects to observe a particular kind of mistake. If a subject did not behave straightforwardly and skipped a choice which would have accepted her, she can immediately see this by observing the cut-off grades. This seems to lead subjects to regret the skipping behavior in future rounds or steps of the mechanism and thus converge to straightforward behavior.

Given the popularity of DA, these findings might make policymakers reconsider DA as the optimal mechanism for implementing matching procedures, where stability is put as the main criterion of interest. On one hand, DA is easier to implement, as it requires only a one-shot submission of preferences, while the IDAM mechanism requires more intensive use of technology, such as access to the internet and perhaps commitment on the part of participants to stay online for some time. Given the rapid development of technologies, in

most countries access to the internet, especially among those who aim to enter a university, is no longer a binding factor, and thus we argue that the potential benefits of the iterative version are higher than the costs. The mere fact that iterative mechanisms are being used to match millions of students to universities in Brazil and China indicates that these constraints are not extremely limiting.

We expect especially high advantages of using mechanisms such as the IDAM in large markets with a high number of universities (this argument is in line with the observation that our surveyed attempts of using the iterative mechanisms are observed in massive markets like those in Brazil and Inner Mongolia). In these markets, where there is a high number of universities or schools, real-life use of DA would require a dramatic constraint of the length of the list when compared to the total number of universities and would thus lose its the main benefit, i.e., strategy-proofness. In the IDAM mechanism, the constraint comes as the number of steps.¹⁴ However, in reality, we argue that the mechanism should be implemented with as many steps as possible.¹⁵ Although one could argue that requiring multiple interactions with the mechanism may pose a significant cost over the students, we believe that modern technologies can provide an interactive feedback, which would allow participants to follow the straightforward strategy by spending a very short period of time in each step and thus simplifying implementation of the almost unconstrained IDAM. In Brazil, for example students are currently able to update their choices via a free cellphone “app”.

Moreover, in markets with a large numbers of universities, the feedback of the iterative mechanism is more valuable than in small markets. This is due to the fact that in big markets participants must be aware of what universities are within their reach, and providing real-time feedback with the updated information about the cut-off grades serves as a very valuable tool.

Lastly, we would like to mention that one important factor, which may influence the success of iterative mechanisms such as IDAM, would be the exact way in which the interaction and design of the feedback are implemented. Although these features are beyond this study, we argue that they are of significant importance, and thus should be tested with real participant by methods such as focus groups and field testing before implementation.

¹⁴In the online Appendix we describe an additional series of experiments in which constrained versions of IDAM and DA (restricted number of periods in IDAM and restricted length of the ranking in DA) are compared. There we show that the benefits of the IDAM mechanism over DA also takes place when using the restricted versions.

¹⁵Note that the mechanism implemented in Inner Mongolia is run in almost continuous time, and thus the number of steps could be counted as unconstrained.

References

- Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak, Alvin E Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. Changing the boston school choice mechanism. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006. [2](#)
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the nyc high school match. *The American Economic Review*, 99(5):1954–78, 2009. [2](#)
- Michel Balinski and Tayfun Sönmez. A tale of two mechanisms: student placement. *Journal of Economic theory*, 84(1):73–94, 1999. [1](#), [2](#)
- Péter Biró. University admission practices – hungary, 2012. URL [matching-in-practice.eu](#). [2](#)
- Inacio Bo and Rustamdjan Hakimov. The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism. Technical report, Working Paper, 2016. [1](#)
- Li Chen and Juan Sebastián Pereyra. Self-selection in school choice. *ECARES Working Papers*, 2015. [2](#)
- Yan Chen and Yinghua He. Information acquisition and provision in school choice. Technical report, 2016. [2](#)
- Yan Chen and Onur Kesten. Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study. Technical report, Working Paper, 2015. [2](#), [1](#), [9](#)
- Yan Chen and Tayfun Sönmez. School choice: an experimental study. *Journal of Economic theory*, 127(1):202–231, 2006. [2](#), [4.1](#)
- Yan Chen, Ming Jiang, Onur Kesten, Stéphane Robin, and Min Zhu. Matching in the large: An experimental study. Technical report, Working Paper, 2015. [9](#)
- Tingting Ding and Andrew Schotter. Learning and mechanism design: An experimental test of school matching mechanisms with intergenerational advice. Technical report, Working Paper, 2015a. [2](#), [9](#)
- Tingting Ding and Andrew Schotter. Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network. Technical report, Working Paper New York University, 2015b. [2](#)

- UM Dur, Robert G Hammond, and Thayer Morrill. Identifying the harm of manipulable school-choice mechanisms. Technical report, mimeo, 2015. [2](#)
- Federico Echenique, Alistair J Wilson, and Leeat Yariv. Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study. 2015. [2](#)
- Urs Fischbacher. z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. *Experimental economics*, 10(2):171–178, 2007. [4.1](#)
- Binglin Gong and Yingzhi Liang. A dynamic college admission mechanism in inner mongolia: Theory and experiment. Technical report, 2016. [2](#), [9](#)
- Ben Greiner et al. *The online recruitment system ORSEE: a guide for the organization of experiments in economics*. Max-Planck-Inst. for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, 2003. [4.1](#)
- Pablo Guillén and Rustamdjan Hakimov. How to get truthful reporting in matching markets: A field experiment. Technical report, WZB Discussion Paper, 2015. [2](#)
- Pablo Guillen and Alexander Hing. Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism. *European Economic Review*, 70:178–185, 2014. [2](#)
- Rustamdjan Hakimov and Onur Kesten. The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice. Technical report, WZB discussion paper, 2014. [2](#), [1](#)
- Avinatan Hassidim, Deborah Marciano-Romm, Assaf Romm, and Ran I Shorrer. Strategic” behavior in a strategy-proof environment. Technical report, working paper, 2015. [2](#), [4.2.2](#)
- Flip Klijn, Joana Pais, and Marc Vorsatz. Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: A laboratory experiment. Technical report, 2016. [2](#), [3](#), [9](#)
- Shengwu Li. Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. *Working paper, Stanford University*, 2015. [5](#)
- Joana Pais and Ágnes Pintér. School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 64(1):303–328, 2008. [2](#)
- Joana Pais, Ágnes Pintér, and Róbert F Veszteg. College admissions and the role of information: an experimental study. *International Economic Review*, 52(3):713–737, 2011. [2](#)

Parag A Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez. Leveling the playing field: Sincere and sophisticated players in the boston mechanism. *The American Economic Review*, 98(4):1636–1652, 2008.

2

Parag A Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez. School admissions reform in chicago and england: Comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. *American Economic Review*, 103(1):80–106, 2013. 2

Alex Rees-Jones. Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match. *Available at SSRN 2662670*, 2015. 2

Min Zhu. Experience transmission: Truth-telling adoption in matching. *Available at SSRN 2631442*, 2015. 2, 1, 9

Appendix

Instructions of the experiment

Welcome! This is an experiment about decision-making. You and the other participants in the experiment will participate in a situation where you have to make a number of choices. In this situation, you can earn money that will be paid out to you in cash at the end of the experiment. How much you earn depends on the decisions that you and the other participants in the experiment make.

These instructions describe the situation in which you have to make a decision. The instructions are identical for all participants in the experiment. It is important that you read the instructions carefully so that you understand the decision-making problem well. If something is unclear to you while reading, or if you have other questions, please let us know by raising your hand. We will then answer your questions individually.

Please do not, under any circumstances, ask your question(s) aloud. You are not permitted to give information of any kind to the other participants. You are also not permitted to speak to other participants at any time throughout the experiment. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand and we will come to you and answer it. If you break these rules, we may have to terminate the experiment.

Once everyone has read the instructions and there are no further questions, we will conduct a short quiz where each of you will complete some tasks on your own. We will walk

around, look over your answers, and solve any remaining comprehension problems. The only purpose of the quiz is to ensure that you thoroughly understand the crucial details of the decision-making problem.

Your anonymity and the anonymity of the other participants is guaranteed throughout the entire experiment. You will neither learn about the identity of the other participants, nor will they learn your identity.

General description

This experiment is about students who are trying to enter a university. The 24 participants in the room are grouped into three groups of eight persons each. These eight participants represent students competing for university seats. You will compete with the same seven participants for the whole experiment. The experiment consists of 20 independent decisions, which represent the students admission processes. At the end of each round every student will receive at most one seat in one of the universities or will remain unassigned. In the end of the experiment one round will be randomly drawn to determine your payment.

There are eight universities that differ in quality and specialization. Each university has only one seat. Universities admit students based on their final exam grade. Each student has a grade for math and a grade for language. Universities M1, M2, M3 accept based on the math grade only. Universities L1, L2, L3 accept based on the language grade only. Universities H1 and H2 accept based on the average grade of math and language.

Instructions for DA

Your payoff depends on a seat of the university you will be assigned to. In order to get a seat at any university you will have to participate in the centralized allocation mechanism. At the beginning of each round you will submit the list of your preferences to the centralized allocation mechanism, and it will use the lists of all the participants in order to determine allocation. All the steps of the allocation described below take place without any further interactions from the students. Thus, the only thing required for the allocation from the students' side is to submit their lists of preferences.

The allocation procedure is implemented in the following way:

1. The mechanism sends applications from all students to the university of their top choice (the one which is stated first in the submitted list sent to the allocation mechanism).
2. Throughout the allocation process, a university can hold no more applications than its number of seats. If a university receives more applications than its capacity then it rejects

the students with the lowest relevant score (math grade for M1, M2, M3; language grade for L1, L2, L3, and average grade for H1,H2). The remaining applications are retained.

3. Whenever an applicant is rejected at a university, her application is sent to the next highest university on her submitted list.

4. Whenever a university receives new applications, these applications are considered together with the retained applications for that university. Among the retained and new applications, those with the lowest relevant grades in excess of the number of the slots are rejected, while the remaining applications are retained.

5. The allocation is finalized when no more applications can be rejected. Each participant is assigned a slot at the university that holds his/her application at the end of the process.

Example for DA

Example: In order to understand the mechanism better, let us go through an example together. If you have any questions about any step of the allocation procedure please feel free to ask at any point. There are six students (ID numbers from 1 to 6) on the market, and three universities (University M1, University L1, and University H1) with two seats in each university. Students have the following grades in their exams:

	Student1	Student2	Student3	Student4	Student5	Student6
Math	80	90	60	90	70	40
Language	50	20	80	30	76	82
Average	65	55	70	60	73	61

University M1 ranks students based on the math grade only, University L1 grades students based on the language grade only, and university H1 ranks students based on the average of the two grades. Students submitted the following school rankings in their decision sheets:

Student ID	1	2	3	4	5	6
Top choice	L1	H1	M1	H1	H1	M1
Middle choice	H1	M1	H1	L1	M1	H1
Last choice	M1	L1	L1	M1	L1	L1

This allocation method consists of the following steps:

Step 1.

Students 3 and 6 apply for a seat at M1. University M1 has two seats available for allocation and two applicants, thus students 3 and 6 are retained at University M1.

Student 1 applies to University L1. University L1 has two seats and only one applicant, thus student 1 is retained in University L1.

Students 2, 4, and 5 apply for University H1, but it has only two seats available for allocation, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based on the average grade for math and language: student 2 has average grade of 55, student 4 has 60 and student 5 has 73. Among the applicants, student 2 has the lowest average grade, thus student 2 is rejected, and students 4 and 5 are retained at University H1.

	Retained students in the beginning of the round	Applications of the step	Rejected students
University M1	-	3,6	-
University L1	-	1	-
University H1	-	2,4,5	2

Step 2.

Student 2 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step. She applies to her second choice – University M1. Now University M1 considers student 2 together with the retained students who applied to University M1 in the previous step – students 3 and 6. So the University has three applications for two seats, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University M1 ranks students based on the math grade: student 2 has a math grade of 90, student 3 has 60 and student 6 has 40. Student 6 has the lowest math grade among the applicants, thus student 6 is rejected from University M1, while students 2 and 3 are retained.

	Retained students in the beginning of the round	Applications of the step	Rejected students
University M1	3,6	2	6
University L1	1	-	-
University H1	4,5	-	-

Step 3.

Student 6 applies to University H1. So the University has three applications for two seats, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based on the average grade: student 4 has the average grade of 60, student 5 has 73 and student 6 has 61. Student 4 has the lowest average grade among applicants, thus he is rejected from University H1.

	Retained students in the beginning of the round	Applications of the step	Rejected students
University M1	2,3	-	-
University L1	1	-	-
University H1	4,5	6	4

Step 4.

Student 4 applies for University L1. Thus, there are two applications for two seats at University L1. No one is rejected. All current retained allocations are finalized.

	Retained students in the beginning of the round	Applications of the step	Rejected students
University M1	2,3	-	-
University L1	1	4	-
University H1	5,6	-	-

Thus, the final allocation looks as follows: University M1 – students 2, 3; University L1 – students 1, 4; University H1– students 5, 6.

Instructions for IDAM

Your payoff depends on a seat of the university you will be assigned to. In order to get a seat at any university you will have to participate in the centralized allocation mechanism. The allocation procedure is implemented in the following way:

1. All students apply to one of the universities.

- a. Throughout the allocation process, a university can hold no more applications than its number of seats. If a university receives more applications than its capacity then it rejects the students with the lowest relevant score (math grade for M1, M2, M3; language grade for L1, L2, L3, and average grade for H1,H2). The remaining applications are retained.

2. Each student is informed about whether her application was rejected or retained. Moreover, the minimum corresponding grades of retained students of all universities are publicly announced. If an applicant is rejected at a university, she can send the application to any other university. If an applicant is retained at a university, she is not active at this step.

3. Whenever a university receives new applications, these applications are considered together with the retained applications for that university. Among the retained and new applications, those with the lowest relevant grades in excess of the number of the slots are rejected, while the remaining applications are retained. All students see the result of the step. Each university publishes the minimum corresponding grade of the retained students. If an applicant is rejected at a university, she can send the application to any other university. If an applicant is retained at any university, she is not active at this step.

4. Step 3 is repeated until allocation is finalized. The allocation is finalized when no more applications can be rejected. Each participant is assigned a slot at the university that holds

his/her application at the end of the process.

Example for IDAM

In order to understand the mechanism better, let us go through an example together. If you have any questions about any step of the allocation procedure please feel free to ask at any point.

There are 6 students (ID numbers from 1 to 6) on the market, and three universities (University M1, University L1, and University H1) with two seats in each university. Students have the following grades in their exams:

	Student1	Student2	Student3	Student4	Student5	Student6
Math	80	90	60	90	70	40
Language	50	20	80	30	76	82
Average	65	55	70	60	73	61

University M1 ranks students based on the math grade only, University L1 grades students based on the language grade only and university H1 ranks students based on the average of the two grades.

This allocation method consists of the following steps:

Step 1.

Students took the following decisions about their application: Students 3 and 6 apply to M1, student 1 applies to L1, and students 2, 4 and 5 apply to H1.

Students 3 and 6 apply for a seat at M1. University M1 has two seats available for allocation and two applicants, thus students 3 and 6 are retained at University M1.

Student 1 applies to University L1. University L1 has two seats and only one applicant, thus student 1 is retained in University L1.

Students 2, 4 and 5 apply for University H1, but it has only two seats available for allocation, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based on the average grade for math and language: student 2 has average grade of 55, student 4 has 60 and student 5 has 73. Among the applicants, student 2 has the lowest average grade, thus student 2 is rejected, and students 4 and 5 are retained at University H1.

	Retained students in the beginning of the step	Applications of the step	Rejected applications	Minimum accepted grade
University M1	-	3,6	-	40
University L1	-	1	-	0
University H1	-	2,4,5	2	60

Note, that if a university has a free seat the minimum accepted cut-off grade is zero.

Step 2.

Student 2 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only one who is active at this step.

She decides to apply to University M1.

Now University M1 considers student 2 together with the retained students who applied to University M1 in the previous step – students 3 and 6. So the University has three applications for two slots, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University M1 ranks students based on the math grade: student 2 has a math grade of 90, student 3 has 60 and student 6 has 40. Student 6 has the lowest grade among the applicants, thus student 6 is rejected from University M1, while students 3 and 2 are retained.

	Retained students in the beginning of the step	Applications of the step	Rejected applications	Minimum accepted grade
University M1	3,6	2	6	60
University L1	1	-	-	0
University H1	4,5	-	-	60

Step 3.

Student 6 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only one who is active at this step.

Student 6 decides to apply to university H1.

University H1 considers student 6 together with the retained students – students 4 and 5. So the university has three applications for two seats, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based on the average grade: student 4 has an average grade of 60, student 5 has 73 and student 6 has 61. Student 4 has the lowest average grade among the applicants, thus he is rejected from University H1.

	Retained students in the beginning of the step	Applications of the step	Rejected applications	Minimum accepted grade
University M1	2,3	-	-	60
University L1	1	-	-	0
University H1	4,5	6	4	61

Step 4.

Student 4 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only one who is active at this step.

Student 4 decides to apply for University L1.

University H1 considers student 4 together with the retained students – student1. Thus,

there are two applications for two seats at University L1. No one is rejected. All current retained allocations are finalized.

	Retained students in the beginning of the step	Applications of the step	Rejected applications	Minimum accepted grade
University M1	2,3	-	-	60
University L1	1	4	-	30
University H1	4,5	6	4	61

Thus the final allocation looks as follows: University M1 – students 2, 3; University L1 – students 1, 4; University H1 – students 5, 6.

Instructions for IDAM-NC

Your payoff depends on a seat of the university you will be assigned to. In order to get a seat at any university you will have to participate in the centralized allocation mechanism. The allocation procedure is implemented in the following way:

1. All students apply to one of the universities.
 - a. Throughout the allocation process, a university can hold no more applications than its number of seats. If a university receives more applications than its capacity then it rejects the students with the lowest relevant score (math grade for M1, M2, M3; language grade for L1, L2, L3, and average grade for H1,H2). The remaining applications are retained.
2. Each student is informed about whether her application was rejected or retained. If an applicant is rejected at a university, she can send the application to any other university. If an applicant is retained at a university, she is not active at this step.
3. Whenever a university receives new applications, these applications are considered together with the retained applications for that university. Among the retained and new applications, those with the lowest relevant grades in excess of the number of the slots are rejected, while the remaining applications are retained. All students see the result of the step. If an applicant is rejected at a university, she can send the application to any other university. If an applicant is retained at any university, she is not active at this step.
4. Step 3 is repeated until allocation is finalized. The allocation is finalized when no more applications can be rejected. Each participant is assigned a slot at the university that holds his/her application at the end of the process.

Example for IDAM-NC

In order to understand the mechanism better, let us go through an example together. If you have any questions about any step of the allocation procedure please feel free to ask at any point.

There are 6 students (ID numbers from 1 to 6) on the market, and three universities (University M1, University L1, and University H1) with two seats in each university. Students have the following grades in their exams:

	Student1	Student2	Student3	Student4	Student5	Student6
Math	80	90	60	90	70	40
Language	50	20	80	30	76	82
Average	65	55	70	60	73	61

University M1 ranks students based on the math grade only, University L1 grades students based on the language grade only and university H1 ranks students based on the average of the two grades.

This allocation method consists of the following steps:

Step 1.

Students took the following decisions about their application: Students 3 and 6 apply to M1, student 1 applies to L1, and students 2, 4 and 5 apply to H1.

Students 3 and 6 apply for a seat at M1. University M1 has two seats available for allocation and two applicants, thus students 3 and 6 are retained at University M1.

Student 1 applies to University L1. University L1 has two seats and only one applicant, thus student 1 is retained in University L1.

Students 2, 4 and 5 apply for University H1, but it has only two seats available for allocation, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based on the average grade for math and language: student 2 has average grade of 55, student 4 has 60 and student 5 has 73. Among the applicants, student 2 has the lowest average grade, thus student 2 is rejected, and students 4 and 5 are retained at University H1.

	Retained students in the beginning of the step	Applications of the step	Rejected applications
University M1	-	3,6	-
University L1	-	1	-
University H1	-	2,4,5	2

Step 2.

Student 2 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only

one who is active at this step.

She decides to apply to University M1.

Now University M1 considers student 2 together with the retained students who applied to University M1 in the previous step – students 3 and 6. So the University has three applications for two slots, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University M1 ranks students based on the math grade: student 2 has a math grade of 90, student 3 has 60 and student 6 has 40. Student 6 has the lowest grade among the applicants, thus student 6 is rejected from University M1, while students 3 and 2 are retained.

	Retained students in the beginning of the round	Applications of the step	Rejected applications
University M1	3,6	2	6
University L1	1	-	-
University H1	4,5	-	-

Step 3.

Student 6 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only one who is active at this step.

Student 6 decides to apply to university H1.

University H1 considers student 6 together with the retained students – students 4 and 5. So the university has three applications for two seats, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based on the average grade: student 4 has an average grade of 60, student 5 has 73 and student 6 has 61. Student 4 has the lowest average grade among the applicants, thus he is rejected from University H1.

	Retained students in the beginning of the round	Applications of the step	Rejected applications
University M1	2,3	-	-
University L1	1	-	-
University H1	4,5	6	4

Step 4.

Student 4 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only one who is active at this step.

Student 4 decides to apply for University L1.

University H1 considers student 4 together with the retained students – student1. Thus, there are two applications for two seats at University L1. No one is rejected. All current retained allocations are finalized.

	Retained students in the beginning of the round	Applications of the step	Rejected applications
University M1	2,3	-	-
University L1	1	4	-
University H1	4,5	6	4

Thus the final allocation looks as follows: University M1 – students 2, 3; University L1 – students 1, 4; University H1 – students 5, 6.

Discussion Papers of the Research Area Markets and Choice 2016

Research Unit: **Market Behavior**

- David Danz, Steffen Huck, Philippe Jehiel** SP II 2016-201
Public statistics and private experience:
Varying feedback information in a take-or-pass game
- Jana Friedrichsen** SPII 2016-202
Signals sell: Designing a product line when consumers have
social image concerns
- Uri Gneezy, Silvia Saccardo, Roel van Veldhuizen** SPII 2016-203
Bribery: Greed versus reciprocity
- Inácio Bó, C.-Philipp Heller** SPII 2016-204
Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
- Manuela Angelucci, Silvia Prina, Heather Royer, Anya Samek** SPII 2016-205
When incentives backfire: Spillover effects in food choice
- Marina Agranov, Jacob K. Goeree, Julian Romero, Leeat Yariv** SPII 2016-206
What makes voters turn out: The effects of polls and beliefs
- Roel van Veldhuizen** SPII 2016-207
Gender differences in tournament choices: Risk preferences,
overconfidence or competitiveness?
- Jana Friedrichsen, Tobias König, Renke Schmacker** SPII 2016-208
Welfare stigma in the lab: Evidence of social signaling
- Inácio Bó, Rustamdjan Hakimov** SPII 2016-209
Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence

Research Unit: **Economics of Change**

- Armin Falk, Nora Szech** SP II 2016-301
Pleasures of skill and moral conduct
- Thomas Deckers, Armin Falk, Fabian Kosse, Nora Szech** SP II 2016-302
Homo moralis: Personal characteristics, institutions, and
moral decision-making
- Jenny Simon, Justian Mattias Valasek** SP II 2016-303
The political economy of multilateral aid funds
- Vittorio Bassi, Steffen Huck, Imran Rasul** SP II 2016-304
A note on charitable giving by corporates and aristocrats:
Evidence from a field experiment

All discussion papers are downloadable:

<http://www.wzb.eu/en/publications/discussion-papers/markets-and-choice>

- Ludwig Ensthaler, Steffen Huck, Johannes Leutgeb** SP II 2016-305
Games played through agents in the laboratory – A test of Prat & Rustichini's model
- Maja Adena, Steffen Huck** SP II 2016-306
Online fundraising, self-deception, and the long-term impact of ask avoidance
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Roman M. Sheremeta, Nora Szech** SP II 2016-307
Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
- Maja Adena, Steffen Huck** SP II 2016-308
A field experiment on crowdfunding for a club good
- Kai Barron** SP II 2016-309
Belief updating: Does the 'good-news, bad-news' asymmetry extend to purely financial domains?
- Research Professorship: **Market Design: Theory and Pragmatics**
- Kevin McLaughlin, Daniel Friedman** SP II 2016-501
Online ad auctions: An experiment
- Yongfeng Zhang, Qi Zhao, Yi Zhang, Daniel Friedman, Min Zhang, Yiqun Liu, Shaoping Ma** SP II 2016-502
Economic recommendation with surplus maximization
- Qi Zhao, Yongfeng Zhang, Yi Zhang, Daniel Friedman** SP II 2016-503
Recommendation based on multi-product utility maximization