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Dynamics in European Political Identity

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ABSTRACT The creation of a political community is a difficult yet vital task for the European Union. Using Eurobarometer time series of 25 years and the European Election Study of 2004, this article reviews the state of the development of a ‘sense of community’ with regard to two concepts: Identity is measured in terms of perceived citizenship and pride to be a European citizen; we-feeling is captured by assessing trust in European people and acceptance of new member countries. A collective identity is growing slowly among the European citizens, but the data suggest a center–periphery distinction between the core members and the joiners of the different enlargement waves. EU citizens trust each other, but the East–West continental divide still remains detectable.

KEY WORDS: European Union, political community, sense of community, identity, we-feeling, enlargement

Introduction

The existence of a collective identity is generally seen as one of the central preconditions for EU democracy (e.g. Scharpf 1999). A collective political identity constitutes a political community. The idea of a political community, in turn, is intimately linked with the concept of citizenship. The creation of a citizenry, i.e. the codification of the rights and duties of individual citizens, was a core element of the process of nation-building (Kuhnle 1993). This citizenry, at the same time, is the source of authority of any democratic government: the principle of democracy requires that powers and executive competencies must originate in and be justified by the citizens subjected to them. The aim of our enquiries is, therefore, to ascertain if the citizens of the

European Union share a common political identity and, if they do, what have the recent waves of enlargement of the EU done to it?¹

European integration started out as an alliance of nation-states. It concerned first and foremost economic issues. Economic integration reached a peak with the realization of the Single European Market when member states transferred important policy-making competencies to the European Community. The Maastricht Treaty, which codifies this transfer of competencies, is actually said to have shifted the balance of EU government from a formerly predominantly intergovernmental to a now mainly supranational mode. In policy areas where intergovernmental decision making was replaced by supranational decision making, the position of the European Parliament as the representative body of EU citizens has been strengthened.

The increasing role of supranational, as opposed to intergovernmental, decision making and the establishment of a European citizenship might have promoted the development of a political community of the EU. But the growing-together of a political community depends at least as much on people's self-perceptions and identifications as on the provision of rights of citizenship or on predominant modes of government. Therefore, our central question can be reformulated as follows: do EU citizens identify themselves as such? Do they perceive their fellow EU citizens to be alike? Have European citizens developed a 'sense of community' that unites old and new members?

Historical Sources of Unity and Diversity

History has shown that the emergence of a sense of belonging and community and related attitudes, such as perceptions of identity and solidarity, takes a long time. Compared to the time that nation-states took to consolidate, the history of European integration is still rather short. Feelings of identity and solidarity can hardly have fully developed during these brief periods of history. But, of course, centuries of common European history elapsed before European integration began. The discourse dedicated to construct a European unity and identity makes reference to common roots in history, religion, science and culture in order to emphasize Europe as a distinctive cultural entity. 'Graeco-Roman civilization, Christianity, and the ideas of Enlightenment, Science, Reason, Progress and Democracy are declared the core elements of this European legacy' (Stråth 2002, 388).

The tradition of the Greek *polis* and the Roman Empire influenced in similar ways the development of institutions in the legal system, the armed forces and the administration of European nation-states. All over Europe, the same sequence of reference cultures came into force: first Greek and Roman, then (during the Renaissance) Italian, and German and Austrian during the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Likewise, Europeans used to refer to common cultural achievements (literature, music, architecture) and to common European symbols: Roman monuments, the victory over Islam, the Crusades, the French Revolution (Pfetsch 1997, 104–5). Last, but not least, Europeans consider themselves to be a community of values and ideas. The idea of liberty, of democracy, of the modern nation-state, individualism,

human rights, freedom of speech, rationality, the political republic, and the separation of Church and State — all this is considered to be genuinely ‘European’ (Mintzel 1997, 325–6).

Europe is characterized not only by its common heritage. There is as much diversity and conflict as there are common roots. Religious and linguistic differences essentially underlie the major ethnic cleavages that have regularly been the reason for confrontation and war. Three religious cleavages are at the basis of distinct socio-cultural areas on the European continent: the division between Latin and Orthodox Christianity, that between the Christian and the Islamic world and, finally, the division between Catholics and Protestants. In addition, Europe exhibits a great variety of languages, which has become even more distinctive with the development of the nation-states in the nineteenth century. It is against this background that some think of Europe as a huge ‘multicultural society’ composed of a variety of religious, national and regional cultures (Mintzel 1997, 332–6).

A European Political Community?

The history of Europe suggests that the traditions of diversity, division and conflict are at least as strong as the common cultural heritage. This history of diversity does not necessarily prevent the evolution of a European political community. However, the sheer existence of nation-states based on a century of cultural and political autonomy constitutes an obvious obstacle. First, these nation-states are linguistic communities that guarantee the communicative competence of every citizen.² EU citizens, by contrast, are confronted with an immense linguistic variety. This apparent Babel make the development of a Europe-wide public more difficult, but not impossible — as we can see from the fact that European political communication is already taking place (i.e. de Vreese 2003; Koopmans and Erbe 2004). However, given the complex institutional structure of the EU, no effective system of opinion formation and interest intermediation has fully developed yet (e.g. Schmitt 2005). As a result, processes of legitimizing EU government still depend on the effectiveness of the respective national (sub-)systems. This might suggest that objective conditions for the genesis of a European political community are not very favourable, but such a development is not impossible on principle.

Other factors might have promoted the development of a European political community. Not least among them is the obvious economic success of the process of European integration (Dalton and Eichenberg 1992; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). Also, the greater permeability of national borders after the agreement of Schengen, as well as the ever-increasing contact frequency of European citizens as a result of progressing economic integration, might have promoted perceptions of community and mutual solidarity among EU citizens (Schmitt and Treiber-Reif 1990; Bosch and Newton 1995). The political concept of a European identity was designed by the Copenhagen summit in December 1973 and followed by the establishment of symbols like the flag and the anthem in the beginning of the 1980s. The

common currency is the strongest symbol of European unity because it comes closest to citizens' everyday life (Risse 2003). In the same way, the introduction of European citizenship is a symbol that imitates the nation-state in order to stimulate a European political community.

Our prime purpose is to determine the degree to which the EU has developed into a political community. After this brief review of objective conditions, we will now turn to both a more subjective and empirical view. According to Easton (1965, 177), a political community exists when members show some readiness or ability to work together to resolve their political problems. That a European political community in such terms exists is unquestioned, but we are interested in knowing whether European citizens, during almost half a century of European integration, have developed a European 'sense of community'. The existence of a political community does not necessarily require that its members are aware of it — i.e. the prior existence of a sense of community. However, the stronger such a sense of community is developed, the greater are the system's stress-reducing capabilities (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970).

This concept *sense of community* was first introduced by Karl Deutsch. He defines it as 'a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling", trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of co-operative action in accordance with it' (Deutsch et al. 1957, 36). Easton (1975) follows Deutsch in his conceptualization of the 'sense of *social* community'; in his view, cohesion emerges between people regardless of the type of political regime in which they live. He, therefore, distinguishes this 'sense of *social* community' from a more specific 'sense of *political* community'. In his typology of political support, the latter represents the highest (i.e. the most basic and enduring) category of diffuse support for the political system.

Our empirical investigation of the sense of a European community distinguishes two basic dimensions. *Identification* refers to the citizens themselves: do they consider themselves as European citizens and are they proud to be European? *We-feeling* refers to fellow citizens: do European citizens consider their fellow Europeans to be as trustworthy as their countrymen? Which new members, if any, are they ready to accept into 'their' Union? Figure 1 illustrates this conceptualization and specifies the operationalization strategy pursued in the following.

These notions of *identification* and *we-feeling* are compatible with modern theories of intergroup relations. Their starting point is the distinction between ingroups and outgroups (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Minimal differentiation is sufficient to give rise to an ingroup-outgroup distinction. This is reinforced by overstating similarity within the group and differences to other groups. Ingroup membership is an important factor in the formation of personal identity. Ingroup-outgroup relations are driven by social processes of categorization, comparison, competition and conflict. As a result of these dynamics, perceptions of ingroups are biased toward homogeneity, and the attitudes towards outgroups and their members are




Figure 1. Concepts, indicators and data sources. EES, European Election Study 2004; EB, Eurobarometer.

characterized by stereotyping and hostility. In this view, the evolution of a sense of community among EU citizens is the result of ingroup formation. Shortly after World War II, intergroup conflict between European societies was still extremely high. One of the central aims of the founding fathers of the European Union was to reduce conflict and overcome hostility between European societies by creating a new, superior ingroup which eventually would lead to the development of European identifications and we-feelings. We aim at measuring the success of European ingroup formation after half a century of economic and political integration, and after five successive waves of enlargement. The data that are used for this purpose are from the European Election Study 2004 (EES) plus selected Eurobarometer trends (EB). The indicators are discussed one by one, in the sequence suggested by the analytical scheme above.

Identifications

This section is dedicated to monitoring the evolution of European identifications. First, mass perceptions of European citizenship are tracked over a period of twenty-five years (1982 to 2007). Secondly, the development of pride in being European is compared across countries.

Perceived citizenship

Eurobarometer have used two different instruments for the analysis of European identification. The first was fielded eleven times between 1982 and 1992, and now repeated in the European Election Study 2004. This question asks whether people, in addition to their national citizenship, also consider themselves as European citizens.³ The second instrument started a new Eurobarometer time series in 1992 when the first trend was discontinued. In twenty surveys between 1992 and 2007, people were asked to think about their future political identification.⁴ Although the two measures are not strictly comparable, they still offer an impression of the direction of trends over the whole period. Detailed results for the more recent trend are documented in Table A1; these figures report, country by country, proportions of respondents who think of themselves as European citizens.

Here, we concentrate on describing the overall trends using both indicators (Figure 2). The lines report proportions of respondents who ‘never’ think of themselves as European citizens (according to the first indicator), and who see themselves in the near future as ‘only national’ (according to the second). Choosing these negative poles seems to be the best way to make the two trends comparable. Average proportions are displayed for six country groups: the original six plus the countries of the five successive expansions. This presentation of the data follows the expectation that duration of membership has a positive impact on identification levels: the longer the country is a member of the EU, the stronger should be European identification and the weaker national-only identification. We thus expect to find a pattern similar to the one identified for the development of general EU support (see, e.g., Schmitt and Treiber-Reif 1990; Dalton and Eichenberg 1992; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Bosch and Newton 1995). This expectation, however, is not fully borne out by the data. Rather, country group characteristics come to the fore. While citizens in the original six member countries are still the most ‘European’ (i.e. the less exclusively national), the first and oldest expansion (adding the UK, Ireland and Denmark to the Community) brought in more Euro-distant publics. Contrary to this, the second expansion (adding Spain, Portugal and Greece) integrated distinctly pro-European publics; these citizens consider themselves as ‘European’ as those in the founding member countries. The third expansion of the Union (adding Austria, Sweden and Finland) is somewhere in between: fewer ‘European self-perceptions’ than in southern Europe, but more than in Britain, Ireland and Denmark, and the trend displays an increasing degree of European identification. The latest and largest expansions of the Union — adding eight post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe plus Cyprus and Malta in 2004 as well as Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 — brought in surprisingly European-minded citizens: One in two citizens of the youngest member countries thinks of herself as a European citizen. However, only the longer trends will show how identification is developing in these new member countries.

The duration argument also implies that European identifications should grow more or less steadily over time, while national-only identifications




Figure 2. Feeling like a European citizen, 1982–1992 (percentage ‘never’), and thinking of oneself as European or national, 1992–2007 (percentage ‘only national’).

Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1982–2007, weighted data.

should decrease. This expectation is again not fully in accordance with empirical evidence. The general pattern is not one of linear trends. Rather, we observe fluctuations that affect the different publics in more or less the same way. Tentative explanations for these ups and downs refer to two factors: first, changes in basic economic conditions, social welfare cutbacks and security concerns (dissolution of the communist bloc and war in former Yugoslavia) and, secondly, the increasing importance of EU policy making for everyday life (Niedermayer 1997). In addition, in the early 1990s, the debate on European Monetary Union, in particular, may have depressed European identifications (Lilli 1998).

Pride in being European

Pride in being European is our second indicator of European identification.⁵ When we test the dimensionality of European pride and self-perceptions as a European citizen, we find that both attitudes are indeed originating in the same latent attitudinal construct (Table A1). This is so everywhere, though in some countries somewhat more pronounced (e.g. in the Netherlands) than in others (e.g. in Greece). This is not to say that the two indicators are equally distributed if it comes to country patterns (Table 1). Other things being equal, southerners seem to be prouder than citizens in the northern member countries. To be sure, geographical locations are poor explainers of political attitudes. Whether this ‘southern’ pattern has to do with economic factors (the South is a major receiver of transfers from the structural fund) or with

Table 1. Pride to be a citizen of the EU, 1995–2004

	EES 2004	Flash 1995	2004-1995
Luxembourg	76	70	6
Ireland	74	64	10
Portugal	74	64	10
Cyprus	74		
France	73	65	8
Spain	67	66	1
Italy	64	80	-16
Greece	61	47	14
Belgium	60	60	0
Hungary	52		
Germany	49	42	7
Poland	46		
Britain	43		
Denmark	43	49	-6
Slovenia	42		
Austria	40	46	-6
Slovakia	37		
Finland	37	41	-4
Northern Ireland	31		
Czech Republic	29		
The Netherlands	26	45	-19
Estonia	25		
Latvia	24		
Sweden	23	37	-14

Percentage ‘very proud’ or ‘fairly proud’.

Source: European Election Study (EES) 2004 and Eurobarometer Flash 47 (1995), weighted data.

cultural factors (‘Latin Europeans’ are allegedly more expressive than others when it comes to emotions like pride) cannot be answered at this point, however. In addition to geography, duration of membership seems to matter somewhat more here, with citizens from younger non-southern member countries being less proud than others.

Looking at the dynamics, we see signs of a growing gap between proud and non-proud national publics over the last decade. In 2004, we find everything between three quarters and one quarter of our respondents being proud of their European citizenship, both in old and new member countries. Significant decreases are notable in the Netherlands (−19), Italy (−16) and Sweden (−14); the steepest increases are diagnosed for Greece (+14), Portugal (+10) and Ireland (+10). The corresponding shifts in perceived citizenship are much smaller. Assuming that we can exclude methods effects, pride in being European seems to include a much stronger evaluative component that reacts to current and concrete political events

and decisions. The comparative stability of self-perception as European point to the fact that it can be considered an affective attitude (Scheuer 2005, 70f).

We-feelings

Our operational definition of 'sense of community' distinguishes two dimensions: identifications and we-feelings. We now turn to the second and investigate, first, whether EU citizens trust their fellow Europeans and, secondly, to what degree Europeans are ready to accept more member countries into the EU.

Trust in European people

Trust is a fundamental condition for the development of a sense of community. It is expected to increase with growing experiences of positive conduct of fellow citizens. So, here again, duration of membership should play an important role. Moreover, the existence of a common enemy is a potential factor contributing to the development of a sense of community. For most of the post-war period, the communist threat was an external reference point that might have fostered perceptions of a common bond amongst the people of the EU. Actually, since the collapse of the Soviet Empire, observers had been complaining about the return of nationalism, and fears had grown that the community may fall apart without the eastern threat. This did not happen, however, as we know by now. Rather, the EU was able to integrate a major part of the former communist bloc. How successful is this integration in terms of we-feelings can be seen from the figures on trust in European people.

Trust in people of various countries has been measured repeatedly in Eurobarometer surveys using a four-point scale between 1970 and 1994.⁶ As the list of member and candidate countries became longer, another instrument with a dichotomous answering scale proved to be more suitable.⁷ The European Election Study also used the dichotomous answer categories.⁸ Earlier work has shown that trust between EU member countries is generally higher than between members and non-members, and that mutual trust between the EU member countries is growing over time (Niedermayer 1995). We use the data based on the dichotomous answering scale and analyse for every country how much its people are trusted by the peoples from the other member countries (Table 2).

In 2004, the people from all but one 'old' EU-15 member countries are trusted by a two-thirds majority of fellow Europeans. Only the British miss this threshold: they are down at 51 per cent and have actually lost fifteen percentage points of trust over the past decade.⁹ Considering the fact that levels of trust are even more stable than levels of perceived citizenship, this is a major drop indeed. What could have caused such a dramatic downfall? The only likely reason we can think of is the role that the UK played and continues to play in the Iraq war. It seems that the close alliance of the British with the Americans in this case has severely damaged the trust of their fellow Europeans. Interestingly, the loss in trust in the Brits is complemented by a

Table 2. Trust in other European people, 1995–2004

	2004 EU-25	2004 EU-15	1995 EU-15	Diff. EU-15 2004-1995
Swedes	83 ^a	86	84	2
Danish	79	82	81	1
Finns	79	81	81	1
Luxembourgers	78	82	84	-2
Dutch	78	81	80	1
Spaniards	77	80	71	9
Belgians	75	78	82	-4
Portuguese	73	76	68	9
Germans	71	73	65	8
Austrians	70	73	75	-1
French	67	70	63	7
Irish	66	73	71	1
Italians	66	68	61	7
Greeks	66	66	62	4
Maltese	59	61		
Hungarians	59	59	56	3
Czech	56	55	50	6
Estonians	51	53		
British	51	50	66	-15
Latvians	50	52		
Cypriots	50	48		
Lithuanians	49	50		
Poles	47	48	46	2
Slovenes	47	46		
Slovaks	46	44		
Bulgarian	35	35		
Romanian	28	29		
Turks	26	26		

Percentage 'tend to trust'.

^aRead: In 2004, 83 per cent of all non-Swedish EU-25 citizens considered the Swedes to be trustworthy.

Source: Eurobarometer 45 (1995) and European Election Study (EES) 2004; weighted data. Note that this question was not asked in the Belgian, British, Lithuanian, Maltese and Swedish survey of the EES 2004.

strong decrease of British pride in being European. The gap between British and Europeans was thus a case of mutual refusal. If this discord has been alleviated in the meantime cannot be answered, because unfortunately the trust question in the Eurobarometer surveys was discontinued in 1997.

An additional major finding with regard to the levels of trust among EU citizens is that there are indeed three classes of countries: old members, new members, and (then and present) candidate countries, with old members enjoying highest trust, new members somewhat less trust, and candidate

countries only little trust. With the exception of the case of Britain, these three classes are accurately sorted one after the other. We also note that it does not make much of a difference for the levels of trust whether we analyse opinions of citizens in the old EU-15 or include the samples from the new member countries.

Acceptance of new members

There is no indication that the European Union after the last enlargements has found its final configuration yet. There is still a large number of would-be members beyond those who already take part. It is conceivable that some of them will join the EU in the future. Croatia and Turkey are official accession countries. The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has also obtained the status of an accession country, but negotiations have not begun yet. All remaining Balkan countries are potential applicants: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia as well as Kosovo (as defined by the UN resolution). The EU has repeatedly reaffirmed at the highest level its commitment for eventual EU membership of the western Balkan countries, provided they fulfil the accession criteria. While we-feelings are expressed toward actual members, the readiness to accept new member countries is indicative of a mental map in the minds of the citizens that may include some countries and reject others. Such a mental map does not have to be stable over time but may react to changes in the respective countries and the relationship to them. How welcome are additional member countries to the citizens of the EU, and did these attitudes change over time? Table 3 displays the development of approval to the accession of potential members for the last decade separately for old and new member states.

The potential candidates presented to the respondents can be sorted in three groups.¹⁰ The first group contains Norway and Switzerland, both of which have declined membership on the bases of referenda, as well as Iceland, which has not signalled interest in joining the EU until now. The second group consists of a number of post-communist eastern and southeastern countries, such as the remaining parts of former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and FYROM) as well as Ukraine and Albania. Turkey, finally, represents the third group and the bridge to the Islamic world.

The accession of Switzerland, Norway and Iceland receives strongest support, although their accession is currently just a hypothetical case. Being rich Western countries, their entry would not imply new burdens to the union but enlarge the group of net-payer countries. Old and new members welcome them alike, with roughly four out of five respondents saying they would be in favour of these countries becoming part of the EU in the future. The accession of the western Balkan countries is approved by less than a majority of the EU citizens. Among them, Croatia performs best (even better than Bulgaria and Romania before their accession), and Albania receives the least approval. The support for Croatia has increased strongly from about 30 per cent in the year 2000 to about 50 per cent in 2008, while the entry of Bulgaria and Romania was approved by only about 40 per cent

Table 3. Citizens' views about accession of new member countries, 1997–2008

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2005	2006	2008
EU-15									
Switzerland			70	70	75	75	76	77	77
Norway			71	70	74	75	76	76	78
Iceland					60	61	67	67	70
Romania	33	37	34	33	36	35	41	38	
Bulgaria	36	39	36	35	38	39	45	42	
Bosnia and Herzegovina				27	30	31	39	36	39
Croatia				31	33	35	47	46	51
FYROM				27	29	30	39	37	39
Yugoslavia ^a				29	32		36		
Serbia								34	36
Montenegro								37	39
Kosovo									33
Albania					27	27	32	30	33
Ukraine							38	37	42
Turkey			30	30	34	32	29	26	30
NMS-10									
Switzerland							83	87	85
Norway							82	86	84
Iceland							72	78	77
Romania							53	55	
Bulgaria							64	68	
Bosnia and Herzegovina							50	54	49
Croatia							70	74	70
FYROM							51	56	50
Yugoslavia ^a							50		
Serbia								52	46
Montenegro								57	52
Kosovo									40
Albania							40	45	41
Ukraine							57	62	62
Turkey							38	37	40

Percentage 'in favour'.

^aIn the year 2005 named 'Serbia and Montenegro'. NMS, new member states.

Source: Eurobarometer autumn surveys, weighted data

of Europeans in 2006. The readiness to accept new member countries from east and south-east Europe has generally increased in the course of the last five years. A very different situation is observed for Turkey. The approval for this country to join the EU remains around 30 per cent for the whole time period covered. Although the potential membership of Turkey has been an issue for many years already, it is less welcome than the other countries mentioned before.

Looking at the general picture, however, one can imagine a certain fatigue among the western EU members to extend their union each time to more and geographically distant countries. Although approval rates have increased slightly over time, only Croatia is approved by a majority of EU-15 citizens. The new member countries display by and large the same preference order of countries as the old member states, but show generally higher approval rates. Only a small number of potential member countries falls repeatedly below the majority threshold, namely Albania and Turkey as well as Kosovo (newly asked in 2008). The new members may take advantage from the smaller geographical distance and the broader experience with the relevant countries from Soviet times. It seems plausible that the new members need to play a bridging role when it comes to integrating more eastern members into the political community of the EU.

Summary

Over the past centuries, the common cultural and political roots of the people of Europe could seldom prevent long-standing hostilities from violent eruption. It was only after World War II that political elites started to initiate the process of European integration which deliberately aimed at creating a common framework of social and political identifications. The political institutional success of these efforts is obvious. But how about its social basis? Have the people of Europe grown together into a political community; is there a ‘sense of community’ among EU citizens? The general answer is yes. Over half a century after World War II, a majority of EU citizens identifies with the new political community in the European Union.

Lacking pertinent and comparable survey information for most of this fifty-year period, we cannot determine when and how these identifications came into being. However, based on our findings from the analysis of available data, we must assume that they have been growing slowly. Over the last decade or so, there was not much of a secular change in European identifications; seasonal effects prevailed. If we drew a map of European Union identifications in the early 2000s, a centre–periphery picture would come to the fore. The highest level of identifications exists in the six original member countries, closely followed by European South; the further away one gets from this core of the Union in geographical and/or temporal terms, the weaker identifications become.

Majorities of EU citizens trust the people of other member countries. The people of the new member countries in Central and Eastern Europe, however, are still less trusted, and Turks are trusted the least. Figures on trust as well as on readiness to accept new members show that European citizens have a rather clear-cut mental map of the Union, a shared understanding of who is alike and who is different. The new Eastern member countries are still considered different; the East–West continental divide remains detectable. It will take a while for them to be fully integrated and accepted in the European ingroup. An additional but somewhat minor difference is commonly seen between people from the North and the South of Europe. A common view of

all members is, however, that Turkey is clearly different from what is considered European.

Notes

1. This is an updated and revised version of a chapter that was originally published by the first author (Scheuer 1999).
2. This is not to say that states must be linguistically homogeneous; Belgium and Switzerland are obvious examples of nation-states that are not. However, in order to meet democratic requirements, every citizen must be able to communicate with state authorities in his or her own language (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1993, 438). This implies in places that there is more than one official language (such as three in Belgium and four in Switzerland).
3. Question wording: 'Do you ever think of yourself not only as a [nationality] citizen but also as a citizen of Europe? Often, sometimes, never'.
4. Question wording: 'In the near future do you see yourself as [nationality] only, [nationality] and European, European and [nationality], or European only?'.
5. Question wording: 'European Union Member States are "European citizens". Are you personally proud or not to be a "European citizen"? Would you say that you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, or not at all proud?'.
6. Question wording: 'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all'.
7. Modified question wording: 'For each, please tell me whether you tend to trust them or tend not to trust them'.
8. Question wording: 'Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. Can you please tell me for each, whether you have a lot of trust of them or not very much trust. If you do not know a country well enough, just say so and I will go on to the next. How about the Austrians: do have a lot of trust of them or not very much trust?'.
9. In order to avoid distortion through composition effects, over-time changes are calculated on the basis of EU-15 countries only.
10. Question wording: 'For each of the following countries, would you be in favour or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?'.

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Appendix A

Table A1. Those who consider themselves as European citizens, 1992–2007

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2007
Belgium	58	65	66	61	50	47	53	56	56	52	62	54	62	64	69
France	67	65	75	68	63	64	64	59	62	63	65	63	68	66	67
Germany	55	54	66	60	47	48	49	49	54	57	60	61	61	63	69
Italy	69	70	71	73	62	63	68	71	73	66	77	72	65	61	44
Luxembourg	69	63	76	75	71	73	67	72	73	75	74	74	66	74	76
The Netherlands	56	59	65	60	57	57	57	56	57	54	58	54	59	65	70
Denmark	51	50	51	46	42	44	49	44	47	59	62	62	58	60	62
UK	43	37	48	42	37	38	35	30	31	28	34	33	38	34	38
Ireland	46	49	58	53	47	47	45	44	47	43	53	47	53	47	40
Greece	60	56	54	47	38	46	46	40	44	41	49	48	43	53	51
Spain	60	55	61	55	54	52	60	63	70	59	67	65	61	58	62
Portugal	58	52	55	53	46	39	37	47	48	47	53	49	51	55	48
Austria				46	44		47	51	48	52	55	48	51	52	54
Finland			59	47	40		45	38	41	40	44	42	42	51	51
Sweden				38	34		39	37	40	48	47	47	46	56	54
Cyprus (south)													69	69	61
Malta													66	71	66
Poland													54	59	54
Czech Republic													42	61	50
Slovakia													61	60	55
Hungary													35	49	54
Slovenia													55	64	63
Estonia													54	48	51
Latvia													51	54	43

Table A1. (Continued)

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2007
Lithuania													43	44	42
Bulgaria													54	42	50
Romania													53	56	42
Turkey													28	22	
Cyprus (north)													48		
Croatia													63	66	
Original 6 ^a	62	62	69	65	56	57	59	58	62	61	66	64	64	63	62
1st extension ^b	44	39	49	43	38	39	37	32	33	31	37	36	41	37	40
2nd extension ^c	60	55	59	53	50	49	53	56	61	54	62	59	56	57	58
3 rd extension ^d				43	39		43	42	44	47	49	47	47	54	53
4th extension ^e													50	57	53
5th extension ^f														55	44

'Only European', 'European and national' and 'national and European'.

^aBelgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy.

^bUK, Ireland, Denmark.

^cGreece, Spain, Portugal.

^dAustria, Finland, Sweden.

^eCyprus, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

^fBulgaria, Romania.

Source: Eurobarometer, weighted data (national weight for country figures, EU-weight for country groups).

Table A2. Mokken scaling of European pride and identifications as a European citizen

	H-value
The Netherlands	0.77
Finland	0.76
Northern Ireland	0.74
Cyprus	0.69
Estonia	0.69
Italy	0.66
Latvia	0.66
Czech Republic	0.65
Austria	0.64
Slovakia	0.64
Ireland	0.60
Belgium	0.58
Britain	0.53
Denmark	0.53
Hungary	0.52
Slovenia	0.52
Poland	0.49
France	0.46
Luxembourg	0.46
Portugal	0.46
Germany	0.43
Spain	0.42
Greece	0.41

Source: European Election Study (EES) 2004. Mokken scaling tests for the unidimensionality of a set of items. Meaning of H-values: below 0.30 = no scale, above 0.30 = a weak scale, above 0.40 = a medium scale, and above 0.50 = a strong scale.