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Economic Necessity or Self-actualization?
Attitudes toward Women's Labour-force Participation in the East and West

Michael Braun, Jaqueline Scott and Duane F. Alwin

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Economic Necessity or Self-actualization?
Attitudes toward Women's Labor-force Participation in the East and West

INTRODUCTION

In Western democracies, there has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of married women and mothers who are employed outside the home. Over the last few decades, this trend has challenged the traditional 'homemaker' role which was relatively popular in the first half of this century, especially among the middle classes (Lupri, 1983). For example, in the United States the labor-force participation among women with children under 18 had risen from 22 percent in 1950 to 67 percent in 1987 (figures based on data from the U.S. Dept. of Labor; see Hoffman, 1989), and in West Germany from nearly one quarter to roughly 45 percent (figures based on data from Statistisches Bundesamt; see also Sommerkorn, 1988). These trends have been accompanied by a number of associated changes in family life, such as declining fertility, delays in the initiation of child-bearing, decreasing amounts of time spent caring for children, and an increasing reliance on sources of non-family child-care (Cherlin, 1981; Cherlin and Furstenberg, 1988; Höhn and Lüscher, 1988; Kiernan, 1988; Lupri, 1983; Nave-Herz, 1988; Schmidtchen, 1984; Sgritta, 1988).

Related to these objective trends in behavior are changes in attitudes, which now show a greater acceptance of non-familial roles for women. Attitudinal changes are likely to be both a cause and consequence of women's employment experience, an experience that affects not only the woman herself but also her spouse and family. Despite the prevalence of such attitudinal and behavioral changes throughout the West, little comparative research has been undertaken to date that addresses the question of cross-national differences in gender-role attitudes. One exception to this is our recent research (see Alwin, Braun and Scott, 1992) concerning the acceptance of female labor-force participation at different stages of the family cycle, in Britain, Germany, and the United States. In these three countries, there is substantial cross-national agreement in the preference for a primary familial role for women, especially when the children are young. Yet some interesting inter-country differences are apparent, that may well reflect normative and structural factors associated with the labor-force participation rates of women, especially when no children are present in the household.

1 We are grateful for the support of ZUMA and the Economic and Social Research Council. We also gratefully acknowledge the expert research assistance of Tom Carson, who managed the data and carried out the analysis for this paper.
Our earlier paper was restricted to a comparison of West Germany, Britain, and the United States, because data were only available then for those countries. Now, however, comparable survey data are available from five additional countries, including Hungary; and similar, but not identical, information has also been collected for East Germany. These data from two (former) socialist countries provide a challenging opportunity for comparing gender role attitudes across socialist and capitalist systems, as well as across nations. We expect to find major system-level differences between East and West, both in the way work and family are linked, and on gender-role attitudes.

Women's Work: Economic Necessity or Self-actualization?

Both economic systems — the democratic market economies on the one side and the authoritarian socialist systems on the other— had an entirely different approach to women's paid work. While in most capitalist countries there is considerable variation in the demand for female labor, both between countries and during the different phases of the economic cycle, public opinion has been rather luke-warm in its support of women's labor-force participation. In socialist countries, however, there was a chronic labor shortage and, because salaries were low, most people regarded double incomes as an economic necessity of family life (see Braun, 1992b). In addition, socialist systems asserted that it was the moral obligation of all non-disabled citizens to work. Moreover, in rhetoric at least, socialist countries were committed to achieving the full emancipation of women, a process that implied changing the gender-role attitudes of both men and women.

As a result, the position of women in former state socialist countries differed in some important respects from the prevailing situation in Western societies. In all state socialist countries there was extremely high labor-force participation of women. In East Germany, for instance, some 90 percent of the women were in paid jobs prior to reunification (Winkler 1990a) and 'right-to-work' laws were enacted. Official GDR policy emphasized the compatibility of job participation and the family work of women and among the special measures adopted to that purpose were: the right to paid leave in the case of illness of a child; shorter working hours for mothers without a reduction in pay; additional paid leave and maternity leave; and nearly full satisfaction of all demands for child-care facilities (Gerhard 1991).

It has often been argued, especially in describing the situation in the GDR and in today's East Germany, that women have acquired an intrinsic interest in work and that work means much more to women than simply earning money. Unfortunately, such assertions are not usually backed by empirical evidence and, until now, there has been no relevant data that could address whether East German women stress the self-actualization aspect of work more than women from other countries. Even when such assertions are supported by survey data, they have tended to be based on summary measures of the
importance of work or the preference for a paid job, which confound the opportunity for self-fulfilment with economic necessity (see Dannenbeck and Keiser, 1992; Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1990; Spellerberg et al., 1992).

Contrary to the argument that in the former socialist countries women will place more emphasis on self-actualization than do those in the West, we hypothesize the opposite. In the West more emphasis will be given to the importance of work as a route to self-fulfilment and less to economic well-being, than in the East because, in market economies, female labor-force participation has been less mandatory, and women (and men) have had to fight for women's right to work, both in family settings and in society at large. This fight has been based not on economic necessity, but rather on women's rights and opportunities for independence.

In our subsequent analysis we first compare gender-role attitudes in East and West Germany and, thus, we can compare economic systems, while controlling for nation. This enables us to avoid at least some of the problems connected with linguistic and functional equivalence that plague most cross-national research. Even so, there are bound to be some differences in the meaning of questions in the two parts of Germany, because of the very different experiences and objective conditions (see Braun, 1992b). Thus, while for comparative purposes we assume some degree of indicator equivalence, we realize that it would be difficult to argue that our measures are exactly equivalent.

Gender-role attitudinal differences will need to be interpreted in the light of the different importance attached to work and family in the two Germanys. In East Germany, the importance of both 'one's family and children' and 'career and work' is much higher than in West Germany. Braun (1992b) argues that the higher importance rating for the family in East Germany should not be equated with more traditional attitudes, because the East Germans are no more traditional in their views about cohabitation than West Germans, and are far more liberal in attitudes towards abortion. Instead, East Germany's greater emphasis on the family should be regarded as a direct consequence of economic insecurity, with the family being regarded as an important refuge and source of social support.

Unfortunately, due to political restrictions on empirical social research in the former GDR, pre-reunification data are not available on comparable gender-role attitudes and a lot has changed in East Germany in the aftermath of reunification. Although we suspect that, in East Germany, conditions and attitudes have moved closer to those in the West, this trend can not be verified. Any differences, therefore, between East and West Germany have to be interpreted with caution, and can not simply be attributed to the effect of the former socialist organization of society, because this would imply that the only distinction between the two populations are concerned with historical differences in socialist or capitalist heritage. Yet it is obvious that the present conditions of the two parts of Germany are quite distinct.
In order to control for possible idiosyncrasies of the German case, we also consider cross-national data from Great Britain, the United States, Austria, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. The primary focus is on the comparison of socialist versus capitalist economic organization, and secondarily on differences between individual countries in the West.

In addition, there are several other variables that can not be ignored. Our previous research indicated that there are non-trivial intra-country differences of age, education, employment and, not surprisingly, gender. Younger cohorts and college educated are more favorable than older cohorts and less educated to a less traditional role for women. Moreover, there was a strong correlation in the US, Britain, and the former West Germany between attitudes and behavior, with women who work (or men whose wives work) looking on women's labor-force participation more favorably than full-time homemakers and their spouses. Women are more ideologically committed to women's independence through employment than men, and less fearful of negative consequences for the family and children. Gender differences relevant to this paper will be discussed, after our main hypotheses have been addressed.

**Gender-role attitude measurement issues**

Our earlier research addressed the question of the desirability of women's labor-force participation using a set of attitude measures asking whether and under what lifecourse circumstances 'women should work outside the home full-time, part-time or not at all' (see Alwin et al., 1992). The question asked specifically whether women should work before there are children, when there is a preschool child, when there is a child of school age, and after the children have left home. A major problem with using this approach to measuring the acceptance of women's labor-force participation is that it fails to distinguish the different reasons for why women should work, and, as we shall see, this inherent ambiguity is especially problematic for inter-cultural comparisons. Though there may be many different reasons for working, we would like to single out two pivotal concerns: the necessity to earn money and the desire for self-fulfilment. In reality, both motives may be present simultaneously, but structural variables and institutional characteristics should have a bearing on their relative importance. It is by no means easy, however, to determine whether women's employment is regarded more as an opportunity for self-actualization than an economic necessity. Survey data show that there is considerable support for women contributing to the family income (Alwin et al., 1992). Nevertheless, support for a married woman having a job is often confined to circumstances in which the job and the woman's family responsibilities are not in conflict, either because the child is at school or because the work is part-time (Scott and Duncombe, 1991). Under these conditions, even if the motive for working is not a purely economic one, self-fulfilment is clearly regarded...
as subservient to family responsibilities. In this paper, therefore, we make no attempt to
gauge whether independence or economic necessity is the most important motivation for
work within a given country, instead we restrict ourselves to a cross-national comparison of
the relative balance of these different motivations.

In our analysis we make use of a number of general gender-role items regarding the
consequences of women working for young children and the family, ideological reasoning
about the proper occupational role of women, and two aspects of the importance of work --
its contribution to female independence and the necessity of a double income. These
measures allow us to examine whether attitudes differ in the different domains. Some of
these domains relate closely to objective circumstances, for example, consequences for the
family and children are likely to be influenced by the availability and quality of alternative
sources of child-care. Similarly, the necessity of a double income is likely to relate to the
objective economic situation. Others reflect a more subjective orientation, such as gender-
role ideology and the possible contribution of work to the independence of the woman.

In the following sections we present data on the attitudes of women and men in East
and West Germany towards the different dimensions of gender-roles mentioned above: consequences of women working, gender ideology, and importance of work. We then
estimate different models that might help explain the differences in the two Germanys.
First, we introduce controls for a variety of demographic characteristics such as marital
status, schooling, women's labor-force participation, and presence of preschool children.
We then introduce a summary index of work values. Because the factors structuring male
and female attitudes may be different, we use separate models for men and women.
Finally, we widen our focus by examining gender-role attitudes in all eight ISSP countries,
and, more specifically, by comparing East Germany and Hungary with the Western
nations.

DATA AND METHODS

The data reported here come from two sources: the 1991 ALLBUS Baseline Study
in East and West Germany (see Zentralarchiv, 1992) and the 1988 International Social
Survey Program (ISSP) survey on the family (see Zentralarchiv, 1991). The former was
the first simultaneous study of the ALLBUS program (the German General Social Survey,
see Braun and Mohler, 1991) in both parts of Germany. Data from the ISSP were
collected in the eight nations which belonged to the confederation of national 'general
social surveys' (see Davis and Jowell, 1990).

It should be noted that ALLBUS and ISSP measures are broadly comparable but,
with some exceptions, not identical. There is considerable overlap in the two sets of
measures of gender-role attitudes, but there are several problems we encountered. First,
most of the ALLBUS items use a four-point response-scale with no 'can't choose' option
explicitly offered, while ISSP has a five-point Likert scale for all items, as well as allowing 'can't choose'. Second, the surveys were separated by time, with a three year interval between surveys. This means that cross-national comparisons may confound national differences with differential rates of change in gender-role attitudes between the different countries. Third, the ALLBUS study is a personal interview, while the ISSP is (as a general rule) administered as a self-completion, following a personal interview. Therefore, any direct comparisons of the East German data with those from the other ISSP countries seems unwarranted. Instead, West Germany has to be regarded as a crucial link between the two sources of data.

Measures

Our measures of gender-role attitudes are shown in Table 1, which lists the mnemonics, the exact question wording, the response type and the data source. The response alternatives for type (1) were: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree; and for type (2) were: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. Note that no explicit 'can't choose' option was offered in the ALLBUS, even if an ISSP item was employed.

The grouping of items into three categories (see Table 1) -- consequences of women working, gender ideology, and the importance of work -- was prompted primarily by theoretical considerations (see Scott, 1990). However, these groupings were also generally borne out in a factor analysis of the ISSP questions, in which we estimated exploratory factor models within each country, separately for men and women (see also Scott and Duncombe, 1991). In general, these factor analyses supported a three-factor model for these measures, although there were some inconsistencies in which the items were not always associated with the same factors. This may reflect, in part, the ambiguity of some of the items, which could result from differing interpretations of questions in different cultural contexts. But generally, the ISSP data support the separation of these items into the three categories noted in Table 1. In the ALLBUS data, in both parts of Germany, there were only two factors found to underlie the questions included. Such results are, of course, potentially interpretable in terms of national/cultural differences, although it is well known that the results of factor analysis are often dependent upon the particular items included in the analysis. In any case, we decided that because of the potential discrepancies in findings that might be due to the acceptance of a particular factor model, we would not use factor-based scores, but focus on the individual items instead. Factor scores are also undesirable for another reason: grouping items that display high amounts of absolute correlation ignores the marginal distributions of the component measures, and may conceal cross-national differences. For example, both of the items
### Table 1

Measures of Gender-Role Attitudes in the 1991 ALBUS and the 1988 ISSP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Label</th>
<th>Question Wording</th>
<th>Variable Type</th>
<th>Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSEQUENCES OF WOMEN WORKING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAWKWRM</td>
<td>A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALLBUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIDSUFFR</td>
<td>A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALLBUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEFAM</td>
<td>It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALLBUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMSUFR</td>
<td>All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETIFWRK</td>
<td>For a child it is even better if his or her mother works and not just takes care of the home and the family</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALLBUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAPIFWRK</td>
<td>A woman and her family will all be happier if she goes out to work.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENDER IDEOLOGY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEHELP</td>
<td>For a woman it is more important to help her husband with his career than to get ahead herself.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALLBUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENOUNCE</td>
<td>A married woman should renounce working if there is only a limited number of jobs and if her husband is able to provide the living for the family.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALLBUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMEKID</td>
<td>A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEWRK</td>
<td>Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUBBYWRK</td>
<td>A husband's job is to earn money, a wife's job is to look after the home and family.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMPORTANCE OF WORK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEJOBIND</td>
<td>Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ALLBUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWOINCS</td>
<td>Both the husband and wife should contribute to the household income.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ALLBUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISSP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
labeled 'importance of work' (FEJOBIND and TWOINCS) may correlate in all of the countries and load on the same factor, but if acceptance of the first item surpasses that of the second in some of the countries, while the reverse is true in others, then a composite measure would conceal the inter-country differences. In this analysis, therefore, we use single items and not composite scores.

Gender-role attitudes are not easy to measure and it is worth elaborating on some of the possible ambiguities in these items. The first item, MAWKWRM, may be interpreted either as being concerned with the emotional needs of the child, or with the capabilities of the mother. In Britain and the US where maternal deprivation theories have held such sway (e.g. Bowlby, 1971), emphasis may be given to the needs of the child, rather than the mother's capacity to juggle work and family roles. This child-need emphasis is made explicit and unambiguous in the second item, KIDSUFFER. The items FEFAM and FAMSUFFER, which are different in the two studies, are even more ambiguous, as the questions tap not only consequences for the family, but also whether working is beneficial for the woman herself, thus confounding consequences and gender-role ideology. Finally, HAPIFWRK is perhaps the most ambiguous item of all, because, in addition to confounding consequences and gender-role ideology, it may also tap the possible contribution of a double income to the economic well-being of the family. This confusion is made worse by some translations: for example, in Italy the phrase 'se la donna ha un lavoro' is used. This phrase refers to actual job status, 'if the woman has a job,' which has a quite different meaning than the intended general employment status, 'if she goes out to work'.

The first item of the 'importance of work' dimension, FEJOBIND is also problematic, especially in cross-national research. Leaving aside the possibility that a respondent does not want a woman to be independent, respondents may disagree with the item either because they do not consider having a job a sufficient condition, or because they do not consider it a necessary condition for women's independence. Moreover, people in different countries may interpret independence somewhat differently, with some placing emphasis on financial independence and others on autonomy in decision-making (Scott, 1990). Our hunch is that the economic interpretation may be more prominent in those countries where excessive financial hardship often follows in the wake of divorce; whereas in countries with a more developed welfare system, independence may be interpreted in terms of autonomy and equity in marital power. Even the 'double-income' item, TWOINCS, confuses these two possible interpretations: should the woman contribute to the household income because it is economically necessary, or because that would enhance her independence and self-fulfilment? One possible solution is to consider the two items in tandem: if more importance is attached to independence than to double income, then this may reflect a more pro-feminist stance.
As we argued above, one possible interpretation of gender-role attitudes in the two Germanys involves differences in work motivation among women. Thus, in order to better understand the nature of gender-role attitudes, we include several measures that get at the nature of work values. Specifically, we use a work value index constructed as a simple average from the valid responses to the following items:
- A job is just a way of earning money - no more.
- I would enjoy having a paid job even if I did not need the money.
- Work is a person’s most important activity.

In addition, we also consider importance ratings for the two areas of life: 'one's own family and children' and 'career and work'. For these, respondents were given a seven-point scale with only the end-points labeled as 'unimportant'(1) and 'important'(7), respectively. In the analyses we dichotomize the distribution by collapsing categories 1 through 6, as the bulk of the responses for these items is at the extreme positive end.

In this paper we compare mean scores of individual gender-role items both within and between countries. Despite some well-founded concern about this strategy in comparative research when limited to single variables (Küchler, 1987), we think that it is warranted here, because we compare patterns of cross-national differences for many different measures, and we rely on multivariate models that control for important composition variables. In the following tables our dependent variables are recoded so that high values always indicate less traditional attitudes.

RESULTS
Comparison of Gender-Role Attitudes in East and West Germany

Before discussing the results concerning gender-role attitudes, it is useful to summarize the relevant demographic differences in the two Germanys. Table 2 shows the distribution of cohort, marital status, schooling, the presence of children in the household, and women’s labor-force participation, separately for men and women. The most striking difference between East and West Germany is in female labor-force participation: in the East almost 70% of married women worked at the time of the survey, against only 50% in the West. Moreover, among those who work, more than two thirds pursue full-time employment in the East, while in the West less than one-half have full-time jobs. It should also be noted that when the 'not working' category -- excluding those who are retired-- is considered (not shown), the overwhelming majority not working in West Germany are homemakers, whereas, in East Germany, they are unemployed.

The East Germans also show a stronger orientation to the family with fewer 'never married' men and women than in the West and with more who are 'currently married'. In addition, the number of households with children is higher in the East. As we suggested
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Characteristics</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre 1930</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1949</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1973</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently married</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated/Divorced</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Married</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level I</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level II</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level III</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level IV</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level V</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level VI</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level VII</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children 1-17 yrs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>currently in HU</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children 1-5 yrs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>currently in HU</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female currently working&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No spouse&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Married R's Only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female currently working&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>2</sup>Includes married and living together (partners).

<sup>3</sup>Refers to female respondents and spouses or partners of male respondents.

<sup>4</sup>This category applies to men only.
earlier, the East Germans tend to place greater importance on the family, not because of more traditional values, but rather because the family is seen as a crucial private refuge. There are marked differences between East and West Germany with regard to the perceived consequences of women working. East Germans are much more likely than West Germans to hold that 'a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work' (MAWKWM), and that 'it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and the family' (FEFAM), and to reject that 'a preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works' (KIDSUFFER). They are also more likely than West Germans to concur that 'for a child it is even better if his or her mother works and not just takes care of the home and the family' (BETIFWRK). All of these differences between the two parts of Germany are similar for both men and women, and are highly significant.

This divergence in views concerning the consequences of mothers working is presumably due not only to the very different past experiences of the two Germanys but also, to a lesser extent, differences in the present situation. In the former GDR nearly all women and, by extension, a vast majority of men had immediate experiences with the dual role of the woman as mother and worker. Not only was the working mother the norm, but also women's dual role reflected a way of life promulgated by state ideology and fostered by the provision of alternative child-care arrangements. At the time of the survey, East Germany had an extensive child-care system that was run and paid for by the state and employers; although, following reunification, this facility is likely to be reduced to the far more restricted level of child-care available in West Germany. In West Germany there is little provision for the conflicting needs of work and the family, and, generally, employers do not provide day care facilities at all. Moreover, the usefulness of both public and private creches and kindergartens is limited by their highly restricted hours, which make life difficult for parents whose work-hours are irregular. Thus many working parents have to supplement child-care arrangements with assistance from kin, friends, neighbors, or babysitters. Similar problems continue when children reach school-age, as it is rare for German schools to offer meals, and the school day usually ends very early. For these reasons, combining motherhood and employment is far more difficult for West Germans, than was the case in the East. It is, therefore, not surprising that West Germans are more likely than East Germans to perceive the negative consequences for families of working mothers: without institutional support, juggling work and family responsibilities may well result in high levels of stress, for both parents and children.

Although there are strong differences between East and West Germans in their perceptions of the consequences of women working, there is less difference between the two parts of Germany with respect to 'gender ideology'. Surprisingly, there is no difference in the
Table 3

Gender-Role Attitudes by Country and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Role Attitudes</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Consequences of Women Working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. (HAWKURM)</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>62.73</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>147.94</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works. (KIDSUFFR)</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>78.38</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>77.60</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family. (FEFAM)</td>
<td>72.90</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>40.56</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For a child it is even better if his or her mother works and not just takes care of the home and the family. (BETIFWRK)</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>100.46</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>175.45</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Gender Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For a woman it is more important to help her husband with his career than to get ahead herself. (FEHELP)</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>p=0.81</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>p=0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A married woman should renounce working if there is only a limited number of jobs and if her husband is able to provide the living for the family. (RENOUENCE)</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>17.25</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>p=0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Importance of Work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person. (FEJOBIND)</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>p=0.03</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income. (TWIINCS)</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>186.61</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>224.94</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Variables are scored so that high reflects pro-feminist attitudes.
level of agreement that 'For a woman it is more important to help her husband with his
career than to get ahead herself' (FEHELP). East Germans are more 'pro-feminist' than
West Germans in rejecting the statement that 'A married woman should renounce working
if there is only a limited number of jobs and if her husband is able to provide the living for
the family' (RENOUNCE). However, given that in the former GDR there was near
universal labor-force participation of women and there was an ideological commitment to
the emancipation of women through 'right to work' legislation, rejection of this item is
surprisingly low.

The fact that, in East Germany, public opinion is not more committed ideologically
to gender-role egalitarianism requires further explanation. Perhaps one reason is that the
so-called women's emancipation in East Germany was decreed by the state. Women did not
have to fight for their right to work -- either in their own families or at the societal level.
Instead, it was imposed on them by the paternalistic state, through party decrees. In
addition, there has been little public discussion of these issues, and there has been no
independent feminist movement, to contribute to consciousness-raising among the grass­
roots.

Thus, where attitudes reflect the different objective situation -- as is the case for the
consequences of women working -- the two Germanys are far apart. By contrast, there is
less difference between East and West Germany on questions of ideology that reflect deep­
seated values about gender-roles. Socialism has had surprisingly little impact on these
ideological values, despite a deliberate commitment to changing traditional gender-roles.
This is not to say that gender-role ideology has the same origins in the two parts of
Germany, and we have no means of determining the degree of attitude change over the 40
years, since the separation. But what is clear is that the socialist system has only been
marginally more successful than Western liberal democracies in its attempt to undermine
traditional gender-role beliefs.

As we indicated above, both items concerning the importance of work are somewhat
ambiguous, and therefore it is better to consider the relative strengths of these items than
single marginal distributions. There is a far greater difference between the two parts of
Germany with respect to the question whether 'both the husband and the wife should
contribute to the household income' (TWOINCS), with the East Germans displaying nearly
universal acceptance, while East Germans are only slightly (although still significantly)
more likely than West Germans to endorse the statement that 'having a job is the best way
for a woman to be an independent person' (FEJOBIND). Thus, it is really only on the
economic necessity of two incomes that the two Germanys differ substantially. Moreover,
in the West, there is higher support for a job being the means to independence rather than
income, but the reverse is true in the East. Again, the item tapping the necessity of two
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>East Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Family and Children</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>6.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F 17.56</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>33.97</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Occupation and Work</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>6.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F 45.12</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
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<td>WORK VALUES</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work without money</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F 81.44</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>18.77</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only money important</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F 0.834</td>
<td>p=0.85</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>p=0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job most important</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F 160.11</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>200.49</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Values Index</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3.37</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F 162.63</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
<td>129.46</td>
<td>p=0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
incomes is likely to reflect objective circumstances, and attitudinal differences between the two parts of Germany may be reduced, once we control for structural differences in labor-force participation, education and other background variables. However, before presenting the results of a multivariate analysis of gender-role attitudes, we first discuss the relative importance given to family and work in East and West Germany.

In order to better understand the nature of the difference between the gender-role attitudes of the two Germanys with respect to the 'importance of women working', we considered the possibility that the differential emphasis on work and family in these contexts could help account for the difference observed above concerning the economic necessity of women working (especially TWOINCS). As indicated in Table 4, East Germans place a greater emphasis on the importance of work and the economic necessity of working. This may, then, in part explain the differences in gender-role attitudes. We turn to this issue momentarily, but we should also perhaps point out that East Germans also place higher importance on family and children, so it is not as if the difference entails an orientation that places emphasis on work to the neglect of the family. This also might suggest a rating bias, that is, the East Germans may express a 'halo effect' in many realms of their lives, due to the 'shock' of recent exposure to the West. In any event, we explore the extent to which these aspects of work values may help account for the gender-role attitude differences documented above.

Multivariate Analysis A number of different regression models for gender-role attitudes, which successively introduce controls for demographic variables, labor-force participation and children, and work values are shown in Table 5. The purpose of these analyses is to determine whether the East-West attitudinal difference (shown as a mean difference in model 1) persists when structural conditions and value orientations are held constant. First, it can be seen in model 2, that controls for marital status, birth cohort, and level of schooling have very little effect on the mean difference between countries. This result is hardly surprising, for although these factors do relate to gender-role attitudes (see Alwin et al, 1992), the distributions of cohort, marital status and schooling are not that dissimilar in the two Germanys (see Table 2). Therefore, we include them as controls primarily to increase the statistical power in evaluating the effects of the other factors considered.

Second, female labor-force participation and the presence of preschool children variables do not reduce the difference between East and West Germany in most cases. A slight reduction, however, does occur for MAWKWRM, KIDSUFFER, RENOUNCE, and BETIFWRK and, although this only marginally affects the East-West difference, it is consistent with our argument that work experience is positively related to more egalitarian attitudes. Specifically, we argue that if women work this increases their own and their
Table 5
Multivariate Analysis of Gender-Role Attitudes in West and East Germany: 1991 ALLBUS Baseline Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>MAUKVRM</th>
<th>KIDSUFFR</th>
<th>FEFAM</th>
<th>BETIFURK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>MALE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.50***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N^5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>FEHELP</th>
<th>RENOUNCE</th>
<th>FEJOBIND</th>
<th>TWOINC5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>MALE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Mean</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.17***</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N^5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^Married males only
**<.05
***<.01
****<.001

Model 1: Mean difference between countries, no controls.
Model 2: Model 1 plus controls for marital status, birth-cohort category and level of schooling.
Model 3: Model 2 plus controls for women's labor-force participation and presence of preschool children.
Model 4: Model 3 plus controls for work values.
spouse's pro-feminist attitudes, and, since the two Germanys differ with respect to female labor-force employment, this will account for at least some of the gender-role attitudinal differences, seen earlier in Table 3. Although the effect of controlling for labor-force participation and presence of school-children is slight, it is in the expected direction.

Third, by including controls for 'work values' in model 4, we substantially reduce the difference in the two items concerned with the importance of work, namely FEJOBIND and TWOINC. In the case of FEJOBIND the difference, which was quite small before any controls were introduced, is reduced to virtually zero; and, in the case of TWOINC, the difference is reduced markedly, especially among women. In addition, the work values control makes a small reduction in most of those items where a difference between gender-role attitudes in East and West Germany remains.2 Thus the difference in orientation to work in the two Germanys is clearly a crucial factor in explaining gender-role attitudinal differences, especially for those items which differentiate between the importance of work for economic reasons or for women's independence.

Intermediary conclusion: the German case
In the above analysis we have tried to bring empirical data to bear on the question of East-West differences in gender-role attitudes and its linkage to female labor-force participation and work values. By examining these issues in a multivariate context, we have avoided some of the problems of looking at univariate frequency data (see Küchler, 1987). And while we have explained some of the differences observed between the two countries, most were left unaccounted for, and it is a major challenge to arrive at an unequivocal explanation for the results. It is difficult to know to what extent the remaining differences reflect differences in recent economic experiences, social structural differences, the differential influences of the mass media, differences in political ideology, or unmeasured 'cultural' differences between the two Germanys. We, thus, offer the following tentative conclusions.

Is the difference between East and West German attitudes towards women's dual role one of 'self-actualization' versus 'economic necessity'? The data here do not allow us to answer this question decisively. However, we can say, with some certainty, that East Germans are more favorable to the non-familial role of women than West Germans, but that while there is near universal conviction in East Germany of the economic necessity for women working there is relatively less support for work as

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2 Additional analyses were done with importance ratings for for 'one's own family and children' and 'career and work' described above. However, the inclusion of these items along with work values does not reduce the mean difference between countries any further. We do not, therefore, present these additional models in Table 5.
important for women's independence. If economic hardship is reduced in East Germany in the coming years, then East-West gender-role attitudinal differences may vanish.

In addition, there is a consistent difference between the two Germanys in the perceived consequences of women working. We attribute this in part to systemic differences in child-care arrangements, although further exploration of this explanation will be necessary. In 1989, for example, there were places for 95% of the 3-6 year old preschool children in East Germany, whereas for West Germany in 1986, this figure was 80%. In 1960, the figures were 30% and 45% respectively, so while there has been growth in access to child-care in both Germanys, nonfamilial opportunities for preschool child-care were more pervasive in the East, prior to reunification (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 1992). This could account for the findings reported here, although it is also necessary to take into consideration the social meaning of work, popular conceptions of the importance of maternal presence in early child development, and the perceived adequacy of child-care in the two systems. In any event, if there is a linkage between possibilities of adequate child-care and gender-role attitudes regarding consequences to children, there may be a future change in this dimension, as East German women become accustomed to the more constricted child-care system of the FRG.

These interpretations implicitly suggest that the differing ideologies that existed between the two Germanys had no profound effect on gender-role beliefs into the 1990s. We hope to continue to explore this question when, in 1994, the ISSP plans to replicate these gender-role attitudes to the extent possible. Existing data do not permit extensive elaboration on this issue, due to the inclusion of only one socialist country (Hungary) in the 1988 ISSP module. However, it is possible to explore gender-role attitudes across a broad spectrum of countries: West Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, and the formerly socialist Hungary.

Attitudes towards gender-roles in the ISSP-Countries

Among the capitalist countries, the United States is, overall, least traditional in their views concerning the negative consequences of women working. The two other English speaking countries in the sample, Britain and Ireland, as well as the Netherlands are somewhat less pro-feminist. The two German speaking countries, West Germany and Austria, are most likely to hold beliefs that female labor-force participation is detrimental to children and the family. In this paper, however, we are not interested in explaining the individual country differences in attitudes, instead we will focus on the East-West difference. The contrast,

3 Unlike the other consequence items, MAWKWRM is more likely to be endorsed by the German speaking nations than by Anglo-Saxons. This, as we discussed in the
## Table 6

Gender-Role Attitudes by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender-Role Attitudes</th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Aus</th>
<th>Hun</th>
<th>Meth</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Consequences of Women Working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. MAUWARM</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. KIDSUFFER</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. FAMSUFFR</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. HAPIFURK</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>2.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Gender Ideology</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. H0MEKID</td>
<td>2.95</td>
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<td>3.09</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. HOUSEWRK</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. HUBBYWRK</td>
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<td>3.36</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>3.43</td>
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<td>3.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>III. Importance of Work</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. FEJOBIND</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>3.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. TWINICS</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>3.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>2797</td>
<td>1276</td>
<td>1362</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>1636</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
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</table>
however, between the two former socialist countries — East Germany and Hungary — is of relevance, because, in many respects, East German attitudes are more similar to those held in the West than in Hungary.

The two socialist countries have quite different gender-role attitudes in comparison to West Germany. (West-German attitudes are a necessary base-line for comparison, because East Germany was not included in the ISSP data). East Germans are far more optimistic than West-Germans, regarding the negative consequences of working mothers; whereas Hungarians are not only more sceptical about the quality of relationship a working mother can form with her child (MARKWRM) but are also as pessimistic as the West-Germans about pre-school children suffering. These differences between East Germany and Hungary will require further explanation, because, in many respects, the two socialist countries are very similar. Still, the divergence of gender-role attitudes suggests that there is little commonality due to sharing similar economic and political systems during the state-socialist era in Eastern Europe.

Hungary, like the GDR, had an extremely high female labor-force participation, with virtually all non-disabled women working. In addition, the Hungarian state also provided extensive and high standard day care for young children, and facilitated the employment of mothers by making their work demands relatively less onerous (Rueschemeyer and Szelenyi, 1989). Furthermore, both populations have dramatically declining birth rates, far below replacement level.

Yet, despite these similarities, important differences remain between Hungary and East Germany, that can help explain the substantial differences in attitudes towards women's role in these two former state socialist countries. Hungary was, until recently, a basically agrarian society, and although economic necessity combined with the tenets of socialist ideology to create favorable working conditions for women, there was little attempt to overturn traditional gender roles. In Hungary, there has been open discussion of the negative consequences of women's labor-force participation for family life, with working women blamed for rising divorce-rates, the steady increase in single-parent families, and the low birth-rates.

In addition, Hungarian women were largely excluded from the lucrative second economy, because of marked sex-segregation in the labor-force. This increased the introduction, is probably due to a different interpretation of the question in the different cultural contexts, with Anglo-Saxons focusing more on maternal deprivation, and Germans more on women's capacity to manage dual roles. It is also worth noting that the pro-feminist stance taken by Italians for HAPIFWRK and HOUSEWRK are both likely due to translation problems, with the Italian reference being whether the woman has a job, rather than whether she is working. Thus, the question may provoke a comparison of employment and unemployment, rather than a comparison with the voluntarily chosen home-maker role.
inequality between male and female earnings, and may, in consequence, have made female labor-force participation less attractive. By contrast, the GDR had a higher percentage of women fully integrated into economic life and, in public rhetoric at least, maintained the compatibility of women being committed both to work and family life. Moreover, as other data from the ISSP survey show, Hungarians regard all alternative sources of caring for children (including that of relatives, friends, and neighbors) as largely inadequate, which suggests that the gender-role attitudes of Hungarians reflect traditional beliefs about maternal responsibility, rather than concern with the quality of public child-care.

Regarding attitudes within the domain we labeled 'gender ideology', the British are, among the Western democracies, the most pro-feminist in their belief that the woman's place is not necessarily in the home, followed by the Americans and Dutch. The Irish, who were relatively egalitarian in their views of the consequences of women working, are as traditional as the Germans and Austrians with respect to gender-role ideology. It should be remembered that the East Germans were only marginally more pro-feminist on one of the two ideology items than the West Germans. However, the Hungarians are considerably more traditional than any other country, when it comes to ideology concerning the woman's role. Thus Hungarians widely endorse the view that housework is as fulfilling as a paid job and they believe that what most women really want is a home and children. As this attitude is widely shared by both men and women, it seems reasonable to suppose that Hungarian women are forced into the labor-market by economic necessity and do not regard a paid job as a means of self-actualization. This conjecture is supported by the items concerned with the importance of work, which are discussed below.

With respect to the 'importance of work' domain, Germany, Britain, Austria, and the Netherlands all give more support to a job being important for independence (FEJOBIND) than to the economic necessity of two incomes (TWOINCS). One possible explanation why Americans give relatively less support to independence than economic necessity, is that independence may be associated more closely with financial independence than is the case in Europe. In the States, paid work is also more financially critical for women, both because of the bleaker prospects faced by women and children in the aftermath of divorce, and also because of the necessity of obtaining employer contributions to health insurance. The Dutch, on the other hand, with their relatively generous welfare provisions, are the least likely to mention the necessity of a double income.

Hungary and, as we have already seen, East Germany show extremely high support for both the husband and wife contributing to the household income, with relatively less support for the independence item. It is true that incomes are much lower in both Eastern countries so that the economic necessity of a double income should be higher. But
the economic hardship in the former socialist countries does not explain why there is relatively little support for a job as a means to a woman's independence. This finding, together with the earlier findings concerning gender-role ideology, suggests that attitudes in the former socialist countries are either more traditional (as in Hungary) or at least no more liberal (as in East Germany) than in the Western democracies.

**Gender-differences in gender-role attitudes**

The focus of this paper is on East-West differences in gender attitudes, and, by and large, we have found that the socialist system has been no more successful in undermining traditional gender-role beliefs than liberal (or less liberal) Western democracies. This result, however, will come as no surprise to feminists who assert the dominance of patriarchal structures both in the West and the East (e.g. Dölling, 1991). In our earlier research we found that women were consistently more egalitarian than men in their gender-role attitudes concerning the negative consequences of mothers working. This is also attested to by a growing body of literature. In addition, we found that both women who work and men whose wives work are also more egalitarian, although the gender differences persist among those directly experiencing female employment (Alwin et al., 1992). This finding is broadly true of all the eight countries considered in this paper (not shown). The difference in degree of gender difference in attitudes by country would be interesting to explore further (e.g. its relation to feminist movements and family legislation), but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

**CONCLUSION**

The main focus of this paper was on the differences between the East and West in attitudes towards women's familial role and their role in the labor-market. We were unconvinced by the popular claim that women in (former) socialist countries place greater emphasis on the intrinsic value of a job for self-actualization than do women in the West. Our scepticism was because in socialist countries women's labor market emancipation has been by decree, rather than by popular choice. Our hypothesis was the opposite: work will be more valued as a means to self-fulfilment in the West, where women's paid employment is less mandatory and where the struggle for women's right to work has been fought in terms of individual freedom.

In order to test this hypothesis we first compared different gender-role attitudes of East and West Germans. Our results indicate that the main differences that occur are readily explainable by differences in past structural conditions, or to a lesser extent, present realities. For example, in East Germany, where child-care and employment conditions facilitated women working, there is far less pessimism concerning possible negative consequences of working mothers for families and children. Similarly, it is hardly
surprising that given the realities of economic life in East Germany, there is almost unanimous support for the need of a double income. However, there is no difference at all between East and West Germans in their belief that a woman should give precedence to her husband's career over her own. Even on the item that asked whether women should be willing to renounce her job, if jobs were scarce, the East Germans were only slightly less willing than West Germans to sacrifice women's right to work. These results cast substantial doubt on the success of socialist ideology in undermining traditional gender-role beliefs.

In order to establish whether the gender-role attitudinal differences between East and West Germany disappear when demographic and structural differences are controlled, we estimated several regression models. Controlling for labor-force participation and presence of children does reduce the difference between the two Germanys, suggesting that the greater work experience of East Germany does heighten pro-feminist beliefs. However, the most important finding was that the difference in attitudes concerning why work is important for women is substantially reduced when underlying work values are controlled. This implies that gender-role attitude differences in the East and West are somewhat superficial and the basis of the present differences is job insecurity and penury.

Finally, we enlarged our focus to take in the other seven countries that were part of the International Social Survey Program, in order to be able to contrast East Germany and Hungary with the Western democracies. Our findings indicate that there are no clear-cut East and West differences, except for the high emphasis placed by the (former) socialist countries on the need for a double income. Instead, we found that inter-country differences depended on what aspect of gender-role attitudes was being considered. Yet, overall, the German speaking countries (FRG and Austria) were more traditional in their gender-role attitudes than the Anglo-Saxon countries and the Netherlands. East Germany (like the Anglo-Saxon countries) was relatively optimistic in rejecting possible negative consequences of women working; whereas the Hungarians, despite their high quality public child-care, were far more sceptical (like West-Germans) and remained committed to the traditional maternal role. In fact Hungarians appeared to be rather traditional on all the various gender-role dimensions (except the need of a double income), suggesting that there has been little change in traditional gender-role beliefs that were prevalent when Hungary was mainly an agrarian society.

We conclude, therefore, that self-actualization in a job has at least no higher importance in the former socialist countries than in the Western democracies. Indeed, in Hungary, attitudes are so traditional that women's self-actualization is viewed almost exclusively as being through their familial role. Even in East Germany there is reason to believe that more egalitarian gender-role attitudes may be undermined once economic
hardship is reduced. Thus it is clear that socialism, which tried to achieve the professional
emancipation of the woman by decree, has not succeeded in eliminating traditional gender-
role attitudes.

In the West, as we stated at the outset, there has been a dramatic increase in the
proportion of married women who are employed outside the home and this change is
widely regarded as both being a consequence of attitudinal changes, and a likely cause of
further change towards more egalitarian attitudes. This paper, however, shows clearly that
high female labor-force participation alone does not automatically lead to liberal gender-
role attitudes. Nor do low rates of women working indicate traditionalism, as in the Dutch
case, where comparatively low rates of female labor-force participation go together with
relatively liberal attitudes. Conflicts in the work and family role of women are also not
removed by widespread child-care or state legislation to improve the conditions of working
mothers. Of course, such steps are desirable and can do much to ease the conflicts and
reduce the strain on women and their children. Perhaps, however, real changes in gender-
role attitudes will only occur when societies, whether socialist or capitalist, think as readily
in terms of reducing the work and family conflicts for men and their children.
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