

The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates

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The Summa Halensis

Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie



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The Summa Halensis



Doctrines and Debates

Edited by
Lydia Schumacher

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Simon Maria Kopf and Lydia Schumacher

A Guide to Citing the *Summa Halensis*

When citing the Quaracchi edition of the Franciscan Fathers, we suggest and use in this volume the following form as a standardized way of citing the *Summa Halensis*:

Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol III, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2 (n. 162), Solutio, p. 179.

The relevant text divisions of the Quaracchi edition include, in the following order:

Vol–	Volume (<i>tomus</i>)
P–	Part (<i>pars</i>)
In–	Inquiry (<i>inquisitio</i>)
Tr–	Tract (<i>tractatus</i>)
S–	Section (<i>sectio</i>)
Q–	Question (<i>quaestio</i>)
Ti–	Title (<i>titulus</i>)
D–	Distinction (<i>distinctio</i>)
M–	Member (<i>membrum</i>)
C–	Chapter (<i>caput</i>)
Ar–	Article (<i>articulus</i>)
Pr–	Problem (<i>problema</i>)
Pa–	Particle (<i>particula</i>)
(n[n].)–	Paragraph number[s]

A further specification of the thus determined entity (to be cited as given in the edition) might, at this point, include:

[arg.]–	Objections
Respondeo/Solutio–	Answer
(Sed) Contra–	On the Contrary
Ad obiecta–	Answers to Objections
p[p]–	Page number[s].

The second instance of citation should read as follows (including all relevant text divisions):

SH III, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2 (n. 162), Solutio, p. 179.

Note that according to our proposal the number after *SH* indicates the volume number (*tomus*) of the Quaracchi edition—and not the book (*liber*) of the *Summa Halensis*. Hence *SH I* refers to Book 1, *SH II* to Book 2.1, *SH III* to Book 2.2, and *SH IV* to Book 3, respectively. The unedited Book 4, which is not part of the Quaracchi edition, will be cited, with reference to the respective edition, as *SH Bk IV*.

Where it would not lead to confusion, a shorthand could be used for further citations:

SH III (n. 162), p. 179.

Please note that all translations of the *Summa Halensis* and other texts belong to the author, unless otherwise noted.

Lydia Schumacher

The *Summa Halensis*: Doctrines and Debates

Introduction

The Franciscan intellectual tradition as it developed before Bonaventure, and above all, Duns Scotus, has not been the subject of much scholarly attention over the years. By most accounts, Bonaventure's forebears, and even Bonaventure himself, worked primarily to systematize the intellectual tradition of Augustine that had prevailed for most of the earlier Middle Ages.¹ In contrast, Scotus is supposed to have broken with past precedent to develop innovative philosophical and theological positions that anticipated the rise of modern thought. Thus, Scotus and his successors have been the focus of many studies, while his predecessors are deemed largely insignificant for the further history of thought.²

This volume and another that accompanies it will make a case for the innovativeness of early Franciscan thought, which the editor has also advanced elsewhere.³ The contributions are based on proceedings from four conferences which were held over the course of 2018 and sponsored by the European Research Council. While these conferences concerned the early Franciscan tradition in general, their more specific focus was the so-called *Summa Halensis*, a massive text that was collaboratively authored by the founding members of the Franciscan school at Paris between 1236 and 1245, in an attempt to lay down a distinctly Franciscan intellectual tradition for the very first time. Although some final additions to the text were made in 1255–6, the *Summa* was mostly composed during the second quarter of the thirteenth century and thus within the first 50 years of the existence of the University of Paris, which was founded around 1200 and served as the centre for theological study at the time. In countless respects, it laid the foundation for the further development of the Franciscan intellectual tradition.

The need for a text like the *Summa* was precipitated in part by the rapid growth of the Franciscan order—from 12 members in 1209 to as many as 20,000 by 1250—the

1 Ignatius Brady, 'The *Summa Theologica* of Alexander of Hales (1242–1248),' *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 70 (1977): 437–47; Étienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St Bonaventure* (Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1965). See also A.-M. Hamelin, *L'école franciscaine de ses débuts jusqu'à l'occasionalisme*, *Analecta mediaevalia Namurcensia*, 12 (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1961); Christopher Cullen, *Bonaventure* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

2 Olivier Boulnois, *Être et représentation: Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999); Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990).

3 The accompanying edited volume is published by De Gruyter under the title, *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*. See also Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

most gifted of whom required a basis for their scholarly formation. As a matter of fact, the *Summa* was the text on which the likes of Bonaventure and Scotus were inducted into their order's intellectual tradition.⁴ Bonaventure, for one, credits everything he learned to his 'master and father' Alexander of Hales, which is scarcely an exaggeration.⁵ As is well documented, the rapid emergence of a scholarly division within the order quickly gave rise to considerable controversy both within and outside of its membership. While some largely lay Franciscans, particularly those who had known Francis, questioned the compatibility of studies with the Franciscan ideal of poverty, the 'secular' masters at the young university, namely, those who were not associated with a religious order, perceived the friars as competitors for students, prestige, and ultimately as a threat to their personal income.

One of the ways that the Franciscans sought to defend their stake in university life involved attempts to 'out-do' the secular masters in terms of the scope and extent of the theological texts they produced. The Franciscans were aided in this regard by the entrance of Alexander of Hales into the order in 1236, which instigated the production of the *Summa Halensis* itself. In his already long and distinguished career, Alexander had been celebrated as one of the most sophisticated and significant theologians in the Parisian Faculty of Theology.⁶ As is well known, he championed the effort to give a central place in the university timetable to lectures on Lombard's *Sentences*, in addition to the Bible. Furthermore, he composed one of the earliest *Sentences* Commentaries, eventually establishing this practice as the key to obtaining the license to teach theology, the medieval equivalent to the doctoral degree.⁷ By acquiring such a distinguished scholar amongst their ranks, the Franciscans captured their place in the university at a time when higher education was fast becoming the precondition for religious and spiritual authority and thus essential to the very survival of the order.⁸ More immediately, they gained the human resource needed to oversee the project that ultimately resulted in the *Summa* that bears Hales' name.

Although Alexander certainly oversaw the work of the *Summa* and contributed a great deal to it, whether indirectly or directly, the editors of the fourth tome, led by Victorin Doucet, eventually clarified that other Franciscans were involved in its composition as well.⁹ This was something that the editors of tomes 1–3, overseen by Ber-

⁴ Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 126.

⁵ Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi: in librum II* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), Prologue, Lib II, d 23, a 2, q e (II, 547).

⁶ Keenan B. Osborne, 'Alexander of Hales,' in *The History of Franciscan Theology*, ed. Keenan B. Osborne (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2007), 1–38.

⁷ Philipp W. Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's Sentences* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

⁸ Neslihan Senocak, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order 1209–1310* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2012).

⁹ Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summa Fratris Alexandri";' in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948); Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the *Summa*,' *Francis-*

nard Klumper, had insisted on denying, in the face of mounting evidence against a single author. As Doucet showed, the first and fourth tomes were likely authored primarily by Alexander's chief collaborator, John of La Rochelle, who had plans to prepare a *Summa* of his own before Alexander entered the order and his services became otherwise enlisted. Most probably, tomes 2 and 3 were prepared by a third redactor, who worked on the basis of John and Alexander's authentic works but did not always follow them exactly.

The multiple authorship has been one reason for the *Summa*'s neglect, as modern scholars have tended to focus on single-authored works by a known author. However, the *Summa Halensis* is significant precisely because it represents the 'collective mind' of the founders of the Franciscan intellectual tradition at Paris and their attempt to articulate the contours of this tradition for the very first time.¹⁰ Far from a compilation of relatively disjointed sections, the *Summa* exhibits remarkable coherence and an overarching vision, and it contains many ideas that would quickly become defining features of Franciscan thought.

This is confirmed by manuscript evidence, which illustrates that the first three volumes were received as a whole following the deaths of John and Alexander in 1245.¹¹ Such evidence is strengthened by the fact that only two small additions and no major corrections were made to these volumes in 1255–6, when Pope Alexander IV ordered William of Melitona, then head of the Franciscan school at Paris, to enlist any help he needed from learned friars to complete the last volume on the sacraments, which was not composed by Alexander and John and has yet to be prepared in a modern critical edition.¹²

Because of its collaborative nature, the *Summa* effort ultimately resulted in an entirely unprecedented intellectual achievement. There were of course other great works of a systematic nature that did precede it, including many Commentaries on Lombard's *Sentences* and other early *Summae* like the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre and the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor. However, the text that is by far the largest among these, namely, the *Summa aurea*, contains only 818 questions for discussion by comparison to the *Summa*'s 3,408, as Ayelet Even-Ezra shows in her contribution to these volumes. There is virtually no comparison in size between the *Summa* and earlier texts.

can Studies 7 (1947): 26–41; Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the *Summa* (Continued),' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 274–312.

10 Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 327–31.

11 Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the *Summa*,' 296–302. See also Palemon Glorieux, 'Les années 1242–1247 à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 29 (1962), 234–49.

12 Robert Prentice, O.F.M., 'The *De fontibus paradisi* of Alexander IV on the *Summa Theologica* of Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945), 350–1. The additions include *SH* 1, *De missione visibili*, 514–18; 2: *De corpore humano*, 501–630; *De coniuncto-humano*, 631–784.

In many respects, this *Summa* was the first major contribution to the *Summa* genre for which scholasticism became famous, which served as a prototype for further instalments in the genre, including Thomas Aquinas' magisterial *Summa Theologiae*, which only began to be composed twenty years after the *Summa Halensis* was completed. Although Thomas Aquinas took a different view from his Franciscan counterparts on many issues, a comparison of the two texts shows that he adopted many topics of discussion from them which indeed became common topics of scholastic discussion more generally. For example, he inherited from them the idea for his famous 'five ways' to prove God's existence, the notion of eternal law, his account of the passions, and a structure for dealing with questions on the soul.

A major reason for the unprecedented size and scope of the *Summa* is that it incorporated an unmatched number of sources into its discussions. These included the traditional patristic sources that can be found in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, along with the newly translated Greek patristic sources of Pseudo-Dionysius and John of Damascus, whom Lombard had begun to use in a preliminary way. The Summists also engage with more recent sources from the 11th and 12th centuries, including Anselm of Canterbury, whose works had largely been neglected until Alexander and his colleagues took an interest in them, as well as Hugh and Richard of St Victor and Bernard of Clairvaux. The *Summa* even maintains a dialogue with earlier contemporaries like William and Philip the Chancellor.

Of special note amongst the *Summa's* sources are many philosophical texts that had recently become available in the West in Latin translations. This in fact is one reason why the size of the *Summa* mushroomed so significantly, namely, because it was the first systematic treatise extensively and comprehensively to incorporate philosophical questions—about the nature of reality and knowledge for instance—into its treatment of how the world comes from and relates to its divine source. This is also a significant respect in which it set the agenda and terms of further scholastic debate. A common misperception of the scholastic period is that the incorporation of philosophy into the scope of theological inquiry was due largely to the rediscovery of Aristotle. This may have been true for the generation of Aquinas, but there was a period of about 100 years, between 1150 and 1250, when Latin access to Aristotle was patchy and riddled with problems.

A basic problem concerned the fact that the Aristotelian translations from Greek were not perceived to be of a high quality, and they were sometimes partial and were not produced all at once. For this reason, scholars during this period tended to rely much more heavily on the readily available work of the Islamic scholar Avicenna, whose writings translated from Arabic were of a much higher quality and became available all at once, between 1152 and 1166. Although Avicenna took Aristotle's texts as a point of departure, he proceeded from there to develop a system of thought that is nonetheless incommensurable with Aristotle's and in many respects advances beyond it, not least by incorporating a Neo-Platonic dimension. At the time, the Neo-Platonist reading of Aristotle was not uncommon, as it had long been proffered in the

Greek and Arabic commentary traditions on Aristotle, not least on the basis of spurious Aristotelian works like *The Theology of Aristotle*.

Although Latin thinkers did not have this work until the Renaissance, they possessed a variation on it in the *Liber de causis*, which Aquinas realized in 1268 was actually a compilation based on Proclus' *Elements of Theology* rather than an authentic work of Aristotle himself. Such Neo-Platonizing works legitimized the reading of Aristotle in line with Avicenna. Furthermore, they justified projecting ideas from Avicenna on to Christian Neo-Platonists like Augustine, who was reconciled with Aristotle by means of Avicenna as well. In this connection, early scholastics and especially Franciscans relied particularly heavily on spurious Augustinian works, such as *De spiritu et anima*, *De fide ad Petram*, and *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, which lent themselves to interpretation in terms of Avicenna's thinking.

While the Franciscans were by no means exceptional in making use of Avicenna at the time, they were by far the most predominant school of thought to do so; and indeed, their incorporation of Avicennian themes was far more extensive than many of their contemporaries. In the case of the Franciscans particularly, there appears to have been a sort of happy coincidence between the Avicennian materials that were available and popular at the time and what was well-suited to articulating a distinctly Franciscan form of thought. Francis had been more emphatic than most in insisting on the radical dependence of all things on God and the necessity of his guidance in human knowing. Avicenna aided the first Franciscan intellectuals to give an account of philosophical and theological matters that respected his values. This presumably went a long way towards justifying to members of the order itself that there was a place for high-level intellectual pursuits in their life.¹³

That is not to say that Franciscan thought is a function of Avicenna or any other authority. While Avicenna in many cases provided important philosophical resources for Franciscan thinking, these were always adapted to suit Franciscan and more broadly Christian purposes, as well as supplemented with insights from other sources in the Christian and even the Islamic and Jewish traditions that resonated with the Franciscan ethos. The ultimate product of these synthesising efforts was a systematic framework for thinking that was entirely the invention of early Franciscans. Although it incorporates many authorities, consequently, the *Summa* cannot rightly be described as a mere attempt to rehearse or systematize any authority, including the authority of authorities, Augustine.

¹³ According to the early 20th-century medievalist, Étienne Gilson, the appropriation of Avicenna was the key to Franciscan efforts to 'systematize' the work of Augustine, whose intellectual tradition had prevailed for most of the earlier Middle Ages. The Franciscans sought to do this, in Gilson's opinion, in order to give Augustine's legacy a chance of surviving the competition that was increasingly posed by the popularization of works by Aristotle. See Étienne Gilson, 'Les sources Greco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 4 (1929): 5–107; Étienne Gilson, 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 1 (1926–7): 5–127.

In this connection, it is worth noting that the *Summa* is not exceptional in making extensive use of Augustine. All major thinkers at the time, from Anselm and Hugh of St Victor to Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, also gave disproportional weight to Augustine's authority. The reason for citing Augustine in such cases was not simply to interpret or bolster his own views, however. Rather, references to Augustine were marshalled as proof texts to lend support to the author's own perspectives, regardless of whether those coincided with authentic views of Augustine. This was standard and even required practice at a period in time when the accepted method of advancing one's own arguments involved situating them in relation to a broader, if loosely defined, tradition or authority for thought.

As Mary Carruthers rightly notes, authorities in this period were not so much thinkers but texts; and texts were subject to interpretation, with their meanings always capable of being extrapolated in new ways in new contexts. What rendered any given text authoritative was precisely whether it gave rise to such new readings, which in turn became part of the meaning or tradition of the text.¹⁴ Although scholastic authors generally invoked authorities with a view to bolstering their own agendas, that does not mean there were not cases, including in the *Summa*, where they sought to represent the position of a particular authority fairly accurately.¹⁵ In such cases, however, there was generally a coincidence between the views presented by an authority and those of the scholastic author, who was still working for his own intellectual ends, which remained the ultimate arbiter of his use of sources. In spite of this reality, a tendency remains to take scholastic quotations from authorities at face value, thus interpreting texts like the *Summa Halensis* as more or less the sum or function of their sources.

The Objectives of this Volume

This volume offers a corrective to that tendency in the form of contributions which examine in detail how the *Summa* reckons with some of the most significant doctrines and debates in the theological context of the time. Many of these concern the doctrine of God himself, which is treated in entries which assess the debate which long divided Greek and Latin thinkers whether God is an individual or a universal (Côté); whether he can be referred to through analogical, equivocal, or univocal language, that is, language that is either related, unrelated, or exactly the same as

¹⁴ As Mary Carruthers has observed in *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 262.

¹⁵ Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 235. Marcia L. Colish, 'The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century,' in *The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Grundler*, ed. Nancy Van Deusen (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1997), 1–26, esp. 11; Marcia L. Colish, 'Authority and Interpretation in Scholastic Theology,' in Marcia L. Colish, *Studies in Scholasticism* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 5.

language used for things that are ‘not God’ (Wood); whether his existence can be proved, and if so, how (Schumacher); how God predestines some to salvation (Harkins); how his providence operates in the world (Barnes); and what it means to say that God is Triune (Coolman).

As the authors of articles on these issues show, these are all areas of Franciscan innovation, but so are the *Summa*’s interventions in Christology as well as moral and sacramental theology. These matters are dealt in further contributions on the reason for the Incarnation (Hunter), the definition of personhood in the *Summa* (Kobusch), the nature of grace in early Franciscan authors (Strand), and the Summists’ attitude towards philosophers, pagans, and Jews (Marenbon). As regards moral theology more specifically, there are important innovations to note in the *Summa*’s account of passions and sins (Veccio), and eternal and prescribed laws as well as oaths and vows (Saccenti). In the field of sacramental theology, the *Summa* breaks new ground in dealing with issues surrounding penance (Levy), the Eucharist (Colish), prayer (Johnson), and the immaculate conception (Ingham).

In dealing with such diverse matters of doctrine, the contributions in this volume highlight what an exceptional text the *Summa* was in its context and how it served to construct what was at the time an entirely novel Franciscan intellectual tradition, which laid the foundation for the work of Franciscans for generations to follow. By illustrating the *Summa*’s novelties in key doctrinal areas, in fact, this study provides grounds for identifying continuity where scholars have generally seen a break between the earlier Franciscan tradition and the new departures of John Duns Scotus and his generation.

In that sense, the current project not only shifts the credit for some of Scotus’ innovations back on to his predecessors but also highlights more clearly the Franciscan ethos that underlies his work, which shines most clearly through the study of early Franciscan thought. By these means, the study of the *Summa Halensis* clearly demarcates Franciscan thought from any modern developments in intellectual history which took place outside the order, exonerating Franciscan thinkers of the charges some have made that they are responsible for all the alleged ills of modernity. At the same time, this study helps to clarify how Franciscan ideas were meant to be construed and employed on their own terms and the promise they might hold for reckoning with philosophical and theological problems today. To make such a recovery of the Franciscan intellectual tradition possible is one ultimate objective of this project to highlight the tensions between authorities and innovation in early Franciscan thought.

Antoine Côté

The *Summa Halensis* on Whether Universal and Particular Are Said of God¹

Abstract: This paper examines the *Summa Halensis*' theory of universals. I first try to tease out that theory from the *Summa*'s answer to the question of whether the Persons of the Trinity are related to the divine essence as species is related to genus or particulars to species. I then briefly discuss the philosophical interest of the *Summa*'s position by drawing attention to some significant parallels between it and one version of twentieth-century trope theory. I conclude by comparing the *Summa*'s treatment of universals with that of other early Franciscans discussions.

This paper has a rather narrow focus, namely the *Summa Halensis*' treatment of the question of 'whether the notions of universal and particular apply to divine matters', which covers six columns of text in the critical edition.² It is a question we find in the commentaries on the *Sentences* and *Quaestiones* of many scholastic authors, including those of many early Franciscans, in no small part because it had been touched upon by Peter Lombard in Distinction 19 of Book 1 of the *Sentences*. It is a question we expect to find in a systematic treatise on theology such as the *Summa*, and in particular in the section of it dealing with divine names in general. At issue is whether it is correct to think of the relation of the Persons of the Trinity to the divine essence as the relation of species to genus or of particulars to species. The scholastics tend to agree that the answer is no; and the *Summa* is no exception. What we will want to know is 1. why the *Summa* endorses this position, and what this tells us about its conception of universals and particulars in general, 2. what the philosophical interest of their position is, and 3. how their position compares to that of other early Franciscans.

¹ I would like to thank Johannes Zachhuber for his comments on the version of this paper that was read at the Oxford *Summa Halensis* workshop. Thanks are due as well to Marcia Colish and Lydia Schumacher for their suggestions and comments. Finally, I am grateful to Riccardo Saccenti for providing me with a legible copy of Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 691.

² Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), pp. 498–501.

The *Summa* on ‘whether the notions of universal and particular apply to divine matters’

The Case Against There Being Universals in God

Our author (or, more precisely, the author of this section of the *Summa*) is very clear right from the outset: there are no universals or particulars in God, or rather, as they put it, there is no universal or particular being in God.³ But things are a little more complicated than this statement suggests. Our author invokes the principle that God has all perfections and no imperfections and asserts that God will possess ‘whatever relates to perfection’ in universal and particular being. In order to determine whether anything does, we first need a definition of what a universal is. The *Summa* settles on the definition of the universal as ‘what is in many and of many’. This is a common definition in the Middle Ages. Many scholastics, e.g. Albert the Great and Nicholas of Cornwall, attribute it to Avicenna;⁴ the *Summa* attributes it to Aristotle.⁵ What does the *Summa* mean by a universal being of many and in many? To say that a universal is ‘of many’ is just a way of saying that a universal term (though, the *Summa* never talks about universal ‘terms’) is predicable of many subjects, following Aristotle in the *Categories*. To say that a universal is in many, however, can mean two very different things according to the *Summa*. It can either be in many in such a way that it is numerically the same universal in the many things in which it exists (*communis eo quod ipsa manet una et eadem numero, non divisa in illis*⁶); or it can be in many in such a way that it is multiplied according to the number of things in which it exists. What the *Summa* wants to establish is whether the divine essence is a universal in one of the three ways I have just mentioned: by being said of many, by being in

³ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 499.

⁴ Albert the Great, *Peri hermeneias*, l. 1, tr. 5, c. 1, in *B. Alberti Magni Ratisbonensis episcopi, ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera omnia*, vol. 1, ed. Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1890), 413: ‘Universale autem est quod est in multis et de multis suae naturae suppositis: et ideo omnis, et nullus, et huiusmodi signa universalia esse non possunt, sed sunt signa designantia utrum universale sit acceptum universaliter vel particulariter secundum sua supposita: et haec sunt verba Avicennae’ [The universal is what is in many and of many suppositis belonging to its nature. Hence ‘all’ and ‘no’ and other such signs cannot be universals, rather they are signs indicating whether the universal is taken universally or particularly following its suppositis. Those are the words of Avicenna]. Nicholas of Cornwall, *Notule super librum Porfirii* (Oxford, Corpus Christi College E 293B, fol. 71ra): ‘Dico quod hoc est huiusmodi cuius ratio non prohibet dici de multis et esse in multis, et hoc est esse uniuersale secundum Auiscennam’ [I say that this is such that its nature does not prohibit its being said of many and being in many, and that is to be a universal according to Avicenna]. Cited by Patrick Osmund Lewry, ‘Oxford Logic 1250–1275: Nicholas and Peter of Cornwall on Past and Future Realities,’ in *The Rise of British Logic*, ed. Patrick Osmund Lewry, Papers in Medieval Studies, 7 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), 37.

⁵ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 499.

⁶ SH I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 386), p. 569.

many in the multiplied sense, or by being in many in the non-multiplied sense; and the answer will depend on whether one of these three sorts of universal in any way ‘pertains to perfection’. The *Summa*’s thesis is going to be that being said of many (as of ‘man’ in ‘Socrates is man’) is always a sign of imperfection and thus cannot apply to God, while being in many *in the non-multiplied* sense is always a sign of perfection, and so must belong to God.

Why is being said of many a sign of imperfection? Because our author believes that a predicate that does not express the whole of the subjects of which it is predicated must be an imperfect predicate (though he uses those very words). Thus the predicate ‘man’ in the proposition ‘Socrates is man’ is truly said of Socrates, but it does not express the totality of what makes up Socrates, ‘his quantity, qualities and actions, which are nonetheless part of Socrates’ being’. Hence ‘man’ must be an imperfect predicate; and its being said of Socrates must be a sign of imperfection. By contrast, in ‘The Father is God’, ‘The Son is God’, and ‘The Holy Spirit is God’, the term ‘God’ refers to the whole being of the Father, of the Son and the Holy Spirit. ‘God’ is thus not said ‘of many’, and so is not an imperfection.

But why now is being in many (in the non-multiplied way) a sign of perfection? First of all to be *in* anything even if only one thing, is a perfection. The reasoning is as follows. First, ‘something that is only in one thing’ for the *Summa* is just another name for a particular; and a particular is said to be perfect because it signifies the ‘whole being’. (*Nobilius et perfectius est esse non de multis quam quod est esse de multis: quia cum dico ‘de’ dico partem, non totum.*⁷) If we take ‘Socrates is Socrates’ as an example, the *Summa* might be saying that ‘Socrates’ is ‘in’ Socrates as opposed to being said of him because the predicate ‘Socrates’ is true of the whole Socrates, not just true of a part of him. However, while to be in one thing is a perfection, to be in *only* one thing is an imperfection, the *Summa* tells us, because ‘it is more noble to be [in the non-multiplied way] in many than to be in only one thing’. It is unfortunate that the *Summa* offers no justification for the principle that it is nobler to be (in the non-multiplied way) in many than to be in only one thing, and advances no arguments to forestall predictable objections. If I know of a foolproof way of hacking into another person’s life savings, it is presumably not nobler for that knowledge to be shared, ‘to be in many’, rather than just in one. Of course, what the *Summa* means is probably that it is nobler for something *good* to be in many rather than in just one. But even that admits of counter-examples. On the other hand, if we do accept the principle, then God’s being in three Persons verifies it, since the divine essence is then ‘in many’. Of course we would then need to have arguments for why three is just the right ‘many’. Although our author does not supply these in his discussion of universals, he (or one of his collaborators) does (as most scholastic theologians do) have arguments elsewhere in the *Summa* to show that the number of Persons in which the divine unity can exist indivisibly can be (A) neither fewer than

7 SH I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M2, C1 (n. 76), p. 122.

three (*non potest esse in paucioribus quam in tribus personis*⁸), nor (B) greater (*si ergo ponitur summa diffusio, erit ipsam ponere in tribus personis tantum*⁹). If we accept these, then the undivided existence of the one divine essence in three (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) is the noblest way for something to be numerically identical in many.

In sum, because being in many is one way of being a universal—since created universals are in many, though dividedly—and because God is in many, though undividedly, then although God cannot be said to be universal, there is nonetheless, as the *Summa* puts it, something of the perfection of a universal in God.

The Case Against There Being Particulars in God

Having established that there are no non-multiplied universals in God, the *Summa* then sets out to prove that there are no particulars in God. The proof proceeds by distinguishing the different possible ways in which something can be particularized and by showing that none belongs to God.

Drawing from Boethius' *De trinitate*, the *Summa* asserts that there are three ways in which something can be singularized or individualized: through matter, through accidents, and through a 'signate and singularized form' (*a forma signata et singulari*).¹⁰ The *Summa*, predictably, explains that there are no particulars in God in the first two senses—since there are clearly neither matter nor accidents in God. It also argues that there are no particulars in the third sense. Their discussion here deserves close attention.

In the third way, as Boethius says, when "man" is said, it is predicated of many men; but if we attend to that humanity that is in the individual Socrates, it [i.e. the humanity] becomes individual, since Socrates himself is individual and singular. Whence it follows that just as Socrates and Cicero are cognized as singulars and are numerically many through their singular properties and singular accidents, so too they are made many through their proper individual and singular humanities.¹¹

⁸ SH I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2, C1 (n. 304), p. 439.

⁹ SH I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2, C1 (n. 304), p. 440.

¹⁰ The phrase 'forma signata' is a *hapax* in the *Summa*. The use of *signat** and cognates to express the idea of determination and particularity appears to have originated in Avicenna. On this matter, see Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin's classic *Le "De ente et essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Le Saulchoir, Kain: Revue des Sciences théologiques et philosophiques, 1926), esp. ch. 3.

¹¹ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 500: 'Tertio modo, sicut dicit Boethius, cum 'homo' dicitur, de pluribus quidem hominibus praedicatur; sed si illam humanitatem, quae est in Socrate individuo, consideremus, fit individua, cum Socrates ipse sit individuus et singularis. Ex quo accipitur quod sicut Socrates et Cicero suis singularibus proprietatibus et accidentibus singulares et numero plures cognoscuntur, sic suis propriis individuis et singularibus humanitatibus numero plures efficiuntur.'

It is important to note that for it to make sense for the *Summa* to introduce signate forms (which I will take to mean the same thing as instantiated universals) as a third kind of agent of particularity, these forms must be particular independently from the particularity they get from the accidents or the matter, i.e. ‘ways’ 1 and 2. It cannot be the case that what the *Summa* means by the third sense of particular is that something becomes a signate form *by virtue* of its being received into this or that portion of space or into these or those accidents; for then the third sense would collapse into the other two. An historical example of the sort of thing I believe the *Summa* is ruling out by introducing this third sense of particularity would be William of Champeaux’s (one of the nominalists’ favourite punching bags) theory of material essence criticized by Abelard in his *Glosses on Porphyry*. Here is a brief statement of the position by Abelard (keep in mind that ‘matter’ and ‘form’ mean roughly the opposite of what they mean for a scholastic):

Some people take “universal thing” in such a way that they set up essentially the same substance in things diverse from one another through forms. This substance is the “material essence” of the singulars it is in. It is one in itself, and diverse only through the forms of the inferiors (*in se ipsa una, tantum per formas inferiorum sit diuersa*).¹²

Assuming here William means by ‘forms of the inferiors’ something like ‘accidental forms’, then he is saying that the *only* thing that makes the material essence this material essence as opposed to that material essence is that it is received in these accidental forms as opposed to those: take those forms away, and what is left is the self-same ‘universal thing’. This, I contend, cannot be what the *Summa* believes signate forms are if these are to represent a *bona fide* third way of being particular. They must be particular in a different way. I can think of two ways: (A) a signate form is different from every other co-specific signate form in and of itself; or (B) a signate form is different from every other co-specific signate form by *acquiring* some difference as a result of its ‘reception’ in or its association with, accidents and matter (like two pairs of the same make of shoe acquire different particular shapes as a consequence of the gait, stride, weight and shape of feet of the person wearing them). The texts seem to support (A). For instance:

Just as Socrates and Cicero are cognized as singulars and are numerically many through their singular properties and singular accidents, so too they are made many through their proper individual and singular humanities.¹³

12 Peter Abelard, ‘From the “Glosses on Porphyry” in His *Logica ‘ingredientibus,’* in *Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals*, trans. and ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 29. The italics from Spade’s translation have been removed.

13 *SH* I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 500: ‘Sicut Socrates et Cicero suis singularibus proprietatibus et accidentibus singulares et numero plures cognoscuntur, sic suis propriis individuus et singularibus humanitatibus numero plures efficiuntur.’

Or take the following passage from the treatise on Personal names taken absolutely:

Rather, other is the commonality of essence, other that of relation. For the essence is common because it itself remains numerically the same, undivided in them <i.e. the Persons>. Hence its commonality is not the commonality of the universal. However the distinctness or incommunicability is common more in the way of the universal: for the distinctness is not the same in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; rather other is the Father's, other the Son's. That commonality is multiplied and numbered, not the remaining one.¹⁴

Let us examine this passage a little more closely. The author starts out by rehearsing the difference between the commonality of the divine essence and the commonality of a universal: the essence is common by virtue of the fact that it is *ea ipsa in multis*, whereas the universal is common in division. Evidently these are two radically different types of commonality, and if to be universal is to be common in the second sense, then there will no universality in God, which is exactly what the *Summa* believes. But then the author immediately adds that there is some analogue of universality in God after all, except that one should not look for it in the divine essence but rather in the distinctness or incommunicability of *Persons* ('However the distinctness or incommunicability is common more in the way of the universal.'). But how can *distinctness* be an analogue of universality? What the *Summa* means here is simply that the predicate 'distinct' can be applied to each Person: 'The Father is distinct from the Son', 'The Father is distinct from the Holy Ghost', etc., just like any *bona fide* universal term. The crucial point our Summists want to make is that what makes each Person distinct from the other two is, well, *distinct* in each Person: *alia Patris, alia Filii*; and since there is supposed to be an analogy between distinctness in God and universals in creatures, the inference we are supposed to draw is that the universal 'man', which is predicable of Socrates and Plato, is also *other* in Socrates and *other* in Plato. Actually, we don't even need to draw the inference ourselves, the *Summa* does it for us in the following text:

To the first objection I reply in accordance with the following rule: there is no place for a distinction where union is not taken from diverse causes. For instance, humanity in Socrates and Plato <come> from diverse causes; whence I can say that Socrates is another man from Plato, for the ratio by which Socrates is a man is other than that by which Plato is a man, for other is the humanity of Socrates, other that of Plato.¹⁵

14 *SH I*, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C2 (n. 386), p. 569: 'Sed essentia aliter est communis, aliter relatio; essentia enim communis est eo quod ipsa manet una et eadem numero, non divisa in illis: unde communitas sua non est communitas universalis. Distinctio vero sive incommunicabilitas communis est magis per modum universalis; non enim est distinctio eadem in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, sed alia Patris, alia Filii: hoc enim commune multiplicatur et numeratur, reliquum non sic.' See also *SH I*, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C5 (n. 390), p. 574.

15 *SH I*, P2, In2, Tr1, Q2, M3, C2, Ar2 (n. 360), p. 538: 'Ad primum secundum hanc regulam: non habet locum distinctio ubi non est ex diversis causis unio. Verbi gratia, humanitas est in Sorte et Platone ex

The point is made yet again, in slightly different terms, in the treatise on divine unity. The question at issue there is whether divine unity is compatible with the having of a plurality of natures. The answer is that it is not. But this requires some argument, the *Summa* realizes, since one of the ways we know that two things have different natures is that predicates apply to one that do not apply to the other; but of course different predicates *do* apply to the different Persons of the Trinity, though they all have the same nature. For instance, the predicate, ‘not being from another’ is true of the Father, while ‘being from another’ is true of the Son. The exact details of the *Summa*’s reply need not concern us. What is worth noting is the conclusion of that reply, to the effect that certain inferences are warranted *in divinis* that are not in the case of creatures.

And thus, as Boethius says, the following inference is valid: “the Father is God, the Son is God, therefore they are one God”; but the following one is not: “Socrates is a man, Plato is a man, therefore they are one man.” Because therefore in God, or in the Father and the Son, one does not find a different form, as in Socrates and Plato, the argument is without basis.¹⁶

It seems pretty clear, then, that the *Summa* considers each signate form to be somehow different from, other than, all other co-specific signate forms. But of course this might raise a problem: if this humanity is distinct from that humanity, and so on with other humanities, then there is no universal at all, since a universal should be or express a unity. The Platonic realist has a ready answer to this: he locates the unity in the one uninstantiated real universal in which all the instantiated universals participate or which they imitate. But the *Summa* explicitly rules out this possibility:

The universal form does not exist separately; rather it depends on the first (substances); whence, once the first substances are destroyed, it is impossible that any of the others remain. The universal depends for its existence on the singulars.¹⁷

As far as the authors of the *Summa* are concerned, when it comes to humanity (or any other universal), all there is is this humanity and/or that humanity, etc. Yet the *Summa* denies that this fact robs universals of all real unity: universals qua instan-

diversis causis; unde possum dicere quod Sortes est alius homo a Platone, quia alia est ratio qua Sortes est homo et alia qua Plato est homo, quia alia est humanitas Sortis, alia humanitas Platonis.’
16 *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M2, C2 (n. 77), p. 125: ‘Et ideo, sicut dicit Boethius, sequitur: “Pater est Deus, Filius est Deus, ergo sunt unus Deus”; sed non sequitur: “Sortes est homo, Plato est homo, ergo sunt unus homo.” Quia ergo in Deo, sive in Patre et Filio, non invenitur differens forma, sicut in Sorte et Platone, non habet ibi locum ratio.’

17 *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C5 (n. 44), p. 69: ‘Forma enim universalis non habet esse per se nec separatum, immo dependens a primis: unde, destructis primis, impossibile est aliquid aliorum remanere; et ita secundum actum existendi dependet a singularibus universale.’

tiated, qua signate forms, *do* possess or display a unity; it might not be as perfect as the unity displayed by the divine essence, but it is, the *Summa* assures us, a unity.

For since the essence in those Persons is the same and is absolutely simple, and is not multiplied following their multiplication, clearly in it (sc. the essence) is a great and the highest perfection of unity. Hence the unity of the essential universal falls short of the unity of the first essence in that although both essences are in many, the universal essence is in many in such a way that it is multiplied and numbered by them.¹⁸

The same point is made in more striking terms in the treatise on Personal names taken absolutely. There the *Summa* is trying to answer the question of whether the fact that the divine Persons should be called three ‘things of nature’ (*res naturae*)—as the *Summa* thinks they should—entails that there are three things (*tres res*) in God. The *Summa* wants to answer that this consequence does indeed follow, provided the term ‘thing’ is taken personally, not essentially.¹⁹ But the author then has to show how this answer is compatible with an assertion by John of Damascus to the effect that whereas in creation there are real differences and rational commonalities, in God there are only rational distinctions and a real commonality, a contention that seems to entail that there are no things, no *res*, in God (assuming here that only particulars can be *res*). Here is the objection:

Again, Damascene [writes that]: “it is one thing to consider [something to be] in reality, and another to consider [it to be] in reason”; and he says that those [two types of consideration] are used in opposite ways of creatures and God. For in creatures difference is considered [to be] in reality, for Peter is really different from Paul; the commonality, however, is considered [to be] in reason only. However, in God, it is the opposite: the commonality or unity are considered [to be] in reality, difference in reason.²⁰

18 *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 83), p. 134: ‘Nam cum eadem sit essentia et omnino simplex in istis personis, non multiplicata secundum multiplicationem earum, patet quod in ipsa est magna et summa perfectio unitatis. Unde in hoc deficit unitas essentiae universalis ab unitate essentiae primae, quia licet utraque sit in pluribus, tamen essentia universalis ita est in pluribus quod multiplicatur et numeratur per illa.’

19 It is worth mentioning that the *Summa*’s view of *res* as applying to the divine Persons is diametrically opposed to the influential view espoused more than a century earlier by Stephen Langton, according to whom ‘res’ can be said of the Godhead, not of the Persons. I am grateful to Marcia Colish for drawing my attention to this point and to the following excellent article by Luisa Valente, ‘Logique et théologie trinitaire chez Étienne Langton: *Res, ens, suppositio communis, et propositio duplex*,’ in *Étienne Langton: Prédicateur, bibliste, théologien*, ed. Jean-Louis Bataillon, Nicole Bériou, Gilbert Dahan, and Riccardo Quinto (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 563–86, esp. 570–4.

20 *SH I*, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M3, C7 (n. 404), p. 595: ‘Item, Damascenus: “Aliud est considerare re, aliud ratione”; et dicit quod ista e contrario se habent in creaturis et divinis. In creaturis enim differentia re consideratur: differunt enim secundum rem Petrus et Paulus; communitas vero ratione consideratur; in divinis autem e converso: communitas sive unitas re consideratur, differentia ratione (...).’

The *Summa* finds nothing objectionable in John's distinction of two types of consideration, as long as it is understood that the *ratio* in question is not a pure figment of the mind, but is caused by both the extra-mental thing and the intellect,

And reason, which is not empty, is not wholly caused by the intellect, but (also) by the thing.²¹

Thus, when John says that commonalities in creatures are considered 'in reason', the *Summa* is telling us, this ought not to be taken to mean that commonalities are entirely mind-dependent: the commonality is 'out there', the *Summa* assures us, but it is—note the choice of words—'diminished':

When Damascene says that in creatures difference is considered [to be] in reality whereas commonality [is considered to be] in reason, it is not being said that commonality is considered [to be] in reason because there is no real commonality, but because there [i. e. in creatures] the commonality according to the thing is diminished, whereas the difference is perfected. Hence it follows that if creatures differ numerically they differ simpliciter, but it does not follow that if creatures differ numerically, they differ simpliciter. However it does not follow that because they are generically and specifically one, then they are one. It is for this reason, therefore, that it is said that their commonality is not considered [to be] in reality.²²

The authors of the *Summa*, then, are very clear: there is a real unity in the diverse humanities. It might be a diminished unity, but it is a unity all the same. Thus, the difficulty mentioned above, namely that the existence of a plurality of 'different' instantiations of the same universal would prohibit the existence of any real unity, is forcefully rejected by the *Summa*: it is possible *in creatis* for signate singulars (particular instantiations of a universal) to enjoy a particular kind of unity, diminished unity. But then, if this is so, we see at once why 'particular' in this third sense cannot apply to God, since the unity of the divine essence must be a perfect, non-diminished, unity. The *Summa* has now shown that none of the three ways of being particular applies to God, and so can conclude that there is no particularity in God. QED.

To sum up: a universal *in creatis* is something that is said of many and is in many *in the multiplied sense*. A universal *in divinis* is not said of many but is identically in many, in fact in three, in the non-multiplied sense. There are no particulars in God because God is devoid of matter, accidents and singular forms. But the Persons are 'individual' in some sense. So, as the authors put it: 'The divine being is neither

²¹ SH I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M3, C7 (n. 404), p. 595: '[E]t ratio, quae vana non est, non causatur totaliter ab intellectu, sed a re.'

²² SH I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M3, C7 (n. 404), p. 595: 'Cum ergo dicit Damascenus quod in creaturis differentia consideratur re, communitas ratione, non dicitur communitas considerari ratione eo quod non sit aliqua communitas secundum rem, sed quia communitas secundum rem est ibi diminuta, sed differentia perfecta; unde sequitur: "si creaturae differunt numero, quod differunt simpliciter"; sed non sequitur: "sunt unum genere, unum specie, ergo sunt unum"; propter hoc ergo dicitur quod communitas eorum non re consideratur.'

universal nor particular but has something of each.’²³ The author of our question of the *Summa* had denied at the outset that universals or particulars apply to God. We now see in what sense this is true. What he wants to deny applies to God is what Peter Lombard calls the universal ‘according to the philosophers’, the universal that is said of many and is in many in the multiplied sense. That in a nutshell is the *Summa*’s answer to the initial question whether the notions of universal and particular apply to divine matters.

Characterizing the *Summa*’s Position

Now that I have outlined the *Summa*’s answer to the initial question and tried to suss out its understanding of what universals and particulars are, I want to take a step back and very briefly reflect on what kind of theory it is and what interest it holds for the historian. My starting point will be the *Prolegomena* to Volume 2 of the *Summa*, which states that the *Summa* belongs to the ‘moderate realist’ camp.²⁴ For reasons I will indicate below, I don’t think the term ‘moderate’ is very useful or appropriate here, and I am going to suggest something else in its place that I think better captures the nature of the *Summa*’s insight. The term ‘realist’, however, is appropriate, and it unquestionably applies to the *Summa*’s theory of universals. Let us start with that.

Remember that according to the *Summa*’s ‘Aristotelian’ definition, a universal is said of something or is in something. The *Summa* then argues that universals *in creatis* are said of something, and are in something—dividedly, of course—namely in real particulars. But if they are *in* particulars, then they must be real.

The *Summa* also expressly refers to universals as *res*. It does this in connection once again with John of Damascus’ distinction between looking upon something as really existing and looking upon something as being in reason only, a distinction that might be thought to imply that existence in thought is exclusive of real existence. However, this is the wrong inference to draw according to the *Summa*. To properly understand John of Damascus’ position, we need to understand that there are two senses of the term ‘ratio’. It can either signify the mind’s act of gathering and comparing objects, or it can signify that which is received in (or as a result of) the act of gathering. When we say that a universal is a ‘ratio’, we are using ‘ratio’ in the second sense, for the universal is not the operation itself but what is received by the intellect in the process of comparing, and this, we are told, is a *thing*:

²³ SH I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M2, C1 (n. 76), p. 122: ‘[E]sse divinum non est universale vel singulare, sed habens aliquod de utroque.’

²⁴ ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,’ in Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 2 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1928), L: ‘Ex iis constat Halensem inter realistas moderatos adnumerandum esse’ [Whence it is clear that Alexander of Hales is to be counted among the moderate realists].

To the second argument it must be said that “reason” is said in two ways. In one way it refers to that receiving that is in the act of gathering; in another sense it is said of what is received in the act of gathering. When the intellect receives a thing absolutely, then it is said to understand. But when it receives it in the act of gathering, according as it joins one to the other, then it is called reason. If then we call reason the very motion or receiving of the thing in the act of gathering, that is not how Damascene takes reason, but in the second way. Hence Damascene does not want to say that the divine Persons are considered “in reason” [where “reason” refers to] the motion of the intellect itself or to the receiving in the act of gathering, but rather “in reason” [where “reason” refers to] that which is received by the intellect in the act of gathering. For the universal is received by the intellect in the act of gathering, that is, in many; but that [i. e. the universal] is a thing.²⁵

Ipsum (sc. universale) tamen est res: the universal is a *res*. The point could not be made any more clearly. The *Summa*’s theory, then, is unquestionably a realist one. But what kind of realism?

I have suggested that it wasn’t very useful to describe the *Summa*’s brand of realism as a ‘moderate’ one. Why not? Moderate realism is usually opposed to so-called exaggerated realism, the arch-exponent of which was Plato (and William of Champeaux).²⁶ The distinction was in great vogue among neo-scholastic historians who were keen to show that their favourite philosopher (e. g. Aquinas or Scotus or, indeed, the author(s) of the *Summa Halensis*) was a moderate who eschewed extremes. But one person’s moderate is another’s extremist, and it is questionable how useful a label can be that is applied to theories as different as those of, say, Scotus and Aquinas. Furthermore, the *Summa*’s theory, with its assertion that universals exist in things (albeit dividedly), doesn’t strike one as particularly moderate at all.

So what kind of realism? I am going to suggest that we can more usefully think of our authors as espousing a form of *trope-realism*. In saying this I realize that contemporary historians of philosophy have also applied *that* label to authors as different as, say, Aquinas or William of Ockham, whose views one might hesitate to bring under the same banner; still, it seems to apply particularly well to the view put forward by the *Summa*. The word ‘trope’ in the precise sense in which it is used by phi-

²⁵ SH I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q3, C4 (n. 316), p. 464: ‘Ad secundam rationem dicendum quod ‘ratio’ duobus modis dicitur: uno modo ‘ratio’ dicitur ipsa acceptio quae est in collatione, alio modo appellatur ‘ratio’ illud quod accipitur in collatione. Quando enim intellectus accipit rem absolute, tunc dicitur intelligere; sed quando accipit ipsam in collatione, secundum quod confert unum alii, tunc dicitur ‘ratio’. Si ergo dicatur ‘ratio’ ipse motus vel acceptio rei ab anima in collatione, hoc modo non accipit Damascenus ‘rationem’, sed modo secundo. Unde non vult dicere Damascenus quod solum considerentur divinae personae ‘ratione’ quae sit motus ipsius intellectus sive acceptio in collatione, sed ‘ratione’ quae est ipsum acceptum ab intellectu conferente. Et haec ‘ratio’ res est, sicut dicimus ‘universale est ratio’, non quia ipsum sit acceptio ipsa, sed est ‘ratio’, id est ipsum acceptum ab intellectu conferente, quia universale accipitur ab intellectu in collatione, scilicet in multis, ipsum tamen est res.’

²⁶ One of the first historians of medieval philosophy to use the phrases ‘moderate realism’ and ‘exaggerated realism’ is Maurice de Wulf, in his *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale précédée d’un aperçu sur la philosophie ancienne* (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1900), 169.

losophers, was coined by Donald Williams in 1953, to refer to what others have called ‘abstract particulars’, ‘particular properties’, ‘particular qualities’, or even ‘characters’.²⁷ Common to all versions is the belief that qualities or characters (trope theorists usually eschew the term ‘universal’) are real (contra ‘austere’ nominalists) but particular (contra Platonic realists). Because particulars play center-stage in trope-theoretical solutions to the problem of universals, one often talks not of ‘trope realism’ but of ‘trope nominalism’. But not all those whose solution to the problem of universals involves an appeal to tropes have been nominalists. Indeed, the one trope-theorist I am going to appeal to to support my claim that there is a significant doctrinal parallel between the *Summa* and trope-theoretical accounts of the problem of universals, namely George Frederick Stout, denied he was a nominalist at all:

The position that characters are as particular as the concrete things or individuals which they characterize, is common to me and the nominalists. But I differ from them essentially in maintaining that the distributive unity of a class or kind is an ultimate and unanalysable type of unity.²⁸

Because of space constraints, I am going to rest my case that there exists a substantive doctrinal parallel between the *Summa*’s brand of realism and at least one version of trope theory on a quick commentary of this very short text. There are three points I want to draw attention to. The first point is simply the description of characters as being ‘as particular as the concrete things’ they characterize. Substitute ‘signate forms’ for ‘characters’ here and we have a statement the *Summa* would gladly endorse (even though both concepts might not be exactly congruent); for, remember: signate forms are one of the three sorts of particulars distinguished by the *Summa*. The second point is the use of the phrase ‘distributive unity’. This is the expression Stout uses to describe the type of unity embodied by all the particulars falling under the same class. It is the Stoutian counterpart of the *Summa*’s descriptions of universals as *un[a] sed multiplicat[a]*, or having ‘diminished unity’. The unity is distributed across all the members of the class; it is not the unity of some supposed ‘indivisible quality’ that ‘is really the same’.²⁹ Likewise, for the *Summa* the diminished unity of the universal, which exists in its particulars dividedly, is to be strictly distinguished from the *summa unitas* of the divine essence, which is ‘not multiplied according to the multiplication of Persons’.³⁰

It is true that Stout in the above quotation talks about the unity as being that of the *class*, and this might seem to suggest that he thinks of distributive unities as mental objects. But this is not what he means, as the following passage makes clear:

²⁷ Donald Cary Williams, ‘On the Elements of Being: I,’ *The Review of Metaphysics* 7 (1953): 7.

²⁸ George Frederick Stout, ‘The Nature of Universals and Propositions,’ *Proceedings of the British Academy* 10 (1921–3), 159.

²⁹ Stout, ‘The Nature of Universals,’ 162.

³⁰ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 83), p. 134.

Agreeing with the nominalist that characters are as particular as the things or substances they characterize, the inference I draw from this thesis is not that there really are no universals, but that the universal is a distributive unity.³¹

What I take Stout to be saying here is that distributive unities are ‘ontic’; they are features of reality; they are not mental, generated by the mind in the process of comparing particulars, and having no purchase on reality. I am not sure how common such a view is amongst trope theorists, but I believe that it certainly invites comparison with the *Summa*. The third point, which naturally flows out of the preceding two, is Stout’s statement that the distributive unity embodied by a given character is ‘ultimate and unanalysable’. Although this point is not explicitly made by the *Summa*, it does follow from their position. For if, as is the case according to the *Summa*, all there is, *a parte rei*, to any universal, is the loose unity following from its particular instantiations, then that is where the ontological buck stops as far as that universal is concerned. That makes that universal qua existing dividedly in particulars *ultimate and unanalyzable*.

If this is right, then, notwithstanding other differences in doctrine, context and aim (and, again, those differences are undeniable, and a more detailed analysis would be necessary to fully spell them out), there is a real, and intriguing, convergence in metaphysical insight between our authors, one that is not captured by referring to them as moderate realists.

The *Summa* and other Early Franciscans on Universals and Particulars

Having presented the main line of the *Summa*’s discussion of whether universals and particulars apply to God and commented on its philosophical interest, I now want to briefly examine how its treatment of this issue compares with those of other early Franciscans before 1245, the date by which the *Summa* was written.³² I have examined five relevant texts for the purposes of this comparison. They are by three of the first four regent masters for the Franciscans at Paris (i. e. all save William of Melitona). Two are by Alexander of Hales, two (assuming 4, below, really is his) by John of La Rochelle, and one by Odo Rigaldus. Here are the titles and dates:

1. Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in librum I Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*. Date: 1223–1227.³³

³¹ Stout, ‘The Nature of Universals,’ 161.

³² According to Roger Bacon’s testimony, in *Opus minus*, in *Fr. Rogeris Bacon Opera quaedam hactenus inedita*, ed. J.S. Brewer (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Robert, 1959), 32–327.

³³ Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*), 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi:

2. Alexander of Hales, Quaestio (postquam fuit frater) <Utrum sit ponere vere universale in divinis>. Date: 1236–1245.³⁴
3. John of La Rochelle, *Summa de divinis nominibus*, Quaestio <Utrum hoc nomen Deus sit universale ad <nomina personalia> et illa sint singularia sicut eius singularia>. Date: before 1245.³⁵
4. John of La Rochelle (?), *Glossa in Sententias*. Date: 1236–1245.³⁶
5. Odo Rigaldus, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum*. Date: 1241–1245.³⁷

The first thing to note about these texts is that they all bear a very strong family resemblance. All exploit the same body of authoritative authors, Augustine, Boethius, John of Damascus, Peter Lombard, and Richard of St Victor being the main ones. Also, many of the arguments they advance in support of their respective positions recur in other authors, either in the *solutio* proper or in answers to objections. For instance, an argument that plays an important role in Alexander's *solutio* in his *Glossa* relies on Boethius' distinction between *quo est* and *quod est*. Alexander identifies the universal with the *quo est* and the particular with the *quod est*, and concludes that since the *quo est* and *quod est* do not differ in God, there can be neither universal nor particular in God.³⁸ The same answer is found in a more condensed form in Vat. Lat. 691:

To solve these objections one must note that the difference between universal and particular follows the difference between “quod est” and “quo est”. In the First <being> these are wholly the same, and thus there is no charater of universal or particular in divine matters.³⁹

Another example is the thesis, which we have seen plays an important part in the *Summa*'s solution, that the commonality of the divine essence is received ‘non-multi-

Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 1:200–4. Dating according to the editors, ‘Prolegomena,’ in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 1:116*.

³⁴ Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16406, fol. 41ra.

³⁵ Trier, Stadtbibliothek 162, fol. 130va.

³⁶ Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 691, fol. 24rab. For the dating see J.G. Bougerol, ‘La glose sur les Sentences du manuscrit vat. lat. 691,’ *Antonianum* 55 (1980): 166.

³⁷ About the dating of Odo's *Lectura*, see Leonardo Sileo, *De rerum ideis: Dio e le cose nel dibattito universitario del tredicesimo secolo* (Vatican City: Urbaniana University Press, 2011), 16*-20*. My transcription of Odo's commentary is based on Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14910, though I have also looked at Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 5982, and Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale 824.

³⁸ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 19, 1:201: ‘Item, dicit Boethius in libro *De Trinitate*: “In simplicibus non differt ‘quod est’ et ‘quo est’, in composito aliud est.” Universale vero est ‘quo est’, differens ab eo ‘quod est’; particulare est illud ‘quod est’, differens ab eo ‘quo est’. Cum ergo in Deo non differant ‘quod est’ et ‘quo est’, in Deo non est universale vel particulare, et sic nec genus nec species.’

³⁹ Vat. lat. 691, fol. 24ra: ‘Ad horum solutionem notandum est quod universale (universaliter: *cod.*) et singulare differunt per differentiam eius quod est et quo est. In primo omnino sunt idem et ita non est ratio universalis et particularis in divinis.’

pliedly' by the Persons, unlike the commonality of the universal, which is received in multiplied fashion. This same distinction is found in Odo Rigaldus's discussion.⁴⁰ It also forms the basis of Alexander's *solutio*, this time in his *Quaestio* (Text 2 above), where it is coupled with another thesis defended by the *Summa*, namely that although the divine essence is not a universal, common predicates of Persons are:

To the second <objection> it must be said that here there is nothing common according to essence <that is> multipliable in God, as one finds in creatures, as is plain from that commonality that is multipliable according to the nature of the suppositis. Thus, not only can we say "Peter is a man", "Paul is a man", but also "Peter and Paul are two men." Yet, although we can say in divine matters "The Father is God", "The Son is God", "The Holy Spirit is God", nevertheless we cannot say that there are three gods, rather God is one. And thus universal being in God is not common in the same way a universal is common in creatures. But in creatures one does not only find common that is multipliable according to essence, but also <the common> that is common to God in reason. Hence when we say "Peter is an individual", "Paul is an individual" and so on, "individual" is common to those suppositis according to reason, not according to essence; Similarly, we can say here in a second way that it <i.e. "individual"> is common in God with respect to "Person" or "hypostasis". Whence there is here a commonality of intention, not of thing.⁴¹

40 Odo Rigaldus, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum* I, d. 19 (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14910, fols 50vb–51ra): 'Ad hoc dicendum quod in divinis non est universale nec particulare; particulare non, quia particulare dicit particulacionem essentie; una enim essentia numero non est in multis particularibus; sed partitur et particulatur in eis. Hoc autem fit dupliciter, vel ex adventu materie, sicut particulatur essentia speciei in individuis, vel ex adventu differentiarum, sicut particulatur essentia {51ra} generis in diversis suis speciebus. Neutrum autem horum reperitur in divinis; immo essentia una et eadem numero, sine sui particulacione tota est in qualibet trium personarum, et sic ratio particularis non cadit ibi' [To this it must be said that in God there is neither universal nor particular. There is no particular, as particular indicates the partitioning of the essence. For the numerically identical essence is not in many particulars; rather, it is partitioned and particularized in them. This happens in two ways: either through the advent of matter, as when the essence of the species is particularized in individuals, or through the advent of differentiae, as when the essence of a genus is particularized in a diversity of its species. But neither of these two cases applies to God; indeed, (God's) essence is numerically the one and the same. It is, without partitioning, wholly in each one of the three Persons, so that the notion of particular does not apply here].

41 Alexander de Hales, *Questio <Utrum sit ponere vere universale in divinis>* (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16406, fol. 41rb): 'Ad secundum dicendum quod ibi non est aliquod commune secundum essentiam multiplicabile in divinis sicut est (etiam: *cod.*) reperire in creaturis, sicut patet de hoc communi (hoc: *add. cod.*) quod est multiplicabile secundum naturam suppositorum. Unde non solum possumus dicere 'Petrus est homo', 'Paulus est homo', sed etiam 'Petrus et Paulus sunt duo homines'. Sed licet possimus dicere in divinis 'Pater est Deus', 'Filius est Deus', 'Spiritus Sanctus est Deus', non tamen possumus dicere quod sint tres dii, sed unus est Deus. Et sic non est eodem modo esse universale commune in divinis sicut est universale secundum essentiam in creaturis. Sed in creaturis non solum est reperire commune secundum essentiam multiplicabile sed etiam commune ratione Deo. Ergo cum dicimus 'Petrus est individuum', 'Paulus est individuum', et sic de aliis, individuum est commune ad hec supposita secundum rationem, non secundum essentiam. Per simile hic secundo modo possumus dicere quod est commune in divinis respectu persone vel ypostasis. Possumus enim dicere quod Pater est quod est, Filius est ypostasis et similiter Spiritus Sanctus. Unde est ibi communitas intentionis, non rei.'

A further example is the distinction between a universal being *de multis* or *in multis*, on which the *Summa* had based its argument against universals *in divinis*. The same distinction figures prominently in Odo Rigaldus's discussion:

Again, there isn't the character of universal here, for although "being in many" pertains to worthiness, "being of many" pertains to unworthiness, inasmuch as it denotes partness.

Again, "being of" denotes the character of what constitutes, just as genus denotes the being of the species, because <the species> is constituted out of genus and differences. But such partness and constitution is not to be found in God, hence nor is the character of a universal.⁴²

Even the *Summa's* doctrine of 'signate forms' is (distantly) echoed by a comment of John of La Rochelle in his *Summa*:

That character of universal that is apt to be predicated of many is understood of many things that differ not merely personally, but by their proper natures, such as Socrates and Plato, of whom "man" is predicated. "God" is not predicated of many so understood. For the divine Persons do not differ by their proper natures.⁴³

Is there any evidence beyond the presence of many of the same ideas or arguments in the *Summa* as in the other texts identified above, of actual textual dependence of the *Summa* on any of the above texts? The only unmistakable case concerns the *Glossa* of Vat. Lat. 691, which lists a series of four arguments purporting to show that the divine essence is a genus or a species with respect to the Persons: the same arguments reappear in the very same order in the *Summa* as the first four *sed contra*s (out of a total of seven).⁴⁴ And the *Summa's* responses to the three first of those objections (but not the fourth) follow the corresponding ones in the *Glossa* very closely, with the exception of a short *preterea* paragraph present in the *Glossa* which our Summists left out. Here are the objections:

⁴² Odo Rigaldus, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum* I, d. 19 (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14910, fol. 51ra): 'Item, ratio universalis non est ibi, quia licet 'esse in multis' dignitatis sit, tamen 'esse de multis' indignitatis sic est, quia dicit rationem partialitatis. Item, 'esse de' dicit rationem constituentis, sicut genus dicit esse speciei, quia ex genere et differentiis constituitur. Huiusmodi autem partialitatem et constitutionem non est reperire in divinis et ideo nec rationem universalis.'

⁴³ Johannes of La Rochelle, *Summa de divinis nominibus* (Trier, Stadtbibliothek 162, fol. 130va): 'Illa ratio universalis apta nata de pluribus predicari intelligitur de pluribus, non que differunt personaliter tantum, immo que differunt naturis propriis, ut Sor et Plato, de quibus predicatur homo. Deus enim non predicatur de pluribus sic acceptis. Non enim persone divine differunt naturis (personis: *cod.*) propriis.'

⁴⁴ That the *Summa* drew from Vat. lat. 691 here was pointed out by Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae Fratris Alexandri",' in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), CCLVIII, under 'Num. 333–344.'

<i>Glossa in Sententias</i> ⁴⁵	<i>Summa Halensis</i> ⁴⁶
Sed contra. Videtur quod divina essentia sit genus vel species. Divina essentia predicatur de qualibet persona essentialiter, non conversim; ergo est ad eas genus vel species.	Contra: 1. Divina essentia praedicatur de qualibet persona essentialiter et non conversim; ergo est genus vel species personarum.
Item, particulare sive singulare est de quo aliquid dicitur, ipsum vero de nullo. Sed hec ratio convenit cuilibet persone. Ergo quilibet persona est singulare sive particulare. Sed particulare sive singulare dicitur ad universale. Igitur cum persona non dicatur nisi ad essentiam, essentia est universale.	2. Praeterea, particulare sive singulare est de quo dicitur aliud, ipsum vero de nullo alio dicitur; sed ratio ista convenit cuilibet personae; ergo quaelibet persona est particulare sive singulare; sed singulare et particulare dicuntur ad universale; ergo, cum persona non dicatur nisi ad essentiam, essentia est universale.
Ad idem Boethius sic diffinit “personam”: “persona est rationalis nature substantia individua”; sed omnis substantia individua est individuum; ergo persona est individuum; sed individuum dicitur ad universale. Ergo essentia est universale.	3. Item, “persona est rationalis naturae substantia individua”; sed substantia individua est individuum; ergo persona est individuum; sed individuum dicitur ad universale; ergo essentia est universale.
Item, Damascenus dicit quod “Deus et homo significant speciem; ypostasis autem individuum demonstrat, scilicet patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, Petrum, Paulum”.	4. Item, Damascenus dicit quod “‘Deus’ et ‘homo’ significant speciem communem; hypostasis autem individuum demonstrat, scilicet Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, Petrum et Paulum”.

45 Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 691, fol. 24r: [But against this, it seems that the divine essence is a genus or a species. The divine essence is predicated of each Person essentially, but the converse does not hold. Therefore, (the divine essence) is a genus or a species with respect to them.

Again, a particular or a singular is that of which something is said, whereas itself is said of nothing. But this definition applies to each Person. Therefore, each Person is a singular or a particular. But a particular or a singular is said with respect to a universal. Hence, since a Person is said only with respect to essence, essence is universal.

Boethius defines “person” thusly: “a person is an individual substance having a rational nature” but every individual substance is an individual; hence, a person is an individual; but an individual is said with respect to a universal. Therefore, essence is universal.

Again, Damascene says that “God and man signify species; but a hypostasis picks out an individual, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Peter, Paul”].

46 *SH* I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 499: [Against the above: 1. The divine essence is predicated of each Person essentially, but the converse does not hold. Therefore, (the divine essence) is the genus or the species of the Persons.

2. Furthermore, a particular or singular is that of which something else is said, whereas itself is said of nothing else; but this definition applies to each Person; therefore, each Person is particular or singular; but singular and particular are said with respect to a universal; therefore, since a Person is said only in relation to the essence, the essence is universal.

3. Again, a person is an individual substance having a rational nature; but an individual substance is an individual; therefore, a Person is individual; but an individual is said in relation to a universal; therefore, the essence is universal.

4. Again, Damascene says that “‘God’ and ‘man’ signify a common species, while hypostasis picks out an individual, namely the father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Peter, and Paul”].

Here are the answers:

*Glossa in Sententias*⁴⁷

Ad illud quod obicitur primum, dicendum quod predicari essentialiter dicitur equivoce de substantia divina et de genere vel specie, quia essentia divina aliter est essentia patris et filii et spiritus sancti, aliter animal est essentia hominis et asini: unitas enim animalis in suis speciebus, ut dicit **{rb}** Damascenus, non consideratur re, sed unitas divine nature in personis re consider-

*Summa Halensis*⁴⁸

1. Ad primo obiectum, quod “divina essentia praedicatur” etc.: dicendum quod “praedicari essentialiter” dicitur aequivoce de essentia divina et de genere sive specie, quoniam essentia divina aliter est essentia Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, aliter animal essentia hominis et asini: unitas enim animalis in suis speciebus, ut dicit Damascenus, non consideratur re, sed ratione;

47 Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 691, fol. 24ra: [To the first objection, it must be said that “to be predicated essentially” is said equivocally of the divine substance and of genus or species, for the way in which the divine essence is the essence of the Father, of the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is other than the way in which animal is the essence of man and donkey. For, as Damascene says, the unity of animal in its species is not considered as a thing, whereas the unity of the divine nature in the Persons is considered as a thing. And this is said because the divine essence is not multiplied in the Persons in the way in which the genus is multiplied in species and the species in individuals.

To the objection that “a Person is a singular because it is that of which something is said, whereas it is not said of something else”, it can be said that “of which something is said” is said equivocally of Person and of singular and particular, for when I say “of which it is said”, in so far as these words apply to a singular and particular they bespeak a relation to matter or to a subject, neither of which is found in God.

Furthermore, in “particular” there is the idea of part, but in God there is no part. For a part has diminution and imperfection. Singular, therefore, cannot be in God for it bespeaks composition according to substance and place, and according to accidents. To the objection that a person is an individual, it must be replied that “individual substance” is said in two ways: either on account of a distinction of properties, and in this way individual does apply to Person in God; or on account of a separation from other things in respect to number and according to place and accidents, and in this sense individual denotes a singular].

48 *SH I*, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 500: [1. To what was objected first, namely that “the divine essence is predicated” etc., it must be said that “to be predicated essentially” is said equivocally of the divine essence, and of genus or species. For the way in which the divine essence is the essence of the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is other than the way in which animal is the essence of man and donkey. For, as Damascene says, the unity of animal in its species is not considered as a thing, whereas the unity of the divine nature in the Persons is considered as a thing. And this is said because the divine essence is not multiplied in the Persons, whereas the genus is multiplied in the species and the substance of the species in the individuals.

2. To the second objection it must be stated that when it is said “particular or singular is that of which something else is said, whereas itself is said of nothing”, “of” is understood in the sense of a relation to a subject; but the character of a subject is in no way in God. However, insofar as “of” is said of a divine Person, it is said metaphorically on account of a resemblance of speech, not because a real relation is posited to the thing, but only according to speech.

3. To the third it must be said that “individual substance” in the definition of person is said in two ways: either on account of a separation which is according to substance and place and accidents, and in this way it is said of the created person; or on account of a distinction of properties only, and in this way “individual substance” applies to the uncreated Person; (...)].

Continued

Glossa in Sententias⁴⁷**Summa Halensis**⁴⁸

atur. Et hoc dicitur quia divina essentia non multiplicatur in personis, sicut genus multiplicatur in speciebus et species in individuis.

unitas essentiae in personis re quidem consideratur: et hoc dicitur, quia essentia non multiplicatur in personis, substantia vero generis multiplicatur in speciebus et substantia speciei in individuis.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod “persona est singulare quia est de quo dicitur aliquid, ipsa non de alio”, potest dici quoniam illud “de quo dicitur aliud” dicitur equivoce de persona et singulari et de particulari, quia cum dico “de quo dicitur”, ut convenit singulari dicitur habitudinem ad materiam sive ad subiectum, quorum neutrum est in divinis.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod cum dicitur “particulare sive singulare est de quo dicitur aliud, ipsum vero de nullo”, intelligitur “de” per rationem habitudinis ad subiectum; ratio autem subiecti nullo modo est in divinis. Secundum vero quod dicitur de persona divina, dicitur transumptive ratione similitudinis locutionis, non ut ponatur ibi habitudo ad subiectum secundum rem, sed solum secundum locutionem.

Preterea, particulare dicitur rationem partis, sed pars non potest esse in divinis. Pars enim semper habet diminutionem et imperfectionem. Singulare igitur non potest esse ibi quia dicitur compositionem secundum substantiam et situm et secundum accidentia.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod in definitione personae “substantia individua” dicitur dupliciter: vel propter separationem quae est secundum substantiam et situm et accidentia, et sic dicitur de persona creata; vel propter distinctionem proprietatum solum, et hoc modo convenit “substantia individua” personae increatae; (...)

Ad illud quod persona est individuum, dicendum quod “substantia individua” dicitur dupliciter: vel propter distinctionem proprietatum, et sic convenit individuum persone in divinis; vel propter separationem ab aliis quantum ad numerum et secundum situm et accidentia, et sic individuum facit singulare.

Although there can be little doubt that our Summists ‘lifted’ these four *sed contras* and the responses to the first three of them from the *Glossa* of Val. Lat. 691, it is interesting to note that their *solution* is very different from that of Vat. Lat. 691. I indicated above that the solution of Vat. Lat. 691 relied on Boethius’ *quo est / quod est* distinction. But the *Summa* does not appeal to that distinction in its solution, which has more in common with Alexander’s *Quaestio* and Odo’s *Lectura*. Are we to conclude, then, that what our Summists are offering is but a mere ‘repackaging’ of familiar doctrines? Although there would be some truth to this conclusion, it would not be entirely correct. For the *Summa*’s discussion does offer at least a modicum of originality, even compared with Alexander’s *Quaestio* and Odo’s *Lectura*. It is to be found in the threefold classification of types of particularity, and the emphasis on the signate form’s particularity as a means of distinguishing the commonality of universals from the commonality of the divine essence. Although that theory is not fully spelled out by our Summists, it is sufficiently developed to allow them to provide a solution to the problem of ‘whether

the notions of universal and particular apply to divine matters' that is plausible, answers some standard objections, and is philosophically suggestive.

Jacob W. Wood

Forging the Analogy of Being

John of La Rochelle's *De divinis nominibus* (Trier, Abtei St. Matthias, 162) and the *Summa Halensis* on Knowing and Naming God

Abstract: This chapter studies the shift from equivocity and univocity towards analogy in treatises on the divine names in late 12th and early 13th-century *Summae* through an analysis of questions 1–4 of John of La Rochelle's *De divinis nominibus* and the corresponding sections of the *Summa Halensis*. It documents how in the *De divinis nominibus*, John selectively edits William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea* in order to introduce the metaphysics of causality into the traditional treatise on the divine names. This initially led John to formulate an analogy of being which accommodated earlier approaches to divine predication by adhering to the *modus significandi* of concrete names, but using the metaphysics of causality to deny that their *res significata* could be applied directly to God. Subsequently, the editor of Book 1 of the *Summa Halensis*—likely John himself—took a more kataphatic approach to the analogy of being. Although he preserved John's earlier use of the *res/modus* distinction in the case of negative names, he reversed it for names of eminence, denying the *modus significandi* of concrete names, but using the metaphysics of causality to affirm that their *res significata* could be predicated *proprie* of God.

Introduction

Since medieval authors generally considered the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius to have been the genuine literary products of Paul's convert at the Areopagus, and since they had access to the text of Pseudo-Dionysius' *Divine Names* from the 9th century onwards,¹ the *Divine Names* exercised a commanding influence over the philos-

1 For a discussion of the manuscripts of Dionysius available to medieval scholastics, see H.F. Dondaine, *Le corpus dionysien de l'Université de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1953); Timothy Budde, 'The *Versio Dionysii* of John Scottus Eriugena: A Study of the Manuscript Tradition and Influence of Eriugena's Translation of the *Corpus Areopagiticum* from the 9th through the 12th Century' (PhD thesis, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2011); Gioacchino Curiello, "'Alia translatio melior est': Albert the Great and the Latin Translations of the *Corpus Dionysiacum*," *Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 14 (2013): 121–51; Bernard Blankenhorn, *The Mystery of Union with God: Dionysian Mysticism in Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 30–46. Editions of the translations available to the medievals can be found in Pseudo-Dionysius, *Dionysiaca*, ed. Philippe Chevallier, vol. 1 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937).

ophy and theology of the Latin Middle Ages.² While some later authors wrote direct commentaries on the text,³ many more simply incorporated the text alongside—and often above—other *auctoritates* within the context of their other theological work. It was a challenging task. For theology is, at its root, an exercise in knowing and naming God, and so Pseudo-Dionysius raised for theologians of the Latin Middle Ages what we would today describe as ‘meta-questions’ about how the discipline of theology functions at all.

The home which these meta-questions tended to find in the late 12th and early 13th centuries was among the many Summae of theology that were then coming into existence. Although they do not figure heavily in the text of Peter Lombard’s *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*,⁴ one can find extensive treatments of the divine names throughout many of the other, lesser-known Summae of the period. Louisa Valente has noted that in some texts, such as the Summae of Peter of Poitiers, Praepositinus

2 On the reception history of Pseudo-Dionysius in the Middle Ages, see the sources cited in Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Theology as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Boston: Brill, 2012), 101, n. 173. To these may be added Jean Leclercq, ‘Influence and non-Influence of Dionysius in the Western Middle Ages,’ in Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Complete Works* (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 25–32; Paul Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Paul Rorem, ‘The Early Latin Dionysius: Eriugena and Hugh of St Victor,’ in *Re-Thinking Dionysius the Areopagite*, ed. Sarah Coakley and Charles Stang (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 71–84; Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘The Medieval Affective Dionysian Tradition,’ in *Re-Thinking Dionysius the Areopagite*, 85–102.

3 Direct commentaries are more common on the *Celestial Hierarchy* than they are on the *Divine Names*. The two principal commentaries on this work are those of John Scottus Eriugena and Hugh of St Victor. For the text of Eriugena’s commentary on the *Celestial Hierarchy*, see John Scottus Eriugena, *Expositiones in ierarchiam coelestem*, ed. Jeanne Barbet, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 31 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1975). For the text of Hugh of St Victor’s commentary on the same work, see Hugh of St Victor, *Super Ierarchiam Dionysii*, ed. Dominique Poirel, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 178 (Turnholt: Brepols, 2015). Direct commentaries on the *Divine Names* do not appear to begin in earnest until after Thomas Gallus. For the text of Gallus’ commentary, see Thomas Gallus, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, ed. Declan Anthony Lawell, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 223 (Turnholt: Brepols, 2011). After Gallus, commentaries appear in quick succession by Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. Until the completion of the critical edition of Grosseteste’s commentary by Gioacchino Curiello, a critical edition of Grosseteste’s commentary remains a significant *desideratum*. For Albert, see Albertus the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, ed. Paulus Simon (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972); for Thomas, the best edition remains Thomas Aquinas, *In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio*, ed. Ceslas Pera, Pietro Caramello, and Carlo Mazzantini (Turin: Marietti, 1950).

4 Peter Lombard treats the divine names in *Sentences* 1, d. 8 and d. 22. For the text of these distinctions, see Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, vol. 1, ed. Ignatius Brady, 3rd ed. (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971), 95–103 and 178–80. Although Peter Lombard’s treatment of the divine names compared to those of his contemporaries might appear to be somewhat cursory, it must be borne in mind that, since the *Sentences* were the fruit of oral teaching, the edition of the *Sentences* which we possess should by no means be considered Peter’s ‘definitive’ text. See Mark Clark, ‘Peter Lombard, Stephen Langton, and the School of Paris: The Making of the Twelfth-Century Scholastic Biblical Tradition,’ *Traditio* 72 (2017): 3–4 and 80–1.

of Cremona, and Stephen Langton, the discussion of the divine names is so central that it provides the ordering principle for trinitarian theology as a whole.⁵ Yet even when the structure of the text is not determined by its treatment of the divine names, other texts from the period, such as the *Summae* of Robert of Melun, Simon of Tournai, and Alan of Lille, as well as the anonymous *Summa Sententiarum*, the *Summa Zwettlensis*, and the *Tractatus Invisibilia Dei*, contain detailed and often extensive treatments of the topic.⁶ All of these works are trying to grapple with the paradox at the heart of Dionysian thought: how are we to know and name a God who lies fundamentally beyond all affirmation and negation?

Late 12th-century theologians typically attempted to describe the paradox of divine affirmation and negation by means of a twofold movement: an upward movement of *translatio*, in which terms spoken properly of creatures were emptied of their creaturely meaning and applied *translative* to God with the rules of revealed doctrine; and a downward movement which they called by various names, and in which terms spoken *proprie* of God were borrowed for use among creatures.⁷ Within this discussion, there were two poles in relation to which later theologians would place themselves. One extreme was that of equivocity, in which all theological speech

5 Louisa Valente, *Logique et théologie: Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2007), 337: '[L]a classification des noms divins n'est pas seulement située au début de la *Summa*, elle fournit aussi le principe autour duquel le traitement des thématiques trinitaires est bâti.' See Book 1 of Peter of Poitiers' *Summa*, the text of which can be found in Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis*, ed. Philip Moore and Marthe Dulong, vol. 1 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1943); Book 1 of Praepositinus of Cremona's *Summa Qui producit ventos*, the text of which can be found in Giuseppe Angelini, *L'Ortodossia e la grammatica: Analisi di struttura e deduzione storica della teologia Trinitaria di Prepositino* (Rome: Università Gregoriana, 1972), 191–303; and the first part of Stephen Langton's *Summa*, the text of which can be found in Sten Ebbesen and Lars Mortensen, 'A Partial Edition of Stephen Langton's *Summa* and *Quaestiones* with Parallels from Andrew Sunesen's *Hexameron*,' *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 49 (1985): 37–134.

6 See Book 1, Part 3 of the *Summa* of Robert of Melun, the text of which can be found in Robert of Melun, *Oeuvres de Robert de Melun*, ed. Raymond Martin, vol. 3/2 (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1952), 1–97; the questions on the divine names in the *Summa* of Simon of Tournai, a witness to the text of which can be found in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14886, fols 3vb-9ra; in passim throughout the *Summa Quoniam Homines* of Alan of Lille, the text of which can be found in Palémon Glorieux, 'La Somme "Quoniam Homines" d'Alain de Lille,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 20 (1953): 119–359; Book 1, Chapters 7 and 9 to 10 of the *Summa Sententiarum*, the text of which can be found in PL 176:52D-54C, 55B-58D; Book 1 of the *Summa Zwettlensis*, the text of which can be found in Nikolaus M. Häring, *Die Zwettler Summe: Einleitung und Text* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1977), 34–77; and in passim throughout the *Tractatus Invisibilia Dei*, the text of which is available in Niklaus M. Häring, 'The Treatise 'Inuisibilia Dei' in MS Arras, Bibl. mun. 981 (399),' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 40 (1973): 104–46.

7 On *translatio*, see Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 74. The most common label for the downward movement was *denominatio* (see Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 76–8). Valente points out that Alan of Lille abandoned the use of the label, *denominatio*, using *translatio* to describe both an upward and a downward movement. The subsequent tradition followed Alan (Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 219–20).

follows an upward movement of *translatio*; this approach was given its classic expression for subsequent theologians by Alan of Lille.⁸ The other was that of univocity, in which all theological terms follow the downward movement outlined above; this approach was given its classic expression for subsequent theologians by Praepositinus of Cremona.⁹

Although in some ways Alan and Praepositinus set forth opposite approaches to the question of knowing and naming God, there was one important respect in which these earlier Summists agreed with one another: the signification of philosophical terms does not carry over into theology. For Alan, the *words* with which we name God may first be formed in the human disciplines and then carried over into theology, but their *signification* remains restricted by the human disciplines; we can only use them in theology because we seem to know more than we can say: the surface meaning of our words (the *proprietas dicendi*) only ever refers *improprie* to God, even if the sense that our words evoke beyond their metaphorical meaning (the *proprietas essendi*) refers *proprie* to God.¹⁰ For Praepositinus, there is no such divergence between our knowledge and our speech, but that is because the signification of the words with which we name God must first be formed in theology, and then borrowed by the human disciplines.¹¹ This absence of any conscious reliance on the human disciplines for the signification of theological terms gives these earlier Summists an almost completely grammatical focus. They view the principal task of the theologian as delineating the ‘rules’ (*regulae*) according to which words, whose signification comes entirely from revealed doctrine, may be used in theological discourse. These rules could come from one of three places: from theological authority, from treatises on grammar, and from treatises on logic.¹²

By the mid 13th-century, equivocity and univocity gave way to a doctrine of analogy, in which—though individual theologians differed radically on the particulars—it was now supposed that the human disciplines could supply theological terms with

8 Alan of Lille, *Summa Quoniam Homines* 10 (Glorieux, 144–5). See Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 206–32.

9 Although Praepositinus does not use the abstract noun *univocitas* or any of its cognates explicitly when he describes the thesis which later scholastics would associate with univocity in *Summa Qui producit ventos* 8.2 (Angelini, 248–51), Angelini, *L’Ortodossia e la grammaticà*, 135, recognizes it as a legitimate interpretation of Praepositinus’ thought, going so far as to describe univocity as ‘il postulato supremo’ of Praepositinus’ methodology.

10 Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 211–3.

11 Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 256.

12 The use of and interplay among these respective sources is not consistent among theologians of the period. Valente makes a basic distinction between Porretanians, who prefer reason to authority, and Lombardians, who bend reason to authority (see Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 19, 385–8). But if we consider Valente’s argument that Stephen Langton marks the culmination of the late 12th-century grammatical tradition, in the light of Mark Clark’s argument in ‘Peter Lombard, Stephen Langton, and the School of Paris,’ 22–48, that Langton should also be seen as the inheritor of the ‘Lombardian’ school, this suggests that Valente’s basic division may need to be reconsidered.

signification.¹³ Scholars have yet to pinpoint a precise moment when the shift occurred,¹⁴ but we see it in Book 1 of Albert the Great's *Commentary on the Sentences* and in Book 1 of the *Summa Halensis*, both completed in the mid-1240s.¹⁵ While these texts utilize different, and at times opposing branches of the Arabic-Aristotelian tradition to explain how one moves along the Dionysian *triplex via* from philosophy into theology, they are united in the idea that it can be done. The elevation of our phil-

13 Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 8, following Jean-François Courtine, *Inventio analogiae: Métaphysique et ontothéologie* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2005), refers to this as the 'invention of analogy'.

14 The shift had causes both internal and external to the Latin tradition. Within the Latin tradition, Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 260–1, argues that this shift has in part to do with Stephen Langton's attempt to integrate Alan's equivocality with Praepositinus' univocity. For Langton, most theological terms follow Alan's paradigm, but there are some terms—which Langton calls *superpredicamentalia*—that share semantic content with their philosophical counterparts. According to Valente, Langton's *superpredicamentalia* effectively become the transcendentals in later authors.

While acknowledging the importance of *superpredicamentalia* within the Latin tradition (see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 45–6), Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 75–6, points to the seminal influence of Avicenna's *Prima Philosophia* for the 13th-century paradigm shift, going so far as to say that it 'determined the medieval reading and reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*'. While Aertsen is more sanguine about the role of Avicenna specifically in the formulation of the medieval doctrine of the analogy of being (Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 97), the conclusions reached below in this study provide evidence that Avicenna's influence on the formulation of this doctrine was more significant than Aertsen realized.

Amos Bertolacci, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization,' in *The Arabic Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Boston: De Gruyter, 2012), 202–4, distinguishes three phases of the reception of Avicenna's *Prima Philosophia*: an initial, local reception confined to Toledo in the second half of the 12th century, in which the *Prima Philosophia* is the principal text from the Aristotelian tradition on metaphysics; a wider reception in both Paris and Oxford through the 1230s, in which the *Prima Philosophia* is considered alongside, but secondarily to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* itself; and a final phase, seen especially in Oxford after 1240, in which the *Prima Philosophia* is considered not as an independent work but as an interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and in which Averroes' *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* ascends to a greater level of influence than Avicenna's *Prima Philosophia*. The texts considered in this chapter date to Bertolacci's second and third periods. The use of Avicenna's *Prima Philosophia* in the doctrine of analogy in *Summa Halensis*, which we shall examine below, provides evidence of the continued importance of Avicenna in the third phase.

15 See Jacob W. Wood, 'Kataphasis and Apophasis in Thirteenth Century Theology: The Anthropological Context of the *Triplex Via* in the *Summa fratris Alexandri* and Albert the Great,' *Heythrop Journal* 57 (2016): 293–311. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 46–53, also points to the logical works of Albert the Great, which can be dated to the early 1250s, while Amos Bertolacci, 'A New Phase of the Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West: Albertus Magnus and His Use of Arabic Sources in the Commentaries on Aristotle,' in *Albertus Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee: Die Begegnung der Wissenschaftskulturen im 13. Jahrhundert und die Entdeckung des Konzepts der Bildung durch Wissenschaft*, ed. Ludger Honnefelder (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2011), 259–76, 491–500, provides a more general account of the reception of Avicenna's and Averroes' metaphysics in Albert's work.

osophical language by analogy thus establishes not just rules, but even ideas which form the basis of theological thought, a presupposition which the earlier Summists had by and large rejected.

The goal of the present study is to document one part of the 13th century shift towards analogy in questions 1–4 of the *De divinis nominibus* in MS Trier, Abtei St Matthias, 162. I will show how John of La Rochelle uses these questions to rework William of Auxerre's *Summa Aurea* in order to introduce the analogy of being into the traditional *Tractatus de divinis nominibus*. Although it would not be proper to speak of John's work as a direct 'source' for the *Summa Halensis*, given the fact that John himself was likely the principal editor of the corresponding section of the *Summa Halensis*, questions 1–4 of the *De divinis nominibus* of Trier 162 can be said to set a trajectory which the *Summa Halensis* later follows. In the *De divinis nominibus*, which John initially intended as a part of a larger Summa in the tradition of Alan of Lille and Praepositinus of Cremona, John incorporates the analogy of being into the traditional *Tractatus de divinis nominibus* in such a way as to preserve the apophatic character of divine naming: although our names for God are drawn from the human disciplines and applied to God by the *via eminentiae*, John uses the distinction between the *res significata* and the *modus significandi* of divine names to argue that we must detach their signification from creatures if we wish to name God with them. In the *Summa Halensis*, the editor continues to offer this formulation as the pattern according to which we use *negative* divine names, but argues that names of eminence use the *res / modus* distinction in the opposite manner to achieve a kataphatic result: we deny their concrete *modus significandi*, but apply their *res significata* to God *proprie*.

Since the text of John's *De divinis nominibus* has not previously been studied, it is necessary to begin with an analysis of the text itself. That analysis will establish it as the second part of the *De articulis fidei* by John of La Rochelle, originally intended for inclusion in John's unfinished *Summa theologice discipline*. After the nature of the text has been established, we can proceed to an analysis of John's understanding of analogy in the *De divinis nominibus*, and finally to a comparison with that of the *Summa Halensis*.

The Text

The manuscript, Trier, Abtei St Matthias, 162, dates to the 14th century.¹⁶ Beyond that, its provenance is unknown. Besides various insertions, notes, and outlines, it contains the following selection of philosophical and theological works:

¹⁶ See Max Keuffer, *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der Handschriften der Stadtbibliothek zu Trier*, vol. 2 (Trier: Kommissionsverlag der Fr. Lintz'schen Buchhandlung, 1891), 78–9; Petrus Becker, *Die Benediktinerabtei St. Eucharius-St. Matthias vor Trier*, Das Erzbistum Trier, 8 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996), 139. In what follows, I will use Becker's foliation.

- Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion* 24–26 (f. 1v-2r)
- John of La Rochelle, *Summa de vitiis et peccatis* (f. 5ra-89rb)
- Cassiodorus, *De anima* (f. 89va-91rb)
- Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* (91va-101rb)
- Augustine, *De agone christiano* (101va-106vb)
- Pseudo-Augustine, *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus* (106vb-109va)
- John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de anima et virtutibus* (109va-125vb)¹⁷
- John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus* (125vb-142rb)
- John of La Rochelle, *De articulis fidei*, pt. 2 (142va-144ra)
- John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* (145ra-188ra)
- Gratian, *Decretum*, Table of Contents to p. 1 (188va-190vb)

The *De divinis nominibus* is not directly attributed to John in the manuscript. The rubricator has labeled it as the *secunda pars tractatus de symbolis*. Its incipit is more difficult to understand: *sequitur pars secunda prime partis istius partis*.¹⁸ This is actually an oblique reference to John's *De articulis fidei*. However, that fact can only be seen by comparing the two texts to one another.

As noted above, John originally planned the *De articulis fidei* as the first part of a *Summa theologicæ discipline* which he never fully completed. Doucet observes that John's *Summa* seems to have gone through approximately three redactions, and that the second and third redactions explicitly state that John planned to divide the work into six *Summulae*: a *Summa de articulis fidei*, a *Summa de vitiis*, a *Summa de donis*, a *Summa de legibus et praeceptis*, a *Summa de virtutibus*, and a *Summa de sacramentis*.¹⁹ While the *De articulis fidei* can therefore be referred to as a *Summa* or *Summula* in its own right, it can also be referred as the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa theologicæ discipline*.

The incipit of the *De articulis fidei* is traditionally given as *Summa theologicæ discipline in duobus consistit, scilicet in fide et moribus*.²⁰ Those are the first words of the

17 The rubrication ascribes this *Tractatus* to 'Frater Od.' [=Odo Rigaldus?]. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, 'Introduction,' in John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964), 14, takes up the question of this rubrication, and presents on pages 14–16 the evidence that this work, and the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* which it contains, should be ascribed to John of La Rochelle. For a summary of evidence to the contrary, see Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae Fratris Alexandri",' in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), ccxii.

18 The combination of these two labels seemingly led Keuffer, *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der Handschriften der Stadtbibliothek zu Trier*, 78–9, to conflate the text of the *De divinis nominibus* with the extract from John of La Rochelle's *De articulis fidei* which follows it; Petrus Becker, *Die Benediktinerabtei St. Eucharius-St. Matthias vor Trier*, 139, distinguishes the two texts but leaves both works ultimately unidentified.

19 Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' ccxiv.

20 Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' ccxii.

prologue to John's *Summa* as a whole, and since the *De articulis fidei* is the first part of that *Summa*, they are traditionally prepended to it. But this is misleading. After introducing the *Summa* as a whole and explaining its plan, John transitions to the *De articulis fidei* and gives the *De articulis fidei* a new incipit, based on Rom. 10:10. We will give the text in Latin for the sake of analysis:

De articulis vero fidei secundum formam Apostoli prosequendum est: Dicit enim ad Rom. X: Corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad salutem. Et ideo de iis est prius agendum secundum quod corde credendi sunt; deinde secundum quod ore fideliter confiteri locutionibus catholicis et veris.²¹

Having distinguished those things which are to be believed in the heart from those which are to be confessed in words, John goes on say—without explaining exactly what he means—that the *prima pars* is divided into three further *partes*: a Commentary on the Apostle's Creed, a Commentary on the Nicene Creed, and a Commentary on the Athanasian Creed.²²

In the prologue to the *De divinis nominibus*, John makes two direct references the prologue of the *De articulis fidei*. In the first sentence, he quotes its incipit. In the second, he refers to it by name, and picks up the distinction between what is believed with the heart and what is confessed in words.

Sequitur pars secunda prime partis istius partis: *Sicut enim dicitur ad Romanos X: Corde creditur ad iustitiam ore autem confessio sit ad salutem.* Dictum est in parte precedenti de hiis que debemus corde credere, scilicet de articulis fidei; modo restat inquisitio qualiter ea, que credimus, possimus ore fideliter confiteri.²³

By comparing the two texts, we can see that the words *istius partis* in the incipit should be punctuated with a colon; the demonstrative pronoun *istius* refers forward to the quotation of the incipit to the *De articulis fidei*, naming that work by its incipit. In this case, the most natural reading of the incipit of the *De divinis nominibus* would

21 Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' ccxii: [We should now proceed to discuss the articles of faith according to the Apostle's plan. For he says in Romans 10:10, "We believe with the heart unto righteousness, but confess with the mouth unto salvation." For that reason, we should begin by discussing [the articles of faith] insofar as they should be believed with the heart; then, insofar as they are faithfully confessed with the mouth in terms which are catholic and true].

22 Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' ccxii. I am grateful to Riccardo Saccenti for allowing me to supplement Doucet's transcription with a pre-publication version of his own, more complete transcription of this work.

23 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, prolog. (Trier, Abtei St Matthias, 162, fol. 125vb) (emphasis added): [Here follows the second part of the first part of this part: "For it is said in Romans 10:10, 'We believe with the heart unto righteousness, but confess with the mouth unto salvation.'" In the previous part there was discussion of those things which we must believe with the heart, namely, the articles of faith; now there remains an investigation of how we can faithfully confess with the mouth those things which we believe].

be: ‘Here follows the second part [i.e. the *De divinis nominibus*] of the first part [i.e. the Commentary on the Nicene Creed] of this part [of the *Summa*]: *Sicut enim dicitur ad Romanos* [i.e. the *De articulis fidei*].’ That gives us the following placement of the *De divinis nominibus* within the overall structure of the *De articulis fidei*:

De articulis fidei (Prima Pars of the *Summa*)

1. Part 1
 - i. Commentary on the Apostle’s Creed
 - ii. *De divinis nominibus*
2. Part 2: Commentary on the Nicene Creed
3. Part 3: Commentary on the Athanasian Creed

Not only is this one possible reading of the incipit of the *De divinis nominibus*; it also potentially explains why John’s Commentary on the Nicene Creed would have been appended to the *De divinis nominibus* in Trier 162. Whatever the case may be about John’s intentions, it appears that the compiler of this manuscript or of its exemplar followed this interpretation of the incipit.

However, if we turn our attention to the distinction between what is believed with the heart and what is confessed in words, it becomes evident that the *De divinis nominibus* should not be appended to John’s Commentary on the Apostle’s Creed. When the *De articulis fidei* distinguishes between that which is believed with the heart and that which is confessed in words, it claims—somewhat counterintuitively—that *all three* of its credal commentaries fall under the heading of ‘that which is believed with the heart’. Then, when the *De divinis nominibus* picks up the distinction, it agrees that a so-called ‘previous part’ has covered ‘that which is believed with the heart’, and promises that the *De divinis nominibus* will now take up ‘that which is confessed in words’. This means that the *De divinis nominibus* places itself not in the midst of but *after* the three credal commentaries *De articulis fidei*. This leads us to a different interpretation of the structure of the *De articulis fidei*: what we traditionally think of as the *De articulis fidei* is only the *prima pars* of the *De articulis fidei*. The *De divinis nominibus* is its *secunda pars*:

De articulis fidei

1. *Prima pars*: What is believed in the heart
 - i. Commentary on the Apostle’s Creed
 - ii. Commentary on the Nicene Creed
 - iii. Commentary on the Athanasian Creed
2. *Secunda Pars (De divinis nominibus)*: What is confessed in words

The incipit to the *De divinis nominibus* can thus be interpreted in the following manner: ‘Here follows the second part [i.e. the *De divinis nominibus*] of the first part of this part [of the *Summa*]: *Sicut enim dicitur ad Romanos* [i.e. the *De articulis fidei*].’ This interpretation is to be preferred on the basis of internal evidence, as it makes

the best sense of how these two texts frame themselves in relationship to one another.²⁴

As it stands, the text of the *De divinis nominibus* is unfinished, incompletely copied, or both. We can tell this by comparing the rest of the prologue to the work as a whole. After the reference to the *De articulis fidei*, the prologue continues with a taxonomy of the grammatical forms which our terms can assume when we speak about God. This taxonomy has been lifted almost verbatim from the *Tractatus de divinis nominibus* in the *Summa* of Praepositinus of Cremona. It differs from Praepositinus primarily in the addition of a distinction between abstract and concrete nouns, and by the omission of a taxonomy of adjectives. An outline of the taxonomy as it appears in John's *De divinis nominibus* is as follows; the names in parentheses are John's examples of each kind of name:²⁵

Vocabula about God

1. Said from eternity (*Deus, Bonus*)
 - a. Befits all three persons (*Iustitia*)
 - i. Befits all three persons *per se* (*Deus*)
 1. Abstract (*Divinitas, Essentia*)
 2. Concrete (*Deus*)
 - ii. Befits none of the persons *per se* (*Trinitas*)
 - b. Befits only some of the persons
 - i. Befits two (*Principium Spiritus Sancti, Vnare*)
 - ii. Befits one (*Pater, Filius, Spiritus Sanctus*)
2. Said with reference to time (*Creator, Refugium, Dominus*)

24 While the simplest explanation should usually be preferred, another possibility is that the words *istius partis* from the incipit to the *De divinis nominibus* are a corruption of the words *istius operis*. This would require two assumptions. First, we would have to assume a paleographical error: at some point, a scribe forgot to copy the *o* of *op^{is}*; a subsequent scribe saw *p^{is}* and copied it as *p^{is}*. Second, we would have to assume that John composed the prologue to the *Summa* as a whole after he composed both parts of the *De articulis fidei*, such that the incipit of the *De articulis fidei* at one point functioned as the incipit of the *Summa* as a whole. In that case, the interpretation of the prologue would be: 'Here follows the second part [i.e. the *De divinis nominibus*] of the first part [i.e. the *De articulis fidei*] of this work: *Sicut enim dicitur ad Romanos* [i.e. the *Summa*].' This reading makes for a clearer sentence, but it lacks manuscript evidence. It is also somewhat out of character with John's writing in the *De divinis nominibus*, which can be awkward at times, and tends to equivocate with the word *pars*.

25 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, prol. (Trier 162, fols 125vb-126ra). Since the manuscript has not been well-copied, it requires a great deal of editorial work. Where possible, I have corrected it from context, or from a comparison with its sources. All formatting is given by way of editorial suggestion. Letters or words that have been ~~stricken through~~ should be deleted; words in [brackets] should be added. I have also taken the liberty of standardizing orthography and punctuation. For the comparable text in Praepositinus, see Praepositinus of Cremona, *Summa Qui producit ventos* 1.1 (Angelini, 199).

At the conclusion of the taxonomy, John promises to discuss each the members of the taxonomy in turn. But in reality, most of them are missing from the text as we have it. The text begins with two questions on whether and how we name God.²⁶ After that, it takes up concrete and abstract nouns in the reverse order in which they are given in the taxonomy. The text breaks off in the middle of the discussion of abstract nouns.²⁷ It never gets to the name *Trinitas*, or to any of the names that follow it.

Question 1: Introducing the Analogy of Being

Following the prologue, the first question begins with a *proemium*, announcing that anyone who wishes to discuss the divine names must begin with the question of whether God is namable at all.²⁸ This seemingly innocuous observation is also a clue to how our author intends to engage the late 12th- and early 13th-century tradition. Prior to William of Auxerre, it was generally assumed that God is namable, whether by equivocity or univocity, and so the subject matter of the traditional *Tractatus de divinis nominibus* was not *whether*, but *how* God is namable. But William innovated the tradition by beginning his own account of the divine names with a defense of our ability to know and to name God at all.²⁹

William's defense of our ability to know and name God is grounded in the metaphysics of causality. Appealing to the impossibility of an infinite regress in causes, William argues that God can be known to exist as the uncaused cause, the source of influx into creatures, and the highest object of desire.³⁰ For William, these metaphysical considerations protect the integrity of a grammatical approach to naming God. God, as the highest cause, so infinitely exceeds the natural world that any at-

26 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, qq. 1–2 (Trier 162, fol. 126ra-126vb).

27 The discussion of abstract nouns is divided into those which signify the divine nature without reference to creatures, and those which signify the divine nature with reference to creatures (Trier 162, fol. 130va). The discussion of those which signify the divine nature without reference to creatures is complete. The discussion of those which signify the divine nature with reference to creatures is subdivided into three names: *Potentia*, *Sapientia*, and *Voluntas* (Trier 162, fol. 133ra). After completing a discussion of *Potentia*, John divides the discussion of *Sapientia* into five parts: *Scientia/Sapientia*, *Dispositio*, *Providentia*, *Predestinatio*, *Reprobatio* (Trier 162, fol. 138va). The subsequent text follows this outline, but breaks off on fol. 142rb in the middle of the discussion of *Providentia*.

28 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 1 (Trier 162, fol. 126ra): 'Volentibus tractare de diuinis nominibus ꝛ[o]ccurritur primo questio utrum Deus sit nominabilis et qualiter' [The first question that occurs to those who want to discuss the divine names is whether God is nameable, and how].

29 On the centrality of this theme for William, see Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 266–7. William's *Tractatus de divinis nominibus* in the *Summa Aurea* includes a treatment of *nomina essentialia* (l. 1, tr. 4), *nomina adiectiva* (l. 1, tr. 5), and *nomina personalia* (l. 1, tr. 6). See William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, vol. 1, ed. Jean Ribaillier (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980), 35–109. William's discussion of whether God is nameable can be found in *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 1 (Ribaillier, 36–40).

30 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 1, nn. 1–3 (Ribaillier, 21–2).

tempt to carry signification gathered from Creation into our speech about the Creator necessarily fails.³¹ William thinks that a failure to appreciate God's apophatic transcendence in this way was actually the cause of the early Trinitarian heresies.³²

When John takes up the question of whether we can know and name God, he begins by considering the negative opinion: "That he cannot, is shown by threefold authority and reasoning."³³ Bearing in mind the significance of William of Auxerre for the history of this question, if we compare this statement of John to the corresponding chapter of William's *Summa Aurea*, John appears to be describing precisely what one finds in William's text: *obiectiones* drawn from three specific *auctoritates* (Dionysius, Damascene, and [Pseudo-]Augustine), together with supporting reasoning.³⁴ John then goes on to give verbatim many of the specific quotations which appear in the corresponding chapter of the *Summa Aurea*.³⁵ Apart from a single, three-word reference to the Psalms in the fourth *sed contra*,³⁶ John does not cite a single text that cannot be found in the corresponding chapter of the *Summa Aurea*.

The overlap between William's text and John's raises the question of which is prior. Apart from the fact that William's work is prior to John's in general, the fact that John's text is posterior also appears from a large section of text in the first *obiectio*, which is only present in John's text. It consists of a gloss on each of the words which Dionysius uses to deny that we can know and name God properly. The gloss aligns each of Dionysius' words with one member of a taxonomy of the apprehensive powers of the soul, and it aligns each apprehensive power of the soul with the kind of knowledge proper to it.³⁷ The remote source of the taxonomy can be in-

31 William finds proof for this in the thirteenth chapter of John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*, which describes God as both 'incomprehensible' and 'above our thoughts'. See John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 13.6, although William cites it as Chapter 10. For the text, see John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), 59.

32 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, prolog., s. 2 (Ribaillier, 18).

33 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 1, proem. (Trier 162, fol. 126ra): 'Quod non, ostenditur auctoritate triplici et ratione.'

34 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 1 (Ribaillier, 36–7).

35 John references the following texts:

Obj. 1 (Trier 162, fol. 126ra): Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 1.5 (Chevallier, 35). This is taken from William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 1, q. 1, obj. 3 (Ribaillier, 36).

Obj. 2 (Trier 162, fol. 126ra-b): John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 1.13 (Buytaert, 59). This is taken from William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 1, q. 1, obj. 7 (Ribaillier, 37).

Obj. 3 (Trier 162, fol. 126rb): John does not actually cite any authentic texts of Augustine. He merely copies two texts which William attributes to Augustine. See William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 1, q. 1, obj. 7–8 (Ribaillier, 37).

36 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 1, s.c. 5 (Trier 162, fol. 126rb): 'Item. In Psalmo: *Domini nomen illi*' [Likewise. In Psalm [67:5 (Vulg.)]: *The Lord is his name*].

37 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 1, obj. 1 (Trier 162, fol. 126ra): 'Prima est Dionysii in libro *De divinis nominibus*. Deus omnibus per se uniuersaliter est incomprehensibilis, et neque sensus eius est (...) *sustantia* [neque fantasia], neque opinio, neque nomen, neque uerbum, neque tactus,

ferred from the definition which John gives to the word, *opinio*. That definition reads *est autem opinio acceptatio unius partis cum formidine alterius*. It is based on Avicenna's *De anima* 5.1: *opinio (...) est conceptio ad quam accreditur cum formidine alterius partis*.³⁸ In that same paragraph, Avicenna goes on to give a very similar taxonomy of apprehensive powers and their acts as we find here. But as close as this parallel is, it is not an exact match to either of the two versions of Avicenna's *De anima* which were in circulation at the time.³⁹ An even closer parallel can be found in John of La Rochelle's *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* 2.23,⁴⁰ and his

[*neque scientia,*] et in enigmatē, id est, in allegoria scripturarum. Ab omnibus dicit ut nullus homo excipiat; *universaliter* ut omnis modus comprehendendi remoueat. Quod tangit inductive: *neque sensus eius est* etc.: Quedam comprehensio est per sensum; ~~quedam sensitiva~~, que remouetur cum dicitur *neque sensus eius est* qua cognoscimus res corporales presentes. Quedam comprehensio est per ymaginationem siue fantasiam qua cognoscimus res corporales absentes, ~~quod~~ [que] remouetur cum dicitur *neque fantasia*. Quedam ~~ap[com]~~prehensio est per rationem probabilem, que dicitur opinio (est autem opinio acceptatio unius partis cum formidine alterius); ~~quod~~ [que] remouetur cum dicitur *neque opinio est*. Alia comprehensio ~~que~~ est per doctrinam, et hoc dupliciter: nam alia est per scripturam; alia est per auditum. Illa que est per scriptum intelligitur per *nomen*; que per auditum intelligitur per *uerbum*. (...) Alia ~~ap[com]~~prehensio [est] interior, et hoc est duplex: qui[el]dam enim est affectus, et ita comprehensio est sicut tactus, sicut patet in amore, que est copula amantis et amati, sicut dicit Augustinus; alia est intellectus, et ista dicitur *scientia* [The first comes from Dionysius in the book, *On the Divine Names*. God is *incomprehensible of himself universally to everyone* and *there is no sense of him* (...) [*nor phantasm*], *nor opinion, nor name, nor word, nor touch*, [*nor knowledge*] and *in a mystery*, that is, in biblical allegory. By *everyone* he says that no person is excluded; *universally* that every manner of comprehending is removed. He discusses this inductively: *there is no sense of him*, etc.: There is a certain comprehension by sense, which is removed when it is said *there is no sense of him* by which we know present, corporeal things. There is a certain comprehension by imagination or phantasm, by which we know absent corporeal things, which is removed when it is said *nor phantasm*. There is a certain comprehension by probable reason, which is called opinion (now, opinion is the acceptance of one possibility with apprehension about the other); this is removed when it is said *nor is there opinion*. Another comprehension is by teaching, and this happens in two ways: for one [kind of teaching] is by writing; the other by hearing. The one which is by writing is intended by *name*; the one which is by hearing is intended by *word*. (...) Another comprehension [is] interior, and this is twofold: one is the affect, and in this way comprehension is like touch, as takes place in love, which is the union of the love and the beloved, as Augustine says; the other is the intellect, and in this way it is called *knowledge*].

38 Avicenna, *De anima* 5.1. The text can be found in Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, vol. 2, ed. S. van Riet (Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 1972), 79: [Opinion (...) is a conception which one trusts with apprehension about another possibility].

39 On the two Latin versions of Avicenna's *De anima* see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), 7–8; on the availability of both to John, see Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima*, 50. Simone van Riet, 'Le "De anima" d'Avicenne: Une conception spiritualiste de l'homme,' in Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de anima*, 94*-6*, points out that while the two versions agree concerning the definition of *opinio*, ten manuscripts of Version A and one manuscript of Version B contain a gloss on the definition of *opinio*, which distinguishes it from *dubitatio*.

40 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* 2.23, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964), 97.

Summa de anima 119.⁴¹ In those respective chapters, John is paraphrasing the section of Avicenna just referenced. He gives verbatim the definition of *opinio* that we find in our text, but develops the material we find in the *De divinis nominibus* significantly further. It seems reasonable to infer, therefore, that in the *De divinis nominibus* John is working from a copy of William's *Summa Aurea*,⁴² and that he has added this taxonomy to it. He appears to have done so in an initial effort to incorporate some of the distinctions about the soul which he found in Avicenna, and which he would further develop in subsequent work.

Although John does, for the most part, stay close to William's ideas, and even to William's wording, there are two other places in this question where John makes major revisions to William's work. The purpose of these revisions appears to have been to introduce William's discussion of the metaphysics of causality—which was originally supposed to deny the possibility of naming God *proprie* from creatures—into the traditional *Tractatus de divinis nominibus* in such a way as to make it the basis upon which we name God *proprie* from creatures. We see evidence of this shift in a large deletion from the *solutio*, and an addition in the reply to the third *sed contra*. The deleted section from the *solutio* contains a statement from William, together with *auctoritates* and *rationes*, to the effect that we cannot name God *proprie*.⁴³ This may have been a common theme throughout the late 12th and early 13th centuries, but John's introduction of the metaphysics of causality into the *Tractatus de divinis nominibus* would ultimately call it into question.

With the ground thus cleared to make a more radical change, the reply to the third *sed contra* begins the work of doing so. In the passage of the *Summa Aurea* parallel to it, William clarifies that when we say *ens* of God, we intend something purely negative. We start with the *ens* which is known first to the intellect; we add the privation *non ab alio*; and the resultant name means something like 'unreceived-being'

⁴¹ John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* 119, in *Summa de anima: Texte critique avec introduction, notes, et tables*, ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), 285.

⁴² The use of William of Auxerre in this way was common in the 1230s. Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' CXXXI, points to the fact that both Hugh of St Cher in the composition of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, as well as Roland of Cremona in the composition of his *Summa*, had William's *Summa Aurea* 'constanter prae oculis'. Magdalena Bieniak, 'The Sentences Commentary of Hugh of St Cher,' in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 134, confirmed this initially with regard to Book 1 of Hugh of St Cher's *Commentary on the Sentences*, and subsequently with regard to the work as a whole in Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris ca. 1200–1250* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 100: 'A substantial part of Hugh of St Cher's *Sentences Commentary* consists in an almost verbatim reproduction of William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea*.' Riccardo Quinto, 'Le commentaire des *Sentences* d'Hugues de Saint-Cher et la littérature théologique de son temps,' in *Hugues de Saint-Cher (d. 1263): bibliste et théologien*, ed. Louis-Jacques Bataillon, Gilbert Dahan, and Pierre-Marie Gy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 315, n. 41, makes a similar claim about Roland of Cremona's *Summa*, arguing that commonalities between Hugh and Roland can most likely be explained by their common use of William of Auxerre's *Summa Aurea*.

⁴³ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 1, q. 1, sol. (Ribaillier, 39).

(literally, *ens non ab alio*) or that which is ‘truly being’ (*vere ens*).⁴⁴ For William, even *vere ens* is radically negative; it becomes a proper name for God only by losing its previous connection with the creatures it used to signify.⁴⁵ William thinks that this is part of God’s providential plan for our salvation. Quoting Ps. 17:12 (Vulgate) in the reply to the first *sed contra*, that God ‘conceals himself in darkness’, William argues that God hides from natural reason ‘so that faith may be meritorious’.⁴⁶

John changes the structure of William’s negative predication. ‘Positive knowledge’ (*cognitio positiva*), he says, is knowledge which is like ‘sight’ (*uisus*) and ‘absolute’ (*absoluta*). No Christian theologian, save perhaps for the ontologists of the 18th century, would argue that humanity can have this kind of sight *in uia*. But between William’s absolutely negative knowledge and the vision of the saints in heaven, John makes room for an analogy based on the metaphysics of causality: since the soul knows that God is the cause of its being, it also knows that God possesses being ‘better’ (*melius*) and more ‘nobly’ (*nobilius*) than the soul does. There is thus opened through the *via negationis* and the *via causalitatis* by which the soul knows itself, a kind of *via eminentiae*, whereby it predicates being of God in connection with, not in contrast to, its own being.⁴⁷ Moreover, since according to this line of reason-

44 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 2, sol. (Ribaillier, 42–3).

45 Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 267–72, notes that William does in a certain respect attempt to make room for the univocal tradition. Although conceding that theological terms are, properly speaking, equivocal with their philosophical homographs, William does admit that they are univocal with reference to their effects. His example is ‘justice’. Although created justice and uncreated justice are equivocal in themselves, they agree in their principal effect: giving to each his due. See William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 5, c. 3 (Ribaillier, 72–3). Although preserving a preference for equivocality, expressed in similar language, in the case of *nomina essentialia*, William does admit certain other forms of univocity in tr. 6, c. 2 (Ribaillier, 83).

Philip the Chancellor largely follows William on this point. See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, prol., q. 4, vol. 1, ed. Nicolai Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985), 21. While preserving the fundamentally negative character of the term *bonum* as applied to God, he sees a certain correspondence between the effects of uncreated and created goodness, which he describes as a *proportio*.

46 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 2, ad s.c. 1 (Ribaillier, 40): ‘Deus enim modo se occultat nobis et ponit tenebras latibulum suum ut fides habeat meritum’ [God hides himself from us now and conceals himself in darkness [Ps. 17:12 (Vulg.)] so that faith may have merit].

47 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 1, ad s.c. 3 (Trier 162, fol. 126va): ‘Ad illud Damasceni, quod *cognitio Dei naturaliter est insita anime*, distinguendus est cognitio privatiua siue comparationis, et sic naturaliter Deus cognoscitur ab anima rationali. Cognoscit enim rationalis creatura quia non fuit semper, et ita quod ex nichilo in esse. Quare et ab alio est, quod conuertit non esse tale quale ipsum est, sed melius et nobilius. Et est cognitio positiua, que est sicut uisus et absoluta. Et sic Deus ab anima non cogitatur in uia’ [To the objection from Damascene, that *the knowledge of God is naturally placed within the soul*, we should distinguish privative knowledge or [knowledge] by comparison. According to this sort of knowledge, God is naturally known by the rational soul. For a rational creature knows that it did not always exist, and thus that it was brought forth from nothing into being. Wherefore it comes from another, which converted the non-being [into being], only [that other] is better and more noble [than itself]. There is also positive knowledge, which is like sight and

ing, the soul does not approach God altogether in darkness, John substitutes William's citation from the Psalms in the reply to the first *sed contra* with a citation from 1 Timothy more to his purpose: it is not that God dwells in darkness, so much as God 'reclines in inaccessible light'.⁴⁸

Question 2: Relating the Analogy of Being to the Previous Tradition

John refines his use of the analogy of being in his reception of the next question in William's work: on Dionysius' distinction between symbolic and mystical theology.⁴⁹ For William, the distinction has to do with the origin of the words with which we name God. If the words come from creatures outside the soul, they are symbolic; he gives the examples of 'lion' and 'fire'. If the words come from effects that God creates inside the soul in the midst of prayer and contemplation, they are mystical; he gives the examples of 'sweet' and 'beloved'. William is clear that there is no fundamental difference between how the words are used once they are taken from their respective spheres: both categories of words signify creatures, and so both are predicated of God by way of negation.⁵⁰

On the surface, John seems to accept William's use of Dionysius' distinction between symbolic and mystical theology: he copies William's association of symbolic theology with exterior creatures and his association of mystical theology with 'interior' creatures.⁵¹ But he also revises William's text to make room for an analogy based on the metaphysics of causality alongside the other two ways of naming God. He does so with reference to a quotation from Damascene that John borrows from the next question in William's work. The context of that quotation is a discussion of the apparent disagreement between Damascene and Dionysius about whether *Qui est* or *bonum* is the first name for God.⁵² John will take up that discussion later in

is absolute. God is not known by the soul in this way *in via*]. In *Summa de anima* 18 (Bougerol, 74), John introduces a similar point in the context of arguing that the soul is not caused by an angel.

48 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 1, ad s.c. 1 (Trier 162, fol. 126va). 'Non enim se habet oculus interior intellectus ad lucem summam que est Deus sicut oculus exerior ad lucem corporalem. Comparatio enim ex parte illa est finiti ad infinitum. Ex parte alia finiti ad finitum. Et ideo deficit intellectus in contemplatione. *Recumberatur enim a luce inaccessiblei*' [The interior eye of the intellect is not oriented towards the highest light, which God is, like the exterior eye is to corporeal light. For the former comparison is of the finite to the infinite; the latter comparison is of one finite thing to another. This is the reason why the intellect fails in contemplation: *he dwells in inaccessible light*].

49 In his edition of the *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 1 (Ribaillier, 40–1), Ribaillier does not distinguish this as a second question, but the text raises a separate topic and offers a separate *solutio*, and for this reason ought to be distinguished as a separate question.

50 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 1, q. 2, sol. (Ribaillier, 40–1).

51 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 2 (Trier 162, fol. 126va-b).

52 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 2 (Ribaillier, 41–3).

Question 4, and so we will have reason to return to it below. But in order to establish the context for John's quotation here, we may note that one of William's objectors argues that since all names are equivocal when predicated of God, there is no way to establish which is first:

Every name by which we name God names him through an image which is from our perspective (*secundum nos*). Therefore, both the name "he who is" (*Qui est*) and the name "good" (*bonum*) name God through an image which is from our perspective. Therefore, since no image drawn from creatures necessarily occurs first, seeing as we can use any of them indifferently, it follows that neither of those names comes first in God.⁵³

In support of this objection, William's objector quotes a colorful passage from Damascene:

It is impossible for us human beings, clothed with our thick flesh, to understand and to speak of the divine and non-material workings of God, unless we use images, forms, and signs, which are from our perspective (*secundum nos*).⁵⁴

Although William does not agree with the objector in general, since he thinks that *ens* names God *simpliciter*, while *bonum* also connotes an effect in a creature,⁵⁵ William himself uses this quote to reinforce a point which he will later affirm: for an image, form, or sign to be *secundum nos* is for it to be said *translative* of God. Even when we use a name like *ens* which signifies the divine essence *proprie*, 'we do not understand God in that [predication] without some sign or distinction, since the privation itself is a sort of sign or distinction.'⁵⁶ This means that although we use a word that describes God *proprie*, we can only use it *translative*.

John takes up William's quotation from Damascene into the *solutio* of his second question, in order to refine the relationship between the analogy of being and the previous tradition. Taking advantage of the fact that Damascene gives three examples of things we use to speak of God, John adds a third member to Dionysius' distinction between symbolic and mystical theology, and to William's related distinction between naming God from exterior effects and naming God from interior effects:

⁵³ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 3, obj. 2 (Ribaillier, 41–2): '[O]mne nomen quo nominamus Deum nominat ipsum per ymaginem que est secundum nos. Ergo et hoc nomen "qui est" et hoc nomen "bonum" nominant Deum per ymaginem que est secundum nos. Ergo cum nulla ymago creaturarum ex necessitate primo occurrat, quia qualibet possumus uti indifferenter, sequitur quod nullum illorum nominum sit principalius in Deo.'

⁵⁴ John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 11 (Buytaert, 52), quoted in William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 3, obj. 2 (Ribaillier, 41): 'Homines grossam hanc carnem <indutos>, divinas non <materiales> operationes deitatis intelligere et dicere impossibile est, nisi ymaginibus et formis et notis que sunt secundum nos uti fuerimus.' I have given the text as it appears in William's work.

⁵⁵ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 2, sol. (Ribaillier, 42).

⁵⁶ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 2, sol. (Ribaillier, 43): '[N]on intelligitur ibi Deus sine nota vel distinctione aliqua, quia ipsa privatio est quasi quedam nota sive distinctio.'

Therefore, God is named in three ways, by *images* of material things; by *forms* of spiritual things; [and] by *signs* of privations, all of which are from our perspective (*secundum nos*). Therefore, God is named in three ways: from a property of a material thing, as in “lion”, “sun”; from a property of a spiritual thing, as in “wise”, “benevolent”; [and] by a privative distinction or sign, as in “un-created”, “immense”.⁵⁷

What John says concerning *ymagines* corresponds with William’s description of symbolic theology. What John says concerning *formae* corresponds with William’s description of mystical theology. But the words that John uses to describe our use of *signa*, which he takes out of context from William’s explanation of how we can speak words that refer to God *proprie*, suggest that John is attempting to move beyond William here. William and John agree that speaking in this way includes a privation. For William, this was supposed to preserve the apophatic character of our speech about God. But since for John, the language of privation includes the analogy of being, the addition of a third member to Dionysius’ distinction appears to be a deliberate attempt to make room within the previous tradition for the possibility of using the analogy of being to name God *proprie*. John explores this possibility further in the subsequent question.

Question 3: Refining the Analogy of Being

John’s third question tries to reconcile the earlier tradition with the analogy of being that he had introduced in Questions 1–2. That John is—at least in his own mind—charting new territory with his third question is clear from the question’s structure and content. Without William’s *auctoritates* and *rationes* to rely upon, it is dramatically shorter. It consists of two *obiectiones*, two *sed contra*, and replies to each. There is no separate *solutio*. The tenuousness of John’s response is reflected in the qualified manner in which he offers it: *sine preiudicio*.⁵⁸ In the reply to the first *sed contra*, John gives an initial description of how he thinks the analogy of being works. Bearing in mind that John thinks that the name *ens* includes the privation *non ab alio*, he uses this text to connect the *via negationis* with the *via causalitatis*.

Ens or *esse* is said *per prius* and *posterius* of God and a creature because he is the fount and origin of being in creatures. Therefore he truly “is” immutably and *per se*, while being is said

⁵⁷ John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 2 (Trier 162, fol. 126vb): “Tripliciter ergo nominatur Deus, “que sunt secundum nos”: *ymaginibus* corporum; *formis* rerum spiritualium; ~~notis~~ [notis] priuationum. Tripliciter ergo nominatur Deus: proprietate rei corporalis ut *Leo, Sol*; proprietate rei spiritualis ut *Sapiens, Benignus*; distinctione priuatua siue ~~nota~~[nota] ut *Increatus, Immensus*.”

⁵⁸ John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 3, sol. (Trier 162, fol. 126vb): ‘Ad hoc responderi potest sine preiudicio’ [We can respond to this without prejudice].

per posterius of a creature, both because it “is” *per accidens*, and because it “is” *secundum quid*.⁵⁹

The reference to immutability suggests that our author intends that the *via eminentiae* should follow upon the *via causalitatis*. He draws this out more explicitly in his reply to the second objection.

With regard to the second we should say that when I say “he who is” (*qui est*), it names God properly, because he is being most fully. Three things need to be taken into account:

The first is that the thing signified (*res significata*) by my saying *qui est* is superior to every description, which is shown in the circumlocution by which *qui est* tries to describe it. It appears that our language fails in the concrete when it narrates what it names with a circumlocution.

The second is that it is an infinite *res*, which is made clear by the infinite name, *qui est*.

Moreover, the third is that he “is” truly and immutably, which is shown in the co-signification of the verb *est*. For the present tense co-signifies. Augustine in *Eighty-Three Questions* [q. 17] argues thus: *Everything past no [longer] exists. [Everything] future does not yet exist.* Therefore also, *there is no (...) past and future, that is, in God.* It is clear from this that immutability is understood in the co-signification of the present. From these [arguments] it is clear that that when I say *qui est*, it signifies the divine essence *proprie*, not *translative*.

But here we should note: that you do not fully describe the being of any creature if you say *qui est*, unless you say *qui est hoc*, like *qui est anima*, or *angelus*, or *celum*, or *terra*, or things of this sort.⁶⁰

59 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 3, ad 1 (Trier 162, fol. 126vb): ‘Ens uel esse dicitur per prius et posterius de Deo et creatura quia ipse est in creatura fons et origo essendi. Et ideo uere est immutabiliter et per se. Esse uero per posterius dicitur de creatura et quia per accidens et secundum quid.’ A similar idea about priority and posteriority appears in Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, prol., q. 5 (Wicki, 23), but Philip’s understanding of priority and posteriority still follows William on equivocity and univocity.

60 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 3, ad 2 (Trier 162, fol. 127ra): ‘Ad secundum dicendum quod propri[et]as nominat Deum hoc [quod] dico *qui est*, quoniam ens e[st] plenius. Tria enim notant[ur]:

Primum est quod res significata per hoc quod dico *qui est* superior est omni narratione, quod monstratur in circumlocutione qua pretendit *qui est*. In concreto apparet quod deficit lingua in illius narratione quod circumlocutione nominatur.

Secundum est quod sit res infinita, quod monstratur per nomen infinitum, qui est.

Tertium est eiam quod uere et immutabiliter est, quod monstratur in consignificatione huius uerbi *est*. Presens enim consignificat. Augustinus in libro *Octoginta III Questionum* [q. 17] argumentatur sic: *Omne praeteritum (...) non est. [Omne] futurum nondum est.* Ergo eiam, *omne (...) preteritum et futurum deest*, scilicet, *apud Deum*. Ex quo patet quia immutabilitas intelligitur in consignificatione presentis. Ex hiis manifestum est quoniam hoc quod dico *qui est* proprie, non translative, diuinam essentiam significat. Est hic tamen notandum, quod de nulla creatura plene describis esse si dicas *qu[i]oniam est*, nisi dicas, *qu[i]oniam est hoc*, ut *qu[i]oniam est anima*, uel *angelus*, uel *celum*, uel *terra*, et huiusmodi.’

Here John carefully aligns the *via eminentiae* with the *via causalitatis*, through an appeal to the infinity of the divine being. This would seem at odds with the idea that the analogy of being should merely complement the earlier tradition, as John had suggested in Question 2, were it not for the fact that John is also very careful about the way in which he employs the *via eminentiae*. Although he does not do so as explicitly as he might, John introduces here a distinction between the *res significata* and the *modus significandi* in the *via eminentiae* which he uses to preserve most of the substance of the earlier tradition.⁶¹

To be fair, John's use of the *res / modus* distinction is inchoate and not as explicit as it might be; while *res significata* functions as a technical term here, *modus significandi* does not. That he intends 'abstract' and 'concrete' as *modi significandi* has to be inferred the language of the prologue, which uses the term *modus* to refer to the abstract and concrete use of names. But once we make the connection, it becomes clear that John tries to incorporate the earlier, apophatic tradition into the *via eminentiae* by adhering to the concrete *modus significandi*, while detaching the *res significata* from any reference to creatures. This allows him to establish a connection between words formed among the human disciplines and the names we use for God, while preserving the earlier tradition's insistence that the signification of those words cannot be carried over into our speech about God.

Question 4: Rejoining the Earlier Tradition

Having introduced the *res / modus* distinction as a means of harmonizing the earlier tradition with the analogy of being, John is now able to rejoin William's text and to explain the ordering of the divine names. His adherence to the concrete *modus significandi* and his detachment of the *res significata* from any reference to creatures allow him to repeat what William says verbatim, even if underneath the surface a great deal has changed:

Yet, we should note this: that the name *qui est* names God by a simpler *ratio* than the name *bonum*. For it is *ens* which first presents itself to the intellect. But when you add the privation "unreceived" (*non ab alio*), it becomes a proper name for God. And in this way it signifies

⁶¹ The distinction being employed here has received a significant amount of scholarly attention in recent decades. For bibliographies on its history, see Valente, *Logique et théologie*, 47, n. 38, and Gregory Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 335, n. 6. Irène Rosier, 'Res significata et modus significandi: Les implications d'une distinction médiévale,' in *Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und Mittelalter*, ed. Sten Ebbesen (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1995), 143, observes that Alan of Lille employed the same distinction with regard to the name *Qui est*, but thought that since our speech does not preserve the *ratio significandi*, it is all improper. This may suggest an additional reason for John's tenuousness: he is not only parting company with William of Auxerre, he is even calling into question Alan of Lille.

God without any image drawn from a creature. It is an oblique name, according to which a privative distinction is understood, that is, unreceived being (*ens non per aliud*). But the name *bonum* goes beyond the *ratio* of my saying *qui est*. For it connotes an effect in a creature, namely, the love or rest by which a rational creature reaches its end in God and rests in him as in its end.⁶²

The *rationes* of *qui est* and *bonum*, as well as the ordering between them, are taken directly from William.⁶³ Yet there is one important difference between John and William here. For William, we can know more than we say; we can use names that name God *proprie* in themselves, but we always use them *translative*. This means that our knowledge of God can extend beyond creatures, but our speech about God is always in some way tied to them. It is otherwise for John. We can use concrete names that signify God *proprie* in themselves, and we can even use those names *proprie*, but only if we first abandon the connection between their signification and creatures. Consequently, when William says in the course of his argument that ‘although the name *qui est* is not said *translative* of God, nevertheless we do not understand God through it without an image, or sign, or note from a creature,’⁶⁴ John has to delete this phrase. On the surface, he does so for the sake of consistency. Since it was an allusion to Damascene’s comment about our ‘thick flesh’, which John had earlier re-interpreted to refer to the analogy of being, John would have effectively said that God can be understood without the analogy of being had he left the phrase in, which is precisely the opposite of what he was at pains to show. But under the surface, and more importantly, he had to delete it because detaching our signification from creatures was the only way in which John could harmonize the earlier tradition with the analogy of being. The name *Qui est* names God *proprie* in itself and we name God *proprie* with it when we use it, but only at the expense of our knowing precisely what we mean to say when we do.

62 John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus*, q. 4, sol. (Trier 162, fol. 127rb): ‘Hoc tamen notandum, quoniam hoc nomen *qui est* simpliciori ratione nominat Deum, quam hoc nomen *bonum*. Ens enim est quod primo se offert intellectui. Addita tamen hac priuatione, *non ab alio*, efficitur proprium nomen Dei. Et ideo significat Deum sine aliqua ymagine creature conuocata. Nomen obliquum [est], secundum quod intelligitur distinctio priuatua, id est, *ens non per aliud*. Hoc uero nomen *bonum* superhabundat ~~respectu~~ [rationem] huius quod dico *qui est*. Conuocat enim effectum in creatura, scilicet, dilectionem uel quietem qua creatura rationalis finitur in Deo et quiescit sicut in fine suo.’

63 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 2, sol. (Ribailier, 42–3).

64 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 2, sol. (Ribailier, 43): ‘Vel potest dici quod, quamvis hoc nomen ‘qui est’ non dicatur translative de Deo, tamen non intelligimus Deum per ipsum sine ymagine vel signo vel nota creature’ [Or it can be said that although the name ‘He who is’ is not said *translative* of God, nevertheless we do not understand God by it without an image, or form, or sign of a creature].

Relationship to the *Summa Halensis*

Given the incomplete state of the *De divinis nominibus*, we must exercise caution before speaking of this text as a potential ‘source’ for the *Tractatus de divinis nominibus* of the *Summa Halensis*.⁶⁵ To speak of it as a source would seem to imply that it existed as a published work and that the editor of the *Summa Halensis* had the work on his desk or in his mind when composing the corresponding sections of the *Summa Halensis*. That may be too much to ask of a text that never reached the stage of formal publication. However, the state of the text does not preclude us from examining its relationship to the *Summa Halensis* altogether. That is because the best available evidence suggests that John himself was not only the author of the *De divinis nominibus* studied above, but also the editor, or at least the principal editor,⁶⁶ of the corresponding section of the *Summa Halensis*. We might therefore more profitably ask whether or to what extent these two works might be representative of John’s thought at different stages of his career. In this respect, the *De divinis nominibus* can serve as a reference point, which establishes the tradition within which and the trajectory along which John developed his understanding of the analogy of being in the *Summa Halensis*.

While any definitive discussion of this possibility would require a more in-depth study than space will allow us here, in what remains I will attempt to show what that trajectory might look like: in the *De divinis nominibus*, John introduces the analogy of being alongside the earlier tradition, by adhering to the concrete *modus significandi* but detaching the *res significata* from any reference to creatures. In the *Summa Halensis*, he develops his thought in two ways. First, he allows this synthesis from his earlier work to stand in for the earlier tradition, recategorizing names spoken of God in this way as *nomina negativa*. Second, he introduces another, radically kataphatic manner of knowing and naming God alongside it: that of denying the concrete *modus significandi* while affirming the *res significata* drawn from creatures. It is this newer way of knowing and naming God that he now assigns to the *via eminentiae*.

We can see how the *Summa Halensis* begins to relate to John’s earlier work by examining its use of Damascene’s colorful statement about our ‘thick flesh’. William had merely used the text as an illustration that all of our words fail in the predication of God, while John initially took it as an occasion to introduce the analogy of being into the traditional *Tractatus de divinis nominibus* by associating Damascene’s images, forms, and signs, with symbolic theology, mystical theology, and the analogy

⁶⁵ The *Tractatus De divinis nominibus* can be found in Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, P2 (nn. 333–518), pp. 491–751. The part corresponding to qq. 1–4 of John’s *De divinis nominibus* can be found in *SH* I, P2 (nn. 333–52), pp. 491–523.

⁶⁶ Doucet, ‘Prolegomena,’ CCLXII–CCCLXV.

of being respectively. The *Summa Halensis* quotes this same passage from Damascene in the question of whether the divine being can be named with a name of essence. Although there have been significant developments in the period between the *De divinis nominibus* and the *Summa Halensis*, the outlines of John's earlier thought are still clearly discernible:

We should say that naming the divine *esse* happens in two ways: by its effects and by impressions of notions placed into the intellect. By effects he is named Creator, Omnipotent, and even God, as will be made clear. But by impressions of notions, which are placed into the intellect, he is named being, true, and good: for these notions of first being, first truth, and first good, have been impressed on us, as was said above, in the Question about Divine Essentiality, and the Question of Goodness. Now, the notion of being is first, because being is the first intelligible, wherefore with this notion impressed upon it from the divine being, as Damascene says that "the knowledge of God's being has naturally been placed in us", it [i.e. the soul] names God *ens* and *essentiam*, and this takes place from our perspective (*secundum nos*).⁶⁷

The *Summa Halensis* tracks John's earlier work closely. It begins with the notion of being; it attributes that notion to the soul apart from external creatures; and the soul applies that notion to God by a *via negationis* (because it receives it from another), a *via causalitas* (because God is its cause), and a *via eminentiae* (because God possesses it pre-eminently). Apart from the epistemology of impressed concepts, which explains *how* the knowledge of being arrives in the soul, as well as the *ratio* of true, which by this point has made its way into the discussion,⁶⁸ this teaching on analogy in the *Summa Halensis* is almost exactly what we found in John's earlier work.

Making an allowance for the developments just mentioned, there is only one major difference between the doctrine of analogy in the *Summa Halensis* and John's earlier work: the *Summa Halensis* argues that the analogy of being, conceived in this way, should not only stand alongside, but in some respects replace the earlier tradition. Let us recall that in the interpretation of Damascene's comment about our 'thick flesh', John's earlier work associated symbolic theology with *ymagines* drawn from God's corporeal effects, mystical theology with *signa* drawn from God's intelli-

67 SH I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q1, M1, C1, Ar1 (n. 345), Solutio, p. 513: 'Et dicendum quod nominatio divini esse est duobus modis: per effectus et per impressiones notionum quae sunt inditae intellectui. Per effectus nominatur Creator, Omnipotens et etiam Deus, sicut patebit. Per impressiones vero notionum quae sunt inditae intellectui nominatur ens, verum et bonum: hae enim notiones entis primi et veri primi et boni primi nobis impressae sunt, ut declaratum est supra, Quaestione de divina essentialitate et Quaestione de bonitate. Notio autem entis prima est, quia ens est primum intelligibile: unde hac notione sibi impressa de divino esse, sicut dicit Damascenus quod "cognitio essendi Deum naturaliter nobis inserta est", nominat Deum ens et essentiam, et hoc secundum nos.'

68 A likely source for the inclusion of this name in John's subsequent work is Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*. Philip begins the *Summa de bono* by taking up William's question about the comparison of *ens* and *bonum* in q. 1 (Wicki, 8–9), but then proceeds to insert a consideration of *verum* into that discussion in qq. 2–3 (Wicki, 9–20).

gible effects, and the analogy of being with *nota* made from privations. The *Summa Halensis* does something even more bold. By arguing that the analogy of being begins with impressed concepts, which are—after all—intelligible effects, the *Summa Halensis* simply replaces William’s mystical theology with the analogy of being. Accordingly, it reinterprets Damascene in such a way as to definitively rewrite the earlier tradition: it associates the analogy of being with *formae* drawn from God’s intelligible effects, rather than *notae* of privations.

Therefore, with regard to the objection from John Damsascene, the response is already clear, because we name God with a name of essence: both with a form, that is, with a notion placed within us, and also from our perspective (*secundum nos*).⁶⁹

As John had done in the *De divinis nominibus*, the editor of the *Summa Halensis* betrays a hint of caution as he steps out beyond the received tradition. Responding to the second objection, which argued from Rom. 1:20 that the *invisibilia* of God are made know through *ea quae facta sunt*, and not in any other way, and that *ea quae facta sunt* refers only to corporeal creatures, the *Summa Halensis* responds:

We should say that the Apostle says that divinity is understood “through those things which have been made”, yet he does not deny that it can be known through impressed notions. Nevertheless, even if it were said that it is not possible to understand divinity except through that which has been made, then in that case, notions placed in [the soul] to know God should be counted among those “things which have been made”, as means to understanding and naming God (...)⁷⁰

One can sense a certain anxiety here. The editor is defensive, seemingly aware of how significant a step he is taking.

It is not that the *Summa Halensis* altogether abandons the earlier tradition, even if it seems to be replacing it with the analogy of being. The editor simply seems to consider John’s earlier idea of adhering to the concrete *modus significandi* and detaching the *res significata* from any reference to creatures as a sufficient way of safeguarding the apophatic concerns of that earlier tradition. He therefore no longer feels the need to place this kind of analogy *alongside* the earlier tradition. Accordingly, he

⁶⁹ SH I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q1, M1, C1, Ar1 (n. 345), Ad obiecta 1, p. 513: ‘Ad illud ergo quod obicitur a Ioanne Damasceno iam patet responsio, quia nomine essentiae nominamus Deum et forma, hoc est notione nobis indita, et etiam secundum nos.’ See Rosier, ‘*Res significata et modus significandi*,’ 147.

⁷⁰ SH I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q1, M1, C1, Ar1 (n. 345), Ad obiecta 2, p. 513: ‘[D]icendum quod Apostolus dicit quod divinitas intelligitur “per ea quae facta sunt”, non tamen negat quin possit intelligi per notiones impressas. Et tamen si diceretur quod non est possibile aliter intelligere divinitatem nisi per illud quod factum est, tunc notiones insertae ad cognoscendum Deum deputarentur in iis “quae facta sunt” sicut media ad intelligendum et nominandum Deum; notio tamen entis sive essentiae absolvit ab omni comparatione.’

reclassifies names that are said in this way as *nomina negativa*.⁷¹ He goes on to describe these names as names which proceed from effect to cause, in such a way ‘they are said *proprie* in one sense, and *improprie* in another sense’.⁷² He is even willing to say that they are used *per translationem*,⁷³ though he continues to maintain that they are said *proprie* without reference to creatures.⁷⁴

Alongside these *nomina negativa*, the editor makes room for a new kind of name: one which utilizes the *res / modus* distinction in the opposite way, denying the concrete *modus significandi*, but affirming the *res significata* drawn from creatures. John describes names that follow this pattern as those which proceed from cause to effect in such a way that:

[The soul] more truly attributes those names, which signify a species without matter or a perfection of nature, to the cause rather than to its effects. Wherefore according to this way, goodness, truth, and things of this sort are said to be in God, and much more *proprie* than [they are said] of a creature, because goodness, truth, and power are in God by essence, but in a creature by participation.⁷⁵

With its negative names, the *Summa Halensis* preserves the earlier tradition by means of John’s analogy of being from the *De divinis nominibus*. But with its names of eminence, the *Summa Halensis* develops and moves beyond the earlier tradition, including John’s *De divinis nominibus*, by arguing that there are names formed among the human disciplines which can carry their signification over into our knowing and naming God, even when we name God *proprie*.

Conclusion

As mentioned at the outset of this essay, the *Summa Halensis* was part of a broader movement towards analogy in the mid 13th century. Assuming that the editor of its *Tractatus de divinis nominibus* is one and the same as the author of the *De divinis nominibus* of Trier 162, it would not be altogether inconceivable if the same man, who as a young scholar introduced the analogy of being into the earlier tradition

71 SH I, P2, Tr1, Q1, C2, Ar1 (n. 334), Respondeo, p. 495.

72 SH I, P2, Tr1, Q1, C2, Ar2 (n. 335), Respondeo, p. 496: ‘Quaedam (...) sunt quae uno modo dicuntur proprie, alio modo improprie.’

73 SH I, P2, Tr1, Q1, C2, Ar2 (n. 335), Respondeo, p. 496.

74 SH I, P2, Tr1, Q1, C2, Ar1 (n. 334), Ad obiecta 1, p. 495. John insists that the name *Qui est* names God without any comparison with creatures, although he does allow that the privation, *non ab alio*, could be construed as a kind of comparison.

75 SH I, P2, Tr1, Q1, C2, Ar2 (n. 335), Respondeo, p. 496: ‘[I]lla nomina, quae significant speciem sine materia vel perfectionem naturae, verius attribuit ipsi causae quam ipsis effectibus. Unde secundum hanc viam in Deo dicetur bonitas proprie et veritas et huiusmodi; et multo magis proprie quam de creatura, quia ibi est bonitas et veritas et potentia per essentiam, in creatura vero per participationem.’

sine praeiudicio, gave it a tentative, but more definitive shape in the *Summa Halensis*. Without more manuscript witnesses to John's *De divinis nominibus* and a more complete study of the entire work, it will remain impossible to say for sure. But it does at least appear that the *De divinis nominibus* set the tone, and in some sense the pattern, according to which the *Summa Halensis* would attempt to engage the late 12th- and early 13th-century Latin tradition of knowing and naming God.

By tracking John's use of William of Auxerre and examining the *Summa Halensis'* relationship with John's earlier work, we can see more clearly one part of the process by which the 13th century Latin tradition moved towards analogy. In the works studied above, it began with John taking the metaphysical arguments that William used to defend the integrity of the earlier, grammatical tradition, and inserting those arguments *into* the grammatical tradition. It continued with John's adoption the *res / modus* distinction as a way to preserve as much of the grammatical tradition as possible: by detaching the *res significata* of names said with a concrete *modus significandi* from any reference to creatures, John was able to suggest a way in which God might be named from creatures according to the *via eminentiae*, without therefore carrying over any signification drawn from the human disciplines into our speech about God. But by the time of the *Summa Halensis*, either John or someone following in his footsteps appears to have thought so highly of this solution that he allowed it to replace the earlier tradition, classifying names said in this manner as *nomina negativa*, and reserving the way of eminence for something more radically kataphatic: names which deny the concrete *modus significandi* and affirm that a *res significata* drawn from creatures can be predicated *proprie* of God. With this latter possibility, the *Summa Halensis* took a definitive step beyond the grammatical tradition, and helped to usher in a new philosophical and theological era: suggesting at last that signification drawn from the human disciplines can and should be carried over into our speech about God.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ It is commonly thought that in the period after the *Summa Halensis* there began to be a divergence between Franciscan and Dominican theologians concerning how we speak of God *proprie*, with Franciscan explanations of analogy leaning in the direction of univocity, and Dominican explanations leaning in the direction of equivocity. But the conclusions reached in this chapter suggest that the reality may in fact be far more complex. In Book 1, d. 22, q. 1, of Thomas Aquinas' *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, vol. 1, ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), 531–42, Aquinas engages the tradition mediated through John and the *Summa Halensis*, advancing from the question of whether God is nameable (a. 1), to the question of whether God is nameable *proprie* (a. 2), to the question of whether there is only one name for God (a. 3), to the question of the categorization of divine names (a. 4). His responses closely parallel those of John and the *Summa Halensis*. Not only does Aquinas closely follow them on whether the analogy of being names God *proprie*, he may also follow—at least initially—the *Summa Halensis* on how. In Book 1, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, (Mandonnet, 818–21), Aquinas distinguishes an analogy based on priority and posteriority from an analogy based on creatures imitating the creator. As Aquinas explains these two kinds of analogy, the former is very close to the analogy of being expressed in John's *De divinis nominibus* as well as the negative names of the *Summa Halensis*, while the latter is very close to the names of eminence

in the *Summa Halensis*. Aquinas rejects the first as reducing to a form of univocation, presumably because he thinks that it reduces to some form of Praepositinus' understanding of divine predication, but he affirms the second as an adequate expression of analogy. Although, therefore, there exist significant epistemological differences between the *Summa Halensis* and Aquinas' *Scriptum super Sententiis*, these passages suggest that the influence of John of La Rochelle and the *Summa Halensis* on subsequent discussions of analogy may not have been confined to the Franciscan tradition, and that there may be a greater degree of inter-relatedness between Franciscans and Dominicans on the question of analogy than is commonly thought.

Lydia Schumacher

The Proof for a Necessary Existent in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: Since the late medieval period, Anselm of Canterbury has been heralded in the West as the first proponent of the so-called ontological argument for God's existence. This kind of argument purports to provide proof for the reality of God, which is derived from the very definition of God as the supreme being. Although Anselm's work has garnered considerable attention in the late medieval and modern periods, it was largely neglected in the century between his death and the first years of the University of Paris in the early 13th century. A few other precedents notwithstanding, Alexander of Hales and the authors of the *Summa Halensis* were the first extensively to appropriate and popularise the work of Anselm, not least, the famous argument which can be found in chapters 2–3 of his *Proslogion*. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, however, the Summa's version of Anselm's argument represents a significant development beyond Anselm's own iteration. Through an assessment of Anselm's argument on its own terms and a study of the Summa's presentation of the argument in relation to its sources—above all, Richard of St Victor and Avicenna—I will argue that early Franciscans rather than Anselm are responsible for developing the version of the ontological argument that has been associated in some form with Anselm's legacy to this day.

Since the late medieval period, Anselm of Canterbury has been heralded in the West as the first proponent of the so-called ontological argument for God's existence. This kind of argument purports to provide proof for the reality of God, which is derived from the very definition of God as the supreme being. As such a being, ontological arguments presume, God must possess all perfections—including the perfection of existence. Thus, one need only think about what he is to know that he exists. In that sense, ontological arguments are purely rational: they have no other source than human reason. Over the centuries, philosophers have formulated many different versions of this basic argument; however, most of them are framed with reference to a broader tradition of thought that supposedly began with Anselm.¹

1 A version of this paper appears in Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). Variations on an ontological argument have been offered by Norman Malcolm, 'Anselm's Ontological Arguments,' *The Philosophical Review* 69 (1960): 41–62; Graham Oppy, *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Alvin Plantinga, *God and Other Minds* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967); Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974); Charles Hartshorne, *Anselm's Discovery: A Re-Examination of the Ontological Proof for God's Existence* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1965); Rene Descartes, 'Meditation 5,' in *Discourse on Method and The Meditations*, trans. F.E.

Although Anselm's work has garnered considerable attention in the late medieval and modern periods, it was largely neglected in the century between his death and the beginnings of the University of Paris in the early 13th century. A few other precedents notwithstanding, Alexander of Hales and the authors of the *Summa Halensis* were the first extensively to appropriate and popularise the work of Anselm, not least, the famous argument which can be found in Chapters 2 to 3 of his *Proslogion*. In writings completed both before and during the period of the *Summa's* authorship between 1236 and 1245, these first Franciscan intellectuals developed a common approach to reading Anselm's argument which is expressed most fully in the *Summa* itself.² As this suggests, early Franciscans functioned 'as a community, and not merely as a group of scholars who happened to be working at the same institution.'³

In this case as in so many others, moreover, the *Summa Halensis* stands as the clearest expression of their collective mind. When articulating their uniquely Franciscan perspectives, we have learned that the Halensian Summists tended to quote authorities not merely as a matter of unequivocal endorsement but with a view to locating their own opinions within larger traditions or streams of thought which could legitimize them. The example of the *Summa's* appropriation of Anselm's argument is no exception to this rule. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the *Summa's* version of Anselm's argument represents a significant development beyond Anselm's own iteration.⁴ In order to bolster this claim, I will start by examining Anselm's argument, attending carefully to the pastoral or pedagogical objectives he outlines in his 26-chapter *Proslogion*. This discussion will cast doubt on the claim that the famous argument can be interpreted in exclusively ontological terms.

Following this, I will analyse the sources in addition to Anselm that inform the Franciscan interpretation of his argument. These sources include Avicenna, whose celebrated proof for the necessary existent is the closest forerunner of which I am aware for what is known today as the ontological argument. As a perceived associate of the Augustinian tradition, Anselm was not immune to an Avicennian interpretation. This interpretation became possible through the mediation of the 12th-century mystical theologian Richard of St Victor, who was perhaps the first to assess Anselm's argument without reference to the broader context of the *Proslogion*.

Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 85–9; Gottfried Leibniz, *New Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, trans. Alfred Gideon Langley (New York: Macmillan, 1896).

² Scott Matthews, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition: Anselm's Argument and the Friars* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 46–80, esp. 62.

³ Matthews, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition*, 72.

⁴ In his own way, Jean Chatillon has demonstrated this in his 'De Guillaume d'Auxerre à saint Thomas d'Aquin: l'argument de saint Anselme chez les premiers scolastiques duxième siècle,' in *Spicilegium Beccense I: Congrès international du IXe centenaire de l'arrivée d'Anselme au Bec* (Paris: Vrin, 1959), 209–31, esp. 226–7. See also Anton Pegis, 'The Bonaventurian Way to God,' *Mediaeval Studies* 29 (1967): 206–42, esp. 211.

By de-contextualising Anselm's argument, Richard established a precedent which later allowed early Franciscans to attribute something like Avicenna's argument to Anselm, albeit without acknowledgement, in what was ultimately an argument of their own invention. This Franciscan version of the argument is the one to which Thomas Aquinas likely, and famously, objected, in objecting to what he referred to as Anselm's argument. At the same time, this rendition of the argument is closer to the one that is associated with Anselm's legacy to this day. Through the *Summa Halensis* and its authors, consequently, it is fair to say that the West was introduced for the first time in intellectual history to what has come to be known as Anselm's ontological argument.

Reading Anselm's Argument

In recent years, a growing body of literature has cast doubt on the notion that Anselm offered nothing but an ontological argument for God's existence such as we understand it today, whether to foster faith seeking understanding in believers or to persuade non-believers to believe. While this is not the place to explore that literature in full, I do want to consider some textual evidence which supports an alternative reading, starting with the argument from Chapter 2 itself, which can be stated as follows:⁵

God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived (i.e. the supreme being).
It is better to exist in reality than in the mind alone.
God is whatever it is best to be.
Therefore, God exists in reality as well as in the mind.

In formulating this argument, Anselm asserts unequivocally that all who apprehend the definition of God as supreme being must affirm that he exists. After all, God is whatever it is best to be, and existence in reality is better than existence in the mind, rather like the existence of wealth is superior to the mere thought of possessing it. On this basis, Anselm goes on to argue in Chapter 3 that those who apprehend the meaning of the word 'God' cannot logically deny that he exists. As Chapter 4 elaborates, it is only possible for the fool to say in his heart, 'there is no God', insofar as it is possible in principle to think a thought that does not bear on reality.

So construed, Anselm's argument could in fact be construed as an ontological proof for God's existence. The fact that his own detractor Gaunilo interpreted it as such suggests that it was indeed ripe for consideration in this way, and Anselm's reply to Gaunilo indicates that he was aware of and accepted that. Nevertheless, the broader context of the *Proslogion* summons us to read the proof in a different light. The text begins with a prayer in which Anselm professes his inability to

⁵ Lydia Schumacher, 'The Lost Legacy of Anselm's Argument: Rethinking the Purpose of Proofs for the Existence of God,' *Modern Theology* 27 (2011): 87–101.

know God and pleads with God to restore in him the image of God that is effaced by sin.⁶ When referring to this process of renewal at later points in the text, Anselm notably continues to operate on the assumption that God himself remains altogether unknowable, insofar as the divine nature exceeds the spatio-temporal constraints of human knowledge.⁷

Thus, the restoration Anselm has in mind does not reinstate knowledge of God in his own right but an ability to reflect the image of a God who never ceases to know himself as highest good, in the only context possible for human beings, namely, that of ordinary knowledge and life. What is restored, in other words, is an ability to think and act in reality in keeping with the belief in God as ‘highest good’ that is held in the mind. The exercise of such an ability has a highly significant effect when it comes to assessing objects and circumstances in the world. For the knowledge that God alone is absolutely significant prevents persons from ascribing too much significance to these matters and thus from perceiving them in ways that are inconsistent with reality, and a personal ability to flourish therein. In sum, the knowledge of God checks the human tendency to engage in the sinful patterns of thinking and acting whereby the image of God is effaced. By the same token, it replaces them with patterns of appreciating things for what they really are, as God made them to be.⁸

In that sense, the knowledge of God that Anselm perceives as realistically attainable is a knowledge of things other than God, assessed in the light of faith in his absolute significance. By Anselm’s account, this ‘mediated’ knowledge of God can only be gained progressively, as the eyes of the mind gradually re-adjust to the vision of the world in God’s light, just as physical eyes must become accustomed to brighter levels of light.⁹ So conceived, Anselm’s argument is ultimately a resource for bringing a professed belief in God to bear in reality, and thereby for cultivating a habit of seeing the world in the light of faith. In doing this, believers gradually conform to the image of a God who always thinks and acts in the knowledge of his supreme goodness.¹⁰ At the same time, Anselm concludes in the final chapters of the *Proslogion* that they become ready to gaze upon the reality of God himself in the life to come.¹¹

This ‘pedagogical’ way of interpreting Anselm’s argument as a ‘formula’ of sorts for applying belief in God is borne out by many passages in the wider text of the *Proslogion* that tend to be neglected on the standard reading. In Chapter 2 itself, for ex-

6 Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, pro., in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, 2 vols, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt (Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1968).

7 Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion* 1, 13, 16.

8 See compatible readings of Anselm in Matthews, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition*, 1–14; Schumacher, ‘The Lost Legacy of Anselm’s Argument,’ 87–101; Robert Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 1–11.

9 Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion* 26.

10 Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion* 13–21.

11 Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion* 24–6.

ample, Anselm provides an illustration as to how his argument is meant to function. More specifically, he notes that,

when a painter plans beforehand what he is going to execute, he has the picture in his mind, but he does not yet think that it actually exists, because he has not yet executed it. However, when he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and understands that it exists because he has now made it.

As a mental picture provides a painter with the resource needed to transform that picture into a reality, so this illustration confirms that Anselm's argument is a tool that for allowing belief in God to form and transform ordinary thoughts and actions.

In keeping with the ancient tradition of spiritual exercises, consequently, Anselm seemingly delineates a sort of 'practical syllogism' through which we may apply the belief that that God is 'whatever it is best to be' in assessing the worth of objects and circumstances we encounter in the world. By these means, we ensure that God does not merely exist notionally in the mind but also plays a vivid part in our dealings with reality. This is arguably what Anselm has in mind when he claims that 'existence in reality is better than mere existence in the mind', namely, that it is better to operate in reality like God exists than simply to say that one believes that he does, and act as if he does not.

While it is clearly foolish on Anselm's view to deny that God exists altogether, it is likewise foolish nominally to acknowledge his reality as the supreme being and then fail to live in accordance with what is professed to be true. In short, it is foolish because it is inconsistent and thus irrational, not to say hypocritical. So construed, Anselm's argument provides a remedy against hypocrisy because it facilitates an increase in the consistency between the belief Christians profess or hold in the mind about who God is as the sole being of absolute significance and the way they live in reality. Insofar as its application reveals the difference belief in God makes to the way we understand everything that is not God, it may be said to provide a sort of 'personal proof' for the reality of God. To make both believers and through them, unbelievers aware of this difference is arguably what Anselm's project of *faith seeking understanding* is all about.

The Sources of the *Summa's* Proof

Although Anselm's argument thus interpreted is not wholly lacking in potential to reinforce belief in the reality of God, a reading of his whole *Proslogion* refutes the notion that it does nothing but deliver the sort of ontological proof for God's existence that it has long been supposed to provide. How then did such a reading of his thought emerge? To answer this question, we must look not only to the sources of early Franciscan thinkers, who were the first in the West not only to incorporate Anselm but also to defend a so-called proof for a necessary existent. As noted in the

chapter on philosophical context, this proof was one of Avicenna's most celebrated contributions to the history of philosophy. In what follows, I will review briefly the contours of Avicenna's argument, before examining the proof for the necessary existence of one God, whereby Richard of St Victor paved the way for the Franciscan appropriation of Avicenna.

The proof for the necessary existent that Avicenna presents in his *Book of the Cure*, which is the text that Latin scholars at this time would have known, starts from encounters with possible or 'contingent beings'. These are beings that did not have to exist, and which cannot therefore be the source of their own existence, goodness, truth, or whatever. The existence of such beings suggests that there is a further being through whom they exist, which is itself the cause of its own existence and which is necessary in that sense. In Avicenna's account, this proof engenders the further conclusion that there cannot be an infinite chain of beings that cause one another, but that there must be an initial, uncaused cause at which they all terminate.

Though reflection on things possible in themselves and necessary through another serves as the catalyst for concluding that there is a necessary existent, Avicenna insists that his is not a cosmological argument that infers the necessary existent from empirical realities.¹² Rather, it is a purely metaphysical proof which can be worked out simply through rational reflection on what it means to be a necessary being that exists through itself and through which other things have their existence. Such a being cannot *not* exist, insofar as it is part of its definition to cause its own existence. Since we are innately aware of what it means to be a necessary being, moreover, we cannot fail to know this being not only as the cause of itself but also of everything else.

On this showing, contingent beings do not so much prove the reality of God as trigger the latent awareness of the one through whom they have their existence, who in turn exists through himself.¹³ That stated, it is a matter for debate whether and to what extent an Avicennian proof has something in common with ontological arguments let alone the one attributed to Anselm. While both arguments move from the definition of God to his reality, this only establishes them as members of the same species or genre, not as argumentative twins.¹⁴ Those who specialise in Avicen-

¹² Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 1.3, in *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina*, 3 vols, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1977–83), 1. See also the translation work by Michael E. Marmura, *The Metaphysics of the Healing: A Parallel English-Arabic text = al-Ilahiyāt min al-Shifā'* (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2005).

¹³ Pegis, 'The Bonaventurian Way to God,' 216, quoting Étienne Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1943), 108: 'All knowledge comes from prior knowledge, and the apparently immediate and primitive recognition of the contingent supposes the prior knowledge of the necessary. Now the necessary is nothing other than God; human intelligence, therefore, experiences the fact that it already possesses the knowledge of the first being at the very moment when it undertakes to prove it.'

¹⁴ Peter Adamson, 'From the Necessary Existent to God,' in *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays*, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 170: 'proving the existence of a nec-

na will be better placed to address this debate, which is not the primary focus here. The main goal in the present context is instead to trace how early Franciscans came to project Avicenna's proof for the necessary existent on to Anselm.

For this purpose, we must turn to the argument for the necessary existence of one God that Richard of St Victor offers in the first chapter of his *De Trinitate*, the overarching project of which is to establish the necessity of God's unity and ultimately Trinity. One of the key assumptions underlying Richard's project is that 'we do not hold anything more firmly than that which we grasp by a resolute faith'.¹⁵ Although this assumption may seem counter-intuitive, since God subsists beyond the reach of human experience, Richard seems to think it holds true in an objective sense, insofar as God is the source of all beings, and thus the only being that must exist.

Since 'it seems utterly impossible that things that are necessary lack of a necessary reason', Richard further argues, there must be not only plausible but also necessary reasons for the things we believe about God.¹⁶ Here, he borrows a distinction between 'necessary' and 'fitting' reasons that Anselm had invoked in explaining why God became man, and which notably does not feature in his *Proslogion*. In the context where Richard deploys such reasons, the belief at issue is the oneness of God—and the corresponding impossibility of positing more than one God. Richard's argument for divine unity turns on a preceding argument in favour of divine necessity.

In this regard, Richard notes that everything that exists must either exist from eternity or in time and must receive its being out of another or from itself. On this basis, he concludes that a being, such as God, that is from eternity must also be from itself, because nothing that is eternal is preceded by and thus derived from another. By contrast, creatures which exist in time necessarily come from God rather than from themselves.¹⁷ Precisely because God is a being who derives from no other, Richard further argues, there cannot be more than one God, otherwise there would be multiple beings that do not come from another. However, the sheer existence of multiple beings would suggest that one came from the other, which entails a contradiction.¹⁸

Although Richard does not quote the *Proslogion* or any other source explicitly in developing these arguments—a practice quite common in this type of writing and also used by Anselm—he makes implicit reference to Anselm in affirming that 'it is essential that something supreme should exist', and 'we define as supreme over all things, that of which nothing is greater, nothing is better. Without a doubt, the rational nature is better than the reasonless nature. It is indispensable, then, that

essary existent is different from proving the existence of God,' and neither Avicenna nor the Franciscans seemingly intend to do the latter.

¹⁵ Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* 1.2, in *De Trinitate: texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, ed. Jean Ribailier (Paris: Vrin, 1958).

¹⁶ Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* 4.

¹⁷ Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* 7.

¹⁸ Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* 17.

a rational substance be supreme above everything.¹⁹ As he later posits, ‘divine knowledge cannot conceive anything on the intellectual plane more perfect than God. Even less, then, human understanding can imagine something greater and better than God.’²⁰

In this context, it seems clear that Richard imports the main claims Anselm makes in Chapter 2 of his *Proslogion* into his own argument for the necessary existence of a singular being that is ‘from itself’ and is, as such, from eternity. By the same token, Richard removes Anselm’s argument from the broader context of the *Proslogion*, jettisoning the rest of the 26-chapter text in what has now become a relatively common practice. In doing so, he set the stage for the Halensian Summists to go a step further and deploy Anselm’s argument not merely to defend a proof for the necessary existence of *one* God but the necessary existence of God in himself, along the lines of Avicenna. The justification for this conflation was already seemingly provided by Richard when he invoked Anselm’s ‘necessary reasons’ to argue that there is only one God. In what follows, we will see how the *Summa* brings its sources together while moving beyond them in an innovative way.

The Proof for a Necessary Existent

The very first question addressed in the *Summa Halensis*, after introductory material on the status of theology as a science and the nature of knowledge of God, inquires whether God exists necessarily, or is a necessary existent. The very fact that this question, not previously posed in a scholastic text in this same way, is posed here is quite striking. It is hard to imagine that the question could have occurred to the Franciscans in a vacuum: they found it in their inheritance of Avicenna. The *Summa*’s answer to this question is itself delivered across two main sections of the text. The first argues that the divine substance exists by necessity (*quod necesse est divinam substantiam esse*). The second contends that God cannot be thought not to exist (*quod non potest cogitari Deum non esse*). As a matter of fact, however, the first article presents five main arguments why God necessarily exists.

Although most readers today tend to associate the idea of delineating ‘five ways’ to prove God’s existence with Thomas Aquinas, the *Summa Halensis* was the first text to implement this approach, with arguments taken from the notions of being, causality, truth, goodness, and eminence.²¹ The first way of proving the necessary existence of God, from being or existence, is elucidated with reference to arguments from Ri-

¹⁹ Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* 11.

²⁰ Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* 19.

²¹ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 25), I-V, pp. 40–2; Lydia Schumacher, ‘Aquinas’s Five Ways: A Pastoral Interpretation,’ *Theology* 119 (2016): 26–33.

chard of St Victor, largely rehearsed above, which assert that all things that are or could be either existed from eternity or began to be in time, and have their being either from themselves, or from another that exists of its own accord.²²

On this basis, Richard distinguishes between four different ways in which a being can exist, namely, from eternity and from itself; neither from eternity nor from itself; from eternity, but not from itself; or from itself but not from eternity. According to Richard, the last option is impossible: nothing is able to exist from itself and not from eternity, else there would have been nothing to bring into existence all that began to exist and continues to exist in time. By the same token, something had to exist from eternity and from itself to give existence to other things. In the account of the Summist, this ‘something’ is the divine substance.

The second, closely related, way to prove the necessity of the divine, namely, from causality, takes an insight from John of Damascus as its point of departure. According to John, all that exists is either caused or uncaused, that is, created or uncreated. But all that is causable is changeable; that is to say, it moves from non-being into being. But nothing can cause itself. Therefore, there must be an uncaused substance, namely, God.

The third way, concerning truth, refers primarily to Anselm’s *De Veritate*. There, Anselm writes that if truth had a beginning or an end, then even before it began to be true, it would have been true that truth did not exist at some point in time. After truth comes to an end, moreover, he writes that it will be true that ‘there is no truth’. Since truth cannot therefore exist or even cease to exist unless there is truth, truth exists eternally, and the truth is God.

The fourth way, from goodness, turns specifically to Anselm’s most famous rendering of his argument in *Proslogion* 2, in order to affirm him as the supreme good that is the source of all goods. As such a good ‘than which nothing greater can be conceived’, he exists not only in the mind but also in reality, because existence in reality is better than mere existence in the mind, and God is whatever it is best to be. Only such a good can give rise to others. In elaborating this interpretation, fascinatingly, the *Summa* acknowledges that its reading of Anselm is not based directly on his main text, but is to some extent eked out of his reply to Gaunilo. There is as clear an admission as one could hope for that the *Summa*’s understanding of Anselm was not necessary the primary one that Anselm intended.

The fifth way, from eminence, draws on Anselm’s *Monologion* 4, with a corroborating quotation from Richard of St Victor, which calls attention to the fact that there are degrees of being, in which higher grades of being serve as causes for those that are lower. As the *Summa* observes, these causes cannot regress infinitely but must terminate in an ultimate cause. On this basis, the Summist concludes with Anselm that there is a super-eminent being, which is superior to all other natures, and is ranked inferior to none. And this is God.

22 SH I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 25), I, p. 40, quoting Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* 1.6.

In summary, there are five ways to establish the necessity of the divine being. The first does so by appealing to the necessity of an eternal being that can give rise to temporal beings; the second, to something uncaused and unchanging that can engender things that are caused and changing; the third, to an eternal truth that is the condition of possibility for all finite truths, even the truth that truth may begin or end; the fourth, to a good that is the source of all goods; and the fifth, to the necessity of a super-eminent being that supersedes all grades of finite being.

At face value, these five ways might seem like cosmological ways of the sort provided by Thomas Aquinas. After all, they infer the existence of God on the basis of empirical things that are temporal, caused, true, good, and exist at inferior grades of being. In the second article of the *Summa's* discussion, however, it becomes clear that such a bottom-up approach to establishing the divine reality is not what the Summists have in mind. Here, the *Summa* follows the precedent set by Richard of St Victor in his *De Trinitate* to remove Anselm's argument from the broader context of the *Proslogion*. For his part, we have seen, Richard deployed this argument to argue for the necessity of one God.

In the Franciscan account, by contrast, the argument for divine necessity becomes an end in its own right. That is not to suggest that the Summists actually entertain doubts about God's existence. This would have been highly unlikely at the time. Rather, they seek to give a reasoned explanation for the belief in God that they take to be true. This explanation turns on the assumption that our knowledge of God is prior to that of anything else: we possess it before we even encounter things in the world. This is because the human mind is the image of God and is, as such, 'naturally directed...toward that being in whose image it exists'.²³ As Anton Pegis has noted, this is a very strong interpretation of what John of Damascus meant when he insisted that all human beings enjoy an innate knowledge of God, namely, that if God is the light of reason, we cannot help but know God.

For these Franciscans, God's image is the locus of our capacity not only to know God himself but also to know all the things in the world that he has made. We cannot know the world before we know him because we have no recourse to true understanding of reality without aid from the one who made it. At the background here is the doctrine of the innate knowledge of the transcendentals which the *Summa* also adapts from Avicenna. According to the Franciscan version of this doctrine, we have an innate knowledge of being and its first determinations, which makes it possible for us to comprehend beings accurately in their own right and thereby in terms of the way they reflect their creator.

When we reflect on God as the very source of such cognitive powers, or on ourselves as his images, consequently, we cannot help but know him as necessarily existent. We alight upon a proof for God's existence that is purely rational or based solely upon sources derived from the human mind itself. These are the very resources

²³ Pegis, 'The Bonaventurian Way to God,' 225.

through which we can draw the further inference that God must exist on his own terms. As he is the source of our being, the *Summa* reasons, he must likewise be the source of his own. In confirming this, the *Summa* restates Anselm's argument as follows: God is whatever it is best to be; that than which no better can be conceived; the supreme being. Since existence in reality is better than existence in the mind or imagination only, God necessarily exists.

This conclusion does not apply to any being other than God, the *Summa* echoes Anselm's reply to Gaunilo in affirming, insofar as beings besides God have a beginning and end in time and can therefore in principle be thought not to exist.²⁴ While it is possible for this reason to think of such beings in abstraction from the question whether they actually exist, God cannot be regarded as non-existing, precisely because the definition of his being is to exist through himself, or to exist necessarily, and so to be one through whom other beings exist, insofar as they do so.

Once God has been established as self-subsistent along these lines, he can be further recognized as the one through whom all other things exist, are good, and so forth, with the help of the five ways. We can see God as the Supreme Being that is reflected in created beings; the Cause of what is caused; the Good that is in ordinary goods, the supreme Truth that is in truths, and so on. The innate knowledge of God which we access either through reflection on ourselves or himself is the key to discovering his presence in the world, albeit finitely, but in a nonetheless direct or univocal way as we will discover in the next chapter.

In the aforementioned respects, we can discern how creatures testify to his reality, not so much by establishing it on empirical grounds as by triggering the awareness of him that is always present in the mind as his image. As Étienne Gilson put it, the proofs from creatures are proofs on this understanding because 'they set in motion intelligible notions that imply the existence of God'.²⁵ Thus, he goes on to say, 'it is only *in appearance* that our reasoning takes its origin in the recognition of sensible data'.²⁶ Since we have an innate idea of God, the 'sensible world will never aid us in constructing it; it can only offer us the occasion to recover it.'²⁷

So construed, the five ways are clearly founded on one purely rational or ontological way of proving God's existence. This can itself take two forms, depending on whether we reflect on God in his image or in terms of who he is in himself. In affirming this, incidentally, the *Summa* anticipates Bonaventure's three-pronged approach to proving God's existence on the basis of God's interior image, the world, or the very

²⁴ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C2, Ar2 (n. 27), Solutio, pp. 44–5.

²⁵ Pegis, 'The Bonaventurian Way to God,' 216, quoting Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 108.

²⁶ Pegis, 'The Bonaventurian Way to God,' 216, quoting Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 108.

²⁷ Pegis, 'The Bonaventurian Way to God,' 216, quoting Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 108.

definition of God: what is inside, outside, or above the self.²⁸ As we have seen, all these ways are founded on the innate knowledge of God as the one through whom we ourselves possess our characteristic powers: who is closer to us than we are to ourselves and is therefore not unknowable by us. This knowledge in turn enables us to see that he exists in himself—his essence is his existence, as scholastics put it—and that he is as such the giver or existence to all things which testify to his reality in turn.

There is only one way we can fail to recognise God's existence in any of the aforementioned ways. In illustrating this point, the *Summa* distinguishes between knowledge insofar as it pertains to the knower versus the object known. In his own right, as the object known, God cannot be thought not to exist. To understand the meaning of the word 'God' is after all to understand that he cannot *not* exist: that the perfection of existence is part of what it means for him to be the supreme and self-subsistent being through whom all other beings have their being.

As knowers, however, we may refuse to acknowledge that we subsist through one that is self-subsistent: that the divine being is the very condition for our existence. In denying this, we inevitably become ignorant of the testimony to God's existence that derives not only from the self as his image but also from creatures and from reflection on the very meaning of the term 'God', which entails existence by definition.²⁹ According to the *Summa*, this is what Anselm means when he allows that the fool may say in their heart, 'there is no God': not that God can be objectively regarded as non-existent, but that we can refuse to accept his place in our lives, as the source of our life, our powers, and of all things.

This is what is at stake in a further distinction the *Summa* draws between understanding of a thing in universal or particular terms, or in terms of its universal but not its proper reason. As the *Summa* notes, many individuals understand that beatitude is happiness. While they therefore understand what beatitude is in universal terms, they may still believe that it specifically consists in wealth, honor, or other worldly goods. Thus, they may fail to appreciate what beatitude is in proper terms, and so to grasp that it turns on the vision of God. By the same token, idolaters recognize God in universal terms, as the principal and omnipotent being, but overlook what he is in proper or specific terms, elevating false images or false gods as objects of worship. In this way, they give to something that is not God a place that he alone should have in our lives.

The only way to overcome the ignorance of him that results is through repentance from sin, which restores recourse to the innate knowledge of God through which we can know that he exists in the three main ways. When we accept that he alone can satisfy the conditions for our own and all possible forms of existence, as a matter of fact, we cannot actually avoid acknowledging that God is self-subsis-

²⁸ Pegis, 'The Bonaventurian Way to God,' 206–42, esp. 210.

²⁹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C2, Ar1 (n. 27), Solutio, pp. 43–4.

tent, and, as such, necessarily exists. As we have seen, the basic argument that underlies this conclusion is similar to that of Avicenna: it starts from the innate assumption that all things that exist, including the self itself, must do so through a being that exists through itself and is necessary in that sense.

In order to draw this type of argument into the Christian tradition of thought, the Summists project something like Avicenna's proof for a necessary existent on to Anselm by removing Chapter 2, not to mention 3 and 4, of the *Proslogion* from its larger context. In this regard, they followed the example of Richard of St Victor, who had done something similar previously in order to establish that there is necessarily only *one* God. The further de-contextualisation of Anselm's discussion of 'necessary reasons' to support this conclusion arguably lay the groundwork for the Summists later to read Avicenna's proof into a text by Anselm that simply does not contain anything exactly like it.

Although the *Summa* is indebted to such sources, its proof for God's necessary existence is clearly more than the sum or function of them. As in other cases of scholastic thought, the Summists worked with their own objectives in mind and turned their sources precisely to that end. What they produce as a result is an argument the exact form of which cannot be found in any of the authorities they employ, including Anselm. That is not to suggest that the Summists or even Richard mishandled Anselm's writings or any others in recasting their meaning. As we have seen, the manipulation of sources was standard and even required practice at a time when the accepted way of thinking creatively and innovatively involved locating personal opinions within larger, if loosely defined traditions or streams of thought, elaborating and even redefining them in the process.

In the case of the first Franciscans, this is precisely what happened with Anselm's *Proslogion*. By excising Chapter 2 from this text and recasting it as a proof for the necessary existent, the Summists bequeathed to subsequent thinkers an understanding of Anselm that has dominated in some capacity ever since. As far as the Western tradition is concerned, consequently, the Franciscans, not Anselm, must be regarded as the real innovators of Anselm's ontological argument. In closing, therefore, it is worth considering exactly what may have motivated the early Franciscans as Franciscans to articulate a theistic proof in this novel manner.

The Franciscan Nature of the Proof

Although the authors of the *Summa* do not elaborate explicitly on the motivation for their work, it stands to reason that their intent was at least in part to articulate philosophical and theological positions that were consistent with the spiritual ideals of the order's founder, Francis of Assisi. This would have been necessary for survival in their institutional home at the University of Paris. Furthermore, it was essential to training up the next generation of Franciscans in a distinctly Franciscan way of thinking. This generation included the likes of Bonaventure, who claims to have

learned all his good ideas from his Parisian Franciscan teachers, first and foremost, Alexander of Hales.

For these founders of the Franciscan school of thought, Avicenna's argument was not only conveniently accessible, but also particularly well suited to capturing the example of Francis of Assisi. Famously, the saint maintained a constant consciousness of God's presence that gave him insight into the way all creatures testify to their Creator. In a description of the Franciscan argument, Scott Matthews affirms that 'it is this teaching above all that fundamentally expresses Francis' experience of God, as immanent within the nature and intimately related to the soul.'³⁰

According to the Franciscan tradition of thought, we have seen that the ability to know God in these ways can never be lost, even in the wake of sin, lest God be charged with failing to render himself eminently knowable to all human beings. By this account, consequently, sin simply makes us ignorant of the knowledge of God we nonetheless always possess. As such, it is a defect of the will to exhibit the love of God that opens up access to the knowledge of God, not a defect on the part of the intellect as regards the knowledge of God himself. By leading us to love things other than God more than God, in summary, sin obscures our intuitive awareness of God.

For the early Franciscans, this awareness of God can only be restored through the rekindling of the will to love God and thereby to regain immediate access to the innate knowledge of him that was never lost. In addition to explaining and holding Franciscans accountable to maintain the intuitive, personal connection with God that Francis enjoyed, this way of putting things may have been designed to assert the legitimacy and even primacy of Franciscan thought at a time when the very idea of a Franciscan intellectual tradition was being called into question both within and outside the order, by those who believed intellectual pursuits to be incompatible with Francis' intentions for his followers.

By positing love—and undoubtedly a Franciscan understanding of it—as the 'key' to knowledge not only of God but also, through him, of everything else, the Summists implicitly declared that a Franciscan attitude, and even a Franciscan lifestyle, is the means to all true knowledge, of the world, the self, or God. In turn, they suggested that such knowledge is constitutive of the Franciscan perspective and Franciscan lifestyle.³¹ In this way, they refuted objections to a Franciscan intellectual tradition at the level of that tradition's own development. By the same token, the Summists codified an approach to natural theology that would become a fixture not only in the later Franciscan intellectual tradition but even, arguably, in modernity.

³⁰ Matthews, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition*, 53.

³¹ Matthews, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition*, 71–3.

Franklin T. Harkins

Defusing Theological Dynamite

Predestination and Divine Love in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: Aiming partially to fill a significant lacuna in the scholarship on scholastic understandings of predestination, this essay seeks to show that the doctrine set forth in the *Summa Halensis*, though dependent upon Augustine's well-known definition, diverges essentially from the African bishop's mature teaching. Specifically, the *Summa* teaches that predestination is God's eternal 'volitional knowledge' of those humans who will, by their free wills, use grace well to attain finally to glory. In contradistinction to the popular modern perspective that sees predestination as arbitrary and irrational, the *Summa* understands God's 'volitional knowledge' as perfectly 'rational' (*rationabilis*) precisely in that it carves out room for the human to will freely and to participate authentically in God's salvific plan. In this way, the *Summa* served to defuse the theological dynamite of the late Augustine's predestinarian teaching.

Predestination stands as one of the most constitutive doctrines of the Catholic theological tradition and, at the same time, has been one of the most misunderstood and controversial among modern commentators.¹ In his assessment of Augustine's theological influence, the prominent English church historian W.H.C. Frend, for example, maintained that the Bishop of Hippo 'left the Middle Ages with a theological legacy of arbitrary predestination, which sacrificed the vast majority of mankind to everlasting torment in the name of the righteousness of an inscrutable God.'² For Frend, Augustine was a 'crusted old pessimist' concerning post-lapsarian human nature and free will, which led him to develop a doctrine of predestination whose essence was 'fatalism unrelieved'.³ Like most people today who give any thought whatsoever to predestination, Frend betrays an understanding of the doctrine that generally aligns with the definitive Reformed interpretation propounded by John Calvin and codified at the Dutch Synod of Dordrecht, or Dort, in 1619.⁴ According to this Calvin-

1 For a brief introduction to the doctrine that notes some of the contemporary difficulties and confusions, see Matthew Levering, *Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For a fuller consideration, see Peter J. Thuesen, *Predestination: The American Career of a Contentious Doctrine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

2 W.H.C. Frend, *The Early Church* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1982), 198.

3 Frend, *The Early Church*, 207.

4 See John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* III, chs. 21–2, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Library of Christian Classics, 21 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 920–47; and Carlos M.N. Eire, *Reformations: The Early Modern World, 1450–1650* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 295–6 and 572–4. The Synod of Dort affirmed double predestination and proposed a doctrinal summary that came to be known as Five-Point Calvinism, which can easily be memorized

ist view, the eternally existent God actively and inscrutably wills either salvation or reprobation for each human before all time and supervenes upon human freedom such that each one is ineluctably moved by divine imperative toward either final salvation (and the grace such movement requires) or everlasting damnation (and the grave sin it demands).⁵

Calvin and his followers did not create this understanding out of whole cloth, of course. They intended themselves as faithful disciples of both Scripture and Augustine. And, indeed, their doctrine is generally thought to comport with that of the late Augustine in particular—the Augustine who disputed with the Pelagians from 412 onward. The Calvinist doctrine is, to use Gerald Bonner’s description, ‘essentially Augustinian theology’.⁶ In such late anti-Pelagian writings as *Contra Iulianum* (c. 422), *De praedestinatione sanctorum* (c. 429), and *De dono perseverantiae* (c. 429), for example, Augustine definitively rejects the notion that God elects based on foreseen merits.⁷ Recognizing that Scripture and the theological tradition sometimes designate predestination by the name foreknowledge, Augustine denies that divine predestination is reducible to what God eternally knows each human will do with the gifts of faith and grace that God might provide. Predestination is not simply or primarily God’s foreknowledge of what humans are going to do; rather, it is foreknowledge of what God Himself is going to do. Augustine’s teaching here effectively ensures that predestination is wholly dependent on an immutable and inscrutable divine agency.⁸ ‘God’s gratuitous initiative in the predestination of people ends up in an apartheid-like form of salvation,’ Donato Ogliairi notes, ‘reserved to the

by means of the acronym TULIP: Total depravity, Unconditional election, Limited atonement, Irresistible grace, and Perseverance of the saints (Eire, *Reformations*, 572).

⁵ See Thomas Joseph White, ‘Catholic Predestination: The Omnipotence and Innocence of Divine Love,’ in *Thomism and Predestination: Principles and Disputations*, ed. Steven A. Long, Roger W. Nutt, and Thomas Joseph White (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2016), 94–126, esp. 97; and Herbert McCabe, ‘Predestination,’ in Herbert McCabe, *God Still Matters*, ed. Brian Davies (London: Continuum, 2002), 182–6, who summarizes the Calvinist view thus: ‘So it looks as though each one of us is born with a destiny. (...) And God has arranged all this beforehand; there is obviously nothing we can do to alter our destinies. Whether we get to heaven or not, it seems, has nothing to do with what we choose to do: it has all been fixed beforehand by God’ (McCabe, ‘Predestination,’ 182).

⁶ Gerald Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity: St. Augustine’s Teaching on Divine Power and Human Freedom* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 14.

⁷ See, e.g., Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* 5.4.14 (PL 44:791–93); Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 10.19 (PL 44:974–75); and Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae* 18.47 (PL 45:1022–23). In *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 3.7 (PL 44:964–65), Augustine explains that his current view represents a break with his former thinking, set forth in such works as *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos* 60 (c. 395; PL 35:2078–79), according to which God chooses to give grace to those humans whom He foreknows will have faith so that, by performing good works, they might attain to eternal life.

⁸ See Donato Ogliairi, *Gratia et certamen: The Relationship between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the So-called Semipelagians* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 330–4.

happy few whom God has decided to endow with the invincible strength of his grace.⁹

Because it seems completely to preclude human freedom and thus genuine human participation in salvation, Augustine's mature doctrine of predestination has been roundly critiqued as unjust, unnatural, and even dangerous. James Wetzel explains: 'Augustine's doctrine of predestination, founded on his premise of unearned election, has been akin to theological dynamite. To preach this doctrine is to invite revolution and retrenchment, license and rebuke.'¹⁰ Gerald Bonner's harsh judgment provides testimony to its explosive potential: 'Nothing is gained by attempting to defend the doctrine, which remains a terrible one and more likely to arouse our awe than enlist our sympathy.'¹¹ In his book-length treatment of Augustine on predestination, Bonner puzzles over how so great and wide-ranging an intellect was unable, or unwilling, to transcend 'so narrow a view of the divine purpose for the greater part of humanity'.¹² Among the handful of possible explanations he offers is that Augustine tended to address himself to one or more theological issues separately rather than to the construction of a single, comprehensive system that sought to harmonize or reconcile the range of scriptural and theological teachings. Augustine was never moved to pen 'a *summa theologiae augustiniana*', a fact that Bonner finds greatly regrettable.¹³

Scholars seeking to trace lines of influence concerning predestination—and a constellation of concomitant philosophical and theological issues—from Augustine to the high and late Middle Ages have focused largely on Aquinas and the subsequent Thomistic tradition, on the one hand, or on Franciscan theologians who flourished after the mid 13th century, such as Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Peter Auriol, on the other.¹⁴ Consequently, we still have much to learn

9 Ogliari, *Gratia et certamen*, 333.

10 James Wetzel, 'Snares of Truth: Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,' in *Augustine and his Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner*, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London: Routledge, 2000), 124.

11 Gerald Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies* (London: SCM Press, 1963), 392, quoted in Wetzel, 'Snares of Truth,' 124.

12 Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity*, 132; see also Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity*, 15.

13 Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity*, 132.

14 See, e.g., Jean-Pierre Arfeuil, 'Le dessein sauveur de Dieu: La doctrine de la prédestination selon saint Thomas d'Aquin,' *Revue thomiste* 74 (1974): 591–641; Michał Paluch, *La profondeur de l'amour divin: Évolution de la doctrine de la prédestination dans l'œuvre de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2004); Harm Goris, 'Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination, and Human Freedom,' in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 99–122; Andreas Speer, 'Divine Government and Human Freedom,' in *Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought: Studies in Honour of Carlos Steel*, ed. Pieter d'Hoine and Gerd Van Riel (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2014), 517–37; Rudi te Velde, 'Thomas Aquinas on Providence, Contingency and the Usefulness of Prayer,' in *Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility*, 541–52; Pasquale Porro, 'Divine Predestination, Human Merit and Moral Responsibility: The Reception of Augustine's Doctrine of Irresistible

about predestinarian doctrine in the period between the mid 12th century, when Peter Lombard penned the *Sentences*, and the mid 13th century, when Aquinas and Bonaventure produced formal commentaries on the Lombard's book. This historical rift in scholarly understanding is intimated by Susan Schreiner and Jeremy Thompson who, in their 2013 treatment of the medieval reception of Augustine's doctrine, move directly from the Lombard to Aquinas.¹⁵ The present essay aims partially to fill this significant lacuna in the scholarship by considering predestination and divine love in the *Summa Halensis* (*SH*). Through an analysis of several questions in the *SH* on the nature and objects of predestination, I seek to show that the Halensian doctrine, though dependent upon Augustine's well-known definition, diverges essentially from the African bishop's mature teaching. Specifically, the *SH* teaches that predestination is God's eternal 'volitional knowledge' of those humans who will, by their free wills, use grace well to attain finally to glory. If Frensdorff's claim—that Augustine bequeathed an 'arbitrary' doctrine to the Middle Ages—is correct, the early-Franciscan Summists seem to have been less than entirely satisfied with what they had received. Indeed, I will demonstrate, contra Frensdorff, that the *SH* understands God's predestination as perfectly 'rational' (*rationalis*) precisely in that it carves out room for the human to will freely and to participate authentically in God's salvific plan. In this fundamental way,

Grace in Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus,' in *Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility*, 553–70; the essays collected in Long, Nutt, and White (eds), *Thomism and Predestination: Principles and Disputations* (see above, n. 5); Klaus Obenaus, *Electio e sinu Trinitatis: Bonaventuras Prädestinationslehre nebst einem Reflexionsbeitrag* (Hamburg: Kovač, 1996); Franklin T. Harkins, 'The Early Aquinas on the Question of Universal Salvation, or How a Knight May Choose Not to Ride His Horse,' *New Blackfriars* 95 (2014): 208–17; Franklin T. Harkins, 'Contingency and Causality in Predestination: 1 Tim. 2:4 in the *Sentences* Commentaries of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus,' *Archa Verbi* 11 (2014): 35–72; Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Die Prädestinationslehre des Duns Scotus: im Zusammenhang der scholastischen Lehrentwicklung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954); Allan B. Wolter, 'Scotus' Paris Lectures on God's Knowledge of Future Events,' in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus*, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 285–333; Cruz González-Ayesta, 'Duns Scotus on Synchronic Contingency and Free Will: The Originality and Importance of his Contribution,' in *Proceedings of 'The Quadruple Congress' on John Duns Scotus*, vol. 1, *John Duns Scotus, Philosopher*, ed. Mary Beth Ingham and Oleg Bychkov (Münster: Aschendorff, 2010), 157–74; J.J. McIntosh, 'Aquinas and Ockham on Time, Predestination and the Unexpected Examination,' *Franciscan Studies* 55 (1998): 181–220; Tetsuro Shimuzuo Shimizu, 'Time and Eternity: Ockham's Logical Point of View,' *Franciscan Studies* 50 (1990): 283–307; James L. Halverson, 'Franciscan Theology and Predestinarian Pluralism in Late-Medieval Thought,' *Speculum* 70 (1995): 1–26; James L. Halverson, *Peter Aureol on Predestination: A Challenge to Late Medieval Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 1998); Christopher Schabel, *Theology at Paris 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); Christopher Schabel, 'Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, and the Problem of Predestination,' in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 1, *Current Research*, ed. G.R. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 221–65.

¹⁵ Susan E. Schreiner and Jeremy C. Thompson, 'Predestination,' in *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, vol. 3, ed. Karla Pollmann et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1594.

the *SH* served to defuse the theological dynamite of the late Augustine's predestinarian teaching.

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As the topics treated in the four books of the *SH* generally follow those of the Lombard's four books of *Sentences* (viz. the Triune God, creation, the Incarnation of the Word, and sacraments and Last Things), here predestination is taken up within a broader consideration of divine knowledge, which constitutes Tractate 5 (*De scientia divina*) of the First Inquiry of the First Part of Book 1. Book 1 is divided into two major parts: the *Prima Pars* concerns 'the unity and trinity of the deity ordered to the heart's belief', whereas the *Secunda Pars* treats 'the unity and trinity of the deity ordered to the mouth's confession'. Following the Introductory Tractate on the teaching of theology (*De doctrina theologiae*) and the human's knowledge of God in this life (*De cognitione Dei in via*), the prologue to the First Inquiry (*Inquisitio Prima*) makes clear the scriptural roots of this basic bifurcation of Book 1: 'There are two parts of this investigation, according to the words of the Apostle in Rom. 10, 20 [sic], "One believes with the heart for justice, but confesses with his mouth for salvation".'¹⁶ The First Inquiry of the *Prima Pars* treats the substance of divine Unity (*De substantia divinae Unitatis*), whereas the Second Inquiry treats the plurality of divine Trinity (*De pluralitate divinae Trinitatis*). The consideration of the divine unity that constitutes the First Inquiry is divided into six tractates, which concern: divine essentiality, immutability, and simplicity (Tractate 1); the immeasurability (*immensitate*) of the divine essence (Tractate 2); divine unity, truth, and goodness (Tractate 3); divine power (Tractate 4); divine knowledge (Tractate 5); and divine will (Tractate 6). The Second Part of Book 1, on divine unity and Trinity ordered to the mouth's confession, is also divided into two Inquiries, the first of which concerns the divine names in general (*De divinis nominibus in generali*) and the second the divine names in particular (*De divinis nominibus in speciali*). Predestination's place within this overall structure of Book 1 indicates that the Summists understand this doctrine not only as having to do in the first instance with God's knowledge (as opposed to God's power or will), but also as a topic falling fundamentally within the realm of the human reader's belief toward justice (rather than his verbal confession or discourse about God toward salvation). We are in the highly speculative realm of knowing God (and, more specifically, of knowing God's knowing), as best we can in this life, rather than of naming God, which would seem somewhat easier based on more data—and more straightforward data—received from revelation (e.g. *Deus, persona, hypostasis, Pater, Filius, Imago, Spiritus Sanctus*).

¹⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris Irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, P1, In1, p. 39: 'Cuius inquisitionis duae sunt partes, secundum verbum Apostoli, Rom. 10, 20 [sic]: "Corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem a confessio fii ad salutem".' Interestingly, the edition wrongly cites this Pauline passage as Rom. 10:20; the correct citation is, in fact, Rom. 10:10.

In Tractate 5, after treating of the knowledge of God considered absolutely, the *SH* turns to the knowledge of God considered relatively: relative to future events (i. e. divine foreknowledge), relative to things to be done or made (i. e. the divine dispensation), relative to things to be managed or directed (i. e. divine providence), and relative to those to be saved (i. e. divine predestination). Here in the preface to the treatment *de scientia Dei relate ad salvanda*, the Summists make clear the lack of clarity in—and the potential for confusion concerning—the basic scriptural and theological vocabulary related to God’s knowledge and will vis-à-vis salvation:

Following an order, and with the Lord helping us, we must inquire about predestination and its opposite, namely reprobation, and at the same time divine election and love. For predestination assumes election and love; for everyone who is predestined by God has been chosen and loved, but is not converted [to God]. For someone is called elect only insofar as his present justice is concerned, such as Judas, although he is reprobate. Similarly, everyone who is elect has been loved, but is not converted [to God]. For election considers grace, but love considers not only grace but nature as well; grace, however, assumes nature, but nature does not assume grace. Hence someone who is still evil on account of nature is said to be loved. Therefore, predestination always looks to glory; election does not always look to glory, but always to grace; love does not always look to grace or glory, but always to nature.¹⁷

The hierarchy of terms set forth here explains how divine love and election, though necessary to predestination, are in themselves insufficient for it: one can be loved, which is according to nature, and chosen, which merely indicates his or her present justice, without being turned finally back to God. Love can be spoken of only with regard to nature, and election only with regard to grace; predestination alone, however, indicates something about the human person’s relation to glory.

When the Summists open their consideration in *Membrum 1* with the question, ‘What is predestination?’, they divide the question into three chapters: 1. what is it according to name; 2. what according to the nature of understanding (*secundum rationem intelligentiae*); and 3. what according to reality. The treatment of predestination *secundum nomen* begins with some of the key scriptural passages that introduce the vocabulary of predestination, election, and love. Those who will be saved are said to be predestined and loved, as in Mal. 1:2, ‘Jacob have I loved’, and elect or chosen, as in Rom. 11:5, ‘a remnant will be saved according to election’; they are also said to be called, justified, and glorified, as in Rom. 8:30: ‘Those whom He pre-

¹⁷ *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, p. 315: ‘Ordine consequenti, adiuvante Domino, quaerendum est de praedestinatione et eius opposito, scilicet reprobatione, simulque de divina electione et dilectione. Praedestinatio enim divina ponit electionem et dilectionem; omnis enim praedestinatus a Deo est electus et dilectus, sed non convertitur: electus enim aliquis dicitur tantum quantum ad praesentem iustitiam, sicut Iudas, quamvis sit reprobus; item, omnis electus est dilectus; haec non convertitur: electio enim respicit gratiam, dilectio vero non solum gratiam, sed naturam; gratia autem ponit naturam, sed natura non ponit gratiam: unde dilectus dicitur adhuc qui malus est ratione naturae. Praedestinatio ergo semper respicit gloriam; electio non semper respicit gloriam, sed semper gratiam; dilectio non semper gratiam vel gloriam, sed semper naturam.’

destined, he also called; and those whom He called, He also justified; and those whom He justified, He also glorified.’ Such passages as Mal. 1:2 and Rom. 8:30 indicate that predestination is from eternity, whereas calling, justification, and glorification take place in time. Love and election, by contrast, are both eternal and temporal realities. Mal. 1:2 indicates the eternal nature of God’s love, whereas Christ’s words in John 14:21 intimate its temporal aspect: ‘He who loves me will be loved by my Father.’ Similarly, Matt. 20:16, ‘Few are chosen’, points to election from eternity, whereas John 6:71 highlights its temporality: ‘Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?’ This one was Judas, of course, who was elect, the *SH* notes.¹⁸ Though it is not stated explicitly here, the reader is left to conclude that Judas—though elect—was not among those predestined, reinforcing the points that: 1. predestination is strictly eternal; and 2. election, with both temporal and eternal aspects, is a necessary but insufficient condition for predestination.

In responding to the question of what predestination is according to name, the Summists explain predestination, love, and election vis-à-vis eternity and temporality by understanding each of these terms in relation to grace. Grace itself can be considered in three ways: as given or conferred, as received, and as used. Predestination considers what is conferred by grace, love looks to grace received, and election pertains to the use of grace.¹⁹ It is the prefix ‘pre-’ that accounts for the strictly eternal nature of predestination, as does its consideration of what is conferred by grace. The Summists explain:

There are two things in the word “predestination”: a going before and a destination. And in the destination there are three things: for it is necessary that it is of someone, from something, and to something. Therefore, there are three things in predestination: [1] one [is described] as the beginning, namely the “preparation”, from which it is; [2] “of glory in the future” designates the end to which it is; [3] “of grace in the present” designates the middle through which it is. Thus, the destination is designated according to time, but predestination, by reason of the going before, is eternal. For this preposition “pre-” indicates the going before in relation to time.²⁰

Whereas the ‘destination’ in ‘predestination’ indicates one’s movement from one thing to another and, as such, is temporal, the ‘pre-’ signifies the *antecessio*, the be-

18 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C1 (n. 220), pp. 315–6.

19 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C1 (n. 220), Respondeo, p. 316.

20 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C1 (n. 220), Respondeo, p. 316: ‘In nomine praedestinationis duo sunt: antecessio et destinatio, et in destinatione tria: oportet enim quod sit alicuius et de aliquo et ad aliquid. Et ideo in praedestinatione sunt tria: [1] unum ut principium, scilicet ‘praeparatio’, a quo est; quod dicitur [2] ‘gloriae in futuro’, dicit ut terminum ad quem est; quod dicitur [2] ‘gratiae in praesenti’, dicit ut medium quod est; destinatio ergo dicitur ex tempore; sed praedestinatio ratione antecessionis est aeterna: haec enim praepositio ‘prae’ dicit antecessionem aeternitatis ad tempus.’ As we will see below, here the authors have in view Augustine’s famous definition of predestination as ‘the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future’, which they quote explicitly in part in *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C2 (n. 221), Contra 1, p. 316, and in full in *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C3 (n. 222), arg. 1, p. 318.

gining of or preparation of grace and glory that is in God eternally. The author further describes this *antecessio* thus: 'I say that predestination designates the eternal approbation of God as it is with respect to the good, even before all time.'²¹

With this nominal understanding in view, Chapter 2 proceeds to ask what predestination is according to the nature of understanding (*secundum rationem intelligentiae*). The question here is that of the intellectual category to which predestination fundamentally belongs: that is, does it have to do principally with God's knowledge, will, or power? The solution makes clear that predestination falls primarily within the category of divine knowledge, though it is not a matter of God's simple knowledge (*scientia simplex*). Rather, being 'in the genus of the knowledge of [God's] good will or approbation',²² it straddles divine knowledge and will, though it leans more toward the former. The Summists state it somewhat differently when they note that in the phrase, 'knowledge of good will or approbation', knowledge is understood directly and will or approbation obliquely.²³ Drawing this distinction between simple knowledge, which the *SH* understands as 'in the speculative mode', on the one hand, and what I will call 'volitional knowledge', which is 'in the practical mode', on the other, enables the Summists to carve out room for both divine and human causation. Whereas simple knowledge cannot be said to be a (or the) cause of those things that are known, knowledge with or of approbation is a (or the) cause of the known in this case, that is, of things or persons approved.²⁴ It is divine approval by which the approved are approved, and the approved are approved and known to be approved eternally: this is, as we have seen, simply what predestination is, according to the *SH*.

This leads quite naturally, then, to the question of what predestination is in reality (*secundum rem*), which is taken up in Chapter 3. The starting point is Augustine's well-known definition: 'Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future.'²⁵ The language of this definition reminds the reader of the eternal and temporal aspects of predestination. Objection 1 explains: if grace is in the present, it is clearly not from eternity; then neither is the preparation of such grace from eternity; thus, predestination appears not to be from eternity.²⁶ The second objection follows from the first, explaining that if an architect or craftsman is said to 'prepare' a house that is to be built, he must have those things that

21 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C1 (n. 220), Respondeo, p. 316: '(...) dico quod praedestinatio dicit approbationem Dei aeternam, secundum quod est respectu boni, etiam ante omne tempus.'

22 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C2 (n. 221), Solutio, p. 317: 'Ad hoc dicendum quod praedestinatio est in genere scientiae beneplaciti sive approbationis.'

23 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C2 (n. 221), Solutio, p. 317: 'In scientia beneplaciti vel approbationis intelligitur scientia in rectitudine et voluntas sive approbatio in obliquitate.'

24 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C2 (n. 221), Solutio, p. 317.

25 See Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 10.19 (PL 44:974), where Augustine sets forth the first half of this definition.

26 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C3 (n. 222), arg. 1, p. 318.

pertain to the actual construction or existence of the house, such as wood and stones. By analogy, if predestination is the preparation of grace from eternity, it is necessary that there be something from eternity that pertains to the grace that is going to be prepared. But its preparation is not from eternity precisely because ‘nothing about grace is said to have been from eternity’.²⁷ Similarly, Objection 3 asks what the basis for the preparation from eternity is, observing that although a craftsman has the knowledge to build a house and the will to do it, such knowledge and will are not described as his ‘preparation’ of the house. By analogy, if God eternally knows and wills with respect to someone to whom grace is going to be given in the present because this person finally is going to use it well, the preparation of grace is not said to be on account of this foreknowledge and fore-willing.²⁸

Significantly in the light of these objections, the *respondeo* neither dismisses nor further questions Augustine’s definition as a, or indeed *the*, way to understand predestination according to reality (*secundum rem*). Rather, it distinguishes between two senses of the word ‘preparation’, one temporal and the other eternal:

“Preparation” is used in two ways: for it is called “preparation” when grace is given and before it is given, namely when there is knowledge that someone finally is going to use it well and when there is the will to give it to him. Used in the first way, inasmuch as it concerns grace having been prepared, it is also called temporal preparation. In the second way, it is called eternal preparation because used in this way it brings in the will from eternity, that is, the will of Him who is going to give grace to that person with foreknowledge that that person finally is going to use it well.²⁹

Satisfied that this distinction provides a clear solution to the first objection, the Summists turn immediately to the second. There is not at all an exact parallel between a human craftsman and God, they explain, because the human craftsman is not sufficient in himself for all of his activity; rather, he must rely on material external to himself, like wood and stone, to complete his work. ‘The Highest Craftsman,’ by contrast, ‘has the power of working without matter.’³⁰ Even in those cases where the divine

27 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C3 (n. 222), arg. 2, p. 318: ‘ergo si praedestinatio est praeparatio gratiae ab aeterno, oportet quod ab aeterno sit aliquid de re praeparanda; sed nihil de gratia dicitur ab aeterno fuisse; ergo praeparatio huius non fuit ab aeterno.’

28 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C3 (n. 222), arg. 3, p. 318.

29 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C3 (n. 222), Respondeo, p. 318: ‘Praeparatio dicitur dupliciter: praeparatio enim dicitur cum datur gratia et antequam detur, scilicet cum est scientia quod aliquis bene usus est finaliter et est voluntas dandi ei. Secundum primum modum, quantum est ex parte praeparatae gratiae, quod est connatum dicitur praeparatio temporalis; secundum modum secundum dicitur aeterna praeparatio, quia hoc modo importat voluntatem ab aeterno, voluntatem scilicet dandi isti gratiam cum praescientia quod bene sit usus ea finaliter.’

30 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C3 (n. 222), Ad obiecta 2, p. 318: ‘Ad secundum dicendum quod non est simile de artifice homine et de Deo, quia artifex homo non est sibi sufficiens ad totam suam operationem, et ideo requirit materiam subiectam; artifex Deus sibi per omnia est sufficiens nec indiget materia subiecta; unde Artifex summus habet vim agenda sine materia.’

action has to do with matter, God can operate either with or without it. As such, God's 'preparation' is never dependent on any material thing; rather, divine 'preparation' designates any operation in which God's wisdom, knowledge, and will concur. Over against the assertion in Objection 2 that 'nothing about grace is from eternity', the Summists affirm that, though this is true of the effects of grace, it is by no means true of its cause.³¹ They conclude by briefly noting that the solution to Objection 3 is clear from the response to Objection 2. Because God, unlike the human craftsman, requires nothing external to Himself for His operations, His knowledge and will (together with His wisdom, of course) concerning those who are to be saved constitute His 'preparation'.

Having established what predestination is according to name, understanding, and reality, the *SH* moves, in Membrum 2, to a consideration of *quorum sit praedestinatio*, of what or whom predestination is, that is, to what realities or beings as objects it pertains. This inquiry consists of six questions, five of which are treated here: 1. whether it is of being or non-being; 2. whether it is of all [humans]; 3. whether it can be of the reprobate; 4. whether it is of angels; 5. whether it is of the blessed; and 6. whether it is of Christ (treated in Book 3, on the Incarnation of Christ). Presently we can consider only the first two of these questions. The apparent paradox that predestination is both eternal and of a creature provides the occasion for the *Summa's* asking whether predestination is of being or of non-being. Because no creature exists from eternity, predestination would appear to be of non-being, the sole objection notes.³² Following the *contra*, which draws on the teaching of Origen and Augustine that predestination has to do with the destining of someone or something that exists, the *respondeo* answers based on a distinction concerning *ens*, being or existence. A thing is called a 'being' either in its proper nature or in the foreknowledge or foreordination of God, the Summists explain:

The being of a thing in its proper nature is not eternal, but temporal. But the being of a thing in foreknowledge or in fore-ordination is eternal and does not differ from the divine being, because this kind of being of a thing is not other than the being of an eternal idea or reason in God. The being of a thing in its own nature is being simply (*simpliciter*), [whereas] the being of a thing in its cause or in foreknowledge is the being of a thing according to something (*secundum quid*).³³

Predestination is said, then, with respect to a thing 'being' in its cause or in divine foreknowledge, but not with respect to a thing existing in its own proper nature. This means that predestination can be said with respect to a thing of being according

³¹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C3 (n. 222), Ad objecta 2, p. 318.

³² *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 223), arg. 1, p. 318.

³³ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 223), Respondeo, p. 319: 'Esse rei in propria natura non est aeternum, sed temporale; sed esse rei in praesentia sive in praedestinatione est aeternum et non differens ab esse divino, quia esse rei huiusmodi non est aliud quam esse ideae sive rationis aeternae in Deo; esse rei in sua natura est esse simpliciter, esse rei in causa sive in praesentia est esse rei secundum quid.'

to something (*secundum quid*), and with respect to a thing of non-being simply (*simpliciter*).³⁴ One example, which the *SH* itself does not offer, may prove helpful here. Predestination, which is eternal, pertains to the being of Peter *secundum quid*, that is, in his being in divine foreknowledge; but it does not pertain to his being *simpliciter* precisely because he does not exist in his own proper nature eternally. We must say that predestination, because it is eternal, generally (not only in the particular case of Peter) pertains to non-being if being is considered *simpliciter*, that is, in its own proper nature.

Having established that predestination pertains to beings as they exist in the divine foreknowledge, the *SH* moves, in Chapter 2, to the question ‘whether predestination is of all’. Following from the discussion in Chapter 1, the reader may assume that the *omnium* here refers to all beings, as existing in the mind of God. However, the first objection’s introduction of 1 Tim. 2:4, ‘God wills that all humans should be saved’, narrows the field of inquiry considerably.³⁵ If God wills that all human beings should be saved, predestination seems to be of all humans. Interestingly, however, without citing any authority, the *contra* states matter-of-factly: ‘Not all will be saved; therefore not all have been predestined.’³⁶ The *contra* takes it as a foregone conclusion—in light of the scriptural evidence, Augustinian teaching, and the intervening theological tradition—that every human will not be saved, and thus that every human is not predestined. Building on the earlier distinction between divine knowledge and will and on the explanation of ‘preparation’ in God, the *respondeo* opens thus:

Foreknowledge orients itself equally toward all; similarly, the will orients itself in one way toward all. But the will with foreknowledge does not orient itself equally toward all. This is not, however, on account of [any] difference that is in foreknowledge, but because we do not orient ourselves equally to it. Hence predestination designates not merely the will of God, but His will with foreknowledge that they [i.e. predestined humans] are going to use their good gift well.³⁷

Simultaneously affirming that the divine will orients itself only in one way toward all humans and that this same will with foreknowledge of human free will does not enable the Summists effectively to introduce the classic distinction of John Damascene between God’s antecedent and consequent will as a lens through which to read 1

³⁴ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 223), *Respondeo*, p. 319.

³⁵ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M2, C2 (n. 224), *arg.* 1, p. 319.

³⁶ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M2, C2 (n. 224), *Contra*, p. 320: ‘Non omnes salvabuntur; ergo non omnes sunt praedestinati.’

³⁷ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M2, C2 (n. 224), *Respondeo*, p. 320: ‘Praesentia se habet aequaliter ad omnes, voluntas similiter uno modo se habet ad omnes; sed voluntas cum praesentia non se habet aequaliter ad omnes. Non tamen hoc est propter diversitatem quae sit in praesentia, sed quia nos non habemus nos aequaliter ad ipsam; unde praedestinatio non solum dicit voluntatem Dei, sed voluntatem cum praesentia quod bene usuri sunt dono suo.’

Tim. 2:4. By His antecedent will, God does, in fact, will that all humans should be saved. ‘For this is the will’, the Summists explain, ‘that considers the saveable rational creature’, that is, the will that considers the salvific end for which all rational creatures are created and intended.³⁸ But by God’s consequent will, which includes foreknowledge concerning a particular rational creature’s use of God’s gift by means of his own free will, God wills that only the elect should be saved. It is in this way, the Summists note, that the will of God is called ‘rational’ (*rationalis*) because it would be unjust for God to will final salvation for someone whom He knows will use the divine gift badly by means of his or her own free will.³⁹ There is an important distinction here, then, between God’s ‘rational’ will and God’s will concerning the ‘rational saveable creature’. It simply would not be reasonable, according to the Summists, for God to save all creatures, as He wills antecedently, if they themselves do not will to act according to this divine will.⁴⁰

This same point is reiterated in the subsequent consideration of divine election. When it is asked, in Chapter 1 of Titulus 3, whether election should be placed or located in God, the second objection offers 1 Tim. 2:4 as evidence that the will of God is ‘equal’ or ‘just’ (*aeque*) with regard to all in order that all might be saved.⁴¹ The *respondeo* explains that election is the preferential choosing of one of two options that lie before someone, and that this choosing can happen in one of two ways: either ‘by prior deliberation’ (*praecedente deliberatione*) or ‘by prior certain knowledge’ (*praecedente certa cognitione*). Whereas we humans elect in the first way, with consideration or consultation in time concerning doubtful or contingent things, God does so in the second way, with sure knowledge and outside of time.⁴² But God’s certain, eternal *cognitio* ‘sees beforehand’, as it were, every human person’s deliberations and actions concerning the divine salvific will for humankind; and so God’s eternal election takes account of each human’s temporal elections, as it were. Simply stated, human election matters greatly to divine election. Indeed, in reply to the first two objections, the Summists affirm: ‘It must be said that the will of God orients itself equally toward

38 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M2, C2 (n. 224), Respondeo, p. 320: ‘(...) voluntate antecedente “vult Deus omnes homines salvos fieri”; haec enim est voluntas quae respicit creaturam rationalem salvabilem.’

39 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M2, C2 (n. 224), Respondeo, p. 320: ‘(...) et sic dicitur voluntas Dei rationalis; si enim vellet alicui finaliter salutem qui male usus est per liberum arbitrium, non esset iusta.’

40 For a fuller engagement with Damascene’s distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will, and with 1 Tim. 2:4 in the context of this distinction, see the consideration ‘De voluntate beneplaciti’ in SH I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M1 (n. 273), pp. 372–5.

41 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti3, C1 (n. 241), arg. 2, p. 334: ‘(...) sed aequae est voluntas Dei respectu omnium ut salventur, quia “vult omnes homines salvos fieri”, et aequa est ratio, constat, respectu omnium; ergo restat quod apud ipsum non sit electio.’

42 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti3, C1 (n. 241), Respondeo, p. 334: ‘(...) sed hoc potest esse dupliciter: praecedente deliberatione vel praecedente certa cognitione. Primo modo est electio in nobis, secundo modo in Deo.’

all [humans], but not all [humans] orient themselves equally toward Him.⁴³ What distinguishes the elect human from the non-elect one is precisely that the former ‘finally remains in grace’, whereas the latter does not; and this ultimate abiding in God’s supernatural gift constitutes, from the human side of this sacred mystery, the grounds upon which the human who is divinely chosen is chosen.⁴⁴

Furthermore, human elections vis-à-vis God’s salvific will matter not only to divine election, but also, *a fortiori*, to reprobation. The Summists locate reprobation in the genus of ‘practical foreknowledge’, as it has to do fundamentally with God’s eternal knowledge of human action or practice. But, like predestination, reprobation is also a kind of ‘volitional knowledge’. Indeed, our authors teach that reprobation is ‘not in the genus of foreknowledge of a simple notion, but in the genus of foreknowledge not only with approbation but also with detestation: for it is knowledge with approbation of punishment and with detestation of iniquity.’⁴⁵ Whereas predestination is divine foreknowledge only with approbation, reprobation entails divine detestation as well. But the *SH* is quick to point out that God’s hatred of human iniquity and corresponding approval of punishment for such wickedness is a good. The Summists teach explicitly here that God is not the cause of evil; but, because punishment falls in the genus of the good, God can be said to be the efficient cause (*causa effectiva*) of it, just as God is the efficient cause of all good. However, the fault or offense (*culpa*) of the human who is reprobate is the meritorious cause (*causa meritoria*) of his or her ultimate punishment.⁴⁶

The picture is still more causally complicated, however, in that reprobation requires not only the human’s final withdrawal *from* grace, but also God’s withdrawal *of* grace from the human. Recognizing that the ‘withdrawal of grace’ (*subtractio gratiae*) is the *effect* of reprobation, the Summists ask whether this effect is from God. Can this withdrawal of grace from the human who is to be reprobate be attributed in any way to God? Instead of offering a single, direct determination of this difficult question, our authors briefly set forth three ways that the question has been answered by certain others. The first two solutions, which do not demand our attention here, may be identified with William of Auxerre and Praepositinus of Cremona, respectively. The third, which seems to be the Summists’ preferred solution, teaches that the ‘non-gift of grace’ (*non-appositio gratiae*)—that is, God’s withholding of grace from some—can be considered in two ways, namely in terms of absolute

43 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti3, C1 (n. 241), Ad obiecta 1–2, p. 334: ‘dicendum quod voluntas Dei aequaliter se habet ad omnes, sed non omnes aequaliter se habent ad ipsum.’

44 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti3, C1 (n. 241), Ad obiecta 1–2, p. 334: ‘(...) iste finaliter manet in gratia, ille non: et *ideo* iste eligitur, ille non’ (emphasis mine).

45 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti2, C2 (n. 235), Respondeo, p. 329: ‘Ipsa est in genere praescientiae practicae, et non in genere praescientiae simplicis notitiae, sed in genere praescientiae, non cum approbatione solum, sed etiam cum detestatione: est enim scientia cum approbatione poenae et cum detestatione iniquitatis.’

46 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti2, C2 (n. 235), Respondeo, p. 329.

being (*in esse absoluto*) and in terms of ordained being (*in esse ordinato*). If the non-gift is considered in terms of absolute being, the hardening experienced by the reprobate is not from God, as the non-gift is no thing, a privation of the good. If, on the other hand, the non-gift is considered insofar as it has being in a particular order and has ‘the being of punishment’ (*esse poenae*), it is from God.⁴⁷ Thus, the Summists conclude: ‘For God ordains this privation, which is a punishment, by reason of His own justice.’⁴⁸

* * *

In his 1920 revision of *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, the German sociologist Max Weber painted a starkly fatalistic and individualistic picture of the doctrine of predestination as understood, and lived, by the early-modern followers of John Calvin:

The Father in heaven of the New Testament, so human and understanding, who rejoices over the repentance of a sinner as a woman over the lost piece of silver she has found, is gone. His place has been taken by a transcendental being, beyond the reach of human understanding, who with His quite incomprehensible decrees has decided the fate of every individual and regulated the tiniest details of the cosmos from eternity. God’s grace is, since His decrees cannot change, as impossible for those to whom He has granted it to lose as it is unattainable for those to whom He has denied it.⁴⁹

This unscriptural doctrine is, according to Weber, characterized by an ‘extreme inhumanity’ that led its adherents to an ‘unprecedented inner loneliness’ and an utter isolation vis-à-vis their salvation. The individual Christian was ‘forced to follow his path alone to meet a destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity’.⁵⁰ For Weber, no one and no thing—no priest, no sacraments, no Church, not even God Himself—could be of any help whatsoever to the human whose destiny had long been determined to be damnation.⁵¹

When, over a half-century later, W.H.C. Frend claimed that Augustine ‘left the Middle Ages with a theological legacy of arbitrary predestination’,⁵² he seems to have assumed the late Augustine’s teaching, which certainly shaped the modern Calvinist account. And, indeed, it is not difficult to see how Frend might have supposed

47 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti2, C3 (n. 236), Respondeo, p. 330: ‘Si consideretur in esse absoluto, obduratio non est a Deo; sed secundum quod habet esse in ordine et habet esse poenae, sic est a Deo.’

48 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti2, C3 (n. 236), Respondeo, p. 330: ‘(...) ex iustitia enim sua ordinat hanc privationem, quae poena est.’

49 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 103–4.

50 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 104.

51 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 104–5.

52 Frend, *The Early Church*, 198.

this account to be thoroughly pessimistic, fatalistic, and irrational. But, as I have sought to demonstrate, medieval scholastic theologians such as the authors of the *Summa Halensis* would have found this modern Calvinist interpretation strangely flat-footed and theologically problematic, particularly in light of the early-medieval conciliar tradition concerning predestination they had received. The Second Council of Orange (529) and the Synods of Quiercy (853) and Valence (855), for example, made clear that divine grace is primary in leading the predestined to final salvation, on the one hand, and that the culpable rejection of this grace, offered antecedently, is essential to the ultimate damnation of the reprobate, on the other.⁵³

In line with this conciliar doctrine, the *SH* teaches that predestination is God's eternal 'volitional knowledge' of those humans who will, by their free wills, use well the grace prepared for them to attain finally to glory. Following closely the scriptural witness and Augustine's classic definition, the early Franciscan school seems to have understood well the necessity, in explicating the doctrine of predestination, to balance carefully its eternal core, as it were, with its temporal causes and effects, that is, its divine causality with the indispensable human contribution. Indeed, the *Summa's* interpretation of 1 Tim. 2:4, aided by Damascene's distinction, serves as a necessary fulcrum for this delicate balancing act: although God's (antecedent) will for the 'saveable rational creature' is universal salvation, this selfsame divine will is 'rational'—that is, just—only if salvation is limited to those whom God knows will (consequently) use grace and their own free wills well.

It is significant, particularly in light of the late Augustine's insistence that predestination is *not* essentially God's foreknowledge of what humans are going to do, that the *SH* understands predestination 1. as pertaining first and foremost to divine knowledge, rather than divine will, and 2. as a doctrine aiming at inculcating Christian belief toward justice. For the Summists, both predestination and reprobation are manifestations of God's perfect love, goodness, and rationality or justice. In the case of reprobation, God's hatred of human iniquity and approval of punishment for it are located in the genus of the good. The non-gift of grace to the reprobate *in esse absoluto* is not from God, as it is simply a privation, a lack of being. But insofar as it is *in esse ordinato*, that is, ordered to punishment, it is from God and exists by reason of God's justice, which is reason itself.⁵⁴ Indeed, when the Summists ask 'whether there is a cause or reason of the divine will', they maintain, aided by Anselm, that the divine will should not, properly speaking, be said to be either 'from

⁵³ See White, 'Catholic Predestination,' 95–6, and, for the synodal declarations, Heinrich Denzinger, *Compendium of Creeds, Definitions, and Declarations on Matters of Faith and Morals*, ed. Peter Hünermann, Robert Fastiggi, and Anne Englund Nash, 43rd ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), nn. 373–97, 621–4, and 625–33; see especially Synod of Quiercy, Chapters 1 and 3, the latter of which provides a summary interpretation of 1 Tim. 2:4 (Denzinger, *Compendium*, nn. 621 and 623).

⁵⁴ See also *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar3 (n. 279), Respondeo, pp. 386–7, where, in response to the question, 'By what reason does God permit evil things to happen?', our authors answer, in thoroughly Augustinian terms, that evil happens by reason of the good in which it always exists.

reason' (*ex ratione*), as if from some other principle, or 'beyond reason' (*praeter rationem*), lest it might seem irrational; rather, it is absolutely identical with reason.⁵⁵ Thus, over against the popular modern perspective that understands predestination as 'arbitrary' and irrational, the *SH* argues that God's predestinating will is perfectly rational, and indeed is reason itself.

As I have aimed to show, the *SH* builds this argument for predestination's rationality to a significant degree on the way in which it makes room for genuine human freedom to will and to act. Nearly all of the questions treated above emphasize both sides, as it were, of the predestination equation—the eternal and the temporal, the divine and the human—and the necessary balance and interrelation between the two. The heart of the modern critique of both the late Augustine and Calvinism is that God's eternal decree renders each human's life and its end a *fait accompli* that precludes true and efficacious human freedom. The *SH* seems to have anticipated this critique by some 800 years, and offers what I take to be a convincing alternative to the late Augustine. Today's popular view of predestination, forged in the fire of Augustinian doctrine and Calvinist history, imagines God's eternal decree as a kind of *ur-event* on the same temporal plane with all human willing and doing. And so, if God 'before all time' chose some humans for everlasting life and others for reprobation, individual humans can do nothing either to effect or to overturn this salvation or damnation, respectively. Divine willing and acting, on the one hand, and human willing and acting, on the other, are imagined as in competition with one another in a kind of zero-sum game. The *SH*, by contrast, assumes a metaphysical picture of reality according to which 1. true human freedom of willing and acting is impossible without God's willing and acting eternally (that is, completely outside of time), and 2. God's eternal 'volitional knowledge' of each human requires and necessarily takes into account that particular human's free willing and acting in time. Here the model of the relationship between the eternal and the temporal, the divine and human, is not competitive, but rather cooperative or concurrent.⁵⁶ With this fundamental assumption of divine-human concurrence in hand, the authors of the *Summa Halensis* developed a doctrine of predestination that effectively defused the theological dynamite set by the late Augustine.

⁵⁵ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, C3 (n. 271), Respondeo, p. 366.

⁵⁶ Subsequent scholastic theologians likewise assumed and further developed this understanding of divine-human concurrence in the context of providence, predestination, and other doctrines. In Aquinas, e.g.; see, for instance, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.15, 2.48, 3.77–83 and 94–96, in *Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas*, vols 11 and 12, trans. Fr. Laurence Shapcote (Green Bay, WI: Aquinas Institute, 2018), 11:27–8, 241–2 and 12:147–60, 184–97; and Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13; q. 19, aa. 7–8; q. 23, esp. aa. 5–6; q. 83, a. 1; and q. 105, a. 5, in *Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas*, vols 13 and 14, ed. John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón, trans. Fr. Laurence Shapcote (Lander, WY: Aquinas Institute, 2012), 13:164–7, 218–21, 257–62 and 14:317–9, 517–9; see also Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (London: Routledge, 2003), 131–58; and Michael J. Dodds, *The Unchanging God of Love: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Theology on Divine Immutability*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 183–98.

Corey L. Barnes

Providence and Causality in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: William of Auvergne's treatment of providence in his *De universo* (1230s) selectively employed Avicenna, Aristotle, and the category of efficient causality to mark a distinction between divine foreknowledge and providence. William's focus on efficiency and affirmation that natural agents work in the mode of servants follows Neoplatonic impulses to instrumentalize nature and thereby risks eviscerating any meaningful secondary causality. Considerations of providence at Paris in the 1230s and 1240s engage with or react to William, with the *Summa Halensis* providing an interesting example. The *Summa Halensis* counters this risk by framing providence within the larger scope of divine knowledge and will, using reinterpreted versions of Aristotelian formal and final causality. The Summists avoid the danger of reducing providence to predictive knowledge or to atemporal awareness of temporal events by stressing the causality of the divine intellect and will. Further, the Summists counter the danger of magnifying the causal efficacy of providence until God remains the sole agent of every effect by framing the causality of the divine intellect and will in terms of formal and final causality. By this approach, the *Summa Halensis* harmonizes providential causality with the integrity of secondary causality.

The *Summa Halensis* begins its consideration of providence with a clear recognition that the observable world is full of confusion and disorder and with a clear affirmation that everything not well ordered in itself 'is nevertheless well-ordered with respect to divine providence, which always orders for the good'.¹ That this is so appears beyond doubt for the Summists; *how* it is so requires careful consideration. How does providence order for the good what is disordered in itself? How does divine providence order the disorder of secondary and contingent causes? To answer these and related questions, the *Summa Halensis* invokes Aristotle's explanatory categories of efficient, formal, and final causality. Without neglecting efficient causality, the Summists place special emphasis on formal and, to a lesser extent, final causality.² To frame better the importance of this emphasis, a brief analysis of William of Auvergne's discussion of providence in his *De universo* will prove useful. William em-

¹ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C1 (n. 195), p. 282.

² A useful brief discussion of the *Summa Halensis* on providence can be found in Hester Gelber, 'Providence,' in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, vol. 2, ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 761–72.

ployed an Avicennan-inflected Aristotelianism that risked undermining the causal integrity of nature and lapsing into necessitarianism through his focus on efficient causality. Even when William treats final causality as related to providence, he frames finality in terms of efficiency. The *Summa Halensis* counters with balanced attention to formal and final causality in a subtly powerful correction to William of Auvergne as well as to Avicenna and with a strident affirmation of human freedom.

William of Auvergne (c.1180/1190 – 1249) served as Bishop of Paris from 1228 until his death.³ This was during a time of change in Paris generally and within the University of Paris specifically. Though criticized by the papacy for his handling of university related matters (or crises), William exercised a clear influence on theological reflections in the 1230s and 1240s. During this period, he composed his sprawling *Magisterium divinale et sapientiale*, a seven-part opus covering a tremendous range of topics. William's *De universo*, written in the 1230s and itself far from slim, is merely one the *Magisterium's* seven parts. Within the *De universo* William embeds a treatment of providence indebted to Aristotle and Avicenna as much as to Augustine and Boethius and intended, among other things, to counter dualistic arguments associated with the Cathars.⁴

The *De universo* begins with arguments for a unified first principle and proceeds thereafter with arguments for the universe as a unified whole. The anti-Cathar force of the arguments is obvious and shapes the remainder of the lengthy work. William stresses from the beginning that contrariety does not divide unity.⁵ God creates solely for the sake of the divine beauty, and divine beauty causes the unified whole of the universe as well as the diverse participations in or reflections of divine beauty that constitute the diversity of creatures.⁶ William fills out this initial framing with a long series of chapters aiming to specify and refute errors of the philosophers, including Aristotle, followed by an accounting of creation following Genesis. This basic disposition in the *secunda primae's* treatment of governance, which discusses time and eternity, argues against an eternal world, supports the perdurance of souls, and concludes with arguments supporting the resurrection and, where appropriate, glorification of bodies. Next comes providence, and it is worth pausing, even if just for a moment, to reflect on the stakes for providence in light of William's sketch of creation and redemption.

³ For more information on William, see Noël Valois, *Guillame d'Auvergne, évêque de Paris, 1228–1249: sa vie et ses ouvrages* (Paris: Librairie d'Alphonse Picard, 1880) and Amato Masnovo, *Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a San Tomaso d'Aquino*, vol. 1, *Guglielmo d'Auvergne e l'Ascesa verso Dio* (Milan: Società editrice 'vita e pensiero', 1930).

⁴ See Roland Teske, 'William of Auvergne and the Manichees,' *Traditio* 48 (1993): 63–75.

⁵ William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-I, c. 11, in *Guilielmi Alverni Opera omnia*, vol.1 (Paris: Apud Andream Pralard, 1674; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), 605.

⁶ William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-I, cc. 16 and 18, 611–2. See also Henri Pouillon, 'La beauté, propriété transcendente, chez les scolastiques (1220–1270),' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 21 (1942): 263–328. Pouillon also provides a helpful, brief discussion of John of La Rochelle and the *Summa Halensis*.

Medieval theologians knew the contours of classical debates regarding providence from Augustine and Boethius, but the context changed significantly and reflected different concerns in the decades prior to William's *De universo*. Peter Lombard offered a rather terse presentation of providence in the midst of defining and distinguishing a series of related terms. Foreknowledge (*praescientia*) concerns future things, whether good or evil. Predestination (*praedestinatio*) concerns human salvation. Providence (*providentia*) pertains to the governance of things and thus relates to arrangement (*dispositio*)—a term for making or doing—though Peter notes providence is sometimes accepted for foreknowledge.⁷ By the time William of Auxerre wrote his *Summa aurea*, the topic of providence remained a mediating point between divine knowledge and power. The *Summa aurea* raises the central concern of whether divine foreknowledge imposes necessity upon things and proposes a strategy later adopted by Thomas Aquinas in his own treatment of providence.⁸ William distinguishes three basic qualifications: infallibly, necessarily, and contingently. God foreknows everything infallibly, and, crucially, foreknows everything as either coming to pass necessarily or contingently. Infallibly designates God's foreknowledge while necessity and contingency pertain to secondary causes and effects. Before moving on to divine power, William examines the relationship of providence to good and evil. Considered in their universality, all things are 'wholly good and are in themselves delectable'.⁹ Within that universal order, some individuals fall short due to human weakness or mingling with devilish works.¹⁰ The main point to stress here is that William of Auxerre follows and develops Peter Lombard by recognizing providence as a point of contact between divine knowledge and divine power, yet William moves beyond Peter in recognizing the pull and danger of a divinely imposed necessity conditioning every created reality.

Despite William of Auxerre's knowledge of Aristotle, his considerations of foreknowledge, necessity, providence, and power do not utilize the Stagirite's scheme of four causes or explanatory modes. William of Auvergne, by contrast, regularly employs Aristotelian causal categories to elucidate providence.¹¹ Within that framework of Aristotle's four causes, William concentrates on efficient causality and, though to a

7 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* I, d. 35, cc. 1–6, vol. 1, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971), 254–5.

8 See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 22, in *Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu impensa Leonis XII P. M. edita*, vol. 4 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888), 263–9.

9 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 10, vol. 1, ed. Jean Ribailier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980), 199.

10 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 10 (Ribailier, 199).

11 Bertolacci clarifies the Latin reception of Avicenna through a threefold periodization with William of Auvergne inaugurating the second period. See Amos Bertolacci, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization,' in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 197–223.

lesser degree, final causality.¹² Despite the novel categories of analysis, William follows the pattern of first distinguishing foreknowledge and providence. He writes:

the meaning (*intentio*) of foreknowledge differs from the meaning of providence, because the meaning of foreknowledge is broader and extends as much to future evils as to future goods (...), but the meaning of providence is narrower and does not fall except on future goods.¹³

With such specifications established, William turns his attention to defending the existence of providence. Through a lengthy discussion of animal and insect actions and other examples derived from Aristotle's *Physics*, he argues that God providentially orders creation for human benefit. These borrowings from Aristotle moderate William's emphasis on efficient causality by invigorating the discussion with final causality. Though we will see William consistently and thoroughly qualifies this final causality in and through efficient causality.

'There is nothing in the sublunary universe,' William argues, 'either of human beings or of animals that is not regulated by the creator's care and providence.'¹⁴ Providential care extends equally to universals and to singulars.¹⁵ William dwells on the providential ordering of animals and insects as divinely ordered to goodness. The creator's goodness and wisdom permit nothing to be made without a cause or to be made uselessly but rather regulates everything through providential care.¹⁶ This includes individual parts of animals, whole animals, and the totality of all animals, according to which they enjoy a natural utility that functions as a utility of or for creation with respect to the end.¹⁷ William returns to themes of final causality in expressing providential care over human affairs and in exploring a second mode or meaning of care related to intellection. He associates this with human apprehension and in a more excellent fashion with God. 'There is not anything among created things or of their happenings (*eventibus*) that the creator does not care for through this mode and intention.'¹⁸ William spells this out by noting that there is nothing within creation that falls outside the care and attention of providence, and this includes not only the things themselves but also their ends and activities.¹⁹ Through this grand scope of universals and singulars, non-rational creatures and human beings, ends and utilities (or means), divine providence knows and cares for all of creation. This scope also suggests a difficulty.

12 The focus on efficient causality derives from Avicenna. See Mikko Posti, 'Divine Providence in Medieval Philosophical Theology 1250–1350' (PhD thesis, University of Helsinki, 2017), 54–6.

13 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-III, c. 1, 754.

14 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-III, c. 8, 771.

15 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-III, c. 11, 774–5.

16 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-III, c. 5, 765.

17 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-III, c. 4, 763.

18 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-III, c. 10, 774.

19 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-III, c. 10, 774.

William's insistence on creation through one principle and for one end, creation governed by the one supremely good God, creation ordered by divine providence at the level of universals and singulars, providence ordering by its care of all species, their individuals, and their actions, this grand insistence unavoidably raises concerns regarding free will or contingent causality within the larger framework of providential care. Framed more generally, the question is whether, despite his interest in preserving space for human free will, William ultimately undermines the integrity of secondary causality. The concern takes specific shape with William's repetition of the following principle: 'nature works in the mode of a servant.'²⁰ Though he attributes this to Aristotle, it in fact reflects later Neoplatonic conceptions and derives from Avicenna.²¹ In stressing the servility of nature and the efficacy of divine causation, readers medieval and modern feared William renders nature a mere conduit for divine causality to the detriment of natural integrity and secondary causality.

According to James Reilly, Thomas of York (1220 – 1269) charged William as guilty of reducing all true efficient causation to God's causality.²² Michael Miller has argued the charge, broadly speaking, attributes to William occasionalism, i.e. that what we perceive as the causes of things are not the true causes but merely the occasions for the effect. Miller dismisses the charge in large measure by framing William's thought in relation and reaction to Avicenna and Avicbron.²³ William attributes to Avicenna a scheme of necessary emanation that simultaneously constrains or obligates God and separates God from direct or immediate causal efficacy within creation.²⁴ If creation proceeds as necessary emanation, William argues, then God acts in the mode of a servant just as does nature.²⁵ In contrast and under the influence of Avicbron's *Fons vitae*, William stresses that God always and only causes through will rather than from any necessity.²⁶

Nature presents the opposite case for William, seemingly against Aristotle's contention that everything existing by nature 'has within itself a principle of motion and

²⁰ William refers to this principle often. See, e.g., William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-III, c. 3, 759; I-III, c. 21, 787; I-III, c. 21, 788; II-I, c. 8, 816.

²¹ Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* 9.2, vol. 2, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 1980), 448: 'what is natural does not act through election but in the mode of a servant.'

²² James Reilly, 'Thomas of York on the Efficacy of Secondary Causes,' *Mediaeval Studies* 15 (1953): 225–33.

²³ See Michael Miller, 'William of Auvergne on Primary and Secondary Qualities,' *The Modern Schoolman* 75 (1998): 265–77 and Michael Miller, 'William of Auvergne and Avicenna's Principle "Nature Operates in the Manner of a Servant",' in *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: in Islam, Judaism and Christianity*, ed. John Inglis (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2002), 263–76. The following discussion is indebted to Miller's analysis.

²⁴ See William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-I, c. 26, 619–20. On Avicenna, see Caterina Belo, *Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

²⁵ William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-I, c. 21, 614.

²⁶ See William of Auvergne, *De trinitate*, c. 9, ed. Bruno Switalski (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1976), 64 and Miller, 'William of Auvergne on Primary and Secondary Qualities.'

stationariness'.²⁷ William expressly links natural powers to the divine will as the empowering and constraining condition for natures.²⁸ William even goes so far as to deny that natures are causes in any normal sense.²⁹ Rather, they cause only with respect to our perception of the causal relationships pertaining between things; they serve only as causes with respect to our senses.³⁰ Attempting further to clarify his meaning, William equates causation with the giving of *esse*. This pertains principally to God as the efficient cause of created *esse* and can be attributed to nature only insofar as creatures pass along *esse* as a gift they have themselves received.³¹ Two points deserve attention here. First, William again maintains God alone as true cause, verging on an equation of causation and creation *ex nihilo*.³² Second, his presentation of causation as the giving of *esse* funnels causality into the category of efficiency. Within this framework, William stresses divine generosity in granting space for creatures to pass on what they have received to other creatures.³³ Miller judges this as constituting a genuine, even if derived, causality. Regardless of how one judges William, his approach raised questions and elicited challenges, giving new shape to perennial discussions.

The *Summa Halensis*

The *Summa Halensis* shares many sources and concerns with William of Auvergne but develops this shared material differently, laboring to avoid the dangers of William's approach by construing providence largely through formal and final causali-

27 Aristotle, *Physics* 2.1, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 329. Against this standard translation and interpretation, Helen Lang reads Aristotelian nature as a passive principle of being moved. See Helen Lang, *The Order of Nature in Aristotle's Physics: Place and the Elements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 40–50.

28 William of Auvergne, *De trinitate*, c. 11 (Switalski, 76).

29 William of Auvergne, *De trinitate*, c. 11 (Switalski, 77).

30 William of Auvergne, *De trinitate*, c. 11 (Switalski, 79). Miller provides a series of examples from the *De trinitate* and *De universo* to show that William did grant true causal efficacy to created natures. These examples, however, can be read within the general framework of causing with respect to sensory data. See Miller, 'William of Auvergne on Primary and Secondary Qualities,' 272–4.

31 William of Auvergne, *De trinitate*, c. 12 (Switalski, 79).

32 Gilson addresses this to some degree in his exploration of how William presents all creaturely *esse* as participation in God's *esse* such that God remains most intimate to all creatures. See Étienne Gilson, 'La notion d'existence chez Guillaume d'Auvergne,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 15 (1946): 62–9. Caster takes exceptions to Gilson and Masnovo (see above, n. 3) in Kevin J. Caster, 'The Real Distinction Between Being and Essence according to William of Auvergne,' *Traditio* 51 (1996): 201–23 and treats William's views in light of influences on his thought in Kevin J. Caster, 'The Distinction between Being and Essence according to Boethius, Avicenna, and William of Auvergne,' *The Modern Schoolman* 73 (1996): 309–32.

33 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I-I, c. 26, 622.

ty.³⁴ This construal significantly escapes the consequences (or seeming consequences) of William's emphasis on efficient causality, an emphasis that risks defining the integrity of created secondary causality against the efficacy of divine creative causality. The Summists begin with the most basic question, whether there is providence, and respond principally with the authority of Boethius and of Augustine.³⁵ The primary issue at stake concerns the apparent disorder within creation. The Summists respond: 'Although things in the world, when considered in themselves according to their own mode, seem to be disordered in the world, nonetheless, with respect to providence they are well ordered; thus, with respect to providence itself there is neither confusion nor disorder [in the world].'³⁶ The Summists elaborate upon this with the *Gloss* that providence always orders to the good what in itself is disordered. A more focused challenge to the very existence of providence concerns evil. The general strategy applies in this specific case; providence orders evil to the good such that evil becomes useful for the progress and perfection of good.³⁷

If the *Summa Halensis* begins its treatment of providence in broad agreement with William's central concerns, matters change drastically with the second topic, 'what is providence'. The Summists, frame the question in terms of whether providence pertains to wisdom (glossed in terms of formal causality), will (glossed in terms of final causality), or power (glossed in terms of efficient causality).³⁸ In a stark departure from William, the Summists argue providence can principally be reduced to wisdom and to the good, thereby shifting the emphasis away from efficient causality and towards formal and final causality.³⁹ As the Summists write:

there are two (things) in providence, namely seeing (*videntia*) or cognition, because to see before (*providere*) is to see (*videre*), and something added beyond this [seeing], namely causality. Providence names a certain causality of order or governance and rule. According to the meaning (*ratio*) of seeing, [providence] introduces (*importat*) cognition and knowledge. According to what is added beyond that, by which it indicates (*notat*) the causality of governance or order, [providence] names the good will of God, which itself is the governor of things. Thus, by virtue

34 See Posti, 'Divine Providence,' 58–63 for a brief but useful discussion of the *Summa Halensis*.

35 Several texts from Augustine served as authorities on providence, but none elicited quite as many questions as *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 24 (PL 40:17).

36 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C1 (n. 195), p. 282.

37 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C1 (n. 195), p. 283. Posti identifies two scholastic strategies (accidental and instrumental) for addressing providence and evil among the medieval scholastics and argues the *Summa Halensis* employs both (Posti, 'Divine Providence,' 62–8). On this theme, see also Oleg Bychkov, 'Decor ex praesentia mali: Aesthetic Explanation of Evil in Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Thought,' *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 68 (2001): 245–69.

38 See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 285. On the relationship of these theological and philosophical categories, see Philotheus Boehner, 'The System of Metaphysics of Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945): 366–414.

39 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 286.

of the first [i. e. seeing], [providence] pertains to wisdom; by virtue of the second [i. e. causality of governance], it pertains to the will.⁴⁰

Following this, the Summists acknowledge that providence relates to or at least can be reduced to power, and thus to efficient causality, but only as it is co-understood with knowledge and will.⁴¹ I will elaborate the force and consequences of the shift from emphasizing efficient causality to emphasizing formal and final causality, but it is worth dwelling for a moment on the change itself and its terms. The Summists do not simply trade one category of Aristotelian causality for another (though they do this); the Summists also link the causal categories to the trinitarian appropriations of power, wisdom, and will. By employing these typical categories of appropriations, the *Summa Halensis* accomplishes several things. One, it expands the frame of reference for divine providence from a unitary divine nature to a trinity of divine persons.⁴² Two, it builds upon its own earlier considerations of divine attributes to clarify providence. These two points are not unrelated, and I hope it will suffice here to focus on the second.

Broadly speaking, the *Summa Halensis* situates providence within the larger investigation of divine knowledge, a consideration following directly the treatment of divine power. As the examination of divine power unfolds, the Summists introduce distinctions and qualifications that clarify the limits—not of divine power itself—but of its concrete instantiations and to attempts at exploring the created order through reflections on divine power. The process begins with possible limitations to divine power and by distinguishing finite and infinite power. A ‘finite power can in its totality be educed in its act, while an infinite power can be educed in act but not in its totality, for this contradicts its infinity.’⁴³ In other words, no particular act exhausts an infinite power, and so God’s providential ordering of all reality reflects the particular application of an infinite divine power unlimited in itself and absolutely but concretely specified and directed. The question then becomes what concretely specifies and directs an infinite power in specific acts?

The Summists clarify this complex relation while addressing a series of topics and aided by several distinctions, the most basic of which is between *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata*.⁴⁴ This distinction, the Summists emphasize, implies no

⁴⁰ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 287.

⁴¹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 287.

⁴² See Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘A Cord of Three Strands is not Easily Broken: The Transcendental Brocade of Unity, Truth, and Goodness in the Early Franciscan Intellectual Tradition,’ *Nova et Vetera* 16 (2018): 561–86.

⁴³ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C1 (n. 140), p. 219.

⁴⁴ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C2 (n. 141), pp. 220–1. See Lawrence Moonan, *Divine Power: The Medieval Power Distinction up to its Adoption by Albert, Bonaventure, and Aquinas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 131–44.

limitation on divine power. There can be no such limitation.⁴⁵ This is so ‘even though the flowing out (*egressum*) in act of the divine power is always concomitant with will, justice, goodness, foreknowledge, and reason (*ratio*), which are the same reality in God but differ according to the reason of [our] understanding.’⁴⁶ *Potentia ordinata* does not represent a limited power but only an ordering of unlimited divine power ‘according to the plan (*ratio*) of divine preordination of justice rendering to each according to merit’.⁴⁷ Just because something can be done does not mean it should be done. Full recognition of this guides the Summists’ approach to divine power. Such is evident when the Summists question whether God could have made things better than they are. This depends on a distinction,

because we can consider things in themselves (and according to this whatsoever thing can be made better), or [we can] consider things within the universe of things (and according to this it should be conceded that they cannot be made better with respect to the power of the thing made but can be made better with respect to the power of the one making).⁴⁸

Even if only implicitly, this frames or sets the stage for treatments of providence. Unlike William’s narrow focus on divine power refracted through efficient causality, the *Summa Halensis* emphasizes the unlimited divine power as ordered according to a set of divine attributes identical in themselves but distinct in our understanding of them. The Summists apply a similar principle to differentiations in modes of divine causality.⁴⁹

Returning to providence, the Summists specify that providence chiefly pertains to wisdom operating as formal causality and to will operating as final causality. Providence can be reduced to power operating as efficient causality, but only insofar as power is co-understood with knowledge and will. Knowledge and will are not thereby rendered as limits on power, nor are formal and final causes construed as limits on efficiency. Rather, the *Summa Halensis* assumes a coincidence of causes and an identity of attributes in God, weaving together Aristotelian approaches to causality and theological notions of divine simplicity.⁵⁰ These principles must be kept in

⁴⁵ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C3 (n. 142), p. 221.

⁴⁶ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C3 (n. 142), pp. 221–2.

⁴⁷ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C2 (n. 141), pp. 220–1. Posti frames arguments of this type as reinterpretations of middle Platonic notions of conditional fate (Posti, ‘Divine Providence,’ 24–8) and argues such notions were received in scholastic thought through the mediation of Boethius. The Summists employ a parallel in Christology in distinguishing various forms of possibility. They define the ability or possibility of justice (*posse de iustitia*) as possibility according to the fittingness of merit (*posse secundum congruentiam meritorum*). This all falls within a discussion of considering power not absolutely but as ordered by justice. See *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q1, C4 (n. 4), pp. 15–6.

⁴⁸ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M3, C1 (n. 143), p. 223.

⁴⁹ *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M1, C2 (n. 7), p. 16.

⁵⁰ On the coincidence of causes in Aristotle, see Robert Bolton, ‘Why Does Aristotle Need Four Causes?’, in *La Causalité chez Aristote*, ed. Lambros Couloubaritis and Sylvain Delcomminette (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin; Bruxelles: Éditions Ousia, 2011), 27–46. See *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2,

mind when the Summists present providence as the ‘plan of the exemplar considered in the divine art’ (*exemplaris ratio consideratur in arte divina*).⁵¹ By introducing exemplarity, the Summists are specifying the particularities of divine formal causality in a significant manner.

The Summists make clear that formal exemplarity does not posit separate forms existing independently in an ideal realm with actual created realities being merely lesser imitations such as in the case of mathematical forms. The Summists note Aristotle and Avicenna reject such understandings of formal causality.⁵² They approve instead Seneca’s distinction between *idea* and *eidos*, with the former as eternal exemplars and the latter as the forms of individual substances.⁵³ The focus remains on Seneca’s use of *idea*, according to which the Summists stress the unity of the eternal exemplar, itself identical with the first efficient cause. The plurality or diversity of effects no more multiplies or diversifies the exemplar cause than the efficient cause.⁵⁴ The exemplar cause further extends beyond what was, is, and will be actual to the full range of infinite divine possibility.⁵⁵ When considered in terms of knowledge, the exemplar cause includes or extends to evil as well as to good. The exemplar cause can also be considered in a narrower sense as divine art. Thus considered, the divine art or *exemplaris ratio* arranges (*determinat*) goods alone.⁵⁶

Having specified what providence is, the *Summa Halensis* turns to how providence works, first noting two fundamental elements involved in providence: cognition and causality—itsself divided as in habit and in act.⁵⁷ With respect to cognition and habitual causality, providence is eternal. Insofar as it causes in act, providence is temporal.⁵⁸ This does not, of course, compromise providence’s simplicity. Perhaps the most interesting reflections emerge in response to the question ‘whether providence is a cause of things and in which genera of cause?’⁵⁹ Before specifying limited

Ti1, M1, C2 (n. 7), p. 16. Coolman articulates well the theological significance of this correlation for the *Summa Halensis* and the early Franciscan intellectual tradition in Coolman, ‘A Cord of Three Strands.’ 51 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 288. Thomas Aquinas’ preferred definition of providence, *ratio ordinis rerum in finem*, seems something of a response. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 1, 263.

52 SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 9), p. 18. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.4–5, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1691–2 and Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* 7.3, 366–75.

53 SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 9), p. 18, citing Seneca, *Epistle* 58 (Seneca, *Epistles*, vol. 1, *Epistles 1–65*, trans. Richard Gummere (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917)). The Summists also distinguish intelligible forms in the soul. On this sense of form, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, ‘Avicenna’s ‘Giver of Forms’ in Latin Philosophy, Especially in the Works of Albertus Magnus,’ in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics* (see above, n. 11), 225–49.

54 SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C2 (n. 10), pp. 18–9.

55 SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C3 (n. 11), p. 20.

56 SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C4 (n. 12), p. 21.

57 On this distinction, see also SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M1, C1 (n. 6), p. 15.

58 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar1 (n. 197), pp. 288–9.

59 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), pp. 289–91.

senses in which providence functions as final and efficient cause, the Summists highlight the role of formal exemplar causality. They write:

We concede that providence is a cause and with respect to cognition and seeing (*videntia*) (...) is a formal exemplar cause. This is so because just as in the science of building the exemplar cause of a house is in the builder, so also the exemplar cause of everything going to be made is in the divine science. The divine science itself is called the idea of things, and Boethius says providence exists (*se habet*) according to the mode of a plan (*ratio*) or of the exemplar cause in the builder.⁶⁰

Providence is in the divine science as the eternal exemplar for all creation. This relates to the temporal unfolding or actualization of the eternal plan. Unlike in the case of a builder, there is no failing in the divine fulfillment or actualization of the eternal exemplar. The formal exemplar cause can thus be identified with eternal providence as cognition in the sense of God's understanding of what amongst the infinite range of possibilities will be actualized or created as divine participations. This last element must not be forgotten, for it is part and parcel of what ensures this formal exemplar causality retains its exemplar status. Providence can also be considered in terms of causality and is also eternal when causation is considered in habit or habitually. This would, in the divine science, correspond to the eternal plan as cause of its temporal actualization or unfolding. Providence's causality in act is temporal. The Summists treat the causality of providence in act largely in terms of efficient causality and largely in response to the Damascene's presentation of providence as the *bona voluntas Dei*. In this sense providence 'governs and rules the whole'.⁶¹

The Summists also grant a qualified role to final causality in providence, despite rejecting providence as a final cause of things.⁶² The argument to which the Summists respond weaves together passages from Augustine and Boethius to identify in turn providence with the *summum bonum*, the *summum bonum* with the end of all things, and therefore providence with the final cause of all things. Following Avicenna, the *Summa Halensis* further qualifies the end as moving the efficient cause.⁶³ It also notes that the *summum bonum* has two meanings insofar as 'an end brings a thing to completion (*terminat*)' and as 'things are ordered in themselves just as to a terminus'.⁶⁴ Assembling these various pieces, the Summists conclude:

The end that moves the efficient is in providence, which thus possesses in itself the power for ordering all things as an end, but not by reason of bringing a thing to completion. Nevertheless, according as it possess the reason of an end, it is more referred to the efficient itself. Providence

⁶⁰ *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.

⁶¹ *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.

⁶² *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290: 'We say that providence is not a final cause of things.'

⁶³ The editors here refer to Avicenna, *Sufficiencia* 1.11.2 (*SH I* (n. 199), p. 290, n. 10): 'Finis movet efficientem ut sit efficiens.'

⁶⁴ *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.

therefore is the *summum bonum*, and the *summum bonum* possesses the aforementioned two meanings, one of which fits to providence.⁶⁵

That is, providence is not itself the end of things as their completion. Nonetheless, providence can be called an end and an efficient cause, but ‘it is called efficient in as much as it communicates or diffuses itself, and providence is called good (*bonum*) according to this meaning (*per hanc rationem*).’⁶⁶ This presentation of an efficient cause as self-communicative or self-diffusive obviously reflects typical scholastic framings the Dionysian good as self-diffusive.⁶⁷ This is important for a few reasons, one of which relates to understandings of finality or final causality. The Summists’ construal of efficiency or efficient causality framed in the Dionysian terms of the self-diffusive good shifts dramatically the terms of efficient causality in William’s treatments of divine providence. More specifically it shifts the general sense of efficiency away from a moving cause exerting force or control to a creative act infusing all things with an innate yearning for the *summum bonum* as their origin and end framed formally. This is important, among other things, for the Summists’ approach to chance.

Questions of chance and fortune entered scholastic reflections on providence through Aristotle’s *Physics* and reflections thereon. Within the *Physics* and its investigations of the workings of nature, Aristotle considers chance (*automaton*) and luck (*tyche*).⁶⁸ The inquiries include whether they should properly be regarded as causes (or explanations) and how they relate to the other causes (or explanations). Going against the grain of previous approaches, Aristotle grants chance and luck genuine explanatory power and broadly classifies them under the explanatory heading of final causality. Events occur by luck when the events are sufficiently explained neither by necessity nor by intention but only through the addition of an accidental cause.⁶⁹ Aristotle presents luck as a subset of chance. Events occur by chance when the end achieved varies from the natural or intended end through the intervention of an external accidental cause.⁷⁰ Chance and luck are not causes in their own right or in addition to the standard four causes but rather remain always posterior to and dependent upon intelligence and nature working according to the four causes or explanations.⁷¹ Aristotle’s basic strategy of folding chance and luck within the larger

⁶⁵ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.

⁶⁶ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.

⁶⁷ Niarchos stresses that the good in Dionysius should not be identified with any one Aristotelian cause. See C.G. Niarchos, ‘Good, Beauty and Eros in Dionysius’ Doctrine of Divine Causality,’ *Diotima* 23 (1995): 106–8.

⁶⁸ Most fundamentally, Aristotle contrasts luck and chance with the regularity of nature.

⁶⁹ See Aristotle, *Physics* 2.5 (Barnes, 1:335–7) and *Metaphysics* 11.8 (Barnes, 2:1681–3).

⁷⁰ See Aristotle, *Physics* 2.6 (Barnes, 1:337–8).

⁷¹ See Lindsay Judson, ‘Chance and ‘Always or For the Most Part’ in Aristotle,’ in *Aristotle’s Physics: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Lindsay Judson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 73–99 and John Dudley, *Aristotle’s Concept of Chance: Accidents, Cause, Necessity, and Determinism* (Albany, NY: State Univer-

framework of explanations or causes afforded medieval scholastics with a means through which to account for chance and luck within a grander providential order.⁷² That is, events that seem to lack a strict cause or explanation or to happen fortuitously in no way challenge or undermine the divinely instituted order of providence. Rather, providence works in and through what happens by chance or by luck.

This basic Aristotelian presentation lies behind the consideration of providence and chance in the *Summa Halensis*, and the Summists employ it to harmonize authorities from Boethius and Augustine.⁷³ Augustine's denial of chance within a providentially ordered world did not simply contradict other authorities, it seemingly excluded chance and perhaps imposed necessity. The Summists reverentially interpret Augustine's concerns through a distinction between two ways things are said to happen by chance. According to the first way, chance indicates an unexpected outcome (*inopinatus eventus*) occurring 'from a confluence of causes that do not have any order'.⁷⁴ Augustine, so the Summists hold, merely denied chance occurrences in this sense to deny that anything was wholly lacking in order. The specification of the second way consists entirely of a lengthy quotation from Boethius expounding an Aristotelian approach, the thrust of which is to define 'chance as the unexpected outcome from the confluence of causes carried out for some purpose'.⁷⁵ The differentiation between the two ways hinges on order. The second way locates chance outcomes within a larger structure of mutually ordered causes and thus can seamlessly fold chance within the order of providence. That is, providence itself orders the confluence of causes exceeding the intention of the created agents.⁷⁶ This all relates to formal exemplarity, though exploring how requires investigation of providence and the voluntary.

The Summists' basic approach grants that providence covers both what is natural and what is voluntary but does so differently, with natural events categorized

sity of New York Press, 2012). Judson stresses how Aristotle maintains the explanatory power of chance without elevating it to an independent causal principle. Dudley emphasizes an anthropocentric approach more in line with later interpreters of Aristotle, including the medieval scholastics, than with Aristotle himself.

⁷² See Posti, 'Divine Providence,' 17–20.

⁷³ Boethius' reflections from *Consolatio philosophiae* IV-V (PL 63:786–862) offered the standard or baseline for scholastic approaches. Augustine's *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q.24 (PL 40:17) presented something of a problem insofar as it denies chance within providence.

⁷⁴ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar2 (n. 201), p. 293. The phrase *inopinatus eventus* derives from Boethius, but this particular use seemingly derives from Abelard. See Peter Abelard, *Dialectica: Pars secunda: Analytica Priora* III, in *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, ed. M. Victor Cousin (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1836), 287–8. Abelard writes about outcomes regarded as chance not simply due to human ignorance of all the full confluence of causes but due rather to the nature of the things themselves.

⁷⁵ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar2 (n. 201), p. 293, quoting Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae* V, pr.1 (PL 63:831–832).

⁷⁶ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar2 (n. 201), p. 294: 'From this it stands that chance outcomes are subject to divine providence, because the causes concurring to such an outcome are from it.'

under the providence of acceptation (*secundum acceptionem*) and voluntary under the providence of concession (*secundum concessionem*), a distinction taken from John Damascene.⁷⁷ Natural things cannot do otherwise and so cannot resist in any way providential order. However, ‘providence according to concession’, the Summists hold,

concerns things where resistance and contradiction belong: and it is so in free choice, for God gave free choice so that it may consent or not consent to the good and [so it may] consent to evil if it will. Whatever [free choice] does, whether good or evil, providence always orders it.⁷⁸

Little here clarifies precisely how the providence of concession allows for freedom of choice, though the Summists provide some answers in reflecting on providence’s effects. Within this discussion, differentiations among various types of necessity relate as well to various types of causality. Recalling the Summists’ conscious emphasis on formal exemplar and final causality, it comes as no surprise that the concurrence of divine providence and human free choice can best be discerned through these modes.

At the most basic level, the *Summa Halensis* argues providence creates in everything a ‘necessity of order’ without thereby rendering this or that thing itself necessary.⁷⁹ What proceeds from free choice proceeds into being ‘mutably’ but nonetheless proceeds into an order of necessity. No necessity determines that these things are but only how, once they exist, they exist within a providential order. The Summists further elaborate upon the relationship of providence and necessity by distinguishing types of necessity. The basic division stands between what is necessary simply or absolutely, on the one hand, and what is necessary relatively or respectively, on the other hand. Whatever cannot possibly be otherwise falls within the first type, and so the Summists concentrate on the second broad category in this consideration. Within relative or respective necessity, the Summists list necessity from something (*ab hoc*), with something (*cum hoc*), and for something (*ad hoc*). Only the necessity from and for something are relevant here. Necessity from something results from force (or violence). A heavy object may be raised up high, and any necessity to its being so raised derives from the force raising it up (against its natural inclination). As an example of necessity for something (*ad hoc*), the Summists argue, ‘medicine is said to be necessary for health, not because health cannot exist without it, but it is necessary for [a particular someone] to have it.’⁸⁰ The applicability of this example to the relationship of providence and free choice is not immediately obvious.

⁷⁷ John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 29 (PG 94:963–970). William of Auxerre discusses these classifications in *Summa aurea* I, tr.10 (Ribaillier, 198–201).

⁷⁸ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar3 (n. 202), p. 294.

⁷⁹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C7, Ar2 (n. 209), p. 302.

⁸⁰ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C7, Ar2 (n. 209), p. 302. The *Summa Halensis* parses various related senses of necessity when considering the Incarnation. On this see, Corey Barnes, ‘Necessary, Fitting, or Possible: The Shape of Scholastic Christology,’ *Nova et Vetera* 10 (2012): 657–88.

Providence creates a necessity for something (*ad hoc*) rather than from something (*ab hoc*) ‘because providence does not compel (*cogit*) free choice’.⁸¹ Rather, ‘when something is from free choice, whether it was good or evil, it is necessarily ordered by providence itself for some good, not, I say, determinately to this or that, but indefinitely for some [good].’⁸² What are we to make of this?

As an initial observation, the denial of necessity from something (*ab hoc*) relates to and reinforces the shift away from efficient causality. When providence works primarily through efficient causality, free choice—and in fact any true secondary causality—risks becoming a challenge, a competing force inevitably overcome by providence. Promoting necessity for something (*ad hoc*) might seem to stress final causality within providence, but this requires qualification. As the Summists had earlier affirmed, providence cannot strictly be regarded as a final cause because it is not itself the highest good to which things aim or are ordered.⁸³ Necessity for something (*ad hoc*) relates to the necessity of order. Under the broad influence of Averroes, subsequent theologians frame this in terms of final causality.⁸⁴ The *Summa Halensis* prioritizes formal exemplar causality, but how this prioritization applies to necessity for something (*ad hoc*) merits further investigation.

The Summists often parse key distinctions through the trinitarian appropriations of power, wisdom, and will. When considering whether wisdom can be called a cause of things, the Summists offer a qualified response that wisdom ‘is called a cause as in disposition, but art is called [a cause] in necessity or proximate disposition. Necessity, however, is not said here as what constrains a cause but as what compels an effect.’⁸⁵ Unlike William, the Summists regard free choice as a cause rather than simply as an effect. When discussing the order of the universe, the Summists offer further useful reflections. Order exists not only in the universe as a whole but also in its parts. Such order often remains hidden, but the hidden order will eventually be made manifest.⁸⁶ And, though order can be noticed both according to simultaneity and to *prius et posterius*, order has greater reference to *prius et posterius*.⁸⁷ Perhaps most importantly, the Summists return to the coincidence of causes framed through trinitarian appropriations: ‘order in creatures is from divine power, wisdom, and will, because the operation is undivided. Yet, on account of appropriation it is said that

81 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C7, Ar2 (n. 209), p. 302.

82 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C7, Ar2 (n. 209), p. 302. This coheres with Gössmann’s presentation of fittingness within the context of Christology. See Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung de Summa Halensis (Alexander von Hales)* (München: Max Hueber Verlag, 1964), 73–9.

83 Posti argues final causality rises to the fore in discussions of providence under the growing influence of Averroes. The *Summa Halensis* does not follow that path but also diverges from earlier approaches forcefully influenced by Avicenna. See Posti, ‘Divine Providence,’ 56–8.

84 Thomas Aquinas offers a clear example of this. See Posti, ‘Divine Providence,’ 71–94.

85 SH I, P2, In2, Tr2, S2, Q3, M2, C5 (n. 455), p. 651.

86 SH II, In1, Tr2, Q4, C2 (n. 87), p. 110.

87 SH II, In1, Tr2, Q4, C4 (n. 89), p. 113.

order fits to divine wisdom, because to order things appropriately (*decenter*) in itself fits to wisdom.⁸⁸

This particular framing of providence looks forward to the *Summa Halensis'* Christology, and the Christology in its turn sheds further light on the compatibility of providence and human freedom. The limits of space do not allow for investigating the parallels here, but it is still valuable at least to mention two points. First, the Summists emphasize that, while any of the divine persons could become incarnate, incarnation most befits the Son due to the appropriation of wisdom. The logic associates creation with power, recreation with wisdom, and glorification with goodness, thereby presenting the incarnation as recreation through wisdom.⁸⁹ In this sense, the incarnation provides the very model for how providence orders what in itself is disordered as the formal exemplar cause. Second, the incarnation further exemplifies the harmony between freedom and some necessity. The larger framing concerns distinctions between superior and inferior causes as well as between necessity of compulsion and of immutability. With respect to the superior cause, i.e. God, the incarnation can only be regarded as necessary according to the immutability of divine providence.⁹⁰ With respect to the inferior cause, the Summists question the necessity of the passion and determine it was only necessary according to the necessity of the final cause, because necessity of the final cause does not remove the voluntary character of individual actions.⁹¹ The concurrence of necessity according to the superior formal exemplar cause and according to the inferior final cause allow for human free choice ordered by providence for the good.

We are now in a position to gather these various reflections together into some general conclusions. Reading the *Summa Halensis'* treatment of providence as a response to William of Auvergne's treatment in his *De universo* sheds light on what themes the Summists sought to highlight and why. William labored to combat dualism and Avicenna's scheme of necessary emanation. In combatting a scheme of necessary emanation, William stressed creation as a voluntary divine act. In combatting dualism, William stressed Avicenna's emphasis on the efficient causation of all reality from one first principle. Even if this particular combination partitioned the divine creative act from any necessity, it seemingly reduced everything thereafter to necessity. The Summists sought an alternative to the forceful impositions or compulsions of efficiency and found one in formal causality. Moreover, the Summists' category of formal causality owes as much to later Neoplatonic interpretations as it does to Aristotle.

The Summists' point of departure develops a clever parallel of Aristotelian causal categories and trinitarian appropriations. Efficient, formal, and final causality map onto power, wisdom, and will. Just as importantly, Aristotle's emphasis on

⁸⁸ *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q4, C5 (n. 90), p. 114.

⁸⁹ *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar1 (n. 14), p. 31.

⁹⁰ *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), p. 14.

⁹¹ *SH* IV, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C1 (n. 148), pp. 206–7.

the coincidence of causes reinforces trinitarian circumincession (or *perichoresis*), while principles of trinitarian appropriations justify specification of one cause or attribute without excluding the others. The Summists' strategy from the beginning undercuts William of Auvergne's singular focus on efficient causality by insisting on causal coincidence and trinitarian circumincession and then shifts the focus to formal causality and wisdom. This shift frames the Summists' approach to explaining unlimited divine power educed in limited acts within a definite order and to defining providence as the 'plan of the exemplar considered in the divine art (*exemplaris ratio consideratur in arte divina*)'. Specifying formal exemplarity weaves in elements related to final causality without thereby equating providence itself with the *summum bonum* to which all things are ordered. Providence itself is not the end of the ordering but rather the plan of the ordering precisely as enacted. The enactment of this order situates human free choice within an order of necessity to something (*ad hoc*) rather than from something (*ab hoc*) and, through this specification, alleviates the tensions of William's emphasis on efficiency.

Boyd Taylor Coolman

The Comprehensive Trinitarianism of the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The Trinitarian theology of the *Summa Halensis* is both a remarkable achievement in its own right (synthesizing a growing stream of traditional sources, including Augustine, Dionysius, John of Damascus, and Richard of St Victor), as well as a significant influence on later scholastic luminaries, especially St Bonaventure. Some of its signature features include the important role of *imascibilitas* in the understanding of the person of the Father, the emphasis on emanational modes of origin as constituting each of the divine Persons, the importance of self-diffusive goodness as the fundamental ground of Trinitarian plurality, and lastly, its comprehensiveness, its inclination to think trinitarianly about all of reality, from the divine nature itself, to divine activity in creation and salvation, to the transcendental properties of all being, including the human person, to its original theory of trinitarian beauty.

Introduction: St Francis, the Trinity, and the Early Franciscans

‘You are three and one, the Lord God of gods; You are the good, all good, the highest good’—so St Francis near the beginning of his ‘[The] Praises of God’.¹ The Poverello was devoted to the Three-in-One, not as a speculative doctrine, but as a Reality to be worshipped. He begins his *Rule*, accordingly, with this Trinitarian doxology:

Wherever we are, in every place, at every hour, at every time of the day, every day and continually, let all of us truly and humbly believe, hold in our heart and love, honor, adore, serve, praise and bless, glorify and exalt, magnify and give thanks to the Most High and Supreme Eternal God Trinity and Unity.²

1 Francis of Assisi, ‘The Praises of God,’ in *Early Documents*, vol. 1, *The Saint*, ed. Regis J. Armstrong, J.A. Wayne Hellmann, and William J. Short (New York: New City Press, 2001), 109. St Francis composed this prayer of praise on Mount La Verna in September 1224, when he received the stigmata. The prayer was written on a parchment which also contains the blessing that Francis gave to brother Leo. The parchment with the autographs of Francis is conserved as a relic in the Basilica of St Francis in Assisi.

2 ‘The Early Rule (The Rule Without a Papal Seal)’ [=Regula non bullata], c. 23, in *Early Documents*, vol. 1, *The Saint*, 85. See William J. Short, ‘The Rule of the Lesser Brothers: Earlier Rule, Fragments, Later Rule, The Rule for Hermitages,’ *The Writings of Francis of Assisi: Rules, Testament and Admonitions*, ed. Michael W. Blastis, Jay M. Hammond, and J.A. Wayne Hellman (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2011), 31.

Three things are noteworthy in Francis' Trinitarian devotion: the emphasis on divine goodness; the attention to both unity and trinity; the subtle progression from interior, heart-felt faith ('believe, hold in our heart and love, honor, adore (...)') to external, doxological confession ('(...) praise and bless, glorify and exalt, magnify and give thanks'). Shortly after his death, when his brothers did begin to speculate on matters Trinitarian, all three aspects figured centrally. As expressed in the *Summa Halensis* (*SH*), that massive summary of early Franciscan theology prior to Bonaventure, the early Franciscan intellectual tradition (EFIT) grounded its trinitarian theology in divine goodness, strove to hold one and three together, and organized its textual expression according to this progression from belief in the heart to confession with the mouth. In short, early Franciscan trinitarian speculation seems to derive from the spiritual impulse of St Francis, even as it pursues a scholastic *intellectus fidei* never attempted by the Poverello.³

The Trinitarian theology of the *SH* was pioneering and innovative in its time,⁴ and proved influential among subsequent scholastics. There are several signature features of this account that will be noted below, but the most important overarching characteristics are two: first, the *centrality* of the Trinity within Halensian theology as a whole and second its *comprehensive scope*. The *SH* signals the centrality of the Trinity in its General Prologue:

The whole discipline of Christian faith (*fidei disciplina*) pertains to two things: to the faith and understanding (*fidem et intelligentiam*) of the Creator and to the faith and understanding of the Savior. Hence, the prophet Isaiah, speaking in the person of the Lord, said (43:10–11): "Believe and understand that I am he: before me no God was formed and after me there will not be. I am, I am the Lord, and there is no Savior apart from me." For the faith of the Creator principally contains two things, namely, the cognition (*cognitio*) of the substance of the Creator and cognition of the works of the Creator. The cognition of the substance of the Creator consist in the cognition of the divine Unity and of the same most blessed Trinity (...).⁵

Here, all divine activity in history reduces to the acts of creating and saving, and both are acts of a single triune Agent. The whole *disciplina fidei* pertains ultimately to that single Reality.

³ Cf. Bert Roest, 'Religious Life in the Franciscan School Network (13th Century),' in Bert Roest, *Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission (c. 1220–1650)* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 51–82.

⁴ Hence, the title of Lydia Schumacher's ERC project.

⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, Prologus Generalis: 'Tota christianae fidei disciplina pertinet ad duo: ad fidem et intelligentiam Conditoris et fidem atque intelligentiam Salvatoris. Unde Isaias Propheta, in persona Domini loquens, dicit, 43:10–11: "Credatis et intelligatis quia ego ipse sum: ante me non est formatus deus et post me non erit. Ego sum, ego sum Dominus, et non est absque me Salvator." Fides enim [Conditoris] principaliter continet duo, scilicet cognitionem substantiae Conditoris et cognitionem operis Conditoris. Cognitionis substantiae Conditoris consistit in cognitione divinae Unitatis et eiusdem beatissimae Trinitatis.'

Yet, the Halensian doctrine of the Trinity is not *merely* one, even the first, among the Christian doctrines; nor is it *simply* the central one.⁶ In continuity with the earliest Christian reflection on this mystery,⁷ it functions rather as a ‘meta-doctrine’,⁸ structuring ‘all Christian reflection on’⁹ everything else, including, among other things, divine causality, creation, anthropology, theological aesthetics, and even the divine essence itself. What follows, accordingly, is both an introduction to the doctrine of the Trinity in the *SH* as well as a cartographic survey of the terrain of this ‘comprehensive Trinitarianism’.¹⁰

Preliminary Observations

First, two preliminary observations, one structural, the other methodological, are in order.

The *SH* divides into four books, roughly mirroring the Lombard’s *Sentences*. After two introductory questions that consider the nature of theology and the possibility of knowledge of God in this life, respectively, Book 1 turns to the ‘Unity and Trinity of the divine substance’. The Prologue begins:

Assisted by the graces of Jesus Christ, we proceed to the proposed inquiry concerning the Unity and Trinity of the divine substance with all reverence. This inquiry has two parts, in accord with the words of the Apostle in Rom. 10:9–10: “with the heart one believes unto righteousness, with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.” There is thus a bipart inquiry concerning the Unity and Trinity of the deity: first concerning the reality itself, which is the Unity of the Trinity, ordered to belief of the heart; second concerning the names, ordered to the confession of the mouth. In this way, we may know (*sciamus*) what we believe and confess [it] with true and catholic expressions.¹¹

6 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Logic*, vol. 3, *The Spirit of Truth*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 23: ‘Christian truth is trinitarian.’

7 Khaled Anatolios, *Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian Doctrine* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 8: ‘(...) orthodox trinitarian doctrine emerged as a kind of meta-doctrine that involved a global interpretation of Christian life and faith and indeed evoked a global interpretation of reality.’

8 Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 335: ‘The doctrine of the Trinity is an anticipatory sum of the whole content of Christian dogmatics.’

9 Justin Shaun Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*’ (PhD thesis, Boston College, 2018), 41.

10 Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘A Cord of Three Strands Is Not Easily Broken: The Transcendental Brocade of Unity, Truth and Goodness in the Early Franciscan Intellectual Tradition,’ *Nova et Vetera* (English Edition) 16 (2018): 555–80.

11 *SH* I, Prologue to First Inquiry, p. 39: ‘Aduvante gratia Iesu Christi, ad propositam inquisitionem circa divinae substantiae Unitatem et Trinitatem cum omni reverentia procedamus. Cuius inquisitionis duae sunt partes, secundum verbum Apostoli, Rom. 10:20: “Corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem, confessio fit ad salutem.” Est igitur inquisitio bipartita de Unitate et Trinitate deitatis:

Surprisingly, perhaps, the *SH* uses Paul's text from Romans as its structural conceit, dividing Book 1 into two halves, the first treating what is to be believed 'in the heart' regarding the Unity and Trinity, the second treating how one speaks of it 'with the mouth'. So, the overarching organizational trajectory arcs from belief to confession, from knowing to naming, from theology to doxology. The parallel with St Francis' prayer to the Trinity, noted above, is striking. Note also that Part 1 considers the divine essence or unity first, and then proceeds to the plurality of the persons. Part 2 is organized around the three kinds of names used in divine predication: essential, personal, and notional names.

A second preliminary point concerns method. In the first two questions, the *SH* concedes that the Trinity is a mystery lying beyond the ken of discovery by created rationality.¹² While the *SH* likens speculative Trinitarian theology to what it calls 'first philosophy or metaphysics', both of which consider the 'cause of causes', it notes that the comparison 'limps'. In contrast to the metaphysician, the theologian does not have the benefit of an essential definition of God, with regard to 'the mystery of the Trinity'.¹³ Regarding 'the very divinity and Trinity of persons', therefore, theology must take a different tack, namely, the inverse of the philosophical. The theologian must begin with revealed characteristics and reason back to the divine essence: in relation to 'the divinity and trinity of persons itself, there is another mode of cognizing, namely, that through operation we cognize power, through power we cognize the substance of divinity.'¹⁴ Divine operation or activity occurs in history, especially in the Incarnation: The philosophers failed to arrive at knowledge of the Trinity, in part 'because they did not recognize the most powerful effect of goodness, namely, the incarnation and redemption.'¹⁵ For the *SH* 'salvation history'

prima de ipsa re, quae est Unitas Trinitatis ordinata ad credulitatem cordis; secunda de nominatione ordinata ad confessionem oris, ut sciamus quod credimus, confiteri locutionibus catholicis et veris.'

12 *SH* I, Introductory Treatise, Prologue to Question II, p. 14: 'Volens autem se manifestare humanis cordibus superessentialis substantia, Deus in latrone Legis praecipit Moysi, Exod. 19:21: "Contestare populum, ne forte velint transcendere terminos ad videndum Deum", ponens limites humanae rationi in inquisitione divinatorum et maxime in perscrutatione abditissimae et sacratissimae divinae Unitatis et Trinitatis' [Wishing to manifest himself in his super-essential substance to the human heart, God in the giving of the Law commanded Moses [in] Ex. 19:21: "Contest the people, lest perhaps they try to transcend the boundaries in order to see God", placing limits on human reason in the investigation of divine things and maximally in the investigation of the most hidden and most holy Unity and Trinity].

13 *SH* I (n. 2), p. 5: 'Item, 'de Deo' dicitur esse ista scientia et non sicut aliae scientiae, velut Prima Philosophia, quia non agunt de Deo secundum mysterium Trinitatis vel secundum sacramentum humanae reparationis' [Again, concerning God there is that science and not as the other sciences, such as first philosophy, since the other sciences did not consider God according to the mystery of the Trinity and according to the sacrament of human reparation].

14 *SH* I (n. 1), p. 4: '(...) ipsa divinitas et trinitas personarum, est modus cognoscendi alius, ut per operationem cognoscamus virtutem, per virtutem ipsam divinitatis substantiam.'

15 *SH* I (n. 10), p. 19: 'quia non cognoverunt potissimum effectum bonitatis, scilicet incarnationem et redemptionem.'

thus becomes the theatre in which knowledge of the Triune God is acquired.¹⁶ Theological science,¹⁷ thus, has as its ‘formal object’ (*ratio*) the Christ-centered, self-revelation of the Trinity in salvation history, as recorded in Scripture.¹⁸

Strictly speaking, then, proper knowledge of the Trinitarian persons is available only through revelation and grace:¹⁹ ‘(...) according to the *Glossa*, [the philosophers] did not have, nor were they able to have, cognition of the Trinity through the proper attributes of the persons, except through teaching or inspiration (...).’²⁰ A lengthy passage gives the rationale:

(...) cognition of the Trinity, with respect to its proper nature, cannot be had through natural reason on its own; it can, nevertheless, be had through natural reason, with the assistance of grace, either given freely or sanctifying (*gratis datam aut gratum facientem*). And the reason is this: because our intellect, darkened by the original corruption, fails in those things which are most true. And therefore it fails concerning the most intelligible things and also concerning those things which are least and therefore are least intelligible—such as is the existence of motion and time, which have the weakest existence—just as the [physical] sense fails at the extremes, that is, in what is maximally and minimally sensible. So it is thus: since the existence of the divine persons in unity of essence is greatest and truest, our darkened intellect fails.

16 Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis (Alexander of Hales)* (Munich: Max Huber Verlag, 1964), 25: ‘Thus is the salvation-historical dimension taken directly into the definition of theology (*Gegenstandsbestimmung*). It provides knowledge of the divine essence, not in the modest way of Aristotelian *prima philosophia*, but rather in its Trinitarian fullness.’

17 Cf. Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘On the Subject Matter of Theology in the *Summa Halensis* and St. Thomas Aquinas,’ *The Thomist* 79 (2015): 439–66.

18 Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte*, 25: ‘Theology, according to the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, deals thus with the knowledge of the divine being (*Wesenserkenntnis*) of the Trinitarian God, known through Christ in his saving work (*Erlösungswerk*), though one must take the *opus restorationis* more in the broad sense that Hugh of St Victor gave it (...).’ The topic of this investigation falls within a larger question, often dubbed ‘the nature of theology’ and in particular its scientific and sapiential status, much discussed by medieval scholastics and even more by their subsequent commentators and researchers. On this topic, M.-D. Chenu’s classic *La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1957) considers the relationship between the *SH* and Aquinas on the issue of the scientific character of theology, but does not treat the particular comparison pursued here; the case is similar with Adriano Oliva, *Les débuts de l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la Sacra doctrina* (Paris: Vrin, 2006).

19 See *SH I* (n. 15), p. 25. Alexander himself stressed this point in his *Disputed Questions*: ‘sed ad comprehendum Trinitatem vel incarnationem nullus potuit per operationem aliquam pervenire sine gratia; ratio enim habet ad hoc posse’ [but for the comprehending of the Trinity or the Incarnation, no one can arrive [at cognition] through some [divine] operation without grace; for reason does not have the power for this] (Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae “Antequam esset frater”* 13.17, 3 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quarachi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 1:167).

20 *SH I* (n. 10), p. 19: ‘Respondeo, secundum Glossam, quod “cognitionem ipsius Trinitatis per propria ipsarum personarum non habuerunt nec habere potuerunt, nisi per doctrinam aut inspirationem (...)”.’

This is no wonder, since, as Aristotle says, in the *First Philosophy*: “Our intellect is related to the most evident things of nature as the eye of an owl [is related] to the sun.”^{21/22}

Historical Context: *Status quaestionis*

The trinitarian theology articulated in the medieval schools, especially at Paris between 1250 and 1300, has received significant scholarly attention in recent decades;²³ the preceding developments, however—those occurring between the mid 12th century (after the Lombard’s *Sentences* and Richard of St Victor’s *De trinitate*) and mid 13th century (before Aquinas and Bonaventure)—remain understudied.²⁴ Broadly speak-

21 *SH I* (n. 10), p. 19: ‘Respondeo quod per naturalem rationem de se non potest haberi cognitio Trinitatis secundum propria; tamen per naturalem rationem, adiutam per aliquam gratiam aut gratis datam aut gratum facientem, potest. Et ratio huius est: quia intellectus noster, obtenebratus per originalem corruptionem, deficit in iis quae verissime sunt; et ideo circa maxime intelligibilia deficit et etiam de iis quae minime sunt et ideo minime intelligibilia sunt—sicut est esse motus et temporis, quae habent debilissimum esse—quemadmodum sensus deficit in extremis, id est maxime sensibilibus et minime. Hinc est: cum esse divinarum personarum in unitate essentiae sit maxime et verissime, intellectus noster obtenebratus deficit. Nec hoc est mirum, quia, sicut dicit Aristoteles, in *Prima Philosophia*: “Intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima naturae sicut oculus noctuae ad solem”.’

22 Again: *SH I* (n. 21), p. 32: ‘Sicut enim visus noster deficit in maxime lucidis et minime, ita intellectus in maxime lucidis, ut in cognitione Trinitatis, propter immensitatem luminis; similiter deficit in minimis, scilicet in tempore et motu’ [For just as our sight fails in the greatest and in the least light, so the intellect in the maximum of light, as in the cognition of the Trinity, on account of the immensity of light; similarly it fails in the smallest things, as in time and motion].

23 See most recently J.T. Paasch, *Divine Production in Late Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

24 Theodore de Régnon, *Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité*, 4 vols (Paris: Victor Retaux, 1892–8); Albert Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Bonaventura: Eine systematische Darstellung und historische Würdigung*, vol. 1, *Die wissenschaftliche Trinitätslehre* (Münster: Aschendorff-Verlag, 1923); Michael Schmaus, *Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Angelicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, vol. 2, *Die Trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1930); Fanny Imle and Julien Kaup, *Die Theologie des hl. Bonaventura: Darstellung seiner dogmatischen Lehren* (Werl: Franziskus-Druckerei, 1931); Alejandro de Villalmonste, ‘Influjo de los PP. Griegos en la doctrina trinitaria de San Buenaventura,’ in *XIII Semana Española de Teología, 14–19 Septiembre 1953* (Madrid, 1954), 553–7; Titus Szabó, *De SS. Trinitate in Creaturis Refulgente: Doctrina S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Orbis Catholicus, 1959); Olegario González, *Misterio Trinitario y existencia humana: estudio histórico teológico en torno a San Buenaventura* (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1966); Russell L. Friedman, ‘Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325,’ *Studia Theologica* 53 (1999): 13–25; Russell L. Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Russell L. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350*, 2 vols, *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*, 108 (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Maria Calisi, *Trinitarian Perspectives in the Franciscan Theological Tradition* (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Insti-

ing, following the lead of de Régnon's original thesis in this regard,²⁵ scholarship continues to distinguish two major approaches to the Trinity in the high-scholastic era, both of which draw deeply from the trinitarian theology of Augustine, yet in different ways and with distinct emphases, in part as a function of other non-Augustinian sources, such as Pseudo-Dionysius and John of Damascus, that are incorporated into them: one, associated with Anselm, Peter Lombard, and especially Aquinas and then the Dominican tradition more broadly; the other, initially formulated by Richard of St Victor, enriched by Thomas of St Victor (i. e. Gallus),²⁶ given definitive expression in the writings of St Bonaventure, and subsequently associated with the medieval Franciscan tradition.²⁷

Since de Régnon and until relatively recently, scholarship narrated the provenance of this 'Victorine-Franciscan axis' of medieval trinitarianism as follows: in his mature thought, Richard's innovation was twofold. First, he extended and deepened an initiative begun by his teacher, Hugh of St Victor, of incorporating the Neoplatonism of the 6th-century Dionysian corpus. De Régnon characterized the results of Richard's Dionysian turn quite starkly. In contrast to the dominant Augustinian medieval tradition, which in its later Dominican appropriation operated with a 'static' Aristotelian metaphysics of being (*esse*), Richard introduced a dynamic, Dionysian neoplatonism of the good (*bonum*) into this Victorine tradition. In this account, then, Richard of St Victor was 'a deserter from the camp of Augustine who drank deeply from Greek streams and thus developed a style that was truly competitive to the Augustinian tradition.'²⁸ As Zachary Hayes pointed out, this narrative profoundly shaped historiography for nearly a century, including the work of Stohr, Schmaus, Imle-Kaup, Villalmonete, and Szabó, 'even influencing the Quaracchi-editors of the *Summa fratris Alexandri*.'²⁹ Second, Richard took the 'psychological intuition' of Augustine in a new direction, toward the interpersonal and moral, wherein the primary orientation seems to be not through the analysis of human cognitional experience, but through an analysis of the nature of love. As Wilhelm Gössmann put it, where Augustine's focus is on the psychological experience of an individual, Richard sought trinitarian analogies in the psychological experience of interpersonal love. Richard thereby

tute Publications, 2008); Boyd Taylor Coolman, *Knowledge, Love, and Ecstasy in the Theology of Thomas Gallus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 34–7.

25 De Régnon, *Etudes*, 2:448–51. Note that de Régnon had two major claims: one, now largely discredited, about the difference between eastern and western Trinitarian theologies (the former, going from nature/essence to persons, the latter from persons to essence/nature); the other, still intact, regarding the two medieval strands of western trinitarianism.

26 See Coolman, *Knowledge, Love, and Ecstasy in the Theology of Thomas Gallus*.

27 Russell L. Friedman distinguishes these two traditions in *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham*, 5–29, describing them as 'relation' and 'emanation' accounts of the Trinity, respectively.

28 Zachary Hayes, 'Introduction,' in *Saint Bonaventure's Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity*, trans. Zachary Hayes (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1979), 18–9.

29 Hayes, 'Introduction,' 18–9.

chose an element that was marginal in Augustine and placed it in the center of his own thought.³⁰

More recently, however, the work of Olegario González and Dumeige drastically revised this narrative, arguing that Richard was not in fact significantly influenced by the Dionysian corpus, and that his predilection for the Dionysian notion of the good was less central than previously assumed, since it is subsumed into the more dominating idea of love or charity, analyzed psychologically and experientially, and that whatever the role of the good is, its presence can be sufficiently explained in relation to his Latin sources, Augustine and Anselm.

But this development has generated new questions. First, if Richard is not the source of Bonaventure's appropriation of Dionysianism into his Trinitarian theology, is there another intervening source? I have suggested elsewhere that Thomas Gallus must be considered a possibility in this regard, but that is uncertain. Second, if Richard does not himself produce a synthesis of Victorine and Dionysian thought, as clearly occurs in Bonaventure, where the Victorine terminology is animated and conditioned by the Dionysian dynamics of fecundity, does that synthesis have an intervening precedent? The most obvious and plausible answer to both of these questions is Bonaventure's teacher, Alexander of Hales. Both his undisputed works and the *SH* make extensive use of both Dionysius and Richard. Many of the Dionysian notions that will figure centrally in Bonaventure, moreover, including fontality, fecundity,³¹ the good as self-diffusive (*bonum diffusivum sui*) and divine love as an eternal circle, are found in these texts. At the same time, the *SH* cites Richard's Trinitarian theology extensively. Yet, earlier scholarship, especially that of Zachary Hayes, has tended to minimize the importance of this Halensian moment, suggesting that none of the 'Alexandrian works' develops these ideas to any great extent. Hayes concedes Bonaventure's dependence on Alexander, but argues that Bonaventure's Trinitarian theology 'transcends that of the *Summa [Halensis]* in unity and coherence of thought', and 'bears the mark of a single, keen mind that has appropriated the tradition in a personal way'.³² The scholarly consensus, then, is as follows: in the early 13th century a distinctive style of Trinitarian theology emerged, whose primary author was Bonaventure, who created a 'highly personal synthesis' (Hayes) out of a variety of elements, including the theology of St Augustine, the Dionysian and Victorine traditions, the religious experience of St Francis, and the philosophy of Aristotle.³³ But does this narrative do justice to the pre-Bonaventurean

30 W.E. Gössmann, 'Die Methode der Trinitätslehre in der *Summa Halensis*,' *Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift* 6 (1955): 256; cited in Hayes, 'Introduction,' 15, n. 6.

31 See *SH I* (no. 481), pp. 683–4. But they may also come from William of Auxerre. See the William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea I*, tr. 8, c. 5, 7 vols, ed. Jean Ribaillier, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7), 1:134–40.

32 Hayes, 'Introduction,' 21–3.

33 Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Bonaventura*, 188–9: 'Certainly Bonaventura faithfully traced many, many individual features of the African father's masterpiece. I only recall the doctrine of ves-

Franciscan achievement, especially that found in the *SH*? Only a comprehensive and careful treatment of that text can answer that question.

Trinitarian Unity: Inquiry I—‘On the Substance of the Divine Unity’

The interpreter of Halensian Trinitarian theology faces a dilemma. She might be tempted to turn directly to the *SH*'s explicit treatment of the three persons, skipping over the discussion of the one essence; to leap, that is, over the *de Deo uno* (Inquiry I—‘On the Substance of the Divine Unity’) to get to the *de Deo trino* (Inquiry 2—‘On the Plurality of the Divine Trinity’).³⁴ Though tempting, this would risk missing a crucial and distinctive part of the *SH*'s comprehensive trinitarianism. Strikingly, the *SH*'s treatment of the essential divine attributes has an unmistakable trinitarian stamp and is thus integral to the *SH*'s Trinitarian theology.

Inquiry 1, ‘On the Substance of the Divine Unity’, begins with two treatises that consider the essential attributes of immutability and simplicity (Treatise 1) and divine immensity (Treatise 2), the latter an important Halensian innovation.³⁵ The third tractate, though, treats the triad of unity, truth, goodness as a unit, while the remaining three treatises (Treatises 4 to 6) consider a second triad, namely, power, knowledge, and will. These two triads are quite clearly trinitarian units for the *SH* and they reflect the fact, put bluntly, that the *SH*'s account of the divine essence is Trinitarian. How? In a word: by the use of Trinitarian appropriations.³⁶

tigium and *imago*, of the son as *verbum* and *imago*, of the Holy Spirit as *Amor* and *Donum*, of *missio* and *appropriatio*. But at certain points, and indeed at the foci of his work, Bonaventura's work shows a very different character. It is a bend, no break is visible. This is where the influence of Richard comes in, which perhaps just because of this, could take up so little space, because there is a certain spiritual affinity between Augustine and Neoplatonism, which is effective in Dionysius. From this source originate all, more or less as variations of the Dionysian *bonum diffusivum sui* to be judged “proofs” for the Trinity, the idea of *primitas*, *condignus* and *condilectus*, *amor gratuitus*, *debitus* and *mixtus*. The mediators of these rich goods are our Saints William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales.’

³⁴ Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 163–82.

³⁵ Cf. Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, 163–82. But see Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* I, d. 3, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 1:68–77, for perhaps the deep source of the introduction of divine eternity/infinity into the discussion of the divine attributes.

³⁶ Trinitarian appropriations *associate* certain essential divine attributes, which are shared by all three persons, with one of the Persons, in order to foster certain theological insights, especially about the Trinity's activity, *tout court*, in salvation history. An appropriation is *not* a unique, proper attribute of a divine person *ad intra*, but an attribute of divine activity *ad extra*, linked to one of the Persons.

At the very outset of Treatise 3, the Halensist indicates explicitly that divine unity, truth, and goodness are three essential attributes not lumped together haphazardly, but rather conceived of as an integrated triad, having a particular ordering among them: ‘coordinated one to another’.³⁷ An initial analysis of the one, true, and good in all created things shows how these three notions—the ‘transcendentals’ in modern parlance—build upon each other, beginning with the one, and proceeding through the true, to arrive at the good. The treatise continues by next linking these three transcendentals to the three non-material Aristotelian causes: ‘those intentions [one, true, good] also differ according to their relation to their cause, namely: “one” in the *ratio* of the efficient cause, “truth” in the *ratio* of the formal [cause], “goodness” in the *ratio* of the final cause.’³⁸

This link between these three divine attributes and the three Aristotelian causes produces a particular triadic ‘watermark’ on all of created reality: ‘for this reason, *esse* in creatures, which flows from a cause, receives a threefold impression, in conformity to its cause.’³⁹ As one, true, and good, created being has a threefold transcendental structure that reflects its Uncreated Source: ‘These intentions thus are not separate from the essence of a thing, as a vestige of the first cause, which is the Trinity of one essence.’⁴⁰ Later, the text will correlate the one-true-good triad with a threefold *vestigial Dei* in all of creation, on one hand, and the power-knowledge/wisdom-will triad with the *imago Dei* in all rational creatures, on the other:

in God there is a certain triad, which shines forth and is represented in every creature, and in this way a creature is called a *vestige*, and this is noted in three ways: one, true, good. There is another [triad] in which the rational creature abounds, by reason of which it is called the *image* of God, which shines forth alone in it, and is noted in relation to these: power, wisdom, and will (...).⁴¹

37 *SH I*, Prologue to Tractate 3, p. 112: ‘sunt unius coordinationis’. Note that the *SH* does not predicate one, true, and good of both created and uncreated being in a univocal way, but rather insists on their analogical relation. See *SH I* (n. 21), p. 32: ‘Dicendum ergo quod non est convenientia Dei et creaturae secundum univocationem, sed per analogiam: ut si dicatur bonum de Deo et de creatura, de Deo dicitur per naturam, de creatura per participationem. Similiter omne bonum de Deo et de creatura dicitur secundum analogiam’ [Therefore, it should be said that, univocally speaking, there is no *convenientia* between God and creatures, but only through analogy, such that if good were predicated of God and creatures it is said of God by nature (*per naturam*) and of creatures by participation (*per participationem*). Similarly, every good [predicated] of God and of creatures is said according to analogy].

38 *SH I* (n. 88), p. 140: ‘differunt intentiones istae secundum relationem ad causam, quae est: ‘unum’, principium in ratione efficientis, ‘veritas’ in ratione formalis, ‘bonitas’ in ratione causae finalis.’

39 *SH I* (n. 73), p. 115: ‘Secundum hoc, esse in creatura, quod fluit a causa, triplicem sortitur impressionem, ut in conformatione ad causam.’

40 *SH I* (n. 88), p. 140: ‘Istae ergo intentiones non separantur ab essentia rei velut vestigia primae causae, quae est Trinitas unius essentiae.’

41 *SH I* (n. 110), p. 172: ‘Dicendum quod in Deo quaedam est trinitas, quae relucet et repraesentatur in omni creatura, et secundum hoc dicitur vestigium, et haec attenditur secundum haec tria: unum,

The *SH* thus conceives of all of created reality, as well as the divine essence itself, in this triadic way.

Throughout this transcendental analysis of creation and of the causality that created it, the *SH* consistently observes that these triads ‘are appropriated to the Trinity’.⁴² As here: ‘(...) truth (...) is appropriated to the Son, just as unity [is] to the Father (*unitas Patri*) and goodness to the Holy Spirit (*bonitas Spiritui Sancto*) (...)’.⁴³ And here: ‘this causality, since it is common to the whole Trinity, is *appropriated* as the efficient cause to the Father, exemplar cause to the Son, final [cause] to the Holy Spirit.’⁴⁴

Similarly, the Halensist executes a trinitarian appropriation with the three essential attributes treated in Treatises 4 to 6: ‘power to the Father (Treatise 4), wisdom to the Son (Treatise 5), and will or *benignitas* to the Holy Spirit (Treatise 6).’⁴⁵ In these three treatises, the Halensist focuses specifically on divine action in the history of creation and salvation. All of the one God’s acts in the economy are powerful, wise, and good; yet each of these attributes common to the essence is aligned or associated with one of the Persons.

Recalling that the entire First Inquiry, which treats the divine essence as such, entails just these six treatises, it is abundantly clear the discussion of the divine essence ‘already performs trinitarian theology’.⁴⁶ Schematically, beginning with the divine persons and the divine nature, and then, ‘descending’, as it were, through divine causality, into all of creation and into the rational creature, this comprehensive trinitarianism appears thus:

verum, bonum. Alia est in qua abundat ipsa rationalis creatura, ratione cuius dicitur imago, quae solum relucet in ipsa et attenditur penes ista: potentia, sapientia et voluntas; in rationali enim creatura dicimus potentiam volendi et potentiam diligendi. Cum igitur processus creaturarum respiciat omnem creaturam et non solum rationalem, constat quod non debet determinari ratio processus penes istam trinitatem in qua abundat creatura rationalis, sed potius penes primam’ [(...) for in rational creatures we refer to the power of willing and the power of loving/choosing. Since therefore the procession of creatures [from God] pertains to every creature and not only to the rational creature, it is clear that the *ratio* of the procession ought not be defined according to that triad in which the rational creature abounds, but rather according to the first triad].

⁴² *SH* I (n. 88), p. 140: ‘appropriantur Trinitati’.

⁴³ *SH* I (n. 89), pp. 143–4: ‘Alia vero de veritate increata secundum quod accipitur personaliter et appropriatur Filio, sicut unitas Patri et bonitas Spiritui Sancto (...).’

⁴⁴ *SH* I (n. 73), p. 115: ‘Quae quidem causalitas, cum sit communis toti Trinitati, appropriatur ut causa efficiens Patri, exemplaris Filio, finalis Spiritui Sancto.’

⁴⁵ *SH* I (n. 450), p. 646: ‘Ratio appropriationis potentiae Patri, sapientiae Filio, voluntatis Spiritui Sancto, sive benignitatis, facta est duplici ratione (...).’

⁴⁶ Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*,’ 78.

1. Divine <i>Persons</i> :	Father	Son	Holy Spirit
2. Divine <i>Nature</i> :	One	True	Good
3. Causal triad:	Efficient	Formal	Final
4. Transcendental triad:	Unity	Truth	Goodness
5. Agential triad:	Power	Wisdom	Will

In sum, by a thoroughgoing application of the ancient practice of trinitarian appropriations, revived in the high Middle Ages, especially within the Victorine tradition,⁴⁷ the *SH* offers an explicitly trinitarian account of the divine nature itself.⁴⁸ At the same time, evincing the above-noted ‘comprehensive trinitarianism’, it also espies a trinitarian ‘signature’ on divine action *ad extra*, on divine causality, on the transcendental properties of being,⁴⁹ and on the soul, even on the definition of created beauty.⁵⁰

47 In *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* 1.2.22, Hugh of St Victor used the triad of power, wisdom, goodness, analogously, as a set of properties of all reality, essentially as transcendentals: ‘These [power-wisdom-goodness] are the eternal foundations of all causes and the first principles, which are ineffable and incomprehensible to every creature’ (PL 176:216C; *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (De Sacramentis)*, trans. Roy J. Deferrari (Eugene, Oregon, Wipf & Stock, 2007), 41).

48 Cf. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 1.6.2, trans. Dominic V. Monti, *Works of St Bonaventure*, 9 (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2005), 45–6: ‘Since the First Principle is most exalted and utterly perfect, it follows that in it are found the most noble and most general properties of being (*conditiones entis*) to the highest degree. These are one, true, and good, which are not associated with being in its individuals (*supposita*) but with its very principle (*ratio*). (...) This triple indivisibility has a logical ordering in that the true presupposes the one, and the good presupposes the one as well as the true. Thus it follows that these three properties, as being perfect and transcendental, are attributed to the First Principle to the highest degree, and, as having an orderly reference, are attributed to the three persons. It follows then, that supreme oneness is attributed to the Father; supreme truth, to the Son, who proceeds from the Father as his Word; and supreme goodness, to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from both as their Love and Gift.’

49 This Trinitarian account of the transcendentals seems to be a unique feature of the EFIT. As Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*,’ 88, notes: ‘Conceiving transcendentals as trinitarian appropriations remains mostly distinctive to the *Summa halensis*. It is absent the *Summa*’s predecessors (William of Auvergne, William of Auxerre), contemporaries (Philip the Chancellor and Albert the Great), and many of its inheritors alike—Bonaventure excepted.’ As for Thomas Aquinas, Norman Kretzmann comments: ‘I have not found Aquinas himself ever presenting or developing this trio of appropriated attributes unmistakably in his own voice.’ See Norman Kretzmann, ‘Trinity and Transcendentals,’ in *Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays*, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 91.

50 For the Halensist, beauty is best defined as the ‘sacred order’ (*ordo sacer*) among the divine persons and among their appropriations (cf. Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*,’ 97–101).

Unified Plurality: Inquiry 2—‘On the Plurality of the Divine Trinity’

The Second Inquiry into what is to be *believed in the heart* about God turns to divine plurality—‘the divine being is a unity existing in a plurality of persons.’⁵¹ Over the course of five questions, the *SH* treats the plurality, the truth, the number, order, and equality of the Persons, respectively. Here, it considers the generation of the Son from the Father, and the procession of the Spirit from both. Here too it both examines the very basis/*ratio* of plurality in the divine nature, namely, goodness and offers a specific account of the very constitution of the persons. In both of these, the *SH* pioneers avenues in Trinitarian theology that will be influential in the next generation of scholastic masters, and beyond.

Arguments for Divine Plurality

Already in the discussion of divine unity in Treatise 4 of the First Inquiry, the *SH* anticipated the issue of divine plurality, offering two arguments for why there must be plurality in God:

Let the self-evident (*per se nota*) proposition be supposed that the divine *esse* is the exemplar of all created *esse*;⁵² let another self-evident proposition be supposed, namely, that unity cannot be the cause of multitude, unless repetition is understood (*intelligatur repetita*) [in that unity];⁵³ again, let another be supposed, namely, that the divine *esse* is one in nature.⁵⁴ From all this, the following is asserted: in created *esse* there is a difference between one and many; therefore the divine *esse* is the exemplar of one and of many, which is clear from the first supposition; but the divine *esse* is unity, which is clear from the third supposition; therefore the divine *esse* is the united exemplar of the one and of the many; but unity is not the exemplar of many, unless repetition is understood [there], as is clear from the second supposition; it follows therefore that the divine *esse* is a repetitive unity; but there is no repetition in any plurality of natures (*aliquibus pluribus naturis*); it remains then that there is repetition in some plurality of persons.⁵⁵

51 *SH* (n. 81), p. 132: ‘(...) quod divinum esse est unitas existens in pluralitate personali.’

52 Cf. *SH* I (n. 80), p. 130.

53 Cf. *SH* I (n. 76), p. 120.

54 Cf. *SH* I (n. 77), p. 124.

55 *SH* I (n. 81), p. 132: ‘Supposita propositione per se nota, scilicet quod divinum esse est exemplar omnis esse creati; item, supposita alia propositione per se nota, quod unitas non potest esse causa multitudinis, nisi intelligatur repetita; item, supposita alia, scilicet quod divinum esse est unum in natura, ex iis arguitur: in esse creato est differentia unius et multorum; ergo divinum esse est exemplar unius et multorum, quod patet per primam propositionem; sed divinum esse est unitas, quod patet per tertiam propositionem; ergo divinum esse est unitas exemplaris unius et multorum; sed unitas non est exemplar multitudinis, nisi intelligatur repetita, sicut patet per secundam propositionem; relinquitur ergo quod divinum esse est unitas repetita; sed non est repetita in aliquibus pluribus naturis; relinquitur ergo quod est repetita in aliquibus pluribus personis.’

In effect, the *SH* claims here that the classical problem of ‘the one and the many’ can only be solved if there is plurality in the uncreated Cause that corresponds to the created many. Since that plurality cannot be essential, it must therefore be personal.

While this first argument invokes the force of rational necessity, the second appeals more to a sense of fittingness (*convenientia*):⁵⁶

Likewise, this is clear from the connection of the perfection of the universe (*connexionem perfectionis universi*). There exists [diverse] natures of several persons, as is clear in the example of one human and one angel; there also exists a plurality of natures in one person, as is clear in one human [possessing body and soul]. If therefore there are two extremes in the nature of things, it also [should be] accepted that there is one [reality] in the middle, which similarly by necessity is understood between the extremes, namely one nature of a plurality of persons; but such is not found in created *esse*; it remains therefore that it exists in the divine *esse*.⁵⁷

This appeal to the symmetry and balance of perfection is redolent of the Victorine-Franciscan tradition, at least as it extends through Bonaventure.

Metaphysics of the Good, *ad intra*

Whatever the force of these arguments, when the *SH* turns to explaining *why* (not just *that*) there is indeed plurality in God, it turns to the concept of goodness.⁵⁸ Tracing a particular genealogy will afford insight into how the notion of goodness functions in the *SH*. From Augustine and the Damascene, comes first of all a basic (neoplatonic) notion of God as good; from the Dionysian corpus comes the principle of the good as by nature *diffusivum sui*, as self-diffusive. From Richard of St Victor, comes the lexical precision of *plenitudo*, of God as the *fullness* of good; from William of Auxerre, comes the notion of good as *perfecta communicatio*, of perfect self-communicating goodness. All these streams merge into the *SH* with the notion of the *bonum* as flow-

⁵⁶ While for moderns logical necessity and sapiential fittingness are very different kinds of arguments, each with diverse persuasive force, medievals tended to see them much more similarly.

⁵⁷ *SH* I (n. 81), p. 132: ‘Item, hoc patet per connexionem perfectionis universi. Est esse naturas plurimum personarum, sicut patet, demonstrato homine uno et angelo uno; et est esse plures naturas unius personae, sicut patet in uno homine. Si ergo duo sunt extrema in rerum natura, et etiam unum medium est accipere quod similiter necessario intelligitur inter extrema; scilicet unam naturam plurimum personarum; sed non invenitur in esse creato; relinquatur ergo quod est in esse divino.’

⁵⁸ Indeed, the Quaracchi editors of the *SH* saw fit to devote an extensive discussion of the good in their general introduction to the whole *SH*. See ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologiae,’ in Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summae theologiae*, vol. 1 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924), xxxv-xxxviii.

ing, self-diffusive, self-communicative, ecstatic plenitude, and of the *summum bonum* as maximally and perfectly such.⁵⁹

The explication of divine goodness occurs on two fronts, *ad intra* and *ad extra*, i. e. within the divine life itself and externally in relation to creation. While the focus here is the former, it is important to note that the very possibility of the latter is itself a function of foundational role of divine goodness *ad intra*. Only because God is good in this way, as ecstatic self-diffusive plenitude *in se*, is there anything other than God *ex se*: ‘the manifestation of divine goodness in the highest way is twofold: with respect to the magnitude of power or with respect to multiplicity.’⁶⁰ The first is *ad intra*; the second, *ad extra*.⁶¹

Ad intra, goodness explains divine plurality in a general way thus:

For the praise of the good and of its perfection is shown in communication, but communication is always of one to another, and so where there is communion, there is always one and another, and so multiplication and number. So, the highest good is as the principal cause of that multiplication in God.⁶²

More precisely, since goodness is common to both nature and will,

just as there is a twofold principle, one which is nature, the other which is will, so there will be goodness in two modes, since there is the good of nature and the good of will (...) Thus good-

59 W.E. Gössmann, ‘Die Methode der Trinitätslehre in der Summa Halensis,’ 258: ‘As with Richard, in the *Summa Halensis* the concept of *summum bonum* is the basis for the derivation of the three persons in God.’

60 *SH I* (n. 64), p. 96: ‘(...) manifestatio bonitatis divinae in summo potest esse dupliciter: quoad magnitudinem potentiae aut quoad multiplicationem. Quoad magnitudinem manifestavit se summa bonitas in generatione Filii a Patre et processione Spiritus Sancti ab utroque ab aeterno. Nulla autem maior potest cogitari potentia quam ut ex Patre generetur Filius per omnia aequalis et consubstantialis. Quantum vero ad multiplicationem potentiae ostendendae in creaturis multis, non potuit esse manifestatio ab aeterno’ [(...) With regard to magnitude, the highest goodness manifests itself in the generation of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit from both from eternity. It is impossible to conceive of a greater power than that a Son equal and consubstantial in every way is generated from the Father. With respect to multiplication of demonstrated power in many creatures, there cannot be an eternal manifestation].

61 *SH I* (n. 64), p. 96: ‘(...) est influentia bonitatis intrinseca in emanatio aeterna Filii a Patre et Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio; (...) est influentia extrinseca, ut in emanatione creaturarum a Creatore, quae sunt in diversitate substantiae, et ad hanc influentiam, si ponatur non fuisse et postea esse, non sequitur mutatio ex parte bonitatis’ [there is an intrinsic inflow of goodness in the eternal emanation of the Son from the Father and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (...); there is an extrinsic inflow, as in the emanation of creatures from the Creator, which are in diversity of substances, and with respect to this inflow, if it started or stopped, it would not imply a change on the part of the good].

62 *SH I* (n. 317), p. 465: ‘(...) quia laus boni et eius perfectio ostenditur in communicatione, sed communicatio semper est unius ad alium, et ideo ubi est communio, semper est alius et alius, et ita multiplicatio et numerus, et bonitas summa est quasi principalis causa istius multiplicationis in divinis.’

ness communicates itself either through the mode of nature or through the mode of will⁶³ and affection.⁶⁴

The communication of goodness ‘through the mode of nature is full and perfect through generation,’ so ‘this communion of goodness is the *ratio* of distinction or of number in that determinate distinction which is of the Father to the Son.’⁶⁵ The communication of goodness ‘through the mode of will (...) is through the *affectus* of love or charity,’ so ‘this communion of the highest good is the *ratio* of number in the determinate distinction which is of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit.’⁶⁶ In short, ‘the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of number [in God] is taken from the part of the perfection of the highest good’⁶⁷—‘to the praise of goodness!’⁶⁸ Apart from

63 Kevin Patrick Keane, ‘The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness in the Trinitarian Theory of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*’ (PhD thesis, Fordham University, 1978), 97 notes the Aristotelian vintage of this distinction.

64 *SH I* (n. 317), p. 465: ‘(...) sicut est duplex principium, unum quod est natura, alterum quod est voluntas, sic bonitas duobus modis erit, quia est bonitas naturae et bonitas voluntatis (...). Communikat ergo se bonitas vel per modum naturae vel per modum voluntatis sive affectionis.’

65 *SH I* (n. 317), pp. 465–6: ‘Communicatio bonitatis, quae est per modum naturae, illa plena est et perfecta per generationem; quod tamen sit de parte substantiae vel essentiae et non de tota essentia, istud imperfectionis est in natura. Quia ergo omnis imperfectio a bonitate summa removenda est et omnis ei perfectio tribuenda, ideo necessarium est quod communicet se per modum naturae, quae communio est per generationem, et quod illa generatio non sit de parte essentiae, sed de tota essentia: et haec communio bonitatis est ratio distinctionis sive numeri in distinctione determinata, quae est Patris ad Filium’ [The communication of goodness through the mode of nature is full and perfect through generation; since nevertheless it is of part of the substance or essence and not of the whole essence that is imperfect in nature. Since therefore every imperfection should be removed from the highest good and every perfection should be attributed to it, it is necessary therefore that it communicate itself through the mode of nature, which communion is through generation, and that that generation not be partial, but of the whole essence: and this communion of goodness is the reason for distinction or for number in the determinate distinction which is of the Father to the Son].

66 *SH I* (n. 317), p. 466: ‘Sed sicut communicat se bonitas per modum naturae, ita per modum voluntatis, quia summi boni summa est communio; non esset autem summa nisi communicaret se per modum naturae et voluntatis; et ideo communicat se per modum voluntatis, quae communio est per amoris affectum sive caritatem; et haec communio summi boni est ratio numeri in distinctione determinata, quae est Patris et Filii ad Spiritum Sanctum’ [But just as goodness communicates itself through the mode of nature, so [it does] through the mode of will, since the highest communion belongs to the highest good; but there would not be the highest unless it communicated itself through the mode of nature and of will; therefore it communicates itself through the mode of will, which communion is through the affect of love or charity; and this communion of the highest good is the reason for the plurality in the determinate distinction which is of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit].

67 *SH I* (n. 317), p. 466: ‘Ratio ergo numeri sumitur ex parte perfectionis summae bonitatis; sed communio totius essentiae per generationem, cum essentia non habeat partem, est ratio numeri Patris ad Filium, communio per naturam voluntatis ratio numeri et distinctionis Spiritus Sancti ab utroque’ [The reason for plurality, therefore, is drawn from the perfection of the highest goodness; but the communion of the whole essence through generation, since the essence does not have parts, is

such perfect and complete self-diffusion of the good *ad intra*, God would not be the *summum bonum*.⁶⁹

In the tradition of Anselm and especially Richard, all this has the force of a kind of self-evident necessity for the *SH*.^{70/71} In fact, discussing elsewhere the procession

the reason for the plurality of the Father to the Son; communion through the nature of the will is the reason for the plurality and distinction of the Holy Spirit from both].

68 *SH* I, (n. 304), p. 438: ‘Duo sunt principia diffusionis in rebus: natura et voluntas. Perfectissima autem diffusio naturae est illa quae est per generationem, perfectissima diffusio voluntatis est illa quae est per amorem sive per dilectionem: et haec est laus bonitatis in rebus; magis autem laudabile est bonum quod diffundit se secundum utrumque modum quam quod diffundit se secundum alterum tantum. Si ergo quod est laudabile et perfectum non potest deesse in summo bono: est igitur in summo bono, quod est Deus, diffusio generationis, quam consequitur differentia gignentis et geniti, Patris et Filii, et erit ibi diffusio per modum dilectionis, quam dicimus processionem Spiritus Sancti’ [There are two principles of diffusion in things: nature and will. The most perfect diffusion of nature is that which is through generation, the most perfect diffusion of will is that which is through love or affection: and this is the praise of goodness in things; but more praiseworthy is that good which diffuses itself in both modes than that which diffuses itself in only one. If therefore that which is praiseworthy and perfect cannot be absent from the highest good, there exists then in the highest good, which is God, a diffusion of generation, which follows the difference of the one begetting and the one begotten, of the Father and the Son, and there will be a diffusion through the mode of affection, which we call the procession of the Holy Spirit].

69 See *SH* I (n. 295), p. 415 and *SH* I (n. 270), p. 365: ‘in Deo sunt actus aeterni, ut generare et huiusmodi, sine quibus non est summa bonitas’ [in God are eternal acts, such as to generate and the like, without which there is not the highest goodness].

70 *SH* I (n. 76), p. 121: ‘Supposita hac propositione per se nota, quod esse divinum est summum et perfectum bonum; item supposito quod perfectio boni consistit in communionem, tertia suppositio est quod communio non est eiusdem ad se, sed unius ad alterum. Ex iis necessario relinquitur quod ponenda est pluralitas in esse divino: quia ubicumque est ponere communionem boni unius ad alterum, necesse est ponere pluralitatem, quia ibi est ponere alterum et alterum vel alium et alium; sed in Deo est ponere summum bonum, sicut patet per primam propositionem, et communionem boni, sicut patet per secundam, quia aliter non esset bonum perfectum, et unius ad alterum, sicut patet per tertiam; ergo in esse divino est ponere pluralitatem’ [This supposes a self-evident proposition, that the divine *esse* is the highest and perfect good; likewise the supposition that the perfection of the good consists in communion, and a third supposition: that communion is not of one person with itself, but of one person with another person. From this it follows necessarily that plurality is to be posited in the divine *esse*: because wherever a communion of the good of one with another is posited, plurality is necessarily posited, since that is to posit one and another or one and another; but the highest good is posited in God, as is clear from the first proposition, and the communion of the good, from the second proposition, since otherwise it would not be the perfect good, and of one with another, as is clear from the third proposition; therefore plurality is posited in the divine *esse*]. Cf. *SH* I (n. 295), p. 414.

71 ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,’ xxxvi: “communio boni non potest nisi duobus modis esse, scilicet vel per modum naturae—et haec est generatio vel productio generati a generante—vel per modum voluntatis—et haec est processio amoris ab amante”—necessario sequitur quod in divinis habentur tum generatio Filii, tum spiratio Spiritus Sancti’ [But since “the communion of the good can only be in two modes, namely, through the mode of nature—and this is the generation or production of the one generated from the one generating—or through the mode of will—and this is the procession of love from the beloved”—it follows necessarily that in divine things there is had as

of the Spirit from the Father *and* the Son, the *SH* invokes each of Richard's interpersonal (less precisely, 'social') arguments for why there *must* be no more and no less than three divine Persons: perfect love,⁷² generosity,⁷³ hospitality,⁷⁴ pleasure,⁷⁵ be-

much as generation of the Son, as a spiration of the Holy Spirit]. See *SH I* (nn. 304–12), pp. 438–53; *SH I* (nn. 317–20), pp. 465–70. See also *SH I* (n. 319), p. 469: 'communio boni non possit nisi duobus modis esse, scilicet vel per modum naturae—et haec est generatio vel productio generati a generante—vel per modum voluntatis—et haec est processio amoris ab amante (...)' [The communion of good can only be in two modes, namely, through the mode of nature—and this is generation or production of one generated from one who is generating—or through the mode of will—and this is the procession of love from one who is loving (...)].

72 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 439: 'Sed communis est conceptio animi quod illud quod laudabilius est summo bono tribuendum est; ergo necesse est ponere, quod summum bonum diligit alium sicut se et velit illum diligi ab alio sicut se; sed hoc non potest esse in paucioribus quam in tribus personis; ergo sunt tres personae; ergo Spiritus Sanctus est; sed non habet esse nisi procedendo; ergo processio eius est' [But there is a common conception of the soul that what is most praiseworthy in the highest good must be shared; therefore, it is necessary to posit that the highest good loves another as itself and wishes him to be loved by another as himself; but this cannot be in fewer than in three persons; thus there are three persons; therefore there is a Holy Spirit; but he is not considered to be except by proceeding; therefore there is his procession]. *SH I* (n. 304), p. 439: "'(...) Summe ergo dilectorum summeque diligendorum", scilicet Patris et Filii, "uterque oportet quod pari voto condilectum requirat, pari concordia pro voto possideat"' ["(...) Therefore it is required that the one who most highly loves and the one who is most highly loved", namely, the Father and the Son, "seek out one who is co-beloved, who is loved mutually by both (*condilectum*) with an equal will and possess such a one with an equal concord"].

73 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 439: 'Item, Richardus de S. Victore, in libro *De Trinitate*: "Sicut in summa caritate non potest deesse quod maximum est, sic nec deesse poterit quod constat esse praecipuum. Praecipuum autem videtur esse in vera caritate alterum velle diligi ut se: in mutuo siquidem amore multumque fervente nihil praeclarior quam ut ab eo, quem summe diligis et a quo summe diligeris, alium aequae diligi velis; probatio itaque consummatae dilectionis est votiva communio exhibitae sibi dilectionis". Ex hoc igitur relinquitur quod cum summa sive maxima caritas probet dualitatem personarum, quod praecipua caritas probet Trinitatem personarum' [Again, Richard of St Victor, in his book *On the Trinity*, says: "Just as in the highest love whatever is greatest cannot be absent, so it is clear that whatever is preeminent will not be able to be absent. However, the preeminent seems to be the willing, in true love, that another be loved as itself: in mutual and fervent love, however, [there is] nothing more excellent than that one should will that another be loved equally by the one whom you most highly love and by whom you are most highly loved; and thus the proof of consummate love is the willing communion in the love that has been shown to oneself." From this, therefore, it is admitted that since the highest or greatest love evinces a duality of persons, that most preeminent love evinces a Trinity of persons].

74 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 439: 'Item, Richardus de S. Victore, in eodem: "Signum magnae infirmitatis est non posse pati consortium amoris, posse vero pati magnae perfectionis; maius est gratanter suscipere; maximum autem ex desiderio requirere". Si enim magnum est pati posse, maius est gratanter suscipere, maximum autem ex desiderio requirere, "hinc manifesta ratione colligitur quod praecipuus gradus caritatis et eo ipso plenitudine bonitatis esse non possit, ubi voluntatis vel facultatis defectus dilectionis consortium praecipuique gaudii communionem excludit. Summe ergo dilectorum summeque diligendorum", scilicet Patris et Filii, "uterque oportet quod pari voto condilectum requirat, pari concordia pro voto possideat"' [Richard of St Victor says: "A sign of great infirmity is the inability to endure a sharing of love, but [a sign] of great perfection is the ability to endure [this]; it is

nevolence,⁷⁶ joy.⁷⁷ For Richard, and for the Halensist following him, all these arguments are simply logical entailments from the *Grund-axiom* that God is the fullness of goodness. From Stohr's perspective, precisely here the *SH* performs the influential synthesis of Richard and Dionysius as the foundation for Bonaventure.⁷⁸

even greater to accept [it] with joy, [it is] greatest, however, to seek [such sharing] with desire." If, indeed, it is great to be able to endure [it], greater to accept it with joy, but greatest to seek for it with desire, "from this it is inferred by clear reason that the preeminent level of love cannot also be by itself the fullness of goodness, where a defect of the faculty or will excludes a fellowship of love and a sharing of preeminent joy. Therefore it is required that the one who most highly loves and the one who is most highly loved", namely, the Father and the Son, "seek out one who is co-beloved, who is loved mutually by both with an equal will and possess such a one with an equal concord"].

75 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 439: 'Item, idem, in eodem: "Dilectionis dulcedine nihil iucundius invenitur, nihil in quo animus amplius delectetur. Huiusmodi autem delicias solus possidet qui in exhibita sibi dilectione socium et condilectum habet. Communio itaque amoris non potest esse in minus quam in tribus personis; nihil autem gloriosius, nihil magnificentius quam quod habes utile et dulce in commune deducere'" ["Nothing can be found more pleasant than the sweetness of love, nothing in which the soul might take more delight. The only one who possesses pleasure of this kind, however, is the one who has a sharer or co-beloved in the love that has been shown to himself. And so a communion of love cannot exist in less than three persons; nothing, however, is more glorious, nothing more magnificent than to share in common what you possess usefully and sweetly"].

76 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 439: 'Item, idem, in eodem: "Notandum in divinis illis personis quod perfectio unius exigit adiunctionem alterius et consequenter in geminis perfectio utriusque requirit cohaerentiam tertiae". Nam cum "in alterutra persona aequa benevolentia existat, necesse est ut pari voto, ratione consimili, praecipui gaudii sui consortem utraque requirat", videlicet Spiritum Sanctum' ["It must be noted that in those divine persons the perfection of union finds perfection in the addition of another and, so, the perfection in the two requires the coherence of a third." For when "equal benevolence exists in another person, it is necessary that with an equal wish, by similar reason, it requires a fellowship of its preeminent joy," [which is] clearly the Holy Spirit].

77 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 440: 'Item, idem, in eodem: "Quamdiu iste ab alio solus diligitur, praecipuae suae dulcedinis delicias solus possidere videtur; similiter et alius, quamdiu condilectum non habet, praecipui gaudii sui communione caret. Ut autem uterque possit istiusmodi delicias communicare; oportet eos condilectum habere", videlicet Spiritum Sanctum' ["As long as that one alone is loved by another, he alone seems to possess the pleasure of his preeminent sweetness; and similarly another, as long as he does not have a mutual delight, lacks a fellowship of his preeminent joy. However, so that both might be able to communicate the pleasure of this kind, it is necessary that they have a mutual delight", which is clearly the Holy Spirit].

78 Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Bonaventura*, 171: 'Alexander pursues the question in the sense of and with reference to Richard and to the Lombard. He became important for Bonaventure in that he moved the question under the perspective of *bonum diffusivum sui*.' Cf. *SH I* (n. 330), pp. 485–6. Stohr's reference to the *bonum diffusivum sui*, of course, raises the question of Alexander's relationship to Dionysius, on which Zachary Hayes, 'Bonaventure's Trinitarian Theology,' *A Companion to Bonaventure*, ed. Jay M. Hammond, J.A. Wayne Hellmann, and Jared Goff, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 48 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 196 rightly comments: 'This shift in Victorine studies unavoidably raises many new questions about Bonaventure, for it has long been assumed that he was deeply influenced by Richard, and that he imbibed a Dionysian inspiration from the great Victorine. If such an inspiration is lacking in Richard, it is—nonetheless—present in Bonaventure. But from what sources is it derived? And what is the precise nature of the tie between Richard and Bonaventure, if

This observation prompts a further clarification. Some secondary literature suggests that in its Trinitarian theology, the Halensist prefers Richard over Augustine. But this can be very misleading. A more precise observation is this: the *SH* does indeed deploy Ricardian arguments (derived from an interpersonal analogy of human love) in order to understand *that* God is plurified, and *why* plurified triadically; i.e. why there must be three but only three in God. But, as will be elaborated below, when the *SH* seeks to understand *how* God is three, it quite explicitly deploys Augustine's psychological analogy.

The Monarchy of the Father

This account of divine plurality as a function of divine goodness, accordingly, puts particular emphasis upon the person of the Father.⁷⁹ It is the person of the Father who, *ad intra*, is the productive goodness that sources the plurality: 'the fullness of goodness is the reason (...) why the Father generates; and this in as much as that goodness is understood [to be] in the Father, that is, in the person which is not from another, and not in as much as [goodness] is considered in se.'⁸⁰ The Halensist thus distinguishes between the *personal* goodness of the Father and the *essential* goodness of the divine nature: 'the highest good or the divine essence can be considered in two ways: as in itself or as in the person who does not have being from another.'⁸¹

Considered *in se*,

it is considered absolutely and apart from the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of diffusion, since if the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of diffusion were understood in it essentially, it would follow that there would be a diffusion of the substance itself in infinite persons and that there

the latter is fundamentally Dionysian while the former is not? These questions raise the further question of Alexander of Hales in relation both to Richard and Dionysius on the one hand, and to Bonaventure on the other.'

⁷⁹ This may be due to the influence of John of Damascus, who channeled the preceding Byzantine tradition to the western Latin thinkers in the high Middle Ages through the Latin 12th-century translation of his most significant and well-known work, *De fide orthodoxa*. This text stressed the monarchy of the Father within the divine life. See Andrew Louth, 'Late Patristic Developments on the Trinity in the East', in *Oxford Handbook of the Trinity*, ed. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 148.

⁸⁰ *SH* I (n. 297), p. 428: 'Dicendum quod plenitudo bonitatis est causa, id est ratio, generationis, quare Pater generet; et hoc secundum quod ipsa bonitas intelligitur in Patre, id est in persona quae quidem est et non ab alia, non secundum quod consideratur in se.'

⁸¹ *SH* I (n. 297), p. 428: 'Dicendum ergo quod summum bonum sive divina essentia potest considerari dupliciter: ut in se vel ut in persona quae non habet esse ab alio.'

would be no order in anyway. Accordingly, the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of self-diffusion is not considered in relation to the divine essence in se.⁸²

Considered in the Father, on the other hand,

the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of diffusion is from the highest goodness in the Father, both from the essence in the Father through generation, and in the Son with the Father through the procession [of the Spirit], as will be clear. Therefore it does not follow from this that to generate is to be attributed to the essence, but rather to the very person having the essence; granted therefore it is not self-diffusive as considered in itself, yet it is diffusive in as much as it is in the person not having being from another.⁸³

As the Quaracchi editors summarized, in the *SH*: ‘the diffusion of goodness in the Trinity is personal,’ i. e. stemming from the Father,⁸⁴ ‘since, by contrast, in the production of [created] things, it can rather be called essential.’⁸⁵ In sum, ‘in the system of Alexander the highest goodness is the explanatory principle [*ratio*] of all communication in God.’⁸⁶ All this, which may have a precedent in earlier eastern Trinitarian traditions,⁸⁷ flows from the *SH* into the thought of Bonaventure.⁸⁸

82 *SH I* (n. 297), p. 428: ‘Secundum quod consideratur in se: sic consideratur absolute et absque ratione diffusionis, quia si hoc modo intelligeretur ratio diffusionis in ea, consequeretur quod esset diffusio ipsius substantiae in infinitis personis, et quod non esset status in aliqua; propterea manifestum est quod essentia secundum se sive summum bonum consideratur absque ratione diffusionis sui.’

83 *SH I* (n. 297), p. 428: ‘(...) est ratio diffusionis ex summa bonitate in Patre, sive ex essentia in Patre per generationem et in Filio cum Patre per processionem, sicut patebit. Non ergo sequitur ex hoc quod essentiae attribuaturs generare, sed magis ipsi personae habenti essentiam; licet igitur non est diffusivum sui ut in se consideratur, nihilominus est diffusivum prout est in persona non-ente ab alio.’

84 Cf. *SH I* (n. 311), pp. 452–3; *SH I* (n. 330), p. 486: ‘Eadem bonitas est qua Pater summe diffundit se generando Filium et Pater et Filius spirando Spiritum Sanctum et illa quae diffusa est in Spiritu Sancto’ [It is the same goodness by which the Father highly diffuses himself by generating the Son and the Father and the Son in spirating the Holy Spirit and that which is diffused in the Holy Spirit]. Cf. *SH I* (n. 304), p. 440.

85 ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,’ xxxvi, n. 15.

86 ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,’ xxxvi, n. 15. See *SH I* (n. 317), p. 466. Cf. *SH I* (n. 248), p. 340.

87 See Keane, ‘The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness,’ 68–9, who sees a similar approach in the Cappadocians and in Pseudo-Dionysius.

88 Hayes, ‘Bonaventure’s Trinitarian Theology,’ 214: ‘Thus, the Father receives an emphasis that would be foreign to the thought of either Augustine or Aquinas, and is similar to the theology of the classical Greek fathers.’

Distinction by Emanation

This emphasis on the primacy of the Father *ad intra* also pushes the Halensist toward what has come to be called an emanational account of the constitution and identity of the divine persons. Here, each of the persons is defined and properly distinguished from the others by a distinct mode of originating,⁸⁹ and thus a singular mode of possessing (*modum se habendi*) the one, simple divine nature.⁹⁰ Preferring Richard's definition of person over others,⁹¹ the *SH* defines a person as both 'an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature' and, more importantly, 'a being existing in itself alone by way of a singular mode of rational existence'.⁹² Or, in a similar vein but from another source, certain anonymous *magistri* (William of Auxerre? Phillip the Chancellor?): 'person is hypostasis, distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity.'^{93/94} Aptly, Coyle suggests a 'hybrid definition', namely, 'a divine person is an

89 *SH I* (n. 341), p. 505: 'In divino esse necessario ponitur natura et ordo naturae secundum rationem originis' [In God, it is necessary to posit nature and the order of nature according to the ratio of origin]. See also *SH I* (n. 22), p. 52; *SH I* (n. 307), p. 445; *SH I* (n. 312), p. 456; *SH I* (n. 316), p. 464; *SH I* (n. 321), p. 472; *SH I* (n. 327), p. 481; *SH I* (n. 467), p. 668.

90 *SH I* (n. 467), p. 668: 'Proprietas enim personalis est quae uni soli personae convenit et eam ab omni alia distinguit' [For a personal property is that which belongs to only one person and distinguishes that person from all others].

91 De Régnon, *Études*, 2:344–5: 'Our doctor [Alexander] openly professed the doctrine of Richard (...) This alerts us that already in Alexander's time, scholastic teaching was trained in a current which he resisted (...) Alexander adopts the whole theory of Richard on personhood (...) He explains the famous definition of person that Richard gives and shows its superiority over that of Boethius.' Keane, 'The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness,' 68–9, seeing similarities here with the Cappadocians' understanding of 'person,' notes that for the Halensist, 'the nature or essence can only be properly understood within the one possessing it,' citing *SH I* (n. 316.), p. 463: 'Intelligendo enim divinam naturam, necesse est quod intelligatur in habente illam' [In understanding the divine nature, one must understand in one possessing it]. For Keane, 'the Augustinian tradition, with its concern for the one divine nature, might reasonably state the inverse of this view: the persons must only be considered within the divine nature.'

92 *SH I* (n. 387), p. 570: 'Nam Richardus ponit duas; prima est haec: "persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia", secunda est haec: "persona est existens per se solum iuxta quemdam rationalis existentiae modum".' The quotations derive from Richard of St Victor, *De trinitate* 4.22, in Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, ed. Jean Ribailier, Textes philosophiques du Moyen Âge, 6 (Paris: Vrin, 1958), 180 and *De trinitate* 4.24 (Ribailier, 182), respectively.

93 *SH I* (n. 387), p. 570: 'Magistri vero ponunt tertiam talem: Persona est hypostasis, distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente.' The Quarrachi editors credit it to Alan of Lille, *Regulae theologicae*, c. 32 (PL 210:637), but the formulation is not quite there. Weber is likely right to suggest that it comes from Alexander himself at *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) I, d. 23, 9b, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 12–15 (Quarrachi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 1:226. Cf. Hubert Philipp Weber, *Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Anthropologie im Mittelalter* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 2003), 119–41.

incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature, distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity.⁹⁵

For the *SH*, the incommunicable modes of having the divine essence are these three:⁹⁶ 1. having it ‘not from another’ (*non ab alio*), 2. having it ‘from another through generation’ (*ab alio per generationem*), corresponding to the above-noted *per modum naturae*, and 3. having it ‘from another through spiration’ (*ab alio per spirationem*) or ‘through procession’, corresponding to the above-noted *per modum voluntatis*.⁹⁷ Assigning abstract terms to these modes produces three personal properties: ‘not being from another’ is the property of innascibility (*innascibilitas*); ‘being from another through generation’ is filiation (*filiatio*); and ‘being from another through spiration’ is procession (*processio*).⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 104: ‘Like all his peers, [Thomas] discusses three main definitions of the ‘person’ in trinitarian theology: those of Boethius and of Richard of St Victor, and the ‘definition of the masters’, to which the early Franciscan school was much attached.’

⁹⁵ Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*,’ 123.

⁹⁶ *SH I* (n. 467), p. 668: ‘Ex quo patet quod proprietates personales sunt tres (...)’ [From this it is clear that the personal properties are three].

⁹⁷ *SH I* (n. 81), p. 133: ‘(...) sed solum originis: quia est ibi habens naturam non ab alio, et habens naturam ab alio per generationem, et habens ab alio per processionem.’ See Alexander of Hales, *Glossa I*, d. 28, 5d, 1:274: ‘(...) sicut prima divisio est ex parte essentialium “ens aliud est ab alio, aliud non ab alio”: ab alio ut creatura, non ab alio ut Deus; ita ex parte hypostaseon erit distinctio “aliud ab alio, aliud non ab alio”. Et ratio est, quia, cum prima divisio sumpta sit ad dividendum res secundum habitudinem causae efficientis, scilicet “ab alio, non ab alio”, maior autem sit convenientia hypostaseon divinarum inter se quam essentialium, prior erit ratio distinguendi personas ad invicem quam creaturam a Creatore. Sed nulla prior est ratio ratione causae nisi ratio principii (...) erit ergo distinctio personarum divinarum secundum originem a principio’ [(...) just as there is a first division on the part of essences, “being that is from another, [being] that is not from another”: from another, such as creatures, not from another, such as God; so with respect to persons there will be distinction “one from another, one not from another”. The reason is that, since the first division is taken for the purpose of dividing things according to their relation to an efficient cause, namely, “from another, not from another”, but there is a greater agreement of divine persons among themselves than of the [created and uncreated] essences, the reason for distinguishing the divine person from one another will be prior to the distinction of creatures from the Creator. But no reason in the ratio of a cause is prior except the ratio of a principle (...), therefore there will be a distinction of the divine persons according to origin from a principle’]. Cf. Walter Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, vol. 2, *Alexander of Hales’ Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 26.

⁹⁸ *SH I* (n. 467), p. 668: ‘In divinis personis est ordo secundum rationem originis; prima autem divisio entis est: omne quod est aut est ab alio aut non ab alio, et haec est prima ratio distinguendi essentiam ab essentia; similiter in divinis est haec ratio distinctionis personarum. Item, “esse ab alio” aut est per generationem aut per spirationem. Iam ergo habemus tres proprietates: quia ex hoc quod est “esse non ab alio” est proprietas innascibilitatis, et ex hoc quod est “esse ab alio per generationem” est filiatio, item, ex hoc quod est “esse ab alio per spirationem” est processio’ [In the divine persons, there is order according to the ratio of origin; for the first division of being is: everything that is either is from another or not from another, and this is the first ratio for distinguishing

More of this will be said below. Noteworthy now is that with this account of the divine persons, the *SH* stands at the headwaters⁹⁹ of a stream of high scholastic Trinitarian theology that, in stressing mode of origin as constituting the persons,¹⁰⁰ flows parallel to an alternative in which relations, more precisely, opposed relations, are constitutive. These two streams are also often associated with the Franciscans and Dominicans,¹⁰¹ respectively.^{102/103}

Emanational Modes: Generation and Procession

The Halensian account of divine plurality posits two emanational modes (*processiones*) from the Father. These ‘eternal pullulations or two shoots or two rays’ (intriguingly citing terms from the Greek patristic tradition) ‘flow forth’ (*fluit*) from ‘the First Principle,¹⁰⁴ the Father’.¹⁰⁵ As noted, this emphasis on divine fecundity is characteristic of the Halensian account.¹⁰⁶

essence from essence; similarly in God there is a ratio of distinction of persons. Likewise, “being from another” is either through generation or through spiration. So we now have three properties: for since there is “being not from another” there is the property of innascibility, and since there is “being from another through generation” there is filiation, and again, since there is “being from another through spiration”, there is procession].

99 See Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Bonaventura*, 105: ‘Now it is interesting that this new direction, which wanted to make the distinction between the divine persons on the basis of origins, and which we see clearly in Alexander’s work in overcoming the old views, is sharply opposed to another whose spokesman we are allowed to designate as Thomas Aquinas.’ The claim, though, originates with Richard of St Victor, *De trinitate* 4.15 (Ribaillier, 177): ‘in God, it is solely in origin that one should seek the distinction of the persons or existents.’

100 Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, 17: ‘On the emanation account of the distinction or constitution of the persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the very same divine essence in three irreducibly distinct ways, the way that each one emanates or originates. Thus, on the emanation account, the Father is the divine essence in a fundamentally different way than the Son is, and the Holy Spirit is the very same divine essence in a third totally different way, these three different ways being how each one originates or has being.’

101 This is Friedman’s heuristic between emanation and relation accounts for distinguishing the persons. Cf. Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, 5–49.

102 Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, 31: ‘In Bonaventure and his early followers, men like Walter of Bruges, Eustace of Arras, John Pecham, and Roger Marston, there had developed a marked Franciscan stress on the *divine* emanations as the constitutive feature of the persons in the Trinity (...) This Franciscan view stood in rather stark contrast to the typical Dominican stress in trinitarian theology—something descended from Aquinas—on *opposition* of relations as the rock bottom constitutive features of the persons.’

103 For more on the typically Franciscan version of trinitarian speculation, see Hayes, ‘Introduction,’ 1–103.

104 Bonaventure will adopt this term extensively in his writings. See, e.g., the *Breviloquium* 1.1.1 (Monti, 27): ‘In the beginning, we should understand that sacred doctrine, namely theology, which deals principally with the First Principle—God, three and one—comprises seven topics in all.’

Already noted above is the distinction between production or diffusion *per modum naturae* ('the most perfect diffusion of nature is that which is through generation'¹⁰⁷) and production or diffusion *per modum voluntatis* ('the most perfect diffusion of will is that which is through desire or through love' (*per amorem sive per dilectionem*)¹⁰⁸). The *SH* also refers to these as 'principal' and 'non-principal' modes of production, the distinction hinging on whether the 'product' retains the generativity that produced it:

It is called the principal mode when the product is so produced that it has the power and the property of producing another from itself. Insofar then as there is a production according to the principal mode in God, there is the production of the Son from the Father, because the Son has the power to produce another from Himself, namely, the Holy Spirit, the property of which the Son retains.¹⁰⁹

105 *SH I* (n. 310), p. 450: 'Ad auctoritates vero Dionysii et Gregorii Theologi dicendum quod cum dicuntur coaeternae pullulationes vel duo lumina vel duo semina vel duo radii Filii et Spiritus Sanctus a Patre, non negatur per hoc quod unus, scilicet Spiritus Sanctus, non habeat originem ab alio, videlicet a Filio, sed per hoc insinuatur in Patre ratio primae originis et primi principii et duplex modus emanationis vel exitus a primo principio, Patre: unus conveniens Filio, qui fluit per generationem, alius Spiritui Sancto, qui fluit per processionem' [To those texts of Dionysius and Gregory the Theologian it should be said that when the Son and the Spirit are called eternal pullulations or two lights or two shoots or two rays from the Father, it is not thus denied that one, namely the Holy Spirit, does not have origin from the other, namely, from the Son, but rather by these expressions is insinuated in the Father the *ratio* of first origin and of first principle of a twofold mode of emanation or going forth from the first principle, [namely,] the Father: one [mode] befitting the Son, who flows forth through generation, another the Holy Spirit, who flows forth through procession].

106 *SH I* (n. 295), p. 416: 'Confitendum verissime quod generatio aeterna est. Unde Richardus de S. Victore, in libro *De Trinitate*: "(...) Numquid natura illa, quae huic naturae fructus foecunditatis donavit, in se omnino sterilis permanebit? Et quae aliis generationem tribuit, numquid sterilis erit?" sicut dicitur Isai. ultimo, 9: "Numquid ego, qui alios parere facio, ipse non pariam? Si ego, qui generationem ceteris tribuo, sterilis ero? ait Dominus"; et loquitur ibi de generatione aeterna, ut dicit Glossa. Est igitur generatio aeterna' [It should be most truly confessed that generation is eternal. Whence Richard of St Victor in his book *On the Trinity* wrote: "(...) Can it be that that nature will remain in itself completely sterile, which gave to this (our) nature the fruit of fecundity? And will that which imparted generation to others, can it be that it will be sterile?" Just as it is said in Isaiah 66:9, "How can I, who makes others to bear, not bear myself? Shall I, who grant generation to the others, be sterile? Thus says the Lord"; and as the *Glossa* says this text speaks of eternal generation].

107 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 438: 'Perfectissima autem diffusio naturae est illa quae est per generationem.'

108 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 438: 'perfectissima diffusion voluntatis est illa quae est per amorem sive per dilectionem.'

109 *SH I* (n. 296), p. 420: 'Secundum modum principalem dicitur, quando productum ita producitur quod habet virtutem et proprietatem producendi alium ex se: secundum ergo quod est productio secundum modum principalem in divinis, sic est productio Filii a Patre, quia Filius habet virtutem producendi ex se alium, scilicet Spiritum Sanctum, et huius retinet proprietatem; (...).' Cf. *SH I* (n. 296), p. 420: 'Ex iis igitur patet quid sit secundum rationem intelligentiae generatio in divinis, quia generatio est univoca productio similis in natura de tota substantia secundum modum principalem, et quare haec productio dicitur generatio, hoc est quia inter omnes productiones generatio principalior

On the other hand:

with respect to the non-principal mode there is the production of the Holy Spirit, because [the Spirit] is produced from the [divine] substance, but does not retain the property of producing another from itself.¹¹⁰

Yet, this distinction does not imperil the equality between the Son and the Spirit.¹¹¹

The Psychological Analogy

To clarify the difference between these two emanational modes of having the divine essence, the *SH* appeals to the psychological analogy for the Trinity, the roots of which are of course Augustinian:

To proceed understood by this mode is to proceed through the mode of understanding (*per modum intelligentiae*), is to proceed as in the case of the Son; [to proceed] through the mode of love (*per modum amoris*) is to proceed as in the case of the Holy Spirit. (...) It should be said, then, that to proceed, said in this way, is said first of the Son and second of the Holy Spirit, according to the reasoning of the intellect, since that procession, which is according to the mode of the understanding from the mind, is prior to that which is according to the mode of love, from both.¹¹²

The Halensist also makes use of the same analogy elsewhere, distinguishing between a ‘diffusion through the mode of generation, in the way that understanding emanates

est, et maxime sic debet esse ut ille qui producitur habeat virtutem producendi alium ex se’ [From these things it is clear what generation in God is, understood conceptually, since generation, univocally [speaking], is the production of something the same in nature from the whole substance, through the principal mode. And why is this production called generation? Because among all [the modes of] production, generation is the more principal, and thus it especially ought to be thus: that the one who is produced have the power of being able to produce another from himself].

110 *SH I* (n. 296), p. 420: ‘(...) secundum autem modum non-principalem est productio Spiritus Sancti, quia producitur de substantia, sed non retinet proprietatem producendi alium ex se.’

111 *SH I* (n. 296), p. 420: ‘Sic tamen intellige ‘principalem’ in generatione Filii, ‘non-principalem’ in processione Spiritus Sancti, ut nullo modo intelligatur ibi inaequalitas, sed utriusque designetur proprietas; quemadmodum, cum dicitur ‘primum’ vel ‘non-primum’, non ostenditur prioritas vel posterioritas in tempore, sed designatur ordo naturae’ [Yet, one should understand ‘principal’ in the generation of the Son and ‘non-principal’ in the procession of the Holy Spirit, such that in no way is inequality understood there, but [rather] so as to indicate the properties of each. So, when ‘first’ and ‘not-first’ are said priority and posteriority in time are not shown, but rather the order of nature is indicated].

112 *SH I* (n. 305), p. 441: ‘procedere intellectum cum modo, est procedere vel per modum intelligentiae, sicut est procedere Filii, vel per modum amoris, sicut est procedere Spiritus Sancti (...) Dicendum ergo quod procedere, cum modo dictum, per prius dicitur de Filio et per posterius de Spiritu Sancto secundum rationem intelligentiae, quia prior est processio quae est per modum intelligentiae a mente quam illa quae est per modum amoris ab utroque.’

from the mind' 'generating and being generated') and a 'diffusion through the mode of spiration, in which way love proceeds from understanding and from the mind' ('spirating and being spirated').¹¹³ In another place, continuing the psychological comparison, the *SH* likens spiration to

the power of reason moving toward the formation of speech, just as it happens when the understanding (*intellectus*) of reason begets a word which is the messenger of understanding, while at the same time breathing (*spirando*) a breath (*spiritum*) which is the vehicle of the word, just as John Damascene says: "it is necessary that a word has a breath (*spiritum*) and the Word of God no less so than our word."¹¹⁴

Furthermore, in a comparison that Aquinas will also make, 'spiration implies movement *away from* the soul, and so does love; while understanding implies movement *within* the soul or *into* the soul; hence, to be spirated befits love, not understanding.'¹¹⁵ Consequently, 'since the generation of the Son is through the mode of understanding from the mind, while the procession of the Holy Spirit is through the mode of love from both [the mind and its understanding], to be spirated will be proper to the Holy Spirit.'¹¹⁶ Again: 'just as from the mind understanding is begotten, so too from both places [i.e. the mind and understanding] love is spirated.'¹¹⁷ This use of the psychological analogy leads directly, not surprisingly, to the Halensian position on the *filioque*, though the topic itself does not receive explicit treatment in the *SH*.

In sum, the Son emanates from the Father through generation (*ab alio per generationem*), which yields a personal property that distinguishes Him absolutely from the other Persons, namely, filiation. This occurs *per modum naturae*, *per modum intelligentiae*, and *per modum rationis*. The Spirit emanates from the Father and the Son through procession/spiration (*ab alio per processionem*), which yields Its personal property, namely, passive spiration. This occurs *per modum voluntatis*, *per modum amoris*, *per modum per dilectionis*, and *per modum donationis*.

113 *SH I* (n. 298), p. 431.

114 *SH I* (n. 306), p. 442: '(...) movens vis rationalis ad formationem sermonis, sicut contingit quando intellectus rationis generat verbum qui est nuntius intelligentiae, simul spirando spiritum qui sit vehiculum verbi, sicut dicit Ioannes Damascenus: "Oportet verbum habere spiritum nec est Verbum Dei deficientius nostro verbo".'

115 *SH I* (n. 306), p. 442: 'spiratio dicit motum ab anima, similiter amor; intelligentia dicit motum ad animam vel in anima; inde est quod spirari convenit amori, non intelligentiae.'

116 *SH I* (n. 306), p. 442: 'Quia generatio Filii est per modum intelligentiae a mente, processio Spiritus Sancti per modum amoris ab utroque, proprium erit Spiritus Sancti spirari.'

117 *SH I* (n. 306), p. 442: 'sicut ex mente generatur intelligentia, sic ex utroque spiratur amor.'

The Persons¹¹⁸

Turning finally to the Persons individually, the following additional points should be added.

Father: As is clear from the foregoing, the *SH* prefers to describe the first divine Person as unoriginated or unbegotten, who possesses the divine nature not from another: ‘for there is one in God who has his nature not from another’ (*non ab alio*).¹¹⁹ As noted, the primary term used to express this is *innascibilitas* (sometimes *inginitus*). At the same time, He is the divine person from whom the other divine persons emanate, from whom the other divine persons receive their ‘being from another’, and this positions Him as the productive source (*principio*), or First Principle, within the Godhead, the single Source or *mon-archia* of divine plurality.¹²⁰ Combining the two ideas, He is one ‘who is not from another and from whom others are’.¹²¹ Most precisely, though, because He generates a Son, He is Father (*pater*)—‘for “father” comes from “principle”’.¹²² Paternity (*paternitas*),¹²³ accordingly, is the *proprium*, the ‘personal property’ of the Father, while *innascibilitas* is a ‘property of the person’ of the Father.¹²⁴ (‘Thus, though the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit, He is not the Father of the Spirit.’¹²⁵)

The Son: For the *SH*, the second Person is the one ‘who is from another and from whom another comes’.¹²⁶ For that reason, He is ‘in the middle/center (*in medio*)’, between the First and the Third. The proper and relational personal names of the second divine person are: Son, Image, and Word.

Because he is generated from the Father, the proper name for the second person is ‘Son’, for ‘He is the true and proper Son by origin, not by adoption, in truth, not in name only, begotten not made.’¹²⁷ The Son persists, in fact, as *semper nascitur*.¹²⁸

118 The personal properties were fixed by the second canon of the Fourth Lateran Council: ‘the Father begets, the Son is begotten, and the Holy Spirit proceeds.’ English from Norman P. Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, vol. 1 (London: Sheed and Ward; Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 231.

119 *SH* I (n. 297), p. 424.

120 *SH* I (n. 297), p. 427.

121 *SH* I (n. 77), p. 125.

122 *SH* I (n. 405), p. 597: ‘unde abundat ‘Pater’ a ‘principio’.

123 *SH* I (n. 483), pp. 685–6. Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 1, n. 14i, 1:14.

124 Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte*, 387: ‘Yet *innascibilitas* must not be regarded as an actual personal property, i. e. as a positive, person-constituting characteristic, for it is only a *distinctio negativa*, thus conceptually dependent on another.’

125 *SH* I (n. 405), p. 597: ‘unde Pater bene dicitur principium Spiritus Sancti, non tamen Pater eius.’

126 *SH* I (n. 305), p. 441.

127 *SH* I (n. 408), p. 601.

128 *SH* I (n. 302), p. 436.

Because the Son is an ‘appearance not different’ (*species indifferens*) from the Father,¹²⁹ ‘an indistinct likeness and coequal’ (*coaequandam imaginata et indiscreta similitudo*) to the Father, ‘an expressive conformity (...) not different in substance with’ the Father,¹³⁰ an ‘express imitation’ (*expressae imitationis*) and ‘express likeness’ (*similitudo expressa*),¹³¹ indeed, ‘the greatest likeness’ (*similitudo summa*) to the Father,¹³² the Son is also Image (*Imago*) of the Father, especially because, with the Father, the Son both ‘possesses and gives the fullness [of divinity to the Spirit]’; that is, ‘just as the plenitude of divinity flows from the Father, so the bestowing of the same plenitude flows from the Son.’¹³³

From the notion of image, the *SH* derives the third proper name for the Son, namely, Word:¹³⁴

129 *SH I* (n. 414), p. 605: ‘Ad aliud dicendum quod species hic dicitur relative: dicit enim essentiam, sed connotat conformitatem plenam quam habet Filius cum Patre in essentialibus et notione. Licet enim Spiritus Sanctus habeat conformitatem in essentialibus, non tamen habet conformitatem cum Patre in aliqua notione; unde non potest dici “species indifferens”, prout sumitur species in hac definitione: dicit enim divinam essentiam, sed connotat notionalem conformitatem’ [It should be said that species here is said relatively: for it refers to the [divine] essence, but connotes the full conformity which the Son has with the Father in essence and in notion. For even though the Holy Spirit has conformity in essence, it nevertheless does not have conformity with the Father in a certain notion; hence, [the Spirit] cannot be called an “indifferent species” as species is understood in this definition: for it refers to the divine essence, but connotes notional conformity].

130 *SH I* (n. 415), p. 606.

131 *SH I* (n. 415), pp. 606–7.

132 *SH I* (n. 89), p. 144: ‘Similitudo ergo principii magna est in creatura, in quantum una est, sed tamen in diversitate essentiae; similitudo maior in Spiritu Sancto, qui est a Patre in identitate substantiae, quamvis non conformis in notione; similitudo vero summa Filius, qui est a Patre in identitate essentiae et conformis in notione (...)’ [A like with the principles is great in a creature, in as much as it is one, but yet in diversity of essence; the likeness is greater in the Holy Spirit, who is from the father in identity of substance, though not in conformity in notion; but the greatest likeness is the Son, who is from the Father in identity of essence and in conformity in notion (...)].

133 *SH I* (n. 418), p. 609: ‘sicut a Patre manat plenitudo divinitatis, sic a Filio’.

134 *SH I* (n. 296), p. 421: ‘Eloquitur autem Filius essentiam et proprietatem Patris, ideo Verbum est; Spiritus vero Sanctus, etsi totam essentiam Patris eloquatur, scilicet potentiam, sapientiam, bonitatem, non tamen in se eloquitur proprietatem Patris qua producat ex se alium, ideo non dicitur Verbum sicut Filius, nec dicitur eius productio ‘generatio’ sicut productio Filii, sicut dictum est: verbum enim plene manifestat de intellectu et intentione dicentis proprietates, ideo Spiritus Sanctus non est Verbum nec profertur a Patre ut Verbum, sed dicitur, id est manifestatur’ [The Son expresses the essence and property of the Father, and thus he is Word; but the Holy Spirit, even if the Spirit expresses the whole essence of the Father, namely, power, wisdom, and goodness, the Spirit nevertheless does not express in himself the property of the Father by which the Father produces another from himself, and therefore the Spirit is not called Word as the Son is, nor is the Spirit’s production called “generation”, as is the production of the Son, as was said: for a word fully manifests from the intellect and with the intention the properties of the one speaking, therefore the Holy Spirit is not the Word, nor is the Spirit brought forth from the Father like the Word (...)].

though knowledge is understood in the concept of “word”, it is not nevertheless absolute knowledge, but knowledge which has arisen from another, namely from the knowledge of memory as in the image of it. Whence the intention of “word” designates a concept having arisen as an image of memory (...).¹³⁵

So, ‘the concept of “Word” is proper to the Son.’¹³⁶

The Spirit: The third Person is one ‘who is from another and from whom no one comes’, the Person in whom the divine essence exists ‘as in an end’ (*in termino*).¹³⁷ That is, the Holy Spirit is in the posture of utter receptivity, or in Richard of St Victor’s language, of ‘owed love’ (*amor debitus*), love that is wholly received, in contrast to the Father’s *amor gratuitus*, love wholly and freely given, and the Son’s love, which is both (*amor ex utroque permixtus*) received (*debitus*) and given (*gratuitus*).¹³⁸ The Spirit, accordingly, is non-productive of further emanations *ad intra*: ‘the highest goodness, as it is the *ratio* of production of a person from a person, in the Father and the Son, so it is the *ratio* of non-production in the Holy Spirit.’¹³⁹ The proper and relational personal names of the third Person are: Spirit and Gift.

Because the third Person processes from the Father and the Son by means of passive spiration, the term ‘Spirit’ is ‘proper to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through the mode of spiration’.¹⁴⁰ Because, moreover, as noted above, that procession is through the mode of will and through the mode of the love of the Father and the Son, ‘the Holy Spirit is the bond (*vinculum*) and connection (*nexus*) and communion (*communio*) of the Father and the Son.’¹⁴¹ More precisely, as the love of the Father and the

135 SH I (n. 424), p. 617: ‘quamvis in intentione ‘Verbi’ intelligatur notitia, non tamen notitia absolute, sed notitia, quae est ex alio orta, videlicet ex scientia memoriae ut imago illius. Unde intentio verbi dicit notitiam ortam et imaginem memoriae (...).’

136 SH I (n. 424), p. 617: ‘intentio Verbi est propria Filio’.

137 SH I (n. 304), p. 440.

138 SH I (n. 307), p. 445.

139 SH I (n. 319), p. 470: ‘summa bonitas, sicut est ipsa ratio productionis personae a persona in Patre et Filio, ita est ratio non-productionis in Spiritu Sancto.’

140 SH I (n. 427), p. 620: ‘hoc modo proprium est Spiritus Sancti, qui procedit per modum spirationis.’

141 SH I (n. 308), p. 446: ‘Spiritus Sanctus est vinculum et nexus sive communio Patris et Filii, et hoc multiplici ratione. Primo, quia est amor procedens a Patre et Filio communiter et uno modo; amor autem nexus est et vinculum amantium. Secundo, quia exit a Patre et Filio in unitate substantiae cum Patre et Filio; quod non posset esse nisi eadem esset et una substantia Patris et Filii, et ideo ostendit unitatem substantiae Patris et Filii; unde Augustinus, in XV *De Trinitate*: “Caritas, qua Pater diligit Filium et Filius Patrem, ineffabilem communionem demonstrat amborum”. Tertio, quia exit a Patre et Filio per eandem habitudinem et relationem sive notionem, quae est communis spiratio’ [(...) 1. because love is that which proceeds from the Father and the Son communally and by one mode; however love is a connection and the bond of the ones loving. 2. because [the Holy Spirit] goes forth from the Father and the Son in unity of substance with the Father and the Son; which would not be possible unless the Spirit were not the same [substantially] and one substance with the Father and the Son, and therefore it demonstrates one substance of the Father and the Son; whence Augustine [says], in [Book] XV [of] *De Trinitate*: “Charity, by which the Father loves the Son and the Son [loves]

Son,¹⁴² ‘the Holy Spirit is love, and love is the first gift; and whatever is given properly is given by love, and for that reason, because in the Holy Spirit all things are given to us, for which the Spirit is called communion.’^{143/144} So the ‘Holy Spirit is properly (called) Gift,’¹⁴⁵ and has ‘the *ratio* of Gift or gifts (...) from its mode of procession from the Father and Son.’¹⁴⁶ Again, ‘a procession of love’ (*processio amoris*) is ‘a diffusion through the mode of donation (*per modum donationis*), as the gift from a giver.’¹⁴⁷ Most precisely, the Holy Spirit has ‘the *ratio* of gift that specifically is a *habitus*’, that is, ‘a readiness/disposition (*aptitudo*)’ to be given, which is more than a mere potency for being given: ‘So the Holy Spirit is called Gift, not only because He can be given (*dari potest*), but so that He might be given (*detur*): whence gift implies not just ability (*potentia*), but readiness/disposition (*aptitudo*) with respect to the one giving.’¹⁴⁸ Finally, this habitual donative inclination in the Spirit is from eternity: ‘the character of gift from eternity, habitually, as it were, befits the Holy Spirit (...).’¹⁴⁹

Conclusion

An immediate indicator of the historical importance of the *SH*’s Trinitarian theology in the EFIT is its influence on Bonaventure. This is variously visible, but a striking illustration comes from the Seraphic Doctor’s *Breviloquium*, from its discussion of the Trinitarian persons:

the Father, ineffably demonstrates the communion of both.” 3. because [the Holy Spirit] goes forth from the Father and the Son by the same condition and relation or notion, which is common spiration].

142 *SH I* (n. 308), p. 447: ‘(...) quasi formaliter, quia ipse est amor Patris et Filii.’

143 *SH I* (n. 308), p. 446: ‘ipse enim amor est, amor autem est primum donum; quidquid autem donatur proprie amore donatur, et ideo, quia ipso omnia nobis donantur, per ipsum dicitur communio.’

144 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 439: “‘amor est donum intrinsecum in ipso dante, in quo dantur dona extrinseca; prius igitur est donum amoris quam donum aliquod extrinsecum.” In summo igitur largitore prius fuit donum amoris quam aliquod donum extrinsecum conferret creaturis sive esse, antequam scilicet bonitatem creaturis distribueret; fuit igitur donum amoris in Deo ab aeterno’ [“Love is a gift that is intrinsic to the giver himself, by which extrinsic gifts are given; more prior is the gift of love, then, than some extrinsic gift” (William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*). Thus, in the highest lavish giver, the gift of love was prior to any extrinsic gift or existence that he conferred on creatures, before, that is, he distributed goodness to creatures; therefore, the gift of love was in God from eternity (...)].

145 *SH I* (n. 430), p. 623: ‘Spiritus Sanctus proprie Donum est.’

146 *SH I* (n. 430), p. 623: ‘habet rationem doni vel donabilis (...) ex modo suae processionis a Patre et Filio.’

147 *SH I* (n. 304), p. 439.

148 *SH I* (n. 430), p. 623: ‘Unde Spiritus Sanctus dicitur Donum, non solum quia dari potest, sed quia ad hoc est ut detur: unde aptitudinem importat respectu dantis, non solum potentiam.’

149 *SH I* (n. 430), p. 623: ‘ratio doni ab aeterno convenit Spiritui Sancto quasi habitualiter (...).’

7. For it is proper to the Father to be the one without an originator, the unbegotten One; the Principle who proceeds from no other; the Father as such. “Unbegottenness” designates him by means of a negation, but this term also implies an affirmation, since unbegottenness posits in the Father a fountain-fullness. The “Principle that proceeds from no other” designates him by an affirmation followed by a negation. “Father” designates him in a proper, complete, and determinate way, by affirmation and the positing of a relation.¹⁵⁰

8. Similarly, the Son is properly the Image, the Word, and the Son as such. “Image” designates him as expressed likeness, “Word” as expressive likeness, and “Son” as personal likeness. Again, “Image” designates him as likeness in the order of form, “Word” as likeness in the order of reason, and “Son” as likeness in the order of nature.¹⁵¹

9. In the same way, the Holy Spirit is properly the Gift, the mutual bond or Love, and the Holy Spirit as such. “Gift” designates him as the one given gratuitously, “Bond” or “Love” as one given freely as the gift excelling all others, and “Holy Spirit” as one given freely as an excelling gift, who is also personal.¹⁵²

Bonaventure’s choice of proper titles for the Persons, and accompanying explanations, is nearly identical to the Halensist’s as summarized in the preceding section. It seems impossible to imagine that the *SH* is not Bonaventure’s source. Not just here, though. Rather numerous aspects of Bonaventure’s Trinitarian theology can found already in the *SH*, including the important role of *innascibilitas* in the understanding of the person of the Father, the typically Franciscan emphasis on emanational modes of origin as constituting each of the Persons, as the importance of self-diffusive goodness as the deep *ratio* for Trinitarian plurality.

But it would be a disservice to the history of medieval theology to see the *SH* as merely a transitional text and moment in the evolution of the EFIT, as only a conduit of patristic and earlier medieval sources from which Bonaventure’s genius would forge a unique and compelling synthesis. Already present in its admittedly long and unwieldy form—the *desideratum* for a *Breviloquium* is patent—is a series of original insights and influential syntheses of prior strands of thought, even if these remain not fully developed.

One example of such is the ‘the unusual importance attached to the notion of the Good in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*’, which has long been noted by numerous scholars and especially analyzed by Keane’s dissertation.¹⁵³ As the Quaracchi editors put it: ‘it would be difficult to explain more profoundly how the intimate life of the Holy Trinity consists in the intrinsic diffusion of divine goodness’¹⁵⁴ in the *SH*. Or Keane:

150 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 1.3.7 (Monti, 35–6).

151 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 1.3.8 (Monti, 36).

152 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 1.3.9 (Monti, 36).

153 See Keane, ‘The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness,’ esp. 30–58. Keane gives a very helpful discussion of how the theme of divine goodness in the *SH* has been treated by modern scholarship.

154 ‘Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,’ xxxvi, n. 15.

The internal coherence of the application of the logic of diffusive goodness by the summists to the Trinitarian processions, to explicate the metaphysical framework of their speculation and its history, or to point out the implications and consequences of the theory for other important philosophical and theological issues.¹⁵⁵

It is moreover the Halensian stress on the diffusiveness of goodness that no doubt prompts the *SH* to offer an account of the inner life of the Trinity that later scholars have dubbed ‘emanational’ in light of its stress on the emanational modes in which each of the Persons has the divine nature as the basis for Its proper distinction.

Lastly, the most important feature of Halensian Trinitarian theology is arguably its comprehensiveness, that is, the way in which it thinks trinitarianly about all of reality, from the divine nature itself (its unity, truth, and goodness), to divine activity *ad extra* (its power, knowledge, and will), in creation and salvation, to the transcendental properties of all being, including the human person, to its original theory of trinitarian beauty. Its preferred theological tool in this, wielded deftly and creatively, is that of trinitarian appropriations. Found already in Scripture and the Fathers, but forged and deployed in the 12th-century proliferation of Trinitarian reflection in particular among the Victorine masters such as Hugh and especially Richard,¹⁵⁶ this piece of scholastic technology pursued ‘an analogy of structure and proportion’,¹⁵⁷ between triadic sets of essential divine attributes and the divine Persons themselves. As such, in the *SH* (and beyond) it functioned in the service of scholastic speculation to grant ‘a certain access to that which otherwise surpasses natural knowledge’ and to afford ‘an inkling of the [divine] mystery’¹⁵⁸ as the basis for spiritual meditation and ultimately Franciscan doxology.

155 Keane, ‘The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness,’ 7.

156 Dominique Poirel, ‘Scholastic Reasons, Monastic Meditations and Victorine Conciliations: The Question of the Unity and Plurality of God in the Twelfth Century,’ in *Oxford Handbook of the Trinity* (see above, n. 80), 169: ‘It is in this proliferation of reflection that appeared the doctrine of ‘Trinitarian appropriations’, a major 12th-century contribution to Trinitarian theology (Hugh, Abelard, and Richard).’

157 Poirel, ‘Scholastic Reasons,’ 180.

158 Poirel, ‘Scholastic Reasons,’ 179.

Justus H. Hunter

The Contribution of the *Summa Halensis* to the Reason for the Incarnation

Abstract: This article gives a clear presentation of the key contributions of the *Summa Halensis* at the outset of the 13th century debates over the reason for the incarnation (*ratio incarnationis*) among Franciscans at the University of Paris. Moving from Alexander of Hales to the *Summa Halensis*, the article shows the brothers' two signal contributions: 1. the categories of necessity and fittingness, set out at the outset of their commentary on the Lombard's third book of *Sentences*, set a frame for their discussion of the reason for the incarnation, and 2. an advanced appreciation for the problems counterfactual reflection presents for divine freedom. Finally, the brothers' contributions are shown to receive further development in Odo Rigaldus' subsequent reflections on the reason for the incarnation.

If there were no fall, would there be an incarnation? Our earliest record of this counterfactual, which sparked the historic 13th-century debates over the reason for the incarnation (*ratio incarnationis*), occurs early in the 12th century in Rupert of Deutz's commentary on Matthew's Gospel, *De gloria et honore Filii hominis*.¹ He gives only a cursory answer to this question.

The first extended discussion of the question was produced sometime between 1230 and 1235 by Robert Grosseteste in Book 3 of *De cessatione legalium*.² Grosseteste's treatment is roughly contemporaneous with Alexander of Hales' far briefer treatment of the question in his *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* (*Qu. disp.*).³ Both texts predate the treatment of the counterfactual question in Book 3 of the *Summa Halensis*.

The *Summa Halensis* marks an important moment in the history of the reason for the incarnation. When the authors of the *Summa* placed the counterfactual in the opening questions of *Summa Halensis* III, they established it as a common point of disputation for theologians commenting the Lombard's *Sentences*. After the *Summa Halensis*, it was standard to consider the question in the opening distinctions of Book 3, until it was moved by John Duns Scotus to the discussion of Christ's pre-

1 Rupert of Deutz, *De gloria et honore Filii hominis super Mattheum* 13.696 (PL 168:1628B).

2 Robert Grosseteste, *On the Cessation of the Laws*, trans. Stephen M. Hildebrand, The Fathers of the Church Mediaeval Continuation, 13 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012); Robert Grosseteste, *De Cessatione Legalium*, ed. Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King, *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi*, 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

3 Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae "Antequam esset frater"* (hereafter, *Qu. disp.*), q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 3 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 1:207–9.

destination in Distinction 7.⁴ However, placement was not the only contribution made by the *Summa Halensis* to the reason for the incarnation.

Though the treatment of the counterfactual question in the *Summa Halensis* is brief, spanning just over two columns of text, it marks a significant moment of development in Franciscan reflection on the reason for the incarnation. Broader contributions of the *Summa Halensis* can be observed by comparison with the treatment of the reason for the incarnation by the two scholars who occupied the Franciscan chair at Paris before (Alexander of Hales) and after (Odo Rigaldus) the period in which Book 3 of the *Summa Halensis* was authored. When viewed together, we see the *Summa Halensis* III marks important developments from Alexander's *Glossa* and *Qu. disp.*, and prepares the even more advanced treatment of the reason for the incarnation by Odo Rigaldus. Thus, in order to assess the particular contribution of the *Summa Halensis* to the reason for the incarnation, we will consider the key texts on the topic in the work of Alexander of Hales, the *Summa Halensis*, and Odo Rigaldus. Together, these texts develop the key conceptual framework for the later, influential reflections on the reason for the incarnation by Bonaventure and Duns Scotus.

Alexander of Hales

Alexander's *Glossa* does not directly address the counterfactual question. It does, however, include comments on multiple causes of the incarnation.⁵ Later, Alexander discusses the counterfactual briefly in his Disputed Question 15, *de incarnatione*. Thus, the best we can discern of Alexander's thought on the reason for the incarnation arises from an analysis of both the *Glossa* and the discussion of the counterfactual in the disputed question.

Redaction A(E) of the *Glossa*, Book 3, was composed circa 1225 to 1227.⁶ In Book 3, Distinction 1, Alexander considers 'multiple causes for the incarnation of the Son'.

⁴ One exception to this rule is the commentary of Albertus Magnus, which locates the question in Distinction 20 of Book 3, on the passion. See Albert the Great, *Commentarii in III Sententiarum*, d. 20, a. 4, in *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, vol. 28, ed. Étienne César Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1894), 360–2.

⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) III, d. 1, 4, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 3:12.

⁶ Victorinus Doucet, Caelestinus Piana, and Gedeon Gàl, 'Prolegomena,' in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 3:32*. For the relevant passages, Redaction E follows A, and L is variant. I will be following Redaction A(E) insofar as 1. the authorship of Redaction L is uncertain and 2. L simply relocates the text of A(E) later in Distinction 1 of Book 3. For a discussion of the text-critical issues in Alexander's *Glossa*, see Walter Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, vol. 2, *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1967), 16–20; Hubert Philipp Weber, 'The

He gives much attention to the phrase, ‘of the Son’. Alexander’s chief concerns are the topics addressed in Peter Lombard’s first distinction of Book 3 of the *Sentences*: why the Son is incarnate and not the Father or Spirit, whether the Father or Spirit could become incarnate then or now, and so on. It is notable, however, that all the arguments he considers have in view the redemption from sin. For instance, Alexander argues that, since all were created in the Word of God, they ought to be *recreated* through the same.⁷ This is consistent with Alexander’s fundamental conception of the incarnate Son as ‘the repairer of human nature’.⁸

As Walter Principe observes, the *Glossa* produces an argument that will recur in the discussion of the motive for the incarnation in the *Summa Halensis*.⁹ It arises, however, in Alexander’s discussion of the Trinity at *Glossa* I, Distinction 31. There, Alexander recites several arguments, against Arians and others, that God is one essence in three persons. The second argument anticipates an argument on the reason for the incarnation in the *Summa Halensis*. Alexander observes the existence of two extremes in nature: multiple essences in multiple persons, and one essence in one person. He then posits that ‘extremes are not in reality unless there is a mediate in which there is no opposite’.¹⁰ The mediate, in this case, would be multiple persons in one nature, and one person in multiple natures. The argument, therefore, applies both to the doctrine of the Trinity and the incarnation. As we will see, the brothers apply it to the latter in the *Summa Halensis*.

The *Qu. disp.* give a clearer view of Alexander’s thought on the reason for the incarnation. The *Qu. disp.* are dated sometime between 1220 and 1236.¹¹ At Question 15, Distinction 2, Membrum 4, Alexander considers ‘whether the incarnation would have had a certain usefulness assuming there were no passion’.¹² He first gives one argument for the negative by appeal to the *praechonium paschale*, a regularly cited authority in medieval debates on the reason for the incarnation. Alexander cites the prayer as follows: ‘(our) birth would have been no gain, had we not been redeemed.’¹³ The same authority appears, also alone, in favor of the negative in the *Summa Halensis*.¹⁴

Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales,’ in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, ed. Philip W. Rosemann (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 79–109.

7 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 1, 4, 3:12–3, at 12: ‘Multiplex est causa quare Filius incarnatus est.’ All translations are my own.

8 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 1, 3, 3:12: ‘Filius Dei incarnatus est reparator generis humani.’

9 Principe, *Theology of the Hypostatic Union*, 82.

10 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 31, 32b, 1:315: ‘Cum ergo extrema non sint in actu rerum, nisi et media sint in quibus non est oppositio.’

11 ‘Prolegomena,’ in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae “Antequam esset frater”*, 3:36*.

12 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 45, 1:207: ‘Consequenter quaeritur, posito quod non esset passio, utrum incarnatio aliquam utilitatem haberet.’

13 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 45, 1:207–8, at 208: ‘Nihil nasci profuit nisi redimi profuisset.’

Alexander gives three counterarguments. Two appear in the *Summa Halensis*. First, he cites the influential passage from Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima*; since the soul is created for glory in both its sensitive and intellectual parts, that through which it reaches glory should be both sensitive and intellectual.¹⁵ Second, he argues, the greatest goodness should declare itself to creation in the greatest way, which requires incarnation in order that the greatest goodness would be manifest.¹⁶ Here Alexander recalls the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius.¹⁷ Third, natural philosophy shows there to be a 'concatenation'—a linking of things—in the world, as between the elements and higher bodies. But for the perfection of this concatenation, there ought to be a further link of deity with creatures. In particular, based on prior arguments for the suitability of union with human nature, this link ought especially to be with human nature. Hence, for the sake of a perfect concatenation, there ought to be incarnation even without passion.¹⁸ Similar appeals to the 'perfect concatenation of the universe' are common in Robert Grosseteste's arguments on the reason for the incarnation in *De cessatione legalium* III.

Alexander favors the arguments for the affirmative response; yes, there would be incarnation without the fall and passion. He responds to the appeal to the *praechonium paschale*; while it is true that our birth would be to no gain unless we are redeemed 'regarding the fittingness of redemption, nevertheless it would be great delight for man were he to see the union of his nature with deity, even if there were no passion.'¹⁹

Although Alexander's early *Glossa* thought of the reason for the incarnation chiefly in connection to the redemption from sin, by the time of the disputed questions he preferred the position that even without the fall and passion there would be an incarnation for the magnified delight of humanity. Moreover, he recites several important authorities (i.e. *praechonium paschale*, Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima*, and Pseudo-Dionysius) and a speculative argument (i.e. concatenation) in Disputed Question 15 that would recur in subsequent debates over the reason for the incarnation.

14 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (SH), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Ad oppositum 1, p. 42.

15 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 46, 1:208. See *De spiritu et anima* 9 (PL 40:785).

16 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 47, 1:208.

17 And so the critical edition cites Eriugena's *Versio Dionysii*; see Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 47, 1:208, n. 3.

18 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 48, 1:208–9.

19 Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 2, m. 4, 49, 1:209: 'Nihil nasci profuit quantum ad convenientem redemptionem; tamen magna delectatio esset homini, quod videret naturam suam unitam deitati etiam si non esset passio.' N.b. Alexander also supplies a standard defense of Anselm's argument at *Cur Deus homo* in Alexander of Hales, *Qu. disp.*, q. 15, d. 3, m. 1, 1:211–3, when he inquires whether or not the incarnation was necessary for repairing the fall, to which he responds that it was fitting that satisfaction be made through the union of divine and human nature.

Summa Halensis

Book 3 of the *Summa Halensis* opens with a tract on the incarnation and assumption in four questions: the necessity of the incarnation (Question 1), the fittingness (*convenientia*) of the incarnation (Question 2), the predestination of the incarnation (Question 3), and the act of the incarnation (Question 4). The first question cites Anselm of Canterbury's *Cur Deus homo* dozens of times. Thus, question one concludes, in Chapter 7, with a consideration of 'whether the reparation of humanity ought to be accomplished by the God-man.'²⁰

Whereas question one focuses upon issues of necessity, in line with Anselm's *rationes*, question two turns to issues of fittingness. This concern arises from Peter Lombard's opening distinctions of *Sentences* III and several arguments from John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* III. There, the Lombard considers speculative possibilities beyond the *de facto* order, such as the possibility of incarnation of the Father and Holy Spirit. Thus, the brothers, in considering the fittingness of the incarnation, revised Anselm's *rationes* in light of problems provoked by the Lombard's questions.

Having determined the incarnation of the Father or Spirit is not suitable, the brothers ask whether or not they could possibly become incarnate.²¹ The first argument for the negative is taken from Anselm:

In book I of *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm says: "Impossibility follows from whatever is unfitting for God." But if another person than the Son were to become incarnate, unfittingness for God would follow; therefore it is impossible that another person than the Son become incarnate. The middle is clear: for it is unfitting for God that there be confusion of the character of the persons.²²

This teaching is opposed by Peter Lombard who insists the Father or the Spirit could have become incarnate, although the Son was the most fittingly incarnate.²³ Whereas the Lombard gives no argument, rational or authoritative, for his position, the *Summa Halensis* develops two—one based on Augustine's theology of the *imago Trinitatis*, the other by appeal to the *Glossa Ordinaria*. In this way, the brothers juxtapose Anselm and Lombard, alongside other authorities, a strategy they pursue elsewhere.²⁴

²⁰ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C7 (n. 9), pp. 23–4: 'Utrum reparatio humani generis debeat fieri per hominem Deum.' Andrew Rosato's essay in the companion to this volume gives a thorough account of the *Summa's* reliance upon and departure from Anselm's *Cur Deus homo*.

²¹ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar2 (n. 15), pp. 31–2.

²² SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar2 (n. 15), Ad oppositum a, p. 32: 'I libro *Cur Deus homo*, dicit Anselmus: "Quodlibet inconveniens Deo sequitur impossibile." Sed, si alia persona quam Filius incarnaretur, sequeretur inconveniens Deo; ergo impossibile est aliam personam quam Filium incarnari. Media patet: Inconveniens enim est Deo quod sit confusio dignitatis personarum.'

²³ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 3, d. 1, c. 2, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 2:26.

²⁴ E.g. SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C3 (n. 18), pp. 28–30.

The brothers attempt to accommodate both Anselm and Lombard with a distinction between two kinds of ‘divine possibility’:

Something is said to be “divinely possible” in two ways, namely what is absolutely possible, and this way is spoken of in III *Sententiarum*, that any divine person is able to become incarnate; and what is suitably possible, and in this way to become incarnate befits the Son alone.²⁵

On questions of suitability (*congruentia*) or fittingness (*convenientia*), the brothers are not afraid to diverge, with all propriety, from Anselm.

Indeed, this judgment is clarified in the preceding article, which considers whether or not it is as fitting for the Father or Spirit to be incarnate as the Son.²⁶ The *Summa Halensis* recites the arguments of John Damascene that incarnation of either the Father or Spirit would be fitting. However, the brothers juxtapose the Damascene with arguments, first, from Anselm, but also from Hugh of St Victor and Augustine. This juxtaposition of authorities leads the brothers to clarify several senses in which the incarnation is *fitting*, and one which is most fitting (*convenientius*). Whereas the incarnation of the Father and the Spirit is fitting, it is only according to appropriation (*secundum appropriationem*), whereas the incarnation of the Son is fitting both according to appropriation and according to peculiar property (*secundum proprium*).²⁷ More precisely, the brothers argue that, according to appropriation, the act of the incarnation is more fitting to the Spirit, to whom goodness and love is appropriated, insofar as love is the proximate motive for the act of incarnation.²⁸ Here the *Summa Halensis* recalls the Lombard’s argument for the Spirit’s unique role in the work of the incarnation ‘because the Holy Spirit is the charity and gift of Father and Son, and the Word of God was made flesh by the ineffable charity of God.’²⁹ But the incarnation of the Son is both 1. fitting according to appropriation (per a. 1), and 2. fitting according to peculiar property, in this case filiation, and therefore more fitting.

Whereas the questions which precede are clearly concerned to square the arguments of *Cur Deus homo* with other sources, notably the Lombard, when the *Summa Halensis* raises the counterfactual question of the reason for the incarnation, the brothers gather an assemblage of other authorities. Here they show the same instinct as Robert Grosseteste in *De cessatione legalium* to go beyond Anselm in fidelity to his methods.³⁰

²⁵ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar2 (n. 15), p. 32: ‘Dicendum quod est ‘posse divinum’ dupliciter, scilicet posse absolute, et hoc modo dicitur, III *Sententiarum*, quod quaelibet persona potuit incarnari; et est posse de congruentia, et hoc modo soli Filio convenit incarnari.’

²⁶ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar1 (n. 14), pp. 30–1.

²⁷ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar1 (n. 14), Ad obiecta 1–2, p. 31.

²⁸ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C4, Ar2 (n. 15), Ad obiecta 2, p. 32.

²⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 3, d. 4, c. 1 (Brady, 2:38): ‘Quia Spiritus Sanctus est caritas et donum Patris et Filii, et ineffabili Dei caritate Verbum Dei caro factum est.’

³⁰ Robert Grosseteste, *De Cessatione Legalium* 3.1.1 (Dales and King, 119).

The brothers deploy *convenientia* exclusively when they speculate ‘whether, if nature had not fallen through sin, there would nevertheless be a reason or fittingness (*ratio vel convenientia*) to the incarnation.’³¹ The *Summa Halensis* assembles four arguments in support of the conclusion that, even without the fall, the incarnation would be fitting. First, as Pseudo-Dionysius says, the Good is diffusive of itself. Just as the Father diffuses his goodness in the generation of the Son, if creation exists there should be the greatest possible diffusion of the Good. The greatest possible diffusion in creation would be for the creature to be united to the Good itself. Second, per Pseudo-Augustine’s *De spiritu et anima*, the incarnation, even in a world without sin, would be necessary for the full beatitude of the human person, both spiritual and intellectual. ‘If the entire human would be beatified in God, God ought to be corporeal and sensible.’³² Third, since there exist three persons in unity of substance (the Trinity), as well as three persons in three substances, (three human beings), there ought to be three substances in unity of person. How is this possible? The creation of a human nature composed of a body and soul (two natures) united to a divine person with a divine nature (one person and one nature). Fourth, if the divine nature possesses a power for existence in multiple (three) persons, divine persons possess a power for existence in multiple natures. This can only be realized in union with a created nature, which is most fittingly a union between the Son with a human nature. Here, as in earlier arguments, the *Summa Halensis* significantly expands the Lombard’s *Sentences* assertions for the fittingness of the Son, rather than Father or Spirit, to be incarnate, and for incarnation to be with a human nature, rather than an angelic nature.

We can note already the similarity between the *Summa Halensis* and Alexander’s *Glossa* and *Qu. disp.* The first two arguments of the *Summa Halensis* are the first two supplied in the *Qu. disp.* 15. The third argument of the *Summa Halensis* recalls the Trinitarian argument at *Glossa* I, Distinction 31. The brothers’ fourth argument is closely related to, and possible derived from, that third, Trinitarian argument of the *Glossa* I, Distinction 31. Moreover, the brothers’ lone argument for the opposite is an appeal to the *praechonium paschale*, the same text that appears in the *Glossa* III, Distinction 1. It is apparent, then, that the author of the treatment of the reason for the incarnation in the *Summa Halensis* was closely acquainted with Alexander’s thought on the topic.

While the formulation of the question and the objections are clearly indebted to Alexander, the actual response of the *Summa Halensis* moves well beyond Alexander. The brothers respond in favor of their preferred, affirmative response to the counterfactual by appeal to two authorities. They produce an original argument from Bernard of Clairvaux’s commentary upon Jon. 1:12. Bernard points out that Lucifer’s fore-

31 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), p. 41: ‘si non fuisset natura lapsa per peccatum, utrum scilicet esset ratio vel convenientia ad incarnationem.’

32 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), arg. 1b, p. 41: ‘si ergo totus homo debet beatificari in Deo, oportet Deum esse corporalem et sensibilem.’

knowledge of the incarnation was a condition of his envy and temptation of humans.³³ If Lucifer has prevision of the incarnation independent of the Fall, then the incarnation is independent of the Fall.³⁴

In further support of their position, the *Summa Halensis*, like Alexander, also supplies the authority of *De spiritu et anima*:

For this reason God became man, that the whole human being might be beatified in him, that humanity might advance both inwardly through intellect, and excel outwardly through sense, that they might find pasture in their Creator, interior pasture in the cognition of deity, outward pasture in the flesh of the Savior.³⁵

The *Summa Halensis* adds an assertion: ‘And this reason (*ratio*) remains, and circumscribes the fall of human nature.’³⁶ The cursory assertion belies the advanced understanding of the problem in the *Summa Halensis* vis-a-vis Alexander. According to the *Summa Halensis*, two specific arguments warrant the conclusion that incarnation would have a reason or fittingness apart from the fall: 1. the authoritative reference to Lucifer’s foreknowledge, and 2. a particular reason for the incarnation in a world without sin, supplied by *De spiritu et anima*. The importance of the particular reason supplied by *De spiritu et anima* explains its repeated recitation, both in the second argument for the affirmative, and in the response.

There remains the alternative authority of the *praechonium paschale*, cited by both Alexander and the *Summa Halensis*. Once again, the *Summa Halensis* makes an important contribution to the reason for the incarnation. The brothers suggest the hymn be understood ‘supposing the guilt of the fall of nature’.³⁷ Given the guilt of the fall, incarnation without redemption would be unprofitable. However, incarnation without redemption would be fitting ‘if the fall of human nature were circumscribed’.³⁸ In that case, while redemption would not be necessary, beatitude would, and beatitude, according to the authority of Pseudo-Augustine, has as a necessary condition the sensitive soul’s perception of God. And that perception is made possible by the incarnation.

We can note, then, several important developments in the brothers’ application of Alexander’s various arguments. The *Summa Halensis* introduces new authorities,

33 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Respondeo, p. 42.

34 Robert Grosseteste produces a similar argument, but from the prevision of Adam on the basis of Eph. 5:32, at *De Cessatione Legalium* 3.1.20 (Dales and King, 127).

35 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Respondeo, p. 42: “Propterea Deus factus est homo, ut totum hominem in se beatificaret, ut sive homo ingrederetur intus per intellectum, sive egrederetur extra per sensum, in Creatore suo pascua inveniret, pascua intus in cognitione deitatis, pascua foris in carne Salvatoris”.

36 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Respondeo, p. 42: ‘Haec autem ratio manet, etiam circumscripto lapsu humanae naturae.’

37 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), p. 42: ‘supposito reatu naturae lapsae’.

38 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), Ad obiecta 1, p. 42: ‘si circumscribatur lapsus humanae naturae’.

especially Bernard of Clairvaux. More importantly, the *Summa Halensis* is far more conscious of the relative value of competing authorities. Among them, the *Summa Halensis* isolates the specific reason given in Pseudo-Augustine: that the human creature, in both its sensitive and intellective faculties, might ‘find pasture’ in the Creator. This specific reason remains for worlds without fall and passion. The brothers’ fixation on this argument, attached to this particular authority, likely explains the recurring appeals to the passage in subsequent treatments of the motive for the incarnation by both Franciscans and Dominicans. Finally, the *Summa Halensis* develops a broader grammar for speculation, namely *ratio* and *convenientia*. This grammar permits the brothers to specify a reason in other possible worlds (circumscribing the fall) while remaining grounded in the authority of Pseudo-Augustine and Bernard.

Odo Rigaldus

In 1230, two years following his entry into the Friars Minor, Alexander was succeeded by his student, John of La Rochelle. John, the likely author of *Summa Halensis* III, held the chair until he fell ill in 1244, finally succumbing in 1245, the same year of Alexander’s death. John was then succeeded by Odo Rigaldus, another student of Alexander. Like John, Odo was possibly involved in the preparation of the *Summa Halensis*, although where and to what extent remains debated.³⁹ He held the Franciscan Chair until 1248, at which point he became Archbishop of Rouen.⁴⁰ As we will see, Odo’s treatment reflects engagement with Alexander, the *Summa Halensis*, and other sources.

In direct contrast with Alexander and the brothers, Odo prefers the negative response to the counterfactual question: incarnation without the fall is against the piety of faith.⁴¹ His argument is clear: unless the Son were incarnate principally for the redemption of sin, we would not be so grateful for the incarnation. To this

³⁹ François-Marie Henquinet, ‘Eudes de Rosny, O.F.M., Eudes Rigaud et La Somme d’Alexandre d’Hales,’ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 33 (1940): 3–54. See also the analysis of Henquinet and others in Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa,’ *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 26–41; Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa (Continued),’ *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 274–312. Finally, note Principe’s comments against Henquinet and Doucet in Principe, *Theology of the Hypostatic Union*, 15, n. 6.

⁴⁰ For a full account of Odo’s life, with special attention given to his duties as Archbishop of Rouen, see Adam J. Davis, *The Holy Bureaucrat: Eudes Rigaud and Religious Reform in Thirteenth-Century Normandy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

⁴¹ Odo’s unedited treatment of the motive for the incarnation is attached to an article by Johannes Bissen as an appendix entitled ‘Fratris Odonis Rigaldis Quaestio Inedita de Motivo Incarnationis.’ It is otherwise unavailable in print. See Johannes Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis: Disquisitio historico-dogmatica,’ *Antonianum* 7 (1932): 334–6.

argument he adds the authority of Bernard, who says that without sin there would not be the mother of God.⁴²

Yet Odo is not so confident as that; he leaves open the possibility of being convinced otherwise: ‘unless I were to see more explicit reasons or authorities, I do not believe that the Son of God would have become man unless humanity had fallen.’⁴³ Odo’s reservations and subtle appreciation for the question, marking a distinction between reasons and authorities (*rationem vel auctoritatem*), mark important developments in the history of the reason for the incarnation, prepared by the *Summa Halensis*.

Odo considers seven arguments for the affirmative response to the counterfactual: four speculative reasons and three arguments from authorities. The first argument is the now familiar argument from the diffusion of the Good, which we saw explicitly in the *Summa Halensis*, and implicitly in Alexander’s *Qu. disp.*⁴⁴ The second argument builds upon two premises: 1. God gives to all creature the happiness of which they are capable, and 2. some creature is capable of union with God. He therefore concludes that God would actualize the capacity for union even without sin.

Odo interweaves his objections to both arguments. It is not necessary that the diffusion of Goodness be manifest in every possible good, but only that there be an eternal diffusion. This need is satisfied by the generation of the Son from eternity. Moreover, the simple creation of the world is a sufficient manifestation of the diffusion of goodness to that which is not God. While God could make multiple worlds, God is not obligated to do so.⁴⁵ Thus, it must not be the case that divine goodness requires the actualization of every possibility or capacity of creation.

Odo considers two further speculative arguments for the affirmative to the counterfactual. Since, according to 1 Cor. 11, ‘man is the head of woman, and Christ the head of man’, unless the Son becomes incarnate, man would lack his head, and the universe would be incomplete, ‘like a picture without a head’.⁴⁶ Here Odo recalls the *Summa Halensis*’ arguments for the perfect concatenation of the universe. The fourth argument we also encountered in the *Summa Halensis*; in the incarnation we find three natures in one person, which completes the universe. The argument is slightly different in Odo’s text. In the *Summa Halensis*, the argument is for the revelation of the extent of divine power. The brothers show a distinctive emphasis upon the revelatory effects of the incarnation. In Odo, the argument is for the completion of the universe, in keeping with the critical theological issue Odo is concerned to confront: whether or not God is obligated to become incarnate in order to perfect some capacity of creation.

⁴² Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 335, contra.

⁴³ Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 335, respondeo: ‘Dicendum, quod nisi videam rationem vel auctoritatem magis expressam, non credo quod Filius Dei factus esset homo nisi homo peccasset.’

⁴⁴ Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 334, sic 2.

⁴⁵ Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 335.

⁴⁶ Bissen, ‘De Motivo Incarnationis,’ 334.

Odo rebuts both arguments for the perfection of the universe with a single argument. Here he makes a critical distinction: Christ is not of the universe (*de universo*), but beyond the entire universe (*supra totum universum*). And so the incarnation cannot be for the completion of the natural order, for the perfection of the universe.

Finally, Odo considers three authoritative arguments. Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima* 9, and Bernard's interpretation of Jon. 1:12, the favored authorities in the *Summa Halensis*, are both recited and rebutted by Odo. Odo includes a further argument from predestination, citing Rom. 1:4 in support. The two authorities pertaining to predestination fail because 'God foresaw from eternity himself becoming human and (humanity's) sinning, and his repairing through incarnation.'⁴⁷ The appeal to *De spiritu et anima* Augustine does not obtain for possible worlds without sin because beatitude in these worlds would include corporeal beatitude as a result of the overflow of glory from the soul into the body. Odo's response to *De spiritu et anima* concludes with a highly characteristic assertion: 'it is nevertheless true that it is a great glory, but not essential, (that we are beatified) by the vision of the most brilliant and beautiful humanity of Christ our Lord.'⁴⁸ The incarnation is both entirely free from necessity, and nevertheless the humanity of Christ is the most brilliant and beautiful created thing.

Odo concludes his reflection on the motive for the incarnation by returning to his central argument: 'But those who want to say that he would have become united to a creature say that we nevertheless owe him thanksgiving, because he assumed a passible and mortal nature, as a result of sin. Therefore we ought to give thanks, yet not as much.'⁴⁹ It is therefore preferable, lacking any compelling argument from authority or reason to the contrary, to say that Christ came to destroy sin and repair nature.

Like the *Summa Halensis* before him, Odo both carries forward and expands the arguments and authorities considered by his predecessors. Notable, however, is his clear distinction between speculative arguments and arguments from authority. Odo's attention to this distinction allows him to rebut these classes of arguments in two distinct, yet coherent ways. When faced with speculative arguments, Odo carefully frees them from entailing any obligation for God to actualize a capacity for the perfection of creation by way of incarnation. Christ remains, for Odo, beyond that which is for the perfection of the universe. When considering authorities, Odo glosses them in line with his aforementioned commitment to divine freedom. It is, finally, this careful preservation of divine freedom which characterizes Odo's contribution

47 Bissen, 'De Motivo Incarnationis,' 336: 'Deus praeviderat ab aeterno se facturum hominem et illum peccatum et se reparaturum per incarnationem.'

48 Bissen, 'De Motivo Incarnationis,' 335: 'Verum est tamen quod magnum est gaudium, sed non essenziale, in visione praeclarissimae et formosissimae humanitatis Christi Domini nostri.'

49 Bissen, 'De Motivo Incarnationis,' 336: 'Illi autem qui volunt dicere quod fuisset unitus creaturae, dicunt quod nihilominus debemus ei gratiarum actiones, quia tunc assumpsisset naturam passibilem et mortalem, sicut fecit post peccatum; et ideo nihilominus tenetur ad gratiarum actiones, sed non tamen ad tot.'

to the reason for the incarnation. His primary concern is that the counterfactual not be settled too strongly one way or the other, for theological reasons. This attitude remains prominent in subsequent approaches to the reason for the incarnation.

The Contribution of the *Summa Halensis*

What exactly does the *Summa Halensis* contribute to the Franciscan tradition of reflection on the reason for the incarnation? Viewed alongside Alexander, we can see several important advances in the *Summa Halensis*. The brothers' placement of the counterfactual question within a treatise on the fittingness of the incarnation, as opposed to its necessity, and the resultant juxtaposition of Anselm with the Lombard and others, produces a climate whereby they advance the understanding of the problem posed by the counterfactual question. This advance is expressed in their pursuit of a reason for the incarnation circumscribing the fall, which they find in the need for a sensitive object for glorification. The arguments of the *Summa Halensis*, then, are all measured with greater sensitivity to the problems posed by the counterfactual than in Alexander's texts. Moreover, they are framed, textually, alongside an important set of distinctions on necessity, possibility, and fittingness.

Odo Rigaldus further advances the *Summa Halensis*' understanding of the problems provoked by the counterfactual as well as the kinds of arguments required for a response. Most notably, he draws the concerns about divine freedom that arise in the *Summa Halensis* directly into the debates over the counterfactual question of the reason for the incarnation. As a result, Odo establishes a firm, explicit commitment to divine freedom that will hold for all the major subsequent Franciscan treatments of the reason for the incarnation in the 13th century. That commitment was prepared by the *Summa Halensis*, in its explorations of fittingness, in its probing after particular kinds of reasons, and in its weighing of them. For that, even the giants Bonaventure of Bagnaregio and John Duns Scotus are in the brothers' debt.

Theo Kobusch

The Summa Halensis

Towards a New Concept of ‘Person’

Abstract: The *Summa Halensis* is, although written by many authors, the birthplace of a new concept of person. To be sure, the traditional definitions of person by Boethius and Richard of St Victor are not rejected, but they are interpreted within a new ontological frame. This new frame is indicated by the notion of *esse morale*, to be distinguished from natural being (*esse naturale*) and rational being (*esse rationis*). The person has a ‘moral being’ which means they are first of all a being of freedom. As such, they are assigned, and this in contradistinction to both natural things and rational things, the specific property (*proprietas*) of ‘dignity’. This dignity is not an incidental but an essential characteristic of the person. Within the aforementioned sources, the moral dimension of the person is highlighted for the first time as its proper nature, which thus pertains from then on to the domain of practical philosophy. The fields of contemporary Christology and philosophy in general also (Bonaventure, Thomas of Aquinas, natural law, Kant) adopted this new concept of person and furthermore created a new idea of individuality according with the *Summa Halensis*: the ‘moral individual’, to be distinguished from the natural and the artificial individual.

The Manifold Meaning of the Concept of Person

Plato and Aristotle did not know what a person is. It was the product of late antiquity, which was the first to develop a concept of the person in the modern sense. Certainly, the Greeks knew what a *prosôpon* is, namely the countenance of the human frontally facing us, or the artificial face of a mask, and the Romans understood the *persona* as the identical role of the actor behind the mask seeping through, yet they did not know what a person is.¹

Even when the concept *persona* is used to denote, so to say, the role in life of the human, i. e. the role he plays in both life and society, still there is a lack of awareness for persons as being distinct from all other things in this world. Cicero’s famous theory of the four roles, which are assigned to the human partly by nature, by universal reason, by coincidence or are chosen by man himself as *cursum vitae*, mirrors what Stoic philosophy has regarded as the determining factors of human life. However,

¹ For an overview cf. Manfred Fuhrmann, ‘Person,’ in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 7, ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (Basel: Schwabe, 1989), 269 – 83.

it does not become clear in this theory, what the unitary ground of personhood is.² When Epictetus later proclaimed the *prohairesis* to be the ground of the person, he took a big step towards the doctrine of will, which contraposes everything volitional with all that is natural.³

To theology it is of elementary significance, that the concept of person has also been incorporated into the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Indeed, the Latin translation of the Greek *hypostasis* with *persona* is anything but transparent. For *hypostasis* is in fact a being in itself, a subsistence, which is to be distinguished from that which is an object of human thought (*epinoia*). Through the doctrine of the Trinity we may be able to better understand—than for instance Aristotle has—what a relation is, what constitutes relational being, even perhaps what being mind involves, yet what a person is, we cannot gather from it. This too is the judgement of famous modern theologians and philosophers.⁴

It shall not remain unmentioned at this point, that the concept of person also plays a significant role in ancient grammar.

A reflection of this manifold meaning of the concept of person as found in Antiquity is provided to us by the Middle Ages. For in the school of Chartres e.g., or also in Abelard, philosophy explicitly contrasts its respective view from that of the trivium, i.e. above all from grammar and rhetoric, particularly in the case of the question so important to philosophical theology concerning the meaning of the concept of person. Abelard is profoundly aware of the ambiguity of the concept of person.⁵ In all three great versions of his ‘Theology’—which is not a revealed theology, but a philosophical theology—i.e. in the *Theologia ‘Summi Boni’*, in the *Theologia Christiana* and in the *Theologia ‘Scholarium’*, he has distinguished between the grammatical, rhetorical and theological meaning of the concept of person. It is very early on that we all learn the grammatical meaning of the concept of ‘person’ by learning to distinguish between personal pronouns. The human being is in this sense three per-

2 Cf. the illuminating explanations of Maximilian Forschner, ‘Der Begriff der Person in der Stoa,’ in *Person: Philosophiegeschichte – Theoretische Philosophie – Praktische Philosophie*, ed. Dieter Sturma (Paderborn: Mentis, 2001), 40–6.

3 Epictetus plays a special role in the history of the concept of person, cf. Charles H. Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine,’ in *The Question of ‘Eclecticism’: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, ed. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 234–59 and Maximilian Forschner, ‘Epiktets Freiheit im Verhältnis zur klassischen stoischen Lehre (Diss. IV 1),’ in *Epiktet, Was ist wahre Freiheit?: Diatribe IV 1*, ed. Samuel Vollenweider et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 97–118.

4 Cf. Forschner, ‘Der Begriff der Person,’ 39.

5 Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.181.2228, in *Petri Abaelardi opera theologica*, vol. 2, ed. E.M. Buytaert, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 12 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), 263: ‘Tribus itaque seu quatuor modis ac pluribus fortassis hoc nomen ‘persona’ sumitur, aliter videlicet a theologis, aliter a grammaticis, aliter a rhetoricis vel in comoediis (...)’ [So the word ‘person’ is taken in three or four ways (and perhaps more besides): in one way by theologians, in another way by grammarians, in another way by rhetoricians or in comedies]. All translations from the Latin in the footnotes are from Mark Thakkar.

sons, namely the one who speaks, as well as the one at whom the words are directed and lastly the one of whom one speaks to another. These three persons in one human being are indeed only to be distinguished by their corresponding propria, namely the speaking of the one who speaks, the listening of the listener and the being-an-object for the two who are conversing. This meaning of the concept of person can in a certain sense be transferred to the theological domain.

It is of extraordinary significance that Abelard portends to the rhetorical meaning of the concept of person. This rhetorical tradition is of central importance for the concept of person, because here it pertains to the person, who has to take responsibility for a certain deed while standing trial at court.⁶ This is the object of the kind of rhetoric which was founded by Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd century B.C.) and which Hermogenes of Tarsos (2nd century A.D.) and his famous commentators (Sopatros and Syrianos among numerous anonymi) have continued within the Greek domain. In the Latin domain it was initially presented to us by Cicero in his early work *De inventione*, partly also in his later works, and so too by the Auctor ad Herennium. The Cicero commentaries of Marius Victorinus and Thierry of Chartres complete this rhetorical tradition.⁷

Rhetoric regards the person as a specific subject, together with what it has done as a subject. More precisely, the rhetoricians, in contrast to the grammarians, understand the person as a substance, whose activity is the activity of reason, so that—in the terminology of the rhetorical tradition—*persona* and *negotium* and correspondingly so too the attributes of the person and the attributes of the deed must always be distinguished.⁸ For this rhetorical meaning of the concept of person, Abelard refers to Boethius' commentary on the *Topics*, which reads: 'a person is that which is called to court, whose words and deeds are the object of prosecution', but also to Boethius' famous definition of person according to which it is 'an individual sub-

6 For the following cf. the detailed explanation in Theo Kobusch, *Selbstwerdung und Personalität: Spätantike Philosophie und ihr Einfluß auf die Moderne* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), 348–71.

7 Further details can be found in Peter von Moos, 'Dialektik, Rhetorik und "civilis scientia" im Hochmittelalter,' in *Dialektik und Rhetorik im frühen und hohen Mittelalter: Rezeption, Überlieferung und gesellschaftliche Wirkung antiker Gelehrsamkeit vornehmlich im 9. und 12. Jahrhundert*, ed. Johannes Fried (Munich: De Gruyter, 1997), 139–44; see also Mary Dickey, 'Some Commentaries on the "De Interventione" and "Ad Herennium" of the 11th and 12th centuries,' *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 6 (1968): 1–41, where the important role of Manegold of Lautenbach is emphasized.

8 Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.178.2207–10 (Buytaert, 262): 'Rhetores quoque alio modo quam theologi siue grammatici personam accipiunt, pro substantia scilicet rationali, ubi uidelicet de persona et negotio agunt et locos rhetoricos per attributa personae et attributa negotio distinguunt' [Rhetoricians also take 'person' in a different way than theologians or grammarians, namely for a rational substance, viz. where they deal with the person and the action and distinguish rhetorical loci by what is attributed to the person and what is attributed to the action]. Concerning the different kinds of attributes see Lucia Calboli Montefusco, 'Die *attributa personis* und die *attributa negotiis* als *loci* der Argumentation,' in *Topik und Rhetorik: Ein interdisziplinäres Symposium*, ed. Thomas Schirren and Gert Ueding (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2000), 37–50.

stance of a rational nature'.⁹ This definition, however, cannot be applied to theology at all, as in order to do so, tritheism would have to be posited.¹⁰ But since in the same place Boethius—as Abelard argues—refers to the ancient explanation of the concept *persona*, which takes it to mean the masks, which represent the people in comedies and tragedies, who are at their centre, the famous definition of person (*naturae rationalis individua substantia*) means precisely this rhetorical sense. And therefore, we call—as Abelard says—the persons in the comedies those people who portray through their *gestus* that which we say and do.¹¹

It was moreover within the rhetorical tradition that one became aware for the first time of what a person is. Indeed, this occurred precisely through the insight that the person is not a What. Rather, the person is the Who of a human being, while the *negotium* is the What, namely what one has done.¹² The distinction between the questions pertaining to the Who and the What, which had long been regarded as a discovery of the Christian doctrine of Trinity of the Middle Ages, is in reality the point of departure of this much older rhetorical tradition. The distinction between What and Who corresponds to that between the thing (*Sache*, pragma) and the person (*prosopon*). It has become infinitely important, not only for jurisprudence, as it was quickly adopted by Roman law, but also for philosophy, as for instance, for the philosophy of Kant, in which the distinction between thing and person appertains to the supporting foundation of his entire practical philosophy.

9 Boethius, *De differentiis Topicis* 4 (PL 64:1212 A): 'Persona est, quae in iudicium vocatur, cuius dictum aliquod factumve reprehenditur'; Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.179.2214–8 (Buytaert, 262): 'Qui etiam hanc acceptionem personae, Contra Eutythen et Nestorium disputans de unitate personae Dei et hominis in Christo, tali prosecutus est definitione: "Persona est", inquit, "naturae rationalis individua substantia" [He [sc. Boethius] followed this way of taking 'person' as well, arguing *Against Eutythes and Nestorius* about the unity of the person of God and Man in Christ with the following definition: "A person", he said, "is an individual substance of a rational nature"]'.

10 Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.179.2218–21 (Buytaert, 262): 'Quae quidem nequaquam definitio dicenda est trium personarum in diuinitate superius a nobis distinctarum, hoc est Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Alioquin cum sint tres personae, essent tres indiuiduae rationales substantiae' [Of course, this definition must never be given for the three persons in the Godhead that we distinguished above, namely the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Otherwise they would be three individual rational substances in virtue of being three persons].

11 Peter Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* 3.180.2222–7 (Buytaert, 262–3): 'Personas etiam comoediarum dicimus, ipsos uidelicet homines qui per gestus suos aliqua nobis facta uel dicta repraesentant. Quas et ipse Boethius ibidem distinxit dicens: "Nomen personae uidetur aliunde tractum, ex his scilicet personis quae in comoediis tragediisque eos quorum interest homines repraesentabant"' [We also speak of the 'persons' of a comedy, namely the people who represent by their behaviour some of our words or deeds. Boethius himself distinguished these persons in the same passage as well, saying: "The name 'person' seems to be derived from elsewhere, namely from the persons who in tragedies and comedies used to represent the people concerned"]'.

12 Marius Victorinus, *Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam* 1.26.7–9, ed. Antonella Ippolito, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, 132 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 116. Cf. Hermogenes, *Peri Staseōn* [= *Les états de cause*] 3.6.3, in *Corpus Rhetoricum*, vol. 2, ed. Michel Patillon (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2009), 22.

In this overview, one must indeed not forget the doctrine of person of Abelard's great contemporary, namely that of Richard of St Victor. The topic of his *De Trinitate* is the self-differentiation of the godly unity in the plurality of the persons. To clarify what is understood by a person therein, Richard in turn invokes a 'general concept of the mind', i. e. a fully accepted axiom, which is the starting point of certain cognition for every intellect. Fully accepted therein is—as the structure of language already suggests—the content of the concepts of substance and person. While the substance of a thing represents its general determinedness, the concept of person signifies an individual, singular and utterly uncommunicable determinedness. The name 'substance' signifies a What, a something, the name 'person' a Who, a somebody. The something is always a generality (*Allgemeines*), the somebody, however, is as such singular, and indeed unique. Accordingly, the question 'what?' always aims at a general determinedness, the question 'who?' asks after the determinedness of the singular. It appears that Richard has adopted the distinction of the questions 'What' or 'Who' from the rhetorical tradition.¹³

The New Ontology of the Person in Alexander of Hales

With Alexander of Hales a new age for the concept of person emerges, and this in two respects at once. The person is for the first time placed in an ontological context within the scope of Christology, and this ontology of the person concurrently generates the awareness of a hitherto unknown mode of being: 'moral being' (*esse morale*). According to the *Summa Halensis* a three-fold view of being must be distinguished in Christ: natural being, i. e. the two natures in Christ, rational being, i. e. being human, and 'moral being'. It is through moral being that Christ is a 'person'. The peculiarity of the person, however, is his dignity, which is grounded in moral being.¹⁴

¹³ For the background of the rhetorical tradition cf. Kobusch, *Selbstwerdung und Personalität*, 348–71.

¹⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48) Vol IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, Di3, M4, C1 (n. 46), p. 70: 'Alii alio modo distinguunt secundum triplicem speculationem respectu esse in Christo: est enim esse morale et esse naturale et esse rationale. Prima ergo opinio respexit ad esse naturale et, quia duae naturae sunt in Christo, dicit Christum esse duo (...) Sequens vero opinio respexit ad esse morale; persona enim est nomen dignitatis, dignitas autem ad esse moris retorquetur: unde ad personam pertinent morales proprietates. (...) Tertia vero opinio considerat esse rationale: unde dicit Christum esse quid secundum quod Deus et aliquo modo se habentem secundum quod homo' [Others draw the distinction [between the three opinions on the metaphysics of the incarnation] in another way, based on three ways of looking at 'being' in Christ: for there is moral being and natural being and rational being. So the first opinion looks at natural being, and because there are two natures in Christ, it says that Christ is two. (...) But the second opinion looks at

Moral being is the being of the will and everything connected to it. It is as such distinguished from natural being. Something which is distinguished in accordance with its nature, as are the human and the devil, can thereby be one and the same according to moral being, namely, with regard to moral depravity.¹⁵ Thomas Aquinas too knows of this distinction and connects the concept of the moral to the one of the realm of the volitional in contrast with the realm of the natural.¹⁶ This significant innovation in ontology and terminology is originally implemented in Christology.

In the background of the doctrine of person in the *Summa Halensis* lies an ontological Christology and within it a theory of moral being, which Alexander has described in greater detail in the *Glossae*. According to this theory, the ‘individual’, the *subiectum* and the ‘person’ are to be distinguished from each other in Christ. They are distinguished regarding their mode of being. The individual, as ‘this human being’ is Christ according to the mode of being of rational being, *subiectum* he is, however, insofar as natural being is constituted by human nature, and finally he is person, insofar as he possesses moral ‘or divine being’.¹⁷ Alexander expresses

moral being; for ‘person’ is a term that indicates worthiness, and worthiness is derived from moral being, which is why moral properties belong to a person. (...) And the third opinion looks at rational being, which is why it says that Christ is something insofar as he is God and a being-in-a-certain-way insofar as he is a man].

15 *SH* III, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar2 (n. 81), arg. 2 and Solutio, p.100: ‘Forte diceretur quod distinctae sunt personae in esse naturali, sed non sunt distinctae in esse morali. – Contra quod sic obicitur: Aliud est peccatum mali hominis et aliud est peccatum ipsius diaboli; ergo distincta sunt peccata; et distinctae sunt voluntates, secundum quod in voluntate est prima ratio peccati; ergo malus homo distinguitur in esse morali ab ipso diabolo; ergo nec est una persona quantum ad esse naturale nec est una persona quantum ad esse morale. (...) [Solutio]: Ad quod dicendum quod diabolus et ipsi mali dicuntur una persona, non in esse naturali, sed in esse morali secundum quemdam modum’ [Perhaps it might be said that [the devil and bad people] are distinct persons in natural being but not in moral being. Against this is the following objection: the sin of a bad man is one thing and the sin of the devil himself is another, therefore [their] sins are distinct; and [their] wills are distinct, because the fundamental ratio of a sin is in the will; therefore a bad man is distinguished in moral being from the devil himself; therefore there is not [only] one person as regards natural being, nor is there [only] one person as regards moral being. (...) In response to this, it must be said that the devil and bad people are said to be one person, not in natural being, but in moral being (in a certain way)].

16 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.10, in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, vol. 14 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1926), 27: ‘Nihil autem ad malitiam moralem pertineret si actus exterior deficiens esset defectu ad voluntatem non pertinente: claudicatio enim non est vitium moris, sed naturae’ [But nothing would come under the heading of moral wickedness if external actions were deficient by a defect that did not belong to the will: for limping is not a moral failing but a failing of nature].

17 Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) III, d. 6, n. 25, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 3:82: ‘Respondeo: intelligendum est quod differt dicere in Christo individuum, suppositum vel subiectum, et personam. Secundum enim esse rationis, est iste homo individuum; secundum esse naturae, est humana natura subiectum; secundum esse morale vel divinum, accipitur persona’ [I reply: it must be understood that in Christ there is a difference between speaking of an individual, a supposit or subject, and a person. For according to ration-

the same notion elsewhere by stating that corresponding to the three-fold being, there are three ‘principles’ in Christ: from a moral perspective, the person, under the aspect of the natural; the subject, i.e. body and soul, (while divine nature does not have the determinedness of the subject); and *secundum rationem*, the ‘first substance’ or ‘this human being’.¹⁸

It is a threefold way of seeing, or as Alexander could also say, of speaking of Christ: when we speak of him from a moral point of view, he appears to us as a person who is a ‘moral thing’, because the person expresses the ‘peculiarity of dignity’. If we speak of him in a logical manner, then the nature (*essentia*) of this human being lies in the foreground, which is signified by the general form of the power of thought. With reference to nature (*naturaliter*) we speak of him when what is meant is the unity of the two natures in him.¹⁹

This threefold perspective is expressed differently again, when Christ is regarded as ‘one’ in the moral sense (*unus*), as ‘one’ in the logical sense (*unum*) and is understood from a natural perspective as the union of two natures.²⁰ Behind this lies the

al being, he is this man, an individual; according to natural being, he is by human nature a subject; according to moral or divine being, he is taken as a person]; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 18, 3:80: ‘Et nota quod quando Christus dicitur secundum personam, tunc dicitur secundum esse morale; quando autem secundum naturam humanam, tunc dicitur secundum esse naturale; quando autem secundum essentiam, tunc dicitur secundum esse rationale’ [And note that when Christ is spoken of with respect to [his] person, he is spoken of with respect to moral being; but when he is spoken of with respect to [his] human nature, he is spoken of with respect to natural being; and when he is spoken of with respect to [his] essence, he is spoken of with respect to rational being].

18 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 7, n. 25, 3:98: ‘Ut dictum est, triplex est esse; ita quasi tria principia inveniuntur in Christo: suppositum vel subiectum, substantia prima et persona. Moralter, persona primum est in sustinendo; naturaliter, subiectum, id est anima et corpus: deitas namque non est in ratione subiecti; secundum vero rationem, substantia prima sive iste homo’ [As has been said, there are three kinds of being; likewise, three quasi-principles are found in Christ: supposit or subject, primary substance, and person. Morally, he is primarily a person in suffering; naturally, he is a subject (that is, a soul and a body, for deity is not in the *ratio* of a subject); and with respect to reason, he is a primary substance or this man].

19 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 38, 3:87: ‘Ortae autem sunt istae tres opiniones secundum triplex esse: naturale, morale, rationale; et secundum haec tria tripliciter contingit loqui de Christo. Persona res moris est, quia dicit proprietatem dignitatis; personaliter loqui de ipso, est loqui moraliter. Quando autem loquimur secundum essentiam quae est homo, cum sit communis forma rationis, rationaliter loquimur. [Quando] loqui autem est de unione naturarum, quomodo duae sunt naturae, naturaliter loquimur’ [But these three opinions arose in accordance with three kinds of being: natural, moral, rational; and in accordance with these three, one can talk about Christ in three ways. A person is a moral thing, because [the word ‘person’] indicates the property of worthiness; to speak of Christ personally is to speak from a moral perspective. But when we speak with regard to [his] essence, which is man, since it is the common form of reason, we speak from a logical perspective. And when we speak of the union of natures, in the way in which there are two natures, we speak from a natural perspective].

20 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 38, 3:87: ‘Moraliter Christus est unus, non unum; rationaliter unum, prout participat unitatem personae; naturaliter est duae naturae’ [From a moral perspec-

distinction of the questions pertaining to the ‘who’ and the ‘what’. It stems from the very first theory of person, which we owe to the rhetorical tradition of Antiquity. It is there that—even prior to Roman law—an initial distinction is drawn between the ‘person’ and the ‘thing’, and in this sense also between the ‘who’ and the ‘what’.²¹ Alexander of Hales has taken up this distinction, which is found already in Richard of St Victor’s *De Trinitate*. ‘Who’ accordingly asks after the person, i.e. after the moral being, ‘what’ in contrast asks after the nature or the natural being.²²

As one can easily discern, the natural being of Christ is understood at times in the sense of a doctrine of two natures, while at others simply as human nature.

More difficult to understand is the expression of the *esse rationis*. On the one hand, the individuality is grounded, as mentioned earlier, in this being.²³ However, it must be taken into account, that Alexander distinguishes a twofold sense of the concept, *individuum*. Something can be called individual, when it is a substance detached through a ‘final separation’, an *atomon* in the Greek sense. The divine persons are not individuals in this sense. Yet we also call something individual—following the idea and terminology of Porphyry—which is distinguished by a ‘collection’ or aggregation of properties, which we cannot find in any other. It is therefore this aggregation of properties, which grounds the individuality of something unique, and the divine persons can be conceived of as individuals in this sense.²⁴ On the other hand,

tive, Christ is one, not one thing; from a logical perspective, he is one thing, in that he shares the unity of a person; from a natural perspective, he is two natures].

21 Theo Kobusch, ‘Person und Handlung: Von der Rhetorik zur Metaphysik der Freiheit,’ in *Person und Rechtsperson: Zur Ideengeschichte der Personalität*, ed. Rolf Gröschner, Stephan Kirste, and Oliver W. Lembcke (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 1–28.

22 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 25, n. 8, 1:247: “Quis est quaesitivum personae; ‘quid’ autem dupliciter: aliquando essentiae, aliquando suppositi essentiae’ [‘Who?’ asks for a person, but ‘what?’ asks in two ways: sometimes for an essence, sometimes for a supposit of an essence]; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 27, n. 8, 1:268: ‘ut per ‘quid’ quaeratur de essentia, per ‘quis’ de persona (...)’ [so that ‘what?’ is used to ask about the essence; ‘who?’ about the person (...)]; *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti1, C3, Ar1 (n. 297), *Solutio*, p. 424: ‘Per ‘quid’ ergo quaeritur ipsa divina essentia, per ‘quis’ ipsa persona (...)’ [Therefore ‘what?’ is used to ask for the divine essence; ‘who?’ for the person (...)]; *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), pp. 661–2: ‘Triplex enim quaestio circa hoc nascitur: quid, quis, quomodo, ut quaerentes de aliqua persona ‘quid est’, respondebitur nomen significans essentiam, ut Deus; quaerentes ‘quis est’, respondebitur nomen significans hypostasim, ut Patrem vel personam; quaerentes ‘quomodo se habet haec persona’, respondebitur proprietates vel relatio, ut generans vel genitus (...)’ [For three questions arise about this: ‘what?’, ‘who?’, and ‘how?’, so when they ask about a person ‘What is this?’, the response will be a word signifying an essence, like ‘God’; when they ask ‘Who is this?’, the response will be a word signifying a hypostasis, like ‘the Father’ or ‘a person’; when they ask ‘How is this person?’, the response will be a property or a relation, like ‘begetting’ or ‘begotten’].

23 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 25, 3:82: ‘Secundum enim esse rationis, est iste homo individuum (...)’ [For according to rational being, he is this man, an individual (...)].

24 *SH* I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), *Ad objecta* 6, p. 501: ‘Nota tamen quod intentio eius quod dicitur ‘individuum’ dicitur duobus modis. Uno modo individuum dicitur discretum secundum substantiam separatione ultima, sicut atomus: et hoc modo intentio individui nullo modo est in divinis personis;

the *Summa Halensis* brings the concept of the *esse rationis* in connection with the Aristotelian notion of the being of truth, the so-called veritative being, which in Aristotle is explicitly excluded from the domain of metaphysics.²⁵ Yet in Alexander the being of truth is not a thing of thought (*ens rationis*) in the sense of the Averroistic translation of the Aristotelian *on hos alethes*, and therefore not a result of human thought. More so it is truth, understood as *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, the truth of the matter (*res*), which is also within the matter and can thereby be grasped by the intellect.²⁶ This is also the meaning of the transcendental determination of that which is true, that which is convertible with being.²⁷ The *esse rationis* therefore does not mean the objective side of the cognized truth, i.e. not the truth as cognized, but the subjective side of the alignment of the intellect with the thing. Through cognition the human is qualified as ‘this human being’, i.e. as an individual.

After all, here we are above all concerned with the concept of a person and the property of dignity which as such belongs to it and is grounded in its moral being. What indeed makes this doctrine of the person into a significant philosophical con-

alio modo individuum dicitur discretum aggregatione proprietatum, quas non est in alio reperire: et hoc modo sumeretur individuum in divinis, si in aliqua auctoritate inveniretur quod persona divina est individuum, quia est substantia habens proprietatem quam non est in alio reperire’ [Note, however, that the notion of what is called an ‘individual’ is said in two ways. In one way, an individual is said to be distinguished with respect to substance by a final separation, like an atom; and in this way the notion of an individual has no place in the divine persons. In another way, an individual is said to be distinguished by an aggregation of properties that are not to be found in anything else; and this is how ‘individual’ would be taken in the divine if it were discovered in some authoritative passage that a divine person was an individual, because it is a substance that has a property that is not to be found in anything else].

25 *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q1 (n. 1), Respondeo, p. 3: ‘Est enim esse rationis, secundum quem modum quaecumque veritatem habent, id est adaequationem rei et intellectus, dicuntur entia: secundum hunc modum malitia est, cum deformat illud in quo est’ [For [one kind of being] is rational being, and in this way all things that have truth – that is, conformity between the thing and the thought – are called beings: in this way, wickedness is a being, as it deforms what it exists in].

26 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, M2, C4 (n. 94), Solutio, p. 152: ‘Sed est alia veritas, quae est adaequatio rei et intellectus: et haec veritas est in re, non solum ratione eius quod habet similitudinem cum primo, immo etiam ratione dissimilitudinis. Unde res corruptibilis, in quantum huiusmodi, non habet similitudinem cum primo, tamen habet veritatem quantum ad hoc unde intellectus apprehendit et intelligit quod haec res est corruptibilis (...)’ [But there is another kind of truth, which is conformity between the thing and the thought: and this truth is in a thing not only in virtue of its having a similarity to God, but also by virtue of dissimilarity. Thus a corruptible thing does not have a similarity to God insofar as it is corruptible, but in this respect it does have a truth whereby the intellect understands and thinks that this thing is corruptible (...)].

27 *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 10 f, p. 4: ‘Ad sequens vero quo dicuntur verum et ens converti: dicendum quod accipiendo esse rationis, dicuntur privationes esse et ex iis relinqui veritatem secundum quod est adaequatio rei et intellectus, et sic dicitur esse secundum rationem (...)’ [In response to the next argument, where truth and being are said to be convertible, it must be said that, taking ‘being’ in the logical sense, privations are said to have being, and truth is said to be left by them, inasmuch as truth is conformity between the thing and the thought; and in this sense [evil] is said to have being according to logic].

ception and concurrently into a pertinent development in the history of philosophy, is clearly discernible for at least two reasons. For one from the fact that Alexander does not simply place the three perspectives alongside each other and enumerate them, but conceives of the third mode of being, moral being, the person, as that which contains and presupposes the other two. A person whose dignity lies grounded in moral being can only be thought of if their natural being, the human nature, and their rational being, human reason, are already presupposed. Within the being of the person the natural and rational being are not destroyed, but ‘suspended’.²⁸ Furthermore Alexander has assigned to the concept of person a univocal sense, i.e. the person is a determinedness, a concept, which must have the same meaning for the created and uncreated.²⁹

At the same time Alexander elucidates in the sense of the history of philosophy, that his doctrine of the person, though presupposing that of Boethius and Richard of St Victor, places a new emphasis on the idea of moral being. In the *Summa Halensis* the two famous definitions of the person, which Boethius and Richard of St Victor presented, are extensively discussed. Furthermore, Alexander clarifies how the theses of Richard must be conceived of as justified ‘corrections’ of the Boethian definition. For his own understanding of the person as a hypostasis distinguished by the property of dignity—which is itself grounded in moral being—Alexander invokes the thought or definition of certain *Magistri*, which was indeed available also to Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.³⁰ This concurrent linking-up to the historically pre-

28 Cf. Alfons Hufnagel, ‘Die Wesensbestimmung der Person bei Alexander von Hales,’ *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 4 (1957): 148–74, esp. 166.

29 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 25, n. 1, 1:238: ‘Respondeo: non communiter dicitur de utroque, sed secundum prius et posterius; tamen aliquo modo est una ratio, quae est: “Persona est existentia incommunicabilis intellectualis naturae” vel “existens per se solum secundum quemdam existendi modum” [I reply: [the word ‘person’] is not said jointly of both [God and creatures], but with a relationship of prior and posterior; and yet in a way there is a single definition, which is: “A person is an unshareable existence of an intellectual nature” or “something existing by itself alone according to a certain way of existing”]. On the same topic, see *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C4, Ar1 (n. 388), p. 572; *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C4, Ar1 (n. 388), p. 573: “(…) Quarta univocatio est secundum convenientiam effectuum, sicut dictum est superius de hoc nomine ‘iustus’, et hoc modo hoc nomen ‘persona’ univocum est ad personas creatas et increatas, quia rationalitas creata et rationalitas increata conveniunt in effectu” [(…)The fourth kind of univocity is according to agreement of effects, as was said above about the word ‘just’; and in this way the word ‘person’ is applied univocally to created and uncreated persons, because a created rationality and an uncreated rationality agree in their effect”]; *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M3, C3 (n. 400), Contra a, p. 589, says: ‘Ergo persona univoce dicitur’ [Therefore ‘person’ is said univocally].

30 *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C3 (n. 387), Contra 9, p. 570: ‘Magistri vero ponunt tertiam talem: Persona est hypostasis, distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente’ [But the masters posit a third such [definition]: a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity]; *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C3 (n. 387), Ad obiecta 9, p. 571: ‘quarta vero, quae est magistralis, dicit de persona quid est secundum usum nominis: sic enim utimur hoc nomine ‘persona’ ut dicamus personas differentes secundum differentias dignitatum’ [but the fourth [or rather, the third] definition, which belongs to the masters, says what a person is according to the word’s usage: for we

scribed person-conception and the transcending of it is expressed e.g. in the following sentences:

Note, that a person is a hypostasis [subsistence], which is signified by the property of dignity; a hypostasis is the incommunicable existence, which is based on certain individualising elements, presupposing the nature. Therefore, every person is a hypostasis, but not the other way around.³¹

The historical significance of the person-conception of Alexander of Hales cannot be estimated highly enough. With the conceptualisation of ‘dignity’ for the first time as the property of the person, i.e. a feature, which belongs to it as such, a new domain of being, which Alexander calls ‘moral being’, comes to the centre of philosophical interest. Moral being is from now on understood in the entire Middle Ages and beyond as the being of freedom or of will.³² Good and evil are the main categories, which apply to this domain.³³ Correspondingly, this domain of being of moral being does not have its respective concept of nothing. Sin is in the sense of the Au-

use the word ‘person’ in such a way that we call persons different according to differences in their dignity]. Cf. Albert the Great, *Alberti Magni Commentarii in I-IV Sententiarum* (hereafter, *In Sent.*), d. 25, a. 1, in *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, 38 vols, ed. Étienne César Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1890–9), 25:624: ‘Alia datur a Magistris, haec scilicet, Persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente’ [Another [definition] is given by the masters, namely: a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity]. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (hereafter, *In Sent.*) I, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 3, 4 vols, ed. R.P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929–47), 1:626; Thomas Aquinas, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, sed contra (Mandonnet, 2:90); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 3 (hereafter, *ST*), in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, vols 4–12 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888–1906), 4:331–2. The term ‘magistri’ seems to imply the authorship of Alanus ab Insulinus, cf. Alan of Lille, *Reguale caelestis iuris* 32, in Nicholas M. Häring, ‘Magister Alanus de Insulis Regulae Caelestis Iuris,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 48 (1981): 146–7.

31 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 6, n. 13, 3:78: ‘Nota quod persona est hypostasis distincta per proprietatem dignitatis; hypostasis est existentia incommunicabilis ex quibuscumque individuibus, supposita essentia. Unde omnis persona est hypostasis, et non convertitur (= n. 32).’

32 Cf. e.g. Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *In Sent.*), II, d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 5, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 2:602: ‘liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se, respicit actum moris’ [free will, as such, has to do with moral action]; Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 2, ed. Victorin Doucet, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 11 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1935), 33: ‘sed esse moris habet principium seminarium in voluntate (...)’ [but moral being has its seminal principle in the will (...)]; Albert the Great, *In IV Sent.*, d. 16, A, a. 23 (Borgnet, 29:592): ‘(...) laudem, vel vituperium: et hoc est esse moris’ [praise or blame: and this is moral being]. On the history of ‘moral being’ see Theo Kobusch, *Die Entdeckung der Person: Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997).

33 *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q5, C1 (n. 13), Ad obiecta 1, p. 22: ‘Nam, cum dicitur quod bonum est contrarium malo per se, hoc intelligitur ratione boni in esse moris’ [For when it is said that good is contrary to evil per se, this is understood in virtue of the good in moral being].

gustinian *privatio boni* a nothingness within the domain of moral being.³⁴ Bonaventure expanded this idea into a doctrine of double nothingness. Nothing as opposed to natural being, i.e. absence or non-existence, and nothing as the opposite of moral being, i.e. moral misconduct.³⁵ Yet as being can also encompass the *privatio* of being, so too does the immoral belong to the domain of being of ‘moral being’. Everything which has any relation to the will, the acts of the will, the circumstances of an action, motives and feelings, an external deed, even a misdeed etc., can be called ‘moral’ and ascribed to moral being. At the centre of this domain, however, lies the person. The person is qualified as a being of freedom, insofar as its mode of being is moral being. Yet the opposite concept to the moral is nature. Freedom and nature are contraposed. While the person also has a natural foundation, a person is a person through freedom.

Because the person is understood as a being of freedom, yet freedom had always been a subject of practical philosophy, the person from then on belongs to the domain of practical philosophy. In this sense Alexander has explicitly assigned the ‘being-a-subject’, i.e. human nature as understood by the philosophical discipline of natural philosophy, and accordingly the ‘individual’, i.e. the cognition, to the logical part of philosophy and finally the ‘person’, as the moral being, to moral philosophy.³⁶

Reception History

The history of the reception of this ontology of personhood developed by Alexander of Hales, which is an ontology of moral being, is in the mid-term traceable both in the philosophy and theology of the Middle Ages, and as well as clearly recognizable in the long-term in the history of philosophy. As for the immediate effect—sweepingly

34 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa I*, d. 36, n. 14, 1:362–3: ‘Sed haec privatio huius termini ‘nihil’ intelligitur in genere moris, et quoniam ‘non aliquid’ est medium inter ‘aliquid’ et ‘nihil’, ut dicit Augustinus in libro *Quinque responsionum*: “Peccatum est actus incidens ex defectu boni” [But this privative sense of the term ‘nothing’ is understood in the moral genus; and since ‘not something’ is an intermediate between ‘something’ and ‘nothing’, as Augustine says in the *Five Responses*, “A sin is an act arising from a deficiency of the good”].

35 Bonaventure, *Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica*, q. 1, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, vol. 5 (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae 1891), 122: ‘Et ratio huius est: quia, cum duplex sit esse, scilicet naturae et gratiae, duplex est nihilitas: uno modo per oppositionem ad esse naturae, alio modo per oppositionem ad esse moris et gratiae’ [And the reason for this is because, since there are two kinds of being, namely natural and graced, there are two kinds of nothing: in one way by contrast with natural being, in another way by contrast with moral and graced being].

36 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa I*, d. 24, n. 7, 1:237: ‘Et sciendum quod cum sint tria nomina: subiectum, individuum, persona, subiectum videtur referri primo ad naturalem philosophiam, individuum ad rationale, persona vero ad moralem’ [And it must be known that since there are three words, ‘subject’, ‘individual’, and ‘person’, ‘subject’ seems to relate primarily to natural philosophy, ‘individual’ to logic, and ‘person’ to moral philosophy].

evaluated—this doctrine of person is adopted by the entire 13th century, most prominently within Christology. Thus only a few years after Alexander, and strongly connected in terminology, Philip the Chancellor states: *Esse personae est morale et respicit dignitatem*.³⁷ In the Christological *Quaestiones* of this time, collected and anonymously edited by W.H. Principe, there is not only a significant distinction between the unity of a natural thing, a thing of thought and a moral thing, but also with regard to the concept of the ‘individual’: the individual within the domain of nature is of a certain indeterminateness, the so-called *individuum vagum*, e.g. ‘any human being’. What is expressed in this way is an individualisation within a general or universal category. The individual in the domain of the rational is constituted by the ‘collection of accidents’, which according to the definition of Porphyry, ‘are to be found in no other’. The moral individual is indeed that which is truly ‘complete’, because it is not subsumable under a universal and is characterized by the distinguishing property of dignity.³⁸ What we can gather philosophically from this, is that that

37 Philip the Chancellor, *Quaestiones de incarnatione*, q. 2, n. 30, in Walter H. Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, vol. 4, *Philip the Chancellor's Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 177: [The being of a person is moral being, and it relates to dignity]. Regarding the connection with Alexander's concept of *esse morale* see Principe, *Philip the Chancellor's Theology*, 34.

38 *Quaestio 3: De unitate Ecclesiae*, n. 6, in Walter H. Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: IV. Quaestiones from Douai MS. 767: Christ as Head of the Church; The Unity of the Mystical Body*,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 44 (1982): 63: ‘Unde cum sit ens natura, est et unum natura, ens moris et unum moris, ens rationis et unum rationis’ [Hence since there is a natural being, there is also a natural unity, a moral being and a moral unity, a rational being and a logical unity]; *Quaestio 2-A: De Incarnatione*, n. 13, in Walter H. Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: III. Quaestiones from Douai MS. 434: The Hypostatic Union*,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 43 (1981): 34: ‘ad hoc responderi solet quod individuum sumitur tripliciter: est enim individuum naturae, individuum rationis, individuum moris: individuum naturae, ut aliquis homo (vagum scilicet individuum); rationis, ut aliquis homo; moris, ut iste homo’ [The usual response to this is that ‘individual’ is taken in three ways: for there is a natural individual, a logical individual, and a moral individual: a natural individual, e.g. any human (that is, an indeterminate individual); a logical individual, e.g. some human; a moral individual, e.g. this man]; *Quaestiones 7: De unione divinae naturae cum humana*, n. 19, in Walter H. Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: I. Quaestiones from the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris*,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 39 (1977): 56: (The fact that the individual can be subsumed under a general) ‘hoc verum est de individuo naturae, non de individuo moris, quod est persona, quod sub nullo est’ [this is true of a natural individual, not of a moral individual, which is a person, which does not fall under anything]; *Quaestio 2-A: De incarnatione*, n. 21, in Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: III*,’ 35: ‘Ad hoc dicendum quod individuum tripliciter dicitur: individuum respectu universalitatis, vel individuum respectu incommunicabilitatis, vel individuum respectu excellentis proprietatis’ [In response to this, it must be said that ‘individual’ is said in three ways: individual with respect to universality, or individual with respect to unshareability, or individual with respect to an excellent property]; *Quaestio 2-B: De incarnatione*, n. 49, in Principe, ‘*Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: III*,’ 40: ‘individuum naturae, quod subiectum est in natura; individuum rationis, quod individuum est “per collectionem accidentium quam impossibile est in aliquo (alio) reperire”; individuum moris, quod perfectum est ab

which is individual in natural things (and then logically also things manufactured by the human being) is replaceable and interchangeable, while the moral individual, i.e. the individual endowed with freedom, that is, the person, is simply nonrecurring, irreplaceable, non-interchangeable, unmistakable and incommensurable with all things.

Also, Bonaventure has adopted the doctrine of person from Alexander of Hales. The complete determinedness of the personality belongs to the individual, if the elements of ‘singularity’, ‘incommensurability’ and ‘supereminent dignity’ are given. Singularity therein refers to the body-soul constitution which is proper to all individuals commonly, incommunicability is that which is not common to all individuals but concerns the properties of one person only and dignity, finally, this most noble property, which stems from the divine nobility.³⁹ Here, in the periphery of Franciscan thought, the notion and concept of the infinite value of the works of Christ is developed, of its ‘infinite merit’, which also transfers to the personality, even the created one. Therefore, according to Bonaventure, ‘infinite dignity’ belongs to the per-

excellenti proprietate’ [a natural individual, which is a subject in nature; a logical individual, which is individuated “by a collection of accidental properties that cannot be found in anything else”; a moral individual, which is complete in virtue of an excellent property].

39 On the origins of this three-fold distinction, see Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris, ca. 1200–1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 47–90. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, 3:133: ‘Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia; dicendum, quod individuum in notificatione personae triplicem importat distinctionem, videlicet singularitatis, incommunicabilitatis et supereminentis dignitatis. Individuum enim dicitur quod est in se indivisum et ab aliis distinctum. – Distinctionem singularitatis voco, quod aliquid non sit commune ad plura, sed dicatur de uno solo; propter quod Socrates dicit individuum, homo vero non dicit individuum. Distinctionem incommunicabilitatis dico, quod aliquid non sit alicuius pars sive veniens in compositionem tertii; unde pes vel manus hominis, proprie loquendo, non dicitur individuum. – Distinctionem supereminentis dignitatis intelligi illam, quae accipitur a proprietate digniori’ [In response to what is objected to the contrary, that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature, it must be said that ‘individual’ in the definition of a person implies three kinds of distinction, namely with respect to singularity, unshareability, and pre-eminent dignity. For something is called ‘individual’ if it is intrinsically undivided and distinct from others. I call it distinction with respect to singularity when something is not common to several things, but is said of one thing only; that is why ‘Socrates’ indicates an individual but ‘man’ does not. I call it distinction with respect to unshareability when something is not part of anything and does not enter into the composition of a third thing; hence a human foot or hand, strictly speaking, is not called an individual. I understand distinction with respect to pre-eminent dignity to be a distinction taken from a comparatively worthy property]. Cf. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, 3:136. See also *SH I*, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M1, C2 (n. 386), Respondeo, p. 568: ‘ad nomen autem ‘personae’ proprietatis individualis, singularis et incommunicabilis’ [faced with the word ‘person’, though, [what is tacitly understood is] an individual, singular and unshareable property]; *SH VI*, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, (n. 35), Solutio, p. 55: ‘Quod concedendum est, et respondendum ad obiecta dicendo quod ad esse personae requiritur triplex distinctio, scilicet singularitatis, incommunicabilitatis et dignitatis’ [This must be conceded, and to the objections one must respond by saying that the being of a person requires three kinds of distinction, namely with respect to singularity, unshareability, and dignity].

son, i.e. an infinite value, which is to be distinguished from a price as the value of the purchase.⁴⁰ Bonaventure designates it as ‘inestimable’, i.e. eluding all quantifiable estimation. Still in the 17th century in Pufendorf, freedom in this sense is called *inaestimabilis*.⁴¹ Here within the frame of the doctrine of person the later fixed terminology of Kant is anticipated: the person alone has ‘dignity’, ‘things’ have only a ‘price, i.e. a finite value’.

Within the reception-history of the concept of person from the *Summa Halensis*, Peter of John Olivi takes up a special position. According to the Franciscan philosophy of the will, he presupposes that ‘what we truly are’, is namely ‘our personality’⁴² or the person a being of the will. Almost concurrently, at the end of the eighties, Matthew of Aquasparta states that ‘the activity of the human being, insofar as it is a human being, is not cognition, but volition.’⁴³

40 Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 13, a. 1, q. 2, 3:280: ‘Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod meritum Christi est infinitum; dicendum, quod infinitas meriti consurgit ex unione illius animae ad personam divinam – ob quam unionem non tantum homo, sed etiam Deus mori dicitur – propter quod meritum illud est infinitum, non ratione gratiae creatae in se, sed ratione infinitae dignitatis personae’ [In response to the objection that Christ’s merit is infinite, it must be said that the infinity of his merit arises from the union of his soul to the divine person – because of which union not only a man but also God is said to die – and accordingly his merit is infinite not in virtue of the created grace within him, but in virtue of the infinite dignity of his person].

41 Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 32, a. 1, q. 5, 3:705: ‘Dicendum quod Christus nominat personam in duabus naturis, quarum una est nobilitatis et dignitatis infinitae, et ipsa persona in se; et natura unita ratione personae habet quandam nobilitatem et dignitatem singularem et inestimabilem’ [It must be said that ‘Christ’ denotes a person in two natures, one of which is of infinite nobility and dignity; and this person in itself, and the nature united by reason of the person, has a certain nobility and dignity that is singular and inestimable]. Cf. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 13, a. 1, q. 2, 3:280: ‘meritum illud est infinitum, non ratione gratiae creatae in se, sed ratione infinitae dignitatis personae’ [Christ’s merit is infinite not in virtue of the created grace within him, but in virtue of the infinite dignity of his person]. Cf. also Vitalis de Furno, *Quodlibeta tria* II, q. 5, ed. Ferdinandus M. Delorme, Spicilegium Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani, 5 (Rome, Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1947), 72: ‘Omnis Christi actio erat infiniti vigoris et valoris, quia elicit a supposito infinito’ [Every action of Christ was of infinite strength and value, because it was brought about by an infinite supposit]. Cf. Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.*, d. 25, a. 1, q. 4, 4:648: ‘Si autem tu quaeras a me, utrum sit peccatum in fide, vel in moribus; dicendum, quod ille qui emit vel vendit huiusmodi spiritualia, aut credit, ea pro pretio posse aestimari et valori rei terrenaе aequari et per pecuniam possideri; et haec est haeresis manifesta (...)’ [But if you ask me whether [simony] is a sin in faith or in moral conduct, I must say that he who buys or sells such spiritual things either believes that they can be valued at a price, equated to the value of a worldly thing, and possessed for money, which is a manifest heresy (...)].

42 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum libri Sententiarum quas primum ad fidem codd. mss.* (hereafter, *In II Sent.*), q. 57, 3 vols, ed. Bernard Jansen, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 4–6 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–6), 2:338: ‘id quod proprie sumus, personalitatem scilicet nostram (...)’

43 Cf. Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de anima beata*, q. 4, ed. Aquilinus Emmen, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 18 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1959), 318: ‘(...) dicendum quod operatio hominis, secundum quod homo, non est intelligere, sed velle (...)’

That which constitutes the determinedness of the ‘personality’ seems for Olivi ‘not able to be cognized without the intellect and the will, because indeed the person is self-reflexive existence, or existence capable of self-reflection and beyond this (*superpositum*), that which exists completely in itself.’⁴⁴ Yet no self-reflection or autonomy is possible without the faculties of the intellect and the will. It is them by which the human being can attain complete possession of himself, and this is a necessary condition of the determinedness of personality.⁴⁵ The person is thereby the being which is endowed with self-reflection, which itself is grounded in the structure of will. Therefore, Olivi can also say, that the ‘root of a personal subsistence’ can only be that which is completely self-reflexive and in itself exists utterly free.⁴⁶ Autonomy and self-reflection constitute the true determination of the person.⁴⁷

Belonging to the immediate sphere of influence of the doctrine of person of Alexander of Hales is also the theology of the Dominicans. Albert the Great cites, as we have seen, the thesis of the *Magistri*. Yet this must not lead to the erroneous opinion that he also accepts the Franciscan teaching on moral being. In his doctrine of the trinity, it is rather the notion of the natural in an intellectual sense which predominates. The ‘person as person’ appears against this background as that which can only belong to a being of a ‘more dignified nature’ and is only cognizable through the property of dignity.⁴⁸

It is a similar case with the concept of the person of Thomas Aquinas. It is the person-definition of Boethius which Thomas adopts. Every individual with a nature

44 Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 54 (Jansen, 2:249–50): ‘Ratio enim personalitatis sine intellectu et voluntate non videtur posse poni nec intelligi, quoniam persona videtur dicere existentiam super se reflexam seu reflexibilem et existentiam seu superpositum in se ipso plene consistens.’

45 Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 54 (Jansen, 2:249–50): ‘Quod non est aliud quam potestas plenarie possessiva sui et aliorum sine qua non est intelligere rationem personae’ [This [dominion] is nothing other than the power of full possession over oneself and others, without which we cannot understand the definition of a person]. Cf. Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 52 (Jansen, 2:200): ‘(...) personalitatem, quae est idem quod per se existentia dominativa et libera et in se ipsam possessive reflexa vel reflexibilis, id est, se ipsam cum quadam libera reflexione possidens’ [(...) personhood, which is the same as per se existence that is dominative and free and possessively self-reflected or reflexive, i.e. that possesses itself with a certain free reflection]; concerning this definition of person see François-Xavier Putallaz, *Insolente liberté: Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle* (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1995), 156.

46 Cf. Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 51 (Jansen, 2:121): ‘quod proprie et per se non est liberum (...) nec potens se reflectere super se directe et per se, quod est contra rationem personalis subsistentiae. Non enim potest esse aliquid radix personalis subsistentiae nisi illud quod est super se ipsum plene re-diens et in se ipso liberrime consistens’ [that properly and per se is neither free (...) nor able to reflect upon itself directly and per se, which is against the definition of personal subsistence. For there can be no root of personal subsistence except that which fully reverts to itself and persists in itself most freely].

47 Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 51 (Jansen, 2:121): ‘(...) cum consistere et reflecti in se sit ratio altissimi suppositi quod personam dicimus’ [(...) since persistence and self-reflection is the definition of the highest supposit, which we call a person].

48 Albert the Great, *In I Sent.*, d. 28, B, a. 1 (Borgnet, 26:54).

in possession of reason is a person, and subsisting in a nature capable of reasoning endows him with the greatest dignity. Dignity therefore also belongs to the divine nature, and not only to the person as a person.⁴⁹ Dignity is also not grounded, as it is in the works of Alexander, in moral being, and hence in the being of freedom, but solely in the subsistence of a nature capable of reason.⁵⁰ According to Thomas, a person is the autonomous being of that which is in possession of reason.⁵¹

As for the long-term effect of the doctrine of person in the *Summa Halensis*, and in other works of Alexander, a few remarks must suffice here. If in the investigation of the historical reception one is guided by the particular concept of person characterized by the attribution of supereminent dignity, which is grounded in ‘moral being’ as distinguished from everything natural, then one is led far into modern thought. At first ideas and terminologies were adopted by the so-called ‘Spanish Scholasticism’, most prominently Francisco Suarez. In the course of this reception, the concept of a ‘person’ was extended to the institution (as a *persona moralis composita*). Moreover, in the 17th century in this context a discovery was arrived at, which is of fundamental significance for the subsequent history of philosophy. This is the discovery of the modality of ‘moral necessity’, which is compatible with freedom, and even taken to be its highest form.

The second great multiplier of the idea of person in the *Summa Halensis* is natural law, specifically in its form shaped by the works of Samuel Pufendorf, namely *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* of 1672. For in this work, which soon became known in

49 Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 29, a. 3, 4:332: ‘Quia enim in comoediis et tragoediis representabantur aliqui homines famosi, impositum est hoc nomen persona ad significandum aliquos dignitatem habentes. Unde consueverunt dici personae in Ecclesiis, quae habent aliquam dignitatem. Propter quod quidam definiunt personam, dicentes quod persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente. Et quia magnae dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona, ut dictum est. Sed dignitas divinae naturae excedit omnem dignitatem, et secundum hoc maxime competit Deo nomen personae’ [For since some well-known people were represented in comedies and tragedies, the word ‘person’ was assigned to signify people with some dignity. So it was customary for people with some dignity in the churches to be called persons. And some people define ‘person’ accordingly, saying that a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity. And because it is of great dignity to subsist in a rational nature, every individual of a rational nature is therefore called a person, as has been said. But the dignity of the divine nature exceeds all dignity, and accordingly the word ‘person’ is maximally appropriate for God].

50 Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 40, a. 3, 4:417: ‘Ad dignitatem autem pertinet proprietas distinguens, secundum quod intelligitur subsistens in natura rationali’ [But the distinguishing property pertains to dignity because it is understood to be subsistent in a rational nature].

51 Thomas Aquinas, *ST III*, q. 2, a. 2, 11:25: ‘Ad secundum dicendum quod personalitas necessario intantum pertinet ad dignitatem alicuius rei et perfectionem, in quantum ad dignitatem et perfectionem eius pertinet quod per se existat, quod in nomine personae intelligitur’ [In response to the second argument, it must be said that personhood necessarily pertains to the dignity and perfection of a thing to the same extent that the thing’s per se existence (which is understood in the word ‘person’) pertains to its dignity and perfection].

Europe and even overseas, the teaching of the *entia moralia* compose the ontological foundation for a theory of the person in the double sense of the word: the individual singular person and the person of the institution (state, church and the like).

Finally, the practical philosophy of Immanuel Kant must be counted among the long-term effects of the Franciscan doctrine of person and will. Kant's practical philosophy is in its essence a doctrine of the will, which though seemingly originating immediately from the school of Chr. Wolff, in the end goes back to the teachings of the will of the Franciscans of the Middle Ages. One important reference for this is to be found therein that, as with Alexander of Hales, the concept of the person lies in the centre of Kant's practical philosophy, i. e. in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). Moreover, in Kant, as before in Alexander, it is solely the person which is marked out by 'dignity' and thereby distinguished from all 'things', which can only have a 'price', i. e. a finite value. By understanding 'dignity' as an 'infinite' or also as an 'absolute value', Kant draws on the terminology of the Christology of the Middle Ages, according to which the work of Christ is of 'infinite value' for humanity.⁵²

What I intended to say with this short contribution by and large, but also with reference to reception history, is this: the *Summa Halensis*, part of whose doctrine of person I have discussed here, is a significant work, and its significance can, not least of all, be deduced from the history of its reception.

52 For a detailed explanation of Kant's practical philosophy see Theo Kobusch, 'Die praktischen Elementarbegriffe als Modi der Willensbestimmung: Zu Kants Lehre von den "Kategorien der Freiheit",' in *Die "Kategorien der Freiheit" in Kants praktischer Philosophie: Historisch-systematische Beiträge*, ed. Stephan Zimmermann, Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, 193 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 17–75; see also Theo Kobusch, 'Das Moralische: Der absolute Standpunkt: Kants Metaphysik der Sitten und ihre Herausforderung für das moderne Denken,' in *Freiheit nach Kant: Tradition, Rezeption, Transformation, Aktualität*, ed. Saša Josifović and Jörg Noller (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019), 54–92.

Vincent L. Strand, SJ

The Ontology of Grace of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle

Abstract: A major advance in the theology of grace occurred in the 13th century, as theologians began to conceive of grace as created, positing *gratia creata* alongside *gratia increata*. While Philip the Chancellor has long been regarded as the primary catalyst of this development, it was Alexander of Hales who introduced these terms, and his Franciscan confrère, John of La Rochelle, who first explained their relation. The contribution of these Franciscans to the development of the theology of grace has been underappreciated, in part because Hales's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (the first critical edition of which has only recently appeared) and Rochelle's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* and *Tractatus de gratia* have received little attention. Through an exposition and analysis of these texts, as well as the relevant portions of the *Summa Halensis*, this article demonstrates how the early Franciscans spearheaded the 13th-century development in the ontology of grace.

A turning point in the theology of grace—what Bernard Lonergan called a ‘Copernican revolution’—occurred in the 13th century at the University of Paris.¹ Specifically, this revolution concerned the ontology of grace. Theologians began to conceive of grace as created, positing *gratia creata* alongside *gratia increata*. The move can be seen in comparing Peter Lombard's conception of grace as something uncreated, namely, charity, which is equated with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul, with the view of Thomas Aquinas, who argues that grace is not only uncreated, but also, as sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), is a created form in the soul.² While this development from the Lombard to Aquinas may have been a Copernican revolution, it was not a quantum leap. Rather, it occurred incrementally through a series of figures. Key among them were the Franciscans Alexander of Hales and his student and confrère, John of La Rochelle (de Rupella). Alexander was the first theologian to use the terms *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*. Rupella was the first to explain their relation. Nevertheless, their theology of grace is relatively unknown. The *De gratia* treatise of the *Summa Halensis*, the magnum opus of the early Francis-

1 Bernard J.F. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000 [original, 1971]), 17.

2 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* I, d. 17, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81): 1:141–52; Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* II, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, 4 vols, ed. Marie Fabien Moos and Pierre Félix Mandonnet (Paris: Sumptibus P. Lethielleux, 1929–47): 2:667–70; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 7, 4 vols, ed. Pietro Caramello (Turin: Marietti, 1948): 2:553.

cans, has received a modicum of study.³ Yet their personal treatises on grace, Hales' *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* and Rupella's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* and *Tractatus de gratia*, have been largely ignored by scholars.⁴ Hence the role these theologians played as catalysts of the 'Copernican revolution' has been underappreciated.

This article seeks to address this lacuna by offering an exposition and analysis of the ontology of grace of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle. In the process, it will challenge three claims. First, scholars have asserted that John merely repeated, or only minimally developed, Alexander's theology of grace.⁵ This claim was made without recourse to Alexander's principal treatise on grace and consequently without a detailed comparison between Alexander's and John's personal treatises on grace. When this comparison is made, as our study will do, it is clear that Rupella significantly developed Hales in articulating the interplay between uncreated and created grace. Second, this article will question the opinion that Philip the Chancellor was the key protagonist in bringing about the new ontology of grace.⁶ As will be

3 Studies of the *Summa Halensis*' theology of grace include Karl Heim, *Die Lehre von der gratia gratis data nach Alexander Halesius* (Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1907); Karl Heim, *Das Wesen der Gnade und ihr Verhältnis zu den natürlichen Funktionen des Menschen bei Alexander Halesius* (Leipzig: Heinsius, 1907); Bogumil Remec, *De sanctitate et gratia doctrina summae theologiae Alexandri Halensis* (Ljubljana: Domus Societatis Jesu, 1940); Alejandro Salas Cacho, 'El concepto de la gracia en la Suma Teológica de Alejandro de Hales' (PhD thesis, Pamplona Universidad Navarra, 1985); H. Daniel Monsour, 'The Relation Between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian Summa: A Lonergan Reading' (PhD thesis, University of St Michael's College, 2000); Hubert Philipp Weber, *Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Anthropologie im Mittelalter*, Innsbrucker Theologische Studien, 63 (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2003); Gérard Philips, 'La théologie de la grâce dans la *Summa fratris Alexandri*,' *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 49 (1973): 100–23; Guillermo A. Juarez, 'La inhabitación y su relación con la presencia ubicua, considerada desde la doctrina de la Suma Halesiana sobre la gracia y la procesión temporal de la persona divina,' *Estudios Trinitarios* 41 (2007): 41–88.

4 A critical edition of Alexander of Hales' *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* is found in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica; Un contributo alla teologia della grazia nella prima metà del sec. XIII*, ed. Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, *Studia Antoniana*, 50 (Rome: Antonianum, 2008). Critical editions of John of La Rochelle's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* and *Tractatus de gratia* are found in Ludwig Hödl, *Die neuen Quästionen der Gnadentheologie des Johannes von Rupella OM (+ 1245) in Cod. lat. Paris. 14726*, *Mitteilungen des Grabmann-Instituts der Universität München*, 8 (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1964). All citations are to page number of these editions.

5 Alister E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78–9; Monsour, 'The Relation Between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian Summa,' 89, n. 8.

6 The attribution has become commonplace. Lonergan calls the Chancellor's formulation of grace a 'pivotal moment'. Stephen Duffy says a 'major breakthrough emerges in his [the Chancellor's] writings.' Paul O'Callaghan regards the Chancellor as 'the first medieval author to have reflected on the relationship between the natural and the supernatural order.' See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 20; Stephen J. Duffy, *The Graced Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1992), 152; Paul O'Callaghan, *Children of God in the World: An Introduction to Theological Anthropology* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 339.

shown, the early Franciscan account, which was developed prior and concurrent to the Chancellor's, exceeds his in sophistication. Third, our study will disprove Karl Rahner's categorical assertion that all scholastic theories base God's indwelling and union with the soul exclusively upon created grace.⁷ This is not the case in John of La Rochelle.

The article will unfold in three parts. The first will introduce Hales and Rupella and their treatises on grace. It will also consider the status of the questions that formed the immediate backdrop to their work. Next, an exposition of Alexander's and John's respective ontologies of grace will be given. The third part of the article will compare and analyze their accounts. It will be shown how John both built on the thought of Alexander, especially in adopting the schema of *esse primum-esse secundum* as a way to articulate the orders of nature and grace, and advanced beyond his master by explaining how created grace is a disposition or habit by which the human person is made deiform and joined to God through the reception of uncreated grace. This latter development in John of La Rochelle marked not only a theological shift within the early Franciscan school, but was a watershed moment for the theology of grace as a whole.

Background

The development in the theology of grace that occurred in the second quarter of the 13th century contained two interconnected elements. First, theologians began to speak of grace as created, distinguishing between uncreated grace and created grace. Second, they began to conceive of grace as an accidental property of the one having grace. This was articulated in various ways, such as by calling grace a quality, habit, disposition, or form. The terminology of *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* surfaced in the works of three theologians operating concurrently in Paris: Philip the Chancellor (c. 1160–1236), Alexander of Hales (before 1186–1245), and John of La Rochelle (c. 1190/1200–1245). In his comprehensive historical study of the notion of created grace, Gérard Philips concludes that the term *gratia creata* appeared for the first time in written form in Alexander of Hales, specifically in Alexander's *Glossa* on Lombard's *Sentences*, which Philips dates to 1225.⁸ The first traces of grace con-

7 Karl Rahner, 'Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace,' in *Theological Investigations I: God, Christ, Mary and Grace*, trans. Cornelius Ernst (New York: Seabury Press, 1974 [original German, 1939]), 325.

8 See Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) II, d. 26, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 2:242–7. The term *gratia creata* also appears in Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'* and in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*; see Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae 'Antequam esset frater'* (hereafter, *Antequam esset frater*), q. 12, m. 2 and q. 53, m. 3, 3 vols, Bibliotheca Francis-

ceived of as an accident are found in William of Auxerre (d. 1231), who calls grace a *habitus superadditus naturalibus*, and in William of Auvergne (c. 1180–1249), who speaks of grace as a medium.⁹ Both conceive of grace as elevating human beings above their natural powers, thus sketching the outlines of a formal theory of *gratia elevans*.¹⁰ For his part, Philip the Chancellor, in his treatise on grace in the *Summa de bono*—the first treatise ever dedicated explicitly to grace—distinguishes between uncreated and created grace, asks whether grace is a substance or an accident, and considers grace vis-à-vis the virtues.¹¹

Yet the Chancellor's treatment of these matters, like that of the other secular masters William of Auxerre and William of Auvergne, is cursory compared to the fuller development found in the early Franciscan school. The chef d'œuvre of this school is the *Summa Halensis*.¹² The *Summa* was long thought to be the sole work of Hales. Since the early 20th century, however, scholars have viewed the *Summa Halensis* as a collaborative work. Alexander likely initiated the project and contributed to parts of it, but his work was supplemented and redacted by other Franciscans at Paris. While it is known that John of La Rochelle was Hales' chief collaborator, definitive proof of the identity of all of the authors for each part of the *Summa Halensis* is lacking. One

cana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 1:155–6 and 2:1020–2; Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, q. 3, ed. Nicolai Wicki, 2 vols, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta, 2 (Bern: Francke, 1985), 1:364. Modern editors date Alexander's *Glossa* to between 1222 and 1229 and the *Antequam esset frater* to between 1220 and 1236. The Chancellor's *Summa de bono* was completed in 1232. See Gérard Philips, *L'union personnelle avec le Dieu vivant: Essai sur l'origine et le sens de la grâce créée*, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum theologicarum Lovaniensium, 36 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1989), 81–2; Monsour, 'The Relation Between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian *Summa*,' 86–90.

⁹ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* II, tr. 10, c. 5, q. 1, ed. Jean Ribailier, 7 vols, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7), 2:289; William of Auvergne, *Tractatus de gratia* 6, in *Il "Tractatus de gratia" di Guglielmo d'Auvergene*, ed. Guglielmo Corti (Rome: Libreria Editrice della Pontificia Università Lateranense, 1966), 60–1.

¹⁰ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* II, tr. 10, c. 5, q. 2 (Ribailier, 2:293–7); William of Auvergne, *Tractatus de gratia* 3 (Corti, 52–5).

¹¹ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, qq. 1–4 (Wicki, 1:355–68). For more on this history, see Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, 'Dottrina della grazia: Da Agostino d'Ippona ad Alessandro di Hales,' in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica* (see above, n. 4), 176–92; Johann Auer, *Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik*, 2 vols (Freiburg: Herder, 1942–51).

¹² The work is also known as the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, *Summa theologica* of Alexander of Hales, or the *Summa [universae] theologiae* of Alexander of Hales. While various editions of the text have been published since the 15th century, the first critical edition was undertaken by the Quaracchi editors in the 20th century: Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48). All citations are to this edition. For other editions, see Irenaeus Herscher, 'A Bibliography of Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945): 434–54.

scholar has suggested that the uncertain status of the *Summa*'s authorship has led to its neglect by scholars, opining that the questions of its authorship will only be settled when there are critical editions of the personal works of all of the *Summa*'s putative authors.¹³

Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki's recent completion of the first critical edition of Alexander of Hales' *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* is a step in this direction. The text opens a hitherto closed window into Hales' doctrine of grace. Alexander's other works for which there exist critical editions, for example, his *Glossa* on Lombard's *Sentences* and his *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, do not contain treatises dedicated to grace, even if they treat the matter obliquely.¹⁴ Moreover, the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* belong to Hales' *postquam fuit frater* phase, having been composed sometime between 1236 and 1245, and thus they represent Alexander's mature theology of grace.¹⁵ This dating also places them in the same period when work was beginning on the *Summa Halensis* and in which John of La Rochelle composed his two personal works on grace, his *Tractatus de gratia* and *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*.

John of La Rochelle has long been seen as the redactor of and principal contributor to the third book of the *Summa Halensis*, where the *Summa*'s treatise on grace is found. Yet the *Summa*'s *De gratia* treatise is a hybrid work. In the main, it relies—sometimes verbatim—on Rupella's writings on grace. Other passages, however, reproduce Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*. For example, the second question of Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (*Quator consequentia gratiam*) is inserted into the *Summa Halensis* with only slight reworkings as the eighth and final question (*De gratia comparative spectata*) of the *Summa*'s first tractate on

13 The suggestion, and this historiography, comes from Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). Other putative contributors to the *Summa Halensis* include Odo Rigaldus, who may have taken over the project after the deaths of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, and William of Melitona, who possibly made the final edits to the *Summa* with Bonaventure. Composition of the *Summa* likely began around 1238. The work seems to have been substantially completed by the deaths of Alexander and John in 1245, although the *Summa* was probably not entirely finished until 1256. For more on the composition of the *Summa Halensis*, see Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae fratris Alexandri"', in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948); Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa,' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 26–41; Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa (Continued),' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 274–312; Jacques Guy Bougerol, *Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure*, trans. José de Vinck (Paterson, NJ: St Anthony Guild Press, 1964), 13–21; Johann Auer, 'Textkritische Studien zur Gnadenlehre des Alexander von Hale,' *Scholastik* 15 (1940): 63–75.

14 For the editions see above, n. 8.

15 Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, '*Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*: Problematiche storico-letterarie,' in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica* (see above, n. 4), 100.

grace, which concerns sanctifying grace (*De gratia gratum faciente*).¹⁶ The *Summa's* articles that pertain to the ontology of grace, however, use Rupella's rather than Hales' material. These include questions such as whether grace is created or uncreated, whether grace is a substance or an accident, whether grace differs from virtue, and what the definition of grace is. This selection is noteworthy, since both friars treat these questions in their respective personal works on grace.

The critical edition of Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* allows one to compare the thought of master and student on these decisive questions. Hitherto, scholars have tended to emphasize the continuity in the early Franciscan school's doctrine of grace, especially between Hales and Rupella. For example, Alister McGrath rightly notes that the latter developed the former's thought by articulating the soul's need for a disposition in order to receive uncreated grace.¹⁷ However, McGrath's account of this development is cursory, being limited by the fact that he only compares John's personal works on grace with Alexander's *Glossa* on the *Sentences* and *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, both of which lack the robust treatment of grace that is present in the *postquam fuit frater* questions. Perhaps for this reason, he concludes that 'it is possible to argue that the main features of the early Franciscan school's teaching on justification are essentially identical with the early teaching of Alexander of Hales.'¹⁸ Similarly, H. Daniel Monsour argues that the first robust discussion of the distinction between the terms *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* is found in the *Summa Halensis*. While noting that the treatise on grace in the *Summa* may represent elaborations on Alexander's thought by his collaborators, including John of La Rochelle, Monsour nevertheless endorses 'the possibility that John may have been largely or, at least, significantly dependent on Alexander for the content of the first part of *De Gratia*.'¹⁹ Both McGrath and Monsour made these assertions without recourse to Alexander's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*. A comparison of these questions with John's personal works on grace presents a different picture, in which the student is seen to have considerably developed the work of his master concerning the ontology of grace. As these texts are little known, an exposition of them is in order.

¹⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 2 (Wierzbicki, 135–60); *SH* IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q8 (nn. 642–45), pp. 1016–22.

¹⁷ McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, 78–9.

¹⁸ McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, 161.

¹⁹ Monsour, 'The Relation Between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian Summa,' 86–90, quotation at 89, n. 8.

Alexander of Hales

Alexander of Hales' *De gratia* questions come from the first series of his *Quaestiones disputatae* 'postquam fuit frater'.²⁰ There are two *De gratia* questions. The first treats grace in general, while the second considers grace vis-à-vis virtues, gifts, fruits, and beatitudes. The first *quaestio* is divided into two *disputationes*. The first disputation considers grace in itself, and the second treats grace in relation to *liberum arbitrium*. Finally, this first *disputatio* consists of two *membra*. The first inquires after the existence and necessity of grace. The second asks what grace is, exploring the quiddity of grace. It is divided into three articles: 1. whether grace is a substance or an accident; 2. whether grace is the same as virtue; and 3. what the definition of grace is. The marrow of Hales' ontology of grace is found in these three articles.

Alexander begins his exploration of the quiddity of grace by asking whether grace is a substance or an accident.²¹ Five preliminary arguments are presented, three that hold that grace is a substance and two that consider it an accident. Alexander commences his *responsio* by drawing a fundamental distinction between uncreated grace and created grace. Uncreated grace is identified with the Holy Spirit; there is no doubt that this is a substance. Created grace, on the other hand, is infused in the soul by God. In order to explain the ontological status of created grace, Alexander makes a distinction between what he calls the 'first being' (*esse primum*) of a thing and its 'second being' (*esse secundum*). These are distinguished by their differing perfections. A thing with respect to *esse primum* is perfected by its own act. This act, with respect to this *esse*, is a substance, not only according to how it is ordered to that which it perfects, but in itself. In contradistinction, a thing with respect to *esse secundum* is perfected by a different act. Yet the act which perfects a thing in second being, like the act which perfects a thing in first being, is a substance, both with respect to this *esse* and with respect to the thing which it perfects in *esse secundum*. In itself, however, *esse secundum* is accidental. Returning to the issue at hand, namely, the ontological status of created grace in the soul, Alexander judges that grace is the perfection of the soul not with respect to *esse primum*, but with respect to *esse secundum*. Therefore, he concludes that grace in itself and simply is accidental. Yet in its ordering to the soul as that which perfects and vivifies it, grace, with respect to *esse secundum*, is a substantial thing.²²

Alexander immediately addresses an objection that states that grace should be a substance, given that grace is a likeness to God. Since substance is in God, the ob-

²⁰ For questions concerning authorship, dating, and redaction history of the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, see Wierzbicki, 'Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Problematiche storico-letterarie,' 69–109.

²¹ Prior to the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, Alexander had already taken up the question of whether grace is an accident in the soul in his *Glossa* on the *Sentences*. However, in this early treatment, he gives neither a clear nor detailed response. See Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 26, 2:245–6.

²² Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 1 (Wierzbicki, 120–2).

jection argues, grace as God's likeness in the soul should also be a substance. Alexander responds that this is not so, because a thing that is in God as a substance is in us as an accident, for example, goodness. Yet grace is something substantial inasmuch as it perfects the soul in what Alexander here calls 'gratuitous being' (*esse gratuito*), which equates with *esse secundum*.²³

Hales' responses to the objections shed further light on the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction. To a first objection that holds that grace must be a substance insofar as it joins the soul to God, Hales argues that while this is true of grace, this joining happens not through nature nor with respect to *esse primum*, but rather through assimilation and with respect to *esse secundum*, which is accidental rather than substantial. A second objection argues that grace is a substance insofar as it vivifies and perfects the soul, just as the soul perfects the body. Alexander responds that grace does vivify and perfect the soul, but not insofar as the soul is a substance, but rather insofar as the soul is ordered to an end. Were grace to perfect the soul in terms of it being a substance in the manner in which the soul perfects the body, then grace would be a substance, but this is not so.²⁴

Having concluded his consideration of whether grace is a substance or an accident, Alexander proceeds in the second article to inquire whether grace is the same as virtue. An opinion holding that they are the same is put forward. It commences with a quotation attributed to Augustine: 'Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly and no one does wrong, which God works in us without us.'²⁵ Since this is also true of grace, it would seem that grace and virtue are the same. Alexander responds that grace is not the same as virtue. He concedes that both the first part and last part of this definition of virtue are also fitting for grace; that is, both virtue and grace are good qualities of the mind and are worked by God in us without us. However, whereas virtues cannot be used badly, grace can be misused—not grace as *gratia gratum faciens*, but grace as *gratia gratis data*. Furthermore, there is a distinction between grace and virtue in the second part of the Augustinian definition, 'by which one lives rightly'. Here, 'to live' refers properly to grace, since the soul lives in this sense by having the life of grace, while 'rightly' is said in reference to virtues, more specifically, in having righteous virtue in actions and affections. Put differently, one *lives* by grace, but lives *rightly*, by gratuitous virtue. As Alexander puts it, 'When I say "gratuitous virtue" I mean two things: first,

²³ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 1 (Wierzbicki, 122).

²⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 1 (Wierzbicki, 122–3).

²⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 2 (Wierzbicki, 124): 'Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte uiuitur, qua nemo male operatur, quam Deus operatur in nobis sine nobis.' For the background of this definition, see the critical edition's apparatus for lines 294–6.

what is gratuitous, and this refers to living; and second, what virtue is, and this refers to having rectitude.²⁶

The Irrefutable Doctor's inquiry into the quiddity of grace culminates in the third and final article, which treats the definition of grace. There are no objections in this article, with Hales moving immediately to his response. He begins by invoking the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction. In *esse primum*, there is a first act, life, by which the living live, and there are other consequent acts which proceed from natural powers. Likewise in *esse secundum*, there is a first act, the life which comes by grace, and then consequent acts which proceed from the powers of the soul, namely, virtues. In light of this parallel, Alexander goes on to say that this first act in *esse secundum*—the life stemming from grace—is common to both baptized infants and good adults, even though only adults, and not baptized infants, can perform meritorious acts. Why? Hales explains that in baptized infants, the first act of the soul in *esse secundum*, the life of grace, exists, as it does in good adults. But this first act of the soul can be distinguished from the soul's other powers from which its operations come forth. In baptized infants, the virtues by which one gains merit do not exist in use, but only in habit, inasmuch as these little ones are pleasing to God in sanctifying grace (*in quantum gratuite sunt*). Then Alexander makes the important observation: 'Just as the act of living, which is the first act in first being, always is in act, so likewise the act which is living by grace always is in act in those having sanctifying grace.'²⁷ For sanctifying grace, rather than gratuitous grace, vivifies the soul. Just as the powers of the soul in *esse primum* are not always in act, so likewise the powers of the soul in *esse secundum* of one in a state of sanctifying grace—namely, the virtues—are not always in act, but exist according to habit. In contrast, 'sanctifying grace always is in act.'²⁸ Thus, this grace can properly be called an act, while the virtues are habits.²⁹

26 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 2 (Wierzbicki, 125): 'Set cum dico "uirtutem gratuitam", duo dico: quod est gratuitem et hoc ad uiuere refertur, et quod est uirtus, et hoc ad rectitudinem habet referri.'

27 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 3 (Wierzbicki, 126): 'Et sicut actus qui est uiuere, qui est primus actus in primo esse, semper est in suo actu, ita actus, qui est uiuere per gratiam, semper est in suo actu, ita actus, qui est uiuere per gratiam, semper est in suo actu in habente gratiam gratum facientem.'

28 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 3 (Wierzbicki, 126): 'Set gracia gratum faciens semper est in suo actu.'

29 A coda to Alexander of Hales' account of the relationship of grace to virtue is found in the article of the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* considering whether grace is necessary. There, Alexander explains how the soul performs meritorious acts. He says that grace is not just the form, but also the mover (*motor*), of free will. In Alexander's account, 'God moves the free will through grace toward the good. God is as a separated mover, and grace is as a conjoined mover' ('Deus mouet liberum arbitrium per gratiam ad bonum, et Deus est quasi motor separatus, gracia quasi motor coniunctus'). God, therefore, is the one that moves the soul to perform meritorious works, but he does so through grace moving free will. See Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 1 (Wierzbicki, 117).

This elucidation of the status of *gratia gratum faciens* as act and the virtues as habits permits Alexander to reach the summit of the whole inquiry concerning the quiddity of grace, namely, his definition of grace:

Grace is the first and perfect act of the soul in second being. It is called “act” in distinction from virtues, which, rather, are habits. It is called “first” in distinction from acts that are elicited by virtues, which are instead consequent acts. It is called “perfect” in distinction from gratuitous graces, which do not fully perfect the soul. “Second being” is added to distinguish it from the perfecting act of the soul in first being.³⁰

John of La Rochelle would develop this conception of grace. To his work we now turn.

John of La Rochelle

In his *Tractatus de gratia*, John of La Rochelle considers the same questions pertaining to the ontology of grace as did his master. The structure of Rupella’s account closely follows that of Hales’. Under the rubric of ‘On grace in general’, John first asks whether grace is necessary, before moving on to the question of what grace is. This question is subdivided into three *membra*: 1. what grace is in reality; 2. what grace is according to definition; and 3. what grace is according to name. In the first of these *membra*, John proposes the core of his ontology of grace in four articles, considering whether grace is something in reality in the soul, whether grace is created or uncreated, whether created grace is a substance or an accident, and whether grace is in essence the same as virtue. These four articles from Rupella’s *Tractatus de gratia* are reproduced—in large measure verbatim—in the *Summa Halensis*, comprising the first chapter of the *Summa*’s *Quid sit gratia* question.³¹ They also echo material found in John’s *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, developing what is sketched there into a more polished literary form.³² Thus, three fonts present themselves for an exposition of John of La Rochelle’s doctrine of grace: the more primitive *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, the *Tractatus de gratia*, and finally the corresponding *Summa Halensis* questions that incorporated his material and were edited under his hand.

³⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 2, a. 3 (Wierzbicki, 127): ‘Gracia est primus actus et perfectus anime in esse secundo; et dicitur ‘actus’ ad differentiam uirtutum, que potius sunt habitus; ‘primus’ ad differentiam actuum, qui habent elici / a uirtutibus, qui magis consequentes sunt; ‘perfectus’ ad differentiam graciaram gratis datarum, que animam non perficiunt; ‘esse secundum’ additur ad differentiam actus perficientis animam in primo esse.’

³¹ *SH* IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (nn. 608–11), pp. 956–66. For a textual comparison of John of La Rochelle’s *Tractatus de gratia* and *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* with the *Summa Halensis*, see Hödl, *Die neuen Quästionen der Gnadentheologie*, 23–8.

³² Hödl, *Die neuen Quästionen der Gnadentheologie*, 18–23.

A preliminary inquiry John makes under the umbrella question, ‘What is grace?’, is whether grace places something in the soul. He answers that grace, by which one is said to be pleasing to God (*esse gratus Deo*), necessarily places something in the soul that renders one pleasing to God. One is pleasing to God, John explains, through deiformity and being assimilated to God; in other words, one is pleasing to God when one is similar to him. In contrast, one is displeasing (*odiosus*) to God when one is dissimilar to him, as is the case for the sinner, whose sin has placed in his soul a defect and privation that renders him unlike God. Grace places in the soul a positive assimilation to God, by which one becomes worthy of eternal life, which is the full assimilation of the rational creature to God.³³

Rupella then asks the pivotal question of whether grace is a created or uncreated thing in the one who has grace. In the *Tractatus*, he presents seven arguments for grace being uncreated and five for it being created before he gives his account; these are each reproduced in the *Summa Halensis*. John states that there is both created grace and uncreated grace in a person having grace. Uncreated grace is equated with the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is called grace both inasmuch as he is gift (*donum*) and inasmuch as he is given (*datum*). These differ, John explains, in that the Holy Spirit is *gift* from all eternity, but he is *given* in time. For even though the Holy Spirit himself is bestowable from all eternity, there has not existed from all eternity a creature to which the Holy Spirit could be given. The bestowal of the gift of the Holy Spirit to the creature, Rupella states, is that ‘glorious gift’ which Jesus promises he will send to his disciples (John 14:16), ‘because the Holy Spirit by it makes us pleasing to him by making us deiform.’³⁴ Because the Holy Spirit is love, and ‘the power of love is to transform the loved into the lover’, when the Holy Spirit is given to us, he transforms us into a divine likeness.³⁵ John calls this transformation ‘deiformity’. It comes about through the soul receiving in its affect the form of the Holy Spirit. Thus, while the Holy Spirit is uncreated grace, he produces created grace as the disposition of the rational soul, preparing it for the reception of uncreated grace.³⁶

The salient point in John’s replies to the objections—many of which argue, in one way or another, that God acts in the soul immediately and thus has no need of created grace—is that while created grace is not needed from the side of God, it is needed from the side of the creature. The assimilation of the soul to God requires an assimilating form and a disposing form, the latter being placed in the soul by the former. The need for this form is not on the part of the Holy Spirit, but rather on the part of the soul, which is not able to receive uncreated grace unless it is disposed

³³ SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar1 (n. 608), p. 957.

³⁴ John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72): ‘Quia Spiritus Sanctus eo facit nos gratos quo facit nos deiformes.’

³⁵ John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72): ‘Haec enim est vis amoris, ut transformet amatum in amantem.’

³⁶ John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72).

by created grace. Put differently, uncreated grace is united to the soul without a medium, but from the soul's side, the medium of created grace is necessary. By a similar logic, Rupella says that created grace in one way is finite and in another way is infinite: it is finite inasmuch as it is in a finite creature, but it is infinite according to its source, uncreated grace, which is infinite goodness. Given that created grace comes from God, it is truth, and so—against the objection that the highest truth cannot be joined to that which is vanity—created grace is seen as that which disposes the soul for such a union.³⁷

The *Summa Halensis* reproduces this discussion, with the addendum of identifying created grace explicitly with sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*).³⁸ In Rupella's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*'s treatment of whether grace is uncreated or created, one finds many of the same arguments concerning the need for a *dispositio* on the part of the soul, rather than on the part of God, for the union of the soul with God. Here, however, John advances one important argument not found in the *Tractatus* or the *Summa*. He cites an argument from Augustine holding that the soul is naturally capable of God (*per naturalia capax Dei*) and capable of being beatified; therefore, it would seem that the soul is beatified without grace, or that grace is simply God himself. John responds by arguing that while the soul is *capax Dei* and capable of being beatified according to its natural powers, nevertheless, it is not beatified through natural powers alone, but rather it is elevated beyond its nature through grace, which elevates its natural powers and sufficiently disposes them for beatitude.³⁹

Rupella then proceeds to ask whether created grace is a substance or an accident. The *solutio* to the article is here reproduced in full, so that a detailed comparison of it with Hales' account may be given:

Created grace has a twofold relation, namely, according to the first being of the soul, which is of nature, and according to the second being, that is, well being or ordered being, according to which it is ordered to the soul. In regard to the first being of the soul, which is the being of nature, I say that [created grace] is an accident, because it is a disposition arising in the soul after the soul has reached its fulfillment in first being. But in a second way, [created grace] is a substantial disposition—although not a substance—namely, in regard to second being. This is because second being with respect to first being is accidental and in no way substantial. For that reason, the principle of this being will be accidental and not substantial. However, [created grace] is substantial with respect to [second being].⁴⁰

37 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72–4).

38 SH III, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar2 (n. 609), p. 960.

39 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 7 (Hödl, 69).

40 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 910), p. 962: 'Gratia creata duplicem habet comparationem, scilicet ad primum esse animae, quod est naturae, et ad esse secundum ipsius, quod est bene esse vel esse ordinis, secundum quod comparatur ad animam. Quantum ad primum esse animae, quod est esse naturae, sic dico quod est accidens, quia est dispositio adveniēns animae post completionem illius quantum ad illud esse. Secundo autem modo est dispositio substantialis, non tamen substantia, scilicet quantum ad secundum esse, et hoc est quia secundum esse est accidentale respectu primi

The notion of created grace as an accident in terms of being a disposition is further developed in the subsequent discussion of whether grace and virtue are the same thing. John opines that they are the same according to substance, but that they differ according to essence and according to *ratio* or definition. For while grace and virtue subsist by the same thing, their essences differ, because that by which grace is grace is not the same as that by which virtue is virtue. John explains that grace differs from virtue as the soul differs from its powers. Thus grace perfects the soul with respect to its essence, but virtues perfect the soul with respect to its powers. He employs the metaphor of light and rays: while a light and its rays are the same according to substance, given that light is the substance of rays of light, there is a difference in essence, since light perfects the air indistinctly, while rays perfect distinct parts of the air. So, too, grace perfects the soul essentially and indistinctly with regard to the soul's powers, while virtues perfect the soul according to distinct powers.⁴¹

The first objection to this account was also treated by Hales; it argues that grace and virtue are the same based on the definition of virtue being a good quality of the mind. John responds by saying that this definition is said of grace and virtue in diverse ways, because 'mind' is here to be understood in a twofold manner. It can refer to a substance, in which case it is fitting to say that grace is a good quality of the mind. But 'mind' can also refer to the powers of cognizing and loving (*potentia cognoscendi et diligendi*), in which case it refers to virtue. Likewise, 'to live rightly' can also be said in two ways. This can mean 'to exist well' (*bene esse*), which happens through grace, or it can mean 'to act well' (*bene operari*), which comes about by virtue. This distinction clarifies a difference between baptized infants and adults: whereas adults 'live rightly' in both senses, according to *bene esse* and *bene operari*, baptized infants live well only in the first sense of *bene esse*. Thus, it is seen how baptized infants can possess grace without virtue.⁴²

Finally, the discourse arrives at the definition of grace. John, in both the *Tractatus de gratia* and *Summa Halensis*, first indicates what grace is according to name (*secundum nominis rationem*) and, second, according to definition (*secundum definitionem*). According to name, 'Grace is a gift given by God without merits that makes the one having it pleasing to God.'⁴³ On the other hand, according to definition, 'Grace is a habit of the mind, universally ordinative of the whole of life.'⁴⁴ This def-

esse et nullo modo substantiale, et ideo principium illius esse erit accidens et non substantia; est tamen substantiale quantum ad illud.'

41 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar4 (n. 611), pp. 963–6.

42 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar4 (n. 611), pp. 963–6.

43 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C2, Ar1 (n. 612), p. 967: 'Gratia est donum a Deo sine meritis datum, gratum faciens habentem.'

44 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C2, Ar2 (n. 613), p. 967: 'Gratia est habitus mentis, universaliter totius vitae ordinativus.' The definition is close to one found in Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, q. 1 (Wicki, 1:357): 'Gratia est habitus universaliter totius vite ordinativus' [Grace is a habit universally ordinative of the whole of life].

inition is then unpacked. The *Summa* says that grace is not a substance, and therefore must be a quality. Qualities, however, are of many kinds, such as forms constituting figures, or natural powers or weaknesses. Grace is none of these, but rather is a quality as a *habit* (*habitus*) or disposition (*dispositio*). It is not a habit of the body, but rather of the soul, particularly of the rational soul, which is why it can be called a habit of the mind (*mentis habitus*). Grace is not a speculative habit like knowledge, but rather a habit *ordinative of life* (*habitus vitae ordinativus*). Moreover, grace is a habit that is *universally* ordinator of life, because it is so in all places, in contradistinction to political virtues, for example, which are habits ordinator of life that vary according to the laws and customs of particular regions. Finally, while charity and other virtues are likewise universally ordinator, these virtues primarily and *per se* order only one specific act, whereas grace orders all acts. Therefore, grace is a habit universally ordinator of the *whole* of life (*habitus universaliter ordinativus vitae 'totius'*).⁴⁵ With this definition, the *Summa Halensis*—under the hand of John of La Rochelle—concludes its consideration of the question, ‘What is grace?’, having presented an ontology of grace that both builds on the thought of the master whose name the *Summa* bears, while surpassing it in innovative ways, as will now be considered.

Theological Comparison and Analysis

The question of whether grace is a substance or an accident, and the associated question of whether grace is uncreated or created, became standard considerations in medieval commentaries on the *Sentences*, appearing in glosses on Distinction 26 of Book 2. Yet a formal consideration of these matters was new in the third and fourth decades of the 13th century. Contemporaneously to the Franciscan confrères Alexander and John, Philip the Chancellor raises these same questions in his *Summa de bono*. Despite the seminal role long attributed to the Chancellor, his conception of the ontology of grace is less developed than the Franciscans’. Philip mentions the distinction between *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, but he does not elaborate upon it.⁴⁶ He also raises the question of whether grace is a substance or an accident, holding grace to be a substance, although in a qualified way. For Philip, grace has the status of an *ens in substantia*: on the one hand, grace is a substance in terms of being a substantial thing that is the ontological foundation of the virtues, which, in contradistinction to the virtues themselves, is not a disposition or *habitus*; on the other hand, grace is dependent upon another substance, the existence of the creature in which it inheres.⁴⁷ One sees in the Chancellor’s thought a slight move-

⁴⁵ SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C2, Ar2 (n. 613), p. 967.

⁴⁶ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, q. 3 (Wicki, 1:364).

⁴⁷ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono gratiae, De gratia in generali, qq. 2–3 (Wicki, 1:358–64).

ment away from the Lombardian conception of grace as a substance, without, however, arriving at positing grace as an accident. The Franciscans Alexander and John carry this trajectory forward in two key moves. First, Alexander explains how grace is an accident by employing the *esse primum-esse secundum* schema. Second, John explains how created grace is a *dispositio* for uncreated grace.

While the *esse primum-esse secundum* binomy is the foundational conceptual schema for Alexander's articulation of the ontology of grace, what he means by these terms is not readily apparent. As Walter Principe puts it, 'Alexander employs the term [esse] so frequently and in such varied contexts that it is difficult to classify its meanings neatly.'⁴⁸ Principe distinguishes three ways in which Hales uses the term *esse*. First, *esse* can denote 'being in general, being in the broadest, common-sense notion', in which case it is synonymous with *ens*. Second, *esse* can mean 'existence', in other words, the fact of existing, whether in reference to God or creatures. Third, in Principe's judgment, the term *esse* carries its greatest philosophical weight when Alexander 'makes it equivalent to essence or to that very perfection conferred by essence'.⁴⁹ It is in this third sense, that is, in terms of the realization of a perfection, that *esse* is being used when Alexander speaks of *esse primum* and *esse secundum*. Hales himself suggests as much when he introduces the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction by stating that these two orders of *esse* have different perfections by which they are distinguished.

Further inquiry into the meaning of this distinction is found by considering similar distinctions in Alexander's earlier works, his *Glossa* on the *Sentences* and the disputed questions '*antequam esset frater*.' In the *Glossa*, Alexander writes, '*Esse* is said simply in a twofold way: either *esse primum* or *secundum*, which is according to an order to an end.'⁵⁰ Hales calls *esse secundum* '*esse ordinis*'. *Esse ordinis* is equated with *esse virtutis*, which is how one speaks of *esse naturae* inasmuch as it is able to be ordered to an end.⁵¹ Elsewhere in the *Glossa*, *esse naturae* is distinguished from *bene esse* or *esse gratiae*.⁵² Insight into this parsing is given in Distinction 34 of Book 2, where Alexander explains that *esse* is said in various ways: there is *esse naturae* and *esse moris*, the latter of which is further distinguished into *esse gratiae* and that *esse moris* which is not *esse gratiae*. These distinctions are made so as to explain how a bad person suffers a privation, not in terms of *esse secundum naturam*, for in that case there would be nothing in which there would be a privation, but rather in terms of the privation of *esse gratiae*, through the loss of the inhabitation

⁴⁸ Walter H. Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, vol. 2, *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 30–1.

⁴⁹ Principe, *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union*, 31.

⁵⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 46, 1:473: 'Et esse simpliciter dupliciter dicitur: aut esse primum aut secundum, quod est ex ordine ad finem.'

⁵¹ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 46, 1:469.

⁵² Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 28, 1:276.

of the *summum bonum*, which is the end of all things.⁵³ Finally, in the *Quaestiones disputatae* ‘*antequam esset frater*’, Alexander uses a further term to explain the action of grace, *esse theologicum*, saying that ‘grace is the first perfection of the soul according to *esse theologicum*’.⁵⁴

By arranging these fragments, an image of Alexander’s conception of *esse primum* and *esse secundum* emerges. They may be said to correspond to the orders of nature and grace. Both refer to perfections of a rational creature. A creature’s first perfection is in *esse primum*, what Alexander sometimes refers to as *esse naturae*. A thing is perfected in *esse primum*, Alexander says, not by grace, but by its own act. *Esse primum*, in other words, is the *esse* of a thing that corresponds to and flows from its nature, the perfection of which is the realization of the connatural end of this substance, and the mere existence of which corresponds to the thing existing rather than not existing. In terms of a rational creature, this obtains through its substantial form, that is, the act of the soul. Anything that exists—one could say ‘merely’ exists—exists in terms of an *esse* corresponding to the thing’s nature. This *esse* exists regardless of a thing’s state; without it the thing would cease to exist. But for Hales, rational creatures have a higher way in which they may exist, which is in terms of *esse secundum*, the *esse* with respect to which grace perfects the soul, ordering it to a higher end and making it pleasing to God. What Alexander means by *esse secundum* is fleshed out by considering the corresponding terms he links with *esse secundum*: *esse ordinis*, *bene esse*, *esse gratiae*, *esse theologicum*, and *esse gratuitum*. Like *esse primum*, *esse secundum* is a perfection, but one which exceeds the connatural perfection of a creature that belongs to *esse primum*. It is a perfection that orders the soul toward an end, which is why *esse secundum* can also be called *esse ordinis*. This is a higher or better mode of existence, which is why it is called *bene esse*. It comes about through God’s action of grace, which is why it is called *esse gratiae* or even *esse theologicum*. Finally, it comes as a gratuitous gift from God and so can be called *esse gratuitum*.

What is striking in Alexander’s discussion is that both *esse primum* and *esse secundum* are understood in terms of being perfected by acts, which are, derivatively and in a qualified way, substances. Hales says that a thing is perfected in terms of first being by its own proper act, and this act, with respect to this being, is a substance, both in itself, and according to how it is ordered to that which it perfects. He has in mind the substantial form of the soul as the perfection of the body. In second being, a thing is likewise perfected by a corresponding act, which is substantial with respect to that which it perfects, yet in itself is accidental. This is a sophisticated ontology of grace by which Hales is able to accomplish two things. First, after the

⁵³ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 34, 2:327.

⁵⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Antequam esset frater*, q. 53, 2:1022: ‘prima enim perfectio animae secundum esse theologicum est gratia.’ In the *Summa Halensis*, the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction is also employed to explain the presence of grace in Christ. See *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T13, M1, C3, Ar3 (n. 510), p. 726.

initial positing of uncreated grace as a substance, he is able to show that created grace is an accident. Second, however, he is simultaneously able to underscore how grace is an act, since a second level of *esse* allows a second order of perfection, and a thing is moved to a perfection only by an act. Alexander's commitment to sanctifying grace always being an act is unwavering, as is seen in his understanding of the relationship of grace to virtues and in his definition of grace. For Hales, the perfecting act of grace in *esse secundum* is the ontological foundation for the virtues. Whereas he calls the virtues 'habits' given that they are not always in act, he will not give such a designation to grace, since grace, for him, must always be in act.⁵⁵

Alexander's ontology of grace shows significant advances over that of Philip the Chancellor. While the Chancellor, without further elaboration, calls grace 'the second perfection of the rational creature', Alexander's account of *esse primum* and *esse secundum* in the rational creature elucidates how and in what this second perfection exists. Moreover, this same schema allows Hales to explain better what the Chancellor seems to have been moving toward in calling grace an *ens in substantia*. Still, the Irrefutable Doctor's ontology of grace as present in his *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* needs development, in at least two regards. First, Alexander's distinction between *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* remains inchoate, as he does not explain their relation; he goes no further than distinguishing them in terms of the former being the Holy Spirit and the latter being infused in the soul. Second, his articulation of *gratia gratum faciens* as the *esse secundum* of a creature, rather than a habit or disposition, presents an ambiguity that could lead to an undesirable extrinsicism in the nature-grace binomy. The ambiguity lies in the use of the word *esse* and a lack of clarity concerning how *esse secundum* properly belongs to the rational creature. On the one hand, *esse* can be understood as an act of existence, with grace perfecting the creature in this new *esse*, conferring to the creature a new, higher act of existence. At the same time, it can be problematic to speak of a thing having two acts of *esse*, for two reasons. First, there could be an elision of *esse* understood as an act of existence with *esse* understood more akin to *ens*, in which case Alexander's account could move toward the position that would develop centuries after him of speaking of nature and grace in terms of nature and supernature, the two-tiered extrinsicism that 20th-century opponents of neo-Scholasticism found wanting.⁵⁶ Second, a perennial danger for doctrines of uncreated and created grace is that created grace becomes reified (or *ens*-ified) as a thing that inheres in the soul as a *tertium quid* that

55 See also Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 26 (red. E), 2:246.

56 Harm Goris calls this extrinsicism 'Suárez's cream cake', what he vividly describes as 'the well-known picture of nature and grace as two tiers, one on top of the other, without an intrinsic connection between the two. Human nature is complete in itself, and it might very well do without grace, that is, without a personal relation to God. Without the cream of grace, it would be a little dry and less tasty, but the cake of nature is not really affected by the cream topping.' See Harm Goris, 'Steering Clear of Charybdis: Some Directions for Avoiding "Grace Extrinsicism" in Aquinas,' *Nova et Vetera* 5 (2007): 69.

would be neither the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit (for that would be uncreated grace), nor a quality of the soul. By describing *gratia gratum faciens* as *esse* without qualifying this as a habit or disposition, Alexander exposes himself to this danger.⁵⁷

John of La Rochelle remedies these weaknesses by conceiving of created grace as a disposition or habit, which is derived from and ordered to uncreated grace. As we have seen, John weaves his own understanding of created grace as a *dispositio* into Alexander's *esse primum-esse secundum* schema. John retains the schema, but employs it differently.⁵⁸ Whereas Alexander understood created grace to be the perfection of the soul in *esse secundum*—that is, the substantial act that brings the creature into a higher level of existence and becomes the ontological foundation of the virtues—John understands created grace to be a *dispositio* in *esse secundum*. This *dispositio* is what John calls a 'substantial disposition' in regard to *esse secundum*, since it is the substantial perfection of a thing in *esse secundum*. Yet, given that *esse secundum* is accidental in regard to *esse primum*, created grace *in se* or considered absolutely is an accident. For Rupella, what perfects the soul in *esse secundum* is rather uncreated grace, what he calls the *summa Bonitas*.⁵⁹ While Hales does at one point note that the Holy Spirit is that by which God comes to us, and *gratia gratum faciens* is that by which we ascend to God, this point remains undeveloped and secondary in his account.⁶⁰

For John, in contrast, the Holy Spirit not only comes to us, but it transforms us to be like God: 'Because the Holy Spirit is love, it is that which, when given to us, trans-

57 Bernardino de Armellada notes that contemporary theology is uncomfortable with the reified element (*el elemento cosificado*) of created grace and seeks that which constitutes supernatural friendship in a personalist dimension. In this light, he suggests that 'it would be interesting to underscore the absolutely prevalent function that Alexander attributes to uncreated grace (=the Holy Spirit) in the supernatural relation—friendly and personal—between the human person and God' ('Sería interesante subrayar la función absolutamente prevalente que Alejandro atribuye a la gracia increada (=el Espíritu Santo) en la relación sobrenatural – amistosa y personal – entre el hombre y Dios'). While de Armellada's desire is laudable, it is not certain that Alexander's account of uncreated grace, thin as it is, opens up many possibilities. Rupella's more developed account of uncreated grace would be more valuable for such a project. See Bernardino de Armellada, 'Una investigación clave en la historia de la teología, especialmente la franciscana,' *Collectanea Franciscana* 79 (2009): 670.

58 Bonaventure, too, will employ the *esse primum-esse secundum* distinction in his articulation of whether grace is a substance or an accident. In John Duns Scotus, what is equivalent to these earlier authors' conception of *esse secundum* is called *esse supernaturale*. See Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi* II, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 2:638; John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 26, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. 8, ed. Charles Balić et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 2001), 274.

59 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 610), p. 962.

60 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 1 (Wierzbicki, 119).

forms us into a divine likeness, which is deiformity.⁶¹ The soul itself receives in its affect a likeness of the Holy Spirit, which renders the soul capable of receiving the Holy Spirit itself. Said differently, created grace is the *dispositio* of the soul that makes it capable to receive uncreated grace, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul. As seen above, John repeatedly argues that while no medium is needed on God's part for God to unite with the soul, human beings are not capable of this union unless they receive a higher disposition that so renders them. For John, this is precisely what created grace does; it 'disposes the soul so that it is ordered to an end'.⁶² For this reason, he fittingly calls *esse secundum 'esse ordinis'*. This is a perfection, but a different perfection than uncreated grace brings about: *gratia creata* 'perfects as disposing', while *gratia increata* perfects 'as bringing to perfection'.⁶³ Whereas for Alexander, human beings are perfected by created grace in *esse secundum*, for John, this perfection is as yet a disposition that orders the creature to a higher perfecting fulfillment (*complens*) in uncreated grace.

In light of this account, Karl Rahner's claim that all scholastic theories 'see God's indwelling and his conjunction with the justified man as based exclusively upon created grace' cannot be maintained.⁶⁴ Regardless of what later scholastic theories may have taught, the first robust scholastic elaboration of uncreated and created grace—Rupella's—articulates the soul's union with God as coming about through a dynamic interplay between uncreated and created grace. For John, created grace is, as it were, flanked on either side by uncreated grace. Created grace has its origin in uncreated grace, as it is infused into the soul by the Holy Spirit. Yet created grace is also ordered to the perfection brought about through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as uncreated grace, rendering the soul capable of such an indwelling through the conferral of a disposition. With this dynamism between uncreated and created grace, John can take the further step of speaking of the deiformity of the creature, which Alexander does

61 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de gratia*, q. 2, m. 1, a. 2 (Hödl, 72): 'Quia ergo Spiritus Sanctus amor est, inde est quod cum datur, nobis transformat, nos in divinam speciem, et tunc est deiformitas.'

62 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 610), p. 962: 'illud, quod disponit animam ut ordinetur ad finem, est gratia creata.'

63 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 610), p. 962: 'perficit ut disponens (...) ut complens.'

64 Rahner called for a reprioritization of uncreated grace vis-à-vis created grace. He held such a prioritization was present in the New Testament and in the Fathers, but then was lost in scholastic speculation as the relationship was inverted. This clarion has resonated with a host of theologians who have sought to reemphasize uncreated grace. While Rahner's historical claim is inaccurate, the broader project of articulating a muscular doctrine of uncreated grace could be aided by a type of early-Franciscan *ressourcement*; i.e. by returning to the seminal account of the relationship of uncreated and created grace wherein the two are in a dynamic interplay, and then crafting a contemporary theology of grace informed by this account. Rahner himself saw the *Summa Halensis* as a precursor of his theory. See Rahner, 'Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace,' 320–5, 337, quotation at 324.

not do, as he does not go further than speaking of an assimilation that the soul has to God in second being.

Furthermore, Rupella's account of created grace as a disposition has the advantage of clarifying a point that is dubious in Hales, namely, in what way *esse primum* and *esse secundum* are related. To put the question differently (and perhaps anachronistically, in the wake of the Baianist and Lubacian-*Surnaturel* controversies concerning supernatural finality), it is unclear in Hales whether the orientation of a creature to be perfected in *esse secundum* belongs to nature *qua* nature, or rather comes about only by grace. While the *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* are not explicit on this point, other writings suggest that Hales tends toward the latter position. Like Bonaventure after him, Alexander bifurcates our first parents' prelapsarian period into two states: a first state 'of innocence' before the conferral of sanctifying grace, and a second state 'of grace' after sanctifying grace had been given but before the Fall.⁶⁵ It follows for Hales, even if he is not explicit on this point, that nature in *esse primum* possesses its own proper and proportionate finality, with the finality obtained toward the perfection in grace in *esse secundum* to be conferred only through grace.⁶⁶ Yet if such a conception avoids the Scylla of blurring the orders of nature and grace, it pushes one toward the Charybdis of extrinsicism, because it does not explain how *esse primum* relates to *esse secundum*. John's account navigates this danger through his conception of created grace as a disposition. This disposition orders the soul toward a union with the Infinite Good through the conferral of a form that is nothing less than deiformity. Thus, even if the source of the perfection of the soul in *esse secundum* is properly extrinsic grace, its effects are intrinsic to the soul itself. While Rupella's account is more primitive than later accounts that speak of nature possessing a specific obediential potency for the reception of a supernatural finality, in its fundamental intuition and outline, John's ontology of grace is in accord with this later theory and may be seen as a precursor to it.

Finally, the development from Alexander to John is further witnessed in the friars' respective accounts of how grace differs from virtue and in their definitions of grace. For Alexander, grace is distinguished from virtue precisely in that grace must always be in act, which is not true of virtues. In his account, grace becomes the ontological substratum of the virtues. Just as life is the first act of a rational creature in *esse primum*, so sanctifying grace is the first act of the creature in *esse secundum*. As such, if grace is not in act, given that it is a substantial act in respect to *esse*

⁶⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 19, 2:165–74. See also *SH* II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1 C1 (n. 505), p. 729.

⁶⁶ Wierzbicki misunderstands Alexander of Hales on this point. He avers that Alexander understands human nature to be assisted by grace from the beginning. This is incorrect, as Alexander posits a prelapsarian state before the conferral of sanctifying grace. Wierzbicki compounds his error by claiming his position is shared by Hubert Philipp Weber, which is not true, as Weber himself notes Alexander's positing a prelapsarian state prior to the conferral of sanctifying grace. See Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, 'La grazia e il libero arbitrio,' in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica* (see above, n. 4), 302; Weber, *Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales*, 145–8.

secundum, the creature no longer exists in this higher way. The virtues that stem from grace are subsequent perfections in *esse secundum* that can be in act or not without affecting the existential status of the being in *esse secundum*. Thus, just as there is *esse secundum* according to grace, there is *esse operari* according to virtue. For this reason, as seen above, Alexander distinguishes between grace and virtue precisely in terms of the former being an act and the latter being a *habitus*. This informs Hales' definition of grace as the 'first and perfect act of the soul in second being', in which he says act is the part of this definition that separates grace from virtue, which is a habit.⁶⁷ John, on the other hand, with his more intrinsicist understanding of grace, has no hesitancy in calling grace a *habitus*, defining grace as 'the habit ordinative of the whole of life'. In so doing, he emphasizes more clearly than Alexander how grace can properly be said to belong to the creature, making a decisive advance over his master.⁶⁸

Conclusion

The early Franciscan theology of grace was a major achievement. Alexander of Hales was the first to employ the terminology of *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*. John of La Rochelle was the first to articulate their relation. This article has sought to explicate their ontologies of grace. In so doing, against the claims of other scholars, it has argued: first, that Rupella significantly developed, rather than merely echoed Hales; second, that the Franciscan account exceeds that of Philip the Chancellor; and third, that the first scholastic account of the relationship of *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* conceives of the soul's union with God as coming about through a dynamic interplay of these two types of grace. While Hales' and Rupella's theology has long been overlooked, it played a major role in bringing about the 13th-century 'Copernican revolution' in the theology of grace. That revolution would subsequently shape Catholic thinking on a host of crucial matters, such as justification, merit, the relation between divine and human freedom—in short, on that mysterious union between God and the soul that lies at the very heart of Christianity.

⁶⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, q. 1, d. 1, m. 1, a. 3 (Wierzbicki, 127).

⁶⁸ Per contra, Wierzbicki argues that Alexander's theology of grace surpasses that of John, in that the former has a more dynamic vision of the relationship of the soul to grace, whereas the latter's is static. Wierzbicki finds this dynamism in Alexander's account of grace being the *motor coniunctus* of free will (see above, n. 29). This reading is not convincing. Alexander's account of grace as joined to the free will as a *motor coniunctus*, distinguished from God's action as a *motor separatus*, suffers from a dichotomy and extrinsicism between uncreated and created grace. John's account is, in fact, more 'dynamic', as it articulates how the soul is not just moved by grace, but rather is transformed by it. See Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, 'Esistenza e necessità della grazia,' in Alexander de Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica* (see above, n. 4), 215.

John Marenbon

Idolaters, Philosophers and an Elusive Jew

The Problem of Paganism in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: This chapter examines the *Summa*'s treatment of the philosophers, by which it means, in the main, the ancient pagan philosophers, although some later Jewish and Islamic figures are also included. It shows how the authors balanced the obvious virtue and wisdom of the philosophers against their moral shortcomings, inevitable since they lacked God's grace, and the severe limitation to their understanding entailed by their limited understanding of the Trinity and their lack of explicit knowledge of the Incarnation. With regard to salvation, the authors seem not to have had a general theory about the fate of the philosophers, but they suggest that some might have been saved by special inspiration. The chapter also considers a more anthropological approach to the pagans in the Old Testament found in *Summa* Book 2, and it argues that there is no evidence of direct knowledge of Maimonides's *Guide of the Perplexed* in the *Summa Halensis*.

The large group of people often described as 'pagans'—all those who were not Christians, Jews or Muslims—posed a problem for Christian thinkers in the Middle Ages. These pagans included the philosophers, poets and heroes from antiquity whose wisdom and virtues many medieval writers so admired. How could pagans, given their ignorance of Christian truth, be the sources of scientific knowledge that the ancient philosophers were taken to be? Could pagans be truly virtuous, and, if not, why did so many famous figures of antiquity appear to have been so? And, if there were truly wise and virtuous pagans, how can it be explained that, at first sight at least, Christian doctrine seems to hold that they have been damned?

This 'Problem of Paganism' was central to the thought of some medieval writers; even for the many, such as the authors of the *Summa Halensis* (*SH*), who did not dwell on it, the Problem generated a tension, and investigating it throws a light on the character of their thinking.¹ The first part of this paper will investigate each of these aspects of the Problem in the *SH*. The philosophers, however, are not the only sort of pagans discussed by the authors (as the writers of the *SH* will be called here). The Old Testament, to which the *SH* devotes so many columns, teems with pa-

1 I discuss the nature and history of the Problem of Paganism in my book, *Pagans and Philosophers: The problem of paganism from Augustine to Leibniz* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). There is a useful discussion of the views about non-Christians in the *SH* in Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis* (Munich: Hueber, 1964), 391–400: *Excursus* 'Die besondere Stellung der Philosophen im Unterschied zu dem Juden und Heiden'.

gans: the ancestors of the Jews, in the time before they received God's law, and the many peoples they fought, defeated, or by whom they were conquered and enslaved. The *SH* looks closely at idolatry and its origins in the Old Testament world, and also at the non-Jewish customs and sacrifices of those times. The second part of this paper concerns this anthropological interest in pagans, another strand in the Problem of Paganism, related to each of its three main aspects. A first indication of the *SH*'s attitude towards the Problem is provided, however, by the terms it uses and the particular ways in which they are made to refer.

Pagans, Saracens, Jews, Idolaters and Philosophers

The term 'pagans' (*pagani*) has a variety of meanings, both in its medieval usages and today. In one sense, *pagani*, and also *gentiles*, designates people who are not Christians, Jews or Muslims. The ancient Greeks and Romans, the Philistines of the Old Testament, and 13th-century Lithuanians or Mongols are all, by this terminology, 'pagan'. It is about paganism understood in this common sense that I formulated the phrase 'the Problem of Paganism', as used in the title and just discussed. The *SH*, however, has a different terminology.

The authors make an explicit division of non-Christians (the *infidels* or non-faithful) in a single passage.² There are the 'Saracens' (*saraceni*) or 'pagans' (*pagani*) who believe that there is one God and do not worship idols, but do not believe in the Incarnation or in the Mosaic Law, and accept neither the Old nor the New Testaments. Then there are the Jews, who accept 'the Law given by God', but not the New Testament, and believe that God is one and their liberator, but do not believe in the Incarnation. Finally, there are the 'idolaters' (*idololatrae*), 'who adore idols for God and who believe in not just one God, but many'.

The authors here have in view principally the division of non-Christian peoples in their own time, but at the back of their minds, they also have the Old Testament. The term 'Saracens' points to the Muslims, and 'pagans' seems to be used just, as in some of the legal documents quoted in *SH*, as a synonym for it (and, true to this usage, the *SH* does not generally use *pagani* to refer to the idolatrous, non-Jewish

² Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q1, p. 715: 'Pagani autem sive Saraceni dicuntur illi qui nec Novum nec Vetus Testamentum recipiunt omnino, sed suis utuntur traditionibus, et, licet credant unum esse Deum nec adorent idola, non credunt incarnationem nec ea quae in lege Moysi continentur. Iudaei vero sunt qui Legem datam a Domino receperunt et unum Deum credunt creatorem et liberatorem, sed Novum Testamentum non recipiunt nec incarnationem Filii Dei credunt. Idololatrae vero dicuntur illi qui idola pro Deo adorant et non solum unum Deum credunt, sed plures, quos etiam Augustinus, in libro *Contra quinque haereses*, paganos vocat. Ibi enim sub duabus differentiis hae tres differentiae comprehenduntur: quidam enim dicuntur Iudaei, quidam pagani, utrobique autem notatur infidelitas.'

peoples of the Old Testament, except in quotations). The characterization given—involving the rejection of the Bible and the Incarnation, as well as the rejection of idolatry and the acceptance of One God—fits the understanding of Muslims among educated medieval Churchmen. Then there are the Jews, and finally the idolaters. These idolaters could correspond to the peoples in the North or beyond Islam, of whom the authors may have had some vague knowledge.³ They also fit the gentiles—the idolatrous tribes who were enemies of the Israelites, in the Old Testament, a book the authors knew very well.

In the detailed discussion that follows, the treatment of non-Christian religions is divided between a biblical and a present-day focus. It begins with a treatment of idolatry, which uses only evidence provided in the Bible. After this, the authors concentrate on the Jews, the one non-Christian group with whom Christians in Europe had regular contact. The *pagani* are mentioned in the course of an argument (which is rejected) that Jews should not be tolerated, because Christians wage war and try to kill the *pagani* who occupy the Holy Land; here they are clearly referring to the Muslims.⁴ In questions about whether Jews can have Christian servants or Christians Jewish ones, the *pagani* (to whom the same is said to apply) are added as an afterthought.⁵

It says something about the authors' priorities that this explicit three-fold classification leaves no room for people who are neither Christians, Jews nor Muslims, *nor* idolaters. But the authors do not, in fact, exclude this group entirely. They talk in various places about the 'philosophers', or describe a writer as a *philosophus*, and although this term is not part of their official classification of religions, their discussions indicate that usually they regard philosophers as both not being idolaters and not belonging to one of the Abrahamic religions.

Unlike any of the groups in their threefold classification, 'philosophers' are always figures from the past, referred to by the authors in the past tense. Most often the term refers to Aristotle and his followers and Aristotle himself is called, as he would be throughout the rest of the Middle Ages, simply 'the Philosopher' (*philosophus*). But Plato too is included among the philosophers.⁶ Sometimes the term refers to the philosophers as cited by Augustine,⁷ and it is also used to refer to the pagans of Rom. 1:21 who knew God but did not glorify him as they should.⁸ The term is also used for more recent figures from the Islamic world, especially Avicenna,⁹ sometimes

3 Cf. Marenbon, *Pagans and Philosophers*, 68–70.

4 *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q2, Ti2, M1, C1 (n. 740), p. 729.

5 *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q2, Ti2, M2, C2 (n. 746), pp. 733–5; *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q2, Ti2, M2, C4 (n. 748), p. 736.

6 *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q5, C4 (n. 96), p. 118.

7 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti2, C2, Ar2 (n. 214), pp. 308–9; *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti2, C4 (n.218), p. 313; *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1 C4 (n. 456), p. 587.

8 *SH* IV, P3, In2, Tr2, Q2, Ti3 (n. 707), p. 1141.

9 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C3 (n. 74), p.117; *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C6 (n. 26), p. 37.

explicitly identified as following Aristotle.¹⁰ The authors also talk of ‘Maimonides and other philosophers’.¹¹ On one occasion, the term ‘Philosophus’ designates, not Aristotle, but Abu Mashar;¹² on another occasion the authors refer to ‘the philosopher, that is to say, Isaac’—alluding to a medical text by the 9th- to 10th-century Jewish philosopher and physiologist Isaac Israeli.¹³

As this list indicates, the authors did not use the term ‘philosopher’ as such to indicate a given religious group—since a philosopher might be a Muslim or a Jew, though apparently not a Christian. But the word could cover those figures from the ancient world, such as Plato and Aristotle, who had not rejected but simply did not know the Old Testament, and were not idolaters.¹⁴ In the case of the *SH*, to examine the themes of what elsewhere are often called pagan virtue, pagan wisdom and the salvation of pagans will mean looking at the philosophers, and what the authors say about their virtues, wisdom and salvation.

The Philosophers’ Virtues

The theme of philosophers’ virtues in the *SH* can be treated quite briefly. Theologians usually dealt with questions about pagan virtue when discussing the virtues in general, but the section on the virtues in general, though promised, is missing from the *SH*. The authors’ position must be gathered, therefore, by contextualizing their passing remarks within the medieval debate.

On the one hand, very few medieval authors accepted Augustine’s position that pagan virtues were not virtues at all. On the other hand, even so great an admirer of the ancient, pagan world as Abelard accepted, following Augustine, ‘that every virtue is charity or from charity’, apparently thus denying the possibility of virtue to those without grace.¹⁵ Indeed, Peter the Lombard’s definition of virtue as ‘a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly and no one uses badly, which God alone works in a human being’ seemed to rule out as virtues any but infused ones—and the authors take this definition but underline God’s role even more heavily, changing its ending to ‘which God works in us without us’.¹⁶ The usual strategy, from Simon of

¹⁰ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C3 (n. 74), p. 119.

¹¹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q4, C6 (n. 162), p. 242: ‘Rabbi Moyses et alii philosophi’.

¹² *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S1, Q1, C3 (n. 430), p. 511.

¹³ *SH* II, In 4, Tr2, S1, Q3, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar1 (n. 438), p. 533: ‘Philosopho, scilicet Isaac’.

¹⁴ But it could also be, though rarely was, used for idolaters, since the ‘philosophers’ of Rom. 1:21 (see above, n. 8) who knew God but did not glorify him are described as having turned to worship-ping created things in place of God.

¹⁵ See Peter Abelard, *Sententie*, s. 251, in *Petri Abaelardi opera theologica*, vol. 6, ed. David Luscombe, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 132:2986; Marenbon, *Pagans and Philosophers*, 88.

¹⁶ See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* II, d. 27, c. 1, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81),

Tournai and Alan of Lille in the later 12th century onwards, was to say that pagans could have ‘political’ virtues—a label taken from Macrobius—and leave their relation to the virtues founded on charity vague: they were not exactly false virtues, but nor were they real ones.¹⁷ The *SH* apparently follows this line. Virtue in the very broadest sense is divided into natural, political and graced varieties; in a less, but still very broad sense, it is divided into political virtue, which is acquired, and graced virtue, which is infused.¹⁸ As the authors say: ‘the aim of the moral philosopher is civic happiness, and he goes no further (...) But the theologian sets eternal happiness as his end.’¹⁹

In keeping with this outlook, the authors insist that the philosophers ‘never came to the knowledge of grace or of graced good’.²⁰ Nor did they know about the Fall, the event that made grace necessary: ‘According to the catholic truth, it must be acknowledged that human nature is fallen. But this is something that the philosophers did not know.’²¹ In itself, this position would have been accepted by every 13th-century Christian thinker, but it has especially serious consequences in the *SH*, because the Fall, and grace, are so central to its outlook. For instance, the authors go so far as to deny that the philosophers knew of free will (*liberum arbitrium*). They realize that this position sounds extreme, and they explain that one meaning of the term is ‘the rational power for opposites’, and in this sense the philosophers did indeed know about it. But the sense that the authors consider most important is free will as the starting point for merit, and to be such, it must be recognized as coming from God. And free will in this sense was unknown to the philosophers.²²

1:480: ‘Virtus est, ut ait Augustinus: bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, et qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus solus in homine operatur’; cf. *SH* IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar4 (n. 611), p. 964: ‘Definit Augustinus virtutem dicens: “Virtus est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur, qua nemo male utitur, quam Deus operatur in nobis sine nobis”.’ Although both Peter the Lombard and, following him, the authors attribute the definition to Augustine, it is in fact a formulation suggested by phrases in Augustine but put together, probably by Peter himself.

17 Cf. Marenbon, *Pagans and Philosophers*, 161.

18 *SH* IV, P3, In1, Tr2, Q2, Ti1, M3 (n. 651), p. 1034: ‘Communiis dicitur secundum quod virtus tantum extenditur ad virtutem politicam, quae est habitus acquisitus, et gratuitam, quae est habitus infusus.’

19 *SH* III, In3, Tr4, S2, Q1, Ti5, C7, Ar3 (n. 580), p. 567. The whole passage runs: ‘(...) finis moralis Philosophi est felicitas civilis nec ultra progreditur. Qui vult conservare pacem civitatis, necesse est ut in hoc attendat differentiam, ut magnis det magna et parvis parva, et ideo aliam medietatem et alia extrema determinat circa haec et circa illa: unde sua extrema ponit secundum parvum et magnum. Sed theologus attendit tamquam pro fine felicitatem aeternam: Philosophus enim ad hunc finem non potuit pervenire natura et ratione, sicut potuit fidelis argumento gratiae et ex adiutorio fidei, scilicet quod in felicitate illa attenditur ratione fruitionis.’

20 *SH* I, P1, Tr3, Q3, M4, C5 (n. 127), p. 198: ‘Quia igitur philosophi nunquam pervenerunt ad cognitionem gratiae vel boni gratuiti (...).’

21 *SH* IV, P1 In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), p. 6: ‘Secundum catholicam veritatem concedendum est humanam naturam esse lapsam, quod tamen philosophi ignoraverunt (...).’

22 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C3, Ar4 (n. 401), p. 478: ‘[L]iberum arbitrium dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo (...) ut ‘arbitrium’ dicatur ab arbitrando rationali consideratione vel discernendo

The Philosophers' Wisdom

There is more material about the *SH*'s attitude to the philosophers' wisdom. That the authors considered them wise is made clear by the repeated references to them, and especially to the *Philosophus* himself, Aristotle, as authorities. Sometimes their views are rejected, but on many occasions they are followed. This significant, explicit presence of the pagan philosophers contrasts with their absence from the mid 12th-century *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard, although it is given far less emphasis than Abelard gives to the ancient philosophers in the various versions of his *Theologia*; and it is very limited compared to later 13th-century theological writing. Augustine indeed, is cited ten times as often as Aristotle. The importance for the authors of Anselm and Richard of St Victor is striking: their positions and arguments often fill the place that, a few decades later, would be taken by Aristotle.

How far did the *SH* consider the philosophers' wisdom extended? Usually, medieval thinkers considered most of the ancient philosophers to have argued for and held to the existence of a wholly good, eternal, immutable, omnipotent, omniscient God. The *SH* is no exception, stating, for example, as an obvious point that does not need to be argued that

(...) the philosophers knew the highest true thing according to himself, that he is the first truth, and they knew that he was good and best and that he was most powerful, and that all things needed him.²³

But the authors quickly explain that this knowledge, which is, as it must be for the philosophers, without grace, is merely knowledge of God through his effects.²⁴

In the 12th century, various thinkers had gone beyond attributing to the philosophers knowledge of a God with the attributes of perfect being theology. They claimed, citing Augustine, that the philosophers knew of the Trinity. Indeed, for Abelard they were equally good witnesses to divine triunity as the Old Testament prophets, if not better. Abelard's assertions rested on his refusing to draw a clear line between know-

quid eligat quidve recuset, 'liberum' autem eo quod in sua sit positum potestate, habens agendi quod velit possibilitatem; et secundum hoc poterant philosophi pervenire ad intentionem liberi arbitrii: hoc enim nihil aliud est quam potestas rationalis ad opposita. Alio vero modo dicitur liberum arbitrium quod habet iudicium rationis, non per quod sit idoneum pervenire ad ea quae ad Deum pertinent, sine Deo aut inchoare aut peragere: et hoc modo est unum principium meriti. Sicut ergo non pervenerunt philosophi ad intentionem meriti, quod est ex gratia et libero arbitrio, ita nec pervenerunt ad rationem liberi arbitrii in quantum sine ipso non est meritum (...).'

23 *SH* IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 606), p. 946: 'philosophi cognoverunt summum Verum secundum se, quia esset prima Veritas; item, cognoverunt quod ipsum erat bonum et optimum et quod erat omnipotentissimum et quod ipso omnia indigebant (...).'

24 *SH* IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 606), p. 948: 'duplex est cognitio de Deo: una est per effectus suos, et haec est sine gratia; alia est per praesentiam sui apud animam, haec autem non potest esse sine gratia. Primo modo cognoverunt philosophi Deum.'

ing the special attributes of the Persons—power, wisdom and benignity—and their proper identities as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.²⁵ But in his commentary on Romans, Peter the Lombard had insisted on this distinction, allowing that the philosophers knew the special attributes, but not the Persons themselves in their proper identities.²⁶ The *SH* insists that, in principle, the Trinity is knowable, but due to its corruption after the Fall, our intellect cannot reach this knowledge without the help of grace—and the authors are even able to quote Aristotle to back up this point.²⁷ Moreover, picking up on a doubt expressed by Augustine and often repeated, the authors consider that the philosophers knew the special properties of only the Father and Son, because of their deficient knowledge of goodness, due among other things to their ignorance of its supreme manifestation in the Redemption:

(...) They are said to have failed in knowing the third person, because they failed in knowing goodness. They did so in many ways: first, because they did not know the most powerful effect of goodness, that is the Incarnation and the Redemption; secondly, because although they knew goodness, they did not worship it as highest, because they attributed their goods to themselves; thirdly because although they knew the special attributes of two of the Persons—power and wisdom—they did not have knowledge of the special attribute of the third person—goodness.²⁸

Although their denial of the philosophers' knowledge of the Trinity can, then, be traced to the authors' emphasis on grace, their position would be the general one among 13th-century theologians. Moreover, unlike their great Franciscan successor, Duns Scotus, the authors accept that the philosopher's cognition of God, although limited and not as triune, is not in itself erroneous.

The middle, somewhat undecided position of the *SH* with regard to the philosophers' knowledge is also found on an issue that, just a few decades later, would sharply distinguish different attitudes to the reliability of pagan philosophy: the eter-

²⁵ See Marenbon, *Pagans and Philosophers*, 77–80.

²⁶ Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in Epistolas D. Pauli* (PL 191:1329 A): 'Non ergo illas tres personas ideo dicuntur intellexisse, quod eas distincte veraciter et proprie intellexerint: sed quia illa esse cognoverunt in Deo, quae illis tribus personis in sacra Scriptura frequenter solent distinctim ac specialiter attribui, scilicet potentia, sapientia, bonitas.' Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* I, d. 3, c.1, 9, 1:71.

²⁷ *SH* I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C3 (n. 10), p. 19: '(...) per naturalem rationem de se non potest haberi cognitio Trinitatis secundum propria; tamen per naturalem rationem, adiutam per aliquam gratiam aut gratis datam aut gratum facientem, potest. Et ratio huius est: quia intellectus noster, obtenebratus per originale corruptionem, deficit in iis quae verissime sunt; et ideo circa maxime intelligibilia deficit (...) Nec hoc est mirum, quia, sicut dicit Aristoteles, in Prima Philosophia: "Intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima naturae sicut oculus noctuae ad solem".' See also *SH* I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C3 (n. 10), Ad obiecta 3, p. 19.

²⁸ *SH* I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C3 (n. 10), p. 19: '(...) dicuntur defecisse in cognitione tertiae personae, quia defecerunt in cognitione bonitatis. Et hoc multipliciter: primo, quia non cognoverunt potissimum effectum bonitatis, scilicet incarnationem et redemptionem; secundo, quia etsi bonitatem cognoverunt, non tamen ut summam et primam venerati sunt, quia sua bona sibi attribuerunt; tertio, quia etsi habuerunt appropriata duabus personis, scilicet potentiam et sapientiam, non tamen habuerunt appropriatum tertiae personae, scilicet bonitatem.'

nity of the world. In the 1260s and 1270s, the Franciscans William of Baglione and, less straightforwardly, Bonaventure would hold that the non-eternity of the world can be demonstrated, and that the philosophers had erred in their reasoning when they argued that it is eternal. Aquinas, by contrast, along with some of the Arts Masters, held that there is no demonstration that the world had a beginning; it is purely a matter of faith.²⁹ The *SH* argues that an eternal world—that is, a world which lacks a beginning of its duration—is an impossibility, because nothing can be created and lack a beginning (an idea Aquinas would reject), and the createdness of the world is evident to reason.³⁰ But the authors also touch on the idea that there is really no dispute here with the philosophers, because they were merely concerned with lower causes.³¹ This line of thought, however, is taken from Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*, and from Alexander of Hales himself, and the authors of the *SH* make it much less clear and emphatic.³²

The Salvation of the Philosophers

The third strand of the Problem of Paganism concerns salvation—in the *SH*, the salvation of the philosophers. Christian doctrine makes faith in the Redeemer a requirement for salvation. It was, indeed, widely held in the Middle Ages that the Gospel had been preached throughout the world, so that, arguably, most of those who did not believe in Christ were guilty of rejecting this belief. But this accusation could not be raised about those who lived before Christ. It was accepted that there were good Jews among those in the Old Testament, who would have been saved—not just the prophets and leaders, who were thought to have had the future coming of the Messiah revealed to them, but ordinary Jewish people of those times. Theologians had at least to explain how their salvation, without faith in Christ, was possible. And they might also want to consider the case of an ancient, non-idolatrous pagan, who has led a virtuous life, such as one of the philosophers.

In his epistle to the Hebrews (6:6) St Paul says that ‘without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him’ (Douai Translation). The authors believed that it was within

²⁹ On the controversy, see Richard Dales, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 18 (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 39–177 and Cyrille Michon, *Thomas d'Aquin et la controverse sur L'Éternité de monde* (Paris: Flammarion, 2004). For the reasons why, *pace* Michon, *Thomas d'Aquin et la controverse*, 47–55, Bonaventure did hold that it could be demonstrated that the world is not eternal, see Marenbon, *Pagans and Philosophers*, 141–2.

³⁰ *SH* I, Pl, In1, Tr2, Q4, M2, C4 (n. 64), p. 95.

³¹ *SH* I, Pl, In1, Tr2, Q4, M2, C4 (n. 64), p. 98.

³² Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, De bono naturae, q. 3, 2 vols, ed. Nikolaus Wicki, *Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta*, 2 (Berne: Franke, 1985), 1:49; Dales, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World*, 68–9 (for editions of texts by Alexander of Hales).

the power of human reason, without the aid of revelation, to discover this Pauline Minimum:

In natural law, following the dictate of reason, there was written a command about faith in the Mediator, in so far as in a certain way faith in the redemption was innate in human reason, because it could be certain to human reason that the nature of man had fallen in general. Now, it was innate to reason that always what is better and more worthy should be attributed to the highest goodness, and from this they did not have to go far to gather that the highest goodness would not permit that the rational human creature, which had perished in general, would perish entirely (...) And so reason dictated that it should believe in the future restitution of human-kind. In this way therefore it is shown that the command with regard to faith in the redemption is in a certain way written in natural law.³³

But, from the time of Hugh of St Victor, it had been generally accepted that belief in the Pauline Minimum was not sufficient for salvation.³⁴ The *SH*, following Hugh's *De sacramentis* closely, but in using perhaps for the first time about faith the terms *implicitite* and *explicitite*, explains how, none the less, the simple Jews of the Old Testament were saved:

One can believe explicitly or implicitly, distinctly or indistinctly. The simple people are said to believe all the articles implicitly or indistinctly, and this in two ways. In one way with regard to what they believe; in the other way with regard to those with whom they believe.³⁵

The authors explain implicitness with regard to faith *in what* in terms of generality: X cognizes *a* (for instance, the Redemption) only in general, as in the Pauline Minimum, but X can be said to have *implicit* faith in all its details. They explain the implicitness with regard to those 'with whom they believe' in terms of vicarious faith: X does not personally cognize *a* or at least not in detail, but X is willing to accept whatever Y believes, and Y has the relevant beliefs about *a* and its details. The authors do not restrict this theory of implicit faith to the simple Jews of the Old Testament. A deaf person who has been baptized will through the grace of baptism come to under-

33 *SH* IV, P3, In2, Tr2, Q1, C3, Ar1 (n. 700), p. 1118: 'In lege naturali secundum dictamen rationis scriptum erat praeceptum de fide Mediatoris, in quantum indita erat quodam modo rationi humanae fides redemptionis, quia certum poterat esse rationi humanae naturam hominis esse lapsam generaliter. Inditum autem erat rationi quod semper melius et dignius est attribuendum summae Bonitati, et ideo satis ex propinquo colligere poterat quod summa Bonitas non permetteret rationalem creaturam humanam, quae generaliter perdita erat, ex toto perire (...) Et ideo dictabat ratio quod credere deberet futuram hominis reparationem. Per hanc ergo viam ostenditur in lege naturali quodam modo scriptum praeceptum de fide redemptionis.'

34 Cf. Marenbon, *Pagans and Philosophers*, 168–9.

35 *SH* IV, P3, In2, Tr2, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 702), p. 1120: 'Ad hoc breviter est dicendum quod est credere explicitite vel implicitite, distincte vel indistincte. Simples autem implicitite dicuntur credere omnes articulos sive indistincte, et hoc duobus modis: uno modo quantum ad illud quod credunt; alio modo quantum ad illos cum quibus credunt.' Cf. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis* I, p. x, c. 7 (PL 176:339D-340C).

stand, when he or she reaches the age of reason, that he should believe what the Church believes.³⁶ It is not, then, that the deaf person comes to understand explicitly the articles of faith, but merely to know in what—the Church—to put trust.

The theory of implicit faith will not help in the case of the philosophers. First, according to the authors, they did not recognize that humans are fallen and so, arguably, they did not even reach the Pauline Minimum, since they did not see the need for a redeemer. Second, there is no group which has explicit faith in Christ (such as the Old Testament prophets) to which they can plausibly be said to have given their faith. The authors have to turn to a different theory when, in a single short passage, they deal directly with the question of the salvation of the philosophers:

It is asked about the philosophers whether they have all been damned, for the sacrament of the incarnation was not revealed to them (...)

St Paul responds to this question about the philosophers (Rom. 1:21–22): “Because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified him as God (...) and their foolish heart was darkened. For professing themselves to be wise, they became fools.” The evil philosophers, then, who took for themselves the glory which is God’s, were blinded, and no revelation of the incarnation was made to them (...) With regard to the good philosophers, however, I believe thus—that a revelation was made to them, either through Scripture, which the Jews had, or through prophecy or through internal inspiration, as was the case with regard to Job and his friends: “God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble” (James 4:6). And the same should be understood about the other simple pagans (*gentiles*).³⁷

The suggestion, then, is that in one way or another, the good philosophers were able to be in the same position as the Jewish leaders (rather than the simple Jewish people). Rather than believe vicariously, they were in a position to believe directly, by having the Incarnation revealed to them in advance, through the Old Testament, prophecy or internal inspiration.

This idea of internal inspiration is one that seems to have originated with Abelard and to have been used by a number of later thinkers, including Aquinas, although the channels of transmission are not clear. Appeal to internal inspiration was usually, however, restricted to what were thought to be the rare cases of people

36 *SH IV*, P3, In2, Tr2, Q2, Ti3 (n. 707), pp. 1141–2. Note here, and also with the answer in the same place about the simple Jews (p. 1141), that the vicarious faith element alone is retained.

37 *SH IV*, P3, In2, Tr2, Q2, Ti3 (n. 707), p. 1141: ‘Quaeritur ergo de philosophis utrum omnes sint damnati universaliter. Eis enim sacramentum incarnationis non fuit revelatum (...) [R]espondet Apostolus de philosophis, Rom. 1, 21: “Cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt”; et sequitur: “Obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum; dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt.” Mali ergo philosophi, qui sibi usurpant gloriam quae Dei est, excaecati sunt; nec est eis facta revelatio incarnationis (...) De bonis vero sic credo quod eis facta fuerit revelatio, vel per Scripturam, quae apud Iudaeos erat, vel per prophetiam vel per internam inspirationem, sicut fuit de Iob et amicis eius; “Dominus enim superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam”, Iac. 4, 6. Similiter et de aliis simplicibus gentilibus intelligendum est.’

who, after the preaching of the Gospel, had no chance to hear it.³⁸ If the authors really want to suggest that a wide range of ancient pagans, both philosophers and simple people, were inwardly inspired with the knowledge they needed for salvation, then they are putting forward an unusual and daring, though highly implausible, theory. But this is just a passing remark, not repeated by the authors elsewhere, and only one possibility out of three—a sign less of radical thinking than the authors' lack of serious interest in the Problem of Paganism.

Maimonides and the Anthropological Approach to Paganism

This, then, is a good moment to turn away from the Problem of Paganism, to investigate the other, anthropological strand of the *SH*'s treatment of pagans. What do the authors have to say about the religious phenomena of paganism? The most important passage in the *SH* for answering this question is a long and interesting discussion about pagan ceremonies in Book 3, in order to provide a rationale for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law.³⁹ But the material here, and the way of using it to explain the Bible, goes back to Moses Maimonides. It is worth pausing to consider the authors' exact relationship to Maimonides and his writings, both because it adds to the picture of how the *SH* uses Arabic sources and it throws light on the extent of the authors' interest in an anthropological approach to paganism.

In his *Guide of the Perplexed*, written in Arabic and finished by about 1190, Moses Maimonides explains how the various ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, many of which seem to be unnecessary or even absurd, were decreed by God in order to wean the Jews away from the idolatry of the Egyptians, and so cannot be understood except by reference to the particular customs of the Egyptians and other pagans.⁴⁰ This approach is known as the theory of 'accommodation'. Although the line of thought can be traced back to early Jewish and Christian sources, Maimonides brings to it an exceptional knowledge of pagan customs, which he had searched out in all the Arabic sources he could find.⁴¹ The *Guide* was translated into Hebrew very soon after its composition by Samuel ibn Tibbon and again, after 1204, less accurately by Yehuda al-Harisi. Sometime before the mid 13th century, a complete Latin translation

³⁸ See Marenbon, *Pagans and Philosophers*, 92–3, 172–6.

³⁹ *SH* IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S3, Q2 (n. 518), pp. 763–83; and cf. *SH* IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S3, Q3, C2 (n. 520), p. 786.

⁴⁰ Moses Maimonides, *Rabi Mossei Aegypti Dux seu Director dubitantium aut perplexorum* (hereafter, *Guide*) III, cc. 30–33 [in modern editions: III, cc. 29–32], ed. Augustinus Iustinianus (Paris: ab Iodoco Badio Ascensio, 1520), fols 90r–93v.

⁴¹ For an excellent introduction to Maimonides' theory, see Sarah Stroumsa, *Maimonides in his World: Portrait of a Mediterranean Thinker* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 84–105.

was made of al-Harisi's version, and it was used by Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and later theologians.⁴²

According to the received picture, the *SH* is at the forefront of the reception of the *Guide*, and John of La Rochelle, who was responsible for Book 3, showed a serious interest in Maimonides' anthropological approach to paganism. Although the editors of the critical edition of the *SH* consider that the material on paganism for the discussion of the ceremonial precepts was taken indirectly from William of Auvergne's *De legibus*, they suggest that the authors knew the *Guide* and used various parts of it at a number of points. In a classic study of Old Testament commentary in the 13th century, Beryl Smalley not only accepted that the authors made use of the *Guide* elsewhere in the *SH*, but also claimed that, in the passage on the ceremonial precepts, *De legibus* was 'supplemented (...) by a direct study of the *Guide*'.⁴³

The most recent writer to examine the early Latin influence of the *Guide*, Göрге Hasselhoff, taking account of the fact that there were other translations of the *Guide* besides the complete one, has qualified this view of the relationship between the *SH* and Maimonides, without entirely rejecting it.⁴⁴ The earliest of the partial versions is the *Liber de parabola*, not a straightforward translation, but rather a compilation mainly occupied by a version of the *Guide* III, Chapters 29 to 30 and 32 to 49 (including, therefore, Maimonides' discussion of the ceremonial precepts and pagan practices),⁴⁵ with some additional matter added by its writer—apparently a learned Jew, writing for the work's dedicatee, Cardinal Romanus, in 1223 to 1224.⁴⁶ It was this text, it seems, and not the complete translation of the *Guide*, which may well not even have been made at the time, that William of Auxerre used in *De legibus*.⁴⁷ The *Liber de uno Deo benedicto*, from the early 1240s or before, is a translation of the *Guide* II, Introduction and Chapter 1 (Maimonides' argument for the existence of God), probably based on ibn Tibbon's Hebrew version.⁴⁸ Hasselhoff argues that neither of the two explicit references to Maimonides in the *SH* shows that the authors were using the complete translation. One, to 'Rabbi Moyses et alii philosophi', about

⁴² See Wolfgang Kluxen, 'Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 21 (1954): 23–50; Göрге K. Hasselhoff, *Dicit Rabbi Moyses: Studien zum Bild von Moses Maimonides im lateinischen Westen vom 13. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert*, 2nd ed. (Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 2004).

⁴³ Beryl Smalley, 'William of Auvergne, John of La Rochelle and Thomas Aquinas on the Old Law,' in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274–1974: Commemorative studies*, 2 vols, ed. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 1:11–71, reprinted in Beryl Smalley, *Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning: From Abelard to Wyclif*, History Series, 6 (London: Hambledon, 1981), 160.

⁴⁴ Göрге K. Hasselhoff, 'The Reception of Maimonides in the Latin West: an introductory survey,' *Jewish Studies Quarterly* 9 (2002): 1–20.

⁴⁵ The omitted Chapter 31 is little more than an aside by Maimonides.

⁴⁶ Kluxen, 'Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides,' 41–6.

⁴⁷ Kluxen, 'Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides,' 44–5.

⁴⁸ See Kluxen, 'Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides,' 36–41 and Hasselhoff, *Dicit Rabbi Moyses*, 88–93; for the use of ibn Tibbon, see Hasselhoff, *Dicit Rabbi Moyses*, 90, n. 4.

animals made from putrefaction, is hard to track down to any given passage by Maimonides.⁴⁹ The other, by contrast, correctly attributes to ‘Rabbi Moyses Iudaeus’ a distinction between ceremonial and judicial precepts. But this remark, Hasselhoff says, could have been taken either from Roland of Cremona, or from an oral source.⁵⁰ Neither of these brief citations requires that the authors had read the *Guide*. On several occasions throughout the *SH*, the editors mention the *Guide*, which they cite in its early modern Latin translation, as a source. Hasselhoff thinks that some of these parallels may point to the use of the *Liber de uno Deo*,⁵¹ and he also suggests the possibility that the long passage on paganism and the ceremonial precepts is not taken from William of Auvergne but from the *Liber de parabola*.⁵²

An even more radical view might be taken, however: perhaps the authors did not even know either of the two partial translations. The unmentioned parallels the editors have found with the *Guide*, except for the passage on the ceremonial laws, are unconvincing. For instance, the authors are said to have drawn the arguments they attribute to the philosophers for the eternity of the world from the *Guide*. But, in fact, the resemblance between their list and Maimonides’ discussion is partial and superficial.⁵³ Furthermore, Hasselhoff’s suggestion that the *Liber de parabola*, rather than William of Auvergne, might have been used for the passage on the ceremonial laws, is unconvincing, given that other materials from *De legibus* are used extensively in this part of the *SH*.

The attitudes of John of La Rochelle, author of Book 3, are brought out by a passage earlier in this book, which is also concerned with the ceremonial precepts. The distinction between ceremonial and judicial laws made in Book 2 is repeated, but John chooses to drop the explicit reference to Maimonides as its originator: it is now attributed to ‘a certain Jewish expositor of the law’ (*quidam Expositor Legis Hebraeus*).⁵⁴ A little before this reference, there is a discussion of how the ceremonial laws for which there is no other explanation were given to the Jews to win them over from idolatry—a crude but not inaccurate summary of Maimonides’ position. This view is attributed to ‘the Jewish literal expositors of the Law’ (*Iudaei expositores Legis ad litteram*).⁵⁵ The phrasing suggests that it may have been gathered from con-

49 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q4, C6 (n.162), p. 242; Hasselhoff, ‘The Reception of Maimonides in the Latin West,’ 15–6.

50 *SH* IV, P2, In3, Tr1, Q1, C5, Ar1 (n.263), p. 377. See Hasselhoff, ‘The Reception of Maimonides in the Latin West,’ 17–8. As Dag Hasse notes, however, Roland’s *Summa* exists only in a couple of MSS written in Italy and did not circulate widely in Paris. See Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), 63.

51 Hasselhoff, ‘The Reception of Maimonides in the Latin West,’ 16–7.

52 Hasselhoff, ‘The Reception of Maimonides in the Latin West,’ 17.

53 Compare *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q4, M2, C4 (n. 64), *Contra* 12–16, pp. 94–5 with Moses Maimonides, *Guide* II, c. 14, fols 46r–47v.

54 *SH* IV, P2, In3, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 265), p. 384.

55 *SH* IV, P2, In3, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 265), p. 384.

versations with Jews, rather than from a written text. John does not seem to see the link between this comment and the long passage taken from *De legibus* later in Book 3, where, like William of Auvergne there, he gives no hint of its Jewish origin.

John's attitude is thrown into relief by the fact the *Liber de parabola* was indeed most probably known in the world of the Paris University Franciscans, since it had been used by none other than Alexander of Hales himself, as Smalley noticed.⁵⁶ What she claimed to be the first Latin use of the *Guide*, in the earliest version of Alexander's *Sentences* Commentary from the mid-1120s, is not, as the editor points out, from the standard complete translation.⁵⁷ Alexander is summarizing rather than quoting, so it is difficult to be certain about the source. But the evidence points to the *Liber*: the quotation is from part of the *Guide* III, Chapter 35, included there; the biblical references are, like those in the *Liber*, close to the Vulgate;⁵⁸ and Alexander does not know the name of the expositor, but says he is not a Christian—exactly what could be inferred from the *Liber*.⁵⁹

John of La Rochelle is only, then, very incidentally and indirectly an early reader and user of Maimonides' anthropological approach to paganism. But his colleagues who wrote Book 2 do some independent thinking of their own in this area in their discussion of idolatry. They believe that, in principle, people of all times could discover that there is one supreme God, who is to be worshipped, and not idols. Although they comment that idolatry takes place because people follow the 'inclination of corrupted nature', they accept that it can be avoided, even by ungraced fallen humans, since the pagan philosophers were not idolaters. Idolatry comes about, rather, through a failure of reasoning:

Although humans consider God to be most good, most powerful and most wise—and these <descriptions> do not fit an idol or the spirit in charge of an idol, none the less, human reason, look-

⁵⁶ Smalley, 'William of Auvergne, John of La Rochelle and Thomas Aquinas on the Old Law,' 135. Hasselhoff, 'The Reception of Maimonides in the Latin West: an introductory survey,' 18, who insists on treating the *SH* as a work by Alexander, seems not to have noticed Smalley's discovery and says that there are no references to Maimonides in any of Alexander's 'other edited works.'

⁵⁷ The passage is at Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) III, d. 37, n. 3, vol. 3, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 14 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1954), 3:471.12–472.7.

⁵⁸ There are two biblical citations. The first (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, 3:471.15) is of Lev. 19:32. It is not found in the full text translation of the *Guide* and the wording, *coram cano capite*, is that of the Vulgate. The second (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, 3:471.22) is of Deut. 16:18. Here the comparison is: Alexander *Constituantur iudices in portis*; Vulgate *iudices et magistros constitues in omnibus portis*; Moses Maimonides, *Guide* III, c. 36 [in modern editions: III, c. 35], fol. 94v, *Iudices et praepositos habebis in singulis ciuitatibus tuis*. For the use of the Vulgate in *De parabola*, see Kluxen, 'Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides,' 42.

⁵⁹ He begins the extract by saying: 'Quidam expositor, licet non sanctus, dicit quod sunt summae praeceptorum quatuordecim in faciendo vel non faciendo.' (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, 3:471.12–14).

ing at the effect and not universally but particularly, and deceived through this, fell into idolatry.⁶⁰

The authors raise as a possible explanation for the rise of idolatry the intellectually undeveloped state of the earliest humans after the Fall: people ‘greatly adhered to things of the senses’. Their intellects did not ascend to God but remained rooted to sensible things and believed that they should pray to them for aid.⁶¹ But this explanation is rejected, because it does not take account of the closeness of the earliest people to the creation, which they learned about through their ancestors, and which stopped them from worshipping creatures rather than the creator. Indeed,

Although they were simple because of the fact that not so much had been left for them in scriptures, from which they could become learned, as happened later on, their natural capabilities were better than those of the people who came afterwards, and with their better natural understanding (*ingenium*), along with grace, which was not lacking then, they were better able to resist the devil’s machinations than in later times, so far as the goodness of natural things was concerned.⁶²

Sin, according to the author, was something that gradually took hold of people, through example, beginning with the attractions of the body, and leading through power and pride to the greatest sin of all, idolatry. Here the authors seem to be influenced by a current of thinking that was Pelagian in origin, but was diffused under orthodox guise in Pelagius’ *Letter to Demetriades*, misattributed to Jerome.⁶³ The Jews, the authors go on to explain, remained free from idolatry for longer than other peoples because they were instructed by Abraham and the patriarchs, who themselves were taught by God. They fell into idolatry when their leader, Moses, left them to be given the Law on Mount Sinai and the idol they chose to worship was a calf because—and here John apparently engaged in his own anthropological research, they were influenced by their period in Egypt, where a cow or bull, dedicated to Serapis, was worshipped.

It is a sign, perhaps, of what little attention John of La Rochelle was paying to the Maimonidean material he copied from William of Auvergne in Book 3 that he does

60 *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q1, Ti1, C2 (n. 733), p. 719: ‘Licet homo ponat Deum esse summe bonum, summe potentem, summe sapientem – haec autem non conveniunt idolo vel spiritui in idolo praesidenti – nihilominus tamen ratio humana respiciens ad effectum, et non universaliter, sed particulariter, et per hoc decepta, incidit in idololatriam.’

61 *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q1, Ti1, C6, Ar1 (n. 737), p. 725: ‘Plurimum adhaerent homines rebus sensibilibus.’

62 *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q1, Ti1, C6, Ar1 (n. 737), p. 726: ‘Licet simplices essent propter hoc quod tot non erant relicta in Scripturis, ex quibus erudirentur, sicut in posterioribus temporibus factum fuit, meliora tamen naturalia habebant quam homines qui postea fuerunt, et ex meliori ingenio naturali cum gratia, quae tunc non defuit, poterant melius resistere machinationibus diaboli quam in posteriori tempore, quantum est de bonitate naturalium.’

63 *Epistola I: Pelagii ad Demetriadem* (PL 30:15–45); see esp. PL30:19D-20C.

not seem to notice that there is a complete contradiction between the theory his colleagues had developed in Book 2 about the origins of idolatry among the Jews and that on which the account adopted from William supposes. Maimonides' explanation of the ceremonial laws is based on the idea that, when they received the Old Law, the Jews had long become accustomed to idolatry and needed careful direction to be weaned from it. According to *SH*, however, the first incident of Jewish idolatry was the worship of the golden calf.

Conclusion

The Problem of Paganism is the result of an essential tension in Latin Christian culture in the long Middle Ages, but it comes to the foreground only for a select group of thinkers; for most, it manifests itself only occasionally, here and there. The *SH* clearly belongs in this larger group. The authors lack the devotion to classical antiquity that made the Problem of Paganism so pressing for thinkers like Abelard or Dante, whilst real contemporary pagans, as opposed to Muslims, seem—in the period before the Mongol threat—to have been beyond their purview. The *SH*'s treatment of paganism is most interesting in its anthropological treatment of pagan religious phenomena, such as idolatry. Although the use of Maimonides, the great pioneer in this field, is unengaged and indirect, the authors are not afraid to develop their own ideas on the subject.

Silvana Vecchio (trans. Hilary Siddons)¹

Passions and Sins

The *Summa Halensis* and John of La Rochelle

Abstract: The *Summa Halensis* contains no systematic treatment of the passions of the soul and the role they play in the dynamics of sin. However, the analysis of the structure of the soul, contained in the *De homine* section of *Summa*, and largely based on the *De anima* of John of La Rochelle, highlights the role that *sensualitas* plays in the moral act. As an expression of human *passibilitas*, which is a consequence of original sin, *sensualitas*, which in turn includes the concupiscible (the appetite of good and the escape from evil) and the irascible (the impulse to obtain or reject something of arduous), represents the irrational part of the soul in which the affective impulses are rooted, and from which the virtues and vices originate.

It might seem rather strange to observe that there is no specific space in the *Summa Halensis* devoted to an analysis of the passions. Not only is there nothing in the *Summa* that can be compared to the long treatise on the passions that Thomas Aquinas put into is *Summa theologiae*, but more generally, the *Summa Halensis* seems to devote very little space to a theme that from the mid 12th century onwards gradually imposed itself on philosophical and theological reflection, and from the first decades of the 13th century onwards found a place in the works of the scholastics. Theologians like William of Auvergne and Phillip the Chancellor tackled the debate on affectivity more or less systematically, examining the relationship between psychology and ethics and the morality of the passions, and outlining one or more classifications of the affective impulses.² In the same period, John of La Rochelle, who made a decisive contribution to the writing of the *Summa Halensis*, in Parts I and II above all, gave the affective powers a certain amount of space in his *Summa de anima*, putting forward various classifications of the passions, which derived from sources that had re-

1 The translations from the Latin were provided by Mark Thakkar.

2 For a reflexion about passions in the 13th century, see Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 226–55; in particular, for William of Auvergne, see Silvana Vecchio, 'Passio, affectus, virtus: il sistema delle passioni nei trattati morali di Guglielmo d'Alvernia,' in *Autour de Guillaume d'Auvergne († 1249)*, ed. Franco Morenzoni and Jacques Yves Tilliette (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 173–87; Carla Casagrande, 'Guglielmo d'Auvergne e il buon uso delle passioni nella penitenza,' *Autour de Guillaume d'Auvergne († 1249)*, 189–201; Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima: Teorie e usi degli affetti nella cultura medievale* (Firenze: Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2015), 93–112, 327–42; for Philip the Chancellor, see Silvana Vecchio, 'Passions et vertus dans la *Summa de bono*,' in *Philippe le Chancelier: prédicateur, théologien et poète parisien du début du XIIIe siècle*, ed. Gilbert Dahan and Anne-Zoé Rillon-Marne (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 169–83.

cently been made available.³ This material came to be included in part at least in the *Summa Halensis*, but only, as we have said, in a partial, asystematic, and episodic way. Despite this, it is still worth attempting to create a rough outline of a discourse on the passions in the *Summa Halensis*, bringing together and connecting the fragments which are spread throughout the various parts of the work and, in the light of this material, attempting to focus on the problem of the relationship between the passions and the sins. At the end of this it will perhaps be possible to consider the reasons for the relative lack of interest of the authors of the *Summa Halensis* in the theme of the emotions.

The problem of the emotions in general is dealt with very briefly in the treatise *De homine*, in the course of an analysis of the various faculties of the soul; after the cognitive faculties, in fact, the *Summa Halensis* analyses the motive faculties. It deals rapidly with *phantasia* and the Avicennian *aestimativa* faculty; these are in reality both cognitive faculties, but they are placed together with the motive faculties because, thanks to the perception and the evaluation of that which appears to be useful, they predispose us to the impulses of the soul. The text then concentrates on *sensualitas*, on one hand, and the concupiscible and the irascible, on the other, which constitute the lower part of the soul, an irrational part, but one that is *suadibilis ratione*, susceptible, that is, to being convinced and guided by reason.⁴

The classification put forward in the *Summa Halensis* is the synthesis of discourses from various sources, all of which, however, substantially derive on one hand from the 'Augustinian' model, as it is presented not so much in the works of Augustine himself, as in the pseudo-Augustinian treatise *De spiritu et anima* written in a Cistercian environment in the 12th century, but systematically attributed to Augustine,⁵ the circulation of which profoundly influenced reflection on the soul and its faculties. The other source is the *De fide orthodoxa* by John of Damascus, which was translated in the mid 12th century and, as from the first years of the 13th century, became an obligatory point of reference for a new approach to psychological

³ Alain Boureau, 'Un sujet agité: Le statut nouveau des passions de l'âme au XIII^e siècle,' in *Le sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge*, ed. Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet (Paris: Beauchesne, 2008), 187–94; Silvana Vecchio, 'Passions de l'âme et péchés capitaux: les ambiguïtés de la culture médiévale,' in *Laster im Mittelalter/Vices in the Middle Ages*, ed. Christof Flüeler and Martin Rohde (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 45–64; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 165–85.

⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti2 (nn. 362–7), pp. 439–45.

⁵ *De spiritu et anima* (PL 40:779–832); for the irrational parts of the soul see PL 40:789–790. For the attribution of the treaty and an analysis of the psychological doctrines contained in it, see Bernard McGinn, *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology* (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 63–74.

themes.⁶ These two sources, together with Avicenna's work, were also the main references for John of Rupella's treatise *De anima*.⁷ In the pseudo-Augustinian model John found the outline for a system of the passions made up of love, hope, pain, and fear—the first two rooted in the concupiscible and the latter two in the irascible—which incorporated the entire range of the emotions.⁸ John of Damascus' model was more complex and, following Aristotle, it distinguished between a part of the irrational soul which does not follow the advice of reason and can be substantially identified with the vegetative and the nutritive faculties, and a part that is ready to follow reason and which is in turn divided into the concupiscible and the irascible faculty; the former, which is directed towards the good, includes desire and joy, while the latter includes the emotions which are directed towards evil, that is, fear and pain.⁹ In the *Summa de vitiis* too, Rupella developed a long and complex analysis, presenting four different classifications of the faculties of the soul. The first, attributed to the *magistri*, distinguishes between five faculties: *sensualitas*, *sensus*, *ymaginatio*, *ratio*, and *intellectus*; the second, attributed to the theologians, corresponds to the one in the *De spiritu et anima* and includes a tripartite division of the soul into rational, concupiscible, and irascible; the third derives from the natural philosophers and distinguishes between a vegetative, a sensitive, and a rational faculty; and the fourth classification is common to both the natural philosophers and the theologians and includes three powers – animal, vital, and natural – each of which is then further subdivided into parts.¹⁰

6 John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 8 (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1955); for the motive faculties see p. 119.

7 John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol, Textes philosophiques du Moyen Âge, 19 (Paris: Vrin, 1995); cf. Denise Ryan, 'An Examination of a Thirteenth-Century Treatise on the Mind/Body Dichotomy: John of La Rochelle on the Soul and its Powers' (PhD thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2010); Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 226–36.

8 John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* 2.2.67 (Bougerol, 196).

9 John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* 2.3.74 (Bougerol, 207–8).

10 John of La Rochelle, *Summa de vitiis* (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16417, fols 78va-79vb): 'Assignantur autem quinque potentie anime a magistris: sensualitas, sensus, ymaginatio, ratio, intellectus. (...) Sequitur divisio potentiarum anime secundum quod comparantur ad suum finem et hoc secundum theologos. Quidam enim assignant tres fines, scilicet verum, bonum, eternum; dicunt autem eternum continuationem veri et boni, et isti dividunt per tres potentias animam: per rationabilem que tendit in verum, per concupiscibilem que tendit in bonum, per irascibilem que tendit in eternum. (...) Sequitur tertia divisio potentiarum anime secundum naturales, et hoc est secundum quod ipsa comparatur ad actus: tres sunt actus anime primi, vegetare, sentire, ratiocinari, et secundum hoc distinguitur triplex anime potentia: vegetabilis, sensibilis, rationalis, immo triplex anima: vegetabilis que est in plantis, sensibilis que est in brutis, rationalis que est in hominibus. (...) Sequitur quarta divisio potentiarum anime secundum theologos et naturales. Potentiarum anime alia est corporalis idest corporis regitiva, alia spiritualis, et illa que est corporalis idest corporis regitiva dividitur in animale, vitale, naturale. Secundum enim has vires corpus regitur et motus conservatur. (...) Illa vero que spiritualis est dividitur in cognitivam et operativam, sive intellectum et affectum' [Now, the masters credit the soul with five powers: *sensualitas*, perception, imagination,

The classification of the *Summa Halensis* re-elaborates and summarizes the options put forward by Rupella. The winning model seems to be a tripartite one, which is the result of a synthesis of the classifications of John of Damascus and that of the *De spiritu et anima*; as we have seen, however, the *Summa Halensis* adds *sensualitas* to the three faculties (rational, concupiscible, and irascible), and this is subject to a lengthy analysis which takes up the whole of Chapter 2. The addition of *sensualitas* is based on the reference to Augustine, that is, to the *De spiritu et anima* once again, and it represents the necessary completion of the theories of the philosophers, who, ignorant of the doctrine of original sin and its consequences, were not able to formulate a correct conception of the soul and assimilated the sensible part of the human soul *tout court*, with that of the beasts.¹¹ An observation of this kind shows the peculiarity of the theological approach to the faculties of the soul and is an indicator of the anthropological reflection that ran through medieval culture and intertwined with the results of the psychological analysis deriving from the recently translated Greek works.

In effect, the term *sensualitas*, used above all from the 12th century onwards, covers a range of different meanings. Sometimes it is simply used as a synonym of sensibility, that is, it is identified with the attitude rooted in the body to feel and judge through the five senses.¹² More often it indicates a motive faculty, which presides over the movements which lead to sensation, that is, the appetites and the emotions of the soul. In both cases, although it comes from the body, *sensualitas* is in reality situated in the intersection between the body and the soul, but it concerns that part of the soul which, as it is foreign to reason, does not constitute a specifically human characteristic, and is common to men and to animals. According to Peter Lombard, *sensualitas* seems to coincide with that irrational part of the soul, which, according to

reason, intellect. (...) Next comes a division of the soul's powers by matching them up to their respective aims, as per the theologians. For some people specify three <such> aims, namely the true, the good, and the eternal, though by 'the eternal' they mean the perpetuation of the true and the good. And these people divide the soul in accordance with its three powers: the rational, which aims at the true; the concupiscible, which aims at the good; and the irascible, which aims at the eternal. (...) Next comes a third division of the soul's powers, this time due to the natural philosophers, namely by matching it up to its acts. The soul has three first acts, vegetation, sensation, and reasoning, and accordingly we may distinguish three powers of the soul, vegetative, sensory, and rational – or rather, three souls, the vegetative (found in plants), the sensory (found in brute animals) and the rational (found in humans). (...) Next comes a fourth division of the soul's powers, due to the theologians and the natural philosophers. Of these powers, some are corporeal (i.e. they regulate the body) and others are spiritual. The powers that are corporeal (i.e. that regulate the body) are divided into the animal, the vital and the natural, for it is in accordance with these forces that the body is regulated and <its> motion is conserved. (...) And the powers that are spiritual are divided into the cognitive and the operative, or into the intellect and the emotions].

11 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti2, M1, C2, Ar4 (n. 366), p. 444.

12 See, for instance, Radulfus Ardens, *Speculum universale (Libri I -V)* 1.52, ed. Claudia Heiman and Stephan Ernst, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 241 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 59; *De spiritu et anima* (PL 40:789–90).

the philosophers, it is the task of reason to rule and govern;¹³ it is a concept that is confirmed in the Bible, where the term *sensualitas* is mostly used to designate the *inferior pars rationis*, that is, the irrational part which is subject to the control of the reason. The long debate on the first movements of sensibility (*primi motus*) which runs through the theological literature of the 12th and 13th centuries revolves in fact around the definition of the nature of *sensualitas*;¹⁴ regardless of the different positions, the discussion on the ethical status of the *primi motus* tends to stress the ‘animal’ quality of *sensualitas*, but for the theologians this characteristic had to be framed and read in the context of the event that indelibly marked the destiny of humanity: in the story of original sin in fact, *sensualitas* played the leading role, as personified in the figure of Eve, woman as the prototype of naturalness as opposed to male rationality, or even in the serpent, an expression of the basest of human appetites which lead to sin.¹⁵ The primary scene of the sin of our ancestors thus stands out against the background of psychological reflection and represents the specific place in which the ‘nature’ of the different faculties of man is played out: the lower part of the soul, destined to be subjected to the dictates of reason, by now seems rebellious and irreducible and bears in it the mark of sin: the impulses that originate in a *sensualitas* which is no longer controlled by reason show the consequences of sin in man, which has made him similar to the beasts.¹⁶

In the *Summa Halensis*, too, the dual nature of *sensualitas*—before and after sin—determines the relationship of analogy and distance of the human soul with that of animals:¹⁷ unlike animals, whose soul is totally irrational and inevitably follows natural impulses, in man the sensible faculty had been predisposed to be subject to reason, but the corruption of sin replaced the dominion of reason with the *impulsum*

13 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* II, d. 24, 4–5, 2 vols, Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 1:453–4.

14 On this debate, see Odon Lottin, ‘Les mouvements premiers de l’appétit sensitif de Pierre Lombard à saint Thomas d’Aquin,’ in Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 2 (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1948), 493–589; Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 178–195; Damien Boquet, ‘Des racines de l’émotion: Les préaffects et le tournant anthropologique du XIIe siècle,’ in *Le sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge* (see above, n. 3), 163–86.

15 Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in omnes D. Pauli apostoli Epistolas: In Epistolam I ad Corinthios*, c. 11 (PL 191:1633); Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis christianae Christianae fidei* VIII, c. 13 (PL 176:315); William of Auvergne, *Sermones de tempore* 74, vol. 1, ed. Franco Morenzoni, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 230 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 282.

16 William of Saint-Thierry, *De la nature du corps et de l’âme*, ed. and trans. Michel Lemoine (Paris: Les belles Lettres, 1988), 159. Cf. Michel Lemoine, ‘Les ambiguïté de l’héritage médiéval: Guillaume de Saint Thierry,’ in *Les passions antiques et médiévales*, ed. Bernard Besnier, Pierre-Francois Moreau, and Laurence Renault, *Théories et critiques des passions*, 1 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2003), 297–308; Silvana Vecchio, ‘Passioni umane e passioni animali nel pensiero medievale,’ in *Summa doctrina et certa experientia: Studi su medicina e filosofia per Chiara Crisciani*, ed. Gabriella Zuccolin (Firenze: Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2017), 257–61.

17 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti2, M1, C2, Ar1 (n. 363), p. 440.

fomitis, the disordered tendency to fulfil the pleasures of the senses: *sensibilitas* was transformed into *sensualitas*, a specifically human impulse which shows the anomaly of man's psychological condition and determines his moral status. This means that, if reason cannot prevent the *primi motus* from arising, but can only block their path by denying them the permission of the higher part of the soul, these movements are in any case structurally disordered and are the sign of sin and the punishment that follows on from it. If it is true, therefore, that sin always derives from the will, that is, from the rational part of the soul, it must also be said that *sensualitas*, which carries with it the consequences of original sin, is structurally 'disordered'; hence the impulses that constitute it are always sinful, at least in a venial form.¹⁸ Situated within that crucial event that was original sin, *sensualitas* manifests itself as an aspect of the *passibilitas* that now characterises the whole of humanity and that indicates all the negativity that befell Adam as a result of sin: death, illness, weakness, and hardship, but also the subversion of the faculties of the soul and the insubordination of *sensualitas*. John of Rupella and Alexander of Hales tackled the theme of *passibilitas* in all its scope, analysing the consequences of original sin both for the body and the soul.¹⁹ The *Summa Halensis* takes up these reflections in the long question *De passibilitate naturae*, which also tackles the problem of the emotions before and after sin. If the psychological structure of man has remained unchanged, what was modified was the disposition of the soul of Adam and his descendants, by now inevitably subject to unregulated emotional impulses which manifest themselves as disturbances.²⁰

It is in the light of this image – which any reflection on *sensualitas* inevitably refers to – that the *Summa Halensis* carries out a detailed analysis of the motive faculties and defines the nature of the impulses of the concupiscible and the irascible. Placed at the intersection between the rational part and the sensible part, the emotions that derive from the concupiscible and the irascible move on their own on the basis of the impulse of *sensualitas*, and only exceptionally can they be guided by reason, as happens in the case of some of the 'rational' or rather the 'mixed' passions,

18 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti2, M1, C2, Ar3 (n. 365), p. 443; see also the analysis of *primi motus* in *SH* III, In3, Tr1, S1, Q2, M1 (nn. 287–96), pp. 301–8.

19 Alexander Halensis, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae "Antequam esset frater"*, q. 16, 3 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 1:224–36: 'De passibilitate animae Christi et Adae'; John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* 1.8.46–9 (Bougerol, 147–60). About the notion of *passibilitas* in the *Summa de anima* see Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, 'Les théories des passions dans la culture médiévale,' in *Le sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge* (see above, n. 3), 120; Bourreau, 'Un sujet agité,' 187–94.

20 *SH* II, In4, Tr3, Q1, Ti1 (nn. 469–73), pp. 631–45. Cf. Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, 'Les passions avant et après la Chute: Modèle thomasiens et tradition augustinienne,' in *Adam, la nature humaine, avant et après: Epistémologie de la Chute*, ed. Gianluca Briguglia and Irène Rosier Catach (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2016), 153–71; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 69–91.

such as intellectual pleasure, mercy, or some kinds of fear or anger.²¹ The *Summa Halensis* does not dwell on the peculiarity of the mixed emotions and the characteristics that distinguish them from the emotions of the concupiscible and the irascible, nor, as we have said, does it create a structured system of the passions; it does however go back to some of the themes examined by the theologians and the masters of the previous generation to illustrate the difference between the concupiscible and the irascible. This distinction, which derived from Plato and was taken up again in the works of John of Damascus and Avicenna, constitutes in effect one of the fixed points that recurs throughout all reflection on the theme of the emotions which developed from the mid 12th century onwards and represented the basis for constructing a system of passions. In the *Summa Halensis* this debate is briefly summarized in the three ways of understanding the distinction between the two faculties of the soul. In the first place, the concupiscible and the irascible can be related to the impulses of the appetite for the good and the flight from evil respectively; this classification, which is attributed to the philosophers, allows the author to identify the main four passions: joy and desire in the concupiscible, and pain and fear in the irascible. This is in effect the model which is most widely used, put forward in different forms by the *De spiritu et anima*, by Damascene, and by Avicenna.²² One variant of this distinction is what the *Summa Halensis* describes as the third way of distinguishing between the concupiscible and the irascible, which is based on the contrast between present and future. This model, which the *Summa Halensis* takes from that of John of Damascus, places the passions linked to the present in the concupiscible—pain and joy—and those which look to the future—hope and fear—in the irascible. The second distinction presented by the *Summa Halensis* is even more interesting. It defines the concupiscible as the impulse of the appetite directed towards that which is pleasurable, while the irascible is the impulse which aims to attain something arduous or honourable. This distinction refers to that re-definition of the irascible which, from the 1220s onwards, imposed itself as the most important novelty in the classification of the affective impulses and which was broadly shared by most theologians, including those who collaborated on the writing of the *Summa Halensis*.²³ It was on

21 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2 (n. 367), p. 445.

22 *De spiritu et anima* (PL 40:728); John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, c. 26 (Buytaert, 24–5); Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus* I, c. 2, 2 vols, ed. Simone Van Riet (Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 1968–72), 1:56–7.

23 William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus* XVIII, in *Guilielmi Alverni Opera Omnia* (Paris: Apud Andream Pralard, 1674; repr. anast. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), 1:175–8; Phillip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono* IV, q. 2, 1, 2 vols, ed. Nicolaus Wicki (Bern: A. Francke, 1985), 1:164; John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* 2.4.107 (Bougerol, 257–60); Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* III, d. 34, n. 20, IIIb, vol. 3, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 14 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1954), 419. For the ‘new’ definition of the irascible, cf. René Antoine Gauthier, ‘Le traité *De anima et de potenciis eius* d’un maître ès arts (vers 1225): introduction et texte critique,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 47; Knuutila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 230.

the basis of this distinction that John of Rupella was able to complete his complex system of the passions, modelled on that of Avicenna, which came to classify eight passions in the concupiscible and 15 in the irascible.²⁴ And it was on this basis too that Thomas Aquinas was to build his system of the passions, basing the possibility of grafting the impulses of the irascible onto the impulses of the concupiscible on the definition of the irascible as arduous, in order to create a dynamic framework based on the circularity of the emotions.²⁵ In the *Summa Halensis* the re-definition of the irascible in relation to the arduous does not serve to create a taxonomy of the passions, but it is linked rather to the cardinal virtues: temperance is related to the search for pleasure and fortitude to the appetite for everything that presents itself as arduous and honourable. In this aspect too, the *Summa Halensis* acknowledged the most recent debate, which involved theologians from Stephen Langton onwards, on the relationship between the parts of the soul and the individual virtues. Phillip the Chancellor in particular constructed an entire classification on this theme, which he used in the *Summa de bono*, establishing a correspondence between the parts of the soul and the virtues, not only for the cardinal virtues (fortitude, temperance, and justice), but also for the theological virtues (faith, charity, and hope).²⁶ In the *Summa Halensis* the treatise on the virtues is mostly incomplete, since it is limited to an analysis of faith; we can, however, imagine that the correspondence between the individual virtues and the parts of the soul put forward by Phillip the Chancellor would have constituted its supporting framework. In effect, the theme, which is only touched on in the analysis of the *vires animi*, is explicitly discussed concerning faith, where it provides an opportunity for outlining a brief framework of the psychological model which is at the basis of the classification of the virtues; the rational faculty presides over faith and prudence, while it is the irascible faculty that orders the appetite of the will that determines the other virtues: in tending towards the end which characterises the theological virtues the irascible supports hope, while the concupiscible animates charity; in an analogous way, in the choice of the means to realise the end (the cardinal virtues), the irascible appetite informs fortitude, and the concupiscible temperance.²⁷ It is impossible to know whether the treatise on the virtues would have developed this classification, and we cannot rely on the treatise *De virtutibus* by John of Rupella either, which, however,

²⁴ John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* 2.4.107 (Bougerol, 256–62).

²⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-IIae, qq. 22–48 in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, vol. 6 (Rome: Ex Typographia Poliglotta, 1891), 168–308. For a bibliography about Aquinas and passions, see Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of 'Summa Theologiae' 1a2ae 22–48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 300–7; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 147–72.

²⁶ Phillip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono* III, B, II, q. 3; III, C, q. 3 (Wicki, 2:665, 755). Cf. Vecchio, 'Passions et vertus,' 172; Carla Casagrande, 'Les vertus chez Philippe le Chancelier, théologien et prédicateur,' in *Philippe le Chancelier* (see above, n. 2), 114–5.

²⁷ SH IV, P3, In 2, Tr1, M8, C1 (n. 691), pp. 1098–1100.

has so far not been found, but was certainly part of the general plan of moral theology.²⁸ In the absence of any references, we can only hypothesize that the treatise on the virtues would have perhaps been the ideal place for analysing the passions in a more systematic way; but this is only a hypothesis, and, as it has come down to us, the *Summa Halensis* forces us to limit our investigation to the relationship between the passions and the sins.

In the *Summa Halensis* the analysis of sin takes up the entire second part of Book 2, where, after a discussion of evil in general, the problem of the sin of the rebellious angels is tackled, followed by original sin and present-day sin in succession, subdivided according to the different forms of classification. The various classifications of sin are analysed in extreme detail starting with that provided by Peter Lombard and used by both Alexander of Hales in his *Glossa* on the *Sentences*, and by John of Rupella in his *Summa de vitiis*.²⁹ In Book 2 of the *Sentences* Peter Lombard discussed the problem of classification, after devoting a series of distinctions to the definition of the nature of sin, listing not only the authoritative definitions found in the works of the Fathers, but also the various opinions that underpin these definitions and the problems that were debated as arising from them.³⁰ Only after this analysis does the Master of the Sentences review the main classifications of the sins, that is, the distinction between mortal and venial, the contrast of psychological origin between sins that derive from fear and sins that derive from desire, the distinction based on the against whom the sins are committed (God, one's neighbour, oneself), the difference between the evil committed (*peccatum*) and the good omitted (*delictum*), and finally the classification of the seven capital vices.³¹

In the *Summa Halensis*, too, the various classifications of the sins are related to the different definitions, which have increased in number with respect to those of the Lombard, and are placed in a single framework modelled on Aristotle's four causes, which illustrate and rationalize the way they are organized.³² This model, which takes up the analogous system used by Rupella in the *Summa de vitiis*, summarises a series of systems of different provenance, used not only in the theological tradition, but also in pastoral literature, which had already created a series of possible systems, destined above all to be used in the questioning of the penitent during confession. The multiplication of the forms of classification, which served to 'catch' the greatest

²⁸ John of La Rochelle, *Summa de articulis fidei* (Milan, Biblioteca Universitaria Brera, AD IX.7, fol. 75ra: 'Summa theologice discipline in duobus consistit in fide scilicet et in moribus (...) Mores vero dividuntur in duo, in peccata et in remedium peccatorum.'

²⁹ Silvana Vecchio, 'The Seven Deadly Sins between Pastoral Care and Scholastic Theology: The *Summa de vitiis* by John of Rupella,' in *In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages*, ed. Richard Newhauser (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2005), 104–27.

³⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II, dd. 30–44 (Brady, 1:496–580).

³¹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II, d. 42 (Brady, 1:569–72). Cf. Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, 'Péché,' in *Dictionnaire Raisoné de l'Occident Médiéval*, ed. Jacques Le Goff and Jean Claude Schmitt (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 884–7.

³² *SH* III, In1, Tr3, Q3 (nn. 259–68), pp. 274–82.

number of sins and prevent even the smallest of faults from getting through the net of an excessively general taxonomy, created a series of different approaches to the subject of sin, which at times stress its nature, at others its phenomenology or psychological or sociological dimension.³³ Within this extremely rich panorama of sins there are at least three classifications that can be related to the affective component of the soul: one that refers to the two passions of fear and love as the origin of the various sins, one based on the three *concupiscentiae* of Augustinian derivation (*concupiscentia oculi, concupiscentia carnis, superbia vitae*), and one which sees the traditional septenary of the capital vices as a series linked to the various faculties of the soul.³⁴

In reality, more than identifying specific typologies of the sins, the distinction between *ex timore* and *ex amore* shows the nature common to all the sins, which is identified in the two opposing impulses of the tendency towards that which appears good and advantageous and the flight from that which appears as evil. But more than opposing, these two impulses often reveal themselves to be present together, and though it is a passion which is qualitatively distinct from love, fear ends up by being re-absorbed within love and is made to be a form of distorted it. Love, in fact, gives rise to the principal impulses of the soul: joy and pain, fear and hope, defined here as *perturbationes*, a term which, even from a lexical point of view, signifies a total dependence on Augustine's model of the passions, which are none other than an expression of the will. To talk therefore of sins *ex timore* or *ex amore* simply means remembering that, just as Augustine maintained, sin is in any case a form of love which has deviated and is deviant.³⁵ The series based on the three *concupiscentiae* is also only apparently a classification of a psychological type: to speak of *concupiscentia* in fact does not in this case imply a specific reference to the concupiscible component of the soul, but shows once again all those forms of deviated love that can be rooted in the different faculties of the soul, including of course the concupiscible, but also the irascible and the rational part.³⁶ In prac-

33 On the various ways of classifying sins, cf. Carla Casagrande, 'La moltiplicazione dei peccati: I cataloghi dei peccati nella letteratura pastorale dei secoli XIII-XV,' in *La peste nera: dati di una realtà ed elementi di una interpretazione: atti del XXX Convegno storico internazionale, Todi, 10-13 ottobre 1993* (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 1994), 253-84; Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, 'La classificazione dei peccati tra settenario e decalogo (secoli XIII-XV),' *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 5 (1994): 331-95.

34 SH III, In1, Tr3, Q3, C3 (n. 268), pp. 281-2.

35 SH III, In3, Tr6, Q2 (nn. 702-716), pp. 688-704. Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 14.6, ed. Bernard Dombart and Alphonse Kalb, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 48 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), 421. For the Augustinian theory of passions, see Carla Casagrande, 'Agostino, i medievali e il buon uso delle passioni,' in *Agostino d'Ipbona: Presenza e pensiero: La scoperta dell'interiorità*, ed. Alfredo Marini (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2004), 65-75; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 19-41.

36 SH III, In3, Tr7, C1 (n. 717), p. 706. On the system of the three *concupiscentiae*, cf. Donald R. Howard, *The Three Temptations: Medieval Man in Search of the World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali: Storia dei peccati nel Medioevo* (Torino: Einaudi, 2000), 210-3.

tice the only classification that takes into consideration the psychological origin from which the sins derive is that of the seven capital vices.

Here the *Summa Halensis* acknowledges the debate that had developed in the early decades of the 13th century in an attempt to give a ‘scientific’ structure to the Gregorian system that had for centuries been accepted and which enjoyed immense success thanks to the strength of two powerful metaphors. On one hand the image of the battle which lined up the different vices in the context of an incessant psychomachia; with extensive use of military vocabulary, in fact, in the *Moralia* Gregory speaks of commanders and simple soldiers who make up the army of the vices, and he describes the different phases of the battle, from the attack to the victory and the final devastation. On the other hand, in Gregory’s work this image is interwoven with the image of the tree, which strengthens the hierarchical model and completes it by referring to the generation of the vices, linked to each other by a family relationship which can be represented by a sort of family tree in which the root—pride—represents both the origin of all the sins and the principal sin.³⁷ Theologians had long reflected on the possibility of translating these images into an organic and coherent system, and they attempted to find in Gregory’s septenary a rational structure that could demonstrate its ‘sufficiency’ and strengthen its solidity and power, as it was too important to be rejected or replaced by other models. In the course of this debate, the psychological structure present in Gregory’s work, and in that of Cassian before it, which had served simply to describe the impulses of the soul underlying the various sins, became the structure which supported the system, based by now on solid scientific ground allowing the various sins to be derived from the different parts of the soul.³⁸ The most obvious example of this new attitude towards the septenary is John of Rupella’s *Summa de vitiis*: here Gregory’s system is interpreted at the intersection between the series of the different parts of the soul (*vegetabilis, sensibilis, rationalis*) and the threefold type of good against which the sinner acts: lower good (*bonum carnis*), exterior good (*bonum mundi*) and interior good (*bonum domini*).³⁹

37 Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* 31.45.87, ed. Marcus Adriaen, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 143B (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 1610. For the enormous success of the septenary, cf. Morton W. Bloomfield, *The Seven Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to Medieval English Literature* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1952); Casagrande and Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali*, 181–224.

38 Sigfried Wenzel, ‘The Seven Deadly Sins: Some Problems of Research,’ *Speculum* 43 (1968): 1–22; Casagrande and Vecchio, ‘La classificazione dei peccati,’ 334–54.

39 John of La Rochelle, *Summa de vitiis* (Paris, BnF, lat. 16417, fols 113rb-va): ‘Secundum ergo inordinaciones amoris boni in primis actibus virium anime est numerus septem capitalium viciorum. Nam inordinacio amoris boni inferioris scilicet carnis secundum actum nutritive est gula. Inordinacio amoris boni inferioris [scilicet carnis] secundum actum generative est luxuria. Inordinacio <amoris> boni exterioris secundum actum concupiscibilis est avaritia. Inordinacio amoris <boni> exterioris secundum actum irascibilis est ira; nisi enim inordinate diligeremus prospera numquam impacienter insurgeremus contra adversa quod fit per iram. Inordinacio amoris boni interioris secundum ordinem

The *Summa Halensis* takes up Rupella's classification, adding another two ways of rationalizing the septenary: in the first one the vices are distributed within the two irrational powers of the soul: rooted in the dual function of the concupiscible of desiring the good and finalizing the impulses of the flesh to it, are in fact the two pairs of sloth/avarice and gluttony/lust, while the irascible has the task of approving the good, which envy opposes, and detesting evil which feeds anger. The second classification distinguishes between the seven capital vices on the basis of two opposing impulses: the 'disordered' appetite for that which presents itself as a good nurtures pride, avarice, greed, and lust, and the equally 'disordered' flight from that which appears as evil translates into sloth, envy, and anger.⁴⁰ In the *Summa Halensis*, however, all three classifications are subject to a series of criticisms that undermine their coherence and importance and they are replaced by a further three models: the first, which is more anthropological than psychological, is based on the three-fold division of man into spirit, soul, and body. The distinction between spirit and soul, which comes from the pseudo-Augustinian treatise of the same name, allows us to isolate from the group of spiritual vices those vices which refer to the very essence of the soul regardless of its link to the body and are therefore common to men and separate spirits (pride and envy), from the vices which affect the soul incarnated in a body, and which translate into a disorder of its concupiscible and irascible faculties (avarice, sloth, and anger); the two carnal vices, on the other hand, (gluttony and lust) are rooted in the body. The second and third model, which are in part identical, distribute the septenary between the irascible (pride, envy, and anger) and the concupisci-

rationis ad id quod supra se est, est superbia que non vult subesse superiori deo. Inordinatio amoris boni interioris <secundum ordinem rationis> ad id quod iuxta se est, est invidia que tristatur de bonis proximorum cum deberet gaudere, quod fit ex hoc quod non diligitur ordinate proximus habens ymaginem dei quod est bonum interius. Inordinatio amoris boni <interioris> secundum ordinem rationis ad se ipsam est accidia, que est tedium interni boni, quod fit ex hoc quod homo minus diligit bonum interius quo factus est ad ymaginem dei quam bonum inferius quo factus est ad similitudinem brutorum' [The number of the seven capital sins therefore corresponds to inordinate loves for the good in the first acts of the powers of the soul. For inordinate love for a lower good (i.e. a carnal good) with respect to the act of the nutritive power is gluttony. Inordinate love for a lower good with respect to the act of the reproductive power is lust. Inordinate love for an external good with respect to the act of the concupiscible power is greed. Inordinate love for an external good with respect to the act of the irascible power is wrath; for without an inordinate love for prosperity we would never rise up intolerantly against adversity, which comes of wrath. Inordinate love for an internal good with respect to the ordering of reason towards what is above it is pride, which does not want to be subject to God above. Inordinate love for an internal good with respect to the ordering of reason towards what is adjacent to it is envy, which laments the goods of neighbours when it ought to rejoice; this comes of not appropriately loving one's neighbour, who has God's image, which is an internal good. Inordinate love for an internal good with respect to the ordering of reason towards itself is listlessness, which is being weary of an internal good; this comes of a man having less love for the internal good by which he was made in God's image than for the lower good by which he was made to resemble brute animals].

⁴⁰ SH III, In3, Tr4, S1, C3 (n. 498), pp. 484–6.

ble (greed, lust, avarice, and sloth).⁴¹ The attempt to force the seven capital vices into the framework of the faculties of the soul appears to a certain extent to be forced and is open to infinite variants, as is shown by the analysis of the individual sins that the *Summa Halensis* develops at length in the pages that follow: pride and envy are unequivocally rooted in the irascible;⁴² avarice, greed, and lust derive from the corruption of the concupiscible;⁴³ the very definition of anger, as *vindex concupiscentiae*, demonstrates the fact that it belongs both to the irascible and the concupiscible;⁴⁴ and the melancholic nature of sloth confirms its dependence on a fear which is nothing other than a form of distorted love.⁴⁵ What seems to be important here, besides placing the individual vices in a particular part of the soul, is to stress the psychological background to the sins, opening a window onto the tangle of passionate impulses which give rise to them.

The various ways of rationalizing Gregory's septenary on the basis of psychological frameworks of various kind merely strengthen the operation systematically carried out by the authors of the *Summa Halensis*, which tends, as we have seen, to multiply the possible ways of classifying the sins. Even though it is important, the septenary of vices is not the only way of cataloguing sin, and perhaps it is not even the most important; besides the psychological framework proposed by Gregory's system there are other just as authoritative systems that show an equal if not greater ability to describe the universe of sin. And if it is true that in some cases the various classifications contain the same sins and make it possible to refer from one to the other, it is equally true that none of them seems to include all the sins, and each one identifies at least one category of sin that risks being left out of all the others. This is the case, for example, of the triad *peccatum cordis, oris, operis*, which allows us to isolate on one hand the 'hidden' sins which are difficult to recognise such as suspicion or *personarum acceptio*, and the category of the sins of speech on the other, which in the mid 13th century represented a sort of moral emergency pointed out by many.⁴⁶ But it is also the case of the sins against God, against

41 *SH* III, In3, Tr4, S1, C3 (n. 498), pp. 486–7.

42 *SH* III, In3, Tr4, S2, Q1, Ti1, C4 (n. 502), p. 494; *SH* III, In3, Tr4, S2, Q1, Ti2, C 7, Ar1 (n. 540), p. 533.

43 *SH* III, In3, Tr4, S2, Q1, Ti5, C3 (n. 574), pp. 563–4; *SH* III, In3, Tr4, S2, Q1, Ti6, D1, C3 (n. 588), pp. 574–5; *SH* III, In3, Tr4, S2, Q1, Ti7, C1 (n. 613), p. 592.

44 *SH* III, In3, Tr4, S2, Q1, Ti3, C3 (n. 549), pp. 541–2.

45 *SH* III, In3, Tr4, S2, Q1, Ti4, C4 (n. 562), pp. 554–5.

46 *SH* III, In3, Tr3 (nn. 350–495), pp. 357–480. On the sins of the heart, Silvana Vecchio, 'Peccatum cordis,' *Micrologus* 11 (2003): 325–42. On the sins of the tongue, cf. Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *I peccati della lingua: Disciplina ed etica della parola nella cultura medievale* (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1987); Edwin D. Craun, *Lies, Slander, and Obscenity in Medieval English Literature: Pastoral Rhetoric and the Deviant Speaker* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Edwin D. Craun (ed.), *The Hands of the Tongue: Essays on Deviant Speech* (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2007); Bettina Lindorfer, *Bestraftes Sprechen: Zur historischen Pragmatik des Mittelalters* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009); Martine Veldhuizen, *Sins of the Tongue in the*

one's neighbour, and against oneself, which had been widely used by John of Rupella and which re-appears in the *Summa Halensis* to group together all the very serious sins that involve a direct attack on the divinity, from heresy to divination and sacrilege, which were not given proper space in the other forms of classification.⁴⁷

This sort of classificatory frenzy which characterizes the *Summa Halensis* and which was widespread in pastoral literature, is, however, unique in the theological and moral *summae*, and responds, as we have said, to the practical need to create an ideally complete review the infinite variety of sin on the basis of a solid foundation. In reality the multiplication of different forms of classification ends up by demonstrating the futility of the very attempt and confirms the inadequacy of every form of classification, each of which is useful for pointing out new typologies of sin, but none of which is able on its own to contain and explain all the sins. In this overall panorama of the universe of sin, the psychological viewpoint certainly appears to be important, but it is neither unique nor resolute, and other forms of classification may be equally valid for describing the sins, and the framework that supports them is perhaps less problematic.

What might appear strange is the absence from the various frameworks classifying the sins of the one which, in hindsight, would seem to be the most obvious, that which defines the individual vices and their overall structure starting from the system of the virtues, a framework adopted by Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologiae*. But the centuries-old difficulty of establishing a precise correspondence between the system of the vices and that of the virtues which could go beyond their simple numerical identity (seven vices—seven virtues) is more than an adequate historical reason to explain the absence of such a form of classification.⁴⁸ What is more, the almost complete lack of a treatise on the virtues prevents us from formulating any kind of hypothesis on the correspondence between the vices and the virtues in the *Summa Halensis*. And the lack of any description of the link between the virtues and the passions, which is only just outlined, as we have seen in the case of faith, can only give us a partial answer to the original question of the relative lack of interest in a systematic analysis of the universe of the emotions. On this theme, more than a coherent and structured doctrine, the *Summa Halensis* offers in fact a series of materials of various provenance, accompanied by debates and discussions which incor-

Medieval West: Sinful, Unethical, and Criminal Words in Middle Dutch (1300–1550) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017).

⁴⁷ *SH* III, In3, Tr8 (nn. 731–870), pp. 715–831; John of La Rochelle, *Summa de vitiis* (Paris, BnF, lat. 16417, fols 133va-165rb). Cf. Vecchio, 'The Seven Deadly Sins,' 126–7.

⁴⁸ On the difficulty of establishing a correspondence between the system of the vices and that of the virtues, cf. Casagrande and Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali*, 190–4; Silvana Vecchio, 'L'albero delle virtù,' in *La parola alle virtù per riedificare un nuovo mondo*, ed. Elena Modena (Vittorio Veneto: Stamperia Provincia di Treviso, 2015), 13–33; Carla Casagrande, 'Multa sunt questiones de divisionibus peccatorum: vizi, virtù e facoltà dell'anima in alcuni testi teologici del secolo XIII,' in *Responsabilità e creatività: Alla ricerca di un uomo nuovo (sec. XI-XIII)*, ed. Giancarlo Andenna and Elisabetta Filippini (Milano: Vita e pensiero, 2015), 89–106.

porate the novelties that were circulating in the scholastic environments just before the large-scale arrival of Aristotle's ethics and psychology. But the reading of the 'new' works on the passions, such as that of John of Damascus and Avicenna, was grafted onto an anthropological background of an Augustinian nature, which ended up by annulling the richness and the novelty of the psychological analysis contained in it. More than the phenomenology and the dynamics of the different passions of the soul, what was important for the authors of the *Summa Halensis* was to stress the notion of *passibilitas*, in which the individual impulses sank their roots, and to underline the role of *sensualitas*, prey after sin to that *lex fomitis* thanks to which the affective impulses manifest themselves in the form of turmoil in the soul. The structural node that links *passibilitas*, *sensualitas*, and sin, and which is at the basis of any discourse on the emotions not only renders a detailed analysis of the impulses of the soul in some way superfluous, but it also transforms the many attempts to investigate the psychological origin of the individual sins into a sort of scholastic exercise which can be infinitely replicated.

Riccardo Saccenti

From 'Lex aeterna' to the 'leges addictae'

John of La Rochelle and the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The issue of law is a crucial topic within late medieval culture as a whole, not merely from the point of view of canonists and civil lawyers. At the beginning of the 13th century, the concept of law and its diverse forms preoccupied theologians, particularly within the Parisian milieu. The development of a structured and systematic theological understanding of reality defined a new framework within which 'law' was considered as a major genre, with a series of species which are necessary to analyse. In this context, John of La Rochelle, one of the very first Franciscan masters of theology at Paris, composed his *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*, which represent the very first complete theological account of law and its forms. Starting from the eternal law, John examines natural law, the prescribed laws, and the law of Moses. His text is the direct source of the treatise on law of the *Summa Halensis* and offers a veritable paradigm for the whole scholastic debate on this issue.

Introducing his research on the evolution of the idea of divine law in the premodern period, Rémi Brague notes that this idea is crucial to understanding the development of the modern concept of law. In his *La loi de Dieu*, the French philosopher offers an overview of the history the notion of divine law, the roots of which can be identified in the Ancient Greek and Hebrew traditions, and which medieval Christian thinkers presupposed and defined as a general principle from which all human positive laws derive.¹ According to Brague, the modern idea of law as something that pertains to human beings only assumes radically different forms in different cultural and historical contexts; nonetheless it clearly depends on the medieval heritage. Focusing on the relation between law and religious thinking, Brague stresses the relevance to modern idea of law of the scholastic debates, in which law was one of the most disputed theological issues.

According to the 12th- and 13th-century masters who lectured on the Scripture or on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, the law is something which has a double relevance: it has clear biblical implications which exegesis clearly shows, but it also involves the legal discourse, as is evident from the huge number of writings that civil and canon lawyers produced on the nature and species of laws. As regards legal theory, the Parisian milieu of the first half of the 13th century marks a significant turning point: it is within this context, more specifically in the 1240s, that a systematic and well-structured analysis of laws come to feature in major theological texts, such as the *Summa*

1 Rémi Brague, *La loi de Dieu: Histoire philosophique d'une alliance* (Paris: Gallimard, 2005).

Halensis. This work, co-authored by the first Franciscan masters in theology, is the result of the sophisticated reorganization of the intellectual inheritance of its authors, including Alexander of Hales.² The third book of the *Summa* includes a long treatise on laws, which is based to some extent on some *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* which are preserved in two manuscripts: Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale 138 (which contains the whole text of the disputed questions) and Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 782 (which contains only the questions on eternal and natural law).

In the 1930s, working on the edition of the *Summa*, father François-Marie Henquinet offered the first detailed analysis of these *Quaestiones*, identifying them as the source of the *Summa* on the issue of law, but also attributing the text to the Franciscan master John of La Rochelle, a pupil of Alexander of Hales who succeeded to his master to the Parisian chair of theology in 1238, teaching until his death in February 1245.³ Henquinet's conclusions were confirmed by the researches of his co-friar Victorin Doucet and by Odon Lottin's studies on the history of scholastic moral thought.⁴ This still unpublished text is certainly relevant to the history of the composition of the *Summa Halensis*, but it is also crucial for understanding the rapid evolution of the scholastic discourse on law towards a more systematic and structured approach.

With a view to clarifying the role of John of La Rochelle in the creation of this great Franciscan theological synthesis, this contribution will firstly analyse the literary and doctrinal links between the *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* and the *Summa Halensis* and then will consider John of La Rochelle's authorship of the for-

2 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol IV, P2 (nn. 224–605), pp. 313–939.

3 François M. Henquinet, 'Ist der Trakt De legibus et praeceptis in der Summa Alexander von Hales von Johannes von Rupella?,' *Fraziskanische Studien* 26 (1939): 1–22, 234–58. See also François M. Henquinet, 'Notes additionnelles sur les écrits de Gueric de Saint-Quentin,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 8 (1936): 369–88. Henquinet's studies are preceded by other references to the *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*. See in particular August Pelzer, *Codices Vaticani Latini: Tomus II: Pars Prior: Codices 679–1134*, Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae codices manuscripti recensiti (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1931), 96–110; Odon Lottin, 'Le droit naturel chez S. Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs,' *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 2 (1925): 37–40, republished in a volume with the same title (Bruges: Beyaert, 1931), 53–57; Ferdinand Pelster, 'Forschungen zur Quästionsliteratur in der Zeit des Alexander von Hales,' *Scholastik* 6 (1931): 321–53; Ferdinand Pelster, 'Die Quästionen des Alexander von Hales,' *Gregorianum* 14 (1933): 401–22, 501–20. Also, Martin Grabmann had linked the name of John of La Rochelle to the *Summa Halensis*. See Martin Grabmann, 'Das Naturrecht der Scholastik von Gratian bis Thomas von Aquin: Nach den gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen dargestellt,' *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie* 16 (1922–23): 12–53, re-edited in Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben: Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, 3 vols (Munich: Hueber 1926–56), 1:65–103.

4 Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae Fratris Alexandri",' in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), CCVCIII–CCCVII and CCCLIV–CCCLXX.

mer text. After assessing these aspects of textual history, the enquiry will then examine the doctrinal features of John's account of law in relation to the early 13th-century theological background. This approach will allow for an initial evaluation of the influence of the Franciscan master's ideas on the debates concerning law in the second half of the 13th century.

The Literary and Doctrinal Parallels Between the *Quaestiones* and the *Summa Halensis*

François-Marie Henquinet has noted the existence of a clear parallel between the *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* and the treaty on laws in the *Summa Halensis*. The two texts exhibit the same structure, starting from the issue of the eternal law and then moving to a detailed discussion on natural law. After the definition of these general species of laws, both the *Quaestiones* and the *Summa* examine the 'prescribed laws', i. e. the law of Moses and finally the law of the Gospel. Henquinet has also underlined the existence of a doctrinal connection between the *Quaestiones* and the *Summa*, which goes through the whole text, and on this basis concludes that the first text was the source for the composition of the second one.

The nature and quality of this textual relationship can be appreciated by considering a parallel between excerpts from the two works, which concerns how they answer the question about the existence of the eternal law, which opens both texts.

<i>Quaestiones disputatae de legibus</i> ⁵	<i>Summa Halensis</i> ⁶
Quaesitum est de lege aeterna et primo quaeritur an sit lex aeterna.	An sit lex aeterna.
Isidorus: "Si ratione lex constat, lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit"; sed planum est quod providentia Dei ratione constat; ergo est lex. Quod autem providentia Dei constet ratione, Boethius: "Providentia est divina ratio in summo principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit."	Ad primum. a. Isidorus, in II Etymologiarum: "Si ratione lex constat, lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit." Si ergo providentia Dei constat ratione, ergo providentia Dei est lex; sed non nisi aeterna; cum ergo providentia divina sit, constat legem aeternam esse.—Minor patet; nam, sicut dicit Boethius: "Providentia est divina ratio in summo Principe constituta, qua cuncta disponit."
Item, Augustinus, in libro De libero arbitrio: "Videtur lex illa quae regendis civitatibus fertur	b. Amplius, Augustinus, in libro De libero arbitrio: "Videtur lex ista, quae regendis civitatibus fertur,

⁵ John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale 138, fols 213vb-214ra; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 782, fol. 129ra): [The eternal law should be inquired into and firstly it is asked whether there is an eternal law. Isidore: "If law exists through reason, then all that exists through reason will be law"; but it is clear that God's providence exists through reason, therefore it is law. That the providence of God exists through reason, Boethius: "Providence is the divine reason, conceived in the supreme principle, which ordains everything."]

Moreover, Augustine, in the book *On Free Will*: “It seems that this law, which is set up for the government of the commonwealth, allows and leaves unpunished much which is punished by divine providence.” But every evil that is punished is punished according to some law; therefore, if something is punished by divine [providence], then divine providence is law.

Augustine proves from the existence of two contrary laws that there is one eternal law. In fact, he says that there is a law that gives the people the power to give honorary offices, and another one that does not, and this is because the people are sometimes serious, sometimes capricious and dissolute; therefore, if these laws are opposite and both right and they cannot exist at the same time, it is necessary to unite them through some one justice; therefore it is necessary that there exists one justice of the eternal law according to which rightness is accorded and then precluded.

On the contrary. The power of the law is to command, to forbid, to allow, to advise, to punish, to reward. The first two actions concern the irascible part of the soul, to allow and to advise concern the rational part, to punish and to reward concern the concupiscible part; however, everything is perfect when it attains its own power, and since there is no eternal law if it is not perfect, therefore there is no such law without its power. However, what is called the ‘power of the law’ is not eternal because to order or to forbid is not eternal, just as the rational creature to which something is ordered or forbidden is not eternal. Therefore, there is no eternal law, since the power of the law is not eternal.

The law has a double status: firstly in disposition, and then in promulgation. However it happens that when it is only in disposition it is not worthy to be called ‘law’ because at this moment it does not bind; therefore there is law only according to promulgation, because that is when it first binds. But it is not correct to say that the promulgation of some precepts is eternal because it is to a creature; and therefore no law is eternal.

If the eternal law was not written or imprinted, it would not bind; this is why divine law does not bind irrational creatures because the knowledge of the law is not impressed on them; therefore it is not law except because it is impressed, because it is on account of this that it binds, for it cannot be said that it binds God. Therefore, if the impression of the divine law is not eternal, neither is the law itself, insofar as it is law.

Answer. According to Augustine in *On True Religion*, where he shows that law is what we call the truth, he says: “Our mind is granted to see the law of immutable truth; but that immutable truth cannot be rooted in the soul, which is mutable. Therefore it is clear that above our mind there is a law which is called the truth”; and this is the eternal law.

Therefore it is necessary to reply to the objection concerning the power of the law that the power of the law is the ground of the truth, that is the rule of ordering and the rule of forbidding etc., and that rule is eternal. But the manifestation of the rule is in the acts themselves when something is ordered or forbidden or advised, etc., and according to this to order and to forbid and similar actions can be considered in a double way: either according to the rule itself of ordering or forbidding etc., or according to the act or effect itself. The eternal law relates to both, because according to the rule and what is in the rule; according to the manifestation it is in the act itself, for then it is manifested when something is ordered or forbidden.

To the other objection it has to be said that law comes on the one hand from ‘reading’, on the other hand from ‘binding’. Insofar as it comes from ‘reading’, the law exists in disposition; insofar as it comes from ‘binding’, law exists in the promulgation. However, insofar as ‘law’ comes from ‘binding’ we can understand it in two ways, that is, actively or passively. Insofar as it comes from ‘binding’ passively, it is said with a view to the creature; insofar as it comes from ‘binding’ actively, it is said with a view to God. But ‘to bind’ actively can be said in two ways, just like ‘rule’. For rule is “the power to compel subordinates”, as Boethius says, and this is eternal, or the act of restraining, which is temporal. Therefore, ‘to bind’ actively can be said in two ways, either as having to do

with power, and in this way it is eternal; or as having to do with the act of binding which is said with a view to the creature and is in time. And according to this it is clear that there is an eternal law.

The solution to the other objection is clear based on this].

6 *SH* IV, P2, In1, Q1, C1 (n. 224), pp. 314–5: [Whether there is an eternal law.

Isidore in Book II of *Etymologies*: “If law exists through reason, then all that exists through reason will be law.” Thus, if God’s providence exists through reason, providence will be God’s law; but definitely an eternal one; therefore, since there is divine providence, it is clear that there is an eternal law. – The minor premise is clear; for, as Boethius says, “Providence is the divine reason, conceived in the supreme principle which ordains everything.”

Augustine in the work *On Free Will*: “It seems that this law, which is set up for the government of the commonwealth, allows and leaves unpunished much which is punished by divine providence.” And Augustine intends at this point to assert the sentence that no evil should go unpunished, and at the same time that every evil is punished according to some law. Therefore, if there is any evil that is not punished by secular law, and it does not go unpunished, it will be punished by the eternal law; therefore, that thing itself is.

Augustine in book I of *On Free Will*: “The two laws seem so contradictory to each other, that one gives the people the power to give honorary offices, the other not, so they cannot be in a community at the same time. Is it possible that one of them is unfair and by no means needs to be endured?”, by which he means: no. Therefore, each of the two is just. As a result, it is argued that it is impossible under the aspect of justice to unite opposing secular laws except through a law that has no opposition and unites them: we call this eternal law.

On the other hand, it is argued that the law exists in the disposition of the law-giver, and thus does not deserve the name ‘law’ because it does not oblige while it is in disposition.

Moreover, it gets its being in promulgation and then earns the name ‘law’, because then it binds; it can not therefore be called a law from the disposition, but from the promulgation. So, if the promulgation of what to do and not to do cannot be eternal, because the public announcement is made to a creature, it is clear that there can be no eternal law.

If the law was not imprinted in the rational creature, it would not bind it: its hallmark is that it does not bind irrational creatures in whom it is not imprinted; therefore there is no law except by imprinting into reason, or that which is impressed upon reason; but this impression is temporal and not eternal; therefore, the nature of the law is temporal and not eternal.

Solution. It must be said, according to what Augustine says in the book *On True Religion*: our mind is granted to see the immutable law of truth. Our mind judges the immutable truth as it judges the following sentence: It is fair that all things are very ordered. So if this, “the human mind, can suffer the changeability of error, it is clear that there is a law above our mind called the truth”; but this law is eternal: in fact, what is above our mind is eternal.

Regarding the first objection, as Isidor says in book II of *Etymologies*, the word ‘law’ comes on the one hand from ‘reading’, on the other hand from ‘binding’. Insofar as it comes from ‘reading’, the law is in the disposition, with the term ‘reading’ extended not only to temporal reading, but to reading in the spirit. Insofar as the law is in the promulgation, it comes from ‘binding’. In the first way it is eternal, not in the second. Yet one can understand it in two ways when one says, ‘The law binds’ because ‘binding’ can be actively or passively understood. If it is actively understood, the eternal law of God is said to be binding; if it is interpreted passively, it is said with a view to the creature. Then, however, one must again differentiate concerning the law that is binding in God, just as concerning rule in God. For rule is the power to compel subordinates, and so it is predicated in terms of *habitus*; but it can also be predicated of activity, and so rule is the act of compelling subordinates; and in both cases a reference to the creature is connoted, but in the first case in *habitus*, in the second in activity.

Continued

***Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*⁵**

multa concedere et impunita relinquere quae per divinam providentiam puniuntur”. Omne autem malum quod punitur secundum aliquam legem punitur: ergo, si aliqua puniuntur per divinam, divina providentia est lex.

Item, Augustinus ex duabus legibus contrariis probat esse unam legem aeternam. Dicit enim quod est lex quae tribuit populo potestatem conferendi honores, alia vero quae non tribuit, et hoc est quia populus aliquando est gravis, aliquando est levis et dissolutus; ergo, si istae leges sunt contrariae et utraeque iustae et simul esse non possunt, oportet quod concilientur per aliquam unam iustitiam; oportet ergo quod una sit iustitia aeternae legis secundum quam rectitudo concedatur et postea prohibeatur.

Contra. Virtus legis est imperare, vetare, permittere, consulere, punire, praemium tribuere. Duo prima pertinent ad irascibilem, permittere et consulere ad rationalem, punire et praemium tribuere ad concupiscibilem. Sed unumquodque tunc est perfectum cum attingit propriae virtuti, et constat quod non est ponere legem aeternam nisi perfectam; ergo non est ipsam ponere sine virtute; sed illud quod dicitur virtus legis non est aeternum, quia praecipere non est aeternum seu vetare, sicut creatura rationalis non est aeterna cui aliquid praecipitur vel vetatur; ergo nulla lex erit aeterna, cum non sit ponere virtutem legis aeternam esse.

***Summa Halensis*⁶**

multa concedere atque impunita relinquere quae per divinam providentiam vindicantur.” Et intendit ibi Augustinus assumere istam propositionem, quod nullum malum debet esse impunitum et quod similiter omne malum punitur secundum aliquam legem. Si ergo est aliquod malum quod non punitur per legem temporalem, et non relinquitur impunitum, ergo punietur per legem aeternam; ergo ipsa est.

c. Item, Augustinus, in libro I De libero arbitrio: “Duae leges ita sibi videntur contrariae ut una earum honorum dandorum populo tribuat potestatem, alia non, ut nullo modo in una civitate simul esse possint. Numquid dicemus aliquam illarum iniustam esse et ferri minime debuisse?” quasi dicat: non. Et ita utraque est iusta. Ex hoc obicitur: Impossibile est leges contrarias temporales conciliari in ratione iustitiae nisi per legem non habentem contrarium conciliationem illas: quam legem aeternam appellamus.

Just as the rule of God in *habitus* is said from eternity, rule in activity is said from the temporal; in the same way ‘law’, if it implies the *habitus* of binding, is in disposition to binding from eternity, and in this way it is called eternal law; but if it implies the act of binding, it is not.

And the answer to the second objection is clear based on this.

The solution of the third [objection] is clear. For though the impression from the eternal is not in effect, it is still in reason from eternity. Therefore, the law is in the disposition from eternity, to be imprinted on the rational soul, even if it is not actually impressed from eternity].

Continued

***Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*⁵**

***Summa Halensis*⁶**

Item, lex duplicem habet statum: est enim in dispositione primo et postea in promulgatione; sed constat quod quando est solum in dispositione non meretur dici lex, quia adhuc non ligat; ergo solus est in in promulgatione, quia tunc primo ligat, sed non est dicere quod promulgatio aliquorum praeceptorum sit aeterna, quia sit creaturae; ergo nulla lex est aeterna.

In partem oppositam arguitur: 1. Lex habet statum in dispositione latoris, et, sic non meretur nomine legis, quia, quamdiu est in dispositione, adhuc non obligat.

2. Item, habet esse in promulgatione, et tunc meretur nomen legis, quia tunc ligat; lex ergo non potest dici ex dispositione, sed ex promulgatione. Si ergo promulgatio aliquorum faciendorum vel vitandorum non potest esse aeterna, quia promulgatio fit creaturae, constat quod non potest lex esse aeterna.

Item, si lex aeterna non esset scripta vel impressa, non ligaret; unde lex divina non dicitur ligare irracionales creaturas, quia illis non est impressa notitia legis; ergo non est lex nisi quia impressa, quia ex hoc ligat, non enim potest dici quod liget Deum; ergo, si impressio legis divinae non est aeterna, nec lex ipsa, in quantum est, est aeterna.

3. Item, si lex non esset impressa creaturae rationali, non ligaret eam: cuius signum est quod non ligat creaturas irracionales, quibus non est impressa; non est igitur lex nisi ex impressione ad rationem sive quod imprimatur rationi; sed haec impressio est temporalis et non aeterna; ergo intentio legis est temporalis et non aeterna.

Responsio: Augustinus, De vera religione, ubi ostendit quod lex est quae veritas dicitur: "Menti", inquit, "nostrae impressum est videre legem immutabilis veritatis; sed illa veritas immutabilis non potest fundari in anima, quae mutabilis est. Apparet ergo supra mentem nostram legem esse quae veritas dicitur"; et ita est lex aeterna.

Solutio: Dicendum, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, in libro De vera religione: menti nostrae concessum est videre legem veritatis immutabilem. Mens enim nostra iudicat de veritate immutabili, ut iudicat istam propositionem: iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. Cum ergo ipsa, scilicet "mens humana, mutabilitatem pati possit erroris, apparet supra mentem nostram esse legem, quae veritas dicitur"; haec autem lex est aeterna: quod enim est supra mentem nostram est aeternum.

Dicendum ergo ad illud quod obicitur de virtute legis quod virtus legis est ratio veritatis, scilicet ratio praecipendi et ratio vetandi, etc., et illa ratio aeterna est. Manifestatio autem istius rationis est in ipsis actibus, dum aliquid praecipitur vel vetatur vel consulitur, etc., et secundum hoc praecipere et vetare et huiusmodi possunt accipi dupliciter: vel pro ipsa ratione praecipendi vel vetandi, etc., vel pro ipso actu sive effectu. Lex autem aeterna utrumque respicit, quia secundum rationem et id quod est in ratione, secundum manifestationem vero est in ipso actu; tunc enim manifestatur quando aliquid praecipitur vel vetatur, etc.

Continued

*Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*⁵

Ad aliud dicendum quod lex uno modo dicitur a ligando, alio a legendo. Secundum quod dicitur [214ra] a legendo, extenso nomine 'legendi', dicitur quod lex est in dispositione; secundum autem quod dicitur a ligando, lex est in promulgatione. Secundum tamen quod dicitur a ligando, dupliciter possumus intelligere, scilicet active et passive. Secundum quod dicitur a ligando passive, dicitur respectu creaturae; secundum quod dicitur a ligando active, dicitur respectu Dei. Sed ligare active potest dici dupliciter sicut dominium. Dicitur enim dominium potestas coercendi subditos, ut dicit Boethius, et ita est aeterna; vel actus coercendi, qui temporalis est. Sic ligare active potest dici dupliciter: vel quantum ad potestatem, et hoc modo est aeternum, vel quantum ad actum ligandi quod dicitur respectu creature et est in tempore; et secundum hoc patet quod lex aeterna est.

*Summa Halensis*⁶

[Ad obiecta]: 1. Ad primo obiectum dicendum, sicut dicit Isidorus, II Etymologiarum: lex uno modo dicitur a legendo, alio modo a ligando. Secundum quod dicitur a legendo, extenso nomine lectionis non solum ad lectionem temporalem, sed ad lectionem secundum quod legitur in mente, sic lex est in dispositione. Lex autem, prout est in promulgatione, dicitur a ligando. Primo ergo modo est aeterna, secundo modo non. Tamen potest distingui, cum dicitur: 'Lex ligat', quia 'ligare' potest sumi active vel passive. Si active, sic lex aeterna in Deo dicitur a ligando; secundum quod accipitur passive dicitur respectu creaturae. Sed adhuc distinguendum de lege ligante in Deo, sicut de dominio in Deo. Dominium enim est potestas coercendi subditos, et sic dicitur secundum habitum; vel potest dici secundum actum, et sic dominium est actus coercendi subditos; et utrobique connotatur respectus ad creaturam, sed primo modo in habitu, secundo in actu. Sicut ergo dominium in habitu de Deo dicitur ab aeterno, dominium in actu ex tempore, ita lex, si importet habitum ligandi, sic ab aeterno est in dispositione ad ligandum, et hoc modo dicitur lex aeterna; sed, si importet actum ligandi, non.

Ad aliud patet solutio per illa.

2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum.

3. Ad tertium patet solutio. Nam, licet impressio ab aeterno non sit in effectu, tamen est in ratione ab aeterno. Unde lex ab aeterno est in dispositione et ad hoc ut animae rationali imprimatur, licet ab aeterno non imprimatur in effectu.

The textual parallels found above confirm that the *Quaestiones* are the model and the doctrinal source of the *Summa Halensis*. However, they also show that the latter rearranges the material in a more concise argument. In particular, the *Summa* eliminates the first *sed contra* of the text of the *Quaestiones*, where it is said:

The power of the law is to command, to forbid, to allow, to advise, to punish, to reward. The first two actions concern the irascible part of the soul, to allow and to advise concern the rational part, to punish and to reward concern the concupiscible part; however, everything is perfect when it attains its own power, and since there is no eternal law if it is not perfect, therefore

there is no such law without its power. However, what is called the 'power of the law' is not eternal because to order or to forbid is not eternal, just as the rational creature to which something is ordered or forbidden is not eternal. Therefore, there is no eternal law, since the power of the law is not eternal.⁷

The *Quaestiones* offer a reply to this argument which is also absent from the text of the *Summa*. They explain:

Therefore it is necessary to reply to the objection concerning the power of the law that the power of the law is the ground of the truth, that is the rule of ordering and the rule of forbidding etc., and that rule is eternal. But the manifestation of the rule is in the acts themselves when something is ordered or forbidden or advised, etc., and according to this to order and to forbid and similar actions can be considered in a double way: either according to the rule itself of ordering or forbidding etc., or according to the act or effect itself. The eternal law relates to both, because according to the rule and what is in the rule, and according to the manifestation it is in the act itself, it is manifested when something is ordered or forbidden.⁸

This example shows how complex is the relation between the *Quaestiones* and the *Summa*, since the latter certainly follows the order and structure of the first, assuming also its doctrinal contents. However, the text of the *Summa* is not a simple transfer from the *Quaestiones*, but rather it reconsiders and rearranges the argument according to a more systematic approach.

The *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* and John of La Rochelle

The attribution of the *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* to the Franciscan theologian John of La Rochelle depends not only on the close relation of this text to the *Summa*

⁷ John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (Assisi 138, fol. 213vb; Vat. Lat. 782, fol. 129ra): 'Virtus legis est imperare, vetare, permittere, consulere, punire, praemium tribuere. Duo prima pertinent ad irascibilem, permittere et consulere ad rationalem, punire et praemium tribuere ad concupiscibilem. Sed unumquodque tunc est perfectum cum attingit propriae virtuti, et constat quod non est ponere legem aeternam nisi perfectam; ergo non est ipsam ponere sine virtute; sed illud quod dicitur virtus legis non est aeternum; ergo praecipere non est aeternum seu vetare, sicut creatura rationalis non est aeterna cui aliquid praecipitur vel vetatur; ergo nulla lex erit aeterna, cum non sit ponere virtutem legis aeternam esse.'

⁸ John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (Assisi 138, fol. 213vb; Vat. lat. 782, fol. 129ra): 'Dicendum ergo ad illud quod obicitur de virtute legis quod virtus legis est ratio veritatis, scilicet ratio praecipendi et ratio vetandi, etc., et illa ratio aeterna est. Manifestatio autem istius rationis est in ipsis actibus, dum aliquid praecipitur vel vetatur vel consulitur, etc.; et secundum hoc praecipere et vetare et huiusmodi possunt accipi dupliciter: vel pro ipsa ratione praecipendi vel vetandi, etc., vel pro ipso actu sive effectu. Lex autem aeterna utrumque respicit, quia secundum rationem et id quod est in ratione, secundum manifestationem vero est in ipso actu; tunc enim manifestatur quando aliquid praecipitur vel vetatur, etc.'

Halensis. It also finds a clear confirmation in the doctrinal coherence of the text with other key writings of the master, such as, for instance, the *Introitus generalis in sacram doctrinam*, which presents John of La Rochelle's account of the structure and order of the Bible, defining the general theological perspective of the Franciscan master.

In the *Introitus* John develops his analysis of the first part of the biblical canon, explaining that the term 'law' refers to various books of Scripture, which belong to different literary genres but share a focus on precepts and on all things related to the compliance to such precepts. As a consequence, the master explains, the law includes: (1) the teaching of precepts, which is detailed in the Pentateuch (Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy), (2) the teaching of examples, which is explained in the historical books (Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Kings, Chronicles, Ezra, Esther, Judith, Tobias, Job, Maccabees) and finally, (3) the teaching of the admonitions, which comprise the content of the books attributed to King Solomon (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticles, Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus). Following this organization, the books of the Bible which belong to 'the Law' articulate a structured moral discourse. As John of La Rochelle explains: 'The precepts establish what has to be done, the examples and the admonitions exhort to do what the precept establishes; but the admonitions are in the discourse, while the examples are in the action.'⁹

John of La Rochelle's explanation of the structure of the Old Testament, together with the threefold distinction concerning the exegetical category of the 'law' is largely quoted in the *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*.¹⁰ Here there is a close analysis of

⁹ John of La Rochelle, *Introitus generalis in sacram scripturam* (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 782, fol. 119r): 'Precepta determinant quid est faciendum, exempla et admonitiones movent ad exequendum illud quod est preceptum; sed admonitiones sunt in uerbo exempla in factis.'

¹⁰ John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (Assisi 138, fol. 225va): 'Dicendum quod lex sumitur multipliciter, scilicet generalissime, generaliter, specialiter et particulariter. Generalissime sumitur pro doctrina operandorum ad quam pertinet lex Moysi; et pro doctrina credendorum, ad quam Prophetarum, in quibus continetur reuelatio credendorum; et pro doctrina omnium orationum, ad quam Psalmi. Et sic continet libros et Psalmos, et sic sumitur Ioan. x: "Scriptum est in lege uestra", etc. Generaliter, pro doctrina preceptorum, que continet lex Moysi; et pro doctrina exemplorum, ad quam pertinent libri historicales; et pro doctrina admonitionum, que continentur in libris Salomonis, et hoc modo sumitur Luc. ultimo: "Hec sunt uerba que locutus sum uobis, cum adhuc essem uobiscum, quoniam necesse est impleri omnia que scripta sunt in lege Moysi et Prophetis et Psalmis de me". [The term 'law' has multiple meanings, a most general one, a general one, a specific one, and a particular one. On a most general level, 'law' means the doctrine of the things to be done, to which pertains the law of Moses; and for the doctrine of things to be believed, to which pertain the Prophets, where the revelation of the things to be believed is contained; and the doctrine of prayers, to which pertain the Psalms. And according to this meaning 'law' contains the books [of Moses and of the Prophets] and the Psalms, and in this sense it is said in John 10: "It is written in your law" etc. On a general level, 'law' means the doctrine of the precepts which the law of Moses contains; and the doctrine of the examples, to which pertain the historical books; and the doctrine of the admonitions, which are contained in the books of Solomon, and according to this meaning it is said in the

the different genres of law, starting with the eternal law and the natural law and then moving on to the Mosaic law and the evangelical law. It is in the context of disputing the content of the Mosaic law that the *Quaestiones* introduce a distinction between four possible perspectives: the most general one, the general one, the specific one, and finally the particular one. From the most general point of view, the master notes, the Mosaic law concerns the things to do, while the Prophets pertain to things to believe, and finally the Psalms are dedicated to the prayers. Thus, according to this more general perspective, the word 'law' refers to the whole Old Testament, including the Psalms and the Prophets.

Moving to the lower level, i. e. the general perspective, the *Quaestiones* note that another threefold distinction has to be assumed: the Mosaic law, i. e. the Pentateuch, concerns the precepts, while the historical books consider the examples and Solomon's books debate the admonitions. This second level of 'law' is the one to which Jesus refers in his distinction between the Law, the Prophets and the Psalms in the last chapter of the Gospel of Luke.

John of La Rochelle's scheme of the structure of the biblical canon with its elaborated theological rationale represents a specific doctrinal feature of the master, which is present in the *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* and through them in the *Summa Halensis*, where it is extensively quoted in the *quaestio* concerning the contents of the Mosaic law.¹¹ This strong parallel confirms the attribution of the *Quaes-*

last chapter of Luke: "These are the words which I spoke to you, while I was yet with you, that all things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me"].

11 SH IV, P2, In3, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 265), Solutio, p. 386–7: 'Dicendum quod Lex dicitur multipliciter. Dicitur enim Lex generalissime, dicitur Lex generaliter, dicitur specialiter, dicitur particulariter. Generalissime dicitur Lex Scriptura sive doctrina totius Veteris Testamenti, sive sit doctrina operandorum, ad quam pertinent libri Moysi; sive sit doctrina credendorum, ad quam pertinent prophetiae, in quibus continentur revelationes credendorum; sive doctrina orationum, ad quam pertinet doctrina Psalmorum. Et hoc modo accipitur Lex, Ioan. 10, 34: "Nonne in Lege vestra dictum est: Ego dixi dii estis?" etc. Constat enim quod istud dicitur in Psalmo; vult ergo dicere quod doctrina Psalmorum continetur in Lege. Sic ergo Lex continet libros Moysi et omnes Prophetas et Psalmos. Secundo modo dicitur Lex generaliter, et sic solum sumitur pro doctrina operandorum, et sic dividitur contra Psalmos et Prophetas et ad hanc coarctatur Lex, Luc. ultimo, 44: "Haec sunt verba quae locutus sum vobis, cum adhuc essem vobiscum, quoniam oportet impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege Moysi et Prophetis et Psalmis de me." Ecce hic dividit Legem contra Prophetas et Psalmos, et sic Lex continet doctrinam praeceptorum, ad quam pertinent libri Moysi, et doctrinam exemplorum, ad quam pertinent libri historiales, et doctrinam admonitionum, ad quam pertinent libri Salomonis' [Law is said in several ways. It is said very generally, generally, specially, and particularly. Law said very generally is Scripture or the doctrine of the whole Old Testament, whether it be the doctrine of things to be done, to which the books of Moses pertain; the doctrine of things to be believed, to which the prophetic books belong, in which are contained the revelations of that which is to be believed; or whether it be the doctrine of prayer, to which the doctrine of the Psalms belongs. And that is how 'law' is understood in John 10:34: "Is it not written in your law: I said, you are gods?" etc. It is clear that this is said in the Psalm; he wants to say that the doctrine of the Psalms is contained in the law. Therefore, the law contains the books of Moses and all the Prophets and the Psalms. In the second way, law is said

tiones to the Franciscan master, as well as the relevance of his theological production for the establishment of the text of the *Summa*.

The authorship of the *Quaestiones* is not the only link between John of La Rochelle and the treaty on laws of the *Summa Halensis*, however. This latter text seems to be more directly connected with the figure of the Franciscan master because of its literary features. The treaty of the *Summa* presents a short prologue where it is said:

The essence of the theological discipline consists of two things: faith and customs. Once the enquiries concerning faith, such as the one on the Redeemer, have been completed, it is necessary to proceed, with the help of Jesus Christ, to enquiries concerning customs.¹²

Thus, the general prologue places the study of the law within a well-articulated understanding of theology according to two major fields, namely systematic and moral theology. It is not present in the *Quaestiones*, but it is common to some of the major theological writings of John of La Rochelle, namely the *Summa de articulis fidei* and the *Summa de vitiis*. For instance, the *Summa de articulis fidei* presents an extended version of the same prologue, where the master articulates the distinction between faith and customs, while providing a more detailed analysis of the two major subjects of the theological discipline. Thus, according to the *Summa de articulis fidei*, the theologian considers the faith, either in terms of *fides qua creditur* or *fides quae creditur*. As regards customs, he focuses on the sins and on the remedies for sins.¹³ These lit-

generally, and so it is taken only for the doctrine of what to do, and to this law is limited in the last [Chapter] of Luke [verse] 44: “These are the words which I spoke to you, while I was yet with you, that all things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me.” Here, therefore, he delimits the law against the Prophets and Psalms, and so the law contains the doctrine of prescriptions, to which the books of Moses belong, and the doctrine of the models, to which the history books belong, and the doctrine of admonitions, to which the books of Solomon belong].

12 *SH* IV, P2, In1, p. 313: ‘Summa theologicae disciplinae in duo consistit, in fide et moribus. Expeditis inquisitionibus pertinentibus ad fidem, ut de Redemptore, cum adiutorio Iesu Christi, procedendum est ad inquisitiones pertinentes ad mores.’

13 John of La Rochelle, *Summa de articulis fidei* (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 221, fol. 62r): ‘Summa theologicae disciplinae in duobus consistit, scilicet in fide et moribus, sicut dicitur in Prologo super Psalterium. Fides autem dupliciter accipitur: est enim fides qua creditur et haec est fides virtus, de qua infra suo loco dicitur; et est fides quae creditur et haec fides nihil aliud est quam articulus fidei. Mores dividuntur in duo: in peccata et remedia peccatorum. Similis enim est moralis consideratio medicinae: Sicut enim tota intentio medici consistit in cognitione aegritudinis corporalis, quae expellenda est, et in cognitione sanitatis corporalis, quae est conservanda, sic tota intentio theologici moralis consistit in cognitione aegritudinis spiritualis, quae est peccatum, et in cognitione sanitatis spiritualis, quae est peccati remedium’ [The whole theological discipline consists of two parts, that is, faith and customs, as is said in the prologue to the Psalms. Faith is taken in two senses: in fact, there is the faith with which one believes and this is the virtue of faith, which will be discussed below in its proper place; and there is the faith which is believed, and this faith is nothing but the articles of faith. Customs are divided into two parts: into sins and

erary features place the treaty on laws of the *Summa Halensis* close to John of La Rochelle's style.

Beside these aspects, the history of the circulation of the texts offers additional knowledge. The manuscript tradition of the *Summa Halensis* shows that the treaty on laws circulated independently from the rest of the *Summa*. The manuscript Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4298 contains the treatise on laws as an autonomous text as well as the John of La Rochelle's *Summa de articulis fidei*.¹⁴ It is on the basis of these elements that Martin Grabmann suggested that the *Tractatus de legibus* would have originally been an independent work, which was later inserted in the *Summa*.¹⁵ The same Vatican manuscript contains the *Quaestiones* 26 and 27 of the third book of the *Summa* on the virtues, presenting them as a sort of autonomous *Summa de virtutibus*, with the above mentioned general prologue which explains John's placement of the moral discourse within his account of the theological discipline.¹⁶

On the basis of this conclusion and what has already been determined regarding the relationship between the *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* and the *Summa*, several hypotheses can be formulated. First of all, John of La Rochelle is most likely the author of the *Quaestiones* which are preserved in the two manuscripts of Assisi and Rome. This text is the direct source of the *Tractatus de legibus* of the *Summa Halensis*, which may also be linked with the theological production of the Franciscan master, due to its stylistic features. The *Tractatus* might be a resume of the *Quaestiones* according to a more comprehensive perspective, or it might be the result of an attempt to provide a more structured exposition of John of La Rochelle's theology along with other texts such as the *Summa de articulis fidei* or the *Summa de divinis nominibus*. It is also possible that the master's pupils, above all, the Franciscans in Paris, composed the *Tractatus* on the basis of John's writings and notes and thus assumed his stylistic features. Certainly, the figure of John of La Rochelle is at the origin of the *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*, and through this text, he became the mind behind the *Tractatus de legibus* in the *Summa Halensis*.

remedies of sins. In fact, the moral examination is similar to medicine: For just as the entire intention of the physician is the understanding of bodily sickness, which has to be driven out, and of bodily health, which has to be preserved, so the whole intention of the moral theologian consists of the understanding of spiritual sickness, which is sin, and of spiritual health, which is the cure for sin].

¹⁴ See Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa*,' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 26–41; Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa* (Continued),' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 274–312.

¹⁵ See Grabmann, 'Das Naturrecht der Scholastik von Gratian bis Thomas von Aquin,' 12–53.

¹⁶ See also, on the whole issue of the independent circulation of some parts of the *Summa Halensis*, Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' CCXI–CCXVI.

John's Discussion of Law and its Contemporary Context

John of La Rochelle develops his analysis of the different kinds of law against a larger intellectual background within which this issue was heavily debated. Particularly in the early 13th-century Paris, theologians started to focus on analysing the notion of law in its multiple meanings. Certainly, the issue of law had been the subject of considerable interest already in the 12th-century legal discourse: the first distinctions of Gratian's *Concordia discordantium canonum* represent in fact a detailed treatise on the different species of laws and rules. In this regard, Gratian and the canonists, together with the civil lawyers, focused their attention on the notion of *ius*, that is, the legal order, distinguishing a variety of different types of law: the natural law, the civil law and the law of nations. Rather than a specific set of precepts, prescriptions and permissions, the *ius* was defined as reasoning about the law according to specific principles. Thus, the natural law, for instance, was construed as an attempt to establish a legal order according to some basic principles which human beings know by nature. Such principles include:

the union of men and women, the succession and rearing of children, the common possession of all things, the identical liberty of all, or the acquisition of things that are taken from the heavens, earth, or sea, as well as the return of a thing deposited or of money entrusted to one, and the repelling of violence by force.¹⁷

By contrast, the Latin word *lex* had a different meaning for these 12th-century authors. They used it to refer to the set of prescriptions and practices proper to a religious perspective or linked to a certain understanding of the relation between human beings and God. Thus, the term 'law' is used, for instance, to indicate different religions: the 'law' of the Jews is different from the 'law' of the Christians and from the 'law' of the Muslims. In some cases, the term 'law' also implies a religious order, since each one of them has its own specific rule, with precepts that define the lifestyle of its members.

While legal discourse focuses more on the notion of *ius*, the biblical exegetes and theologians appear more interested in the idea of *lex*. The different textual sources used by these two groups of thinkers influenced their representative approaches. In fact, both canonists and civil lawyers deal with large collections of laws, in which the notion of *ius* is presented as the pivotal idea of the whole legal discourse. For their part, theologians and exegetes looked to the Scriptures, where they found

¹⁷ Gratian, *Concordia discordantium canonum*, d. 1, c. 7, in *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, 2 vols., ed. Emil Friedberg (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1879–81), 1:2: 'Viri et feminae coniunctio, liberorum successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae celo, terra marique capiuntur; item depositae rei vel commendatae pecuniae restitutio, violentiae per vim repulsio.'

the idea of 'law' as a set of prescriptions linked to the religious practice and more specifically as one the most significant means of defining the relationship between God and the creation.

Certainly, the legal thought and the theological debates were mutually interrelated and influential in the early 13th century. An anonymous disputed question on the laws (*de legibus*), which dates at the 1230s, preserved in the MS Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale 434, argues for a minimal but clear distinction between the Law and the Gospel: 'the law concerns reverence,' the anonymous explains, 'while the Gospel concerns love.'¹⁸ Moreover:

There is a double perfection—the anonymous continues—: interior and exterior. The law makes perfect the inner realities, while the Gospel makes perfect the external realities. In fact, "love is the fulfilment of the law", Rom. 13 [13:10]. Thus, the gospel perfects the law just as form perfects matter when it comes [to be united] to it.¹⁹

The author considers the two terms *lex* and *evangelium* as referring to two different things: while the Law is the set of prescriptions which rules human life, the Gospel gives the inner spiritual meaning to human life and thus also serves as the proper 'form' of the law itself, since it defines the proper aim of the Law. The author clarifies his approach as follows: 'The law constrains but does not lead; the Gospel does not lead but draws towards perfection.'²⁰

Such a distinction between the notions of the Law and the Gospel clearly brings to mind the quotation from Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies* which opens Gratian's *Decree*, and according to which: 'The human race is ruled by two things, namely, the natural law and morals. The natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel.'²¹ Developing this distinction not from a legal but a theological perspective, the anonymous author witnesses to the emergence of a particular interest amongst theologians in analysing of the notion of 'law'. His text presupposes the distinction between the Old Testament and the New Testament, or more precisely, between the Law, i.e. the ten commandments, and the Gospel, which would become a cornerstone in the development of the discourse on the system of laws. In addition, his text is based on the analysis of several quotations, particularly from the Gospel of

18 *Quaestio de legibus* (Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale 434, II, fol. 425rb, n. 571): 'lex est timoris, evangelium amoris.'

19 *Quaestio de legibus* (Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale 434, II, fol. 425rb, n. 571): 'Perfectio duplex [est], intra et extra. Lex intra perfecta facit, extra perfecta per evangelium. Dilectio namque plenitudo legis, ad Rom. xiii [13:10]. Bene per evangelium, tanquam formam adveniens materiae, perfecit eam, scilicet legem.'

20 *Quaestio de legibus* (Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale 434, II, fol. 425rb, n. 571): 'Lex cogit, non ducit; evangelium non ducit immo et trahit ad perfectionem.'

21 Gratian, *Concordia discordantium canonum*, prol. (Friedberg, 1:1): 'Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali videlicet iure et moribus. Ius naturae est, quod in lege et evangelio continetur.'

Matthew and from Paul's Epistle to the Romans, which represent the major biblical sources for the development of the theological account on law.

Starting from the letter of the Scriptures, the theologians lay out a sophisticated and varied description of the different genres and species of law. Another anonymous disputed question from the same Douai manuscript, which also dates on around 1230 to 1235, discusses the existence of four different kinds of law on the basis of the exegesis of Rom. 7:23, which is offered in Peter Lombard's *Collectanea in epistulas beati Pauli*. The biblical text states: 'I see another law at work in me, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within me.'²² Stressing Paul's reference to the presence of different laws in his mind, the *Glossa* notes: 'in this sequence four laws are enumerated.'²³ The anonymous theologian further explains that these four laws are: the law of nature, the law of the flesh, the law of Moses, and the law of the faith, which is also called law of the Spirit or law of the Gospel. The author argues that the distinction between these laws rests upon their different motivating principles: nature is the moving principle of the law of nature, sensuality is the mover of the law of the flesh, the superior part of rationality moves the law of the Gospel, while the inferior part of rationality, which concerns temporal goods, moves the law of Moses. The rationale behind this distinction amongst the laws rests clearly on the inner structure of the human soul, namely the distinction between nature, sensuality, and reason, and then between superior and inferior parts of reason. Such a vision of the human soul was widely debated among the Parisian theologians in the 1220s and 1230s on the basis of the contents of the second book of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and under the influence of relevant philosophical sources, such as Aristotle's *De anima* and Avicenna's *De anima*, together with Averroes' *Great Commentary on the De anima*, which started to be used in the 1230s.

In addition to this distinction, the theologian notes further differences among the laws. He demonstrates that the law of Moses and the law of the Gospel bespeak two different kinds of involvement of the divine grace with respect to the accomplishment of their own respective aims. In fact, operation of grace can lead one to decline evil, as happens when the human will does this under the influence of the law of Moses; but the operation of grace can also compel one to love and pursue the good, and in this case, the law of faith rules the human will. In addition, there is also a clear distinction between the law of nature and the law of Moses, even if their precepts seem to be the same both in their style of articulation and in their content. The theologian notes that certainly the moral prescription of the law of nature

²² Rom. 7:23 (DRB, translation modified on the basis of the Vulgate).

²³ Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in epistula D. Pauli apostoli Epistolas*, ad Rom. 7:23 (PL 191:1426): 'Quatuor enim leges in hac serie memorantur, scilicet lex naturae, lex membrorum, quae pro una cum lege peccati accipitur, lex Mosi, quarta lex fidei' [In this series are mentioned four laws, that is the natural law, the law of the limbs which is considered one with the law of the sin, the law of Moses, and, fourth, the law of the faith].

and of the law of Moses are the same in terms of their substance, but they differ with respect to the genus, species and definition.

This anonymous question presents a sophisticated and clearly articulated account of the issue of 'law', which is also covered in other theological texts of the 1230s and early 1240s. Another anonymous disputed question on natural law, which is preserved in the manuscript Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 782 that also contains a part of John of La Rochelle's *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*, observes the existence of specific differences between the laws. Nature is the basic principle which determines natural law, while grace is at the origin of both the law of Moses and the law of the Gospel. However, this clear distinction does not involve a complete separation among the laws, but rather a reconsideration of the relationship between them. Making use of Aristotelian language, the anonymous author explains that:

[natural law] is the potentiality or matter for the other laws, and its justice is the potentiality to the justice of the other [forms of law]. In fact, in the Gospel (...) there is the perfect justice, in the law of Moses there is inchoate [*inchoata*] justice, while in the law of nature there is only initial [*inchoativa*] justice.²⁴

Clarifying this relation between the laws, the anonymous author notes that they are the same according to their matter, since entail show quite similar guidelines and precepts, but they differ according to their form, because each one is the result of a different formal principle: nature is the principle of natural law, reverence (*timor*) is the principle which defines of the law of Moses, and love is the form of the law of the Gospel.

This series of texts illustrates the emergence of law as one of the major topics of the theological debate in the first half of the 13th century. Moreover, the attempt to offer an increasingly detailed analysis of the notion of law, focusing on its various aspects, is consistent with the attempt of the early 13th-century authors to define a vision which was capable of encompassing the different systems of precepts and practices which were mentioned and described in Scripture, and which remained valid. The distinction between the different species of law had two key consequences. On the one hand it allowed theologians to reconsider all of religious history under the auspices of the notion of 'law'. The Law and the Gospel, i.e. the Old and the New Testament, are seen here as two stages in a chronological sequence of laws that start with natural law, i.e. the law proper to the ancestors whose story was presented in Genesis. The law of Moses coincides with the history of ancient Israel and is followed by the law of the Gospel, which is seen as the achievement of the perfection

²⁴ *Quaestio de lege naturali* (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 782, fol. 22vb): '[Lex naturalis] possibilis est sive materialis ad alias et iustitia sua ad iustitias aliarum. In Evangelio enim, sicut dictum est, iustitia perfecta, in lege Moysi inchoata, in lege autem naturae inchoativa tantum.'

of the set of prescriptions and practices which rules the relation between God and the creatures, particularly human beings. On the other hand, the three or four identified species of law describe different systems of precepts and prescriptions which are also contemporaneous with one another, since the law of the Gospel, even if it is more perfect than the others, does not suppress the law of Moses, nor the natural law, which in fact are still proper to the Jews, the Muslims and other people. Moreover, as several theologians remark, these laws are certainly different according to their 'form', i.e. the religious and spiritual principle which defines them, but they are equivalent in their very contents.

John of La Rochelle develops his own disputed questions on law in light of this growing debate, offering a more expansive and systematic analysis. The Franciscan author examines firstly the notion of eternal law, considering it as the very highest level of law and the statement of an immutable and eternal truth. He explains:

According to Augustine in *On True Religion*, where he shows that law is what we call the truth, he says: "Our mind is granted to see the law of immutable truth; but that immutable truth cannot be rooted in the soul, which is mutable. Therefore it is clear that above our mind there is a law which is called the truth"; and this is the eternal law.²⁵

John suggests that the eternal law coincides, in fact, with the divine will and it is the very principle from which all the other laws derive, with the key exception of the 'unjust' laws. The eternal law, John notes, is not directly present in the human mind, because this is mutable and temporary while the eternal law is immutable and eternal. Thus, it operates as a sort of general model for the following the different species of law, starting with natural law and then moving on to the law of Moses and the law of the Gospel.

According to John of La Rochelle, the eternal law is the first link in a chain which includes all the species of laws, and in which the notion of natural law serves as the medium between the *lex aeterna* and the other 'prescribed laws' (*leges addictae*), i.e. the law of Moses and the law of the Gospel. Moreover, since natural law concerns reason, it is proper to the rational beings only, and it is the principle which validates all the other species of 'positive' laws, including the divine positive laws stated in the Scripture.

²⁵ John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (Assisi 138, fol. 213vb; Vat. lat. 782, fol. 129ra): 'Augustinus, *De vera religione*, ubi ostendit quod lex est que veritas dicitur: "Menti – inquit – nostre impressum est videre legem immutabilem veritatis; sed illa veritas immutabilis non potest fundari in anima, que mutabilis est. Apparet ergo supra mentem nostram legem esse que veritas dicitur", et ita est lex aeterna.' Cf. *SH IV*, P2, In1, Q1, C1 (n. 224), p. 315.

The Influence of John through the *Summa Halensis*: the Case of the *lex naturalis as impressa*

The *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* of the Franciscan master offer the first systematic discussion of the different species of law, presenting them as part of a complex system which explains their mutual relation, as well as their order. The sequence eternal law—natural law—law of Moses—law of the Gospel became a veritable paradigm for the following decades, and the use of John's text as a major source for the treaty on laws of the *Summa Halensis* certainly increased the authority of his account. In fact, the structure and contents of these disputed questions is integrated into the *Summa* and establishes an approach to the topic of law which would be crucial not just within the Franciscan milieu but more broadly speaking for the major authors of the 13th century, including Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In this sense, the *Summa Halensis* represents a medium for enlarging the audience of John's doctrine, for instance, concerning the relation between the eternal law and the natural law.

Examining the difference between the two laws, John distinguishes the law which impresses from the law which is impressed, making use of the ancient metaphor of the seal and of the wax. The theologian explains that the natural law is impressed because it is in the likeness of the eternal law. According to this perspective the notion of natural law involves on the one hand the capability of reason to receive a certain understanding of the eternal law, i. e. to act as the wax which receives the seal and to become the likeness of it. On the other hand, it is evident that in John's opinion, the eternal law is received by rational creatures and thus it is made present to their minds through impression rather than through an autonomous search on the part of reason itself.

This same doctrine is summarized in the *Summa Halensis*, which states:

When it is said "the eternal law is impressed in us by nature", this is the idea of this [eternal law], as it is clear from the words of Augustine. However, that knowledge of the eternal law impressed in the soul, is nothing but the same natural law in the soul, which is a certain likeness and image of the divine law and of the divine goodness in the soul. Thus, natural law is the knowledge of the eternal law impressed in the soul. As the image, which is in the seal, impresses, and the image which is in the wax is impressed and is the image of that which is in the seal, so it is here, because the eternal law impresses, and the natural law is impressed in the soul.²⁶

²⁶ SH IV, P2, In2, Q1, C1 (n. 241), Ad obiecta 2, p. 340: 'Cum dicitur "lex aeterna nobis naturaliter impressa", hoc est notio eius, sicut patet ex verbis Augustini. Notio autem illa legis aeternae impressa animae nihil aliud est quam ipsa lex naturalis in anima, quae quidem est similitudo et imago ipsius divinae legis et divinae bonitatis in anima. Unde lex naturalis est notio legis aeternae impressa animae. Sicut imago, quae est in sigillo, imprimens est, imago autem quae est in cera, est impressa, et est similitudo et imago illius quae est in sigillo: ita est hic, quia lex aeterna est imprimens, lex naturalis est impressa animae.'

The study of natural law within the context of theological debates dating to the second half of the 13th century evidences an agreement on the idea that natural law represents the basic principle of the moral knowledge of the practical intellect. Despite the proper senses of ‘nature’ and ‘natural’, which pertain to physics, there is a peculiar use of these terms in this context to indicate rational creatures and their psychological features, namely their capability to know the difference between good and evil and to act accordingly. Peter of Tarentasia, in his *Quaestiones de legibus*, which dates to the 1260s, explains that natural law is both the enquiry into supreme moral principles (*notio principiorum*) and the overarching rule of human actions (*regula operandorum*) and thus it combines a cognitive aspect, i. e. the knowledge of the good to look for and of the evil to avoid, and an active element, i. e. the rule according to which the same practical intellect determines the action of the will.²⁷

Matthew of Aquasparta, in the early 1280s, notes that natural law is basically a knowledge of the eternal law which makes rational beings able not just to be guided in their moral action but also to guide themselves by rightly orienting their will and desire. Such a moral knowledge is proper to the highest part of rational soul, where this ‘knowledge’ (*notio*) of the contents and prescriptions of the eternal law is ‘impressed’ by its very creation, giving a rule to the practical intellect. Using a passage from Augustine’s *De doctrina christiana*, the theologian explains that the ‘golden rule’, taken from the book of Tob. 4:16 and from the Gospel of Matt. 7:12, i. e. ‘never do to another what you would hate to have done to you; all things therefore whatsoever you would wish that men should do to you, do you also to them,’ states the content of natural law, summarizing a series of precepts whose value is immutable and which are indelibly impressed on the mind of each individual rational creature.²⁸ Thus, honouring God, living honestly, respecting one’s parents, helping the

27 Peter of Tarentasia, *Quaestiones de legibus*, q. 2 (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borghesianus 139, fol. 106vb): ‘Dicit Glossa Hebreorum I super illud *qui cum sit splendor*, quod omni animae indidit Deus seminaria intellectus, scilicet quo ad speculativa, et sapientie, scilicet quo ad operabile. Hec autem notio principiorum videtur universalis cum sit regula operandorum, lex naturalis appellatur. Vnde lex naturalis est habitus cognitivus animae naturaliter impressus’ [The *Glossa Hebreorum*, on the verse “who being the brightness”, says that God introduced in every soul the seeds of the intellect, that is, what concerns the speculative activity, and of wisdom, that is, what concerns practical activity. But this idea of the principles seems to be universal because it is the rule of performing, and it is called natural law. Therefore, the natural law is a cognitive habit of the soul naturally impressed].

28 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de legibus*, q. 2, in *Fratris Matthaei ab Aquasparta Quaestiones disputatae de anima separata, de anima beata, de ieiunio et de legibus*, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 18 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1959), 461: ‘Et haec quidem lex naturalis, quamvis unum habeat generale praeceptum, ut “quod tibi non vis fieri, alii ne feceris, et alii facias quod tibi vis fieri”, secundum Augustinum, III libro *De doctrina christiana*, tamen plura continet alia praecepta, quae derivantur ab isto, ut Deum esse colendum, honeste esse vivendum, parentes esse honorandos, proximis esse subveniendum in necessitate, nulli offensam vel iniuriam irrogandam; quae sunt regulae quaedam immutabiles, indelebiter scriptae in mente cuiuslibet’ [And this natural law, although it has one general principle, namely “do not to others what you

neighbour, not offending or insulting anyone, these are all precepts of the natural law impressed in the intellect, which evil and sin are not able to delete and are common to all humankind.

This understanding of natural law as the highest form of practical knowledge of rational creatures, and more specifically, as an 'impressed' knowledge of the highest moral principle in the intellect, questions the relation between the natural law itself and the powers of the soul and particularly reason. Accordingly, natural law is not 'natural', in the sense that it is not part of the very nature of the rational creature: this *notio* is impressed on the intellect from the creation of each rational being, but it is not involved in the specific 'definition' of the rational creature, nor angel nor human beings. Accordingly, Peter of Tarentasia notes the closeness of this notion of natural law to the idea of habit which Aristotle uses with respect to the notion of virtue. In the *Categories*, as well as in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the Philosopher explains that virtue is not a power of the soul, i.e. an element proper to the nature of the soul, nor is it a passion, i.e. something which is passively received. Virtue, like science, is a habit, i.e. a moral or intellectual disposition that human beings acquire through its exercise and which becomes stable as a sort of second nature. Peter of Tarentasia, following closely the ideas of John of La Rochelle and the *Summa Halensis*, argues that natural law is a habit, because rational beings acquire it through the impression of the eternal law in their mind and more precisely, in the cognitive part devoted to moral knowledge, i.e. the practical intellect.²⁹

do not want them to do to you, and do to others what you want them to do to you", according to Augustine, in book III of the volume *On the Christian Faith*, it contains many other precepts, which are derived from this, such as 'God is to be honoured', 'it is mandatory to live honestly', 'parents are to be honoured', 'it is mandatory to help neighbours in need', 'do not inflict on anyone any of offense or injury', which are certain immutable rules, written indelibly in everyone's mind].

29 Petrus of Tarentasia, *Quaestiones de legibus*, q. 2 (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borghesianus 139, fol. 106vb): 'Ad habitum tamen completum cognitionis duo requiruntur, scilicet species rei cognoscibilis per quas res una distincte cognoscitur. Haec vero duo conveniunt ad actum intelligendi sicut color et lux ad actum videndi. Species quidem principiorum non sunt innatae, quia secundum Aristotelem anima creata sicut tabula rasa, sed lumen innatum est per quod speciebus terminorum incomplexorum receptis anima statim uidet ueritatem complexionis principiorum, ut, recepta specie totius et partis et maioritatis, si proponatur ei omne totum est maius sua parte, statim sine premeditatione adquiescit, quia vero huiusmodi principia intellectualia plus habent de veritate et intelligibilitate eo quod sunt causa veritatis et intelligibilitatis aliorum intelligibilium sicut conclusionum, ut ait Aristoteles, I Metaphysicorum. Ideo propter assimilationem ampliorum in illo lumine intelligibili innato anima statim illo acquiescit non sicut conclusionibus; ideo propter hanc promptitudinem intelligendam dicuntur principia nobis innata non conclusiones. Ideo dicit Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, libro XII, capitulo VI, quod mens naturali ordine subiuncta est intelligibilibus [*ms.* intellectualibus] propter quod illa videt in quadam luce sui generis et incorporea, sicut oculus haec sensibilia videt in luce sensibili. Hoc est lumen, dicit Psalmus: "signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine", et quamvis lux intellectus agentis sufficit ad specierum intelligibilium generationem, aliud tamen fortassis lumen habituale est in mente impressum qui statim videt ipsa prima principia: sicut preter lucem exteriorem qua generantur species visibiles oculus habet lucem aliquam in natura sua. Dico ergo naturalem legem habitum esse impressum naturaliter in anima

In his *Summa theologiae*, Thomas Aquinas offers a different understanding of natural law and its relationship to the powers of the soul, particularly with reason. It is well known that Aquinas defines the natural law in terms of the participation of the rational creature in the eternal law: *participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura* (Ia-IIae, q. 91, a. 2). Using the idea of ‘participation’, the Dominican master suggests that natural law is not something received by rational creatures but on the contrary, it is a product of reason: *lex naturalis* means the knowledge that rational creatures have of the eternal law. This definition certainly highlights the basic cognitive feature of the natural law, but it also stresses that this moral knowledge is ‘natural’ because it is proper to the practical intellect as a power of the soul. In a specific and strict sense, natural law is a statement of the practical intellect: ‘do good and avoid evil’, which describes what to do and not how to do it. Accordingly, for Aquinas natural law is not a habit, but a knowledge which the practical intellect naturally produces: it is not something according to which someone acts (*quo quis agit*), but something that someone accomplishes (*quod quis agit*).³⁰

in parte eius cognitiva non affectiva, etiam intellectu practico non speculativo’ [For the completeness of the habit of the cognition two things are required, that is, the species of the knowable thing by means of which a thing is known distinctly. However, these two things concur to the act of understanding just as color and light to the act of seeing. The species of principles are indeed not innate, because according to Aristotle the created soul is like a clean slate, but the innate light is that through which the soul, once it has received the species of the simple terms, sees immediately the truth of the combination of principles, just as, when a species of the whole, the part, and the greater has been received, if it is proposed to him that the whole is greater than its part, at once, without premeditation, he agrees, because intellectual principles of this kind have more truth and intelligibility since they are the cause of the truth and of the intelligibility of the other intelligibles, such as conclusions, as Aristotle says in book I of the *Metaphysics*. Thus, on account of the greater assimilation to that innate intelligible light the soul immediately assents to that [principle] in a way it does not to conclusions; thus, principles are said to be innate in us for the sake of understanding this readiness, but not conclusions. Thus, Augustine, in book XII, chapter VI of *On the Trinity*, says that the mind is subjected in the natural order to the intellectual things, on account of which it sees them in a unique light that is incorporeal, just as this sensible eye sees in a sensible light. This is the light that the Psalm says: “the light of your countenance O Lord, is signed upon us”, and although the light of the agent intellect is sufficient to generate the intelligible species, there is however another habitual light impressed in the mind which at once sees the very first principles, just as as the eye has a certain light in its own nature in addition to the exterior light with which the visible species are generated. Therefore, I say that the natural law is a habit naturally impressed in the soul, in its cognitive part and not in the affective, and in the speculative intellect and not in the practical].

30 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 1, co., in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia: Iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. 7 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1892), 168: ‘Dicendum quod aliquid potest dici esse habitus dupliciter. Uno modo, proprie et essentialiter: et sic lex naturalis non est habitus. Dictum est enim supra (q. 90, a. 1, ad 2) quod lex naturalis est aliquid per rationem constitutum: sicut etiam propositio est quoddam opus rationis. Non est autem idem quod quis agit, et quo quis agit: aliquis enim per habitum grammaticae agit orationem congruam. Cum igitur habitus sit quod quis agit, non potest esse quod lex aliqua sit habitus proprie et essentialiter. Alio modo potest dici habitus id quod habitu tenetur: sicut dicitur fides id quod fide tenetur. Et hoc modo, quia praecepta legis naturalis quandoque considerantur in actu a ratione,

Conclusions

In his study of medieval accounts of the divine law, Rémie Brague notes that: 'Thomas Aquinas' work represents perhaps the deepest thinking on the concept of law in general, and of the divine law in particular, that medieval scholasticism has given to us.'³¹ More in detail, he remarks that Thomas' distinction between four species of laws, i.e. the eternal law, the natural law, the human law and the divine law (which includes both the Old and New Testaments), would constitute the recovery of the ancient heritage, i.e. the Stoic notion of natural law, and the innovative deduction of the existence of the eternal law as the necessary condition for the existence of all the other species of law. The study of John of La Rochelle's *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* and their influence on the *Summa Halensis* shows that such an idea of eternal law was already present in the Parisian theological debates of the 1240s. John's text is, in fact, the first systematic account on the order of laws which assumes the existence of a *lex aeterna* as the very origin of the whole chain of laws.

The close relation, both in literary features and doctrinal contents between the *Quaestiones* and the treatise on laws of the *Summa Halensis*, suggests that John of La Rochelle's thought was one of the major points of reference for the composition of this Franciscan theological synthesis. At the same time, the features of the reception of John's text in the *Summa* evidence a complex work of rearrangement within a larger theological discourse. The composers of this great theological synthesis placed the issue of law within a specific and well-structured vision of theology, which assumes the *lex* as a subject proper of the moral field.

The relevance of John of La Rochelle's teaching and writings is certainly connected to the composition of the *Summa Halensis* and to the incorporation of several aspects of his thoughts, ideas and texts within it. However, a closer look at John's writings shows that the historical relevance of this Franciscan master depends on his

quandoque autem sunt in ea habitualiter tantum, secundum hunc modum potest dici quod lex naturalis sit habitus. Sicut etiam principia indemonstrabilia in speculativis non sunt ipsi habitus principiorum, sed sunt principia quorum est habitus' [I answer that a thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it has been stated above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially. Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess].

31 Brague, *La loi de Dieu*, 369: 'L'oeuvre de saint Thomas d'Aquin représente peut-être la réflexion la plus profonde sur la notion de loi en général et de loi divine en particulier que nous ait fournie la scolastique médiévale.'

role as a major figure in his generation of theologians in the Parisian intellectual milieu of the 1240s. His reasoning seems to introduce significant innovations into the theological discourse, assuming a more prominent tendency to offer a systematic analysis of the major issues of the theological research. This suggests the need to reconsider John of La Rochelle not just as a source of the *Summa* but as an author with his own intellectual, literary and doctrinal proclivities, whose intellectual value as an independent thinker is at the origin of his influence on the composition of the *Summa Halensis*. Such a historical perspective offers the possibility to place John of La Rochelle among his contemporaries and within the disputes that enlivened the Parisian theological context of the first half of the 13th century. Moreover, it allows one to see in John's thought the origin of key ideas and doctrines, which would become fixtures in 13th-century scholasticism, as is the case with the theological account of *lex*.

Riccardo Saccenti

Beyond the Positive Law

The Oath and Vow as a Theological Matter Between the 12th and Early 13th Centuries

Abstract: The legal value of the oath has been at the centre of the interest amongst historians of medieval legal thought. Focusing on the contents of both civil and canon law, scholars have stressed the relevance of the oath of loyalty as a cornerstone of medieval feudal society, and as a key element in both liturgical practice and the legal structure of the church. Due to its importance, the oath was not only an interest of lawyers: it also questioned the religious and theological discourse which based its approach upon Scripture and tried to understand the world through the divine word. In exegetical and theological texts dating from the late 12th and the early 13th centuries, it is possible to examine how theologians contributed to defining the role and value of the oath within the moral and cultural framework of medieval Latin Europe. In this same period, another concept became crucial for this kind of discussion, namely that of the vow. Focusing particularly on the Parisian theological production of the period, the paper will show how a veritable ‘theology of the oath and of the vow’ was created, which was deeply connected with the social and political systems of the time. The paper will examine the process of creating this doctrine, whose foremost clear presentation is offered in John of La Rochelle’s *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (1240–1245 ca.).

On the 20 July 1213, John, King of England, formally submitted himself to Pope Innocent III, who in 1206 had elected Stephen Langton Archbishop of Canterbury. John had strongly opposed Langton’s election, and the Pope had firstly declared the Interdict against the English kingdom and later on, in 1212, had excommunicated the king. With the excommunication, Innocent had formally dissolved all the obligations of loyalty which committed subjects to their king. In exchange for his acceptance of Innocent’s election of Langton, John was absolved from excommunication by the archbishop himself, and in that same occasion the king pronounced some kind of oath which was probably a repetition of the coronation oath.¹

John’s act needs to be placed within the peculiar context of the months of his alliance with Otto IV against the King of France, Philip Augustus, and Frederick Hohenstaufen, which had involved him in the struggle to establish a new political order in Latin Europe. Philip’s victory at Bouvines, on 27 July 1214, marked a crucial turn-

1 James C. Holt, *Magna Carta* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 196–9.

ing point in this historical process.² Since the Pope directly supported the king of France and Frederic II, and in that same 1212, John was also facing the beginning of the internal rebellion of his barons, he decided to put an end to his conflict with Innocent III and to rebuild a solid relationship with the Church to secure his political positions in England. The renewal of the coronation oath, which associated secular and ecclesiastical matters, starting with the solemn promise to grant and maintain the Church in peace, was therefore imposed on the king by the specific political contingencies of the summer 1212, but it assumed a quite different value from the point of view of Archbishop Langton.

By linking his submission to the Pope's decision with the contents of the coronation oath, John was allowing the archbishop to directly intervene in the political conflicts within the kingdom, as the representative of the only legitimate power which was able to determine the mutual duties of the king and the English clergy and aristocracy involved in that oath. It is from this perspective that Langton dealt with the events of John's reign which will lead, in June 1215, to the *Magna Carta*.³

This specific event in English medieval history is one of the many examples of the statute of the oath as a sign and a practice with crucial political consequences. Moreover, the renewal of the coronation oath of July 1213 before the Archbishop of Canterbury evidences how oath-taking in the medieval context was also a religious matter, or at least deals with sacred things, involving some sort of intervention by the ecclesiastical authority. Between the 12th and the early 13th centuries, the oath was therefore not only an issue discussed by canon and civil lawyers, but it also concerned exegetes and theologians.⁴ Swearing was a basic act in Medieval Europe, being the very basis of the whole legal and political order, as well as of the system of ecclesiastical jurisdiction which had been built by re-framing secular elements such as the oath. This situation was apparently in contradiction with the explicit prohibition of oath-taking stated in the Scripture, both in the Old and New Testaments. Throughout the 12th century, exegetes and theologians debated the meaning and ap-

2 On the political framework of the Battle of Bouvines see George Duby's classic *Le Dimanche de Bouvines: 27 juillet 1214* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973).

3 See Frederick Maurice Powicke, *Stephen Langton* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), 111–3; John W. Baldwin, 'Maître Étienne Langton, future archevêque de Canterbury: les écoles de Paris et la *Magna Carta*,' in *Étienne Langton: Prédicateur, Bibliste, Théologien*, ed. Louis-Jacques Bataillon, Nicole Bériou, Gilbert Dahan, and Riccardo Quinto (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 11–50, esp. 26–9.

4 On the connection between theological debate and political discourse between the 12th and early 13th centuries see Philippe Buc, *L'ambiguïté du livre: Prince, pouvoir, et peuple dans les commentaires de la Bible au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1994); Philippe Buc, 'Principes gentium dominantur eorum: Princely Power Between Legitimacy and Illegitimacy in Twelfth-Century Exegesis,' in *Cultures of Power: Lordship, Status, and Process in Twelfth-Century Europe*, ed. Thomas N. Bisson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 310–28; John W. Baldwin, 'Master Stephen Langton, Future Archbishop of Canterbury: The Paris Schools and Magna Carta,' *English Historical Review* 123 (2008): 811–46.

plication of these prohibitions in order to define the sense in which oath-taking is unjust and why certain kinds of oath are legitimate.

By the end of the 12th century and much more in the first half of the 13th century, the issue of the oath was the subject of a more sophisticated theological analysis, being considered together with another genre of taking a solemn promise, that is, a vow. Particularly within the mendicant orders, the vow was at the centre of a growing theological discussion whose aim is to define its features and role, and to analyse similarities and differences with the oath.⁵ Among the theologians of the mendicant orders, the Franciscan John of La Rochelle offers one of the first analytical discussions about the vow and its connections with the oath. In his *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* he undertakes a close study of vow-taking, and in doing so he significantly rethinks the concept of the oath, reconsidering not only its features but also its proper subject matter.⁶ His text is a precious witness to a crucial turn in the history of the oath as part of the political, legal and religious structures of European civilisation in the Middle Ages. After some general remarks about the status of the oath between the end of the 12th and the early 13th centuries that will help to define the historical framework of John's theological thinking, this study will examine how the Franciscan master defined and understood the oath. By investigating the comparison he made between *iuramentum* and *votum*, it will be possible to define the major features of his account of the oath.

5 A complete overview of the issue of religious vows in the Middle Ages is offered in Alain Boureau, 'Le désir dicté: Histoire du voeu religieux dans l'Occident médiéval' (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2014).

6 On John of La Rochelle's *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* and their contents see François M. Henquinet, 'Ist der Trakt De legibus et praeceptis in der Summa Alexander von Hales von Johannes von Rupella?', *Fraziskanische Studien* 26 (1939): 1–22, 234–58. See also François M. Henquinet, 'Notes additionnelles sur les écrits de Gueric de Saint-Quentin,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 8 (1936): 369–88. Henquinet's studies are preceded by other references to the *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*. See in particular August Pelzer, *Codices Vaticani Latini: Tomus II: Pars Prior: Codices 679–1134*, Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae codices manuscripti recensiti (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana 1931), 96–110; Odon Lottin, 'Le droit naturel chez S. Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs,' *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 2 (1925): 37–40, republished in a volume with the same title (Bruges: Beyaert, 1931), 53–7; Ferdinand Pelster, 'Forschungen zur Quästionsliteratur in der Zeit des Alexander von Hales,' *Scholastik* 6 (1931): 321–53; Ferdinand Pelster, 'Die Quästionen des Alexander von Hales,' *Gregorianum* 14 (1933): 401–22, 501–20. Also, Martin Grabmann had linked the name of John of La Rochelle to the *Summa Halensis*. See Martin Grabmann, 'Das Naturrecht der Scholastik von Gratian bis Thomas von Aquin: Nach den gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen dargestellt,' *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie* 16 (1922–23): 12–53, re-edited in Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben: Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, 3 vols (Munich: Hueber, 1926–56), 1:65–103.

The Oath and the Church: The Early 13th-Century Theological Framework

In his study dedicated to the history of the political oath, Paolo Prodi has stressed the relevance of this practice for the understanding of the legal and institutional history of Europe, suggesting that the medieval discussions established all the essential features of the political oath as the basis for both the legal order and the legitimacy of political authority.⁷ Prodi's perspective combines the historical and sociological approach of Max Weber with Harold Berman's thesis of the 'Papal Revolution' as the key historical event in the definition of the political and religious features of Modern Europe.⁸ In doing so, the Italian historian agreed that the understanding of the history of the oath requires not just a consideration of legal and political history: it also involves the study of the religious value attributed to the *iuramentum*.

This perspective seems to bear directly on the case of king John's renewal of the coronation oath before Archbishop Langton and its consequences in the months after July 1212. The promises solemnly made by the king were essential to establishing his authority in accordance with the divine will, granting him the loyalty of all his subjects, both secular and ecclesiastical. But the oath was also an explicit and clear boundary to the exercise of an absolute power by the king, who swore in God's name. As Langton himself stated in a disputed question which dates to the years of his teaching in Paris, that is, before his election to the archbishopric of Canterbury, the sacred value of the oath was 'proportional' to its form, so that swearing before the altar and the priest, kneeling, amplifies the oath and makes more serious the perjury in case of a violation of the solemn promise.⁹

The religious relevance of the oath and the role of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in granting the sacred obligations it determines is certainly part of the cultural development of Latin Europe from the age of the Gregorian Reform in the middle of the 11th century, when the claim regarding the universal authority of the Apostolic See and

7 Paolo Prodi, *Il sacramento del potere: Il giuramento politico nella storia costituzionale dell'Occidente* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992).

8 Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Studienausgabe*, 5th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1980); Harold J. Berman, *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).

9 Stephen Langton, *Quaestio de iuramento* (Cambridge, St John's College Library, C.7 [57], fol. 235vb): 'Verum est quod dicit auctoritas quod quanto sanctius est etc., recepta eadem circumstantia et sollempnitate iuramenti. Sollemnitas enim sepe facit quod iuramentum maius sit, ut si iuret ante altare coram sacerdote, flexis genibus, ista aggrauant iuramentum' [What the authority says, that "the holier <the thing by which he swears>", etc., is true given the same circumstances and solemnity of the oath. For solemnity often makes an oath greater; for instance, if someone swears while kneeling before the altar in the presence of a priest, all these things make the oath more serious]. Riccardo Quinto has listed this disputed question as CAMB101. See on this Riccardo Quinto, "*Doctor Nominatissimus*": *Stefano Langton († 1228) e la tradizione delle sue opere* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1994).

the complete freedom of the ecclesiastical hierarchy from any secular power, including kings and emperors, radically questioned the ancient idea of the oath as a sacrament. Such an understanding of the oath, which was proper to the Carolingian period, reflected the sacred status of the monarch as a ‘consecrated king’, on the model of the ancient kings of Israel, such as David, but also according to a conception of the monarchic authority, particularly the imperial one, shaped on byzantine models.¹⁰ Rejecting the Carolingian idea that the status of ‘protector of the Church’ gives to the monarch the authority to rule the Church and manage its hierarchy, the Gregorian Reform started a theological process of distinguishing between the oath as a means to establishing proper political relations and its sacred implications, which granted the force of the promise and were under the control of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The development of this process involved the emergence of a clear distinction between the oath and the notion of sacrament that acquired a specific theological sense during the 12th century. This concern about the oath does not engage only the distinction between secular and ecclesiastical powers and the claim regarding the superiority of the latter: inside the Church, the construction of a monarchic hierarchy which culminates with the Pope makes the oath an effective instrument to define the features of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. For instance, in 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council established that an elected patriarch can receive the *pallium* and therefore be officially in charge of his see only after he has sworn his obedience to the Pope.¹¹

The distinction between the political and ecclesiastical oaths suggests the relevance of this issue not only for legal history but also for religious life. Moreover, it contributes to clarifying that the question of making solemn promises which determine a sacred obligation was addressed by canon and civil lawyers as well as by exegeses and theologians whose aim was to explain the order of reality according to the very content of the Scripture.

Theological accounts of the oath were heavily influenced by the liturgical and spiritual features of Christianity and particularly by the meaning given to the forms of religious life. From the middle of the 12th century and into the beginning of the 13th, the rise of new religious orders which required a formal and public acceptance of a rule, gave relevance to the concept of the vow, whose features were quite similar if not identical to that of the oath. In particular, the foundation of the mendicant orders and their recognition by Innocent III introduced within the Church the vow as the way to join the order through an obligation to respect the rule and to

10 See Walter Ullmann, *The Carolingian Renaissance and the Idea of Kingship* (London: Methuen, 1969). On the whole sacramental discussion in the Carolingian period and its impact on the political idea of kingship see Claudio U. Cortoni, “*Habeas corpus*”: *Il corpo di Cristo dalla devozione alla sua umanità al culto eucaristico* (sec. VIII-XV), *Studia Anselmiana*, 170 (Rome: EOS Verlag, 2016).

11 *Concilium Lateranense IV*, n. 24, in *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta*, vol. 2/1: *The General Councils of Latin Christendom: From Constantinople IV to Pisa-Siena (869–1424)*, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Alberto Melloni (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 179–80.

shape one's own life according to three principal vows: chastity, poverty, and obedience to superiors.

The opening lines of the very first version of the rule of the Franciscan order, the so-called *Regula non bullata* (1221), explicitly requires these three features of the religious life as the subject of the vow of each member of the order. 'The rule and life of these friars—it is said—is this, namely to live in obedience, in chastity and without anything of one's own, and to follow the doctrine and footsteps of Our Lord Jesus Christ.'¹² The final version of the rule, the *Regula bullata*, which Pope Honorius III approved in 1223, developed the structure of the vow, describing the joining of the Franciscan order as a process of examination and spiritual and material purification of the novices. They firstly needed to deal with chastity through a vow of continence and later on to abandon all their goods in order to fulfil the vow of poverty. Finally, after the novitiate, they were allowed to take the final vow of obedience whereby they committed themselves to remaining inside the order.¹³

12 *Regula non bullata*, c. 1, in *La letteratura francescana*, vol. 1, *Francesco e Chiara d'Assisi*, ed. Claudio Leonardi (Rome: Fondazione Lorenzo Valla; Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori, 2004), 6: 'Regula et uita istorum fratrum haec est, scilicet uiuere in obedientia, in castitate et sine proprio, et Domini nostri Iesu Christi doctrinam et uestigia sequi.'

13 *Regula bullata*, c. 2, in *La letteratura francescana*, 1:108–10: 'Si qui uoluerint hanc uitam accipere et uenerint ad fratres nostros, mittant eos ad suos ministros prouinciales, quibus solummodo et non aliis recipiendi fratres licentia concedatur. Ministri uero diligenter examinent eos de fide catholica et ecclesiasticis sacramentis. Et si haec omnia credant et uelint ea fideliter confiteri et usque in finem firmiter obseruare et uxores non habent, uel si habent et iam monasterium intrauerint uxores, uel licentiam eis dederint auctoritate diocesani episcopi, uoto continentiae iam emisso, et illius sint aetatis uxores quod non possit de eis oriri suspicio, dicant illis uerbum sancti Euangelii, quod *uadant et uendant* omnia sua et ea studeant *pauperibus erogare*. Quod si facere non potuerint, sufficit eis bona uoluntas. Et caueant fratres et eorum ministri ne solliciti sint de rebus suis temporalibus, ut libere faciant de rebus suis quidquid Dominus inspirauerit eis. Si tamen consilium requiratur, licentiam habeant ministri mittendi eos ad *aliquos Deum timentes*, quorum consilio bona sua pauperibus erogentur. Postea concedant eis pannos probationis, uidelicet duas tunicas sine caputio et cingulum et braccas et caparonem usque ad cingulum, nisi eisdem ministris aliud secundum Deum aliquando uideatur. Finito uero anno probationis, recipiantur ad obedientiam promittentes uitam istam semper et Regulam obseruare. Et nullo modo licebit eis de ista religione exire iuxta mandatum domini papae, quia secundum sanctum Euangelium *nemo mittens manum ad aratrum et aspiciens retro aptus est regno Dei*' [If any men wish to adopt this life and they approach our brothers, they should send them to their Ministers Provincial, to whom alone, and not to others, permission to admit friars may be granted. The Ministers, for their part, should carefully question them about the Catholic faith and the sacraments of the Church. And if they believe all these things and wish to confess them faithfully and to observe them steadfastly unto the end, and if they have no wives, or if they have wives who have already entered a monastery – or if they have given them permission by authority of the diocesan bishop, with a vow of continence already uttered, and the wives are old enough that suspicion cannot arise concerning them – they may say unto them the word of the Holy Gospel, that they should "go" and "sell" all that they have and strive to "give it to the poor." And if they cannot do this, their good will is enough. And the friars and their Ministers should guard against their being anxious about their temporal possessions, so that they may freely do with their possessions whatever the Lord has inspired them to do. If counsel is required, however, the Ministers may

The kind of promises and obligations which are the subject of vows seem quite close to those involved in an oath, but they pertain directly to the religious life of the late 12th and early 13th centuries. More precisely, the vow of the mendicant orders provides an answer to the spiritual needs and requirements of a society within which a new awareness of religious matters was growing in many different parts of the society. It is within this general framework, which Marie-Dominique Chenu has described in terms of ‘Christian evangelicalism’, that Francis of Assisi and Dominic de Guzman founded their respective orders, introducing the vow, which in 12th-century theological discourse had been important, for instance, for the crusaders, as a key stipulation for joining the order and also for establishing its inner structure.¹⁴

In the early 13th century all these elements were part of a debate about the oath, which was heavily influenced by the theological discourse at the time and by the development of the mendicant religious life. The scholastic culture matched with this complex historical process, directly dealing with the nature and role of the oath and with its multiple developments. Therefore, the terms *iuramentum*, *promissio* and *votum* became the subject of several analyses and arguments among theologians, including the first Dominican and Franciscan masters of theology at the university of Paris.

John of La Rochelle: The Oath Between Moral Principles and Legal Order

John of La Rochelle, who was the second Franciscan who held a chair in theology in Paris, devoted special attention to the topic of oaths and vows in his *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus*. This text, which represents the direct source of the treatise on law of the *Summa Halensis*, offers the first complete theological discussion of the key concepts of the order of moral laws, describing a structure which includes the eternal law, natural law and positive laws.¹⁵ John places his investigation of the vow and of

have permission to send the men to “some that fear God” by whose counsel their goods may be given to the poor. After that, they should grant them the garb of probation, viz. two hoodless tunics, a cord, breeches, and a chaperon down to the cord, unless occasionally something else seems to the Ministers to be appropriate in God’s eyes. But when the probationary year is over, they should be admitted to the obedience, promising to observe forever this life and Rule. And in no way will they be permitted to leave this religious order, by command of the Lord Pope, because according to the Holy Gospel “no man putting his hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God”].

¹⁴ Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1957), 225–53. See also James A. Brundage, ‘The Votive Obligations of Crusaders: The Development of a Canonistic Doctrine,’ *Traditio* 24 (1968): 77–118. A series of annotated documents is available in *Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187–1291*, ed. Jessalynn Bird, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

¹⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol IV, P2 (nn. 224–605), pp. 313–939.

the oath within this attempt to describe the foundations of moral life and to fix the theoretical basis of the legal, political and ecclesiastical order according to a theological perspective. The *Quaestiones* directly deal with the 12th-century heritage, namely with authors such as Hugh of St Victor and Peter Lombard; however they also evaluate the contribution of the legal culture and of biblical exegesis. In addition, as a member of the Franciscan order and a renowned theologian, John shows particular care for a matter which was crucial for his own religious framework. During his teaching in Paris, between 1238 and 1245, the order extensively debated the understanding of Francis' religious experience, and John was one of the theologians involved in the composition of the *Expositio quatuor magistrorum*, that is, a commentary on the rule of the order whose aim was to offer a theological explanation of its contents.¹⁶

John of La Rochelle organizes his *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* according to a specific series of topics, starting from the examination of the concept of eternal law and then moving on to the study of natural law.¹⁷ Once he concludes the discussion concerning the laws which are consistent with God and nature, he considers the 'positive' laws, that is the laws which have been established in time by a legitimate authority. This order of genres and species of laws is not only defined according to a logical principle which identifies priorities and pre-eminences, but it also reflects the basic spiritual features of the biblical history of salvation. The eternal law corresponds to God's creation and describes the kind of relationship and dependence of the latter to the former. Natural law explains the basic moral principles which are consistent with human nature and which establish the rights, duties and obligations that are proper to human beings as human. The failure of natural law in guaranteeing the moral good, due to the consequences of original sin, requires the direct intervention of God's grace, which corresponds to the establishment of the Mosaic law. As a kind of positive law, this law reaffirms the very content of natural law

A new edition of the Treatise on Laws of the *Summa* with a German translation and a commentary is offered in *Summa theologica Halensis: De Legibus et Praeceptis: Lateinischer Text mit Übersetzung und Kommentar*, 3 vols, ed. Michael Basse (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018). See on this Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae Fratris Alexandri",' in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), CCV-CCCVII and CCCLIV-CCCLXX. The *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* are transmitted in two manuscripts: Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale 138; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 782. While the Assisi manuscript has the whole text, the Vatican manuscript contains only the sections on the eternal law and the natural law. Therefore, the section on the oath and the vow is present only in the Assisi manuscript. In the following pages the reference to this manuscript is given using the initial A, followed by the reference to the folios.

16 *Expositio quatuor magistrorum super Regulam Fratrum Minorum (1241–1242)*, ed. Livarius P. Oligier (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1950).

17 Silvana Vecchio, 'La riflessione sulla legge nella prima teologia francescana,' in *Etica e Politica: Le Teorie dei Frati Mendicanti nel Due e Trecento: Atti del XXVI Convegno Internazionale: Assisi, 15–17 Ottobre 1998* (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 1999), 119–51.

and develops a series of specific implications connected with the contingency of ancient Israel. The Mosaic law is therefore the first step in a process of restoring of the natural law that has been perfected with the Gospel. The *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* do not provide a study of the law of the Gospel, but such a discussion is offered in the corresponding section of the *Summa Halensis*, suggesting that this topic would have been part of the complete theological scheme of the Franciscan master.

John inherits such a 'historical' vision from 12th-century debates about the natural law, which had considered this concept as properly referred to the pre-lapsarian state of Adam and Eve. In the decade before John's teaching, the inclusion of this approach to the matter of law is attested in some Parisian disputed questions. Dealing with the analysis of the nature of moral law, the Franciscan master uses these arguments to shape his own theological perspective and establishes a key distinction between two genres of law, that is, the innate law and the prescribed law. While the first genre includes both eternal and natural law, the latter involves two species of law. On the one hand, there are the laws that human beings prescribe for themselves; on the other hand, there are the laws which another authority, namely, God, prescribes to human beings. This second species of prescribed law clearly includes both the Mosaic law and the law of the Gospel, while the first one involves the vow, which John classifies as the act which is the possibility of each human being to impose on himself an obligation and a boundary which has the force of the law.¹⁸

The vow is therefore part of the whole order of the laws upon which rest both the moral life and the ecclesiastical order. More specifically, the vow emerges as a means of enforcing some contents of the innate laws, particularly the natural law, which is parallel to the God-given law. Quite significantly, John does not identify the *lex voti* with the law of pagan people: on the contrary, it is fully part of a religious account of law which considers the law of the Gospel as the full completion of the moral life.

The master organizes this section on the law of the vow according to a quite analytical index which considers four major issues, namely the essence of the vow, its object, its subject, and finally, the kind of obligation it determines. Each of these aspects is further divided into more specific questions which contribute to deepening the theological analysis. In doing so, John is able not only to examine and define the vow but also to stress similarities and differences with other key-concepts, namely, 'sacrament' and 'oath'.

The starting point of the Franciscan master is a survey of the different theological, exegetical, and legal authoritative sources on the issue of the vow. He assumes

18 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 220rb): 'Cum multiplex sit lex, scilicet innata et addita, postea quesitum est de lege innata que naturalis dicitur, sequitur uidere consequenter de lege addita, que duplex est: una quam facit sibi homo et alia que fit homini. Prima est lex uoti' [Since there is more than one kind of law, namely innate and prescribed, now that we have enquired about innate law, which is called 'natural', the next thing is to see about prescribed law, which is of two kinds: one that man makes for himself and another that is made for him. The first is the law of the vow].

Peter Lombard's definition as the proper description of the nature of the vow and therefore notes: 'the vow is the witnessing of a spontaneous promise which has to be made to God and concerning those things that pertain to God.'¹⁹ Considering the features of the vow, John inquires how to properly define it: is it a matter of an explicit and external solemn promise? Does it require the use of words, or is it just the liturgical gesture that gives force of obligation to the promise? What is the meaning of the *lemma*, 'that pertain to God'? Which human faculty is directly involved in making a vow? Is the term 'vow' used properly or ambiguously in this kind of search?

Dealing with these questions, John is able firstly to focus on the very essence of the vow, stressing a difference between two species of vow. On the one hand, there is the simple vow, which just requires a solemn promise of the heart and does not necessarily involve a public statement or act. According to Gratian and the legal tradition, this kind of vow involves 'the conception of a better good, confirmed by the soul's deliberation and freely offered to God'.²⁰ Peter Lombard's definition concerns another kind of vow, namely the solemn one, which requires testifying before the Church, that is, not only publicly but also before a sacred authority. John notes also that, assuming a broader meaning of the word 'testify', the simple vow can be included under the auspices of Peter Lombard's statement, because in the solemn promise of the heart, there is an interior testimony of the conscience.²¹

The distinction between the simple and the solemn vow goes back to the 12th century. Its roots can be found in Peter Lombard's distinction between a private and solemn vow, which falls within the genre of an individual vow. The Lombard introduces

19 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* IV, d. 38, c. 1, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 2:478.3–5: 'Votum est testificatio quaedam promissionis spontaneae, quae Deo et de his quae Dei sunt proprie fieri debet.'

20 Gratian, *Concordia discordantium canonum*, c. 27, q. 1, pr., in *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, 2 vols., ed. Emil Friedberg (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1879–1881), 1: 1047]: 'Votum est conceptio melioris boni animi deliberatione firmata deo sponte oblata.'

21 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 220va-b): 'Votum est duplex, scilicet simplex et sollempne. Simplex uotum nihil requirit nisi sponsionem cordis, et secundum hoc diffinitur: "Votum est conceptio boni" etc. In uoto autem sollempni requiritur testificatio in facie ecclesie. Vnde de sollempni intelligitur ista definitio: "Votum est testificatio" etc. Aliter etiam posset concedi, extenso nomine testificationis, quod etiam in uoto simplici est testificatio interior facta sibi, iuxta illud ad Rom. ii: "Testimonium perhibente illis conscientia" etc. Et secundum hoc illa ratio conuenit uoto simplici et sollempni' [There are two kinds of vow, namely simple and solemn. A simple vow requires only a pledge of the heart, and in this sense the definition is: "A vow is the conception of a good" etc. But a solemn vow requires sworn affirmation in the sight of the Church, so the following definition is understood as being about the solemn one: "A vow is the sworn affirmation" etc. Alternatively, it could also be granted, broadening the term 'sworn affirmation', that even in a simple vow there is a sworn affirmation that is internal and made to oneself, as per the passage from Romans 2: "their conscience bearing witness to them" etc. And in this sense the definition is appropriate for <both> a simple vow and a solemn one].

such a distinction in his discussion of marriage, noting that if the violation of a private vow involves mortal sin, the violation of a solemn and public vow adds public outrage.²² Qualifying the private vow as *simplex*, Langton develops Peter Lombard's doctrine, stressing the theological features that make both the simple and the solemn vow a religious matter, which requires the intervention of the ecclesiastical authority. More in detail, he refers the two species of the vow to two different states of Christ: while the simple vow relates to the union of Christ's soul with his human body before the Passion, the solemn vow signifies the same union after the resurrection.²³ Therefore, taking a simple vow means making a private, solemn promise to God, which includes the possibility of changing one's mind, because it assumes as a paradigm for its sacredness the hypostatic union of body and soul in Christ before the Passion, that is, something which was subject to change because Jesus' body was still corruptible and mortal. Developing the metaphor, Langton notes that after the resurrection, the union of body and soul in Christ became invariable, because Christ's resurrected body is no longer mortal nor corruptible. Therefore, the solemn vow, which signifies the union after the resurrection, involves an insolvable obligation.

Langton's description of the sacred nature of the vow and of its obligation was widely known in the Parisian milieu at the time of John of La Rochelle's teaching. However, dealing with the distinction between the simple and the solemn vow, the Franciscan master stressed their reference, to the private and public nature of the two species of solemn promise, respectively, rather than searching for the theological meaning of each one of them. He firstly establishes a clear distinction between the two species of vow that is able to explain the meaning of both the theological and legal definitions of the vow, but which also defines a sort of hierarchy between them according to which Peter Lombard's definition can be assumed as a general definition.²⁴

22 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* IV, d. 38, c. 2 (Brady, 2:478.11–4): 'Singularare votum aliud est privatum, aliud solemne. Privatum est in abscondito factum; solemne in conspectu Ecclesiae factum. Item privatum votum si violetur, peccatum est mortale; solemne vero violare peccatum est et scandalum' [One kind of individual vow is private, the other solemn. A private vow is made in secret; a solemn vow is made in the sight of the Church. Again, if a private vow is broken, it is a mortal sin, but to break a solemn vow is a sin and a scandal].

23 Stephen Langton, *Quaestio de voto* (Cambridge, St John's College Library, C.7 (57), fol. 320rb): 'Votum simplex sacramentum est coniunctionis anime Christi cum suo corpore qualis fuit ante passionem. Set ante passionem fuit uariabilis et dissolubililis, quia et corpus erat corruptibile et anima passibilis, et ideo uotum simplex quod est signum illius uariabile est, et per matrimonium dissolubile est. Votum autem sollempne sacramentum est illius coniunctionis que fuit in anima et corpore Christi in resurrectione. Illa fuit inuariabilis, et ideo uotum sollempne est indissolubile.' I would like to thank Andrea Nannini, who is working towards a critical edition of Langton's *Quaestio de voto* and kindly allowed me to use his text. In the following I will reference the Cambridge manuscript, even though the *Quaestio* is preserved in different versions in the various manuscript collections of Langton's disputed questions.

24 See John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 220va-b).

Similarities and Differences with the Sacrament

Considering the role of an intention, the spoken word, and an act, with respect to the vow and its force, John considers the closeness between the concept of the vow and marriage. It is a question that has become common among theologians and canonists and which can be also enlarged upon to evaluate the definition of the vow in terms of the category of ‘sacrament’. Evidently, marriage has the same elements involved in the vow. It requires firstly a private consent before each one’s conscience. Later on, it needs to be solemnly ratified before the Church. Finally, the spouses have to consummate the marriage with their physical union. An interior solemn promise, an exterior solemn promise, and an act are the three features of the vow as well as of the marriage.

Peter Lombard has already stressed the need to discuss the relationship between the vow and the marriage in order to explain the impossibility of combining the two things: vow-taking excludes the possibility of a contract in marriage.²⁵ The Lombard is clearly considering the religious vow, that is, the kind of solemn promise, private or public, which is at the basis of a specific lifestyle. More in detail, he refers to the vow of chastity, which defines an obligation contrary to the one involved by the marriage.

Stephen Langton follows Peter Lombard in explaining that the concept of the vow properly and primarily refers to the obligation of those who belong to a religious order. Fasting, making pilgrimage, and similar actions are the subjects of vowing, while the marriage is of a completely different nature: it is a sacrament.²⁶ Therefore, the basic question concerns the relation between the notions of vow and sacrament. According to their definitions, the subject of both the vow and the sacrament is a sign of sacred things, and thus it would seem possible to identify them. On the basis of Peter Lombard’s clear distinction between a vow and marriage, Langton stresses the different nature of the vow with respect to the notion of a sacrament.²⁷ The latter

25 Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae* IV, d. 38, c. 2, (Brady, 2:478.15–6): ‘Qui privatum faciunt votum continentiae, matrimonium contrahere non debent, quia contrahendo mortaliter peccant’ [Those who take a private vow of continence should not enter into a marriage contract, because in doing so they commit a mortal sin].

26 Stephen Langton, *Quaestio de voto* (Cambridge, St John’s College Library, C.7 (57), fol. 320ra): ‘Votum dicitur obligatio facta de hiis operibus que in genere spectant ad religionem, sicut ad ieiunandum, peregrinandum et consimilia. Matrimonium autem non est talis obligatio, et ideo non dicitur uotum’ [A vow is said to be an obligation made concerning actions that generally pertain to religion, such as fasting, pilgrimage and the like. But marriage is not an obligation of this kind, and therefore it is not called a vow].

27 Stephen Langton, *Quaestio de voto* (Cambridge, St John’s College Library, C.7 (57), fol. 320ra): ‘Quodlibet sacramentum uel est ad salutem uel ad remedium infirmitatis. Scilicet ad salutem, idest sanctificans, ut baptismus, quia sine eo non est salus. Ad remedium infirmitatis, ut matrimonium. Votum autem non est ad salutem quia sine eo potest esse salus, nec ad remedium infirmitatis. Non enim ad infirmos spectat uouere, set potius ad fortes, et ideo uotum non dicitur sacramentum’ [Every sacrament is either for salvation or for curing a weakness. Namely, for salvation, i.e. sanctify-

concerns salvation and provides a remedy for spiritual deficiency: baptism, for instance, aims at salvation because without it there cannot be eternal salvation. Therefore, marriage, as a sacrament, offers a remedy against spiritual deficiency. By contrast, the vow does not consist in a reaction to spiritual deficiency, but rather corresponds to an effective power: the one who can fulfil the corresponding obligation is able to make the vow.

John of La Rochelle highlights the distinction between a vow and a sacrament, including marriage. The Franciscan master particularly focuses on the fact that a sacrament properly signifies a sacred thing and for this reason, it determines an obligation, while the vow is the expression of the intention to submit oneself to an obligation. This difference is quite evident precisely in the case of marriage, because this sacrament signifies the union of God with the soul through the consent of two souls. Due to this feature, marriage requires the explicit consent of the spouses, without which neither the words nor the physical relationship is valid. The vow has a different feature, because what is crucial in the case of a solemn promise which determines an obligation is the intention to submit to the obligation. This intention is sometimes associated with an internal statement or an internal purpose, and in other cases, it is associated with an explicit statement or with an act. In each of these cases, the vow is fulfilled, because the combination of the intention to submit to the obligation with a statement or an act which explicitly expresses the promise gives force to the obligation.²⁸

ing, like baptism, because without baptism there is no salvation; for curing a weakness, like marriage. But a vow is not for salvation, because there can be salvation without it. Nor is it for curing a weakness, for vowing does not belong to the weak, but rather to the strong. And therefore a vow is not called a sacrament].

28 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 220vb): ‘Ad aliud quod querit an solo uerbo uel facto possit esse obligatio et uotum, dicendum quod non est simile de uoto et matrimonio, quia uotum non est sacramentum, sed matrimonium sic. Vnde, cum sit signum coniunctionis Dei ad animam per consensum animarum, requiritur in matrimonio de necessitate expressus consensus animarum, alioquin nihil ualet uerbum aut coniunctio carnalis. In uoto autem intentio obligandi quandoque copulatur uerbo interiori sive proposito interiori, quandoque uerbo exteriori, quandoque facto. Quandocumque copulatur intentio obligandi alicui istorum, est uotum completum; vnde sine proposito obligandi cum testificatione oris est promissio et uotum similiter in facto, si copuletur intentio obligandi, erit uotum’ [In response to the next argument, which asks whether there can be an obligation and a vow with only a word or a deed, we must say that it is not the same with vows as it is with marriage, because the vow is not a sacrament whereas marriage is. Hence since it is through the agreement of souls that <marriage> is a sign of the union of God with the soul, marriage necessarily requires the explicit agreement of souls; otherwise there is no validity to the word or the union of bodies. In a vow, however, the intention to be obligated is sometimes attached to an internal word or an internal plan, sometimes to an external word, and sometimes to a deed. Whenever an intention to be obligated is attached to any of these, there is a complete vow. Hence <even> without an <internal> plan to be obligated, with a sworn oral affirmation there is a promise and a vow; likewise with a deed, if an intention to be obligated is attached to it, there will be a vow].

Therefore, there is a clear difference between the vow and the sacrament, particularly with marriage. In the latter the explicit consent of man and woman is required, while in the vow, it is crucial to combine the intention with a form of implicit or explicit demonstration of such an intention. Here, John deepens his analysis, questioning how the intention to submit to an obligation is fulfilled by an explicit statement or action if the one who takes the vow has an internal, opposing purpose which does not establish an obligation. The answer to such a question allows the Franciscan master to examine the role of the vow as a key-concept in religious life, particularly within religious orders, as well as in defining the extent of legitimate ecclesiastical authority. It is the intention of the one who vows that determines the obligation, but such an intention can be of two types: on one side, there is the intention of the aim, and on the other side, there is the intention of the act. Both these intentions are proper of the one who vows, but with a significant difference. The intention of the aim requires a clear understanding of such an aim to which the vow tends and therefore a clear consciousness of all the implications of vow-taking. By contrast, the intention of the action is proper at least to the one who understands in a different sense the words that oblige him or intends to do what they oblige him to do.²⁹

This second kind of intention, which concerns the action only, is sufficient to determine the obligation of the vow, as in the case—John explains—of heretics whose obligation towards the Church derives from their baptism. This reference defines a parallel between the relation of the heretic with the Church and between the one who vows and the force of their obligation. The heretic is under the legitimate jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical authority because of their baptism. Even if they wrongly understand the sacred reality that the sacrament signifies, they remain bound by the

29 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 220vb): ‘Sed quomodo potest <esse> quod intentio obligandi copuletur uerbo exteriori uel facto, cum interius habeat propositum oppositi, scilicet non obligandi? Dicendum quod est duplex intentio, scilicet finis et operis. Intentio finis est in illo qui intendit se obligare, intentio operis est in illo ad minus qui intendit dicere uerba que dicunt obligantes se uel qui intendit facere illud quod faciunt obligantes <se>, et ista intentio sufficit ad obligationem uoti, sicut in heretico ad baptizandum <...> intrat ecclesiam, dicendum quod dupliciter potest intendere obligare <se>, quia potest intendere obligare se sicut obligantur intrantes et hoc modo antequam profiteatur <ms. proficiatur> potest exire et ire ad alium ordinem. Si uero intendit se obligare sicut obligantur perseuerantes, tenetur stare et non potest exire’ [But how can it be that an intention to be obligated is attached to an external word or deed while internally <the person> has a plan for the opposite, namely not to be obligated? We must say that there are two kinds of intention, namely purposive and operative. There is a purposive intention in someone who intends to obligate himself. There is an operative intention in someone who at least intends to say the words that people obligating themselves say, or intends to do what people obligating <themselves> do; and this kind of intention is sufficient for the obligation of a vow, as with the heretic at the baptism. <lacuna> enters a religious order, we must say that there are two ways in which he can intend to obligate <himself>, because he can intend to obligate himself in the way that those entering are obligated, in which case before he makes his profession he can leave and enter another order; but if he intends to obligate himself in the way that those persevering are obligated, he is bound to stay and cannot leave].

obligations taken towards the Church: by the act of receiving baptism, they have joined the *societas christiana* and are therefore under the jurisdiction of the hierarchy that rules such a *societas*. In a similar way, the one who vows has at least an understanding of the meaning of the act they are performing and therefore knows that it determines an obligation. Even if they misunderstand the aim of their vow, because they differently interpret the statement they are making, the consciousness of what kind of act a vow involves determines their being bound by the promise they make.

Since the vow can involve a double intention, it also determines two types of obligation. The Franciscan master clearly refers to the vow that the members of a religious order are required to make in order to join it. In fact, he explains that for those who enter the order, the obligation is not absolute, because they are allowed to leave it or to switch to a different religious order before continuing and pronouncing the final and solemn vow. Considering the Franciscan milieu to which John of La Rochelle belonged, this 'simple' obligation is the one which depends on the first two vows, namely, of chastity and poverty, which according to the *Regula bullata* are required to become a novice and to have access to the period of at least one year devoted to become acquainted with the order and its rule. It was at the end of this novitiate that the candidate was able to pronounce his solemn vow, as *perseverans* (one persevering). This vow, which involves the solemn promise to obey superiors, obliges the novice to remain in the order, and precludes the possibility of leaving it. The solemn vow concerning the complete acceptance of the rule of the order, puts the said novice under the jurisdiction of his superiors, making him a *frater* but also legitimizing the authority over him of the order and of the Pope, to whom goes the obedience of all the mendicant orders.

The Vow and the Oath: Two Forms of Obligation

John of La Rochelle's discussion of the vow as a form of prescribed law led him to consider a third issue, namely, the relation of this notion to the oath. Peter Lombard's definition of the vow as a witnessing of a spontaneous promise would suggest an equivalence between the two notions, particularly because the oath itself involves a promise concerning sacred things and requires the witnessing of a spontaneous promise.

Dealing with this problem, the Franciscan master faced a long theological debate which already distinguished the *iuramentum* from the *votum*. For instance, in the writings of the masters of Laon in the early 12th century, the vow was already presented as a specific genre of solemn promise combining a certain statement with a specific ritual which involved the clergy in order to signify an obligation taken before God.³⁰ In contrast, the oath is qualified as an obligation caused by evil and namely

³⁰ Anselm of Laon, *Sententiae*, n. 76, in Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 6

by the weakness of human nature that is required to secure the natural obligations among human beings through a solemn promise made before humans and before God.³¹

This distinction clearly establishes a different framework for thinking about the vow and the oath. As Peter Lombard noted in his *Sentences*, the latter is part of the moral and legal order and its place, according to the theological perspective, is part of the discussion of the ten commandments. The oath is therefore treated in terms of the explicit ban on swearing which is given both in the Old and New Testaments, in order to explain the meaning of these prohibitions and define the perspective accord-

vols (Gembloux: Duculot: 1948–61), 5:66: ‘Quedam sunt, que etiam non uouentes reddere debemus, ut cultum Deo, ceteraque precepta. Alia uero sunt, que, nisi uoueamus, reddere non cogimur, ut uirginitatem seruare. Ad hec uouenda inuitat psalmus: “Vouete et reddite” (Ps. 75, 12). Et nota non esse appellandum uotum, si dicamus nos ituros Iherusalem, uel si aliquid huiusmodi facturos sine deliberatione uel ex cursu loquendi, ut sepe fit, sed cum in manu sacerdotis hoc fit, uel apud quemquam ex longa animi deliberatione. Hic solet queri: si aliquis uoueat canonicam uitam, et efficiatur monachus, uel e conuerso, an dicendus sit uotum fregisse. In quo dicendum est, quia, qui minus arctam uitam uouet, si assumit arctiorem, non solum non fregit, sed impleuit hoc habundanter, ut qui uouit canonicam et efficiatur monachus, non habent quid in eo reclamant hii penes quos uouit canonicam uitam se acturum. Sed si uouit monacum, non reddit si efficiatur canonicus, quia minus soluit quam uouit, nec reuerti potest ad seculum, sed uel eremita potest effici, uel in alio monasterio, quod sibi religiosius uideatur, potest monachari sine offensa prioris monasterii’ [There are some things that we are obliged to render even without taking a vow, such as worshipping God and the other commandments. And there are other things that we are not compelled to render unless we take a vow, such as preserving our virginity. The psalm “Vow ye, and pay” (Ps. 75:12) invites us to take these vows. And note that it is not to be called a vow if we say that we are going to go to Jerusalem (or to do some such thing) without deliberation or in passing, as often happens, but when this happens in the hands of a priest, or in anyone’s presence after a long deliberation of the soul. At this point it is customary to ask whether we must say that someone who vows a canonical life and becomes a monk (or vice versa) has broken the vow. On this, we must say that if someone who vows a less strict life adopts a stricter life, not only has he not broken <his vow>, but he has abundantly fulfilled it, so that in the case of someone who has vowed a canonical life and becomes a monk, the people among whom he vowed to lead a canonical life have nothing to complain about. But if he has vowed <to be> a monk, he does not carry this out if he becomes a canon, because he renders less than he has vowed; nor can he return to the secular world; but either he can become a hermit, or he can become a monk in another monastery that he considers more devout without offending the previous monastery].

31 Anselm of Laon, *Sententiae*, n. 214, in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, 5:137–8: ‘Iurare est a malo, id est ab infirmitate. Infirmitas autem illa aliquando est bonum, aliquando non. Tunc non est malum iurare quando pro utilitate illius cui iuratur ille qui iurat iurare cogitur, ut si quid de Deo quod esset credendum alicui dicerem, si ille responderet se concedere sed primum certitudinem se habere uellet, malum est si iurem, sed tamen hoc procedit ex infirmitate illius qui hoc concedere nolebat’ [Swearing comes from something bad, that is, from weakness. But this weakness is sometimes a good thing, sometimes not. It is not bad to swear when the person who swears is compelled to swear for the benefit of the person to whom he swears. If, for instance, I told someone something we should believe about God, and if he replied that he did <not> grant it but wanted to have certainty first, it is a bad thing if I swear; but even so, this comes from the weakness of the person who did not want to concede it].

ing to which it would be legitimate to take one.³² In light of the prohibitions against oath-taking in Scripture, Christian authors from late antiquity onwards had tried to establish the proper object of the biblical prohibitions, particularly in the New Testament, and what kind of oath could be considered acceptable and required. Peter Lombard firstly stressed that the difference between a good and legitimate oath and a bad one depends upon the circumstances in which the oath is taken and particularly upon the existence of a necessity. Swearing without necessity is a sin, as it involves swearing false things, because in this case the oath, which calls upon God as a witness, involves an abuse of this supreme role of God. The Lombard explains:

Swearing spontaneously and with no need, or false swearing, is a grave sin. However, oath-taking by necessity, for instance, to assert one's own innocence, or to lend support to peace, or to persuade hearers about what is useful for them, it is not evil because it is necessary.³³

Quite significantly, Peter Lombard does not qualify the oath as 'good' but draws a distinction between the evil oath and the necessary one, suggesting that oath-taking is never good in itself, but that it can be necessary and therefore legitimate, not least from a religious perspective. Quoting Augustine, both in the *Sentences* and in his *Gloss* to the epistle to the Romans, the Lombard notes that the oath is not good in

32 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III, d. 39, c. 4 (Brady, 2:221.19–222.8): 'Quod ergo Christus ait in Evangelio: *Ego dico vobis non iurare omnino*, "ita intelligitur praecepisse, ne quisquam sicut bonum appetat iuramentum, et assiduitate iurandi labatur in periurium." Quod vero addidit: "*Sit sermo vester, Est, est, Non, non*, bonum est appetendum. *Quod autem amplius est, a malo est*, id est si iurare cogeries, scias de necessitate venire infirmitatis eorum quibus aliquid suades. Quae infirmitas utique malum est, unde nos quotidie liberari precamur dicentes: *Libera nos a malo*. Itaque non dixit: *Quod amplius est*, malum est: tu enim non facis malum, qui bene uteris iuratione; sed *a malo est*: illius" "qui aliter non credit", id est ab infirmitate, quae aliquando poena est, aliquando poena et culpa. "Ibi ergo Dominus prohibuit malum, suavitur bonum, indulget necessarium" [Therefore what Christ says in the Gospel, "I say to you not to swear at all" (Mt. 5:34), "this he is understood to have commanded so that no one should desire an oath as if it were something good, and by constantly swearing should fall into perjury." And what he adds, "Let your speech be Yea, yea, No, no" (Mt. 5:37), this is a good thing to be desired. 'And that which is over and above is of evil,' that is, if you are forced to swear, know that it comes from the necessity of the weakness of the people you are persuading. And this weakness is certainly an evil, from which we pray every day to be delivered, saying 'Deliver us from evil.' And so he did not say 'That which is over and above' is evil, for you who use swearing in a good way do not do evil; but it 'is of evil'" "belonging to the person who otherwise fails to believe", that is, from weakness, which is sometimes a punishment, sometimes a punishment and a fault. "Here, therefore, the Lord forbade the bad, urged the good, forgave the necessary"]. Lombard built this passage quoting Augustinus, *De sermone Domini in monte* I, c. 17, n. 51, ed. Almut Mutzenbecher, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, 35 (Turhnout: Brepols, 1967), 58–9.

33 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III, d. 39, c. 4 (Brady, 2:221.2–7): 'Sponte enim et sine necessitate iurare, vel falsum iurare, peccatum grande est. Ex necessitate autem iurare, scilicet vel ad asserendam innocentiam, vel ad foedera pacis confirmanda, vel ad persuadendum auditoribus quod est eis utile, malum non est, quia necessarium.'

itself but can avoid being evil because of its necessity.³⁴ Such necessity is due to the indolence of human beings in understanding what is useful for them. The biblical prohibitions on oath-taking are due to the nature of the oath, namely to its sacred character which follows from calling God as a witness to the promise made to another. Precisely the ‘calling of God’ fixes specific boundaries to the oath. More in detail, as Langton has stated, the prohibition on swearing in the Old Testament aims at forbidding idolatry, because it is specifically directed against the practice of swearing an oath on idols or creatures. In contrast, Jesus’ prohibition according to the Sermon on the Mount does not prevent idolatry but aims at continuing to forbid swearing an oath on creatures, because only an oath taken with God as witness can be legitimate.³⁵

34 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III, d. 39, c. 4 (Brady, 2:221.8–12): ‘Unde Augustinus: “Iuramentum faciendum est in necessariis, cum pigri sunt homines credere quod est eis utile. Iuratio non est bona, non tamen mala cum est necessaria”, id est non est appetenda sicut bona, non tamen fugienda tamquam mala, cum est necessaria’ [Thus Augustine: “An oath must be sworn in case of need, when people are slow to believe what is useful for them. Swearing is not good, but it is not bad when it is necessary”, that is, it is not to be desired as good, but it is not to be avoided as bad when it is necessary]. Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in omnes D. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas*, ad Rom. 1:9 (PL 191:1318C): ‘Iuramentum enim faciendum est in necessariis, cum pigri sint homines credere quod eis est utile; non est iuratio bona, id est appetenda, non tamen mala, id est prohibita, cum est necessaria, licet sit a malo infirmitatis eorum quibus aliquid dicitur’ [For an oath must be sworn in case of need, when people are slow to believe what is useful for them; swearing is not good (that is, to be desired), but it is not bad (that is, forbidden) when it is necessary, even though it comes from the evil of the weakness of the people who are told something]. The Augustinian basis of this argument is Augustine, *De sermone Domini in Monte* I, c. 17, n. 51 (Mutzenbecher, 58).

35 Stephen Langton, *Quaestio de iuramento* (Cambridge, St John’s College Library, C.7 (57), fol. 235va-vb): ‘Alia de causa <iuramentum> prohibitum est in ueteri testamento alia in nouo. In ueteri prohibitum est quia iudei proni erant ad ydolatriam et si iurarent per creaturas, forte crederent numen inesse creature, et ideo prohibitum fuit ne iurarent per creaturas. In euangelio uero prohibitum fuit quia apostoli potuerunt credere quod cessante hac causa cessaret prohibitio et ita quod licite possent iurare per creaturas et non teneri Deo cum non crederent numen inesse creature. Vnde in Matheo prohibuit. Dicebant enim pharisei ut habetur in Matheo: “Qui iurat per templum Dei nihil est, et qui iurat in altari nihil est.” Sed Dominus dixit: “Qui iurat in altari iurat in eo et in omnibus que sunt super illud et qui iurat per templum iurat in eo qui habitat in templo”, etc. Ergo patet quod qui iurat per creaturam iurat per creatorem; ergo tenetur reddere Deo iuramenta, ergo equum est iurare per creaturam et per creatorem, quod falsum est quia auctoritas dicit: quanto sanctius est id per quod iurat, tanto penalius est periurum; ergo grauius est iurare per Deum quam per templum’ [Oath-swearing is forbidden for one reason in the Old Testament and for another reason in the New. It is forbidden in the Old Testament because the Jews were prone to idolatry, and if they swore by creatures, perhaps they would believe that the deity existed in a creature, and therefore swearing was forbidden so that they would not swear by creatures. In the Gospel, on the other hand, swearing was forbidden because the apostles could have believed that the prohibition would cease along with its rationale, and in such a way that they could rightfully swear by creatures and not be bound to God because they did not believe that the deity existed in a creature. Therefore he forbade it in Matthew, for the Pharisees said, as Matthew has it, ‘He that sweareth by the temple of God, it is nothing’ and ‘He that sweareth by the altar, it is nothing.’ But the Lord said: ‘He that sweareth by the altar, sweareth by

The fact that oath-taking determines an obligation, which one commits a grave sin in disregarding, would suggest an equivalence with the vow or, as Langton has noted, the idea that the oath could be considered as a species of vow. Both the vow and the oath involve the same elements, namely, the promise and the witness, as well as the involvement of God, which gives a sacred character to the act. However, there are some basic differences, starting from the fact that the vow is made to God while the oath is made on God, that is, the vow determines an obligation towards God, and the oath establishes an obligation with other people and has both God and human beings as witnesses.

John of La Rochelle deepens the question by stressing that a correct analysis of the definition of a vow clearly reveals its differences from an oath.³⁶ Firstly, the master notes, Peter Lombard's definition aims at establishing the declaratory or promissory nature of the vow. According to the words of the *Sentences*, the vow concerns a promise, but it refers to specific subjects: a vow does not concern what is necessary

it and by all things that are upon it; and he that sweareth by the temple, sweareth by it and by him that dwelleth in it', etc. It is evident, therefore, that someone who swears by a creature swears by the creator; they are therefore held to render their oaths to God. Therefore swearing by a creature and by the creator are equivalent – which is false, because the authority says, 'The holier the thing by which he swears, the more punishable is the perjury', so it is more serious to swear by God than by the temple].

36 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 220vb): 'Ad illud quod obicitur de iuramento dicendum quod per ea que ponuntur in diffinitione uoti excluditur iuramentum. Nota ergo quare singula ponantur in diffinitione. Prima quia scilicet sunt assertoria et promissoria, ut ostendatur quod uotum non est attestatio assertoria sed promissoria dicitur 'promissionis'. Item, ut ostendatur quod non est promissionis eorum que sunt necessaria ad salutem additur [pro] 'spontanea'. Item, quia promissio posset fieri homini <ms. hoc> additur 'deo'; et quia deo posset fieri promissio de illicitis, additur 'de hiis que ad deum pertinent,' in qua intelligitur quod uotum debet fieri de bonis, non de malis. Iam patet differentia ad iuramentum, quia quoddam iuramentum est assertorium, uotum non. Item, uotum fit deo, iuramentum homini siue proximo. Item, iuramentum fit per Deum, uotum <ms. iuramentum> autem non per Deum, sed Deo fit. Item, iuramentum finem habet fidem, vnde fit propter necessitatem; uotum autem propter opus et habet finem bonitatem; vnde in iuramento est assertus ut credatur <ms. odeatur>, in uoto est promissio ut compleatur' [In response to the objection about oath-swearing, we must say that the oath is excluded by the details that are included in the definition of a vow. Notice, therefore, why each detail is included in the definition. Firstly, because there are assertive and promissory <sworn affirmations>, in order to show that a vow is not an assertive sworn affirmation but a promissory one, we say 'of a promise'. Again, in order to show that it is not <an affirmation> of a promise of things that are necessary to salvation, we add 'voluntary'. Again, because a promise can be made to a human, we add 'to God'; and because a promise can be made to God about unlawful things, we add 'about things that belong to God', in which it is meant that a vow must be made about good things, not about bad things. At this point the difference compared to an oath is clear, because some oaths are assertive <whereas> vows are not. Again, a vow is made to God, an oath is sworn to a human or a neighbour. Again, we swear an oath by God, but a vow is made not *by* God but *to* God. Again, an oath has assurance as its goal, so it is sworn for the sake of need; a vow, by contrast, is made for the sake of work and has goodness as its goal. Therefore in an oath there is an assertion, so that it may be believed; in a vow there is a promise, so that it may be fulfilled].

for salvation, and therefore the definition stresses that such a promise is spontaneous and not forced. A first significant difference between the vow and the oath therefore concerns the fact that the former requires a completely free decision not forced by necessity, while the latter is legitimate and acceptable from a religious point of view only if it derives from a necessity. This feature is clear also from the assertive character of the statement of the oath, which in fact has the form of a solemn declaration rather than of a solemn promise. In addition, John notes that Peter Lombard's definition clarifies that a vow is a promise made to God only and not to human beings, stressing a double difference from the oath. The latter is, in fact, made to God as a witness of the promise and not as the subject to whom the promise is addressed. Finally, according to Peter Lombard, the vow concerns 'those things which belong to God'; in other words, it is possible to vow only good things and never evil things. By contrast, an oath can concern evil things, and this is because its aim is to establish trust between human beings, and it achieves this result through necessity, while the vow involves an action and its aim is goodness.

On this basis, John concludes, the nature of the oath depends on the need of the statement to be publicly delivered in order to create the required conditions of mutual trust. In contrast, the vow is a promise because it expresses the commitment to perform a good action that must be fulfilled. Certainly, there are formal similarities between the oath and the vow. As John of La Rochelle notes, the vow, as promise which manifests the intention to be subject to an obligation, entails three basic conditions: trust with respect to the conscience of the one who vows, judgment about the cause of the vow in order to not invoke the name of God in vain, and justice, so that what has been promised is licit and just. These same three conditions, as Jerome had stressed in a crucial *auctoritas*, are required also for the oath in order to make it licit from a religious perspective and in relation to the biblical prohibitions on oath-taking.³⁷ The failure to meet one of these conditions, both in the context of an oath and a

37 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 221ra): 'Votum dicit promissionem cum intentione obligandi, et hoc modo debet habere tres comites, sicut iuramentum, quod debet habere ueritatem respectu conscientie iurantis ut credat esse uerum, iudicium quantum ad causam ne accipiatur nomen Dei in uanum, et iustitiam quantum ad illud quod iuratur ut sit licitum. Similiter uotum debet habere ueritatem ut habeatur in corde quod haberetur in uerbo, debet etiam habere iudicium quantum ad causam ne uoueat indiscrete, et iusticiam ut quod uouetur sit licitum et iustum' [A vow indicates a promise with the intention to be obligated, and in this sense it should have three accompaniments, just like an oath, which should have truth as regards the conscience of the swearer, so that he believes it to be true; judgement regarding the matter at hand, so that God's name is not taken in vain; and justice regarding what is sworn, so that it is lawful. Likewise, a vow should have truth, so that what is contained in the word is contained in the heart; it should also have judgement regarding the matter at hand, so that he does not vow recklessly; and justice, so that what is vowed is lawful and just].

vow, results in evil, but in different ways.³⁸ An oath taken without justice is a sin, because the one who is swearing is taking on an obligation which is illicit and unjust. Such an oath is illegitimate, and it does not have the force of an obligation. Rather, if the one who is swearing lacks knowledge of the truth, or consciousness of what kind of obligation he is taking, and judgment, or the recognition of the existence of an effective necessity to call God as a witness of his statement, he is certainly committing sin. However, the obligation he is taking is valid, because it is licit. As John notes: ‘He who swears unwisely and against his conscience swears without truth and justice and therefore he sins, but he is still obliged.’³⁹

Similarly, in the case of a vow, it is not possible to have obligation if the subject of the promise is illicit or unjust, but while in the case of the oath this determines the loss of obligation and a sin, in the case of the vow, it results in sacrilege. Vowing without judgement, or without the understating of the need to do so, is a sin but does not threaten the obligation taken with the vow, which still maintains its justice and its truth, that is, a correspondence between the statement made through words and the statement in the heart.⁴⁰

The Sacred but not Sacramental Nature of the Oath

John of La Rochelle’s analysis of the vow as a prescribed law allows for evaluating some key features of the historical evolution of the concept and practice of oath-taking between the 12th and early 13th centuries. The master’s care for a clear distinction between the notions of a vow, a sacrament, and an oath aims at avoiding every possible ambiguity or confusion among terms which in the early 13th century already designate three different things. The development of sacramental theology, throughout

38 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 221ra): ‘Si ergo aliquod istorum defecerit in uoto uel iuramento, male fit’ [Therefore if any of these <accompaniments> is missing in a vow or an oath, it is made wrongly].

39 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 221ra): ‘Sine autem ueritate et iusticia iurat qui indiscrete et contra conscientiam iurat, et ideo peccat et tamen obligatur.’

40 John of La Rochelle, *Quaestiones disputatae de legibus* (A fol. 221ra): ‘Differt tamen, quia si in iuramento deficiat iusticia, peccat qui iurat, sed non obligatur, quia illicitum est <quod> iurat. Quando autem deficit ueritas <vel> iudicium, peierat qui iurat et tamen obligatur. Sine iusticia fuit iuramentum quando <Dauid> iurauit occidere Nabal. Sine ueritate et iudicio <ms. iusticia> iurat qui indiscrete et contra conscientiam iurat, et ideo peccat et tamen obligatur. Similiter uotum, si non habet iusticiam, sacrilegium est et non uotum. Si autem deest ueritas <ms. necessitas> uel iudicium, peccat uouens et tamen obligatur’ [There is a difference, however, because if justice is missing in an oath, the swearer sins but is not obligated, because <what> he swears is unlawful. But when truth <or> judgement is missing, the swearer commits perjury, and he is nevertheless obligated. An oath was sworn without justice when <David> swore to kill Nabal (1 Sam. 25:22). Someone swears without truth and judgement when he swears recklessly and against his conscience, and therefore he sins, and he is nevertheless obligated. Likewise a vow that lacks justice is sacrilege and not a vow. But if truth or judgement is lacking, the vow-maker sins and is nevertheless obligated].

the 12th century, reveals how a sacrament is a sign of divine things through which God's grace directly operates, marking a clear distinction from the oath which is a human action which calls on God as a witness. More in detail, since the oath establishes an obligation among human beings whose respect depends on the act of swearing before God, the theologians examine the differences between the obligation determined by the oath and that which follows from a sacrament such as marriage. The same kind of analysis allows one to understand the specific features of the vow as a third kind of action that determines an obligation, different from the oath and the sacrament. In this case, as John explains, the obligation which is established is not a relation of mutual trust between human beings whose pact rests upon the calling of God as witness. Vow-taking involves freely and spontaneously submitting oneself to an obligation towards God.

John of La Rochelle's remarks seem to specify that the vow is mainly a religious matter, whose value rests upon its being part of the theological moral order that makes the positive and prescribed laws consistent with the innate and God-given laws. The vow mainly concerns the religious life and its form, and it is the basis for a series of obligations that have a religious and moral value because they submit the one who is vowing to God and they are good in themselves. Since it is a promise made directly to God, a vow that is broken does not involve a simple sin but a sacrilege, or failure in a commitment which is good in itself. By contrast, the oath seems to be considered mainly as a matter of granting trust within the basic social and legal relationships among human beings. Its sacred character does not depend on its own nature but on calling God as a witness, which gives to the statement of obligation the required force. According to Scripture, an oath is not good, but it can be necessary because of the weakness of human nature, which requires to imparting a sacred character to a commitment, in order to give force to the mutual obligation of the contractors.

John's account is certainly part of the historical process of the 'de-sacralization' of the oath which starts in the 11th century with the Gregorian Reform. The Franciscan master suggests that while the oath is proper to secular relationships, the vow is the form of obligation which characterises religious life. It is certainly true that the oath still has an important role within the Church, as the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council suggest. The oath is required for bishops and archbishops, but it can also be asked of laymen, in order to establish an obligation of loyalty to legitimate authorities, both political and ecclesiastical. However, swearing means solemnly stating an obligation before God which involves a mutual relationship between the parties, because, as John of La Rochelle notes, its aim is to grant safety. Therefore, the oath appears as a sort of agreement which concerns an exchange and is based on mutual trust, which is granted by calling on God as a witness. The one who breaks such an agreement commits sin because they are lying before God. Thus, the oath is a useful means of giving stability to human relationships, which is not good, it is necessary for overcoming human weakness. Thus, theological discourse in this period gradually 'de-sacralized' the oath by progressively defining its boundaries: only in

case of need an oath is legitimate and only if it concerns just things does it determine a real obligation. Within the Church the oath does not concern properly what is good in itself but the safety of the *societas christiana*. In other words, it is a means to establishing and defining the legitimacy of ecclesiastical authorities and the exercise of their jurisdiction.

With respect to this secular field, the vow introduces a further level of obligation which is completely religious and involves not the mutual obligation among human beings but the relationship between a human being and God. The concept of vow, which in the 11th and 12th centuries was closely linked to religious practices and to the crusades, with the mendicant orders became the means to joining an evangelical life-style which is not required but is good in itself, because it imitates the life of Christ and the apostles. From a theological point of view, while the oath gives a sacred value to human obligations, the vow establishes an obligation which recalls the one that Jesus accepted by submitting himself to God's will. The vow is thus part of that ideal of *imitatio Christi*, which was crucial to the rise and success of the mendicant orders and determines relevant effects within the Church. The full sacred character of the vow involves a much more stable relationship of obedience to the ecclesiastical authority, with respect to the oath. The obedience to superiors, in fact, is the only way to fulfil the solemn promise made to God that the vow establishes. According to this perspective, if the oath is reduced and limited in its effectiveness and value, the vow strongly reinforces the building of a monarchic structure within the Church. Quite significantly, Gregory IX justified his excommunication of Frederick II in September 1227 on the basis of the Emperor's unwillingness to honour his crusading vow, and in 1245, Innocent IV used this same justification against the Emperor to obtain the approval of the Council of Lyon to depose Frederick. Since the vow determines an obligation towards God, it is only the Pope, the *vicarius Christi*, who is the final and legitimate spokesman of God's will and therefore the one able to grant an obligation whose violation is not just a sin but a sacrilege.

Ian Christopher Levy

Contrition, Confession, and the Power of the Keys in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: This study addresses the sacrament of penance as it is treated within the *Summa Halensis*, specifically focusing upon the role that contrition plays in relation to confession. In order to provide proper context for this treatment in the *Summa Halensis*, we will examine a range of discussions throughout the 12th and early 13th centuries, in addition to the section on penance in Alexander of Hales' Gloss of Lombard's *Sentences*. We would be confident in saying that the *Summa Halensis*, like the earlier Gloss, held that contrition on the part of the penitent is the determining factor in the forgiveness of sins apart from subsequent acts of confession and satisfaction. One central question, however, is precisely how the *Summa Halensis* explains contrition's relationship to the duties of confession and satisfaction, which still remained vital components of the sacrament. A simple answer to this question is not forthcoming; there may even be a shift of position not only from the Gloss to the *Summa Halensis*, but even within the *Summa Halensis* itself.

Is heartfelt sorrow coupled with frank acknowledgement to God of one's sin and a sincere vow to sin no more enough to secure divine forgiveness, or must one make a formal confession to a priest before one can attain pardon? In the most simplistic terms, is it in contrition or confession that the sinner finds justification? In his classic study of the sacrament of penance in the 12th century, Paul Anciaux observed that in the wake of Peter Abelard, and despite the reaction of the Victorines, the consensus among the masters was that sins are forgiven in the contrition of the penitent. Strictly speaking, therefore, confession was not indispensable for the remission of sins. Given the efficacy assigned to contrition, rooted in the fundamental principle that God alone forgives sins, there was no choice but to render sacerdotal power of a secondary order.¹ Two decades earlier Amédée Teetaert similarly concluded that among the first scholastic theologians, confession was seen to have been established in order for penitents to manifest their contrition rather than submitting their sins to the absolution of a priest. Hence the power of the keys was not extended to the remission of guilt and eternal punishment; absolution was merely an official declaration of the pardon already granted by God. These theologians, therefore, attributed the principal role in justification to the subjective acts of the penitent.² Both Anciaux

1 Paul Anciaux, *La Théologie du Sacrement de Pénitence au XII^e Siècle* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1949), esp. 608–14 for a summary.

2 Amédée Teetaert, *La Confession aux Laïques dans L'Église Latine Depuis le VIII^e au XIV^e Siècle: Étude de Théologie Positive* (Paris: Gabalda, 1926), 256.

and Teetaert had, of course, surveyed a range of opinions during this period which were often quite nuanced. And more recently, Joseph Goering has argued that there were not yet two opposing schools of thought in the 12th century, one which favored interior contrition and the other external confession. What took place in the classrooms, according to Goering, was more conversation than debate as a range of views was canvassed. Although he finds that Peter Lombard along with Gratian of Bologna largely established the framework of the discussion going forward.³

This study will address the sacrament of penance as it is treated within the *Summa Halensis* (*SH*), specifically focusing upon the role that contrition plays in relation to confession. In order to provide proper context for this treatment in the *SH*, we will need to examine a range of discussions throughout the 12th and early 13th centuries, in addition to the section on penance in Alexander of Hales' *Gloss* of Lombard's *Sentences*. We would be safe in saying at the outset, however, that the *SH*, like the earlier *Gloss*, held that contrition on the part of the penitent is the determining factor in the forgiveness of sins apart from subsequent acts of confession and satisfaction. A central question that emerges, though, is precisely how the *SH* explains contrition's relationship to the aforementioned duties of confession and satisfaction, which still remained vital components of the sacrament. As we will see, a simple answer to this question is not forthcoming; indeed, there may even be a shift of position not only from the *Gloss* to the *SH*, but even within the *SH* itself.

The Legacy of the 12th Century

Thoughtful theological analysis of the sacrament of penance begins in the first half of the 12th century with the writings of Hugh of St Victor and Peter Abelard. In his 1130 *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, Hugh made one of the strongest cases for the vital role that the priesthood plays in the sacrament of penance. He was making his case in dialogue with those who (he says) ascribe the power to forgive sins to God alone, and concede no measure of human participation. Much like the priests of the Old Law who only confirm that the leper has already been cleansed, so it is now that someone who is first absolved by the Lord through contrition of heart is later shown to have been absolved by priests through confession of mouth. Sins, therefore, have previously been forgiven through contrition. Those who make this argument, however, do not claim that confession of the mouth is therefore unnecessary. Neglecting to confess, having obtained pardon for one's sins, would be to show contempt for a divine institution. Even while one is no longer liable for sins already forgiven, consequently, one still remains liable for the contempt. Nevertheless the point is made that

³ Joseph Goering, 'The Scholastic Turn (1100–1500): Penitential Theology and the Law in the Schools,' in *A New History of Penance*, ed. Abigail Fiery (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 219–37. See also Joseph Goering, 'The Internal Forum and the Literature of Penance and Confession,' *Traditio* 59 (2004): 175–227.

human beings have no power to forgive sins; that power belongs to God alone. Hugh then proceeds to offer a careful analysis of the process of repentance. He makes it clear first of all that just as no one after the fall could rise from sin unless divine mercy would first gratuitously rouse one, so God in his mercy quickens us to repentance through no merit of our own and thereby restores the grace that had been lost. Grace therefore stirs our hearts to repent, such that we are absolved from the debt of damnation. Where does the priest fit into all of this? Hugh draws upon the popular example of Christ raising Lazarus from the dead (John 11:43–44). Christ first absolved Lazarus internally from the bond of spiritual death and then ordered that he be released from his external bonds through the ministry of the apostles. So now in the Church, Christ by grace vivifies the dead internally and arouses them from their sins such that they feel remorse. He then sends them to confess where, through the ministry of the priests, he absolves them from the exterior bond of damnation. Hugh insists, however, that he is not thereby attributing to priests the power to forgive sins. Christ as God can indeed forgive sins apart from human cooperation; yet he can also do through a human being what he does by himself. This is not to say that human beings therefore do nothing even as God works through them. Hugh notes that the power of the keys was not granted to Peter alone, for Christ says to all the apostles and to the successors of the apostles who function in their place: ‘Receive the Holy Spirit, whosever sins you forgive will be forgiven them (...)’ (John 20:22–23). It is no wonder, therefore, that human beings can forgive sins, since they have received a share of Christ’s divine power. For God to grant this power to human beings is nothing else than for God to do this work through humans. In that sense, according to Hugh, the Church’s priests do have the power of binding and loosing as granted to them by God. For even though God can forgive sin directly, it is fitting that human beings be made co-workers in the salvation of sinners. The sinner’s redemption begins with contrition, to be sure, but it is fully perfected when one confesses by mouth what one already grieves over in one’s heart.⁴

We turn now to Peter Abelard who had stated in his circa 1139 *Scito te ipsum* that three things are necessary for the reconciliation of sinners to God: penitence, confession, and satisfaction.⁵ Penitence itself is defined as sorrow of mind for having strayed from the right path.⁶ After surveying what constitutes unfruitful penitence which is rooted in fear of punishment and self-interest, Abelard defines a fruitful penitence as sorrow and contrition of mind that is born of love for God.⁷ What he says next proved to be of great import for discussions in succeeding generations: sin cannot co-exist with contrition of heart, which Abelard designates as true peni-

⁴ Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* 2.14.8, ed. Rainer Berndt (Münster: Aschendorff, 2008), 529–36; PL 176:564–570.

⁵ Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* 1.51, in *Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica*, vol. 4, ed. Rainer M. Ilgner, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis, 190 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), 51.

⁶ Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* 1.52 (Ilgner, 51).

⁷ Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* 1.58 (Ilgner, 58).

tence. For the love of God that inspires such contrition is incompatible with guilt. In fact, it is in this state of contrition that we are immediately reconciled to God and obtain pardon for our previous sins. At that instant the sinner is found worthy of forgiveness on account of divinely inspired contrition and is released from the debt of eternal punishment. Hence were someone to die, despite being prevented from first making one's confession and act of satisfaction, one could still be confident in salvation.⁸ Although it should be said that while this person has been pardoned of his eternal offense, he or she may still have further acts of atonement to perform. Those who die prior to performing all the requisite acts of satisfaction would therefore complete their penance in purgatory.⁹

Given that Abelard had counted confession among the three central components of reconciliation, we are left to ask why someone would seek confession having already been pardoned through their contrition. The first reason, he says, is that we might be helped by the prayers of those to whom we confess; the second, because confession of one's sins to another requires humility and thus is an action of atonement; and finally, because priests have been entrusted with the care of souls and therefore can prescribe suitable acts of penance. In that sense they function as doctors who must examine the wound they would then try to heal.¹⁰ Having said that, Abelard frankly grants that there are cases in which one could avoid, or at least delay, confession without incurring sin if one believed that it would do more harm than good. So long as this is not done out of contempt for God, says Abelard, the person would incur no guilt.¹¹ Admittedly, such occasions would be the exception, and so Abelard counsels people generally to seek those to whom our souls have been committed and follow their advice even if we reckon the priest to be otherwise lacking in good qualities.¹²

In his opening comments of the *Tractatus de penitentia*, written circa 1142 and thus a decade before Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, Gratian of Bologna laid out the fundamental question circulating in the 12th-century schools which we alluded to above: whether by contrition of the heart alone, and secret satisfaction, apart from confession of the mouth, anyone would be able to satisfy God. According to Gratian, there are some who say that pardon for sin can be merited apart from ecclesiastical confession and sacerdotal judgment.¹³ Two schools of thought are then presented here: one saying that contrition as a rule leads to remission of sin, and another that mere contrition is salvific only under exceptional circumstances. Atria Larson, in her 2014 study of Gratian, has argued that no one at this time actually negated

8 Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* 1.59 (Ilgner, 55–9).

9 Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* 1.59 (Ilgner, 59).

10 Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* 1.65 (Ilgner, 65–6).

11 Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* 1.68 (Ilgner, 68).

12 Peter Abelard, *Scito te ipsum* 1.70 (Ilgner, 70).

13 Gratian of Bologna, *Tractatus de penitentia*, d. 1, prol., in *Corpus iuris canonici*, 2 vols, ed. Emil Friedberg (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879; repr. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), 1:1159.

the obligation to confess to a priest. Instead, the question was primarily concerned with the precise moment that sin is remitted during the penitential process.¹⁴ Although in 2016 John Wei has argued that Gratian set himself to address what he reckoned a genuinely open question at the time: whether, in fact, penitents were bound to confess their sins to a priest.¹⁵

As Gratian summarized the first position, we see that as far as its proponents were concerned, sins are clearly forgiven by contrition of the heart, not by oral confession; the disposition of the penitent's heart is the key element.¹⁶ We are resuscitated through grace and thus become sons of light prior to our confession. For nobody will confess unless spiritually alive, living and loving in Christ, and thus in a state undeserving of hell. Because such a state is incompatible with sin, God must already have removed this person's sin prior to his confession. Remission of sin will therefore come by way of contrition as God vivifies the soul prior to, and even apart from, confession.¹⁷

Here we are left to ask what confession by mouth accomplishes if sins are remitted already in contrition? It would seem that it serves to demonstrate one's repentance, even as it does not confer pardon. It may therefore be likened to the circumcision given to Abraham as a sign, but not a cause, of his justification (CF. Rom. 4:II). Likewise, then, confession to a priest presents a sign of pardon received, but is not the cause of that pardon. If this is the first position, the second finds that even as contrition remains necessary, no one can be cleansed from sin apart from confession and satisfaction, so long as there is time to accomplish these two things. Only in this most extreme of cases, such as intervening death, would contrition alone be sufficient for the remission of sins.¹⁸ Having explained both positions, Gratian explicitly leaves it to the judgment of the reader which to follow, since both positions, he says, have wise and religious supporters.¹⁹ Jean Gaudemet has opined that this surprising display of reserve on Gratian's part, having devoted so much time to laying out the different positions over the course of 89 canons, proves that the debate over confes-

14 Atria A. Larson, *Master of Penance: Gratian and the Development of Penitential Thought and Law in the Twelfth Century* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2014), 35–40. See also Larson's new edition: *Gratian's Tractatus de penitentia: A New Latin Edition with English Translation*, ed. and trans. Atria A. Larson, *Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Canon Law*, 14 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2016).

15 John C. Wei, *Gratian the Theologian*, *Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Canon Law*, 13 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2016), esp. 103–6.

16 Gratian of Bologna, *Tractatus de penitentia*, d. 1, d.p.c. 30 (Friedberg, 1:1165).

17 Gratian of Bologna, *Tractatus de penitentia*, d. 1, d.p.cc. 36 and 37 (1) (Friedberg, 1:1167); Larson, *Master of Penance*, 42–55; Wei, *Gratian the Theologian*, 106–10.

18 Gratian of Bologna, *Tractatus de penitentia*, d. 1, d.p.c. 37 (2) (Friedberg, 1:1167); Larson, *Master of Penance*, 63–4; Wei, *Gratian the Theologian*, 111–2.

19 Gratian of Bologna, *Tractatus de penitentia*, d. 1, d.p.c. 89 (Friedberg, 1:1189).

sion was not closed in the middle of the 12th century. The canonists were still uncertain as to the respective importance of contrition, confession, and satisfaction.²⁰

In his circa 1155 *Sententiae* Peter Lombard had noted that with respect to the performance of penance there are three central components: compunction of heart, confession of mouth, and satisfaction in deed.²¹ The question arises soon enough, though, as to whether sin can be remitted by contrition of heart alone apart from the aforementioned satisfaction and confession of mouth.²² Now it would seem that just as inward penance is enjoined upon us, so also is confession by mouth and outward satisfaction if there is opportunity to accomplish these tasks. Offering what proves to be a crucial distinction here, the Lombard will insist that someone cannot be considered truly penitent if lacking the intention to confess. With that in mind, though, it remains the case that remission of sins is granted prior to confession, but tempered with the proviso that one intends to confess when given the opportunity to do so.²³ Having granted that sins are entirely remitted by God through contrition of heart, and from the moment that the penitent has the intention of confessing, what exactly is the priest cleansing if God has already acted on the basis of the penitent's contrition? Having surveyed many opinions on this point, the Lombard alights upon what he reckons the most appealing: God alone, not the priest, remits the debt of eternal death, just as he vivifies the soul interiorly. The Lombard repeats this principle in one form or another as he then states that Christ's grace enlightens the soul inwardly and simultaneously releases the soul from the debt of eternal death. Then, having cited Augustine, Cassiodorus, and Jerome, he concludes that God absolves the penitent from the debt of punishment when he inwardly illuminates that person inspiring true contrition of heart. One is not freed from eternal wrath upon confession to a priest, therefore, since the contrite person has already been set free by the Lord. One has thus ceased to be a child of wrath from the moment one has begun to love and repent.²⁴ Amidst the many and varied opinions advanced by the doctors, the Lombard determines that God remits sins by himself alone in such a way that he both cleanses the soul from inward stain and liberates it from the debt of eternal death.²⁵

Finally, we should note that it was the Lombard who laid out the three tiers within penance considered precisely as a sacrament. There is the sacrament alone (*sac-*

20 Jean Gaudemet, 'Le débat sur la confession dans la Distinction I du "de penitentia" (Decret de Gratien, C. 33, q. 3),' *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* 71 (1985): 52–75.

21 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 4, d. 16, c. 1, 1, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 2:336.

22 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4, d. 17, c. 1, 1 (Brady, 2:342).

23 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4, d. 17, c. 1, 13 (Brady, 2:346).

24 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4, d. 18, c. 4, 1–6 (Brady, 2:357–8). See also Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols, Brill's studies in intellectual history, 41 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 2:583–609, who argues that the Lombard was staunchly committed to the 'contritionist' perspective and did not shrink from all that entailed.

25 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4, d. 18, c. 5, 5 (Brady, 2:360).

ramentum tantum) which is exterior penance; the sacrament and reality (*sacramentum et res*) which is inward penance; and the reality alone (*res tantum*) which constitutes the remission of sins. Interior penance is the reality (*res*) of the outward penitential action, although it also functions as the sacrament (*sacramentum*) of the remission of sin, which it both signifies and brings about.²⁶

If Peter Lombard followed Abelard in emphasizing contrition as the decisive factor in the remission on sins, Richard of St Victor assigned to the priest a much more substantial role in this process. In his *De potestate ligandi et solvendi*, Richard did indeed admit that confession of heart suffices for the salvation of one's soul, since at the point of death, confession to a priest and absolution can be excluded. In that sense, it is true that the Lord alone absolves. Yet, says Richard, confession to a priest is still required, inasmuch as this faculty has been divinely bestowed by God working through his minister.²⁷ What Richard goes on to say will prove of significant import for Alexander's *Gloss* and also for the *SH* itself. For here Richard maintains that when the Lord looses the bonds of damnation, he does so conditionally (*conditionaliter*); the priest for his part does so unqualifiedly (*simpliciter*) or fully (*integraliter*). So it is, according to Richard, that God absolves the penitent from the debt of damnation under the condition that, if one is able, one will seek the absolution of a priest and make the requisite satisfaction. Were the penitent to neglect to fulfill this obligation, he or she would not manage to escape eternal danger. Yet having received the absolution of a priest, and having thus fulfilled the terms of the condition, were that person to die immediately afterwards, he or she would no longer face the threat of eternal damnation. Sinners absolved by the priest still remain obligated to fulfill their assigned penance if they hope to avoid the fire of future purgation. In that sense, even as the priest releases the penitent from the debt of eternal damnation fully and unqualifiedly, he releases that person from the debt of future purgation only conditionally (*sub conditione*); it is conditional upon making satisfaction.²⁸

An important development in penitential practice occurred in 1215 when the Fourth Lateran Council mandated that all men and women confess their sins at least once a year to their own priest (*proprio sacerdote*) and strive to fulfill the penance enjoined upon them. This constitution, *Omnis utriusque*, began to circulate soon after the council's conclusion and then entered into 1234 *Decretales Gregorii IX*.²⁹ In 1216, within a year of the council, Thomas de Chobham produced his *Summa confessorum*, which would become a hugely popular manual for priests. At the outset of his

²⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4, d. 22, c. 2, 5 (Brady, 2:389–90).

²⁷ Richard of St Victor, *Tractatus de potestate ligandi et solvendi* 7 (PL 196:1164D-1165A).

²⁸ Richard of St Victor, *Tractatus de potestate ligandi et solvendi* 8 (PL 196:1165B-1165D). Note that Teetaert, *La Confession aux Laïques*, 257 credits Richard with inaugurating the theory of conditional forgiveness.

²⁹ See Lateran IV, constitution 21, in *Enchiridion Symbolorum: definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, ed. Heinrich Denzinger and Adolf Schönmetzer (Rome: Herder, 1976), n. 812. Cf. *Decretalium D. Gregorii Papae IX*. 5.38.12, in *Corpus iuris canonici* (see above, n. 13), 2:887.

practical guide Thomas addressed the nature of the sacrament itself and its three components: contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Taking as a given here that all guilt is remitted by contrition alone, Thomas must explain to these priests why one would bother go to confession. To that end Thomas evokes the example of the sick person who, although he has gotten considerably better, still faces some ailments which will need to be cured. So it is that, following the remission of guilt, there remain further complications which will have to be cleansed through confession and satisfaction, such as the pleasurable memory of sin and the difficulty of refraining from one's old ways. Confession and satisfaction, with the sense of shame that they induce, will prove helpful in this regard. What is more, though, the merciful God who forgives sins is also the just God who demands satisfaction. It is from his great mercy, therefore, that God commutes eternal punishment into temporal. Thomas offers the example of mercy shown to a thief who deserves hanging; he is spared the death penalty by performing some alternative work of satisfaction.³⁰

Having established that a genuinely contrite penitent has been forgiven his or her guilt even before approaching the priest, it would seem that there is nothing for the priest to absolve. Some people, according to Thomas, say that the priest absolves from sin inasmuch as he shows one to have already been absolved. This cannot be right, however, since the priest never reveals who has come to confession. Better to say, therefore, that the priest has freed the penitent from the obligation of the penitential forum as well as the accusations of the devil.³¹ Like a judge absolving an innocent defendant from the claims of a fraudulent plaintiff and thereby releasing him from future litigation, the priest does not actually absolve the penitent of any sin, since that has already been dismissed through his contrition; he does absolve him from any obligation to confess this sin again or face future accusations leveled by the devil for this sin.³²

Finally, with *Omnis utriusque* clearly in mind, Thomas maintains that when a Christian sins he or she should immediately repent in their heart and resolve to go to confession during Lent. It would actually be better to run to a priest immediately after sinning; but if one repents in one's heart, waiting until Lent is alright.³³ Having repented in one's heart and resting secure in his forgiveness, one should look forward to making one's confession, just as the sick person who is sure his or her illness is not getting worse can more easily anticipate further medical treatment.³⁴

Within the schools at this time, the Parisian master and canon of Meaux, Guy of Orchelles, produced a Treatise on the Sacraments around 1220 which synthesized the

³⁰ Thomas de Chobham, *Summa confessorum* 1.2a, ed. F. Broomfield, *Analecta mediaevalia Namurcensia*, 25 (Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1968), 8–9.

³¹ Thomas de Chobham, *Summa confessorum* 5.1.8a (Broomfield, 207).

³² Thomas de Chobham, *Summa confessorum* 5.1.8a (Broomfield, 207–8).

³³ Thomas de Chobham, *Summa confessorum* 5.2.2a (Broomfield, 236).

³⁴ Thomas de Chobham, *Summa confessorum* 5.2.2a (Broomfield, 236–7). See Lateran IV, constitution 22, in *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, n. 815.

work of previous Parisian scholars, notably Praepositinus of Cremona and Stephen Langton, on the subject of penance, transmitting these ideas to scholars at Paris in the 1230s and 1240s.³⁵ Here contrition is presented as an action of the soul punishing itself and thereby acquiring merit, and so commuting eternal into temporal penalty.³⁶ In keeping with what had become the standard line, though, to spurn the sacrament of confession would result in the forfeiture of the fruit of one's contrition, namely, remission of sins.³⁷

Addressing the precise relationship between grace and contrition, Guy finds that divine power, i.e. grace expels sin prior to the infusion of created grace. Hence created grace does not itself co-exist with sin in the same subject. Rather, says Guy, outer grace (*gratia extra*) has already rid the soul of sin prior to the arrival of inward grace (*gratia infra*). The terminology and process outlined here anticipates the later process of grace freely given (*gratia gratis data*) followed up by sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*).³⁸ As for the role of the priest in all of this, he functions as a herald of celestial judgment, announcing the divine decision. The priest reveals whether sins have been forgiven or retained by God, thereby completing in some way the divine sentence while enjoining a temporal penalty in place of eternal punishment. Then, by authority of the keys, the priest may release one from that temporal penalty.³⁹

Guy's contemporary William of Auxerre explored a three-fold forum: that of God, the Church, and the penitent. There may be a person so contrite that he or she has been absolved by God, yet has not completed the penance imposed by the Church, or perhaps has done so but is not sure the act of satisfaction was sufficient. Or again, someone might manifest contrition great enough to erase not only his or her sin, but achieves such a sense of inner security and spiritual joy as to feel released from the debt of punishment. Absolved in both in the divine and personal forum, therefore, this person still remains subject to the act of penance that the Church imposes.⁴⁰

William was clearly interested in the subjective side of the sacrament, the conscience of the penitent and the penitent's capacity for spiritual growth, which can be furthered in the act of confessing one's sins. Not only can the priest help the penitent to recognize his or her sin but its gravity, but the sense of shame aroused in the revealing of one's sins can result in a spiritual purgation. The very act of going to

35 Guy of Orchelless, *Tractatus de sacramentis ex eius Summa de sacramentis et officiis ecclesiae*, ed. Damian and Odulf Van den Eynde, Franciscan Institute Publications Text Series, 4 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1953), esp. 102–66. My thanks to Riccardo Saccenti for alerting me to this text.

36 Guy of Orchelless, *Tractatus de sacramentis* 6.2.106–7 (Van den Eynde, 107–8).

37 Guy of Orchelless, *Tractatus de sacramentis* 6.2.112 (Van den Eynde, 111–2).

38 Guy of Orchelless, *Tractatus de sacramentis* 6.2.113 (Van den Eynde, 113–4).

39 Guy of Orchelless, *Tractatus de sacramentis* 6.4.136 (Van den Eynde, 139–40).

40 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* 4.8.2, 7 vols, ed. Jean Ribailier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7), 6:199–200.

confession, even if one's devotion may be lukewarm, can yield tremendous benefits. According to William, a person who comes to confession in a state of spiritual aridity may leave fully hydrated. For it is often within the priest-penitent encounter that the person, by the very act of confessing, will erase his or her sins and receive the infusion of grace. Even someone already possessing grace may find that confessing results in the further increase of grace.⁴¹

Before turning our attention to Alexander of Hales and the *SH*, it is worth briefly revisiting the canon law. As touched upon above, the canonists were intensely interested in the sacrament of penance in light of its myriad pastoral implications. Theologians, whose own work both informed the canon law and was informed by it, had to stay abreast of the most recent formulations and applications of that law. Not surprisingly, therefore, the *Glossa Ordinaria* on Gratian's *Decretum* provides a concise *status quaestionis* on penance in the first decades of the 13th century. The *Gloss* begins by noting that contrition of the heart is itself a sign that sins have been forgiven, just as exterior satisfaction serves as a sign of contrition. Grace, therefore, precedes contrition; and remission of sin is thus attributed to grace. Yet, as the *Gloss* notes, others say that sins are forgiven through contrition with respect to guilt, but not with respect to punishment. Still others maintain that remission of sins is rendered conditional through contrition of the heart. And some say that because we offend God in three ways, namely, heart, mouth, and deeds, so three modes of satisfaction are required. Hence all three are necessary: contrition of heart, confession of mouth, and works of satisfaction. As for those authorities who say that sins are remitted by contrition alone, the *Gloss* reckons this to apply in cases of extreme necessity which makes confession of mouth impossible, e.g. when the contrite person is prevented by death from making his or her confession or faces some other serious obstacle. Peter Manducator is named among those who believe that remission of sins becomes conditional through contrition of heart. Huguccio for his part says that by contrition of heart alone sins are forgiven in any adult. Although we again find this caveat: if someone is contrite, proposes to abstain from further sin, plans to confess, and to submit to the judgment of the Church, that one will be forgiven, although actual confession and satisfaction fail to follow. This person sins mortally, however, if in keeping with the Church's precept, he or she is able to confess and perform the work of satisfaction and yet fails to do so.⁴²

⁴¹ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* 4.10.1 (Ribaillier, 6:243–4).

⁴² Gratian of Bologna, *Tractatus de penitentia*, d. 1, prol. (Friedberg, 1:1159); *Corpus juris canonici emendatum et notis illustratum: Gregorii XIII. pont. max. iussu editum*, 3 vols (Rome: In aedibus Populi Romani, 1582), 1:2185–6.

Review of Scholarship on Alexander of Hales and Penance

In a substantial article from 1969, Thomas Jarosz surveyed the scholarship regarding Alexander's position on penance. Here he recounted M. dos Reis Miranda's 1951 study of Alexander wherein Miranda had argued that Alexander should not be placed among the so-called contritionists.⁴³ Instead, he believed, the essence of sacramental penance for Alexander rested in the words of absolution offered by the priest, which is to say that an attrite penitent attains genuine contrition by means of sacramental absolution. Jarosz concluded, however, that Miranda had completely misread Alexander in his attempt to bring the Alexander of the *Gloss* into line with Tridentine theology. In fact, says Jarosz, Alexander's teaching was very much in keeping with the scholastic tradition that followed upon Peter Lombard. Jarosz sees in Alexander not an innovator, but a traditionalist. For Jarosz the authentic Alexander is to be found in the *Gloss*, and there Alexander is a contritionist. Jarosz was therefore critical of those scholars who attempted to construct Alexander's teaching on the basis of the *SH*, some of whom, such as A. Michel, had published their findings prior to the discovery and publication of the *Gloss*.⁴⁴ A corrective, according to Jarosz, was offered by A. Vanneste,⁴⁵ who concluded that Alexander fell into line with Hugh of St Cher and Philip the Chancellor in the tradition of Peter Lombard. On his view, guilt and eternal punishment are removed through the personal contrition of the penitent, whereas confession, absolution, and satisfaction pertain to the deletion of temporal punishment. Jarosz for his part wished to return to the *Gloss* for its insights into the authentic teaching of Alexander on penance apart from the expansion and innovation he believes to be found in the later *SH*, indebted to William of Melitona, Odo Rigaldus, and Bonaventure.⁴⁶

It should be noted, however, that already in 1925, and thus before the critical edition of the *Gloss*, Amédée Teetaert had argued first of all that the *SH* does in fact reflect the authentic teaching of Alexander even though it was composed by other friars; it was a work initiated under Alexander's direction and faithfully transmits his ideas. With regard to the sacrament of penance as treated in the *SH*, Teetaert de-

⁴³ M. dos Reis Miranda, 'A doutrina da Penitência nas obras inédita de Alexandre de Hales,' *Colecanea de Estudos* 2 (1951): 205–406.

⁴⁴ A. Michel, 'Pénitence du IV concile du Latran à la Réforme,' in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. 12/1, ed. Jean Michel Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1933), 956–7.

⁴⁵ Alfred Vanneste, 'La théologie de la pénitence chez quelques Maîtres Parisiens de la première moitié du XIIIe siècle,' *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 28 (1952): 24–58.

⁴⁶ Thomas Jude Jarosz, 'Sacramental Penance in Alexander of Hales' Glossa,' *Franciscan Studies* 29 (1969): 302–346. See too Kilian F. Lynch, 'The Doctrine of Alexander of Hales on the Nature of Sacramental Grace,' *Franciscan Studies* 19 (1959): 334–83. Lynch, in his analysis of the *Gloss*, likewise places the emphasis for Alexander squarely on contrition as the means to forgiveness of sins.

termed that it is indeed contrition which plays the chief role and constitutes the principal factor in the justification of the sinner. Priestly absolution, therefore, exercises no real efficacy with respect to the remission of guilt, although the keys do alleviate temporal punishment in keeping with the power that Christ gave to the apostles.⁴⁷

Alexander's *Gloss* on the *Sentences*

According to Alexander's *Gloss* on the Lombard's *Sentences* (1223–27), there are two effects resulting from penance: remission of guilt and remission of penalty. It is through contrition that guilt is remitted, whereas by confession and satisfaction, the penalty is alleviated, although the penalty can sometimes be lifted by means of contrition alone. With respect to the remission of guilt, penance may be counted as a grace, since the effect of erasing guilt is proper to grace. With regard to the remission of punishment, however, penance is a virtue, since the person in the state of charity makes satisfaction and renders to God what he or she owes, and this belongs to justice. Penance may therefore be considered a work that proceeds from charity and justice.⁴⁸

The *Gloss* finds that term penance (*poenitentia*) can be taken in many ways. It can apply to attrition or repentance, such that the one who repents, even if not in a state of sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciente*), is nevertheless rendered capable of achieving this state with the assistance of grace freely given (*per gratiam gratis datam*). Hence the process begins with the grace freely given (*gratia gratis data*) and continues all the way through to the infusion of sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), which occurs simultaneously with the remission of sins. On other occasions, however, 'penance' is taken for contrition or the effect of repentance; and then again for the will of contrition; the virtue enabling the will; the sacrament of penance; the act of confessing; or the enjoined penalty. So it is that 'penance' may be defined as a voluntary affliction for sin, for the sake of God, directed towards the remission of guilt and penalty. Insofar as it is a sacrament, penance functions both as a sign and a cause of grace. It is a sign without being a cause when it is received from the priest, which presupposes the preceding contrition in which grace is infused. It is important to note therefore that the assumption of the enjoined penance signifies, but does not itself cause, the grace by which guilt is remitted in contrition. It may at times be a cause of grace alone without being a sign, however, provided the spiritual sorrow felt in one's heart does not produce an exterior sign such as

47 Amédée Teetaert, 'Doctrine d'Alexandre d'Alés au sujet du sacrement de Pénitence,' *Études franciscaines* 37 (1925): 337–54. See also Teetaert, *La Confession aux Laïques*, 262–5.

48 Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) 4, d. 14, 6, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 4:210–1.

tears. At the same time, however, it must be said that penance cannot be designated as a cause of grace if the penitent is not disposed to take on an enjoined penance. Finally, penance functions as both cause and sign when that interior spiritual sorrow does burst forth into an exterior corporeal sign, thereby signifying the grace of the remission of eternal punishment.⁴⁹

The question then arises as to whether the three components of penance (contrition, confession, and satisfaction) are all integral to the sacrament. That they are not seems clear enough, since contrition on its own sometimes suffices for the deletion of both guilt and penalty. Here the *Gloss* draws a vital distinction when it observes that contrition can actually be said to constitute the *esse* of penance inasmuch as it is the cause of the deletion of sin, whereas confession and satisfaction belong merely to the *bene esse*. In that sense one could say that penance, considered precisely as a sacrament, can be completed in contrition. Or it may be considered as an act of satisfaction rendered to the Church, in which case it cannot be accomplished apart from taking on the penance enjoined by the priest from the power of the keys in confession.⁵⁰

From this twofold perspective of personal and corporate responsibility, the *Gloss* will assert that the deletion of guilt may take place with respect to God through contrition or with respect to the Church through confession within the penitential forum.⁵¹ Hence while it remains true that contrition alone can delete in God's sight both the guilt and penalty associated with sin, this does not hold in the forum of the Church. Furthermore, the unity of charity by which the mystical body is united assists the penitent in the remission of sin through the supplications of the priest beseeching God's forgiveness. Thus even as sin could be remitted through contrition, it is not done easily apart the sacerdotal supplications offered within the unity of the Church.⁵² The Church thereby proves helpful to the penitent as she aids one in the quest for salvation, which means that her assistance should be sought.

An important question then emerges as to whether the Lord not only blots out the stain of sin, but also the liability of eternal punishment; or whether the priest dismisses this liability by the power of the keys. Now some will contend that the Lord immediately dismisses the liability, since it is owed to the guilt which he has himself forgiven. Moreover, eternal punishment, precisely because it is eternal, is in the power of God alone; hence it is only for God to dismiss. On the other hand, Richard of St Victor (not Hugh as the *Gloss* has it) points out that although God by himself releases the penitent from bonds of obduration, God works through his minister to release him from the debt of eternal damnation. For even as the Lord remits guilt in contrition, he obliges the penitent to his due satisfaction following confes-

⁴⁹ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 14, 6, 4:211; on the working of grace see also *Glossa* 4, d. 17, 5, 4:278.

⁵⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 16, 1, 4:252–3.

⁵¹ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 16, 7, 4:257.

⁵² Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 17, 15, 4:296.

sion. And so, if one does not confess, one remains a debtor to eternal punishment. It is this debt that is absolved when one takes up his penance in confession. Since this is what the priest accomplishes by the power of the keys, it is the priest who dismisses the liability to eternal punishment. Hence when someone makes a worthy confession, we say that the priest releases him from the bonds of eternal damnation. Here Richard's *De potestate ligandi et solvendi* is quoted directly: 'The Lord releases conditionally (*conditionaliter*), whereas the priest does so fully (*integre*).'⁵³

Having presented the case, the *Gloss* offers a conclusion that sticks very close to Richard. For it affirms that when the Lord forgives guilt in contrition, he releases one unqualifiedly (*absolute*) from the bonds of captivity and servitude to sin and the devil. But this same person is released from the bonds of eternal damnation only conditionally (*conditionaliter*), since one must still confess if one has the opportunity—although if that is impossible then he is absolutely released. Note that God, in releasing someone from the bonds of eternal damnation, nevertheless obliges this person to the bonds of expiation through purgatorial punishment. It is from this latter bondage that a priest can release someone through the temporal punishment that he enjoins upon him subsequent to confession. And so it is clear, according to the *Gloss*, that even as remission of one's liability to eternal punishment comes from God, the penitent is absolved of purgatorial punishment by taking on the penance enjoined by the priest through the power of the keys. In that sense one may say that the sentence is forgiven by God through the ministry of the priest. This is why some have maintained that the Lord by means of his priests forgives the sentence of eternal punishment, rather than saying that this offense is unqualifiedly (*simpli-citer*) dismissed by the Lord.⁵⁴ Finally, on this point, the *Gloss* notes that although in contrition, the liability to eternal punishment is dismissed by grace conjoined to spiritual sorrow, the bonds of confession still remain. Were one not released, therefore the penitent could find himself once again in the bonds of eternal damnation; hence the need for taking on the bonds of expiation. This question of the absolute and conditional release from the bonds of eternal punishment will later arise in the *SH*. For now, though, it may be fair to conclude that the *Gloss*, which had otherwise stuck close to Peter Lombard's 'contritionist' position, then veered into a Victorine 'confessionist' stance.

⁵³ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 18, 4, 4:320.

⁵⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 18, 4, 4:322–3.

The Summa Halensis

Question 17: Contrition

In Question 17 of Book 4 of the *SH*, we find contrition defined as an assumed sorrow for sins with the resolution to confess and make satisfaction. Thus one notes from the outset that, in keeping with Peter Lombard's position, genuine contrition contains within itself the intention on the part of the penitent to make an oral confession and to perform the prescribed works of satisfaction enjoined by the priest. The *SH* thereupon continues by pointing out that contrition owes its inception to God who first grants grace to the soul. Having received this grace, one is then capable of assuming the sorrow for sin, which is contrition. Contrition is the indispensable first step which precedes confession, and they both precede satisfaction. The *SH* further insists that the contrite person, unless he confesses and renders satisfaction if possible, remains a transgressor of the Lord's precept, and so will be condemned for the sin of this transgression.⁵⁵

One of the effects of contrition, according to the *SH*, is the justification of the impious. Justice itself is defined, in keeping with St Anselm, as rectitude of the will. In the process of justification, the soul is repaired and informed with justice and thus conformed to God. As a result of this deformity, the soul is made pleasing or acceptable in God's sight. One's cognitive faculty is illuminated, affection set ablaze, and the operative faculty rectified. Thus it would seem for the *SH* that contrition amounts to much more than the mere recognition of sin; it belongs to a whole process of human restoration.⁵⁶ The justification of the adult, moreover, necessarily requires contrition. While it is true therefore that God does work virtue within us apart from our own efforts, this does not happen without sorrow for sins on our part.⁵⁷

Perhaps, though, contrition is not in itself sufficient for absolving one of guilt. After all, it seems that a person could be at once contrite and guilty, which means contrition does not actually have the power to expel guilt. Gregory the Great had noted that someone weeping for his or her sins, who nevertheless does not desert the cause of that sin, is contrite in heart even as he or she refuses to be humbled. It stands to reason, therefore, that even though contrition is required for justification, it is not necessarily sufficient for justification; one could, in other words, be terribly sorry for one's sins and yet remain unjustified. According to the *SH*, we must therefore distinguish here between contrition generally and properly speaking. Commonly it refers to all sorrow for sin, but properly only that sorrow for sin that is informed

⁵⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Alexandri Alensis Angli Summae Theologiae: Pars Quarta* (hereafter, *SH* Bk IV), Q17, M2, Ar3 (Cologne: Sumptibus Ioannis Gymnici, sub Monocerote, 1622), 509–10. Note that I checked the Cologne edition against the Venice 1575 edition.

⁵⁶ *SH* Bk IV, Q17, M4, Ar1, p. 534.

⁵⁷ *SH* Bk IV, Q17, M4, Ar2, pp. 534–5.

and caused by sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*). Hence if one is indeed to be purged of guilt through contrition, this will be because his or her sorrow was informed by divine grace. And this sort of genuine contrition, which affects the forgiveness of sins, includes the willingness to repent of one's sins.⁵⁸

The *SH* provides an analysis of the process by means of which the sinner finds forgiveness. The first stage involves freely given grace (*gratia gratis data*) through which the sinner is moved towards God. Here one comes to recognize the mercy of God, his forgiveness and munificence, and so is built back up again by hope. It is in this way that the sinner prepares himself for the reception of grace. One who was until this point unformed now becomes acceptable to God through grace. While it is true that the infusion of grace and the state of contrition are simultaneous in time, it must be said that grace is still prior in nature. In other words, one cannot be contrite without first having been informed by the sanctifying grace which enables true contrition. This description of the process is not, however, without its problems. If the infusion of grace precedes contrition, it would seem that a person could be just apart from contrition. That is to say, one could be in a state of grace and thus acceptable to God, without having demonstrated genuine sorrow for one's sins. The *SH* meets this objection, however, noting that this would only hold if the infusion of grace were prior to contrition not only in nature, but also in time. Yet, as we have seen, the infusion and the contrition are simultaneous; there is no 'moment' in which the person is just without being also contrite.⁵⁹

In keeping with what we have sketched above, the *SH* observes that in the process of justification there is required on the part of God the infusion of sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), while on our part the sorrow of contrition is required. If this is the case, then in preparation for this event, there is first required from God the grace freely given (*gratia gratis data*), while we exhibit the sorrow of attrition. So it is that in the consummation of justification, which comprises absolution from guilt and punishment, three sorts of sorrow are required at different stages: before justification, coexisting with the process of justification, and subsequent to justification. The first is the sorrow of attrition; the second, sorrow of sacramental contrition; and the third, sorrow of satisfactory contrition. Contrition for its part proceeds in a certain sense from a movement of the free will, because it stems from the instinct of a formed faith; whereas attrition, which also stems from the movement of a free will, arises from the prompting of an unformed faith. This is the customary way that the process works, according to the *SH*, although there are special cases, such as St Paul's Damascus Road experience, when God justifies someone at once without preparation.⁶⁰ It should also be pointed out that contrition and attrition, although both gifts from God

⁵⁸ *SH* Bk IV, Q17, M4, Ar3, p. 535.

⁵⁹ *SH* Bk IV, Q17, M4, Ar7, pp. 548–51.

⁶⁰ *SH* Bk IV, Q17, M5, Ar2, p. 553.

and the result of grace, cannot exist simultaneously any more than could an unformed and formed faith.⁶¹

Note that two Franciscans who were involved in the final compilation of the *SH*, William of Melitona and Odo Rigaldus, adopt similar positions in their own work. In his *Quaestiones de sacramentis*, William had likewise determined that it is grace freely given (*gratia gratis data*) which elicits the movement of free will to experience sorrow for one's sins, thereby setting the stage for the subsequent gratuitous infusion of sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciente*). Then, with the advent of sanctifying grace, the penitent's attrition becomes contrition. It is thus through freely given grace that someone recognizes the wounds of sin, an awareness which is followed by the sanctifying grace that leads one to seek a doctor.⁶² As such, therefore, confession and satisfaction do not precede the illumination of faith or grace; rather it is the intention to confess and perform satisfaction that often precedes illumination.⁶³ As for Odo, in his concise *De contritione* he observed not only that contrition and attrition are unqualifiedly different, but that attrition cannot become contrition.⁶⁴ Attrition remains a partial sorrow for some sins which is moved by grace freely given, according to Odo, whereas contrition grieves fully for all sins and is itself informed by sanctifying grace.⁶⁵ Attrition cannot, moreover, abide together with contrition, since the former is an act elicited from an unformed faith and thus cannot co-exist with the latter act elicited from a formed faith. And while both attrition and contrition are gifts of God, the former lacks charity whereas the latter signifies a movement of the will with charity.⁶⁶ So it is that the presence of contrition, i.e. actual sorrow for sin is necessary for the justification of the sinner.⁶⁷

Such attention paid to attrition was relatively recent, for as Anciaux points out 'attrition' does not really appear as a technical term in theological discussions of penance until the end of the 12th century. Then, by the 13th century, many concluded that attrition can become contrition through grace.⁶⁸ On this point Teetaert finds that both Alexander and Bonaventure were heavily indebted to William of Auvergne who had already developed a clear distinction between attrition and contrition. In his *De sacramentis*, William maintained that attrition was sufficient to approach the sacra-

61 *SH* Bk IV, Q17, M5, Ar3, p. 553.

62 William of Melitona, *Quaestiones de Sacramentis*, tr. 5, p. 3, q. 12, ed. Caelestinus Piana and Geodeon Gal, 2 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana scholastica Medii Aevi, 22–3 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1961), 2:870.

63 William of Melitona, *Quaestiones de Sacramentis*, tr. 5, p. 4, q. 25 (Piana and Gal, 2:927).

64 Odo Rigaldus's *De contritione* can be found in Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 737, fols 221–231. See Jeanne Barbet, 'Notes sur le manuscrit 737 de la Bibliothèque municipale de Toulouse: Questions Disputatae,' *Bulletin d'information de l'Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes* 5 (1956): 7–51, esp. 42.

65 Odo Rigaldus, *De contritione* (Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 737, fol. 222rb).

66 Odo Rigaldus, *De contritione* (Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 737, fol. 222va).

67 Odo Rigaldus, *De contritione* (Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 737, fol. 222vb).

68 Paul Anciaux, *Le Sacrement de la Pénitence* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1960), 139–46.

ment of penance, although he insisted that to obtain forgiveness of sins, attrition would have to change to contrition, which itself constitutes the principal part of penance. The priest's role in this transformation, however, is only to beseech God that he might bestow upon the penitent pardon and sanctifying grace. The priest's words of absolution do not render a judicial sentence, therefore, but amount to a prayer. Priestly absolution is merely an occasional, rather than an instrumental, cause of the forgiveness of sins. This view was shared by Alexander (on which more below).⁶⁹

Question 18: Confession

From here the *SH* takes up the subject of confession in Question 18, which is defined as a complete confession of one's own sins, not those of another, made in the presence of a priest; not, therefore, to God alone.⁷⁰ We are then, naturally enough, brought back to the central question as to whether confession to a priest by the penitent is actually necessary. An appeal is made to Augustine, although the text quoted is from Gratian's *Decretum*: it is the will that is rewarded, not the deed; yet the will is in contrition of heart, while the work is in confession of the mouth. Hence it is by contrition of heart, not confession of mouth, that sins are remitted.⁷¹ And so it would seem that if sin is blotted out by contrition rather than confession, the latter must be unnecessary for the penitent. Moreover, while justification suffices for the salvation of the penitent, confession is not required for the justification of the impious. There are only four things required: the infusion of grace, the movement of the free will, contrition, and forgiveness of sins. Furthermore, contrition on the part of the penitent suffices for the deletion of guilt and punishment, while the deletion of guilt and punishment, for their part, suffice for salvation. Responding to these arguments, the *SH* insists that confession on the part of the penitent is necessary by reason of a precept whether instituted by Christ or by the Church. For it is necessary that we do those things which Christ and the Church have established, lest we be found to hold those precepts in contempt. Confession is also necessary inasmuch as it is only fitting that the sinner, having sinned against God and the Church, be reconciled to the Church which is itself the Body of Christ. Hence it may be said that whereas we are reconciled to God by way of contrition, it is by confession that we are reconciled to the Church.⁷²

⁶⁹ William of Auvergne, *De sacramento poenitentiae*, in *Guilielmi Alverni Opera omnia*, 2 vols (Venice: Apud Ioannem Baptistam Natolinum, sumptibus Damiani Zenari, 1591), esp. c. 4, 2:44 1b and c. 19, 2:472 g. See Teetaert's discussion, *La Confession aux Laïques*, 260–2.

⁷⁰ *SH* Bk IV, Q18, M1, pp. 556–7.

⁷¹ See Gratian of Bologna, *Tractatus de penitentia*, d. 1, d.p.c. 30 (Friedberg, 1:1165). Cf. similar sentiments expressed by Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 31 (PL 36:267–8).

⁷² *SH* Bk IV, Q18, M2, Ar1, p. 557.

Confessing to a priest may indeed fulfill one's obligation, but what exactly takes place when priest and penitent meet? The *SH* notes that while it is true that the diminution of the penalty occurs through the power of the keys, more importantly, God can reward the penitent with an increase of grace through a devout confession as God acknowledges the humility involved in confessing one's sins. Along these lines, the act of confessing one's sins to the priest might also lead to the remission of guilt. For it sometimes happens that someone who is not contrite prior to confession, subsequently, in the midst of confession, receives from God the grace of contrition; and so it is that the Lord justifies the person who freely confesses his sins.⁷³ Note that it is God's direct action, not the sacerdotal power of the keys, which transforms the penitent's attrition into contrition, thereby resulting in his justification. William of Melitona, for his part, had also concluded the penitent need not be fully contrite upon meeting with the priest. Frequently, says William, the grace of contrition is actually given to one while one is making a sacramental confession, provided that the penitent places no obstacle to that grace.⁷⁴ Neither, therefore, does William attribute this conferral of contrition to the sacerdotal power of the keys; it remains dependent upon the penitent's own disposition.

There certainly seem to be some positive incentives to make one's confession to a priest, since God may well reward one for this act of piety even to the point of moving one to the contrition that one hitherto lacked. But if it is true that sins are remitted with regard to guilt, is one actually obliged (rather than merely encouraged) to confess one's sin to a priest? According to the *SH*, confession is indeed necessary. First of all, this is because there is no perfect or sufficient compunction unless the will to confess is present—a position explicitly attributed to Peter Lombard. And here in Question 18 the *SH* then appears to endorse the position of Richard of St Victor that the *Gloss* had also followed. For, according to the *SH*, God does not remit sins in contrition unqualifiedly (*simpliciter*), but rather conditionally (*sub conditione*), that condition being that the penitent would confess his or her sins when the opportunity presents itself. In the meantime, between contrition and confession, sins are remitted—so long (it must be said) as the penitent retains the intention to confess. Lacking such an intention, his penitence or compunction will remain insufficient.⁷⁵

The *SH* insists again, this time with respect to the justification of the impious, that contrition is not sufficient without the intent to confess and the execution of that intention when the opportunity presents itself. Confession, therefore, implicitly belongs to the definition of contrition itself. Moreover, says the *SH*, to the extent that there is contrition it is fitting that confession would follow unless the contrite person is somehow prevented; in that case, as with an adult wishing to be baptized, guilt can be removed through grace or the power of faith. Established teaching on baptism

⁷³ *SH* Bk IV, Q18, M2, Ar1, p. 558.

⁷⁴ William of Melitona, *Quaestiones de Sacramentis*, tr. 6, p. 3, q. 13 (Piana and Gal, 2:1046).

⁷⁵ *SH* Bk IV, Q18, M2, Ar1, p. 558.

actually provides a useful example: even as a willing adult may receive the baptism of the spirit, he or she should still seek out baptism by water in keeping with the Lord's admonition: 'Unless one be baptized by water and the spirit (...)' (John 3:5). Likewise, therefore, the intent to confess remains necessary, lest its omission be interpreted as contempt for the sacrament.⁷⁶

Actually, according to the *SH*, the necessity of oral, or sacramental, confession is established under the evangelical law. First of all, one's sin must be brought into the open and followed by an act of reconciliation on the part of the sinner made to God and the Church. Confession, therefore, provides for the detection of sin and leads to one's subsequent conversion to righteousness when the works of darkness are rebuked. This occurs in confession as the truth is brought to light; the intelligible becomes sensible. By speaking hidden things, they are made manifest as one gives vocal form to words of the heart. The other purpose, as noted, is the free act of reconciliation made to God and the Church; it is in this context that the priest serves as judge and arbiter between the sinner and God. Christ the mediator has left to the Church his own successors whom the Church has instituted as revealers and arbiters, and to whom is committed the authority of reconciliation. Such authority that was first in Christ the head, and is now shared with his members, belongs uniquely to the time of the new law, although it had been already prefigured in the old law when priests had the authority to discern between the clean and unclean, holy and profane.⁷⁷

Question 19: Confession with respect to Absolution

Where, precisely, in the Gospels was sacramental confession instituted? Some say it was when Jesus said, 'Go show yourself to the priests' (Matt. 8:4). Others note that neither the biblical text itself, nor the *Glossa Ordinaria*, actually mention vocal confession; in fact, the *Glossa* says just the opposite.⁷⁸ Then there are those who say that it was instituted in Matt. 4:17 where the precept was given: 'Do penance' (*poenitentiam agite*). Yet to this it is objected that Gregory the Great takes this command as an injunction to produce suitable fruits of repentance, and thus satisfaction; while the *Glossa* says it refers to mortification of the flesh.⁷⁹ And finally there is the problem that, unlike Baptism, which was expressly instituted by Christ, no such clear precept was given in this case. The *SH* is certain, however, that Christ did institute this sacrament, although one must recognize that there are two components in confession. The first is the material, which is the detection of sin; this was not openly instituted by Christ, but was instead insinuated. Then there is the formal, namely the power of ab-

⁷⁶ *SH* Bk IV, Q18, M2, Ar1, p. 558.

⁷⁷ *SH* Bk IV, Q18, M3, Ar1, p. 566.

⁷⁸ *Biblorum Sacrorum cum Glossa Ordinaria*, 6 vols (Venice: Apud Iuntas, 1603), 5:157–8.

⁷⁹ *Biblorum Sacrorum cum Glossa Ordinaria*, 5:69–70.

solving, which was instituted in the conferral of the power of the keys. Formally, therefore, the Lord had instituted the sacrament by conferring the power of the keys upon Peter and the other apostles (Matt. 16:18 and John 20:23).⁸⁰ Hence the sacrament that Christ instituted formally in the conferral of the keys was later promulgated by the Apostle James (James 5:16).⁸¹

What is at the root of the power to absolve sins? The *SH* provides a comprehensive list of answers to this question: some say it is born of authority and thus belongs to God alone; others that it is an excellence pertaining to Christ the man; or a commission or ministry and thus for priests to whom was committed the power of absolving in the reception of priestly orders; or perhaps this power is grounded in a meritorious life and thus belongs to all the saints; and still others hold that it proceeds from the unity of faith such that it belongs to all the faithful. Now, according to the *SH*, these last two are really a matter of beseeching rather than efficacious or judicial power. For although it is sometimes expeditious to confess one's sins humbly to someone other than a priest, this is not a proper sacramental confession, even if it is a work of virtue. To priests alone, says the *SH*, has been handed down the reconciliation that comes through absolving and binding, which is why one is bound to confess to a priest. Thus when it comes to James' admonition—'Confess your sins to one another (...)' (James 5:16)—some, appealing to the *Glossa Ordinaria*, say that this applies only to venial sins which do not need to be confessed to a priest.⁸² And yet since it was by those same words that sacramental confession seems to have been instituted or promulgated, one might say that confession can be taken in two ways: general and special confession. In both the general and the special there is confession to another person, but in special confession only to priests and in general to everyone. In that sense, then, James' single exhortation to confess can refer both to venial and to mortal sins, although with the proviso that to confess one's venial sins is only a counsel, whereas confession of mortal sins to a priest is a precept.⁸³

With the obligation to confess one's sins to a priest came a whole host of practical questions. Specifically, the *SH* had to address the Lateran IV constitution *Omnis utriusque* that had been codified in the Gregorian Decretals. According to the *SH*, one should not take it upon oneself to confess to some other priest and thereby withdraw from one's own parish priest. Someone wishing to confess to another priest, therefore, should first obtain a license from his own priest; if one cannot obtain it, then one may receive it from a superior. One may even confess to his parish priest and then later seek out another more discrete priest of one's own choosing.⁸⁴ As for women afraid to place themselves in danger by confessing to their own priest,

⁸⁰ *SH* Bk IV, Q18, M3, Ar2, p. 567.

⁸¹ *SH* Bk IV, Q19, M1, Ar1, p. 596.

⁸² *Bibliorum Sacrorum cum Glossa Ordinaria*, 6:1303–4.

⁸³ *SH* Bk IV, Q19, M1, Ar2, p. 596.

⁸⁴ *SH* Bk IV, Q19, M1, Ar2, p. 596.

they may confess to a superior or to some other priest without first obtaining a license. In this situation the corrupt priest would actually disqualify himself. For he would be dispensing the poison of death rather than the medicine of salvation, and so stand judged as a corruptor rather than a confessor.⁸⁵

The Lateran IV constitutions had also insisted in the strongest terms that sacramental confession must not be revealed for any reason. The *SH* recognizes that human existence is lived within both an interior and an exterior space. Within the interior forum of conscience, a person deals with those things that are to be kept secret, while the exterior forum pertains to the experiential wherein such things should be made manifest. What belongs to the interior forum of conscience must not be drawn into the exterior experiential forum, as would happen were a confession of sin revealed. What is confessed to a priest is secret, and it is only right that secret things remain hidden, since this pertains to faithfulness. There are clear pastoral concerns that must also be addressed: were a penitent's confession not to remain secret, it would be a thoroughly odious exercise that people would regard with horror.⁸⁶

The question of finding a suitable confessor was also addressed in the Early Rule of 1221, the so-called *Regula non bullata*:

Let all my blessed brothers, both clerics and lay, confess their sins to priests of our religion. If they cannot, let them confess to other discerning and Catholic priests, knowing with certainty that, when they have received penance and absolution from any Catholic priest, they are without doubt absolved from their sins, provided they have humbly and faithfully fulfilled the penance imposed on them. If they have not been able to find a priest, however, let them confess to their brother, as the Apostle James says: *Confess your sins to one another* (James 5:16). Nevertheless, because of this, let them not fail to have recourse to a priest because the power of binding and loosing is granted only to priests (cf. Matt. 18:18). Contrite and having confessed in this way, let them receive the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ with great humility (...).⁸⁷

It would seem, therefore, that the many contingencies surrounding the act of confession were still being worked out in the first few decades of the 13th century and were of immediate concern to the Franciscans.

Question 20: The Keys of the Church

The power of absolution belongs to the larger context of the keys of the Church. Here, as touched on above, the principal texts are to be found in Matt. 16:18 and John 20:23. In keeping with the aforementioned schema, we read that the key of authority be-

⁸⁵ *SH* Bk IV, Q19, M1, Ar2, p. 597.

⁸⁶ *SH* Bk IV, Q. 19, M2, Ar1, p. 599.

⁸⁷ 'The Early Rule (The Rule Without a Papal Seal)' [= *Regula non bullata*], c. 20, in Francis of Assisi, *Early Documents*, vol. 1, *The Saint*, ed. Regis J. Armstrong, J.A. Wayne Hellmann, and William J. Short (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2001), 77–8.

longs to God alone; the key of excellence to Christ; while the key of ministry pertains to the prelates of the Church. To be clear: God alone has the authority to forgive sins, and only Christ can remove human liability to eternal death, since it was through his passion that he made satisfaction on our behalf and thereby liberated us from death. That leaves the last key pertaining to the removal of temporal punishment owed to sin; this is the key that Christ bestowed upon his priests.⁸⁸

The key received by the priesthood must be considered both essentially and accidentally. Accidentally, it is a certain power of discernment which proceeds from knowledge, whether it be acquired or infused. Essentially, though, it is a sacramental power or authority conferred upon the priest in the reception of his orders. For in ordination a character is imprinted, inasmuch as the sacrament of order is a spiritual sign by which spiritual power is conferred upon the ordinand. To the objection that many priests appear to lack this power of discernment, the *SH* finds that is not the case if one is considering knowledge precisely as a sacramental power or authority; such knowledge is a key and is conferred in the rite of ordination. This key, belonging to the priest, is a power both to remove an impediment and a means to discern the measure of guilt, by which is determined the measure of punishment. In this way, the power of knowledge can be seen to cooperate with the power to bind and loose. For Christ, having been constituted as a judge, has granted this authority to his ministers in the Church to distinguish between lepers (cf. Lev. 13:3–17), thus determining for the penitent the penalty appropriate to his guilt. Again, the *SH* stresses, this key is granted in priestly ordination. In fact, if the priest ceased to possess such knowledge, i.e. the authority of discernment, he would cease to possess the key itself.⁸⁹

As for the key that constitutes the power of binding and loosing, this was first given to Peter and afterwards to the other apostles, and then through them to their vicars.⁹⁰ Matt. 16:18 would seem therefore to be a principal proof-text in establishing the conferral of the keys. Yet according to the *SH* there are those who contend that the keys were not actually conferred upon Peter at Caesarea Philippi, but only promised. In fact, this is what Jerome says when commenting on the passage. What is more, it would seem that the one who received the keys could not err. Even though the words *Tibi dabo claves* are expressed in the mode of a promise regarding some future event, it is still the case that they were chiefly given to Peter along with the words ‘Whatever you bind (...)’, which the *Glossa Ordinaria* makes clear.⁹¹ What to make of all of this? According to the *SH*, a certain beatitude was granted to the Apostles such that they could not err in the exercise of the keys. To them grace was given to discern between different sorts of sin and so sins are not loosed unless they had been loosed and not bound unless they had been bound. This appears to have been a unique gift bestowed upon the Apostles alone, however,

⁸⁸ *SH* Bk IV, Q20, M1, p. 603.

⁸⁹ *SH* Bk IV, Q20, M3, Ar1, p. 605.

⁹⁰ *SH* Bk IV, Q20, M3, Ar2, p. 605.

⁹¹ *Bibliorum Sacrorum cum Glossa Ordinaria*, 5:279–82.

since there are many now who possess the keys while lacking the beatitude, which is to say that many clerics can indeed err in the exercise of the keys.⁹²

The fact is that the power of the keys is given to good and bad ministers alike. It is a habitual key that follows upon ordination. And because it depends upon the dignity of priestly ordination itself, it is bestowed irrespective of the personal qualities of the ordinand. Thus even if the priest himself lacks charity he still retains the power of loosing in the faith and charity of the Church. This is because he does not possess the power of the keys though his own power, but only insofar as he is a minister of the Church. Were he to attempt to absolve by his own power, he could not do so unless he actually possessed faith and charity. Even if the ministers do not imitate the Apostles in manner of life, therefore, they nevertheless resemble them in ministerial order and power.⁹³

Question 21: The Power of the Keys

Looking at Hugh of St Victor's reading of the Lazarus event (John 11:43–44), it would seem that Lazarus was first justified by Christ in his raising from the dead before he was handed over to the disciples to be absolved. Hence it follows that absolution by the priest is of no avail before one is first justified by grace and raised from the death of guilt, which means that the priest himself has no power over guilt. Here the *SH* notes that some speak of the power of the keys insofar as it operates within the penitent's intention to confess, while others say it is operative in the act of confession itself. If the first, then the intention is already included in contrition, and in contrition guilt is blotted out. In that sense it is true that the power of the keys does extend in a certain manner to the blotting out of guilt. For someone cannot be justified and released from his guilt unless he intends to confess to a priest. Yet—and this is a crucial distinction—if we are speaking of the power as it operates within the act of absolving, then it cannot extend itself to guilt. This is because someone who worthily comes forward for absolution already approaches the priest contrite and spiritually resuscitated; his guilt has therefore already been forgiven him.⁹⁴

We find a similar argument presented by the Dominican Albert the Great in his *Sentences Commentary* circa 1242 to 1245. The keys, according to Albert, can open up the kingdom by removing the impediment of sin when the contrite person has the intention to confess and perform satisfaction. In fact, says Albert, nothing prevents the key from operating prior to the external action of the priest. For although the guilt and punishment are both absolved in contrition, this absolution does not

⁹² *SH* Bk IV, Q20, M6, Ar3, p. 610.

⁹³ *SH* Bk IV, Q20, M7, Ar1, p. 611.

⁹⁴ *SH* Bk IV, Q21, M1, p. 614.

occur by the power of contrition alone, but rather also by the power of the keys.⁹⁵ Only under these conditions, attached to the vow of the contrite penitent to confess, does Albert allow that the priest may be said to absolve from guilt and eternal penalty. Otherwise, though, we say that the priest only absolves by relaxing part of the penalty. This is because an offense against God is by definition infinite, and so its absolution cannot be subject to finite human power.⁹⁶

As the *SH* continues, it notes that there are others who say that the priest, through the power of the keys, functions as a mediator between God and human beings, such that through the priest, the sinner ascends to God. The priest at once speaks on behalf of humans, while through him God deigns to descend to humans. Having sought grace on behalf of the sinner, the absolution granted presupposes that divine grace has been bestowed upon the penitent, since the priest would never absolve anyone he does not believe God has already absolved. Thus in answer to the question whether the power of the keys extends as far as the blotting out of guilt, the *SH* determines that it does insofar as the priest beseeches God to absolve the penitent, but never as though the priest himself actually confers such absolution.⁹⁷ The priest therefore does not even function as an instrumental cause with respect to the forgiveness of sins. The penitent's guilt is erased directly by God in contrition, which is itself a condition resulting from divine grace. Note that Bonaventure said much the same thing in his own *Sentences* Commentary, observing that when one says that the power of the keys extends to the deletion of guilt, this refers to imploring and beseeching, which is signified in the blessing of the priest. The priest himself, says Bonaventure, does not actually impart absolution to the penitent, which means that the power of the keys does not, properly speaking, extend its reach to guilt.⁹⁸ Compare the position of these Franciscans, as well as the Dominican Albert, to that of the Dominican Thomas Aquinas for whom the power of the keys is the instrumental efficient cause of the grace received in the sacrament, whereas contrition constitutes only a necessary disposition for the reception of that grace.⁹⁹

95 Albert the Great, *Commentarii in Sententiarum* 4.18.1, in *Opera Omnia*, 38 vols, Étienne César Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1890–9), 29:764.

96 Albert the Great, *Commentarii in Sententiarum* 4.18.7 (Borgnet, 29:775).

97 *SH* Bk IV, Q21, M1, p. 615.

98 Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi* IV, d. 18, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 4:473. In 1946 Ralph Ohlmann was chagrined to conclude that Bonaventure's conception of the power of the keys, which exercises no causality in the removal of sin but instead presupposes its removal, did not correspond to the position taken at the Council of Trent. See Ralph Ohlmann, 'St Bonaventure and the Power of the Keys: Part I,' *Franciscan Studies* 6 (1946): 293–315; Ralph Ohlmann, 'St Bonaventure and the Power of the Keys: Part II,' *Franciscan Studies* 6 (1946): 437–65.

99 Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 28, a. 8, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia: iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. 22/3 (Rome: Editori di san Tommaso, 1967), 841–4.

At all events, things get even more interesting when the question resurfaces as to whether God remits the debt of eternal punishment absolutely or only conditionally. Note that here in Question 21, which is devoted to the Power of the Keys, the *SH* seems to present a different take on the matter than we encountered in Question 18 on Confession. First, the context: the *SH* has confirmed that the power of the priest's keys does not extend to eternal punishment, thereby in keeping with Peter Lombard's teaching. Yet it is objected that God can both per se and through his minister absolve the debt of damnation, and this should be understood as complete absolution. For example, if a sinner is contrite and wishes to confess but cannot find a priest, then God does absolve that person apart from his minister. But when there are priests available to whom one can confess and also receive a penance, then it will be through the sacerdotal ministry that the penitent is unqualifiedly and completely (*simpliciter et complete*) absolved of eternal punishment. Consequently, it asked whether God forgives sin unqualifiedly or conditionally (*absolute vel cum conditione*). It would seem the latter, because God absolves no one of eternal punishment unless under the condition that one be reconciled to the Church through the ministry of the Church. For no penitent is absolved of eternal punishment except under the condition that one make his confession to the minister, or at least resolves to do so given the opportunity.¹⁰⁰

On the other hand, absolution from eternal punishment occurs through the conferral of grace which takes place unqualifiedly. For, properly speaking, God withdraws grace from nobody; it is the sinner himself who expels grace. The point here is that God does not confer grace on someone only to take it away later, which would be the case were he only to confer it conditionally. Moreover, by releasing someone from eternal punishment, God binds that person to purgatory. But if God releases the person conditionally, then the obligation remains so long as the condition exists, and while the condition exists he or she is not unqualifiedly absolved from eternal punishment. This would result in a situation whereby someone is bound to purgatory even as he is not absolved of eternal punishment. Yet that would mean that one is not yet bound to purgatory so long as the condition exists, since one cannot be simultaneously bound to purgatory and eternal punishment. Additionally, there would arise the incongruous situation in which someone would be at once worthy of eternal life even while bound to the debt of eternal punishment up until the time that one completes the satisfaction enjoined by the priest.¹⁰¹

As it is, however, the *SH* cannot accept the notion that God may be said to absolve conditionally from guilt and eternal punishment, unless one were speaking very broadly (*quodam modo extraneo*). Better to state more plainly and accurately (*proprius et verius*) that God absolves unqualifiedly and absolutely from guilt and eternal punishment. For if God were only to absolve conditionally, a person could

¹⁰⁰ *SH* Bk IV, Q21, M2, Ar2, p. 616.

¹⁰¹ *SH* Bk IV, Q21, M2, Ar2, p. 617.

at once be a debtor to eternal punishment while presently in a state of grace. In other words, someone will have been freed from sin and thereby justified prior to his or her confession even as that person is walking around with eternal punishment hanging over his head until he finds a priest. And to those who say that God only absolves from eternal punishment under the condition that the penitent be reconciled to the Church and make one's confession to a minister, the *SH* reiterates the foundational principle that the intention to be reconciled and to confess belongs by definition to contrition itself. This means that no one is sufficiently contrite apart from possessing the will and the intention to confess given the opportunity. The nature of contrition thus understood, it is therefore unqualifiedly and absolutely true (*simpliciter vera et absolute*) that God absolves the contrite person from guilt and eternal punishment with no implicit condition attached (*nec est cointelligenda conditio aliqua*).¹⁰² In this vein, William of Melitona had maintained that contrition would have no efficacy unless sacramental confession made to a priest were to follow, precisely because negligence or contempt for confession unqualifiedly (*simpliciter*) renders contrition inefficacious.¹⁰³

Does the treatment of God's conditional absolution present an inconsistency between Question 18 and Question 21; and if so, what do we make of that? If, in fact, Question 18 proposes conditional absolution, then it seems to accord with Alexander's *Gloss*, which in turn concurs with the position of Richard of St Victor. If the *Gloss* is clearly the work of Alexander, does that mean that Question 18 is Alexander's own view and Question 21 a later, even non-Alexandrian, position taken by one of the Franciscans who completed the *SH*? That seems to make the most sense, because the post-Alexandrian editor of Question 21 regarded the notion of conditional divine absolution as untenable. Even as he let stand Alexander's own position in Question 18, he would correct the situation in a section on the power of the keys to which Alexander himself had not contributed. Not wishing thoroughly to discredit the argument of his illustrious master, however, he allowed (as we saw above) that one could speak of conditional absolution, just so long as one was speaking broadly. Hence the editor is only rendering more precise his teacher's position and in that way tying up a few loose ends; continuity is thereby preserved.

The question remains as to which Franciscan might have made this alteration. I have not found in William of Melitona's *Quaestiones de sacramentis* nor in Bonaventure's *Sentences* Commentary any discussion of unqualified and conditional absolution. As for Odo Rigaldus, it seems that he never produced a commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences*, and he does not address this topic in his *De contritione*.¹⁰⁴ It should be said that certain similarities in Book 4 of the *SH* with William of Melitona's *Quaestiones*—a few of which we noted—have led some to doubt the

¹⁰² *SH* Bk IV, Q21, M2, Ar2, p. 617.

¹⁰³ William of Melitona, *Quaestiones de Sacramentis*, tr. 6, p. 3, q. 13 (Piana and Gal, 2:1046).

¹⁰⁴ Killian Lynch, 'The Alleged Fourth Book of Odo Rigaud and Related Documents,' *Franciscan Studies* 9 (1949): 87–145.

Alexandrian provenance of the whole of *SH* Book 4. And it seems that Question 23 on Indulgences might be taken almost entirely from Bonaventure. That Book 4 was compiled from the works of William and Bonaventure is quite possible. Although Bonaventure himself not only claimed to have had the *SH* open before him, but he never questioned its authenticity.¹⁰⁵ We have certainly not resolved this larger matter here, but perhaps our discussion of conditional absolution will have shed some small ray of light on what still remains an opaque path.

105 See Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa,' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 26–41.

Marcia L. Colish

The Eucharist in Early Franciscan Tradition

Abstract: This paper considers three questions on the Eucharist treated by Alexander of Hales in his *Quaestiones disputatae antequam esset frater* and *Glossa* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, and then by William of Melitona in his *Quaestiones de sacramentis* and, as the acknowledged author or compiler of Book 4 of the *Summa Halensis*, in that text in its Cologne, 1622 edition: 1. Transubstantiation as the full substantial change of bread and wine on the altar into the body and blood of Christ as opposed to the remanescence and annihilation theories, the other two orthodox alternatives; 2. How two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time, although one of them, the glorified body of the resurrected Christ, is not held to be subject to the laws of physics governing natural bodies; and 3. How the accidents of bread and wine can survive in the consecrated elements, since they are no longer subtended by the substance of bread and wine. Along with standard authorities, Alexander and William draw on some distinctive sources. These include Peter Lombard's *Collectanea*, not always distinguished from the biblical *Glossa ordinaria* by Alexander's and William's editors; the semantic theory of Prepositinus of Cremona; and Innocent III's treatise on the Mass, which defends the Real Presence as transubstantiation in a work otherwise devoted to the liturgy of the Mass. The paper emphasizes the shifting analyses given by Alexander across his two treatments of these questions, as well as those altered by William—moving from semantic to physical to mathematical argumentation—in support of positions on the Eucharist which they shared, but which the *Summa Halensis* does not adopt.

Eucharistic theology has received no lack of attention from historians of scholasticism. Accenting philosophical explanations of the Real Presence doctrine after 1250, they tend to devalue earlier accounts as technically deficient or as confined to divine miracle. This study of Alexander of Hales, William of Melitona, and the *Summa Halensis* proposes a reevaluation of early Franciscan contributions to two major Eucharistic debates. Theologians in their day offered three alternative theories to explain Christ's Real Presence in the Eucharist. Alexander, William, and the authorities on whom they rely all support the transubstantiation theory and reject remanescence and annihilation. This position affected their approach to the second issue, accidents without a subject in the consecrated species. Sources available to Alexander and William in Latin, and their own ingenuity, informed the uses they make of the *artes* and philosophy. This paper will focus on the modes of argument they apply to these two controverted doctrines.

The characterization of early Franciscans as disinclined to apply rational explanations to the Eucharist can be found even in studies that valorize learning in that

order. Bert Roest begins with Bonaventure,¹ as does David Burr. Burr's early Franciscans join Eucharistic theologians whose view of their job 'was not to prove the unprovable or explain the unexplainable'.² While noting that, by 1330, the Franciscan defense of accidents without a subject had become 'an immovable given of metaphysics',³ William Duba gives no sense of its development before Duns Scotus. Marilyn Adams begins her survey with Aquinas, and is likewise uninterested in early scholastics on the topics she treats.⁴

As is well known, before and after the definition of the Real Presence as transubstantiation at Lateran IV in 1215, three theories were proposed to describe it. All were regarded as tenable within the western orthodox consensus.⁵ Historians have flagged the shift from a largely anti-heretical defense of the Real Presence to its reframing in Aristotelian terms. Indeed, it was the controversy launched by Berengarius of Tours in the 11th century that normalized the language of matter and form, substance and accident, in this context,⁶ Aristotelian terminology accessed by way of Boethius. A standard author in the Latin school curriculum, Boethius remained a major source for the philosophical arguments of Alexander and William as well, along with

1 Bert Roest, "'Franciscan Augustinianism': Musings about Labels and Late Medieval School Formation,' in Bert Roest, *Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission, c. 1226–1650: Cum scientia sit donum Dei, armatura ad defendendam sanctam fidem catholicam...*, The Medieval Franciscans, 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 111–3, and this despite Roest's vigorous defense of the acceptability of learning from Francis of Assisi onward in Bert Roest, 'Francis of Assisi and the Pursuit of Learning,' in *Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission*, 1–18; Bert Roest, 'The Franciscan School System: Re-assessing the Early Evidence,' in *Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission*, 19–50; and Bert Roest, 'Religious Life in the Franciscan School Network (13th Century),' in *Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission*, 51–82. The anthology *De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta scholam franciscanum*, ed. Willibrord Lampen (Bonn: Petrus Hanstein, 1931) is not of use in this paper; while the editor's selections begin with the *Summa Halensis* (ascribing its authorship to Alexander) they do not treat the Eucharistic topics here discussed.

2 David Burr, *Eucharistic Presence and Conversion in Late Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Thought*, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 74/3 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984), 6–7.

3 William O. Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine: The Academic Year 1330–31 and the Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris*, Studia Sententiarum, 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 150–3; quotation at 153.

4 Marilyn McCord Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

5 Hans Jorissen, *Die Entfaltung der Transsubstantiationslehre bis zum Beginn der Hochscholastik*, Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie, 28/1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1965), 11–154, 156; Gary Macy, *The Theologies of the Eucharist in the Early Scholastic Period: A Study of the Salvific Function of the Sacrament according to the Theologians, c. 1080-c. 1220* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 3–5; Gary Macy, 'Berengar's Legacy as a Heresiarch,' in *Treasures from the Storeroom: Medieval Religion and the Eucharist* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 59–80, Gary Macy, 'The "Dogma of Transubstantiation" in the Middle Ages,' in *Treasures from the Storeroom*, 82–120; Paul J.J.M. Bakker, *La rai-son et le miracle: Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250-c. 1400): Contribution à l'étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie*, 2 vols. (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 1999), 1:156–66; Bakker begins his account with William of Auxerre.

6 Jorissen, *Die Entfaltung*, 25–44, 156.

more recent Latin sources and translations. Before continuing, let us note that the investigation in this paper will be limited to printed sources, including, perforce, the uncritical early modern edition of Book 4 of the *Summa Halensis*. Another limitation is that we will not draw systematically on biblical exegesis as a source, although the scholastics did so. And, despite the terms preferred by some modern scholars,⁷ we will follow our medieval authors in naming the three Real Presence theories: remanescence, annihilation, and transubstantiation.

Proponents of remanescence held that the substance of bread and wine remains in the consecrated species, at least in part, in order to provide a substrate in which the accidents of bread and wine can inhere. Proponents of annihilation held that the bread and wine are totally annihilated by the consecration; God then replaces them with newly created species that contain both Christ's body and blood and the accidents of bread and wine. Both annihilationists and proponents of the complete substantial change of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, called transubstantiation since the early twelfth century, had to account for the inherence of the accidents of bread and wine in species that no longer contain the substance of bread and wine. They agreed that such was the case; what they debated was if, and how, it could be explained, beyond the reiteration of biblical and patristic assertions and the appeal to miracle.

Alexander of Hales is rightly hailed for making the commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* a requirement for incipient university theologians.⁸ Yet, it is remarkable how little attention has been paid to the Lombard's own teachings on the Eucharist as a source for Alexander's. In Peter's *Collectanea* (first redaction 1139/41, second redaction 1157/58), his commentary on 1 Cor. 11:23–24 defends the transubstantiation theory and formulates a position on accidents without a subject that resonates later. He invokes the Aristotelian language of substance and accidents. 'It is believed', he observes, that [the bread and wine] 'change into the substance of [Christ's] body and blood' (*credatur transire in substantiam corporis et sanguinis*). Regarding the consecrated species, he maintains that their 'color, taste, shape, and weight, which were accidents of their substance before, (...) may exist without a subject, even as they do in a subject' (*color, sapor, forma, pondus, quae prioris sub-*

7 Macy, 'Dogma of Transubstantiation,' 83 and passim substitutes 'coexistence', 'substitution', and 'transmutation' while James F. McCue, 'The Doctrine of Transubstantiation from Berengar through Trent: The Point at Issue,' *Harvard Theological Review* 61 (1968): 385–430 calls the remanescence theory 'consubstantiation' with an evident eye to later Reformation usage; he gives marginal attention to Alexander of Hales and William Melitona as opponents of remanescence.

8 Philipp W. Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's Sentences*, Rethinking the Middle Ages, 2 (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2007), 60–1, although his discussion of Alexander's departures from and amplifications of the Lombard's teachings at 56, 65–9 does not touch on the Eucharist.

stantiae accidentia fuerunt, (...) dicimus nobis potius videri quod sint sine subjecto quam in subjecto).⁹

While the Lombard does not offer a rationale for these positions in his Pauline exegesis he does so in his *Sentences* (final redaction 1155/57). He first seeks to shift discussion away from the contrast between the Aristotelian natural changes summarized by Boethius and those wrought by divine miracles with a semantic argument, based on a distinction between literal and metaphorical Eucharistic language drawn from Augustine and confirmed by Ambrose and Eusebius: the term ‘body’ (*corpus*) signifies, literally, the invisible body of Christ in the consecrated species; it signifies, metaphorically, the visible elements on the altar. Rather than citing a barrage of biblical references to the Eucharist as if their meaning were transparent, Peter uses this semantic distinction as a hermeneutic tool for interpreting them.¹⁰ Turning to transubstantiation, again back-stopped by Augustine and Ambrose, the Lombard sides with ‘those who say that a substance is changed into a substance, so that the one may become the other essentially’ (*dicentibus sic substantiam converti in substantiam, ut haec essentialiter fiat illa*) and reaffirms that ‘the species of [these] things remain the way they were before, both their taste and weight’ (*species rerum quae ante fuerant remanent, et sapor et pondus*).¹¹ Rejecting the claim that the elements never change or that their change entails the transubstantiation of the grains and grapes that make bread and wine,¹² he wields Gregory the Great against their annihilation, insisting that the elements are changed fully and substantially although they retain their accidents.¹³ As Peter explains, given that the substance of the elements has been changed into the substance of Christ’s body and blood, in which accidents of bread and wine cannot inhere, ‘these accidents therefore remain, subsisting *per se*’ (*remanent ergo illa accidentia per se subsistentia*).¹⁴ Both Peter’s reference

9 Peter Lombard, *In 1 Cor.* 11:23–4, in *Collectanea in omnes D. Pauli apostoli Epistolas* (PL 191:1644B–C) for these two quotations. This text, acknowledged to need a critical edition, is held to represent the second redaction. Unless otherwise indicated translations in this paper are my own.

10 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libros distinctae* 4, d. 10, cc. 1–2, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols, 3rd ed. (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 2:290–6. For more on the Lombard and his immediate predecessors on the topics discussed in this paper see Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, 41/1–2 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 2:552–83.

11 Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4, d. 11, c. 1, nn. 1–2 (Brady, 2:296; Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, trans. Giulio Silano, 4 vols, Mediaeval Sources in Translation, 42, 43, 45, 48 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007–10), 4:54). For more on the consecrated species’ retention of taste and weight see Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4, d. 12, c. 1 (Brady, 2:304).

12 Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4, d. 11, c. 2, nn. 3–4 (Brady, 2:297).

13 Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4, d. 11, c. 2, nn. 3–10 (Brady 2:297–9).

14 Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4, d. 12, c. 1, n. 1 (Brady, 2:304; Silano, 4:60 (with slight modification)). While Jørgen Vijgen, *The Status of Eucharistic Accidents “sine subiecto”: An Historical Survey up to Thomas Aquinas and Selected Reactions*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens: neue Folgen, 20 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2013) focuses on Dominicans from Aquinas forward, at 48 he recognizes that Peter Lombard was the first theologian to argue that Eucharistic accidents

to weight, an accident that is quantifiable, and his argument for the accidents' ability to exist *per se*, have a notable future ahead of them.

The leading post-Lombardian text to take these arguments in a more analytical direction is the *Summa theologiae* of the Paris master Prepositinus of Cremona (1195).¹⁵ In his treatise on the Eucharist and elsewhere Prepositinus tends to ignore positions he disagrees with or to declare that the ones he espouses settle debates which are, in fact, ongoing. Prepositinus omits remanescence and annihilation altogether and confines himself to transubstantiation. His chief contribution lies in his semantics, which takes for granted the theory of signification and supposition that was the last word in Paris. What does 'this' (*hoc*) mean in the consecration formula 'this is my body' (*hoc est corpus meum*)? *Hoc* is a pronoun. Now, nouns and verbs denote things and actions as such, in addition to what they mean in particular statements. Pronouns have meaning only intra-propositionally, in relation to the nouns for which they stand. In this usage, does *hoc* refer to the bread on the altar? If so, before or after it is consecrated? Does *hoc* stand for Christ's body? If so, is this pronoun demonstrative or representative? Can it function both ways at the same time? Does it have the same meaning when spoken by Christ at the Last Supper and by a celebrant today? It all depends on the circumstances, says Prepositinus. At the Last Supper, '[Christ] pronounced the blessing, so that it would be understood to denote [his body] both representatively and demonstratively' (*et representative et demonstrative ut bis intelligatur dixisse hoc modo: benedixit, dicens (...)*). Celebrants must consecrate using the correct formula, given by the Lord himself. Yet, at the Last Supper, it was not Christ's words themselves, 'but his secret and spiritual blessing that accomplished it. For he gave these words their power so that it would be accomplished this way in the future' (*sed sua secreta et spirituali benedictione hoc fecit. Dedit tamen vim illis verba ut per ea in posterum fieret*).¹⁶

Prepositinus also has strict criteria for the verbs used in statements about Eucharistic change. The elements must not be treated as subjects of active verbs. We must not say that the bread will become the Body of Christ, or that it has become the body of Christ. Statements using verbs in the active voice are unacceptable because they attribute agency to the bread, as if it were able to actualize its own potentialities in the change. It cannot do so. There is no parallel here with a statement

could be self-subsistent and that weight was among the accidents mentioned. He discusses other 12th-century figures at 31–64.

15 For the career of Prepositinus see Marcia L. Colish, 'Scholastic Theology in Paris around 1200,' in *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities*, ed. Spencer E. Young, Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 36 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 32–4. For speculative grammar at the end of the 12th century and its application to theology see Luisa Valente, *Logique et théologie: Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220* (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 234–72, 333–83.

16 Prepositinus, *Praepositini Cancellarii de Sacramentis et de novissimis (Summae theologiae Pars Quarta)*, ed. Daniel Edward Pilarczyk, Collectio Urbaniana Series 3: Textus ac documenta, 7 (Rome: Editiones Urbanianae, 1964), 77–9; quotation at 77. See the discussion of Prepositinus and others of his generation in Vijgen, *Eucharistic Accidents*, 71–8.

such as ‘the flour will become bread’ (*farina erit panis*). We must use verbs in the passive voice, since the Eucharistic bread does not act, but is acted upon. Thus, what we must say is that the consecrated bread ‘was transubstantiated, so as to be converted’ (*transubstantiabitur, convertetur*).¹⁷

While Prepositinus notably amplifies the Lombard’s appeal to semantics, he uses a less Aristotelian vocabulary in discussing accidents without a subject and undermines Peter’s argument for why that condition is possible. Abandoning the idea of Eucharistic accidents as able to subsist *per se*, Prepositinus holds ‘that they exist, miraculously, without a subject’ (*Dicimus quod miraculose sunt sine subiecto*).¹⁸ So, on that point he takes a backward step, notwithstanding the semantic refinements he elsewhere makes to the Lombard’s position.

Pope Innocent III had an accurate grasp of the works of Prepositinus and those of other recent and current scholastics. He had studied theology at Paris from the mid-1170s to the mid-1180s and retained a well-informed and lively interest in the subject. As pope he promoted his former master Peter of Corbeil to the see of Cambrai and then to Sens, and raised to the cardinalate Stephen Langton and Robert of Courçon, fellow-students who became masters in turn. Robert served as papal legate to the University of Paris in 1215, implementing statutes that reflect Innocent’s ongoing support of theological education at his *alma mater*. Innocent had Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* read to him at mealtimes, and was heard to remark, correctly, that those who had attacked that master’s Christology had mistaken positions he summarized for those he espoused. Innocent’s response, in 1201, to a theological query sent to him by Peter, Archbishop of Compostela, reveals his grasp of the semantic theory currently being taught, and applied to theology, at Paris.¹⁹

¹⁷ Prepositinus, *Summa theologiae*, 81 and 82 for these quotations. Irène Rosier-Catach, *La parole efficace: Signe, rituel, sacré* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2004), 360 notes Prepositinus’ insistence on verbs in the passive voice but ignores his theological rationale for this usage; here and throughout her discussion of medieval Eucharistic language she processes her authors through the template of speech-act theory, seeing the relevant issue, for them, as the relationship between the speaker’s intentions and the efficacy of the words themselves. At 102, Rosier-Catach confines God’s role to activating the sacrament’s effect in its recipient.

¹⁸ Prepositinus, *Summa theologiae*, 82.

¹⁹ Innocent’s Parisian education, his knowledge and use of scholastic philosophy and theology, and his promotion of scholastics to high ecclesiastical office have been widely noted. See for example Helene Tillmann, *Pope Innocent III*, trans. Walter Sax, Europe in the Middle Ages, 12 (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1980), 3, 4–5, 13, n. 46, 299; Christoph Egger, ‘Papst Innocenz III. als Theologe: Beiträge zur Kenntnis seines Denken im Rahmen der Frühscholastik,’ *Archivum Historiae Pontificae* 30 (1992): 55–123; Christoph Egger, ‘A Theologian at Work: Some Remarks on Methods and Sources in Innocent III’s Writings,’ in *Pope Innocent III and His World*, ed. John C. Moore (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 25–33; Spencer E. Young, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248*, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought: Fourth Series, 94 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 27–8; Matthew Doyle, *Peter Lombard and His Students*, Medieval Law and Theology, 8; Studies and Texts, 201 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2016), 68–71; for the debate on the Lombard’s Christology see Marcia L.

Innocent wrote his commentary on the Mass, *De sacro altare mysterii libri sex* (1195/97), while still a cardinal. This treatise has appealed mainly to scholars writing on the history of its genre or the history of the liturgy.²⁰ Indeed, the bulk of the text deals with what we might call the directions for staging a pontifical high Mass, with a detailed discussion of its prayers, their biblical sources and multiple meanings; the celebrant's gestures, vestments, and accoutrements; and the rules for who can celebrate and receive the sacrament. Book 4 of this work treats the Real Presence doctrine. This section of Innocent's treatise is omitted from its modern critical edition and, while described as 'a compendium of scholastic debates concerning the Eucharist', it is often bypassed by historians of Eucharistic theology.²¹ The only full-dress study of Innocent as Eucharistic theologian in this work is descriptive rather than analytical.²² But Innocent's use of his sources, the positions he defends, and his influence on Alexander of Hales and William of Melitona merit, and reward, further attention.

Innocent draws on both the Lombard and Prepositinus. With the Lombard, he leads off with transubstantiation before critiquing remanescence and annihilation. While he does not disdain the appeal to miracle in the Eucharistic change, he takes to heart Prepositinus' semantic strictures, confining himself to verbs in the passive voice in describing it: 'The matter of the bread or wine is changed into the substance of [Christ's] flesh and blood, (...) transubstantiated into [his] body' (*materia panis vel vini mutatur in substantiam carnis et sanguis, (...) transubstantiatur in corpus*). He also agrees with the Lombard that this substantial change is total and permanent.²³

Colish, 'Christological Nihilianism in the Second Half of the Twelfth Century,' in Marcia L. Colish, *Studies in Scholasticism* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), ch. 15.

20 Gary Macy, 'Commentaries on the Mass during the Early Scholastic Period,' in *Treasures from the Storeroom* (see above, n. 5), 142–71 with the section on Innocent's work at 154–6; Anko Ypenga, 'Innocent III's *De missarum mysteriis* Reconsidered: A Case Study on the Allegorical Interpretation of Liturgy,' in *Innocenzo III: Urbs et orbis: Atti del congresso internazionale, Roma, 9–15 settembre 1998*, ed. Andrea Sommerlechner, 2 vols, *Nuovi Studi Storici*, 55 (Rome: Nella sede dell'Istituto, Palazzo Borromini, 2003), 1:332–9. Cf. the dismissive view of John C. Moore, *Pope Innocent III (1160/61–1216): To Root up and to Plant*, *Medieval Mediterranean*, 47 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 22; for Moore, this is Innocent's 'most problematic' work because it has nothing to say on church governance or current politics.

21 Macy, 'Commentaries on the Mass,' 156; cf. David F. Wright, 'A Medieval Commentary on the Mass: *Particulae* 2–3 and 5–6 of the *De missarum mysteriis* (ca. 1195) of Cardinal Lothar of Segni (Pope Innocent III),' (PhD thesis, University of Notre Dame, 1971).

22 Michele Maccarrone, 'Innocenzo III teologo dell'Eucharistia,' in Michele Maccarrone, *Studi su Innocenzo III*, *Italia sacra*, 17 (Padua: Antenore, 1972), 341–431.

23 Innocent III, *Mysteriorum evangelicae legis et sacramenti eucharistiae libri sex* 4.7 (PL 217:860D-861 A) for the quotation; see also Innocent III, *Mysteriorum evangelicae* 4.7 (PL 217:859C-861 A) for the use of passive verbs and Innocent III, *Mysteriorum evangelicae* 4.9 (PL 217:862C) for the permanence of the change.

The body and blood of Christ fully inhabit all hosts and their fragments, Innocent argues, contra the remanescence theory. He offers an analogy in support of this point. We can see our entire image in a mirror when the mirror is whole and in its fragments if it is broken. While not noting the limits of this analogy, Innocent admits that, since all bodies, resurrected or not, have physical boundaries, he has no response to the objection that no body can be in two places at once.²⁴

In a maneuver that proves influential, Innocent yokes the ability of accidents to exist without a subject to the attack on the annihilation theory. There is no need to posit the utter destruction of the elements and their miraculous recreation *de novo*. Anyhow, even if recreated this way, they will still have accidents without a subject. Not to worry; the Lombard has solved this problem, and Innocent agrees: ‘But after the consecration, an accident exists without a subject, since it exists *per se*, for the substance indeed changes but the accident remains’ (*Sed post consecrationem accidens est sine subjecto, quoniam existit per se, transit enim substantia, sed remanent accidentia*). Without naming any of the Lombard’s self-subsistent accidents, Innocent concludes that, while none of the Aristotelian-Boethian modes of natural change account for transubstantiation, that entire line of argument can be dismissed given the capacity of the transubstantiated species to retain their accidents.²⁵

Innocent laments that controversialists conduct Eucharistic debates ‘more subtly than usefully’ (*subtiliter magis quam utiliter*);²⁶ but more is in store, including developments stemming from his own influence on Alexander of Hales, the true founder of early Franciscan thought on the Eucharist. Alexander’s teaching survives in two texts, his *Quaestio* 51 on the Eucharist, found among his disputed questions (1220/36), and in Book 4 of his *Glossa* on the *Sentences* (1223/25). Both were written before he became a Franciscan. Although his editors make no attempt to date individual *quaestiones*, internal evidence suggests that *Quaestio* 51 predates the *Glossa*, which is how we will treat it here.

Quaestio 51 rarely cites Alexander’s sources expressly. He does quote and attribute the Lombard’s general definition of sacrament.²⁷ But, without naming remanescence or annihilation, he aligns himself with the Lombard’s critique of both positions. Alexander also amplifies Prepositinus’ semantic arguments. At times he also takes an independent line. In a remark not found in his sources, he chides predeces-

²⁴ Innocent III, *Mysterium evangelicae* 4.8 (PL 217:861B-861C).

²⁵ Innocent III, *Mysterium evangelicae* 4.9 (PL 217:861D-862C); quotation at 862B. For the critique of natural modes of change see Innocent III, *Mysterium evangelicae* 4.20 (PL 217:870 A-871D). Innocent on the survival of accidents is noted by Vijgen, *Eucharistic Accidents*, 66, with a good general discussion of his position at 64–9.

²⁶ Innocent III, *Mysterium evangelicae* 4.20 (PL 217:870C).

²⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestio* 51, d. 1, m. 2, nn. 9–12, in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae “Antequam esset frater”*, 3 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 2:894–97, citing Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4, d. 8, c. 7 (Brady, 2:284–6).

sors, who do not always get everything right, with focusing so much on the Eucharistic bread that they slight the wine.²⁸ While ignoring debates on Eucharistic liquids that did exist, Alexander asserts that, had he willed to do so, Christ could have transubstantiated himself into an element other than bread.²⁹

Following the Lombard and Prepositinus, Alexander's main argument in *Quaestio* 51 starts with transubstantiation and treats the semantic propriety of statements about the Eucharist before moving on to remanescence and annihilation. Should we say that the bread becomes the body of Christ? Or that the bread will become the body of Christ? Alexander firmly rejects statements that would give agency to the elements. Thus, we must say that 'the bread is changed into the body of Christ' (*panis mutatur in corpus Christi*). We must not say that 'the bread makes the body of Christ' (*panis fit corpus Christi*) but must say that 'what was bread is the body of Christ' (*quod fuit panis est corpus Christi*) when it is consecrated.³⁰ At the same time as he applies these semantic rules, Alexander agrees with Prepositinus that it is not the words themselves but Christ's power that effects the Eucharistic change.³¹

Against the remanescence theory Alexander's *Quaestio* 51 joins the Lombard and Innocent in stressing that the Eucharistic change is both real and full. Against the annihilation theory he agrees that, since the accidents of bread and wine remain, the elements are not totally annihilated. Citing and dismissing an analogy proposed by some defenders of remanescence, that of light which can pass through glass without changing either the glass or itself, he wraps up his critique of both positions, asserting that the accidents indeed remain unchanged, while the substance of the elements is thoroughly changed, from an unglorified to a glorified state.³²

This brings *Quaestio* 51 to the theme of accidents without a subject. Alexander takes the self-subsistent accidents of the Lombard and Innocent in a new direction. While Alexander uses the term 'marvelous' (*mirabile*) to describe it, he treats this situation as grounded in natural reality, obviating the need to explain it purely as a miracle. He cites Basil, not mentioned by the Lombard or Innocent in this connection: while we can think about accidents distinct from substance, as abstract ideas, what we can only conceptualize, God can do. But the situation in the consecrated elements is not abstract, says Alexander. It is *de facto*. 'An accident,' he as-

28 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestio* 51, d. 1, m. 5, nn. 25–6, 2:903–4. For debates on the substitution of other liquids for wine see Gary Macy, 'Mediterranean Meals to Go: Early Encounters with Nonvinous Cultures,' *Worship* 92 (2018): 12–27, although this study does not include Alexander. My thanks to Prof Macy for this reference.

29 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestio* 51, d. 6, m. 8, nn. 191–4, 2:462–3.

30 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestio* 51, d. 3, m. 1, n. 60, 2:916 for his posing of these questions and d. 3, m. 4, nn. 95–6, 2:930–1 and d. 6, m. 7, nn. 189–90, 2:960–2 for his answers; quotations at d. 3, m. 4, n. 97, 2:931.

31 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestio* 51, d. 6, m. 7, nn. 189–190, 2:960–2.

32 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestio* 51, d. 3, m. 1, nn. 61–76, 2:917–23; d. 3, m. 2, nn. 77–89, 2:924–28; d. 4, m. 2, nn. 112–7, 2:936–8. Alexander raises and dismisses as a non-question the issue of 'how much Christ' is present in the consecrated elements at d. 5, m. 1, n. 29, 2:941–4.

serts, 'sometimes has its own kind of being, according to its own essence, which does not depend on a subject. (...) Thus, even if the substance of bread should be destroyed, its quantity is not destroyed' (*Accidens habet quoddam esse secundum suam essentiam quod non dependet a subiecto. (...) Licet ergo panis substantia destruitur, quantitas tamen non destruitur*). Here Alexander moves from the Lombard's accident of weight, listed along with other, non-quantitative accidents, and focuses on quantity alone. This is an innovation for which Alexander is rightly credited, if it is not always recognized as an extension of the Lombard's teaching.³³

Alexander enriches the above arguments in his *Glossa*. In this work he is much more inclined to cite authorities, beyond those who, like Augustine, are not named but absorbed via the Lombard's assimilation of them. Along with the Lombard himself and Peter's own patristic sources he cites Basil, whom we have met and will meet again, Jerome, and Ambrose. He also cites later authors, including John Damascene, whom the Lombard had introduced into Latin theology, Hugh of St Victor, Peter of Poitiers, Peter Comestor, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Gratian. Some are contemporaries cited by the Lombard, if not on the Real Presence; others wrote after his day.³⁴ Most of the philosophy Alexander invokes, pro or con, comes from Boethius, not from new Greco-Arabic translations. The Latin source he cites most frequently is Innocent III.³⁵ A content-analysis of his Innocent citations, however, shows that few of them come from Book 4 of the pope's treatise on the Mass. The vast majority of them deal with liturgical and administrative matters found elsewhere in that text. On these

33 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestio* 51, d. 3, m. 1, n. 74, 2:922; d. 4, m. 3, nn. 18–27, 2:938–41 for these successive quotations. Vijgen, *Eucharistic Accidents*, 83–6, 354 hails this innovation; but he thinks that *Quaestio* 51 post-dates the *Glossa* although his discussion of the latter text shows that it gives a fuller account of this doctrine. Vijgen does not connect it either with the Lombard's account of accidents without a subject or with Alexander's critique of nihilism. Cf. Bakker, *La raison et le miracle*, 1:293–4, who notes that most subsequent scholastics follow the Lombard on the accidents of taste and weight. At 1:302–4 Bakker presents Alexander's position as quite close to that of Aquinas, framing this idea in terms of the distinction of essence and existence. He does not discuss the influence of the argument he ascribes to Alexander on William of Melitona or the *Summa Halensis*.

34 Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), e.g. 4, d. 8, a. 8, 4:139; d. 11, a. 9, 4:176 (Hugh and Jerome: No post-Last Supper Eucharists were celebrated until after the Crucifixion); d. 10, a. 9, 4:165 (Ambrose: Transubstantiation occurs fully); d. 11, a. 5, 4:173–4 (Hugh and Damascene: Against annihilation); d. 11, aa. 1–2, 4:168–70 (Peter of Poitiers and Bernard of Clairvaux: Transubstantiation as a miracle); d. 11, aa. 3–4, 4:170–1 (Peter Comestor: When, during the pronouncement of the consecration formula, the Eucharistic change occurs); d. 11, a. 2, 4:170 (Damascene: Why there are two species); d. 13, a. 5, 4:201–3 (Gratian: Communion denied to excommunicates). This selection does not exhaust the list.

35 On Alexander's role in putting Innocent on the scholastic agenda but without a content-analysis of his use of his work see Jorissen, *Die Entfaltung*, 34–6, 43–4; Maccarrone, 'Innocenzo III,' 399; Gary Macy, 'Reception of the Eucharist according to the Theologians: A Case of Diversity in the 13th and 14th Centuries,' in *Treasures from the Storeroom* (see above, n. 5), 37.

topics Alexander usually agrees with Innocent.³⁶ The most foundational theological idea he credits to Innocent concerns the manifestation of Christ's divine nature: as a Trinitarian person Christ manifests divine ubiquity in the creation, by essence. He manifests his divinity to the just, by grace. He manifests his divinity in union with his humanity, by incarnation. This union of divinity and humanity in the incarnate Christ has three modes: it exists 'locally, in heaven; personally, in the Word; and sacramentally, on the altar' (*localiter in caelo, personaliter in Verbo, sacramentaliter in altari*).³⁷ Stated at the opening of the *Glossa*'s treatise on the Eucharist, this is a theme to which Alexander returns.

Despite his reliance on Innocent there are issues on which Alexander departs from him. He expressly dismisses Innocent's mirror analogy, citing Aristotle as his counter-authority. This analogy, he notes, fails to address a larger objection to transubstantiation, the inability of two bodies to occupy the same space at the same time. Alexander proposes an alternative: Christ's Real Presence in multiple hosts, or parts of hosts, 'is not contained spatially, as if one part could be assigned here and another part there, parts according to places, but definitively' (*non continetur situ aliter, ut sit assignare hanc partem ibi et hanc partem hic, secundum partes loci, sed definitive*). What is definitive here is the divine nature united to Christ's glorified human body. It is this divine nature that enables him to make his body present simultaneously in all Eucharistic elements and parts of them. Here, Alexander makes a key distinction: divine ubiquity as the enabling condition of the Eucharistic Real Presence is specific to that sacrament. It should not be confused with divine ubiquity in its most general sense.³⁸ In effect, on this topic Alexander uses one of Innocent's positions, which he supports, to correct another of Innocent's positions, which he rejects.

In the *Glossa* Alexander also treats as discussion-worthy a subject declared closed by Innocent, the mandatory use of wine in the Eucharist, compensating here for the inattention to wine that bemuses him in *Quaestio* 51. Alexander takes seriously those who consider whether another liquid might be substituted if wine is unavailable. Alexander shares with Innocent the consensus on concomitance, which views the body and blood of Christ as equally present in each of the consecrated species. That said, there is real merit in the proposal that, where wine is lacking, the best course of action would be to administer the Eucharist via the host alone.

³⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 8, a. 5, 4:135–6; d. 8, aa. 12–6, 4:143–6; d. 11, a. 13b, 4:178; d. 11, aa. 15–6, 4:179–80; d. 11, aa. 20–2, 4:183–4; d. 12, a. 4, 4:190–1; d. 12, a. 11, 4:196; d. 13, a. 3, 4:200; d. 13, aa. 9–10, 4:204–6. The issues here are mostly directives to celebrants and include the use of the liturgical consecration formula despite variations in the New Testament references to it; the need to approach the Eucharist fasting although it was received at the end of a meal at the Last Supper; the mandatory use of unleavened bread, wine, and water; the frequency of Eucharistic celebrations; who is qualified to celebrate; and why the reasons for offering a sacrifice are perfected in the Eucharist.

³⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 8, a. 4, 4:134.

³⁸ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 10, a. 4, 4:155; d. 12, a. 9, 4: 193–5; quotation at d. 12, a. 9, 4:193.

Having aired both the rule Innocent presents as non-negotiable and these other, more practical, options, Alexander admits that he remains undecided on this still open question.³⁹

Turning to Alexander's defense of transubstantiation and critique of remanescence and annihilation, he shares with the Lombard and Prepositinus a concern with semantics, upgrading their analyses. Here too, semantic specifications preface what follows. Alexander refers expressly to the supposition theory presupposed by Prepositinus. Defending Christ's Eucharistic ubiquity, Alexander argues that we cannot say 'this man is everywhere' (*iste homo est ubique*) when *homo* supposit a man like us. We say 'this man' (*iste homo*) when we simply supposit a particular individual. But, in speaking of the Eucharist, when we say *iste homo* what we supposit circumscriptively (*per circumscriptione*) is Christ, the man now in heaven, whose divinity exempts his glorified humanity from the limits of an earthly body.⁴⁰ Alexander presents this innovative application of supposition theory as another way of short-circuiting the objection that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time: 'For when "this man" is said [of Christ], what is referred to is the person to whom human nature is joined' (*Cum enim dicitur 'iste homo' dicitur persona cui humana natura est unita*).⁴¹ Alexander's use of *persona* here is pointed, referring to Christ as a member of the Trinity.

Alexander also follows Prepositinus on verbs and on parts of speech whose meaning depends entirely on their reference to other parts of speech. Since the Eucharistic elements have no agency, he agrees, we must not say that 'the bread can be the body of Christ' (*panis potest esse corpus Christi*) but must say 'the bread is transubstantiated' (*panis transsubstantiatur*).⁴² Moving on to prepositions such as *ex* and *de*, Alexander notes that *de* can refer to the matter from which something derives, as in the statement that the body of Christ was made 'from the Virgin's flesh' (*de carne Virginis*). *De* can refer to the power that makes something happen (*potestativum*), as when we say that Christ was conceived 'by the Holy Spirit' (*de Spiritu Sancto*). In the Eucharist, *de* or *ex* refers to the entity out of which something is changed into something else (*conversivum*). Aristotle's *Metaphysics* supports this analysis, says Alexander: When a change is signified by the use of *ex*, this preposition refers to its *terminus a quo*.⁴³ With Prepositinus, Alexander concludes that, notwithstanding these semantic clarifications, the *virtus* of the Eucharistic consecration lies not in

³⁹ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 11, a. 12, 4:177–8; d. 11, a. 15, 4:179–80. On the development of the doctrine of concomitance and the communion of the laity via the host alone, not controversial at this time, see James J. Megivern, *Concomitance and Communion: A Study of Eucharistic Doctrine and Practice*, Studia Friburgensia, 33 (Fribourg: The University Press, 1963). For debates on the use of liquids other than wine see Macy, 'Mediterranean Meals to Go,' 12–27.

⁴⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 10, a. 4, 4:156.

⁴¹ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 10, a. 5 h, 4:159.

⁴² Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 10, aa. 10–1, 4:165–6.

⁴³ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 10, a. 10, 4:166.

the words used but in the spiritual power imparted to them by Christ.⁴⁴ Words are signs, as are the bread and wine of the Eucharist, and we must grasp the difference between what pertains to the sacrament as a sign (*significationis*) and the power of Christ which pertains to it as its cause (*causalitatis*).

The causative role enabling Christ to inhabit fully the Eucharistic elements informs Alexander's framing of the Lombard's and Innocent's argument against remanescence: 'All of the bread, both in its matter and form' (*totius panis constantis materia tali et forma*) undergoes 'a transmutation which is completed in its becoming the body of Christ' (*transmutationem quae terminatur ad esse corpus Christi*); no 'substance of bread' (*substantia panis*) remains.⁴⁵ Alexander makes the same point against nihilianism: the consecration 'achieves a conversion that applies to the whole substance, matter, and form, the accidents remaining' (*manent accidentia et fit conversio secundum totam substantia: materiam et formam*). Thus, it is incorrect to say that the elements are completely annulled and newly recreated as Christ's body and blood with their accidents intact. For the accidents were not annulled by the elements' transubstantiation.⁴⁶

This brings Alexander to the issue of accidents without a subject. He reviews the accounts of natural change listed by Aristotle and Porphyry by way of Boethius. He agrees that they do not apply to the Eucharist. The *Glossa* develops Alexander's own earlier treatment of the Lombard on self-sufficient accidents. He repeats Basil's remark that God can separate substance and accident in fact while we can only distinguish them as abstract ideas. But the weight of his argument falls on the *per se* existence of the accident of quantity. He compares quantity with other accidents. Not all accidents can exist *per se*. For instance, color is not self-subsistent. It only exists as an attribute of a figure. But figure exists only with respect to quantity (*figura autem in quantitatem*). And 'it is suitable that quantity, which is closer to substance than are many kinds of accidents, receives its own property, by divine power, as if it were a substance' (*quantitas autem, eo quod de genere accidentium propinquior est substantiam, convenit enim in pluribus, ex virtute divina, recipit proprietatem eius quod sit substantia*). Quantity is even closer to substance than abstract attributes like *panitas* and *vinitas*; for, as with other accidents, they 'remain properties subor-

⁴⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 8, a. 7, 4:137–8.

⁴⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 10, a. 9, 4:165; see also d. 11, a. 1, 4:168–70; d. 11, a. 6, 4:173–4. On the sacrament as sign or symbol see also Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 8, a. 11, 4:142–7; d. 9, a. 5, 4:150–1; d. 10, a. 5, 4:156–9 and the discussions of Damien Van den Eynde, *Les définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scolastique (1050–1240)* (Rome: Antonianum, 1950), 130–3 and Macy, 'Reception of the Eucharist,' 37–9; Gary Macy, 'The Theology of the Eucharist in the High Middle Ages,' in *A Companion to the Eucharist in the Middle Ages*, ed. Ian Christopher Levy, Gary Macy, and Kristen Van Ausdall, Brill's Companion to the Christian Tradition, 26 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 380–2.

⁴⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 10, a. 9, 4:165; d. 10, a. 12, 4:167; d. 11, a. 1, 4:168–70; d. 11, aa. 5–6, 4:173–4; quotation at d. 11, a. 1b, 4:169. Noted by Bakker, *La raison et le miracle*, 1:64–5.

dinate' to quantity (*remanent proprietates consequentes*).⁴⁷ Thus, for Alexander, while divine power is involved, the kind of divine power involved looks to be God's endowment of the accident of quantity with its own essential properties, rather than his suspension of the laws of nature. And, for Alexander, not only does quantity have the basic capacity to exist *per se*, its quasi-substantial essence also enables it to subvert the other accidents in the consecrated species.

In our early Franciscan story Alexander's most important disciple is William of Melitona, Parisian regent master from 1247 to 1253. His *De sacramento altaris*, one of William's *Quaestiones de sacramentis* (1245/47), advances Alexander's teaching appreciably. William is also the recognized author of Book 4 of the *Summa Halensis*, left incomplete by his death (1257/60), discussed below. While earlier scholars accent William's interest in the liturgy of the Mass, a recent work flags his contribution to the theme of accidents without a subject.⁴⁸ That topic is extremely important. But other facets of William's work also need comment.

An underappreciated area is William's concern with semantics. On some issues he seconds Alexander and Prepositinus; on others he omits their rules; on still others he adds new arguments. Among the latter, William notes that the nouns 'bread' and 'wine' are comparable to names such as 'Marcus' and 'Tullius', which denote the same individual and not two different essences. Thus, two concomitant species comprise a single sacrament.⁴⁹ William supports Alexander's analysis of the prepositions *ex* and *de* and agrees with him and Prepositinus in banning locutions that grant agency to Eucharistic elements. Thus, we must not say that the consecration 'makes the body of Christ from bread or by bread' (*'ex pane' vel 'de pane' fit corpus Christi*) or that 'the bread makes or can be the body of Christ' (*panis fit corpus Christi*;

⁴⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* 4, d. 11, a. 1, 4:169–70; d. 12, a. 1, 4:185–7; quotations at d. 12, a. 1f, 4:187. Bakker, *La raison et le miracle*, 1:302–4, assimilates Alexander on this topic to its treatment by Aquinas, presenting the latter's position as its real beginning.

⁴⁸ The older view ascribing authorship of the *Summa Halensis* to Alexander, as in Hugo Dausend, 'Das opusculum super Missam des Fr. Wilhelm von Melitona und die entsprechenden Stellen in der Summa theologica Alexanders von Hales,' in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters: Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet*, ed. Albert Lang, Josef Lechner, and Michael Schmaus, 2 vols, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Supplementband 3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1935), 1:554–77, was corrected by Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa,' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1948): 26–41. For William's recourse in the *Summa Halensis* to Innocent III's treatise on the Mass, held to be more extensive than that of any other medieval author but without content-analysis, see Jorissen, *Die Entfaltung*, 42–3; Maccarrone, 'Innocenzo III,' 399–400. For William on accidents without a subject see Vijgen, *Eucharistic Accidents*, 87–94.

⁴⁹ William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris* [=tr. 4], p. 2, q. 5, cc. 17–8, in *Guillelmi de Militona Quaestiones de sacramentis*, ed. Gedeon Gál, 2 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica, 22–3 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1961), 2:530–1. For more on concomitance see William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 6, q. 30, 2:640–1; p. 7, q. 39, 2:677–8.

(...) *panis potest esse corpus Christi*).⁵⁰ But William does not comment on his predecessors' pendant rule requiring the use of verbs in the passive voice to describe the elements' change.

William returns to Prepositinus on the supposition of *hoc* but applies a less adept analysis to the *est* and *corpus* in the consecration formula. As a pronoun, he agrees, *hoc* supposits only in relation to the intra-propositional noun for which it stands. It can supposit its noun simply or demonstratively. It would be a 'false locution' (*oratio falsa*) to say that *hoc* means 'the substance or accidents of the bread' (*substantia panis vel accidens*). What *hoc* actually supposits in the consecration formula is the transubstantiated body and blood of Christ.⁵¹ Moving on to *est*, William admits that, as a present indicative verb, *est* denotes what currently is, not what has just changed. He posits a parallel with 'I baptize you' (*Ego te baptizo*), in which the present indicative verb refers to a status-changing event. He elides the lack of a parallel substantial change in the baptismal water. Still, the unhappy warrant he offers for both formulae is God's creative 'Let there be light' (*fiat lux*), denoting an event that is at once brought about. William recognizes that the *fiat* of Gen. 1:3 is not an indicative verb but an imperative.⁵² Leaving that problem unresolved, he asks why the consecration formula requires *corpus* rather than *caro* to denote Christ's body, since the Bible uses both terms. What William likely has in mind is John 1:14: 'The Word was made flesh' (*Verbum caro factum est*). Well, he observes, arguing here from connotation not supposition theory, *corpus* can also mean corpse, reminding us that Christ accepted death on the cross. And a *corpus* is also a corporation, or a collection whose constituents have something in common; this is the sense of *corpus* as applied to the church.⁵³ While these lucubrations on *est* and *corpus* are less well-honed than the arguments William and his predecessors derive from speculative grammar, he agrees that it is not Eucharistic language, however apposite, but the *virtus* of Christ, that effects transubstantiation.⁵⁴

50 William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 7, q. 35, c. 5, 2:660; p. 7, q. 40, cc. 1–2, 2:679–80 for these successive quotations with more on the theme at 4:680–3; see also William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 7, q. 35, c. 11, 2:661–2. For a similar argument on the use of *hoc* and *est* in the transubstantiation of the wine see William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 4, q. 21, cc. 1–13, 2:597–601. Rosier-Catach, *La parole efficace*, 319–23, 377, 381–2, 417–22, 473 notes William on *hoc*, although not on *ex* and *de*, but without mention of his application of supposition theory, and also his ban on statements that would give agency to the Eucharistic elements, but without mention of the theological rationale for it that he shares with Prepositinus and Alexander.

51 William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 4, q. 15, cc. 1–15b, 2:580–6; quotations at c. 4, 2:581 and c. 6, 2:582.

52 William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 4, q. 16, cc. 1–15, 2:586–9. Rosier-Catach, *La parole efficace*, 389, 391 notes that William recognizes that the would-be *fiat* analogy is a problem he does not solve, but highlights it as the closest he comes to anticipating a speech-act.

53 William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 4, q. 17, cc. 1–8b, 2:590–92. Noted by Rosier-Catach, *La parole efficace*, 418, but without reference to William on *corpus*.

54 William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 5, qq. 22–3, 2:601–8.

William often cites Innocent III, indeed, more frequently than Alexander, but in different contexts. Innocent is William's authority of choice on the reception of communion. Other than that, he quotes Innocent on one linguistic issue: the words following the celebrant's 'this is my body' are canonical but do not accomplish the Eucharistic change.⁵⁵ William ascribes to Innocent Augustine's point, by way of the Lombard, that Christ's presence in the sacrament is real and not metaphorical.⁵⁶ He cites Innocent on the full presence of Christ in every Eucharist and parts thereof, with no reference to the mirror analogy rejected by Alexander, and on the argument that the bread and wine are not totally annihilated since their accidents remain. Unlike Alexander, William expressly criticizes Innocent on accidents without a subject because Innocent appeals to miracle alone.⁵⁷ Indeed, William's own account of accidents without a subject, his most original contribution to Eucharistic theology, yields a new argument drawn from philosophy and mathematics as well as a spirited claim for the role of reason in Eucharistic theology.

William tackles accidents without a substance twice. Dismissing the relevance to the Real Presence of a parts-and-wholes analysis, he makes a general observation: some aspects of the sacrament are natural; others are above reason. But some of the latter can also be understood in natural terms. In natural bodies, substances have accidents. In the consecrated species, 'certain accidents, such as color, taste, and roundness, exist there supernaturally without a subject, without substance: above nature, but not above understanding. For the mind understands accidents without a subject by abstraction' (*supra naturam sunt ibi accidentia sine subiecto, ut color, sapor, rotunditas, sine substantia. Hoc autem est supra naturam, sed non supra intellectum; intelligit autem intellectus accidentia sine subiecto per abstractionem*). The key abstract idea in this case is quantity, an attribute possessed by the species and, he adds, by Christ's glorified body as well. Quantity is an intrinsic attribute of bodies as such, shared by bodies that change into other bodies although their other attributes differ. In this passage William sees the commensurability of these two abstract accidents of quantity as occurring 'above nature and marvelously' (*supra naturam et mirabiliter*).⁵⁸

But is it above rational understanding? In another passage William argues that such is not the case. He repeats that quantity is the prime accident of the elements both before and after the consecration, as it is in the glorified body of Christ. But he

55 William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 4, qq. 18–9, 2:592–5.

56 William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 6, q. 31, c. 6, 2:642–3; q. 33, c. 6, 2:650–3; q. 33, c. 6 g, 2:652–3; q. 33, c. 7, 2:653; q. 34, c. 3, 2:656–7.

57 William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 6, q. 27, c. 7, 2:630; q. 32, c. 5, 2:646; p. 7, q. 35, c. 16, 2:663; q. 35, c. 24, 2:666. Cf. Bakker, *La raison et le miracle*, 1:21–3, 32 who thinks that William subscribes to Innocent's mirror analogy, a citation not found in William's text.

58 William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 6, q. 32, c. 5, 2:646. For Burr, *Eucharistic Presence*, 10, n. 13 and Bakker, *La raison et le miracle*, 1:21–3 this passage is cited as William's sole address to this topic.

alters and amplifies both Alexander's account of accidents without a subject and what he himself says in the first passage quoted. Now citing Aristotle via Boethius and Toletanus (that is, Dominicus Gundissalinus) on the hierarchy of the sciences, William notes that metaphysics deals with invisible realities and not with matter and motion. Physics deals with matter and motion. In between these sciences is mathematics. Mathematical realities, like those of metaphysics, are invisible, although we can represent them visibly. These representations include the accidents of the material forms we use in so doing. In no sense do these accidents delimit mathematical realities themselves, which are separable from them, and vice versa. The most basic of these accidents is quantity. Mathematics thus models a rational account of accidents without a subject in the Eucharist: 'Thus we see that the accident of quantity, as in lines, surfaces and the like, is more fully separable from matter than are other substantial forms, such as carnality and the like' (*Ex hoc videtur quod accidens, quod est quantitas, ut linea, superficies et huiusmodi, magis sunt separabilia a materia quam aliquae formae substantiales, ut carnalitas et huiusmodi*). Since quantity is the accident 'that most greatly approaches and is assimilated to the nature of substance, among accidents it can have *per se* existence to the highest degree' (*ratione qua maxime accedit ad naturam substantiae et illi maxime assimilatur, maxime inter accidentia potest habere esse per se*). Quantity subtends the other accidents: 'It is thus said that color, figure, and [other] accidents have quantity as their subject. (...) Quantity, which of all kinds of accidents is the one closest to substance, is the one that is the subject of the others separated from substance' (*Dicendum est igitur quod color, figura, et accidentia illa habent quantitatem pro subiecto. (...) Quantitas—eo quod est de genere accidentium propinquissimo substantiae—illa, cum aliis separata a substantia, est subiectum aliorum (...)*).⁵⁹

William rests his case on this mathematically-derived argument. Having dismissed remanescence traditionally and abruptly, he wields it mainly against annihilation. There is no longer a need to rely on Basil and our possible thought-experiments, or for that matter, on Alexander's theory of sacramental ubiquity based on Christ's divine *persona*. Rather, William presents his conclusion as a valid application of natural reason to Eucharistic theology. Far from depriving faith of its merit, this argument reinforces it. Yes, like transubstantiation itself, we can describe accidents

⁵⁹ William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 6, q. 26, c. 19, 2:619 and 620; q. 26, c. 23b, 2:624 for the passages quoted. For more on this mathematical argument, undermining a preclusive dependence on miracle, see also William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 6, q. 26, c. 23b, 2:624; q. 27, cc. 1–11, 2:628–31; q. 28, c. 13, 2:636. Vijgen, *Eucharistic Accidents*, 87–94 gives an excellent reprise of this position although he is not interested in its connection with William's critique of annihilation. On the availability of these distinctions among the sciences see Alexander Fidora, 'Die Rezeption der boethianischen Wissenschaftseinteilung bei Dominicus Gundissalinus,' in "*Scientia*" und "*Disciplina*": *Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. Rainer Berndt et al., *Erudiri Sapientia*, 3 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), 209–22; Mario Arioso, *Aristotelismo e teologia: da Alessandro di Hales a San Bonaventura* (Monaco: Liamor, 2012), 19, 28–9, 34–5, 37, 52, 455, although Arioso makes no reference to mathematics or to William of Melitona.

without a subject as a miracle. But, 'while it can well occur miraculously, it is well true naturally' (*bene verum est naturaliter, tamen miraculose bene potest*).⁶⁰

Both William of Melitona's argument and this conclusion expressly counter the position of an unnamed but well-known recent master, William of Auxerre. In the prologue to his *Summa aurea* (1215/29), William of Auxerre states that the application to theology of either natural philosophy or the new semantics of the day is fundamentally unacceptable. Theologians should clarify and defend theological principles known by faith only by reference to other theological principles. William of Auxerre cites as his authority Gregory the Great: if the faith is understood in the light of rational arguments, it loses its merit as a virtue. And, while scholastics often say one thing in their prologues and do something quite different in the body of their works, William of Auxerre sticks to his guns on the Eucharist, simply citing Peter Lombard and John Damascene on the three modes of the Real Presence doctrine and on accidents without a subject while ignoring how these authorities reason to their conclusions.⁶¹ William of Melitona's defense of the role of reason in Eucharistic theology against this rival position, and the highly original argument he offers in its support in his *De sacramento altaris*, thus stand out as a signal statement of early Franciscan theological method.

It remains to consider the degree to which the arguments so distinctive of William and of Alexander find their way into Book 4 of the *Summa Halensis*. Sometimes an author's final work develops and refines his earlier ideas. Sometimes an author's final work shows him running in place. Neither case describes the *Summa* on the three theories of Eucharistic change and on accidents without a subject. Rather, its Book 4 abridges and dilutes positions earlier taught by William and Alexander, omits arguments of both masters, and introduces arguments contradicting rules which, following Prepositinus, they enforce. The *Summa's* organization and coverage of Eucharistic topics are odd. Only two of the 32 *Quaestiones* in Book 4 treat the Eucharist. In between *Quaestiones* 10 and 11, and occupying some 35 per cent of the space devoted to the Eucharist, William inserts a *Tractatus de officio missae* recycling Innocent on the prayers of the Mass. But he also places some topics on the administration of the Mass in the middle of *Quaestio* 10.⁶²

⁶⁰ William of Melitona, *De sacramento altaris*, p. 6, q. 26, c. 21b, 2:623.

⁶¹ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 1.1–2 (prologus), 4.7.2 (Eucharist), 7 vols, ed. Jean Ribailier, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7), 1:15–20 and 6:143–47 for these respective passages. See the excellent discussion in Henry Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi au XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Éditions Parole et Silence, 2006), 19–57.

⁶² Alexander of Hales, *Alexandri Alensis Angli Summae Theologiae: Pars Quarta* (hereafter, *SH* Bk IV), vol. 4 (Coloniae Agrippinae: Sumptibus Ioannis Gymnici, sub Monoerote, 1622). The *Tractatus de officio missae* occupies pages 275–329 in this edition. Other topics of this type derived from Innocent, including who can consecrate, vestments and accoutrements, and the point when transubstantiation occurs during the celebrant's pronunciation of the consecration formula are located in *SH* Bk

Within *Quaestio* 10, *Membrum* 5 treats the three Real Presence theories and *Membrum* 7 treats accidents without a subject. In contrast with predecessors from the Lombard on, William does not start with transubstantiation—and, be it noted, he never uses this term itself in the *Summa*. He opens with the inadequacies of remanescence and annihilation on the change (*conversio*) undergone by the bread and wine, giving these theories equal time. William omits the prefatory semantic clarifications which he and his predecessors stress as criteria for statements about the Eucharist. In dismissing the pertinence of the natural changes derived from Boethius, he omits some from the standard list. Ignoring more recent discussions, his attack on remanescence reiterates Peter Lombard's. The bottom line, for William, is that remanescence is wrong because the full change of the elements in form and matter is supernatural, which the saints confirm.⁶³

If this conclusion disposes of remanescence, annihilation and transubstantiation demand new arguments, some of which invoke principles expressly rejected by theologians in William's tradition including William himself. Again reviewing the inadequacy of Boethius on modes of change, William now cites an Aristotelian principle which, he argues, does work for the Eucharist: Created beings are programmed to actualize their natural potentialities. This potency/act dynamic explains the aptitude for change of the Eucharistic bread and wine. These elements basically want to change into something better. Whatever Aristotle might say, this extension of potency and act from plants, as natural phenomena, to bread and wine as fabricated commodities, ignores the theological rationale for the semantics of verbs specified by Prepositinus and Alexander and applied by the earlier William, for the same reason: we must not ascribe agency to the bread and wine. But the *Summa* does so. William's one nod to current semantic theory is the observation that *conversio* has a supposition different from *annihilatio*. *Conversio* accommodates the retention of an element's accidents, so it is 'unworthy' (*indignum*) to say that the consecration destroys them: 'On the contrary, by marvelous power its own accidents are saved in it' (*immo virtute mirabili salvatur in ipsis accidentibus*).⁶⁴ On annihilation, too, William's conclusion awards the palm to supernatural causation.

Along with an appeal to the authority of unspecified saints, William's defense of the full substantial *conversio* of the elements invokes another Aristotelian principle which may also ascribe agency to them, yoking it to one drawn from mathematics. Just as a line ends in a point, and just as a temporal process ends at some moment in time, so the motion (*motus*) characterizing change in created beings accounts for the aptitude for change of the Eucharistic elements. That claim aside, here too William reverts to Peter Lombard, with a preemptive *envoi* to the three theories that recalls Prepositinus: 'The third opinion is that the substance of bread and wine is con-

IV, Q10, M4, Ar1–2, pp. 233–61; *SH* Bk IV, Q10, M5, Ar1, pp. 261–6; *SH* Bk IV, Q10, M5, Ar2, pp. 265–75; *SH* Bk IV, Q10, M5, Ar3, pp. 329–30; *SH* Bk IV, Q10, M6, Ar1–3, pp. 338–9.

⁶³ *SH* Bk IV, Q10, M5, Ar3, pp. 329–31.

⁶⁴ *SH* Bk IV, Q10, M5, Ar3, pp. 332–3; quotation at 333.

verted into the body and blood of Christ; this is the truth which the church holds, and reproves other opinions' (*Tertia opinio, quod substantia panis & vini convertitur in corpus & sanguinem Christi: & haec est veritas, quam tenet Ecclesia, & alias opiniones reprobatur*).⁶⁵

Following this assertion presented as fact, William moves on to accidents without a subject. Here, the *Summa* walks back from some of his own most innovative arguments but restates others almost verbatim. William opens with Basil, quoted by Alexander but not mentioned in William's earlier work, to underscore God's causative power. True, accidents and substance have different essences. And 'God can separate them without any inappropriateness' (*potest Deus sine omni inconvenientia illa separare*).⁶⁶ But it is not inappropriate to seek auxiliary explanations. William presents a streamlined version of his mathematical argument for quantity as the prime accident that can exist *per se*: 'From this it is seen that the accident which is quantity, or lines, surfaces and the like, is more fully separable from matter than are other stable forms' (*Ex hoc videtur, quod accidens quod est quantitas, vel linea, superficies & huiusmodi, magis sunt separabilia a materia, quam aliquae formae stabiles (...)*).⁶⁷ And so, 'since it is closest to the nature of substance and most fully assimilated to it, quantity, among the accidents, can most fully have being *per se*' (*quod quantitas ratione qua maxime ad naturam substantiae; & illi maxime assimilatur, & maxime inter accidentia, potest habere esse per se*).⁶⁸ Three important features of William's earlier argument, however, do not survive in the *Summa*. One is the idea that quantity subtends the other accidents in the consecrated species. Another is that quantity, as an accident inhering in all bodies as such, is shared by all bodies that change into other bodies, including Christ's glorified body. The third is William's defense of natural reason as supporting rather than undermining the merit of faith in the Real Presence.

And so a problem remains. Why, in Book 4 of the *Summa Halensis*, does William walk back from the most up-to-date and original arguments on Eucharistic theology that he, and Alexander, had developed? As old age, and perhaps illness, supervened, did he run out of steam, suffer memory loss, or have second thoughts? Or, did he envision Eucharistic doctrine in Book 4 of the *Summa* not as a cutting-edge resource for scholastics-in-training, but as a non-technical guide for *confrères* preparing to preach and minister to the laity?

Books have their own fortunes, and research to date suggests that the *Summa* was largely bypassed by Franciscans of the later 13th century interested in the Eucharistic issues treated in this paper. On the issue of accidents without a subject, some Franciscans ignored the *Summa* and responded directly to the *Glossa* of Alexander of Hales and to William of Melitona's *De sacramento altaris*, whether citing their

⁶⁵ SH Bk IV, Q10, M5, Ar3, pp. 333–7; quotation at 335.

⁶⁶ SH Bk IV, Q10, M7, Ar1, pp. 340–4; quotation at 340.

⁶⁷ SH Bk IV, Q10, M7, Ar1, pp. 342–44; quotation at 342.

⁶⁸ SH Bk IV, Q10, M7, Ar1, p. 341.

analysis of the accident of quantity or William's mathematical argument in order to agree or disagree.⁶⁹ They may have taken their cue from Bonaventure, whose regency and lectures on the *Sentences* began in 1253 and were completed in 1257. Bonaventure's commentary on the *Sentences* thus overlaps with William's composition of Book 4 of the *Summa*, and may well have been considered by contemporary Franciscans as superseding it. There are notable departures in Bonaventure from the *Summa* and, indeed, from the earlier positions of Alexander and William as well. For instance, Bonaventure presents semantic arguments on the Eucharist informed by supposition theory largely as objections to be refuted; it is God's power that gives its force to the consecration formula despite its grammatical defects.⁷⁰ On accidents without a subject and on the accident of quantity, Bonaventure does not support the idea that quantity can subtend the other accidents in the consecrated elements; his own explanation resorts to miracle and the ability of accidents to have essences distinct from substance by their operations.⁷¹ Some Franciscans of the later 13th century, prior to John Duns Scotus, distanced themselves from the view that the third description of the Real Presence, transubstantiation, was the preferable way to describe it, with Scotus proposing that what changes in the elements is a change in their external relations.⁷²

During the later medieval centuries all three positions on the Real Presence doctrine, as well as accidents without a subject and the terminology apposite to the Eucharist, remained in lively contention, informed by the scholastics' increasingly sophisticated metaphysics, logic, and semantic theories. In Stephen Lahey's phrase, this made Eucharistic debates 'the quantum physics of the age'.⁷³ Franciscans, and

69 Vijgen, *Eucharistic Accidents*, 164–70 on Richard Rufus and Walter of Bruges.

70 Bonaventure, *On the Eucharist (Commentary on the Sentences, Book IV, dist. 8–13)*, d. 8, c. 1, qq. 1–3, ed. and trans. Junius Johnson, *Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations*, 23 (Leuven: Peeters, 2017), 82–6 (Latin), 83–9 (English).

71 Bonaventure, *On the Eucharist*, d. 10, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, 160–1 (Latin), 162–3 (English); d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 and q. 3 ad 2, 298–306 (Latin), 299–307 (English). As Vijgen, *Eucharistic Accidents*, 155–9 notes, Bonaventure reiterates Basil's argument on God's ability to do what we can only conceptualize, although without citing him by name.

72 Bakker, *La raison et le miracle*, 1:43–8, 213, 224–53 on English and continental Franciscans such as John Pecham, William de la Mare, and John Peter Olivi; Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories*, 110–5 on Scotus.

73 Stephen E. Lahey, 'Late Medieval Eucharistic Theology,' in *A Companion to the Eucharist in the Middle Ages* (see above, n. 45), 499–539; quotation at 539. In addition to titles by Adams, Bakker, and Vijgen cited above see also William J. Courtenay, 'The King and the Lead Coin: The Economic Background of "sine qua non" Causality,' *Traditio* 28 (1972): 185–209; reprinted in William J. Courtenay, *Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought: Studies in Philosophy, Theology and Economic Practice* (London: Variorum, 1984), ch. 6; Paul J.J.M. Bakker, 'Hoc est corpus meum: L'analyse de la formule de consécration chez les théologiens du XIV^e et XV^e siècle,' in *Vestigia, imagines, verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIIth-XIVth Century)*, ed. Costantino Marmo (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 427–51; Alain de Libera and Irène Rosier-Catach, 'L'analyse scotiste de la formule de la consecration eucharistique,' in *Vestigia, imagines, verba*, 171–201; Alain de Libera

others, picked and chose among the philosophical and semiotic resources on offer, in their efforts to ring their own changes on William of Melitona's principle that *bene verum est naturaliter, tamen miraculose bene potest*. Here, we can only hope that continuing research into the reception of the early Franciscan texts considered in this paper will flesh out the later influence of the *Glossa* of Alexander of Hales, the *De sacramento altaris* of William of Melitona, and Book 4 of the *Summa Halensis* in the development of high medieval Eucharistic theology.

and Irène Rosier-Catach, 'Les enjeux logico-linguistiques de l'analyse de la formule de consecration eucharistique,' *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 67 (1997): 33–77; Rosier-Catach, *La parole efficace* (see above, n. 17).

Timothy J. Johnson

Place, Person, and Prayer in the *Summa Halensis*

Reflections on Franciscan Identity in the mid 13th Century

Abstract: This essay argues that *oratio* in the *Summa Halensis* is best understood via the Franciscan appropriation of *locus*, which served in the construction and confirmation of their communal identity in the mid-thirteenth century. The question of their place in the church and the world was subject to intense discussion both inside and outside the Minorite Order. The shift to urban convents was influenced by the monastic paradigm, but this transition did not erase the peripatetic impulse common to the Franciscan worldview. The friars preserved the concept of human beings as *viatores* due to several factors, including the hagiographical accounts of their founder, the rapid expansion of convents, and their diplomatic and missionary travels. In the *Summa Halensis*, Parisian friars engaged two philosophical-theological themes to secure the peripatetic underpinnings of their foundational story regardless of their urban emplacement. The first focused on ontological poverty, which foregrounds the movement from non-being into being as the journey into God. The second was the utilization of *locus* to determine the place of human beings during this passage from non-being into being. This effort reflected the friars' project of identification and emplacement during period of institutional transition preceding the generalate of Bonaventure of Bagnoregio.

In the Fourth Book of the *Summa Halensis* or *Summa minorum*¹, we find a straightforward response to the question, 'can one pray in all places?' The following exemplum suggests we can:

We read of blessed Gregory that while he was purging his bowels and saying a psalm, the devil appeared to him and asked him what he was doing. He responded, 'I am purging my bowels and praising my God since works of nature are not seen as turpid to the perfect.'²

1 Jean-Yves Lacoste's insights into the relationship between religious communities and theological expression provides a foundation for considering the *Summa Halensis* as a manifesto of Franciscan 'thinking' in the mid 13th century, see Jean-Yves Lacoste, *From Theology to Theological Thinking*, trans. W. Christ Hackett (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014). I would like to thank Ms. Maria Dintino and Ms. Jessie Rutland of the Flagler College Library for their assistance in securing the sources needed to complete this essay.

2 Alexander of Hales, *Alexandri Alensis Angli Summae Theologiae: Pars Quarta* (hereafter, *SH* Bk IV), Q26, M3, Ar7 (Cologne: Sumptibus Ioannis Gymnici, sub Monocerote, 1622), 721: 'Legitur enim de B. Greg. quod cum purgaret ve[n]trem, et Psalmum diceret, apparuit ei diabolus, quaerens quid faceret;

While theology admittedly is far more intent on exploring soteriology as opposed to scatology, this essay claims that this story, which is recounted in Question 26 *De Oratione*, reflects the innovative interest of the Franciscan theological community in the theoretical and practical consequences of the 13th-century engagement with Aristotle's *Physics*.³ The Stagyrite's discussion and definition of 'place' in Chapter 4 is, 'Place is the boundary of that containing another thing' allows him, as Edward S. Casey has pointed out, to ascribe a certain agency to place.⁴ It is the definition of place as 'containing' that allows things to be 'somewhere' and 'to be' something specific.⁵ This thematic of *locus* or place emerges at various junctures in all four books of the *Summa Halensis* and is linked with question of identity and personhood.

The theologians of *Summa Halensis* can hardly ignore Aristotle's teaching, mediated in many cases by Avicenna, given the Franciscan concept of the human person as both a material-spiritual creature at home in this world and the world to come as well.⁶ An initial understanding of prayer as an embedded anthropological-theological expression of the human person is enhanced when *De Oratione* is examined against the background of the *Summa Halensis*' arguments regarding place and the concomitant subjects of grace, body, and the soul. This essay offers a systematic examination of selected texts in the *Summa* in order to confirm and comment on the Franciscan attraction to the philosophical conception of place or *locus*, articulated by Aristotle but also employed differently by others, the likes of Augustine, pseudo-Augustine and Anselm.⁷ While pursuing this task, this effort assumes that

et respondit: "ventrem meum purgo, et Deum meum laudo; opera enim natura perfectis turpia non videntur".

3 See Cecilia Trifogli, *Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century (ca. 1250–1270): Motion, Infinity, Place and Time* (Leiden: Brill: 2000), esp. 133–202; Cecilia Trifogli, 'Roger Bacon and Aristotle's Doctrine of Place,' *Vivarium* 35 (1997): 155–76; and Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.1–3, ed. Rega Wood, *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi*, 16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 152–82. On the question of Richard Rufus as author, see Rega Wood, 'The Works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall: The State of the Question in 2009,' *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 76 (2009): 1–73. While the reception of Aristotle and Avicenna varied from Oxford and Paris, Avicenna's commentary on Book 4 of Aristotle's *Physics* was already available as early as the twelfth century, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Andreas Büttner, 'Notes on Anonymous Twelfth-Century Translations of Philosophical Texts from Arabic into Latin on the Iberian Peninsula,' in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Physics and Cosmology*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2018), 313.

4 Edward S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 71.

5 For a study of Book 4 of the *Physics*, with reference to the Greek text, see Diana Quarantotto, *L'universo senza spazio: Aristotele e la teoria del luogo* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2017).

6 On this thematic, see Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca 1200–1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010).

7 The crucial question of 'locus' in the writings of Alexander of Hales will be taken up in a later study. The point of departure for that investigation will be Alexander of Hales, *Quaestio* 45 ['De modo essendi Deus in rebus'], in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae "Antequam*

place and prayer are of specific interest to the Franciscan theological community of the mid 13th century given their commitment, both in theory and praxis, to a mythical-practical re-ordering of the cloister-world paradigm that dominated religious life in the 13th century.⁸

Place, Creatures, and Grace

The reception of Aristotle's *Physics* is immediately evident in Book 2, where the authors note, 'Place is the boundary of that containing another thing' in the treatment of the question: *Utrum omnis creatura sit localis* ('Whether every creature is local').⁹ At first, the *Summa's* authors appeal to the Pseudo-Augustinian *De anima et spiritu* to clarify that a corporeal body is local or perhaps better said, located or embedded, since it is dimensional and circumscribed with an assigned beginning, middle and end. This, however, cannot be said of all creatures; yet, given that all creatures can be totally present somewhere but not somewhere else, they are said to have a locality. The authors then parse Aristotle's definition to argue that not all creatures are local in the sense that each and everything can be contained by another creature. They then further nuance their response to clarify that the explanation from the *Physics* can be applied properly to bodily reality, as noted earlier, and to spiritual realities by way of similitude. While physics serve as the point of departure for the Summists, they go far beyond Aristotle's understanding of place as they explore both the

esset frater", 3 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 2:760–82.

8 For example, see Timothy J. Johnson, 'Place, Analogy and Transcendence: Bonaventure and Bacon on the Franciscan Relationship to the World,' in *Innovationen durch Deuten und Gestalten: Klöster im Mittelalter zwischen Jenseits und Welt*, ed. Gert Melville, Bernd Schneidmüller, and Stefan Weinfurter (Regensburg: Verlag Schnell & Steiner, 2014), 83–96; Timothy J. Johnson, 'Choir Prayer as the Place of Formation and Identity Definition: The Example of the Minorite Order,' *Miscellanea Francescana* 111 (2011): 123–35; Timothy J. Johnson, 'Prologue as Pilgrimage: Bonaventure as Spiritual Cartographer,' *Miscellanea Francescana* 106–7 (2006–7): 445–64; Timothy J. Johnson, 'Dream Bodies and Peripatetic Prayer: Reading Bonaventure's *Itinerarium* with Certeau,' *Modern Theology* 21 (2005): 413–27. This reordering was particularly important for the Franciscans, who, unlike their Dominican counterparts, were faced with the challenge of moving from the hermitage-city paradigm to conventual life centered in the city.

9 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol II, In1, Tr2, Q2, Ti5, C1 (n. 72), pp. 96–7. The definition of locus attributed to Aristotle on p. 96 reads, 'Locus est terminus rei continentis aliam rem.' This precise text is not, however, found in early Latin translations of Aristotle such as *Translatio Vetus*, see *Physica Translatio Vetus*, ed. Fernand Bossier and Jozef Brams (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 160. Indeed, the formulation '(...) locus est "terminus continentis"' is found in the work of Richard Rufus when he is commenting on Book 4.1.7 of Aristotle's *Physics*, see Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.1.7 (Wood, 160–1) thus furthering the suggestion that Richard influenced John of La Rochelle's composition of Book 2 of the *Summa Halensis* in the 1240s.

physical and spiritual dimensions of the term in light of their own theological tradition and cultural-historical shift of perspective due to the Order's rapid urbanization in the 1240s and 1250s.

The meaning of 'containing' is explored further in the following two questions: *Utrum ominis creatura habeat eamden differentitam localitatis* ('Whether every creature has the same difference of locality')¹⁰ and *Utrum creatura possit esse sine localitate* ('Whether a creature is able to be without locality').¹¹ Every creature, whether corporeal or incorporeal, has a location but the physical body is bounded in a place such that—with the exception of the Body of the Lord—a part of the body is in part of the place, but the same is not the case with spiritual creatures.¹² They are in place in a different manner insofar as they can be delimited but not be measured by parts. Some might claim that angels, as spiritual, incorporeal beings are without locality, as their substance and twofold activity of contemplation and knowledge of self and others is not dependent on a physical body.¹³ Nevertheless, they have a certain affinity to corporeal bodies given their ministry to humanity. Like all creatures, however, angels are limited in power; thus they possess locality understood, however, in terms of a position or station in the empyrean heaven.¹⁴ Additionally, only God is present everywhere, while every creature is 'somewhere', that is, either 'here' or 'there' according to Scripture. This mode of distinction pertains to substance, not to place or position; thus angels are in place because they are always somewhere specific. As creatures dwelling in heaven, they are remote from the earth, yet they remain present to the world due to their natural acuity.

The locality of God is also questioned in the *Summa*. When treating the nature of the divine unity, Book 1 also probes the *localitas* of God.¹⁵ The first question is: *An*

¹⁰ SH II, In1, Tr2, Q2, Ti5, C2 (n. 73), p. 97.

¹¹ SH II, In1, Tr2, Q2, Ti5, C3 (n. 74), p. 98.

¹² Concerning place and the sacrament of the altar, see SH Bk IV, Q10, M7, Ar3, pp. 353–8. Alexander himself briefly takes up this question in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* IV, d. 10, nn. 4 and 14; d. 11, n. 6; d. 12, n. 9, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 4:154–6, 168, 173–4, 192–5. Henceforth this work will be referred to as *Glossa*.

¹³ SH II, In2, Tr1, Q1, C3, Ar1 (n. 101), pp. 126–7. See also Travis Dumsday, 'Alexander of Hales on Angelic Corporality,' *The Heythrop Journal* 54 (2013): 360–70 and Franklin T. Harkins, 'The Embodiment of Angels: A Debate in Mid-Thirteenth-Century Theology,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 78 (2011): 25–58. Alexander himself notes that the spiritual locus of angels is determined by their proximity to God *secundum affectionem* while the empyrean heaven is their corporeal place. Human beings acquire their spiritual locus *per victoriam*. See Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 9, n. 25, 2:95–6. On angels, movement, and corporeal bodies, see Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 8, nn. 1–3, 2:73–5. In addition, see Alice Lamy, 'La théorie du lieu selon Alexandre de Halès,' in *Lieu, espace, mouvement: Physique, Métaphysique et Cosmologie (XIIe-XVIIe siècles): Actes du colloque international Université de Fribourg (Suisse), 12–14 mars 2015*, ed. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Olivier Ribordy, and Antoine Petagine (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 39–55.

¹⁴ SH II, In2, Tr1, Q1, C3, Ar2 (n. 102), pp. 128–9.

¹⁵ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2 (nn. 40–4), pp. 64–70.

Deus sit alicubi vel nusquam vel in se ipso ('Whether God is somewhere, nowhere, or in himself').¹⁶ Relying on Boethius' *De Trinitate* and Augustine's *De praesentiae Dei*, the authors note that 'to be in a place' can refer to being contained by a place, present to a place, and to fill up place. While the divine nature is uncontainable, God can fill a place just as wisdom fills a wise person, and water a place. The divine is nowhere circumscribed or enclosed, but present everywhere in the fullness of divine goodness.¹⁷ Furthermore, since God exists 'in his self' any notion of dependency on place is removed; indeed, every place and the entire world depends on the divine nature.¹⁸

When taking up the question: *Utrum divina natura tota sit in omni tempore et semper* ('Whether the entire divine nature is always in all times') Book 1 references Anselm, Aristotle, Augustine, and Richard of St Victor.¹⁹ Aristotle's *Physics* is utilized regarding the meaning of *tota*, which can be spoken of in three ways: 1. as the whole constituted from its parts; 2. as the whole without anything else; and 3. the whole that is perfect and complete.²⁰ The last definition applies to the divine nature.²¹ The authors of Book 1 rely almost exclusively on Anselm's *Monologion* here to define this question and argue for an affirmative response.²² Anselm framed this issue by assuming the supreme being exists in every place and in all times, but confessed further investigation was needed. He concludes, as does Book 1, that this being does not exist in every place since the nature of *locus* is to contain and this being does not exist in time as the nature of *tempus* is to measure. Clearly the divine nature can neither be contained nor measured; nevertheless, this supreme being exists in every place and time.

The question *Quid sit deum esse ubique* ('In what way is God everywhere') allows the Summists to consider place from five perspectives that entail either corporeal or spiritual definitions.²³ Following John Damascene, *locus corporalis* is the boundary of what is contained in accord with Aristotle's definition from the *Physics*. *Locus corpo-*

¹⁶ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C1 (n. 40), pp. 64–5.

¹⁷ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C4 (n. 43), pp. 68–9.

¹⁸ The link between place and dependency is further developed by Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *In Sent.*) I, d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, 10 volumes (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 1:638–9.

¹⁹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, M4 (n. 71), pp. 110–1.

²⁰ When defining the third meaning of *totum*, the *Summa* states, '(...) tertio modo, quod est perfectum et completum' [the third manner which is perfect and complete] and the Quaracchi Fathers understand this to be based on Aristotle's *Physics* 3.6, see *Aristotelis Opera Omnia: Graece et Latine cum Indice Nominum et Rerum Absolutissimo*, 2 vol, (Paris: Editoribus Firmin-Didot et Sociis, Institutii Francici Typographis, 1883), 414. The use of *perfectum* and *completum* does not appear in the *Translatio Vetus*, but Richard Rufus does utilize both terms together when commenting on locus in Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.6 (Wood, 156).

²¹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, M4 (n. 71), p. 111.

²² SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, M4 (n. 71), p. 111.

²³ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C3 (n. 42), pp. 66–8.

ralis communis refers to the heavens, where all creatures, visible and invisible, are contained. *Locus spiritualis* denotes an intelligible place that is incorporeal and intellectual. According to Gregory, the *locus spiritualis communis* is where divine power is exercised such as in the sending of angels. Finally, Ambrose provides the Summists with the definition of *locus spiritualis specialis*, which suggests that every creature is circumscribed according to the limits of its nature. Here it is important to note that all creatures, be they corporeal or incorporeal, as substances are determined by place and thus limited or contained in terms of essence and power. This concept of containment and power fosters a nuanced appreciation of how God is everywhere. Power is twofold regarding place, *extra* or outside and *intra* or within. While the soul contains the body with a power within, the power of the divine is within and beyond all things. Turning to Augustine, the authors of the *Summa* rework his claim that God is present everywhere and never absent from anywhere to argue that God is present in every place and fills every place.²⁴ This suggests that God is both within all things without being enclosed by them and outside of all things without being excluded from them. Hence God is in all things and all things, whether corporeal or spiritual, are in God.

How God is present in sacraments and human beings through the indwelling of grace is also a concern of the Franciscan authors of Book 1. In response to the question *Utrum deus sit in sacramentis per inhabitantem gratiam* ('Whether God is in the sacrament through indwelling grace'), they clarify the nature of indwelling and point out that while God is present in the sacraments through grace, the divine nature cannot dwell within them.²⁵ Indwelling denotes the end of movement, but a sacrament is an *adminiculum* or aid for those still on the way, that is, a means by which humanity, *in statu viatoris* may receive grace. With a nod toward common piety, the text admits that it is common to speak in an intimate way of the divine presence, like Gregory the Great, when claiming that God is in a sacrament. What is meant, however, is that God is within the sacrament as the cause which disposes the soul to reception of grace but does not inhabit the corporal elements.

Corporality is the concern of following four questions, *An in carne ante infusionem animae possit esse deus per inhabitationem* ('Whether God is able to dwell in the flesh before the infusion of the soul'),²⁶ *Utrum deus sit in homine per inhabitantem gratiam et hoc ante nativitatem* ('Whether God dwells in a human being before birth'),²⁷ *Utrum Deus sit in parvulis per inhabitantem gratiam* ('Whether God is in infants through indwelling grace'),²⁸ and *Utrum deus dicitur inhabitare in habentibus gratiam gratis datam* ('Whether God may be said to dwell in those who have freely

²⁴ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C3 (n. 42), p. 67. The reference to Augustine is based on *Letter 187*, c. 6, n. 18 (PL 33:838–839).

²⁵ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C2 (n. 51), pp. 78–9.

²⁶ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C3 (n. 52), pp. 79–80.

²⁷ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C4 (n. 53), pp. 80–2.

²⁸ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C5 (n. 54), pp. 82–3.

given grace').²⁹ This sequence allows the Summists to sketch out the anthropological foundation of their theology of grace in reference to place which, in this context, is illustrated by referring to the soul as the temple of God.

This first question in the sequence is quick to clarify that it is impossible for God to dwell in the body before the infusion of the soul since flesh alone is neither incorruptible nor perpetual. However, when the body is animated, it then is ordered toward grace and thus toward glory. There can be no indwelling unless there is a place in which to dwell. In terms of place as containment, grace is not poured into nature, but into a person. Could this person, who is now both body and soul, receive sanctifying grace before birth? The second question responds in the affirmative but makes a distinction between common and private law. The former grants that God inhabits the soul by means of sacramental grace, but no one experiences such an encounter before birth. The later pertains to the grace of the Holy Spirit which, in rare cases, sanctifies individuals in the womb.

Once born, does God dwell in the child? According to the third question, a proper response is framed by the issue of free will and the nature of injustice or sin. Men and women commit injustice or injustice is committed against them. In the first case, the individual is culpable due to free will but in the second the individual did not make a choice and remains innocent. A child is clearly innocent but suffers the injustice due to Adam's sin. The grace of baptism, through which God may dwell within the soul, can justify the child without consent but cannot do the same with an adult, who sins, unless the individual freely chooses to cooperate with God. An example of cooperative consent is found in the individual who decides to turn toward God, asks for grace, and remains vigilant while holding to this proposal. In answer to such prayer, God, through *gratia gratum faciens* (sanctifying grace) may dwell within an adult. However, if the divine only dwells within a person by means of sanctifying grace, what value is there in *gratia gratis datam* (grace freely given) to all?³⁰ The answer, according the last question in the sequence, lies in the observation of nature. Matter has the possibility of receiving form, and certain dispositions order material to receive this form, but ultimately one disposition arises that is necessary for the *positio*, that is, the placing or positioning of the form in material. In a like manner, expressions of grace such as prophecy and knowledge are dispositions that order the soul, but the necessary disposition that perfects the soul as the temple of God is sanctifying grace.³¹ Only this gift, by which the divine dwells within the soul, allows

²⁹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C6 (n. 55), p. 83.

³⁰ On the term *gratiam gratis datam*, see SH IV, P3, In1, Tr2 (nn. 646–72), pp. 1023–60. This description is more extensive than what is found in Alexander's own works, see Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia: Editio critica: Un contributo alla teologia della grazia nella prima metà del sec. XIII*, ed. Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, Studia Antoniana, 50 (Roma: Antonianum, 2008), 231.

³¹ On the soul as temple, see also SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti1, D3, C3, Ar2 (n. 304), Ad objecta 2, p. 459.

a person, both body and soul, to be united and joined with God, who is the highest truth and goodness.

Place, Body, and Soul

With the body joined to the soul, human corporality is marked by dignity and ordered by grace to heaven.³² This reality leads the authors of the *Summa Halensis* to raise the question, *Quarto quaeritur de dignitate corporis humani quantum ad locationem, et utrum caelum sit locus eius* ('The fourth [chapter] inquires as to the dignity of the human body regarding location, and whether heaven is its home').³³ At issue is the *locus naturalis* or natural place of a person. Taking their cue from Aristotle's *Physics*, the authors affirm that an individual is constituted by a body and a soul and, therefore, must have the same natural place otherwise the person would be deprived of the perfect rest proper to being in one's place.³⁴ Indeed, if the natural place of the soul was one place and that of the body another, the appetites of the soul would never be circumscribed as they are in union with the body.

Upon establishing the premise that there is only one natural place for human beings, the question arises as to whether that place is heaven or earth.³⁵ One argument in favor of heaven maintains that the human body exceeds the stars as the best and most noble of all creatures, so its natural place must be a higher place which, of course, is heaven. Others contend, for example, that matter and form are proportional, so the more noble matter, the more noble the form, and vice versa. Since the form of the human body is the most noble, that is, the rational soul, the most natural place of the human body is the highest place, heaven. Another similar position asserts that it would be wrong to think that the heaven was not the natural place since that is the only place the human could be fully blessed and the appetites of the soul quieted. The arguments against heaven are, for the most part, not in favor of the earth, but, rather the inappropriateness of the body for heaven or heaven for the body. An exception is an intriguing reference to the hermetic tradition via an argument from the *Asclepium* attributed to the enigmatic Hermes Trismegistus.³⁶ Believing that a person was of two natures, corporal and spiritual, Trismegistus alleged that

32 *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C3 (n. 455), pp. 584–6.

33 *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C4 (n. 456), pp. 586–8.

34 The Quaracchi editors suggest references to Book 3, c. 5 and Book 4, c. 1 of Aristotle's *Physics* in this section (*SH* II (n. 456), p. 586, nn. 3, 5, 6, and 10). Richard Rufus treats the question of rest or *quies* at length in his treatment of Book 4.1.6, see Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.1.6 (Wood, 155–6).

35 *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C4 (n. 456), pp. 586–8.

36 For this text, see Hermes Trismegistus, *Astrologica et Divinatoria*, ed. Gerrit Bos et al., *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis*, 144C (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001).

the earthly properties dominated humanity and thus the human body finds a natural place on earth.

In their response, the Summists delineate three different places that divine providence has provided for the human body: 1. terrestrial paradise; 2. earth; and 3. heaven.³⁷ In paradise humans exercised their calling to work and thus care for their place. This exertion was by no means onerous and, instead, was marked by solace. Thrown out of paradise into the earth, men and women could only depend on their toils and tears to provide bodily nourishment. Finally, since heaven is the natural place for the human body in the state of glory, those who are pleasing to God through grace will be established in the empyrean or angelic heaven. There, in body and soul, these individuals will glory as they dwell in perpetual beatitude.

To those who argue the inappropriateness of the body for heaven or heaven for the body, the *Summa* draws attention to the relationship between the condition of the place and what is placed there.³⁸ So, to state that the human body is made for heaven is not a teleological claim, but a supposition as to the appropriateness of heaven as dwelling place. The inference here is that paradise, earth, and heaven are all suitable places for the human body at varying times. Furthermore, to say that only the earth is the natural place for humanity is true only inasmuch as it—unlike paradise and heaven—is imperfect and filled with misery and thus the most appropriate place for indigent men and women, living under the curse of Gen. 3:17, to do both penance and merit grace.

Since the human person is a composite of body and soul, the *Summa* authors naturally wonder about the placement of the soul. They ask *Utrum anima habeat locum spiritualem* ('Whether the soul has a spiritual place').³⁹ Regarding the soul, one view, grounded in Chapter 4 of Book 4 of Aristotle's *Physics*, maintains the proportions of the body are defined by 'containing' and being 'contained', so too, there must be a similar state for the soul.⁴⁰ The opinions of John Damascene, Jerome, and Augustine are marshaled to argue, respectively, that angels are intelligible due to their location in spiritual places (John Damascene), whatever has substance is circumscribed (Jerome), and the locus of the soul is God, therefore a spiritual place is ascribed to it (Augustine).⁴¹ Taking the lead again from Aristotle, the contrary po-

37 *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C4 (n. 456), Respondeo, p. 587.

38 *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C4 (n. 456), Ad obiecta 4, p. 588.

39 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar1 (n. 334), p. 407.

40 Book 3, c. 5 and Book 4, c. 4 of Aristotle's *Physics* are identified as sources for this section by the Quaracchi editors (*SH* II (n. 334), p. 407, nn. 1, 5, and 7). On locus and the issue of *continens* and *contentum*, see Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *In Physicam Aristotelis* 4.1.5 (Wood, 154). This section of the *SH* relies on Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 27, n. 36, l.c. 1:378 which is, as the Quaracchi editors point out, directly dependent in part (*citatur verb.*) on Richard Rufus (Oxford, Balliol 62, 83v).

41 The texts in this section are identified by the Quaracchi editors as John of Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 2, c. 3 (PG 94:870), Jerome, *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 6 (PL 23:108), and Augustine, *De quantitate animae*, c. 1, n. 2 (PL 32:1035). The first two texts are not direct quotes found in the PG and PL texts but

sition argues that one and the same place cannot serve diverse creatures, yet God as *Primum*⁴² contains many creatures directly and thus the divine does not ‘contain’ in the same manner as a place. Augustine confirms that creatures are not in God as in a place, and Aristotle’s view of place as boundary precludes a spiritual place for the soul. The authors attempt to resolve the issue by noting that one can speak of place *simpliciter* or *secundum quid*, that is, in an unqualified or qualified manner. God, as uncreated spirit, offers to spiritual substances a certain *continentia* that allows them to rest in, move toward, and find salvation in the divine. This is distinguished from the simple understanding of place as both ‘containing’ and ‘immobile’; yet, spiritual substances like the soul still have a boundary determined by their power. So, in one way God, can still be said to contain the soul as *locatum* while the soul is contained in *locus*.

The following question is *Utrum anima habeat locum corporalem* (‘Whether the soul has a corporeal place’).⁴³ Here the Summists delineate their perspective in terms of *proprie* (circumference), *minus proprie* (definition), and *communiter* (presence). To be in a corporeal place in terms of presence assumes the existence of the thing and a place. To be in a corporeal place by definition assumes coexistence and the affixing of a boundary. To be a corporeal place by circumference assumes the two previously mentioned points and the addition of symmetry in the place according to the beginning, middle, and end. Accordingly, the rational soul is in place by definition and presence but not by circumference since it is not circumscribed by measurable dimensions, although it is contained, as pointed out earlier, in terms of power. The soul does, however, have a defined corporeal place by reasons of the accidents of the body with which it is united. Even when the soul is separated from the body, it still exists and remains present and commonly considered to have a place.

Place, Person, and Prayer

The preceding analysis of *locus* in the first three books of the *Summa Halensis* lays the foundation for our careful examination of the relationship between prayer and place in the Franciscan theological community of Paris in the mid-1250s. Question 26 *De Oratione* in Book 4 is an exhaustive treatment of the theme that includes Article 7, *De congruentia usus orationis* (‘On the appropriateness of the practice of pray-

are *ad sensum*. The statement attributed to Augustine, *Locus animae Deus est*, is absent from the PL texts. Indeed, the word *locus* is not mentioned at all.

⁴² On the proper name of God and the title of *Primum*, see *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q2, M2 (n. 357), *Ad obiecta* 2, p. 534.

⁴³ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar2 (n. 335), pp. 407–8. Alexander briefly mentions definition and dimension when treating spiritual and bodily creatures in light of the potential vacuum in heaven caused by Lucifer’s fall, see Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* II, d. 2, n. 20, 2:21.

er').⁴⁴ The authors are interested here in the when, where, and how of prayer. Although Paul exhorts the Thessalonians (1 Thess. 5:17) to pray 'without ceasing', the practicality of such advice must be subject to the reality of life and guided by a firm understanding of prayer itself.⁴⁵ Properly speaking, it is the ascent of the mind into God whereby there is a tasting or releasing of something, more commonly, prayer is any contemplative act carried out in relation to God, and most commonly, it includes all good actions.⁴⁶

The earlier treatment of the locality of God in Book 1 and individual human beings in Book 2 assures that no place is excluded when speaking of praising or praying unless the person is not properly ordered to God as a corporeal-spiritual creature. In Book 4, the Summists pose the question: *An omni loco orandum sit; vel tantum in locis sacris, et ad hoc institutio* ('Whether one must pray in every place or only in sacred places instituted for this purpose').⁴⁷ Among the initial affirmative arguments include a reference to both Augustine and Anselm, who maintain that God is present in every place. Since prayers are pious affections directed toward God, and no creature exists outside of divine rule, those who worship in spirit and truth may offer private and public prayer everywhere in accord with the nature of the prayer in question. However, in contrast with the divine, human beings are always somewhere and not somewhere else. As embodied spiritual beings, they are also embedded or located. Consequently, a relationship exists between individuals in specific places and forms of prayer. When it comes to private prayer, where secrets are shared between an individual and God, a secret, private place is natural.⁴⁸ Canonical prayer, such as the psalmody, and other communal prayer forms instituted by the church for the consolation and incitement of devotion, are best suited to church as revealed already in the construction and divine benediction of Solomon's temple.

Churches, properly speaking, are the most appropriate places to pray, since the Lord himself quoted Isa. 56:7 in the Gospel of Matt. (21:13) to remind the money-changers in the temple that his house was meant for prayer.⁴⁹ In a church, believers are also joined by angels who descend from heaven to reverence and honor the Body of the Lord in this sacred place, set aside for the divine. In addition, they serve to gather a community together in the mutually beneficial devotion of canonical prayer, in a manner unlike any other setting since the locus is congruent with the intended

⁴⁴ *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, pp. 719–22. Alexander himself treats the question of prayer in Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 17, n. 24, 3:181–9.

⁴⁵ This Pauline exhortation frames the question of whether marital intercourse and prayer are compatible, see Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* IV, d. 31, n. 10, 4:494–6 and d. 32, nn. 6–15, 4:509–13, esp. n. 14 regarding sacred places and times.

⁴⁶ *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 720.

⁴⁷ *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 720. A similar definition of prayer is found in Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.*, d. 15, p. 2, a. 1, q. 4, 4:368.

⁴⁸ *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, pp. 720b–21.

⁴⁹ *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 720.

activities in the place. Yet, if the ‘Philosopher’, in this case, Aristotle, argues for the congruence of a place with what is done there, what can be said for locations far afield from churches?⁵⁰ It is at this point that the authors of *Summa Halensis* appeal to the graphic example of Gregory praying the psalms in the latrine. If there is a relationship between place and activity, it would seem that anywhere that is deemed shameful inevitably gives rise to shameful thoughts contrary to prayer. Place has agency, without a doubt, thus care should be given to avoid those locales prone to promoting what theologians term ‘turbid fantasies’. At the same time, what is an act of nature per se does not preclude prayer for those who Gregory identifies as the ‘perfect’. Those who are the ‘friends of God’ can pray anywhere if their will in that place is ordered properly toward God.⁵¹ Consequently, purgatory is a locus of prayer while hell is not.⁵²

The discussion of purgatory, hell, and prayer is a reminder that it is the human person, understood as an embodied, material-spiritual being embedded in creation, who is the foremost locus of prayer in the *Summa Halensis*. The question *An oratio sit efficax ex puris naturalibus; vel ex gratia gratis data, sive gratum faciente* (‘Whether prayer is efficacious due to natural causes or due to freely given grace, that is, the grace that makes one acceptable’); without sanctifying grace, it is possible to recognize the misery of human contingency and the necessity for divine mercy.⁵³ Everyone is in *statu viatoris*; thus, the precariousness of life is inescapable, and the human mind can recognize this reality. This existential situation births prayer,⁵⁴ and in this light, it is possible to petition for the material blessings of this world. Yet, this same world is passing away just as human beings are passing through it toward heaven or hell. As Aristotle argues in Book 4 of the *Physics*, bodies move in tandem with their appropriate place and find their natural rest there.⁵⁵ Alexander of Hales’ Franciscan confreres link this movement of bodies to the will, and quote the Philosopher to explain how human beings who are damned come to a voluntary, violent form of rest since they moved away from blessings of prayer when they could have opted for the opposite.⁵⁶ These theologians acknowledge that Aristotle was not referring to the will as they are since grace is needed to merit what they described earlier as the natural resting *locatum* of the glorified body; that is, heaven.⁵⁷ From the perspective of all *viatores* or travelers on the journey into God, prayer is ultimately efficacious only when individuals in their poverty are ordered toward the divine

50 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 720.

51 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 721.

52 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar4, pp. 699–701.

53 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M5, Ar1, pp. 723–4.

54 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar1, pp. 683b–84.

55 On this Aristotelian text and argument, see Aristotle, *Physics: Books III and IV*, trans. Edward Hussey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 11–2, 80–1.

56 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar4, p. 700.

57 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar4, p. 700.

by prevenient grace, which is freely given without merit, and their souls are infused with sanctifying grace.⁵⁸ From this point forward, the hallmark of Franciscan prayer is the graced exercise of the powers of the soul through the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.⁵⁹

As the existential and ontological locus of prayer, the embodied soul is called to be physically as well as spiritually ordered to the divine. Such congruency invites specific external corporal postures that may signify the reality of the relationship between the one who prays and the one to whom the petition is directed.⁶⁰ Referencing Hugh of St Victor, a wide range of liturgical gestures are mentioned, but the *Summa Halensis* underscores two specific gestures: turning to the east and genuflection. Each one is grounded in foundational themes favored by Franciscans, the appeal to exterior rays of the sun as the best metaphor for the divine illumination that comes interiorly through grace and the importance of obedient, penitential humility. Facing the east, where the sun arises as the most noble source of light, orients human beings toward the divine, and speaks of the Creator, who excels over all of creation, and Christ, who is the ‘sun’ of justice. Clearly this action is one of signification, as there is no sense that God dwells more in one locus as opposed to another.⁶¹ The treatment of the *localitas* of God in Book 1 clarified any question in that regard. Indeed, the fact that God is present everywhere highlights the penetrating nature of divine illumination. Genuflection, accompanied by the beating of the chest and outstretched hands suggest humility, together with obedience and penance.

The Summists reveal their predilection for interiority, however, when they remark that these exterior manifestations are in accord with the nature of prayer but are not necessary. Similar to the petitions and praises uttered in public such as psalmody during the liturgical hours, physical gestures may overcome boredom and encourage the pious affections of the community, but interior or mental prayer holds pride of place, so to speak, in the taxonomy of prayer.⁶² Vocalization is necessary for liturgical

58 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M5, Ar1, p. 723.

59 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M1, Ar2, pp. 675–8. On faith, hope, and love as the distinguishing virtues of Franciscan prayer as opposed to the Dominican emphasis on obedience, see Timothy J. Johnson, ‘The *Summa Alexandri* Vol. IV and the Development of the Franciscan Theology of Prayer,’ *Miscellanea Francescana* 93 (1993): 524–37.

60 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 721.

61 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar7, p. 722.

62 It may have been the Franciscan David of Augsburg who coined the term ‘mental prayer’. See Friedrich Wulf, ‘Das innere Gebet (oratio mentalis) und die Betrachtung (meditatio),’ *Geist und Leben* 25 (1952): 385. Given the term’s prominence in *De Oratione* and other 13th-century Franciscan texts, it may have originated in the Minorite community in Paris, see Timothy J. Johnson, *The Soul in Ascent: Bonaventure on Poverty, Prayer, and Union with God* (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2012), 122, n. 434. This approach to interiority and mental prayer is diametrically opposed to their Dominican counterparts, see Simon Tugwell, ‘Introduction,’ in *Early Dominicans: Selected Writings*, ed. Simon Tugwell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 3–4.

prayer and required for the common good. Yet at the same time, God is, as the *Summa Halensis* consistently argued, most intimately present within a person—indeed more present than a person is to him or herself⁶³—and mental prayer denotes the conversation of the heart with God, and likewise the ascending journey of the mind or intellect into the divine. Vocal prayer is ordered to mental prayer and, thereby advantageous inasmuch as it affords this *transitus* or passing over into God.⁶⁴ For the Franciscans, even the divine illumination proper to prevenient grace, which initially births prayer to receive the spiritual gifts of grace, is a decidedly, but not necessarily exclusively interior reality.⁶⁵ When introducing *De Oratione* in Book 4, they claim that interior prayer moves individuals most immediately into God,⁶⁶ who while intimately present with a person, appears to be absent.⁶⁷ In comparison with fasting and almsgiving, there is no doubt that this form of prayer is superior in merit and nobility since it is a form of contemplation *in via* (along the way) engaging, raising, and perfecting the totality of the person's understanding and affections in manner similar to love.

Concluding Reflections

The *Summa Halensis*, while both impressive and comprehensive, is but one representative of the massive literary project of the friars in the 1250s. In another mid 13th-century Franciscan text, *The Sacred Exchange between Saint Francis and Lady Poverty*, there is a memorable scene where Francis, after seeking out the naked and forlorn heroine, invites her to a communal dinner with his confreres. When she inquires as to the whereabouts of their cloister, Francis brings her to a certain hill. Gazing out at the world around them, he declares, 'Lady, this is our cloister'.⁶⁸ Given the fierce polemics surrounding the rapid clericalization and urban domestication of the Franciscans in the 1240s to the 1260s, this encounter with Lady Poverty from the 1230s to the 1250s is a stark reminder of how their communal identity had shifted

63 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar2, p. 686.

64 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar2, p. 690.

65 On the Franciscan focus on interiority and grace, see Johann Auer, *Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik*, vol. 1, *Das Wesen der Gnade* (Freiburg: Herder, 1942), 347.

66 *SH* Bk IV, Q25, M2, p. 667.

67 *SH* Bk IV, Q26, M3, Ar2, p. 686.

68 *Sacrum commercium sancti Francisci cum Domina Paupertate*, c. 30, n. 24, in *Fontes Franciscani*, ed. Enrico Menestò and Stefano Brufani, *Medioevo francescano: Testi*, 2 (Assisi: Edizioni Porziuncola, 1995), 1730: 'Hoc est claustrum nostrum, domina.' On the background of the *Sacrum commercium* text, see Stefano Brufani, 'Il Sacrum commercium sancti Francisci cum domina Paupertate,' in *Fontes Franciscani: Introduzioni critiche*, ed. Stefano Brufani, *Medioevo francescano: Saggi*, 3 (Assisi: Edizioni Porziuncola, 1997), 172.

from the peripatetic days of the early movement only to be replaced, albeit contested, by the stability and stasis of a growing monastic practice behind cloister walls.⁶⁹

The premise of *The Sacred Exchange* is expressed at the outset: poverty has the prerogative among the virtues that prepare a dwelling place for God within those who embrace her.⁷⁰ But where is she located, where is she to be found?⁷¹ This is the question Francis raises, and in the asking, the author appeals to the term *locus* in several passages to narrate how God placed human beings in a most amenable and beautiful place, only to exchange this paradise for a harsh mortality marked by the quest for riches.⁷² Poverty herself wandered, until she prepared an appropriate *locus*, a dwelling place pleasing to the Son of the most high Father.⁷³ Those first following in her footsteps remained faithful to the Lord as they spread the Gospel to the ends of the world, but the false peace of Constantine weakened her.⁷⁴ With the passage of time, the allure of riches returned, and many abandoned poverty, including those dedicated to religious life. Eventually God placed her on a high mountain accessible only to those like Francis.⁷⁵ Now the faithful thorough the ages in tandem with the angels, will both celebrate if Francis and his brothers prepare a place within themselves to receive the grace of poverty, and find refreshment in the fragrance of the prayers offered by those who are passing through the valley of this world.⁷⁶

Without renouncing the importance of poverty, the followers of Francis at the University of Paris found themselves in a much different situation than their confreres on a distant, allegorical or even literal hillside. Nevertheless, the question of their place in the church, and the world at large, was subject to intense discussions and, at times, fierce critique. The shift to large urban convents, and the life that ensued which was influenced by the long-tested monastic paradigm, did not erase the figurative or even literal peripatetic impulse common to the Franciscan worldview. The concept of human beings as *viatores*, while a collective medieval motif, is profoundly preserved in the memory of the brothers due to any number of factors, including the hagiographical accounts of their founder, a rapid expansion of far flung convents throughout Europe, and the widespread diplomatic and missionary

69 See Timothy J. Johnson, “‘Ground to Dust for the Purity of the Order’: Pastoral Power, Punishment, and Minorite Identity in the Narbonne Enclosure,” *Franciscan Studies* 64 (2006): 293–318; Timothy J. Johnson, ‘Dispensations, Permissions, and the “Narbonne Enclosure”: The Spatial Parameters of Power in Bonaventure’s “Constitutions of Narbonne”,’ in *Oboedientia: Zu Formen und Grenzen von Macht und Unterordnung im mittelalterlichen Religiosentum*, ed. Sébastien Barret and Gert Melville, Vita Regularis: Abhandlungen, 27 (Münster: LIT, 2005), 363–82.

70 *Sacrum commercium*, prol. (Menestò and Brufani, 1705).

71 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 2, (Menestò and Brufani, 1707).

72 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 8 (Menestò and Brufani, 1713–4).

73 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 6 (Menestò and Brufani, 1711).

74 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 12 (Menestò and Brufani, 1717).

75 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 3 (Menestò and Brufani, 1708).

76 *Sacrum commercium*, c. 31 (Menestò and Brufani, 1731–2).

travels of their contemporary confreres. In the *Summa Halensis*, they access two philosophical-theological themes to secure the peripatetic underpinnings of their foundational story and secure its continual practice regardless of their urban emplacement.

The first is a sustained focus on ontological poverty, which interprets the movement from non-being to being itself as the very journey into God of all humanity. This acute dependency of humanity, according to the *Summa Halensis*, is the matrix for prayer understood as adoration (God bring individuals into existence), praise (God converses with individuals), and thanksgiving (God brings individuals to their goal).⁷⁷ The second is systematic utilization of *locus* to determine the place of human beings in general, and the Franciscans in particular, during their passage from non-being to being. This effort alone is noteworthy, as it suggests far more than a passing fascination with the philosophical materials available in the day; instead, it represents a community project of identification and instantiation amid a turbulent social-ecclesial period. Wherever they might find themselves in the world—even while *in cloaca* (in the restroom) – the authors understood themselves as *viatores* passing into God everywhere at any time in prayer, even if they no longer shared in the contingencies of the road mirrored so poignantly in *The Sacred Exchange*. Despite a shifting cultural context for many of the brothers, this mythic paradigm remained embedded in Franciscan intellectual theory and spiritual practice at least in the *Summa Halensis*, and writers of the same period such as Roger Bacon and Bonaventure of Bagnoregio.

In conclusion, the question arises as to the degree of innovation the authors of the *Summa Halensis* displayed regarding person, place, and prayer. One thing is clear, and that is that these Franciscan authors are intensely interested in question of emplacement and salvation history.⁷⁸ In *The Mystic Fable*, the French historian and cultural theorist, Michel de Certeau, links prayer and knowledge. Speaking, he claims in accord with St Anselm, is the condition for knowledge, hence prayer as *oratio* is the field where this epistemological dynamic unfolds.⁷⁹ This essay suggests that theory and practice of prayer presented in Question 26 of the *Summa Halensis* is best understood via the Franciscan appropriation of *locus* as a defining, hermeneutical key to individual self-knowledge and communal identity in the mid 13th century. How does this assertion bear out when examined against the writings of religious communities such as the Dominicans? What about the Franciscans themselves? Does this intentional focus on place disappear as they become more firmly entrenched in society, and their mythic paradigm is rendered, practically speaking,

⁷⁷ SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti1, D1, M3, C1 (n. 291), pp. 445–7.

⁷⁸ On the question of salvation history and the *Summa Halensis*, see Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis (Alexander von Hales)* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1964).

⁷⁹ Michel de Certeau, *The Mystic Fable*, vol 1, trans. Michael B. Smith (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 160.

meaningless? And yes, what about the authentic writings of Alexander of Hales himself? His *Glossa* and other critical editions of his works need to be examined in tandem with the treatment of person, place, and prayer in the *Summa Halensis*. These are all questions to be explored at another time, in another place—perhaps by the same person.

Mary Beth Ingham, CSJ

The Sanctification of Mary

Summa Halensis and the *status quaestionis* prior to William of Ware and John Duns Scotus

Abstract: This article examines the early thirteenth century Franciscan position on the Immaculate Conception. Following a presentation of the basic argument taken from *Summa Halensis*, we show how these arguments support the denial of the Immaculate Conception, while they defend her sanctification *in utero*. The argument concludes with a consideration of how these early foundations that ground the denial actually provide the conditions for the possibility of the later, definitive defense of the Marian prerogative. Throughout, the analysis reveals the way in which continuity and discontinuity within a tradition provide the conditions for later discovery and innovation.

Introduction

According to the manuscript tradition, John of La Rochelle (1190 – 1245) authored, and William of Melitona¹ influenced, the questions on the sanctification of Mary found in the *Summa Halensis*.² Following Alexander of Hales, they presented arguments informed by Anselm's concept of original justice, understood as a preternatural inclination toward rectitude in the will. This re-framing and re-casting of the essence of original sin used by Alexander of Hales represents an initial Franciscan shift away from (or nuancing of) the dominant Augustinian teaching in the direction of an Anselmian approach.

This shift enables a subsequent distinction between human nature and the person as it relates to the question of sanctification. And this distinction can be seen to influence the structural unfolding of the *Summa's* argumentation. In this way, a circular influence comes into view: a foundational shift in understanding results in the structural foregrounding of a key distinction that threads through the textual treatment and grounds the conclusion. But, oddly, despite these innovative elements, the conclusion does not depart (at least not yet) from the tradition.

So, despite their creative use of traditional authorities, the early Franciscans do not solve the question of Mary's immaculate conception. In fact, they deny it. Nonetheless, these early arguments and counter-arguments set the stage for the further

1 Franciscan Regent Master 1248 – 1255.

2 Allan B. Wolter, 'The Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in the Early Franciscan School,' *Studia Mariana* 9 (1954): 26 – 69.

development of the complete Franciscan solution that would be presented by John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) at the turn of the 14th century.

In what follows, we examine this early 13th-century Franciscan position on the Immaculate Conception. First, we present the basic argument offered by these early friars in *Summa* Book 3.³ Following this, we show how these arguments supported their *denial* of Mary's Immaculate Conception (although they defended her sanctification *in utero*). Finally, we consider the way in which the early foundations that supported their denial actually provided the conditions for the possibility of what would later become the definitive *defense* of the Marian prerogative, less than a century later.

Throughout, our analysis reveals the way in which continuity and discontinuity within a tradition provide the conditions for later discovery and innovation. Structurally as well as substantively, traditional arguments and authorities are made to play new roles in the development of a particularly Franciscan approach, even to complex theological questions such as this. Indeed, had the earlier Franciscan Masters *not* broken with the traditional Augustinian approach to original sin, its mode of transmission, and its effects, later thinkers such as John Duns Scotus would not have had such a well-developed foundation upon which to advance their arguments in favor of the Marian prerogative.

The Argument in Favor of the Sanctification of Mary Found in the *Summa Halensis*

Biblical texts refer to several important figures held by tradition to be sanctified prior to birth. Jeremiah⁴ and John the Baptist⁵ are the foremost among these. There is certainly a precedent for a question surrounding sanctification in the womb, especially in regard to Mary of Nazareth, who would become the mother of Jesus. Placing Mary's prerogative in the same category as Jeremiah and John was not in dispute. Setting her outside their category, however, would be problematic.

While belief in Mary's sanctification appeared in the West sometime during the Middle Ages, the feast itself has an ancient history in the East, as early as the 7th century. Initially it was a Feast of St Anne, and only later shifted to focus on the 'mother

3 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol IV, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, M2–3 (nn. 75–84), pp. 111–26. John of La Rochelle's special question, *De sanctificatione beatae Virginis Mariae*, was incorporated 'almost verbatim' into the *Summa*. See Wolter, 'The Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception,' 40, n. 64.

4 Jer. 1:5: 'Before you came to birth, I consecrated you.' (RSV)

5 Lk. 1:41: 'When Elizabeth heard Mary's greeting, the child leaped in her womb.' (RSV)

of God'.⁶ Before the close of the 9th century, it had become a universal feast of obligation in the Byzantine empire.⁷ It appeared in central Italy during the middle of the 9th century. Irish martyrologies note the commemorations of *Mariae Virginis Conceptio*, celebrated on 2 or 3 May.⁸ These May feast dates make it difficult to see anything close to a continuous connection from Byzantine commemoration of the Marian feast to that of 11th-century England, when the feast of Our Lady's Conception was propagated in the West and fully recognized by the Bishops as part of the liturgy of the Church of England.⁹

With this background in mind, let us now turn to the text itself in the *Summa Halensis*. There the argument for Mary's sanctification unfolds according to five discrete questions, each focusing on a moment in the unfolding timeline of her development in the womb. The structure and organization of these questions represents a first and innovative 'mapping' of the timeline for sanctification. In this way, the analysis focuses on a deeper reflection of various moments within the womb: temporal instants at which her sanctification could take place.¹⁰ Each of these moments is analyzed according to its possibility for sanctification by divine intervention.

The question that guides the structure of the argument is this: 'if Mary's sanctification had occurred, when would it/could it have taken place?' The options are not many. If she were sanctified *in utero*, then it would have occurred at any one of five different moments in time. Each question takes up one of these moments:

- a) **A divine action before conception in the womb.** Here, divine action would have involved cleansing both her parents, Anne and Joachim, from sin and from its effects so that they could have begotten a child and not passed on original sin.
- b) **A divine action at the moment of conception in the womb.** Scholars distinguished between seminal conception and ensoulment (or animation). In other words, the flesh would have been cleansed prior to its union with the soul. This type of explanation would have involved divine intervention to prevent the libido-driven intercourse of her parents from causing the fleshly urge (*stim-*

6 Allan Wolter traces the careful doctrinal background in Wolter, 'Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception,' 26–7.

7 M. Jugie, 'Immaculée conception dans l'Église grecque après le Concile d'Ephèse,' in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, vol. 7/1, ed. Jean Michel Alfred Vacant and Eugène Mangenot (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1922), 957, cited in Wolter, 'Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception,' 26.

8 H. Thurston, 'The Irish Origins of Our Lady's Conception Feast,' *The Month* 103 (1904): 449–65.

9 Francis M. Mildner, 'The Immaculate Conception in England up to the Time of John Duns Scotus,' *Marianum* 1 (1939): 91–2.

10 Marilyn McCord Adams, 'The Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary: A Thought-Experiment in Medieval Philosophical Theology,' *Harvard Theological Review* 103 (2010): 140: 'Even though none of these early Franciscans embraces the immaculate conception or even immaculate animation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, their further articulation of the consequences of Adam's fall for his descendants forwards the debate by explicitly mapping the points at which God might intervene to cleanse her.'

ulus carnis) to be transmitted to her flesh. This could be understood as an immaculate, yet seminal, conception.

- c) **A divine action after conception and before ensoulment (animation by the rational soul).** This points to the moment of *mediate animation* (the medieval understanding of ensoulment) when an already existing seminal material (zygote or embryo) is joined to the rational soul.¹¹ For cleansing to have occurred at this moment, divine action would have to prevent, by an infusion of grace, the fleshly urge in her parents (*stimulus carnis*) from causing the tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*) in her. This could be understood as immaculate animation.¹²
- d) **A divine action at some moment between ensoulment and birth.** Such a divine intervention would take place at some point during the development in the womb, by the infusion of cleansing grace into her soul. This explanation is similar to the cases of sanctification for Jeremiah and John the Baptist, traditionally described as sanctified before birth.
- e) **A divine action sometime after birth.** This action *ex utero* would have taken place at some point prior to the virginal conception of Jesus.

Note how in all five of these scenarios, the centrality of sexual intercourse as sinful, the transmission of sin through intercourse, and the need for the cleansing of the flesh are all taken for granted. The stain of sinfulness and the need for cleansing testify to the lingering presence of Augustine's approach, despite the structural shift toward a more nuanced analysis of this issue.

So here we see Augustine's authority. And yet, far more is going on in this text than the appeal to tradition. In dealing with, and dismissing, three of the above five possibilities, John of La Rochelle makes use of a key distinction in his analysis that fundamentally alters the impact of Augustine. This key distinction is that between the sanctification of the person and the sanctification of the nature.¹³ The sanctification of nature refers to that nature we all share, passed down from one generation to the next through the act of sexual intercourse. The act of intercourse, which Augus-

11 Traditionally, this was held to be at 35 days for women and 42 days for men.

12 William of Melitona, in his more systematic analysis of the stages listed, actually raised the far more significant question: Whether she was sanctified at the moment the soul was infused? His question, taken from *Quaestiones de sanctificatione B. Virginis* (Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 737, fols 36d-39a; see also Antonio Samaritani, 'La quaestio de sanctificatione B. Virginis di Guglielmo de Melitona,' *Marianum* 30 (1968), 161–80), not included in the *Summa* reveals what is at stake in the question of Mary's Immaculate Conception: the universal redemptive power of Jesus Christ. See Wolter, 'The Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception,' 41, n. 68.

13 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, M2, C1, Ar1 (n. 75), Solutio, p. 112: 'Dicendum quod duplex est sanctificatio, scilicet sanctificatio naturae et sanctificatio personae. Sanctificatio vero personae est per praesentem gratiam; sanctificatio naturae non erit nisi per futuram gloriam (...)' [It must be said that sanctification is twofold, namely sanctification of the nature and sanctification of the person. Indeed, sanctification of the person is through the presence of grace; sanctification of the nature will only take place in the future [state of] glory (...)].

tine identified as the carrier of original sin, was always tainted with concupiscence (*fomes peccati*), the source of sin. The sanctification of an individual, while possible through baptism, never extends beyond that person. We cannot inherit the effects of baptism from our parents. Consequently, absent the sanctification of human nature in general, all human generation is tainted with and transmits the guilt of sin and its consequences. The universal sanctification of human nature will only occur at the end of time, when the general resurrection takes place, glorifying the entirety of humanity.

By contrast, the sanctification of the person takes place in this life and is the result of ongoing divine grace. Here it is not only the individual nature, but the individual's will and the personal capacity for charitable actions that explains how such a sanctification is possible. Personal sanctification begins at baptism, when sanctifying grace cleanses the soul entirely. This restoration turns the soul back toward God. However, in spite of this cleansing and restoring action, remnants of sin remain in the person, specifically the human tendency toward evil (turning toward the things of the world) found in the inability of the higher rational powers to control the lower animal appetites and passions. Because of the differences in personal temperament, the effects of concupiscence vary from person to person. The source of these effects, original sin, does not vary.

This crucial distinction had its source in Anselm¹⁴ and is developed by Alexander of Hales¹⁵ and the tradition.¹⁶ Interestingly, John of La Rochelle does not reference Anselm in his use of this distinction. The distinction between the person and nature in need of sanctification is a development of Anselm's insight that, in Adam, a single human person contained the entirety of human nature. Because Adam was the only human being, he was in a class of beings of which he was the sole member. In him was the seed for the entire human race. In this way, as an individual person he corrupted his own nature; henceforth, the corrupted human nature would be passed on, corrupting all persons who come after.

14 Anselm of Canterbury, *De conceptu virginali et originali peccato*, c. 23 (PL 158:454 A-457B); *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning, 2000), 456: 'As I have said, there is a sin which derives from a nature, and there is a sin which derives from a person. Thus, the sin which derives from a person can be called personal sin; and the sin which derives from a nature can be called natural sin. (It is also called original sin.) Now, just as the personal sin passes over to the nature, so the natural sin passes over to the person.'

15 Alexander uses this distinction in Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* II, d. 30, n. 7, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 2:286–7, cited in Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 4/1, *Problèmes de morale* (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César; Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1954), 171–2.

16 Lottin points to the important author of Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale, 434-II, 383b-388b, who develops the Anselmian distinction and uses it in various parts of his argument. See Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale*, 4/1:175.

This distinction between sanctification of nature and sanctification of person threads through John of La Rochelle's entire argumentation in the *Summa*. In this way, the structure of the argument is itself influenced by the substantive distinction drawn initially from Anselm, but already developed in the Franciscan tradition. On the basis of the distinction, John's argument develops its own unique approach to defend what might be called the 'common solution'.

At this point, we can identify (at least) two important reasons that militated against a defense for the Immaculate Conception. The first reason would argue that, in order to be sanctified, one must be guilty of some impurity or sin. Even to speak of Mary's sanctification implies prior sin. So the question itself presupposes the need for sanctification. The second reason supported the first with the Augustinian teaching on original sin, namely its essential identification with concupiscence and its transmission via sexual intercourse. Since it is obvious that concupiscence remains even in the baptized person, it can be argued that, even with sanctification in the womb, there could be no conception or generation without the presence of sin.

In the first article (sanctification prior to conception), John affirms that Mary must have inherited sin from her parents, since she was conceived in the way that all humans are.¹⁷ Her nature is human nature. Therefore, she could not have been sanctified before her conception.

Thanks as well to this distinction, in the second article (sanctification at the moment of seminal conception), John argues that she could not have been sanctified at the moment of her conception. Here again, he reasons, in natural actions, nature is the mover while in personal actions, the will is the mover. While the will is capable of acting out of charity and thus performing a meritorious act (such as Abraham and Sarah, acting according to the divine command), the act of sexual intercourse follows nature's laws, and is, once again, tainted with concupiscence. This means that even the most laudable personal act of sexual intercourse still transmits original sin, due to the presence of concupiscence.¹⁸

17 *SH IV*, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, M2, C1, Ar1 (n. 75), Solutio, 112: 'Propter hoc non est generatio sine peccato, quia natura non est sanctificata et per generationem transfunditur natura; ideo necesse est ut quod generatur, in generatione contrahat peccatum. Et propter hoc B. Virgo non potuit in parentibus suis sanctificari, immo necesse fuit quod in generatione sua contraheret peccatum a parentibus' [Because of this there is no generation without sin, because the [human] nature is not sanctified and the [human] nature is what is transmitted through generation; and so it is necessary that what is generated contracts the sin in [the act of] generation. And because of this, the Blessed Virgin could not be sanctified through her parents, because it was necessary that in her generation sin was contracted from her parents].

18 *SH IV*, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, M2, C1, Ar2 (n.76), Solutio, p. 114: 'Supposito, quod alibi disputatur, quod coitus coniugalis possit esse meritorius, distinguendum quod est considerare coniugalem coitum meritorium secundum quod est actus personae vel naturae (...) Sed conceptio sequitur ad coitum et respicit naturam moventem, et non voluntatem' [Supposing that, as is disputed elsewhere, conjugal intercourse could be meritorious, one must distinguish between considering such conjugal inter-

Likewise, in the third article (sanctification prior to ensoulment), John makes clear that flesh cannot be sanctified prior to ensoulment, since sanctification is only possible through divine grace, and the body is only able to receive grace when united to the soul.¹⁹

In the fourth article (sanctification in the womb), John confirms that, according to the distinction and the elimination of all other options, if Mary was sanctified in the womb, then this would have to have taken place after conception and ensoulment, and prior to natural birth.²⁰

Finally, in a fifth article, John argues that Mary experienced a second sanctification, at the moment of the Annunciation, wherein her entire being (body and soul) was completely cleansed in order for her to conceive Jesus. Here we find a second moment of sanctification: importantly, this is a sanctification of nature, such that her flesh could unite with the Word.²¹

Two questions can be raised at this point in our analysis. First, what is significant about this distinction between personal sanctification and the sanctification of human nature? Second, how does this distinction, understood as it is by these early Franciscan Masters, both promote and obstruct the later solution we find in the Franciscan tradition?

The Significance of this Distinction for their Argument: Taking a Deeper Look

The centrality of the distinction between sanctification of person and sanctification of human nature in the *Summa Halensis* indicates, first, how these early Franciscans have moved away from the mainline Augustinian position on original sin in order to take up Anselm's explanation of the essential nature of original sin and its relation-

course meritorious insofar as it is an act of the person or of the nature (...) But conception follows intercourse and is the result of a natural, not voluntary, movement].

19 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 77), Solutio, p. 115: 'Dicendum quod caro ante animationem nullo modo potest sanctificari' [It must be said that in no way can the flesh be sanctified before animation].

20 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, M2, C1, Ar4 (n. 78), Solutio, p. 118: 'Concedendum est quod gloriosa Virgo ante suam nativitatem post infusionem animae in suo corpore fuit sanctificata in utero matris suae; et concedendum etiam quod maiori dono gratiae fuit ditata quam aliquis alius' [It must be conceded that the glorious Virgin was sanctified in her mother's womb before her birth, after the soul's infusion in her body; and thus she was given an even greater gift of grace than any others].

21 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, M3, C1 (n. 80), Solutio, pp. 1212: 'In secunda vero sanctificatione fuit sanctificata in quantum potuit esse principium ad carnem aliam, et sic fuit sanctificata in quantum respiciebat naturam, et hoc ut de ipsa acciperetur caro unienda Verbo sine peccato (...)' [In the second [moment of] sanctification she was sanctified in such a way that she could be the source for another's flesh, and thus she was sanctified in [her human] nature so that the flesh uniting to the Verb be without sin (...)].

ship to concupiscence. In order to see this, let us consider how the distinction between sanctification of human nature and sanctification of the person reveals a deeper shift in the understanding of the essence of original sin.

For Augustine, the essence of original sin *was* concupiscence. That is, Augustine argued that the disordered and sinful act of Adam, whose punishment would be handed down through generations, was itself a disordered act of desire (concupiscence). The implication here is that, where concupiscence is present, there too is original sin. This also means that original sin is primarily due to disordered bodily desires, resulting in disobedience.

Anselm of Canterbury distinguished original sin from concupiscence, as cause from effect. Since all sin, he argued, is in the will, original sin is better understood as ‘the absence of original justice’ intended by God within the will. Because of this, disordered corporeal desires cannot explain the nature of Adam’s sin, nor is concupiscence original sin. Rather, concupiscence is the *effect* or *punishment* that human nature inherits as a result of the lack of justice in the will. This effect, this punishment, is passed down through human generation, weakening the will and resulting in both an attraction to what is evil and a more difficult effort in doing what is good.

The distinction between personal sanctification and the sanctification of human nature, so central to the argument in the *Summa*, can be traced back to the argument of Anselm of Canterbury in his *De conceptu virginali et originali peccato*.²² It is derived from Anselm’s discussion of free will as source for the first sin of Adam whose effects are transmitted to all humanity. In Adam all humanity has its source. Indeed, in Adam (and prior to the existence of any other humans) both human nature and the human person existed at one and the same time. After Adam, human nature is shared yet human personhood is individual.

Our will is free, affirms Anselm, due to the presence of two affections (or metaphysical orientations): the higher affection for justice (*affectio iustitiae*) and the lower affection for possession (*affectio commodi*). The higher affection, understood as the *rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata* (the will’s self-conserving rectitude), is indeed the original justice intended by God. It was lost, both for the person and for the human race, as a result of Adam’s sin.

In contrast to Augustine’s explanation, Anselm understands original sin not as a positive entity or stain, but as a deficiency. Namely, the term ‘original sin’ refers to the absence or loss of this original justice, a natural (or, as Wolter terms it, *preternatural*) rectitude of the will as created and intended by God. This state of original justice can be understood as a preternatural (and not supernatural) inclination toward beatitude. Its loss occurred at the moment when Adam sinned. This fallen state is inherited by all descendants of Adam as a state of nature. It is this state that is in need of sanctification.

²² Anselm of Canterbury, *De conceptu virginali et originali peccato*, c. 23 (PL 158:454 A-457B), cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale*, 4/1:14, n. 1.

By contrast to the inherited sin of Adam, personal sin is also explained by free will. In Adam existed human nature and the human person. After Adam, human nature is shared among persons. The sin that derives from our shared nature (original sin) is distinct from those sins which we commit (mortal and venial sins) and for which we alone are responsible.

Alexander of Hales and the early Franciscan masters inherited, defended and championed this Anselmian position on original sin, understood as an absence of original justice. But they also nuanced and integrated Anselm's theory with the historically and theologically more dominant Augustinian understanding of original sin, resulting in a far richer treatment of the nature of our present state, *post lapsum*.

Alexander presented original sin as involving two elements: 1. the lack of original justice (from Anselm), and 2. concupiscence (from Augustine). The first holds the character of sin, and the second has the character of punishment, remaining behind even after baptism. Together, explains Alexander, they provide the dual aspect found in every sin: turning away from loving God (the unchanging Good) toward loving the things of the world (changing goods).²³

As Alexander and the early Masters understood it, original justice refers to a pre-natural quality or habit of the human will which, while free, was positively inclined to *remain* good. When this gift was lost through Adam's sin, the will of itself (*de se*) could incline toward sin. For the friars, the absence of original justice does not entail a positive inclination toward sin; it entails the loss of a positive inclination to remain good, resulting in a type of moral neutrality. They identified the positive inclination toward sin with concupiscence, the second element of, and punishment accompanying, original sin. The two inclinations of our present state, one a deficiency and the other positive attraction, point to the distinction between human nature and the individual person. While the loss of original justice is the same for all humans, concupiscence varies depending upon temperament.

The question surrounding Mary's sanctification now opens to two sub-questions, namely: 1. do the effects of sanctification remove the guilt of the sin itself or 2. do the effects of sanctification heal the consequences of the sin? More simply put: what, exactly, is sanctified in Mary that results in a privilege greater than that enjoyed by Jeremiah or John the Baptist?

²³ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de peccato originali*, cited in Wolter, 'The Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception,' 32, n. 39, which references the work by Lottin on Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15272, fols 170vb-171ra and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16406, fol. 39va. See Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale*, 4/1:199–200.

How these Arguments Support Sanctification Without Affirming Immaculate Conception

It is here that the earlier distinction between human nature and person helps to focus the question of the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin and explains the early Franciscans' hesitation to affirm the Marian privilege. As they understood it, if sanctification in the womb removes the guilt of the sin itself, then this would restore her human *nature* to its primal innocence. If, in addition, sanctification heals the consequences or effects of sin (concupiscence), then it seems that this would mean that the *person*, in his or her affective and voluntary condition, would be restored to the condition of inner harmony that was disrupted when the soul joined to the corrupted flesh.

Since the Franciscans' reasoning followed the tradition, in so far as the human *nature* would only be sanctified in eternal glory, they concluded that Mary's moment of sanctification could only have healed her affective and voluntary condition. It would have resulted in the re-establishment of the inner harmony enjoyed before the fall. This they were willing to admit. However, in order for her to belong to the human family, her sanctification could *not* have taken place except after an initial period of guilt. As John explains in Article 5,²⁴ the sanctification of her nature occurred at the Annunciation, enabling the Word to join with cleansed flesh. Mary would be completely sanctified only by the time she became the mother of Jesus. She could not be sanctified without a prior period of guilt.

The logical conclusion would be that only *personal* sanctification could apply, both to Mary before her birth, and to any baptized person. As these early Masters understood it, her human nature, inherited from her parents, guaranteed her solidarity with Adam and Eve in fallen humanity. Her personal sanctification, however complete, could not be inherited from her parents nor passed down from one generation to the next. And so, Mary was personally sanctified in the womb, like Jeremiah and John the Baptist, after ensoulment and prior to birth.

Two shifts have occurred. First, Anselm's position on original sin replaced a stain-based model with a deficiency-based model. Second, and importantly, this shift supported the more helpful distinction between sanctification of the nature and sanctification of the person. The first shift from Augustine to Anselm had indeed looked promising, insofar as it situated sin in the soul and the effects in the psycho-spiritual disharmony. It also emphasized how original sin is more properly understood as the absence of something, rather than the presence of something.

The second shift, however, actually reinforced the obstacle toward the defense of the Immaculate Conception. This obstacle lay in the continued identification of sin with its transmission through sexual intercourse as a positive stain upon human

²⁴ See above, n. 21.

flesh and, consequently, as an infection of the soul. A positive reality (sin) was still understood as something to be inherited. Accordingly, in order to conceive of the Immaculate Conception, one would have had to imagine that Mary did not inherit or possess human nature as the rest of us do; her nature was *sui generis*. And this, of course, was unthinkable.

Despite the initial Alexandrian shift, these arguments offered by the early Franciscan masters continued to support the traditional ‘sanctification before birth’ position, denying the Immaculate Conception. Why is this? One obvious reason has to do with the dominant authority which Augustine continued to hold within the tradition. Tying the transmission of original sin to sexual intercourse as an act of concupiscence made it extremely difficult for these early Franciscans to distinguish between the essence of original sin (as a deficiency) and its consequences.

Indeed, the early Franciscans recognized the value of the second distinction (sanctification of nature vs. sanctification of person) without fully recognizing how it depended on the first shift surrounding the essential nature of original sin as the *absence* of original justice.

Alexander, in particular, had recognized the essentially spiritual character of ‘the defect called original sin and the need of finding a moral cause for its existence as a fault in the unbaptized’.²⁵ The moral cause for original sin, the fault to be cleansed in baptism, would then lie not in the flesh but in the way that the infected flesh interacts with the spirit at the moment of animation. This type of shift toward solidarity with Adam in our humanity, clearly a value for Franciscans, could promote the recognition that the consequences of Adam’s fall have resulted in a particular weakening of the will *at the very moment of ensoulment*. As Alexander explains, *persona corrumpit naturam, natura corrupta corrumpit personam*.²⁶

At the moment of animation, a rational soul is joined to the already ‘fallen’ or ‘corrupted’ human flesh, whose desires are disordered as a consequence of the inheritance from our first parents. That soul, now weakened by the desires of the flesh, is tainted with the disorder that results from a sin the person did not commit, but that belongs to human nature *post lapsum*. Our shared human nature is an act of solidarity with Adam. We inherit his debt (the absence of justice) and we share the punishments he earned in the same way that we would have shared his rewards, had he not sinned.

Accordingly, the *consequences* of the sin of our first parents are passed down through generations as punishment for a debt we inherit. These consequences are physical: they infect and weaken the soul at the moment it animates the body. They also survive in the disharmony of higher over lower appetites and passions.

²⁵ Wolter, ‘The Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception,’ 37.

²⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae de peccato originali* (Nat. Lat. 15272, fol. 170va-vb; Nat. Lat. 16406, fol. 38rb-38vb), cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale*, 4/1:196: ‘Person corrupts nature, corrupted nature corrupts the person.’

As we attempt to see clearly what the early Franciscans understood about the Immaculate Conception, it is helpful to keep the following in mind:

1. These early Franciscan Masters embraced Alexander's shift toward the notion of original sin as the absence of original justice. Nevertheless, they continued to tie the transmission of original sin to sexual intercourse and libido.
2. While they mapped out the possibilities for sanctification as they relate to mediate animation (ensoulment), they did not focus the question on the exact moment when the soul is infused, and how, at that moment, divine grace could have been operative in protecting the soul from being infected by the tainted flesh. In other words, they do not yet appreciate the power of *prevenient* (or protective) grace. This action has less to do with removing a stain and more to do with removing an obstacle in order to allow the soul to function as it was meant to.
3. Consequently, they did not yet fully grasp how the shift from sin as a 'positive infection' to sin as 'the absence of original justice' would impact the development of a solution that could, in principle, defend a more radical position on the Immaculate Conception. Had they done so, they would have recognized how her soul might have been saved from the 'loss of original justice', thus ensuring the Marian privilege without sacrificing her humanity.

These early Franciscans are still conceptually under Augustine's shadow. Once the full implications of this shift from Augustine toward Anselm are more deeply understood, later Franciscan theologians will recognize the extent to which concupiscence is the effect of sin, rather than its essence. Concupiscence can now be logically separated from original sin, as an effect from its cause. This separation (even if only for a fraction of a moment in time) opens to a more significant distinction between the moment of conception (via carnal intercourse) and the inheritance of original sin by the soul upon its contact with the flesh. And this distinction will enable someone like John Duns Scotus to argue that Mary's immaculate conception can be considered independently of her human conception via intercourse.²⁷

But the author of this text is not yet at this point of reflection. He still considers the immaculate conception to be ruled out, despite the Anselmian distinction he embraces. This is most evident in the second article, where he considers the sanctification of Mary at the moment of her conception. To understand what is at stake for him, let us consider more carefully this article.

²⁷ Wolter, 'The Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception,' 37–8: 'Sanctifying grace will come to play a greater role than the *iustitia naturalis* in the interpretation of the formula 'carentia iustitiae debitae'. When this stage is reached, the fact that Mary was conceived by her parents through an act of carnal intercourse will no longer prove a stumbling-block to admitting her Immaculate Conception. Viewed from the history of the development of dogma, then, Alexander's speculations on the nature and mode of the propagation of original sin, though still far from satisfactory or adequate, represent a not insignificant indirect contribution to the theology of the Immaculate Conception.'

The second article asks: Could the Blessed Virgin have been sanctified in her conception? The text of this question, the editors note, has its sources in the writings of William of Melitona and Odo Rigaldus.²⁸ After a lengthy enumeration of the traditional pros and cons of this argument, primarily from Bernard of Clairvaux,²⁹ the author presents a response, rather than a solution. The arguments against sanctification at the moment of seminal conception focus on three main points. First, only Jesus was conceived without sin. If one argues for Mary's immaculate conception, then one takes away from the preeminence of her son. Second, every act of intercourse is subject to libido. If one argues for Mary's immaculate conception, then one would deny that she was a member of the human race. Third, Church doctrine teaches that all have been redeemed in Jesus Christ. If one argues for Mary's immaculate conception, then one would have to exempt Mary, either because she is not redeemed or because she alone does not need redemption. These reasons will remain throughout the tradition as important counter-arguments to the immaculate conception.

In the response, the act of sexual intercourse is analyzed according to its natural (libido) dimension and its voluntary (potentially meritorious) dimension. For it to have been possible for Mary to have been conceived without sin, there would have needed to have been an act of intercourse completely free from any natural libido. In other words, something like a virginal insemination. This type of sanctification occurred at the annunciation and relates to the conception of Jesus in Mary's womb. Human conception such as with Mary, the author reasons, is always a 'commixed' act, with both natural and voluntary dimensions. The commixed nature of the act makes it impossible for it to be both natural and sanctified. Therefore, while Mary may have been sanctified at some point, it was not at the moment of conception.

Once again we see clearly how, despite 1. the shift from Augustine to Anselm in the definition of original sin and, following upon this, despite 2. the distinction between the domains of nature and person, the natural dimension of human intercourse remains dominant. This prevents a solution that would open toward viewing sanctification as possible at the moment of conception, whether identified with seminal conception, mediated animation or ensoulment. In other words, Augustine's position on the transmission of original sin via sexual intercourse is too authoritative to be dismissed or overruled.

As noted above, William of Melitona's consideration of sanctification at the moment of ensoulment, while not included in the *Summa*, actually places the focus

28 William of Melitona, *Quaestiones de sanctificatione B. Virginis Mariae* (Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 737, fols 37c-37d); Odo Rigaldus, *In IV libros Sententiarum* III, d. 3 (Brügge, Royal Library 208, fols 358b-359a), cited in *SH* IV, (n. 76), p. 113, n. 2.

29 Bernard's Letter to the Canons of Lyon affirmed Mary's holiness but denied her immaculate conception, on the grounds that it would extend to her mother, Anne, the privilege she alone held. Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Epistola* 174 in *S. Bernardi Opera*, 8 vols, ed. Jean Leclercq, Charles H. Talbot, Henri M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957-77), 7:391-4; PL 182:335.

squarely on the major obstacle to an argument in favor of the immaculate conception: if Mary were cleansed at the moment of her conception (whether seminal or animation), she would no longer be counted among those who owe their salvation to Jesus Christ. This objection confirms the tradition's position that in Jesus Christ *all humanity is redeemed*.

Conclusions: The Franciscan *status questionis* and Conditions for the Possible Solution

The early Franciscan treatment of the question of Mary's sanctification in the womb, while not departing from the common teaching, gives evidence of significant structural and methodological innovations. These innovations can mask the presence of Augustinian and Anselmian arguments, making it appear that these authorities have not been re-integrated into a new structure of argumentation. Indeed, a shift in structure and method here reveals the way in which traditional authorities are used in a new context, thereby giving rise to new understandings. These understandings, while not themselves giving birth to new solutions, provide the conditions for later thinkers to offer what would be known as the Franciscan solution to Mary's immaculate conception.

But this solution would be a generation away. In 1253, when Bonaventure incepted as Master, taking over from William of Melitona, the question of Mary's sanctification or immaculate conception had been clarified in the following important ways:

1. Franciscans accepted Anselm's teaching on original sin as the absence of original justice. They nuanced the *post-lapsarian* state, however, as one of moral neutrality—a loss of a positive inclination toward the good, rather than an inclination toward sin.
2. They give evidence of a growing understanding of the power of the distinction between original sin in its essence (as the absence of original justice) and in its effects (as concupiscence).
3. The early Masters had mapped out the various points of human development, moments at which the act of sanctification could occur. This was a structural innovation that would have substantive implications in subsequent thinkers.
4. In their analysis, Franciscans had shifted the emphasis of the question from conception to mediate animation (ensoulment, where soul and flesh unite).
5. William of Melitona had raised (elsewhere) the specific question of sanctification at the moment of animation. This would be the source for the defense of the immaculate conception (understood as mediate animation).
6. A final historical point needs mention. The celebration of Mary's conception was an important feast in England for Saxon Christians prior to the Battle of Hastings (1066). While the feast was suppressed under William the Conqueror, it was never eliminated, and Saxons continued to celebrate it, despite the restrictions.

In 1129, the Council of London approved the celebration for the English province. The growing importance of such local piety, particularly in England, and the pastoral need to recognize what was happening in a local church, influenced Bonaventure who, while not approving the celebration of the Marian feast, saw no reason why the feast should be prohibited.³⁰

All that was needed at this point in the development of doctrine was for someone to argue that sanctifying grace acted upon Mary's soul at the moment it came into contact with her (infected) flesh to cleanse it and protect it from losing the original justice intended by God, by means of *prevenient* grace.³¹ Such an act could be rationally defended in light of the role she would play in the history of salvation, as a type of retroactive effect of the graces won by Jesus Christ. This type of defense would still allow for the bodily effects of original sin (death, suffering, pain) which she did experience. What's more, her privilege could be even more strongly argued in terms of the intensity of grace she would have received, restoring in her the harmony of rational powers over lower appetites. Thus, not only is the sin prevented, but its consequences in her soul are also healed.

The gradual shifting and distilling of the various moves throughout this argument, both structural and substantive, from Augustine to Anselm, from the essence of sin to its consequences, from a more general question to one analyzed according to its temporal sequence, from the sanctification of nature to the sanctification of person, all demonstrate how within a given spiritual and theological tradition, continuity and discontinuity fuel the development of unthinkable solutions to what appear to have been unsolvable questions. By the time Alexander of Hales has been succeeded in the Chair in Paris, John of La Rochelle, Odo Rigaldus and William of Melitona have prepared the way for the innovations in the arguments of Bonaventure, William of Ware and John Duns Scotus.

30 Later, as Minister General, Bonaventure would introduce the celebration into the Franciscan order.

31 Allan Wolter shows the presence of an argument for the immaculate conception that Bonaventure himself cites in his *Sentences*. The author of this argument, most probably Norman or English, is unknown, but its presence in Bonaventure's text clearly demonstrates that, by mid-century, Franciscan thinkers are already anticipating the Scotist solution. See Wolter, 'The Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception,' 52–5.

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